Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
National Security and Defence
Issue No. 15 - Evidence - Meeting of June 5, 2017
OTTAWA, Monday, June 5, 2017
The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, to which was referred Bill C-22, An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts, met this day at 12:59 p.m. to give consideration to the bill.
Senator Daniel Lang (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: Welcome to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. My name is Dan Lang, senator from Yukon. On my immediate left is the clerk of the committee, Adam Thompson. I would like each member to introduce themselves, starting with the deputy chair.
Senator Jaffer: My name is Mobina Jaffer, and I'm from British Columbia.
Senator Wetston: Howard Wetston from Ontario.
Senator Griffin: Diane Griffin, Prince Edward Island.
Senator Kenny: Colin Kenny, Ontario.
[Translation]
Senator Saint-Germain: Good afternoon, Mr. Minister, and good afternoon to your team. I am Raymonde Saint- Germain from Quebec.
[English]
Senator White: Vern White, Ontario.
Senator Harder: Peter Harder, Ontario.
Senator Lankin: Frances Lankin, Ontario.
Senator Day: Joseph Day, independent Liberal senator from New Brunswick.
[Translation]
Senator Boisvenu: Senator Pierre-Hugues Boisvenu from Quebec.
Senator Dagenais: Conservative senator Jean-Guy Dagenais from Quebec.
[English]
Senator Beyak: Lynn Beyak, Conservative, Ontario. Welcome.
The Chair: Thank you.
Today, we will be meeting from 1 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. to begin reviewing Bill C-22, An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts.
Following our first three panels on this bill, we'll meet in camera to review a draft report on Bill C-44, the pre-study on the budget implementation bill.
Joining us on panel one are the Honourable Ralph Goodale, P.C., M.P., Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, and the Honourable Bardish Chagger, P.C., M.P., Leader of the Government in the House of Commons. Joining the ministers are officials from the Privy Council Office: Ian McCowan, Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet, Governance, and Heather Sheehy, Director of Operations, Machinery of Government. From Public Safety Canada is Malcolm Brown, Deputy Minister.
Ministers, welcome. I will invite you to begin. I ask that you limit your opening remarks somewhat so that we can allow lots of time for members of the committee to be able to ask questions. The floor is yours.
Hon. Bardish Chagger, P.C., M.P., Leader of the Government in the House of Commons: Honourable senators, I thank you for allowing me this opportunity to address you in relation to Bill C-22, which will create Canada's first national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians.
I'd like to note for the committee that though I must leave promptly at 2 p.m. in order to attend Question Period in the House, my colleague Minister Goodale will remain beyond 2 p.m. to continue taking your questions. My officials will remain to answer your questions as well.
As part of its commitments on national security and intelligence matters, this government has served notice that powers for the government to combat threats to the safety of Canadians and the security of Canada must be accompanied by strong and robust accountability. Bill C-22 underscores this promise to be more accountable to Canadians and to safeguard our rights and freedoms.
Fundamentally, Parliament is responsible for enacting the laws within which Canada's national security and intelligence agencies fulfill their responsibilities. A consequence is that the government must be accountable to Parliament for the exercise of these authorities. Such accountability is an essential feature of our democratic system, which relies on the open exchange of information. Clearly, this presents a challenge for national security and intelligence, owing to the very nature of those activities.
[Translation]
One of my main priorities as Leader of the Government in the House is to provide parliamentarians with the means to take action and to strengthen our parliamentary institutions. That is why the purpose of Bill C-22 is to expand the dialogue within Parliament on national security and intelligence matters. A mandate on all aspects and broad access to classified information will ensure that the committee's work significantly contributes to the debate in Parliament on national security and intelligence activities, legislation, and spending.
[English]
Enhancing Parliament's role in this regard would introduce a significant new accountability measure within our national security framework. By ensuring that our powers are exercised appropriately and as intended, the committee's work will enhance public confidence in our national security and intelligence agencies.
Although differing views have been expressed on some aspects of the bill, one theme has remained clear throughout the debate: Experts and stakeholders have commended the government for introducing this legislation. As you are aware, a number of Canada's Western allies have already established permanent mechanisms to share classified information with parliamentarians in order to ensure that national security activities can be effectively reviewed without compromising the confidentiality or the sources of such information.
[Translation]
The government's study of our allies' best practices has been beneficial for the purposes of Bill C-22. For example, we have learned that a gradual approach has served other countries well, and I firmly believe this legislation is both an appropriate and ambitious starting point for the Canadian Committee of Parliamentarians. Having said that, I would note that Bill C-22 is based on a cutting-edge and purely Canadian approach to reviewing all the departments and agencies responsible for Canada's national security and intelligence activities.
Broad access to classified information is definitely essential to an exhaustive examination of national security and intelligence activities. On this point, and subject to very specific exceptions, committee members will have access to information on security and intelligence activities across all federal departments, agencies, and Crown corporations.
[English]
However, the public disclosure of such sensitive information could harm Canada's national interests, put Canadians directly in harm's way and jeopardize the ability of our national security and intelligence agencies to perform the duties assigned by Parliament. This is why Bill C-22 includes narrow restrictions related to parliamentarians' access to information as well as provisions to ensure that classified information is kept safe.
Enhancing the accountability of Canada's national security and intelligence infrastructure will be achieved through the ongoing support and commitment of all members of Parliament. You, as members of this Senate committee, will bring a special perspective to the study of Bill C-22, given the past work done by the Senate on similar proposals, including the work of the Special Senate Committee on Anti-terrorism, which recommended the creation of a parliamentary oversight committee.
[Translation]
The government will be pleased to draw on your experience and observations on the merits of this bill.
Now I would like to hand over the floor to my colleague, the Honourable Ralph Goodale, Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, who will present the highlights of Bill C-22. Thank you very much.
[English]
Hon. Ralph Goodale, P.C., M.P., Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness: Mr. Chair and members of the committee. I'm happy to be back here once again.
[Translation]
Thank you for your invitation to discuss this very important piece of legislation, which is intended to establish a National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. This committee was a central part of our national security commitments to Canadians during the last election campaign and is still essential to ensuring that our national security framework protects the safety of Canadians as well as our rights and freedoms.
[English]
At long last, this bill will finally ensure that Canadian security and intelligence agencies are accountable to a committee of parliamentarians, as has long been the case for most of our allies, including the countries in the Five Eyes and many others. As you know, parliamentary oversight of national security and intelligence agencies has long been advocated in Canada by national security experts, by judicial inquiries, by the Auditor General, and by senators and members of Parliament.
At second reading, Senator Harder laid out the past history of those many reports and recommendations in considerable detail, so I won't repeat all of that here. I'll simply emphasize once again that there have been many calls for legislation like Bill C-22, and the Senate has been the source of several of those calls, including a 2009 report by the Special Senate Committee on Anti-terrorism, chaired by former Senator Hugh Segal.
In 2014, Senator Segal tried to put that recommendation into practice by introducing former Bill S-220, legislation that was seconded by former Senator Roméo Dallaire. When Mr. Segal appeared before the House Public Safety Committee last October, he told members of Parliament that Bill C-22 is a "pretty strong approximation,'' to use his words, of the recommendations made by his special Senate committee of 2009.
Indeed, if you look at those recommendations, they called for:
. . . a committee composed of members from both chambers of Parliament, to execute Parliamentary oversight over the expenditures, administration and policy of federal departments and agencies in relation to national security, . . .
That is in fact what is proposed in Bill C-22.
The special Senate committee recommended that members be appointed by the Governor in Council, . . . swear an oath of secrecy . . . and be permanently and statutorily bound to such secrecy. . .
Once again, that is what is envisioned by Bill C-22.
Senators further recommended that reports be submitted to the Prime Minister, that those reports be made public, and that they indicate any redactions made for reasons of national security.
Once more, that is what would happen under Bill C-22.
The special committee's report explained that all of this was necessary to ensure that agencies and departments with national security and intelligence responsibilities:
. . . are effectively serving national security interests, are respecting the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and are fiscally responsible and properly organized and managed.
Those are indeed very worthy objectives. I share them completely, and I hope we can adopt and enact Bill C-22 as quickly as possible because those objectives are embodied in this legislation.
I know that certain concerns have been raised in the Senate's consideration of this legislation thus far at second reading. I would like to try to address them as well as I can in the next few moments.
To begin with, they were concerns expressed about clause 12 as it represents to parliamentary privilege. I want to assure senators that clause pertains only to the classified information to which senators and members of Parliament will be privy as members of this committee. As long as they don't reveal classified information, committee members will be able to discuss their work outside of the committee and, importantly, they will be able to draw attention to perceived deficiencies in the government's performance of its duties to Parliament and to Canadians. Indeed, that bully pulpit is one of the strongest tools that members of the committee will have, as long as in the process of using the bully pulpit they do not disclose classified information.
I'm sure we can all agree that classified information is classified for a reason. Certain information, if publicly discussed, could damage Canada's relationships with international partners or potentially endanger lives, including the lives of Canadians. Parliamentarians should not be able to reveal such information and then claim immunity for doing so. As I noted earlier, the Special Senate Committee on Anti-terrorism was of that same view.
I understand there may be some fear that a parliamentarian may find himself or herself subject to penalties for accidentally revealing state secrets but, to be perfectly frank, if someone is prone to letting such serious things slip out then perhaps they should sit on some other committee and not this one.
I also note in your second reading debate the issue of subpoena power was raised. This was also debated extensively, as you may recall, during the bill's passage through the House of Commons. After much deliberation, the house ultimately decided that this kind of power was not appropriate, and I want to explain briefly why the house committee came to that conclusion.
In the case of a regular parliamentary committee, the government is not legally required to provide requested documentation. However, if the government refuses to provide it, the parliamentary committee can, through the powers exercised by the speakers, compel the government to provide that information. By contrast, Bill C-22 does create a legal requirement for the relevant minister to provide requested information. That's laid out in clause 13, as long as that information is within the committee's mandate. As such there is no need for the subpoena power.
In terms of compelling specific witnesses, there is a need to ensure that the operational independence of government agencies in the security and intelligence field is not infringed. This legislation provides that the deputy head of the agency will decide who in that department or agency is best placed to speak to an issue identified by the committee, and it's very important that this authority remain with the deputy head for operational reasons.
By way of example, let's imagine a situation where the committee subpoenas a particular CSIS field agent to discuss an operation that ended two years ago. That same agent, however, is currently deployed on another operation and his or her leaving could endanger the current mission. The director of CSIS absolutely must have operational control over the activities of his or her agents. We should not risk a situation where CSIS operations, and consequently national security, might be compromised because a particular agent would be legally bound to testify at a certain time.
Finally, I'll address a couple of the changes that the House of Commons made to Bill C-22. For instance, after consultations with Senator Harder, I became convinced that additional members should be added to the committee. However, during those discussions, we noted that the Royal Recommendation attached to this legislation only allowed for nine members. As a result, the government moved a report stage amendment allowing us to affix a new Royal Recommendation and add an extra senator and an extra MP for a total of three senators and eight members of Parliament on a committee of eleven.
The Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security made several other amendments as well, including an important one proposed by the NDP which created a whistle-blower provision. This requires the committee to let the relevant minister and the Attorney General of Canada know if and when they encounter any actual wrongdoing. In other words, they have the ability to blow the whistle.
Honourable senators, the bill before you represents a giant leap forward for national security accountability in Canada. It is an important addition to our current system of review bodies for particular agencies because apart from the fact that agencies like CBSA have no review body at the present time, those that do exist cannot follow a trail wherever it leads throughout the federal government. This new committee of parliamentarians will be able to do that. The current review bodies work vertically only to a specific agency. The committee of parliamentarians has a horizontal mandate and can follow the evidence wherever it goes.
This also stands us in good stead internationally because many of this new committee's international counterparts are likewise limited to examining the work of a particular agency or a limited specified number of agencies and departments. Ours is fundamentally far broader in scope.
Crucially, the bill mandates its own parliamentary review after five years. We know that there will be lessons learned in the early years of this committee's existence. This mandatory review after five years creates a built-in opportunity to learn those lessons and implement them to make the committee work better in the future, especially once this new committee has had the opportunity to establish its credibility in the eyes of the agencies that it will be reviewing and establish trust in the eyes of Canadians.
The last thing I'll mention is that Bill C-22 is a major piece of the government's approach to national security, but it is by no means the only piece. We are currently preparing additional proposals to fulfill the commitments we made during the last election and to act upon the input that we received as part of our unprecedented national security consultations.
I hope to be in a position to put those other proposals in the public domain in the weeks immediately ahead, including filling the review gap that I know the Senate has been concerned about in relation to CBSA, the Canada Border Services Agency. Former Senator Willie Moore was working hard on that topic. When you point out there is a gap, you're right, and it needs to be filled. I hope to explain publicly, in the period immediately ahead, exactly how we intend to do that, in addition to what's here in Bill C-22.
We have committed to enhancing Canada's national security framework in order to better protect Canadians and at the same time to safeguard rights and freedoms. Everything we do in the realm of national security is focused on advancing those two inseparable objectives: keep Canadians safe and protect Canadians' rights and freedoms. Bill C- 22 will do precisely that, and I hope that it can earn your support.
I look forward to your questions. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Minister.
Before we get into the question and answer period, on behalf of the committee I would like to express our regrets for the horrific terrorism act that took place over the weekend in Britain and to express our condolences to the Archibald family when we lost our fellow Canadian, Ms. Chrissy Archibald, in that terrorist attack.
Mr. Goodale: I'm sure all parliamentarians would want to associate themselves with your sentiments.
The Chair: Colleagues, before we start, I'd just like to maybe ask a very specific question. First of all, I should say this: I don't think anybody is arguing that there is a need for an oversight or review committee for the purposes of our national security. I think there is a common objective and purpose for all of us, but I think it goes into the question of the specifics of what the authorities are within the bill and whether or not they meet what we need in the short term, as well as the long term.
I have a question, if I could start off, that has to do how members are appointed to the particular body that we're recommending here. My question is: In the U.K. system, they eventually are voted on in Parliament for the purposes of sitting on the particular committee because of its importance to the national security.
Why does this bill not have the provisions for the Parliament, both the Senate and the House of Commons, to elect and eventually vote on the recommendations for the purpose of the membership of this committee?
Mr. Goodale: Mr. Chair, the reason for that is that the ultimate accountability for the safety and security of Canadians and for the safeguarding of rights and freedoms ultimately rests with the Prime Minister. That's where the buck stops. Accordingly, in drafting this legislation we thought it would be important to ensure that the Prime Minister had the necessary authority to do so, subject to a very elaborate oversight review, transparency and governance framework.
The idea is that the Prime Minister would make the selection, but after the appropriate consultation in the house and in the Senate to make sure that he had the benefit of all the views and advice that those people, with whom he is obliged to consult, would offer to him in that process. At the end of the day, though, it was our view that the Prime Minister needed to have the authority to make the selection, which is, as I recall the history of it, the way that a number of the counterpart committees in other countries also began. Some have evolved beyond that to a different selection process, but that was sort of the genesis of where it all began.
Senator Jaffer: Thank you to both ministers for your presence here. I want to start off by thanking the Prime Minister and both of you for the vision to bring forward this bill. This is a bill that's very much overdue. As we know, any country that sacrifices human rights for security ends up with neither.
I will start with my question for Minister Chagger. Then I have another question for Minister Goodale.
Minister Chagger, the constituents that you and I both serve know that Bill C-51 really harmed and brought a lot of distrust into the community. It also hurt the communities that you and I are part of.
I would like you to explain to us: What was the vision around this bill? What were you looking at? How were you to reach out? How were you going to assure communities that you and I serve that there would now be a way for their rights to be protected?
Obviously, I'm not asking you to give cabinet confidences but I would like to know what was the vision around this bill.
Ms. Chagger: It's true when it comes to our representing Canadians that at the end of the day our goal is always to represent all Canadians. Something we know is that there is not an oversight mechanism that exists currently. The oversight mechanisms that currently exist are limited and are in boxes. That's why, as Minister Goodale was saying, this is the oversight mechanism that will have access to all agencies and organizations that deal with national security.
When it came to the concerns that Canadians are representing and sharing, we know that the politics of fear is strong, and we need to change that. Canadians need to know when they have a complaint or a concern that it is being listened to and that there are mechanisms in place to be able to address those concerns.
Without this committee of parliamentarians that does not exist. We know the importance of national security. Yet we also know the importance of our rights and freedoms. That is why the legislation we are advancing does both. There will always remain the two goals and they will be two goals that we hold of equal value. This committee will allow Canadians that have concerns when it comes to some of the bodies currently in place to be able to address them through this committee, which will be able to get information from wherever the overlap is happening.
Currently, those areas of grey do not have an oversight mechanism, and that's why such a committee is essential and needed.
Senator Jaffer: Minister Goodale, I have a question for you, some of which you covered generally in your opening remarks. I would like to look at clauses 8, 14 and 16. I call them "the triple lock,'' and I think others do as well. Every time the committee looks at the information, they have to go through clauses 8, 14, and 16.
As you know, subclause 8(b) states that the committee of parliamentarians cannot review any subjects related to ongoing operations, if the appropriate minister deems their review would be injurious to national security. Subclause 14(d) of the bill states that the committee of parliamentarians may not have access to information concerning an ongoing investigation that may lead to criminal prosecution. Clause 16 grants ministers the power to deny any information, if it may be considered special operational information under the Security of Information Act.
Minister Goodale, I believe that this can be restrictive for the committee to do its work. There are times when, of course, it is required for the minister to intervene, but this is too restrictive. I would like your opinion on this triple lock of clauses 8, 14, and 16, which sort of limits the work that the committee can do.
Mr. Goodale: In the course of the work before the committee and the house, similar concerns were expressed, Senator Jaffer, and we in fact changed those three clauses to broaden the scope and the mandate of the committee.
First of all, the original wording in clause 8 referred to activities generally, and the language was tightened to refer specifically to ongoing operations. That's substantially narrower as an exception than all activities. In terms of ongoing operations, the point is that there may well be a very good reason about current activity which should remain in the confidential domain. Then, at a later stage, once the activity has stopped being ongoing, it could well be subject to review.
You might notice here that there is an obligation on the minister to actually inform the committee when the circumstances have changed, when the factors that might have led the minister to believe that an inquiry at this moment could be injurious. When those factors have subsided or changed or lapsed, he or she would be obliged to inform the committee that the examination would now be permissible.
What we tried to do in clause 8 was to make the mandate of the committee as broad as possible. I think the amendments that we worked through in the house accomplished that objective. Certainly, the mandate now is broader than the original language.
In the subsequent clauses that you referred to, we have indicated that there are certain categories of information that need to remain secret. Those would be the normal competences of the Privy Council, the identity of witnesses, the identity of sources and matters that are engaged in an ongoing police investigation. Generally speaking, I don't think there is much controversy about those kinds of limitations. In a police investigation, I'm not sure that you would want to have active political oversight. That would be a bit strange.
Originally, the list of exceptions was much longer. It included Information Canada information, for example, and FINTRAC information. All of that has been taken out so that the complete exemptions are very narrowly limited.
In the case of the last clause you referred to, where a minister exercises a discretion to say that a particular type of information should not be disclosed, the minister will have to explain to the committee why he or she is making that judgment. It's not capricious or arbitrary. The minister has been obligation to outline to the committee that they are withholding some information, but they will need to have a very good reason for doing that.
Given that the members of this committee are members of Parliament, eight members of the House of Commons and three members of the Senate, if they are not happy with the explanation or treatment they are getting from ministers, they have the complete opportunity to make that abundantly clear in the public domain. They cannot disclose classified information but they can say, categorically and unequivocally, that they believe the government is offside.
If you have a committee of this stature saying that, it will have a powerful public political impact. If the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians has a real grievance against the government because of restrictions or whatever the government is proposing to impose and the committee says that in the public domain, as they are entitled to do, it's going to be a very uncomfortable period for the government of the day. My instinct is that governments will go out of their way to try to keep this committee happy and satisfied, with the sufficient degree of disclosure.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: Thank you for being here today, Mr. Goodale and Ms. Chagger.
Mr. Minister, the House of Commons has approved an increase in the Senate's representation on the committee from two to three members. Parliament consists of two equal chambers, one of which, the Senate, represents regional interests. At the Prime Minister's request, the Senate has become increasingly independent. I would even add that, since senators' terms are usually longer than those of MPs, senators accordingly have a longer historical memory.
Can you tell us why the government is opposed to the creation of a committee on which the House of Commons and the Senate would be equally represented? The Prime Minister himself has discussed the creation of a committee of parliamentarians. My impression is that we are dealing instead with a government committee. Can you explain to me this opposition to an equal distribution of seats?
[English]
Mr. Goodale: Senator, the issue of numbers, I suppose, is always debatable and subject to different perceptions. When you point to the accumulated expertise in the field of national security of some particular members of the Senate, I think you make a good point. There is a good deal of talent and experience and expertise.
We're finding, not in any formal way but anecdotally, that there seems to be a great deal of interest on both ends of centre block for participation in this committee. There are 338 members of the House of Commons and roughly 100 members of the Senate. In putting the numbers together, while not everybody can participate on the committee we thought the ratio 8:3, having the benefit of the discussion in the House of Commons, was a fair number. It is also supported by past practice, as I understand it, in structuring other committees.
One could argue the arithmetic and nuance it to a certain extent, but on balance I would think the ratio 8:3, for a total of 11, is pretty close to reflecting the numbers at opposite ends of the hallway from the house to the Senate.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: Could you explain to us why the Prime Minister and the Privy Council want to exercise more control over this oversight committee? Would you be open to the idea of our proposing changes to the committee's make-up?
[English]
Mr. Goodale: I guess I would need to know, senator, when you say makeup, exactly what do you mean by that? We think we have the structure configured appropriately, with eight from the house and three from the Senate. Within the eight that would come from the house, there would be a limited number for the government. We would ensure that the official opposition and the third party had appropriate representation within the eight to make sure that we're reflecting the actual nature of Parliament at any given moment in time.
There will be an obligation on future prime ministers to move quickly following elections so that the committee can be up and functioning when you move from one Parliament to the next. We wouldn't want to see a long hiatus in the ability of the committee to be activated, because obviously security and intelligence operations are ongoing all the time and this architecture will have to be successful and functional.
If there is an argument to advance about a different process, we're obviously always prepared to hear different views. Our considered opinion is, having consulted with the public extensively about this and having heard the debates and the commentaries coming from both the house and the Senate up to this point, we think we have that structure at an appropriate balance; but if there is another point to be made, obviously that's what Senator Lang's committee is for.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: You mentioned that we should avoid a gap in the committee's structure. I think one of the best ways to do that would be to provide more seats for senators since we have been around for a longer time.
[English]
Mr. Goodale: I hear your point but again, when we're dealing with 338 members of the House of Commons and 100 senators and trying to get appropriate representation that keeps both houses reasonably satisfied, I think the configuration of eight versus three is reflective of the actual numbers on both ends.
[Translation]
Senator Saint-Germain: Thank you, ministers. National security is a very broad concept, which the bill does not define. The committee's mandate is very limited in scope and you have provided in the bill for certain types of access and restrictions. To get a clear understanding of the scope of the mandate, I would like you to give us an overview of current and contemporary national security and intelligence issues that you feel should be priorities for the committee once it is up and running.
[English]
Mr. Goodale: That is a very interesting question, senator, because importance or priority is very often in the eyes of the beholder. One thing we have tried to make clear in the legislation is that this committee can decide for itself where it wants it go, what it wants to look at and what its priorities are. That will be up to the committee itself to determine.
Clause 8 allows the minister of the day to ask the committee to examine a certain matter, but apart from that the committee will set its own agenda. I think that is an important principle so that the government is not telling the committee what to look at. The committee itself will decide what it thinks it should look at.
You can take a look through the last report or two or three from SIRC, the Security Intelligence Review Committee, or from the Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner, to see the kinds of issues those expert review bodies have been looking at. I think you will get the flavour of the order of magnitude of the kinds of things that those committees believe are important. A committee of parliamentarians might well want to examine those very same issues or others.
There are a whole range of current public safety and national security questions that the public has become engaged in. Because it seems to be on every bus stop along Wellington Street, the one I think of is the electronic use of devices that detect the presence of cellphones. They are IMSIs, as they are called for short. Whenever those devices are used by the security agencies of the Government of Canada, whether that's the RCMP or others, they are subject to a very strict judicial procedure authorizing the use of that kind of technology.
However we know from media reports that some of that technology has been used in downtown Ottawa in the last number of months. We know it's not the RCMP. We know it's not CSIS. Then, who is it? Canadians are anxious to know, and that question is under active investigation by both the RCMP and CSIS at the present time; but the committee of parliamentarians might want to examine the broad question of the use of this kind of technology and what are the appropriate procedures and safeguards that need to be put in place to protect the public interest.
One of the things that is very obvious is that when the CSIS Act was written in 1984, the fax machine was groundbreaking new technology. A lot has happened in the digital world since that time. A very good question could be asked: What are the appropriate rules, regulations and policy regimes that should be put into place now to take account of the fact that technology has changed dramatically over that span of time? The people who would do us harm, from a national security or intelligence point of view, make active use of that technology.
What are the appropriate responses from government and from the security agencies of the people of Canada? That might well be the kind of investigation the committee of parliamentarians could undertake together with the specific examples of where something may have gone wrong and the committee wants to investigate in a more forensic way.
The Chair: Before we proceed any further, Mr. Minister, I very much appreciate your knowledge, but I would ask colleagues to keep their questions short and for the responses to be kept short.
I know we have a fair amount of time, but we do have a whole list of members who want to ask questions and we want to get the information on the record.
[Translation]
Senator Saint-Germain: Mr. Minister, I understand from your answer that you will be prepared to discuss your concerns with the members of this committee to the extent the law permits — and you were very diplomatic — so that committee members can perhaps get an idea of the matters of concern to the Minister of National Defence. Is that correct?
[English]
Mr. Goodale: The scope for this committee will be very broad. The objective is for the committee itself to decide what it wants to look at. By the way we have structured clauses 8, 14 and 16, the objective is to keep the scope for the government to say no, because that would injure national security, to keep that scope very narrow.
Senator White: Thanks all of you for being here. I appreciate it. I want to follow up on Senator Jaffer's earlier question.
When we look at clause 8 in particular, it talks about "any activity carried out by a department.'' Obviously, departments carry out little activity when it comes to the types of questions we want to ask, but the agencies that are accountable, or at least answerable to those departments, do.
When we are refused information, and it's appreciated that the minister could speak, could we also call the department or the agency heads to answer questions as to why it's not appropriate to move forward on a piece of work, and not just the minister?
Mr. Goodale: In the legislation, Senator White, the burden is on the minister in subclause 8(2) to provide the explanation.
Senator White: Yes, I see that.
Mr. Goodale: I would think the minister and his or her officials would want to be very forthcoming in explaining to the committee why a particular line of investigation would not be appropriate at any given point in time.
As you notice in subclause (3), there is a burden then to inform the committee if and when circumstances change; but the committee would be entitled to a full explanation as to why an inquiry couldn't be undertaken at a particular time.
On a technical definitional matter, the use of the word "department,'' as you can see in the definitions section, "department'' is used very broadly. It includes all of the departments, agencies, organizations and whatever within the Government of Canada, including Crown corporations, which have a security or intelligence function. When the word "department'' appears in the statute, it should be read very broadly as any entity within the Government of Canada that carries on security and intelligence operations.
Senator White: Thank you for that because I did look at the definition. I guess it excludes review bodies, which means that we could not call, for example, SIRC to answer questions, even though they may have relevant information to provide to the committee. Is that correct?
Mr. Goodale: The expectation, Senator White, is that the committee of parliamentarians will be working in tandem with SIRC or with the commissioner or presently with CRCC. They will share information and pool their resources in the sense that normally they would not be investigating the same thing. I suppose, if the issue were particularly grave, they could explore the same thing, but to avoid overlap and duplication they would collaborate with each other to make sure their resources are covering the whole waterfront and everything is getting properly looked at without one thing being duplicated.
That will be never be perfect, but we are hoping it will work.
Senator White: My second question is in relation to the secretariat. I'm trying to situate where they sit. I understand the model being proposed. Most secretariats have a ministerial department that they report to, for example, public safety.
I could not find where this secretariat is accountable. Is it accountable to the Privy Council? If so, is there concern about it reporting to the same secretariat as the Prime Minister?
Mr. Goodale: I will ask Mr. McCowan to take a stab at that from a machinery of government point of view.
Ian McCowan, Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet, Governance, Privy Council Office: There is a provision, senator, in the statute that talks about the Prime Minister being able to designate the responsible minister, but Minister Goodale is quite right that in terms of legislation going forward it has been situated in the Government House Leader's portfolio in terms of it being a centralized entity, if you will.
The issue was in terms of other possible placements. Obviously in the public safety portfolio a number of those entities would be engaged in national security activities in question, so the thought was to put it in a more central place to allow for the committee to do its work in a way that it was intended.
Senator White: So you anticipate that it will stay there.
Mr. McCowan: That's a decision that the Prime Minister will ultimately have to make. In terms of hints, the Government House Leader is the sponsor of the legislation. If you look at the Financial Administration Act there is a suggestion that she would be the responsible entity there. That being said, the Prime Minister or some future prime minister could change their mind.
Senator Lankin: I have a couple of questions around clauses 8, 14 and 16. Perhaps I could go on the second round for my other questions.
Thank you to both ministers for being here today. Minister Goodale, I want to ask you about the issue of the mandate of the committee and the issue of access to information. I want to start with the mandate.
I will, by way of side comment, say that I understand completely the issue you raise about the need to establish relationships and grow trust over time. I had the opportunity many years ago to meet with Sir Malcolm Rifkind and a number of members of the committee of parliamentarians in the U.K. from both the Conservative Party and Labour Party. I got a real sense of how they had seen the development over time and the access to information far outweighing what the legislative provisions were with some trust established, so I understand that process.
On the mandate, I'm interested in your perspective on review versus oversight because this seems to be a bit of a hybrid in a sense. If you look at SIRC, that's a review committee. If you look at this, you may not be able to have access to information if it's an ongoing operation but you may.
How do you view that oversight versus review? What was your goal in allowing some current operations to be looked at by the committee?
Mr. Goodale: Senator, I had the opportunity to discuss this and other elements with respect to Bill C-22 with our British counterparts. They made the same point that you just referred to. In establishing this kind of new architecture, building credibility and building trust are absolutely essential. If you don't have either, you're done. Their advice was to begin carefully, learn by experience, develop the trust, develop the credibility, and things will evolve over time. As they pointed out, the structure and mandate of the British committee have evolved dramatically over the last 15 years.
We thought that with having a combination of clauses 8, 14 and 16 we had it. We thought we had it at the beginning, but certainly after the amendments in the house we can say that we have it even more so now, the right combination of a mandate that's as broad as possible and limitations that are as narrow as possible, to ensure that the committee could do its job effectively.
The Chair: Perhaps I could interrupt for a minute. I would like to thank Minister Chagger for attending.
I know you have another commitment, and we very much appreciate the time that you have taken to be with us today. I will excuse you, if you don't mind.
Ms. Chagger: Thank you so much. I'm sure I have left you in more than capable hands.
If there is anything we can do, please do let us know, and thank you for having us here.
Mr. Goodale: Senator Lankin, you are right. It is beyond review. Some would say it is not complete, and I think they are right. It is not complete oversight, but it provides the committee to do more than just the narrow review function. As credibility and trust grow, based upon the practical work of the committee, the oversight function may well get stronger and stronger.
I would mention at this point, as I said in my initial remarks, this is one element in our plans with respect to national security, but there is certainly more to come. It will be important to assess the final result as a package of all of the elements together.
Senator Lankin: I wanted to pursue the issue of access to information. Let me say I think the amendments made to the bill that you have accepted improve the balance a lot. I would say kudos for that.
One of the two issues that interest me under access to information is subclause 14(d), which is the prohibition on anything that is an ongoing investigation which might lead to prosecution. In a sense we are not talking about intelligence; we are now talking about evidence.
The thing that interests me is that there are times when investigations are very prolonged, particularly in national security issues. There are times when there are incidences we know that happened a decade plus ago that are still being investigated. It seems to me that subclause 14(d) could be treated the same as the provisions you set out that give ministerial discretion. That's the first thing I would say.
In the other cases, ministerial discretion can say no to information or documents where there is a concern on national security. It could be similar where there is a concern that it might jeopardize an ongoing investigation that leads to prosecution. That's an area I would be interested in understanding why you are not open to moving that to discretion.
With respect to ministerial discretion, I would appreciate your comments on how you see our developing a standard approach. I have seen, between review agencies and service agencies in particular, inane arguments about redactions on things that could not possibly relate to national security. That discretion is a broad discretion. I appreciate your saying that you think people will bend over backward, but there could be quite different approaches, depending on the minister.
One thing we'd like to know is that we're having some consistency in the government's philosophy behind access to information. Can you address my concerns there?
Mr. Goodale: Senator, one of the things that the committee might want to engage in at an early stage in discussion with the Privy Council Office and other government officials would be that very question, so that members of the committee of parliamentarians could be assured that consistent standards were being applied across the government when redactions were undertaken, regardless of the agency or department in question. That's on information coming into the committee.
On information going out from the committee, the only redaction possible is one that would be requested by the Prime Minister, based on national security and classified information. In that case, the place where the redaction occurred and the reason for it would have to be fully explained.
Our objective there is to empower the committee to report on anything it wants to report on and to say anything it wants to say, short of revealing a classified piece of information. It may well be a very worthy objective for the members of the committee, once they are in place, to engage with the relevant government officials and develop a protocol for how redactions on information coming in would be handled.
On your first point about subclause 14(d), the reason that is there is primarily to avoid the perception of any political direction of police operations. It is exceedingly important that the decisions about law enforcement be made by law enforcement, and not in any kind of partisan or political fashion. That's why that exception is there.
Senator Lankin: Mr. Chair, the next question I had was access to information, but do you want me to hold it for the next round?
The Chair: If we could, as we have a number of members on the list. I would ask once again if everyone could be fairly brief with their preambles and, Mr. Minister, if you could be somewhat brief with the responses as well.
[Translation]
Senator Boisvenu: Welcome to the committee, Mr. Minister. My question is more of a political nature and concerns the designation of the committee chair, which, as you know, is a strategic position from the standpoint of communications with cabinet. First, I would like to understand why a candidate has already been approached to occupy the chairship. Second, was the opposition consulted on that appointment to the chair? If not, I would like to hear your opinion on the fact that public confidence may be undermined by the government's unilateral designation of the chair.
Furthermore, why were committee members not allowed to make that decision?
[English]
Mr. Goodale: Senator, the scheme in the act is that the decisions with respect to membership on the committee and then the chairship of the committee would be decisions to be taken by the Prime Minister, for which he would be ultimately accountable.
At a very early stage in the deliberations, the PM came to the conclusion that he would like Mr. McGuinty to perform the function of chair when the committee was ultimately created, based upon Mr. McGuinty's experience both in Parliament and otherwise in private life. It was the Prime Minister's judgment that he had the qualities necessary to perform effectively as chair. Having come to that conclusion, the Prime Minister made his choice known to be completely transparent about the thinking.
The other members of the committee, now 11 as opposed to the original 9, will involve a consultation process as is specified in the legislation. That consultation is not required by the draft legislation in respect of chair, but it is required in respect of the membership on the committee. The Prime Minister will certainly be reaching out to the appropriate parties, as is required in the legislation, to consult effectively and to get views about who should be ultimately appointed.
At the end of the day, it is the Prime Minister's prerogative and his ultimate responsibility. As I said earlier, when it comes to initial security in so many ways, the buck stops with the Prime Minister himself. Therefore, he needs to have the authorities to put an effective system in place.
[Translation]
Senator Boisvenu: I understand your answer, but responsibility for many strategic high-level positions in government falls to the Prime Minister. Why were the opposition and the Senate not consulted on chair selection in this specific case?
[English]
Mr. Goodale: The point, senator, is that very quickly following the election we wanted to send the signal that the commitment we had made about the creation of a committee of parliamentarians for national security and intelligence purposes was a commitment that was not just window dressing but in fact something the government was very serious about.
By specifying the chair at an early stage it sent a strong signal, even though the legislative process would take some time, as it has. As soon as it has the legislative authority to create this committee, the Prime Minister intends to move as quickly as he can. The early appointment of the person designate to serve as chair was intended to send a constructive signal that we're proposing to move on this as rapidly as we can.
Senator Beyak: Thank you very much, minister, for being with us. Many Canadians watch this committee at home because of the state of the world and they're trusting us to get this important legislation right.
Could you explain to us why the officers of Parliament have been excluded from the bill, specifically the Auditor General, the Information Commissioner and the Privacy Commissioner?
Mr. Goodale: Because, in fact, they are officers of Parliament and not officers of the government.
The bill covers all those agencies that undertake national security and intelligence operations anywhere in the Government of Canada. The Parliament of Canada is separate from that.
Senator Beyak: In all the years I have been here, we've heard from many witnesses that there are silos of review and oversight. There's concern that there's not enough information sharing.
In the bill you covered most of it, but there are still exclusions and gaps from the O'Connor commission. Why it isn't more directly authorized that they have to share information? We've heard many times that our biggest problem is a gap in information sharing.
Mr. Goodale: That is a thing that this new committee of parliamentarians might well want to examine, to get back to Senator Saint-Germain's question about what sorts of things this committee would do.
If internal information sharing among departments and agencies is seen to be an impediment to effective security activity, that is something that would be completely within the prerogative of the committee of parliamentarians to examine.
Remember, we have said throughout this whole discussion that there are two equally important objectives: keep Canadians safe and safeguard their rights and freedoms. We want this committee to make a contribution to both, safeguarding rights and freedoms, absolutely, but also making sure that our security and intelligence agencies and operations are doing everything they should be doing in order to keep Canadians safe.
Advice from this committee of parliamentarians to say we should have a different regime with respect to information sharing would be very important advice to hear.
Senator Griffin: Thanks for being here today. Looking over Bill C-22, I find it is a pretty good bill. Congratulations on that. It's great that there is a five-year review built into it, but rather than waiting for five years I think all of us are anxious to see that the bill is as good now as we could possibly get it. I'm sure that's your objective too.
I have just a couple of specific questions. Whistle-blowers are not protected by parliamentary privilege, because what we have here is a committee of parliamentarians rather than a parliamentary committee. Obviously staff from the department are to provide the committee with information that's requested, but how do junior persons in the department get their information to the committee?
Obviously their supervisor could readily say they can't do a disclosure to the committee. If we have someone in a more junior position who realizes there may be people acting unlawfully above him or around him or her in the department, how do they get to the committee and make a disclosure? What protection is there for them because it is not a parliamentary committee with parliamentary privilege?
Mr. Goodale: Senator, maybe whistle-blower is used in different ways in different contexts. If the committee in its work discovers activity that it considers to be wrong, illegal or inappropriate, and certainly if they find any evidence of wrongdoing that breaks a law, they will have the authority to report that to the Attorney General of Canada. They can tell the minister who is responsible for it but they can go straight through to the Attorney General of Canada so that the information can be acted upon from a legal point of view. That's the output side of the committee's mandate.
On the input side, there's no limitation on a member of the public, a member of the public service or an individual Canadian that has a question, a concern or an issue they want to raise to contact the committee. If they're acting as part of the public service, there's obviously a protocol to be followed for presenting testimony and evidence, but if an individual feels that somehow they're being blocked or misrepresented, or the whole story isn't being told, they would be at liberty to contact the chair or any member of the committee and draw that fact, as they see it, to the attention of members of the committee.
It would then be up to the committee to determine whether they wished to pursue that or not, but one of the virtues of having a committee of parliamentarians is that they tend to have political instincts, either as members of the house or as members of the Senate, and would be able to make a judgment as to whether or not some information coming to their attention deserves some sort of special examination. We have not had that element in our review architecture up to this point. We will now have that, and that will be an important discipline on the process.
Senator Griffin: To follow up on that, it still comes back to the whistle-blower or the more junior employees not protected by parliamentary privilege. They could be dismissed, sanctioned or whatever by their supervisor and/or department. That is an issue where having a committee of parliamentarians as opposed to a parliamentary committee is to their detriment.
Mr. Goodale: Senator, let me ask Mr. McCowan from the Privy Council Office to further elaborate on this. With respect to whistle-blower protections generally in the public service, there is a piece of legislation, the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act that may be relevant to this circumstance.
Mr. McCowan: That's it exactly. Bill C-22 is not intended to create a new regime around whistle-blowing.
As the minister referenced, there is existing legislation that covers the situation you're describing in terms of how a public servant should approach a situation like that. Between two statutes the minister mentioned and the Security of Information Act, that code exists and that's the operative regime in terms of someone who would find themselves in the situation which you just described.
Senator Griffin: I have one final point.
The Chair: No, I am sorry. That can be for the second round.
Senator Wetston: One of the benefits of being at the end of the questioning, minister, is to have been able to hear a lot of your answers, which have been very helpful. The timing for this bill is certainly appropriate, given the geopolitical considerations we find ourselves in each and every day.
I have a very specific question. I am interested in concept to implementation. Concept is a good one; implementation may be challenging. I know you have in your mind what some of those implementation challenges might be. Can you share them with the committee?
Mr. Goodale: They're significant. One is going to be establishing the administrative structure for the new operation in such a way that you have sufficient talent, well prepared to take on the substantive investigatory side of this operation.
The 11 members of the committee will no doubt be very anxious to get on with the process, but they will need support staff. They will need the secretariat. They will need the administrative structure to back them up because they can't do all of that on their own as individual committee members. One significant challenge is the entire apparatus that is necessary to make the committee effective.
Another significant administrative challenge is going to be finding the appropriate space in which this committee will function, because virtually everything it touches from day to day will involve classified information that can't simply be floating around in miscellaneous briefing books. It will have to be maintained in secure conditions.
The British committee, for example, has a dedicated, secure meeting room and office apparatus around it so that members can do their job quite effectively and can have access to the information whenever they need it. They have to go to that office and deal with it internally within those four walls to ensure they are fully informed but at the same time nothing of a classified nature is leaking out from the operation.
The third thing will be for the committee itself to identify its leading priorities. That may involve taking a very hard look at what the commissioner is doing with respect to the Communications Security Establishment, taking a hard look at what SIRC is doing in relation to CSIS to see if there are any issues that the CRCC is dealing with in relation to the RCMP that bear upon national security and intelligence, and to sort out from all of that where the committee wants to start.
What are the most compelling issues that bear upon national security and intelligence and the public's right to know that the committee wants to tackle? That will be important in order to send some strong signals internally among the agencies that this is a credible, serious group of people, and to the public, to Canadians, to say this is a useful addition to our review and oversight architecture.
Those three things strike me as early challenges.
Senator McPhedran: By a happy coincidence, my question relates directly to what you were just responding to, minister. It's not a particularly detailed question, but I keep coming back to concern about the interpretation of what may be a Charter issue, respecting of the Charter, of course, accepting your opening statement and picking up again on what Senator Jaffer said about the importance of respecting Charter rights.
Could you help me understand a bit more about the secretariat? I would frame my concern most succinctly as how to ensure that the secretariat isn't driving this entire process, that the complexity or the amount of detail is such that there are all kinds of judgment calls, including judgment calls about the respect for Charter rights, and if there has been perhaps more detail than you have shared at this point in terms of that particular accountability mechanism within the anticipated structure.
Mr. Goodale: In practical terms, Senator McPhedran, it boils down to the determination of members of the committee. No doubt the secretariat will be trying to offer all sorts of advice and guidance, but the 11 people who serve on this committee will have the authority to call the shots. They need to be vigilant, assiduous and aggressive in making it abundantly clear that they don't intend to settle for mediocrity.
That was a very strong message that came through from our consultations with the British committee. The National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians will be a success based upon the hard-nosed performance of its members. There is some virtue to having different political perspectives and different houses of Parliament represented because they function as a bit of discipline on each other, but I don't think there is any substitute for high calibre, high quality participation by committee members.
The Chair: I want to follow up on that question because I think this is very important. Senator McPhedran raised an important point about whom the secretariat actually works for.
What troubles me in the legislation, the way I understand it, is that the secretariat basically works for the Privy Council Office or the Prime Minister, as opposed to the chair and the committee members reporting to them in respect to their duties and responsibilities.
Why are they not reporting to the chair and the committee as a secretariat, similar to what they do in the United Kingdom? There needs to be, very clearly, a division between the responsibilities of the Privy Council and the Prime Minister's Office versus the committee. There needs to be a gap between the two organizations to ensure that the information the committee is searching for and needs to do their work is independently brought to them, as opposed to being in a position where it may be in some cases compromised for whatever reason?
The question is: Why isn't the secretariat reporting to the committee?
Mr. Goodale: Ultimately, if members of this new committee are not satisfied with what they're getting, they will be absolutely able, to use an expression, to blow the whistle on that and to make it clear in the public domain that they don't believe they are well served. That would be a very damning criticism of the support system.
Could I, just on the structure of it all, ask Mr. McCowan to outline this from a machinery of government point of view?
Mr. McCowan: Because it's part of the executive, it has to reside somewhere in government. If it does reside in the end in the Prime Minister's portfolio, that doesn't change the fact that the committee is driving the bus in terms of the agenda.
As the minister indicated, the secretariat is responsible for following the lead of the committee wherever they go in terms of reviews across government.
The Chair: I would take a contrarian view of that. Whoever the secretariat reports to, that's who they're working for, which is similar to the United Kingdom. My understanding is the secretariat reports to the United Kingdom and it's a separate body, so it's clear who the line of responsibilities is reporting to.
Am I not correct on that?
Mr. McCowan: I'm not specifically familiar with how it's set up in Britain. I think, in practical terms, the minister is correct. If in fact there was a situation where the secretariat was not responsive to the committee, that is something that would tumble into the public domain in rapid order.
In terms of the specifics of the U.K. example, we could certainly undertake to look into that and provide you the specifics of how they are set up.
Senator McPhedran: I have a point of observation. Let's bear in mind that the U.K., as much as we want to learn from other countries, does not have a charter. We need to be very clear that this is a Canadian priority for us to figure out. I'm still concerned about the secretariat driving it.
Mr. Goodale: Senator, I appreciate your point. They didn't start this way in the U.K., but they are now a parliamentary committee, whereas this is a committee of parliamentarians, created by legislation, to perform a certain specific function. The structure is different in the two countries.
As Mr. McCowan mentioned, you need to vest the support apparatus somewhere in the machinery of government, and the most neutral ground is the PCO within the portfolio of the Prime Minister where, as I said earlier, the buck ultimately stops. That's where the final accountability is to be found.
As I mentioned at the beginning of my answer, the key point is for the members of this committee to take the assignment seriously. Those 11 people will be performing a function that's very special and very unique. Compared to the 338 others in the house and the 100 or so in the Senate they will have a very unique function and they will be able to pursue their role aggressively.
Ultimately, if they don't think they are well served, if they think that somehow there is a Charter issue or somehow they are not able to discharge their function on behalf of Canadians, by using that bully pulpit they can make things very uncomfortable for the incumbent government. That discomfort will not go away until the problem is solved. Because they have that stature as parliamentarians and the ability to go public, except for classified information, it is a very powerful tool.
The Chair: Just to follow up with Mr. McCowan in respect of the commitment that was made by the secretariat in the U.K. and how they function versus what we're recommending here, I would ask for that information to be made available quickly because our intention is to deal with all aspects of the bill.
From my perspective as the chair, I think this is a critical area with respect to whom the secretariat actually reports and what are the responsibilities. I would ask that that be provided.
Mr. McCowan: We will get you a summary of how it works in the U.K. and we'll do it quickly.
The Chair: We may, Mr. Minister, have you back on that particular topic, if you have the time, later on in the next couple of weeks.
I have another question, if I could, and that's the question of the actual legislation. It talks about the appointment of the committee. It is to consist of not more than three members who are members of the Senate. That doesn't tell me there will be three members. That tells me there could be one, there could be two or there could be three.
My question to you is with respect to that particular section, to make it clear for the purposes of the bill and going forward. I would like to think that would have a minor amendment to make it clear that there will be three or four members, or whatever the number is, for the purposes of the formation of the committee.
What are your comments on that?
Mr. Goodale: Mr. Chair, when I had the opportunity some weeks ago to meet with members of the Senate and discuss this legislation in a more hypothetical context, Senator Jaffer raised that very point.
I am happy to look at alternate language to make our intention clear. Our intention is a committee of 11, with three from the Senate and eight from the house. The drafts people in the Department of Justice say this is the way to express that, but if there is some better way to do it I am certainly open to examining that better language.
I think they are trying to avoid the notion that the committee is dysfunctional if there is a vacancy at any moment, if one of the members of the house resigns, dies or moves away so that you have seven rather than eight, or if one of the members of the Senate is unable to function and is no longer really part of the committee so that you have two instead of three.
Does that stop the work of the committee? Does that affect quorum at any particular meeting of the committee? The drafts people are trying to avoid saying that you cannot function unless you have eight and three. The "up to'' language provides some flexibility, but the intention, senator, is a committee of eight and three.
Maybe we can find accommodating language that avoids those other pitfalls to saying you have a dysfunctional committee if for the time being you only have seven or if for the time being you only have two. If there is a better way to convey the legal meaning here, I'm open, certainly, to that better language.
The Chair: We are running a little over. Apparently we are having some technical problems with getting through to our next witness, who will be on video. We're going to keep you as long as we can.
Senator Lankin: I want to come back to access to information. There are two parts to this. First, I listened carefully to your answer about subpoena powers. The situation you are trying to avoid is where there is an operational conflict and a need for someone the committee may wish to hear from after they've pursued evidence and they see relevancy to calling someone. That person being involved in a front-line operation would jeopardize the operation were they to be brought in at a certain time. That's understandable.
On the other hand, I want to come back to experience with the service on the complaint side of things, where it was not infrequent that the person you really wanted to speak to was not available. At times that can feel an awful lot like stymieing. I wonder about that and I wonder if there's any openness to finding a way through that roadblock. It may come back to the protocols that you talked about, minister, but I'm interested if there's something stronger in terms of the powers of the committee.
Second is your comments about the secure site the documents would be in and the site of the secretariat. Of course, that's how the other review organizations proceed. You go into the building past security to review documents. The documents are there. You can't take them with you, and I presume that would continue.
As I look at the legislation in terms of the role of the secretariat, the power all exists within the definition of what the committee is able to see. It appears the committee has to ask for it. I'm stymied a bit in that if you don't know what is there, how do you know what to ask for?
In the example of SIRC, the research analysts have access to all documents, anything held within CSIS, with the exception of cabinet confidence. The staff go and sit at the computers. We eventually even had a compatible computer to hook in and be able to research all databases within the service.
Do you envision this secretariat having that kind of relationship? The legislation doesn't seem to compel that. How do you know what you want to see unless you are able to access and research and find the kind of information that would be relevant to bring back to present to the actual committee?
Mr. Goodale: Senator, with the exception of those things specified in the act, the intention here is for this committee to have access to everything else.
The drafting, especially as we work through the amendments in the house, has resulted in a substantially broader mandate than most other committees in most other countries have and exceptions that are very narrow.
Within that frame, this committee has access to everything else. The committee needs to identify what it wants to look at, make the request, and then the burden is on the minister to respond.
Quite frankly, I would think ministers would want to go to some extraordinary lengths to make sure that this new committee of parliamentarians is not unhappy with them. The criticism coming from a committee of parliamentarians that they are not being forthcoming would be pretty devastating criticism for any minister. They would have to have a very good case.
Senator Lankin: You are saying that it might be possible there are information-sharing protocols which would allow secretariat staff to access a full range at the service or the RCMP.
Mr. Goodale: There might be an issue of duplication with SIRC or the commissioner, depending on the agency we are referring to. There is a section in the act which in fact provides, at a very early stage, that this committee and the existing review bodies would work out an arrangement whereby within the framework set out in the law they share information. They would make sure that all of the issues are being properly addressed and, to the extent possible, they are avoiding overlap or duplication that would not be an effective use of resources.
However, I think that kind of practical arrangement, working together with the existing review bodies, is something we should expect this new committee and those review bodies to work out in very short order. If there is a problem with that, if it appears to require more prescriptive direction, then that's something we can come back to when we reassess the legislation if the level of cooperation is less than we would want or confused or not as efficient as it should be.
Senator Griffin: I have a clarification. Back to my whistle-blower, what makes this different from your average situation where they are protected by the usual civil service protection is that in this case you could be dealing with classified information. That's a different situation. Then that individual is at risk of being charged under the Security of Information Act.
Therefore, it comes back to my point that I would really like to see them protected by parliamentary privilege. You don't need to answer that; I'm just trying to make that point.
Mr. McCowan: As I mentioned earlier, my understanding is that there is nothing new in this statute in terms of whistle-blowing. To the extent there is comprehensive code that exists elsewhere in the two statutes which the minister referenced, I am not sure beyond that what else I can offer on that point.
The Chair: Just so that we have clarification, I think what we are trying to grapple with is that the individuals involved are dealing with classified information. How does that relate to the legislation that's in place to protect the whistle-blower versus the situation when you're involved in this highly confidential area of responsibility? Am I not correct, Senator Griffin?
Senator Griffin: Yes, that's it. They could be charged under the Security of Information Act, which is not a very nice thing.
Mr. McCowan: As I understand it, the legislation sets out an approach, a protocol of what a public servant needs to do if they are in that situation. That protocol very much does go to situations where you're talking about confidential information. Basically, there is a framework set out in those statutes, and that's the reference point.
Mr. Goodale: If they chose to send a brown envelope to the media, that would be a problem. If they chose to inform the committee of parliamentarians, there is an appropriate way to do it.
Mr. McCowan: I think the statute speaks to a framework where they try to work it out internally first. I don't have the statute with me, but suffice it to say there is an existing framework that deals with this subject matter.
Mr. Goodale: We will try to get a little more explanation for Senator Griffin on that point.
The Chair: Colleagues, we have run over. I want to thank the minister for his patience and his willingness to spend this time with us in respect to this all-important bill. I want to thank the staff as well for coming.
Joining us for this next panel are two former members of this committee. Senator Hugh Segal is here with us today, and our hope is that Senator Roméo Dallaire will be on video conference as we proceed over the course of this hour.
Welcome back, senator. I know this area of interest has been very much a part of his senatorial responsibility over the course of his life as a senator, and I know it must be gratifying to see that it's up for public debate and public conversation.
I understand you have an opening statement, senator. Please proceed.
[Translation]
Hon. Hugh Segal, former senator, as an individual: I would like to thank committee members for inviting me to discuss the important issue of Bill C-22. Your work here today is very important, even historic.
[English]
I reference the important and historic nature of your work, because unlike like other parliamentary committees created by motions approved in the Senate chamber or in the other place, you are being asked to consider a special committee of parliamentarians, which has never before existed in Canadian history. It will have the compelling and vital mandate of providing oversight for our national security and intelligence services in Canada.
Canada is the only major NATO and Five Eyes player without such a committee. While no proposed legislation is ever perfect and can and will be improved over time, every new departure, especially a breakthrough such as the one before you today, must start somewhere. The longest of great marches must always begin with a first step.
God forbid if the tragic terrorist event that happened in Manchester had happened in Canada, the proposed committee of parliamentarians whose founding statute you now consider would allow Canadian parliamentarians to meet with senior intelligence and police intelligence officials, inquire as to what they knew and when they knew it, how long the suicide bomber had been on their radar, and what the various intelligence services and police forces did with the information they had.
If there were deficiencies either in joint planning or information sharing, and changes were necessary to prevent any such deficiencies from happening again, the proposed committee before you could issue an interim report that would go directly to the Prime Minister of Canada and then briefly thereafter to the Parliament and people of Canada. This is not, members of the committee, just about process. It is about better outcomes to keep Canadians more secure.
Moreover, when holding those hearings the security-cleared parliamentarians appointed by the Prime Minister would have agency and service heads share real information, not diluted because those appearing before you had security clearances prohibiting them from sharing that information, as has been the experience of this committee over the years with distinguished members of the military and other security services that simply were not allowed to share information because of the differential in the security clearances between them and the members of this committee.
This is often what happens when officials appear before normal parliamentary committees. Officials are bound by their oaths of secrecy and cannot share information that might be leaked, wittingly or otherwise, in ways that imperil their sworn duty to protect the national and individual security and safety of Canadians.
When I had the great privilege some decades ago of serving as a prime minister's chief of staff, I had a very high security clearance, and my duties with respect to secrecy, national security and non-disclosure were very clear and very precise.
[Translation]
The central proposition is the idea of balance between parliamentary oversight and the protection of national security. In my opinion, that balance is well respected in the bill you are examining today. The principle of balance is essential to this new instrument for monitoring our national security.
[English]
There are important firsts in this bill. The fact that the new committee of parliamentarians will determine its own government-wide agenda is new and unprecedented in our NATO partners. The fact that civilian, military and border protection intelligence and security issues will be open for this committee's review and oversight; the fact that there be a well-funded administrative and support mechanism, which I think should be largely under the committee's control, where expertise and in-depth experience can be assembled to assist the committee; and the fact that other non-parliamentary review mechanisms, such as SIRC, can share material with the national intelligence and security committee of parliamentarians, are all important firsts never before available to Canadian parliamentarians and our historic departures.
Were I to offer respectful suggestions for your review, recommending a vice-chair of the committee be considered and be from the Senate would be something I commend to your consideration. In any observations you might choose to offer in this committee's report back to the Senate, you might also offer views on the specific regulations that will need to be passed to make the new committee operational and bring it into operation as quickly as possible.
Wording that was permissive with respect to adding another senator as opposed to directive might also be constructive in terms of ensuring a better balance, which I strongly support, without getting into the difficulties about the Royal Recommendation and what that does to bills that come from this place to the other place.
Parliamentary privilege, which per force has to be set aside for the new committee to respect secrecy necessary for in camera sessions to be productive and for a genuine trust to be built between security agencies, the new committee is not, in my view, a meaningful price to pay for the principle of parliamentary oversight. Without exclusion from parliamentary privilege, there cannot be a free and open exchange of vital information parliamentarians have the right to have. The notion that privilege would not cover the protection of that particular information, in my view, I submit respectfully, is not a high price to pay.
In the end, the execution of measures to protect national security at the federal level is the purview of the government of the day and specifically of the prime minister of the day, whichever political party is in office. A special committee of parliamentarians needs to be bound by all the provisions of secrecy and respect for national security, as are the officials who work for the executive branch in its agencies while advancing and protecting our national security for those who might appear before the committee.
Seeking an undertaking from the Minister of Public Safety that the present government would not permit agency heads who are invited to unreasonably decline to appear would also strengthen the committee's reach and range.
In any definition of national security in a democracy, certainly any definition that I have ever advanced, national security promoted by various state organizations, ministries, agencies, laws, regulations, analytics, intelligence, prophylactic and police agencies, along with those of our democratic allies, is not only about protecting Canadians from intimidation, physical harm, threats, unlawful subversion or violence. It is about protecting the freedom from fear, fundamental to the operation of a democracy.
One of the two freedoms embraced in the Atlantic Charter that was agreed to by Messrs. Churchill and Roosevelt off the coast of Newfoundland in August 1941, some 75 years ago, those freedoms, which included freedom from want, were about democracy and the economic opportunity it generated as a basis for the post-war free world.
Protecting democracy is the central purpose of national security in a democratic country. That engagement cannot be achieved without democratic oversight by parliamentarians of all of our national security instruments. That is what Bill C-22 initiates for the first time in Canadian history, and that is why I argue it is very important. I commend this law to your most positive consideration. As Prime Minister Mulroney said when his government negotiated the free trade agreement with the United States, we should not let the perfect be the enemy of the good.
Bill C-22 is not perfect but undue delay in search of the perfect might imperil the entire venture, a venture for which the present government campaigned in an open election and for which it received a clear democratic mandate. I am glad to take any questions or personal attacks you care to offer.
The Chair: Thank you very much, senator. I see now that we have Senator Dallaire on video conference. I'm sorry we're starting a bit late. I would ask everyone to be brief with their questions and brief with their responses so we can make best use of our time.
Senator Dallaire, I understand you have some opening remarks.
Lieutenant-General (Retired) the Honourable Roméo Dallaire, former senator, as an individual: I will do everything I can, Mr. Chair, to be brief also, although that's not my forte.
Ladies and gentlemen of the committee, senators and colleagues, I would like to reinforce what Senator Segal has presented to you from the mention of a practitioner and the absence of tools being able to provide, in my opinion, committee and ultimately government with an appropriate level of analysis of situations that can in fact put our country in peril.
We have moved away from the Cold War, from the very near-simplistic scenarios of the Eurocentric bipolar world in which the processes well laid out by John le Carré and the rest of the well-known gang that in fact applied for security on both sides.
We stumbled in the 1990s into an era of enormous ambiguity and complexity in all different domains from outright security forces through to economics, to culture, to abuse of ethnic and even to religious power-sharing. We have seen numbers of countries implode. We have seen massive abuses of human rights that have been perpetrated in countries but have also gone beyond borders. We're in an era where in fact we are nearly without borders, as our own country is facing threats by recruitment of extreme violence organizations of our young people in this country.
The security of our nation is based on the very strong premise of knowing what's going on or its intelligence capability. It is the framework upon which any operational decision can be taken by any agency, and certainly ultimately by governments, in order to have a picture of what is there and what they can do to resolve it.
Intelligence organizations by nature are very reclusive and very protective. Although they are strong in their analysis and they are strong in collating information, they are extremely weak in disseminating that information even internally through their own organization, let alone wanting to disseminate or pass that information on to sister organizations in the same country and let alone to allies.
We have a situation where we even have police forces and military forces in operational theatres not trusting each other because they aren't sure if their sources will be protected and they will be able to apply the proper decisions.
I state all that because unless a body is overseeing, supervising, monitoring and providing guidance to the multitude of intelligence-gathering capabilities that we have in this country, and in any of the modern countries, we will see gaps. We will see interpretations that are at odds, without our being able to bring a resolution because we have no tool to resolve except from a ministerial point of view.
I would argue that the executive in that context doesn't have the overarching engagement I would think essential for us to be able to guide ultimately the right decisions in a right and timely fashion. This committee, this incredibly essential committee, has been a bugbear ever since the day I became deputy chair of the defence committee and even chair of the veterans committee.
Fellow senators, as a three-star general, I had levels of security that the terms are within themselves I think secure, but the minute I walked into the Senate and into the committee, I became blind and had no depth into the extremely complex scenarios which were being faced to provide guidance and recommendations to government, let alone to affect legislation. To me, it made absolutely no sense whatsoever that you could not go in depth, beyond generic policy points, to be able to hold people accountable but also to get the proper information to take the right decisions and provide the right recommendations to government.
We cannot keep parliamentarians blind in this era of enormous complexity and ambiguity in which we don't know from what angle, from what direction or from what source threats can come. We don't have an integrated capability, an instrument to integrate intelligence and be able to hold intelligence agencies accountable should that ever come to fruition.
Building on the current commissions and providing that capability overriding by parliamentarians is to me the most efficient but also the most responsible position the government can take toward its people in guaranteeing that even intelligence-based policing will be coordinated and will be brought to bear in order to provide solutions to the complexity we're facing in deciding how to move our resources and ultimately save lives, including those who serve overseas in operational theatres.
Thank you very much.
The Chair: Thank you, senator. As I said at the beginning, time has passed us by to some degree so I would ask the questions, with their preambles, to be brief and to the point. I would sincerely ask my ex-colleagues, Senator Segal and Senator Dallaire, to be brief in their answers so that all members have the opportunity to ask their questions and we get the necessary information on the record.
Senator Jaffer: Thank you to Senator Dallaire and Senator Segal for the work you have done on this issue for so many years and for presenting today.
As you know, one huge challenge is that we have balance in our oversight of intelligence agencies and promote the protection of Canadian civil liberties, essential freedoms and privacy, consistent with our Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Many believe that clause 8 should be amended to explicitly state that the committee's mandate includes reviewing national security and intelligence activities to ensure conformity to Canada's international human rights obligations. I heard both of you saying it's not perfect. I'm not wanting to put words in your mouth, but I understand you are saying is: "Let's start with this and then we can look at amending.''
The communities I represent are concerned if this is enough. Will the committee understand that the mandate is based on our Charter of Rights and Freedoms? I'd like to hear from both of you on that.
Mr. Segal: Senator, thank you for that very important question. This is a committee, if it is established, that will be setting up a new source of tension within the Government of Canada, within the operations of the Government of Canada. That tension, in some measure, will reflect precisely the points that you just raised between the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, presumption of innocence, very important fundamental principles, and the protection of our national security.
While there may in fact be immense merit in the recommendation that you have suggested with respect to clause 8, my view is that any committee appointed by the Prime Minister, which reflects the talents and the skillsets of both the chamber in which we are now and the other place, will have within it individuals who will share those views and will apply them distinctly, without the need for statutory encouragement to do so. This is what I think Canadians have the right to expect.
Lt.-Gen. Dallaire: I would argue, senator, that this parliamentary oversight is in fact going to prevent the freelancing and is going to prevent any agency from in fact moving in directions that may offend the human rights and the Charter responsibilities. It can be held accountable in doing so, in real time, because the committees that exist now are after-the- fact committees. They can't get into the heart of the operational side and don't influence the battle, if I may use the term. This can actually hold these different agencies accountable. In so doing, you'll get a far more direct and immediate response than what we have been able to give anybody in the past.
The Chair: Colleagues, we are going to limit you to one question because we have a long list of senators wanting to ask questions. You'll have one question and then we'll have to move on to the next senator.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: First, I want to welcome my two former colleagues. It was a pleasure for me to work with them.
Given the importance of the matters it addresses, this parliamentary committee should continue operating when Parliament is dissolved. Is the composition of eight MPs and three senators the best format? How do we prevent a gap from occurring given the number of MPs who might not return after an election? Based on your extensive experience, do you have any suggestions for preventing a gap that an election might create on this committee?
Mr. Segal: There is a strong balance on the British committee between the House of Lords and the House of Commons, which underscores the principle you just mentioned. In the first year of the committee's operation, there will be many questions about the triggering of elections, and we will consider how to continue the committee's proceedings. We now have legislation that gives us an answer, but we will have to find a way to continue our work.
If the government wants to maintain its credibility over the importance of this committee, it will find positive solutions. Otherwise, it will not be taken seriously. In my opinion, the government's current commitment is very serious.
Lt.-Gen. Dallaire: Senator Dagenais, I would say that the continuity model remains in the hands of the senators and the secretariat that will be established and will work in the shadows during the government changeover period. In those circumstances, the risk will be assessed before the election is held and the committee will be able to resume thereafter.
I would like there to be a better balance. However, I believe the continuity being put in place is reasonable in the current circumstances.
Senator Saint-Germain: Senator Dallaire and Senator Segal, you both have experience in public governance. More particularly, General Dallaire, you have extensive and widely noted experience in the armed forces.
I am concerned about unequal powers. As you know, we very much operate in silos in national security. This is not necessarily unique to Canada, but it is what we observe. Committee members will have supervised access to information, a lower level of access than members of the Security Intelligence Review Committee or the Commissioner of the Communications Security Establishment of Canada. They will also have no power to compel witnesses and thus no subpoena authority.
Based on your experience, how do you think this legislative reality can be offset? Would an amendment be necessary? How else could we establish a balance among the forces within the committee in its access to essential information?
Mr. Segal: I do not think an amendment is the best way to protect an equality of power. The best way to protect it is to have a committee that, from the outset, states its wish to establish equality among the forces within government. The committee's powers will always focus on protecting the public interest by this direct action. That will create tension and put pressure on the government of the day. Will its response be positive? Will it reject this idea of equality of forces? As the minister indicated, the problem for a government that rejects everything is that that will undermine its credibility.
In my opinion, you have to start with legislation that at least provides a platform, and you have to establish an atmosphere of trust among the members of the committee so they can work to reflect Canada's democratic values and duties.
Lt.-Gen. Dallaire: The existing commissions have very specific powers and prepare their reports based on obsolete data. In the intelligence world, those entities can provide the essential picture that has to be corroborated before the basic decisions can be made. There is a whole set of sources, and this committee will be the envy of all intelligence organizations because it will have access to many sources of information.
Otherwise the departments will respond, but the subpoena is something that should be considered. However, as we have seen, the British do not need it, and they have operated that way for a very long time. Lastly, I would say that the committee will meet needs much more effectively than these commissions whose powers are far too limited.
[English]
Senator White: Thanks to both of you. Obviously, retirement makes you look better. Glad to see both of you here today.
My question actually refers to access to information and whether or not you believe this allows the proposed committee to access the information required, in comparison to some of the oversight bodies that I would argue have more access to information than this committee will.
Do either of you have any recommendations as to changes that might be required or whether you believe it does provide enough information?
Mr. Segal: Senator, thank you for that question. I don't think there is anything in the content of the bill which limits the ability of the committee that has been conceived in the act, Bill C-22, to set out a very aggressive course about what it needs to see and has to do its job. As Senator Lankin will know from her vast experience on SIRC, those other agencies you refer to are review bodies that often look back at events and into what transpired to report appropriately to see whether rule of law, human rights and the Charter have been respected, which is a very important function.
I must say that from the beginning I have always thought this bill is about what we are doing now about our national security going forward. What are the plans? What are the strategies? What are the budgets? What is the capacity? What are the information sources we need?
In that context, in my view, the committee has a very clear opportunity. I would say, without being presumptuous, it has a responsibility to articulate a very broad reach of information they will need to come to those conclusions for the report they make from time to time to Parliament through the Prime Minister and to the Canadian public.
I would argue that whether or not ATI, or access to information, is embraced as something which is operational at every level is interesting but not germane to the actual work of the committee.
Lt.-Gen. Dallaire: Ditto with what Senator Segal is saying. I went through a lot of thinking, as an example, with regard to the military and the field operations of both the other agencies and the military and our ability to look into their future planning. The whole aim is how we will be effective in the future in anticipating what's coming down the road and to proactively curtail it or, hopefully, prevent it from ever happening.
Yes, I have given in to the argument that when you have people in the field whose lives are significantly at risk there are certain limits you must consider, particularly when you have a lot of special operations going on.
The parameters in the paragraph surrounding that dimension seemed to me to be at a reasonable level. It would guarantee that we'd get enough information without having to go to the access route, which in itself has limitations on the ability to get an answer in a timely fashion.
[Translation]
Senator Moncion: My question is further to that of Senator Saint-Germain concerning governance. Of all the witnesses I have heard to date in committee meetings I have attended as part of the study of new bills, you are the only one who has ever talked about governance.
You talked about regulations for the purpose of implementing this bill; regulations include all the implementation and all responses to concerns often raised by provisions that have not been adequately drafted. For what sectors or parameters do you anticipate these kinds of regulations, which would address concerns about access and quantities of information to be received?
Mr. Segal: Thank you for your question. I would respectfully say that the creation of detailed regulations by a subcommittee of the government or the Privy Council is one thing but that establishing the basic principles that must govern those regulations, the principles that you have already discussed, is still one of the options that you should consider as members of this committee.
I hope that, in the observations section of the report you table in the Senate before third reading of the bill, you will have an opportunity to set forth detailed observations about the regulations and founding principles that must be complied with. I think that could serve as a guiding instrument for the government.
I just heard the minister say it might be difficult to set up the agency. If it does not comply with the principles set forth in good faith by this committee, it might be even more difficult for it to do its work. This is an opportunity for the government and for this committee to emphasize the principles concerning the details, operations, and oversight that the present government will have to comply with.
Lt.-Gen. Dallaire: This agency will have to learn about existing bills and regulations so it can determine how to acquire the ability to draw on all individual channels so that these people can enjoy the protection they need to do their work. I think the regulations will evolve and require clarification by the government to assist the various organizations in abiding by the spirit of the legislation, which will enable them to act in accordance with regulations that work and not with those that, on the contrary, might be restrictive and ultimately prevent the committee from acting. In other words, the implementation is up to you, but I think you will have to learn to come up with solutions in what I believe is the not-too-distant future.
[English]
Mr. Segal: I have just a small addition, if I may. There is a wonderful story about Mr. Churchill sitting across the House of Commons when a newly elected member joins him, looks across the way and says, "There is the enemy,'' and Churchill says, "No, no, no, that's your opponent. The enemy is sitting right behind you.''
If you choose to lay out the principles around regulation, it's very important that you do not give Treasury Board the opportunity to decide the normal financial requirements will apply to this committee as they do to every other department because the normal financial requirements can't apply to our national security agencies.
If this committee is to do a competent job in overseeing what they do, they have to have a measure of financial freedom within reason that would not be prescribed by well-meaning but disconnected from reality Treasury Board analysts, one of the great challenges all governments face, and this government as well as any.
[Translation]
Senator Boisvenu: Welcome to our former colleagues. It is good to see you again looking so well.
I am going to discuss topics that have previously been addressed in a different way and that concern information management. We know this bill affords the government and its prime minister considerable leeway in the management of information, in determining what may or may not circulate. We know that, horizontally, this bill will affect many organizations and that a lot of delicate information concerning Canada's security will therefore be exchanged.
I have read the bill. Earlier you said that Canada was the only country that did not have such a committee. However, if we compare ourselves to other countries, do we have any indicators regarding privacy and the protection of personal information? The Privacy Commissioner raised this concern. Have other countries established clearer guidelines for the exchange and transmission of information than what we have provided for in this bill? I would like to hear your views on that subject.
Mr. Segal: The committees that other countries such as our NATO allies, for example, have struck have extensive experience. They have established standards, concerns and work methods that have created certain expectations.
What we have before us is a blank slate. In other words, the new committee will have an opportunity to establish its own ways of managing information. If I understand the challenge correctly, the committee will be formed by the Prime Minister of Canada and will consist of members from both houses, who will have the necessary security clearances to access all important and available information. Being invited to appear before this committee, as the head of an agency, for example, will be different from being invited to appear before a parliamentary committee.
It will be different from a committee that might perhaps be guided by partisan considerations. This committee will enjoy all the importance conferred on it by the legislation, by Bill C-22 and an appointment by the Prime Minister. This will create serious expectations. If the government prevents certain information from reaching the committee, as the minister indicated, the committee will have a right to request the reason publicly, and that will cause fundamental problems for the government.
I think they will try to avoid those kinds of problems for the first three or four years. There will be some tension, which is good for democracy, but also for compliance with the mandate of the committee, which will be working for the people of Canada.
Lt.-Gen. Dallaire: The nature of the beast being what it is, there can be no doubt that all intelligence agencies will be very nervous about the concerns you just stated. It will take a lot of finesse and learning, which will be essential to guaranteeing security. In the same context, however, I would simply like to point out that committees will too often be more concerned than the agency about their rules of engagement. People tend to be more restrictive than to use the powers they have been granted to the full. Only with time will they exercise their powers to the full extent.
With a statutory committee that enjoys all these protections, our first concern should be to ask ourselves whether committee members will really want to push the envelope and seek that information from agencies that are not used to being consulted. Second, will they trust each other enough to base their responses on responses that have been pooled and not individualized, or ultimately even forgotten?
[English]
Senator Lankin: Thanks to both of you for appearing here today. I would like to pursue and expand upon, particularly Senator Segal, a couple of things that have been said. You spoke about two things. One was a financial framework that's different from Treasury Board's framework with other entities and organizations.
I would like to you to expand on that a bit because when I see SIRC, or even the service or the RCMP, they are under Treasury Board financial framework and national security doesn't change that in terms of what their interest is. What is your concern and what can we do about that?
You also spoke about the focus of this committee. In all your comments, it seemed to be more on the area of national security and following intelligence or looking at an incident that has happened or whatever. When Senator Jaffer asked you a question, you talked about human rights and Charter compliance.
I do not want to duplicate, but when I look at the mission of SIRC as an example I think it is key. This is the only body that will be able to pan across the various security entities. Information sharing, joint task forces, and the things going on within our security services, the Five Eyes partners and other partners in specific situations have potential. We have already seen things that have been hidden from SIRC and other places as a breach of Charter rights.
Are you saying it's less important for this committee? I would like you to expand on that, please.
Mr. Segal: Let me talk about perhaps one of the instruments that could be available to this committee. When it's constituted the committee could make a decision, if it chose to do so, to have a memorandum of understanding with the Clerk of the Privy Council with respect to what has to be different between this committee and other agencies of government. This is not an agency of Parliament. It is very clearly an agency of government.
That's where some of those issues can be addressed. With respect to being involved in a detailed investigation about perspective threats to our national security, that may require more financial capacity and time than is normally budgeted for. There should be a mechanism whereby that matter can be addressed by the committee's leadership of the committee and the Clerk of the Privy Council so that work can in fact take place. That is a completely reasonable proposition that any Clerk of the Privy Council would want to be supportive of, understanding there is a debate and it's not automatic.
With respect to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and those issues, it is quite the contrary. I actually think this will be the one committee that is security cleared and has the ability to ask questions about activities that may in fact have unwittingly violated the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which heretofore officials could not be frank with the previous committees about because they did not share the same security clearance.
That information would have to be forthcoming. Then the committee could make strong recommendations to Parliament and to the people of Canada, through the Prime Minister's Office, about what is acceptable and what is not. It can also make recommendations to the Attorney General in any circumstance where in their view an investigation should be pursued about criminal or other charges that might be laid. That is not a power which exists for any parliamentary committee in Canada with respect to matters of national security.
Senator McPhedran: Thank you both very much for being here. I want to gear my question to both your expertise and experience with operations.
First,I have a point of clarification, Senator Segal. Did you say that the secretariat should not report primarily to the committee?
Mr. Segal: No, I said quite the contrary. I said that when I worked in a Prime Minister's Office a thousand years ago, we used to say, "machinery of government was where good ideas went to die.'' It was not because they are bad people but because they are more interested in how and when, and not about the why. In my view a lot of what governments should be about is the why.
While machinery of government will say we have to look at appointments, salaries, ranking, status and all that legitimate stuff, the actual direction of that secretariat in what it does, what its priorities are and what matters it pursues would be the purview of the committee, or else it is not serving the interests of the committee.
That is the kind of matter that would be well addressed in a memorandum of understanding between the committee and the Clerk of the Privy Council because the machinery of the government secretariat reports to the Clerk of the Privy Council. This committee is appointed by the Prime Minister and the clerk reports to the Prime Minister. There is a coming together there.
If the value is real, i.e. a committee that is supposed to do its job effectively and get administrative and investigative support in that process, then in that context they should be more than keen to have a memorandum of understanding which respects the role of this committee in directing the agency. However, matters of salary and rank and all the rest have to be sorted out by the machinery of the government in the normal way.
Senator McPhedran: This then is my question to both of you, please, from your different perspectives: Do either one of you have a concern that you think should be rectified in the law to make sure the secretariat is not driving the committee?
Mr. Segal: Let me just say that I think there is a risk of that. However, if as one of its first matters of priority the committee lays out its request for a memorandum of understanding to keep that from happening, it sets up the risks for the government in letting the agency drive the committee's work as opposed to the other way around.
Lt.-Gen. Dallaire: I will reinforce the fact that the senators and MPs sitting on that committee will feel empowered and indeed demanding of the secretariat for material to make these very difficult decisions and recommendations. I don't think the secretariat will ever have a mirror independent policy.
It will be really a supportive agency and in so doing it will be what the committee wants and not what it thinks it should have.
The Chair: We're coming to a conclusion and I want to follow up on the question of the secretariat because I think it's important.
It's clearly stipulated in the legislation how the executive director is appointed, by whom it is appointed, and by its rank in respect to the pecking order that you referred to earlier, Senator Segal. It's very clear in the way the secretariat is set out here that it will be reporting, in my judgment, to the Privy Council or the Prime Minister's Office depending on how it's designated vis-à-vis the responsibility.
If this committee is to be in an arm's-length situation from the Privy Council and prepared to be able to do the job they are asking them to do, it would seem to me the executive director's prime responsibility would be to report to the chair and the committee in order to ensure that we get independence of information when required. Similar to what Senator Lankin talked about regarding information sometimes not being brought forward at an appropriate time, as opposed to an arm's- length situation where it may well have to come forward.
My question is in respect to this legislation and the way it is written. I would like to hear your comment. I would submit that there should be an amendment to ensure the executive director and their staff report to the committee as opposed to any office within the Prime Minister's Office. Your comments, please.
Mr. Segal: I would oppose that amendment, and let me say why. First, it is one of the amendments that would have the capacity of derailing the bill completely and having the whole project lost. That would be a great diminution of our democratic remit on the issue of national security in terms of parliamentary democracy.
Second, we all know of circumstances where the CEO of an organization is responsible to a chairman of the board, but there is a joint assessment of how effective that person is being in discharging the duties they are expected to discharge.
There would be nothing to stop the new committee and its chair from saying, "Here are our expectations,'' making it clear to the Privy Council Office that they will be assessing the performance of the agency against those expectations, as they will be in assessing whether the particular head of the agency should or should not be reappointed.
Think about the dynamics: A government sets up a committee and gives it powers that never existed before, has an agency, and after the two years, for whatever reason, the members of the committee say, "This agency is not serving our purposes.''
The government will want to have a joint reflection with the chairman of the committee and his colleagues relative to what constitutes appropriate performance for the agency and the agency head. In that context, you must have a dotted line where there may be a reporting relationship in terms of finances and administrative issues and expense accounts to one place, but in terms of purpose, achievement, activity and goals, that has to be to the absolute chairman of the committee.
The Chair: Senator Dallaire, do you have a comment? I'm about to call this panel to a conclusion.
Lt.-Gen. Dallaire: Only to reinforce that the chair of the committee will hold that head of the secretariat to account like we've not seen in many other occasions because of the nature of the information, the sense of security, the sense of safety, and ultimately the decisions coming out of the committee that will influence the Prime Minister directly.
I do not think there will be room for the head of that secretariat to be able to do any freelancing at all. In fact the chair of that committee will hold him or her very much accountable to meeting their requirements in the first instance.
The Chair: Colleagues, I would like to thank Senator Segal and Senator Dallaire for taking time out of their busy schedules. As Senator White said, it looks like retirement is doing both of you well. It is very nice to have you come before us to contribute to a worthwhile, important national debate.
Just before we begin with our next witness, I would remind you that after we've concluded this panel we will go in camera for a few minutes to discuss the recommendations on Bill C-44, which is the finance pre-study we did a number of weeks ago. You all have copies of it. It has been distributed. I wanted to let you know that will be the next order of business.
I would like to welcome Mr. Therrien to the proceedings.
I understand that you have opening remarks. Please proceed.
[Translation]
Daniel Therrien, Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada: Thank you for inviting me here to discuss this important piece of legislation with you.
Let me say up front that I am supportive of parliamentary oversight for security and intelligence activities. To retain the public's trust, Canada needs expert oversight — which we have in part, although it is not perfect — and parliamentary oversight that alone can provide non-partisan democratic legitimacy.
In my brief remarks today, I will set out what in my view should be the desirable characteristics of an effective parliamentary oversight regime, how the bill before you may fall short, but why my recommendation is that you adopt the bill nevertheless.
To ensure effective review, the proposed committee should be given as wide a mandate as possible and as unfettered access to information as possible. As such, the committee should ideally not be subject to limits in relation to information that would be injurious to national security. By analogy, courts that review the legality of activities of national security agencies can review most security-sensitive information, subject to exceptional ministerial certification under the Canada Evidence Act. When courts issue judgments on the legality of certain activities there can be redactions, but these redactions are decided by judges, not the government. I would advocate for similar standards for the committee.
In terms of the exceptions to access outlined in sections 14 and 16, while I accept that there may be little need for the committee to know, say, the names of witnesses or confidential sources, I believe that exceptions should be as limited as possible. I am particularly concerned with the carve-out in clause 16(1)(a) for "special operating information,'' defined in the Security of Information Act. This category includes purely operational information that the committee would not require to fulfil its broader mandate, but it also includes information of a more general nature, which may raise policy issues, such as "the means used. . . to covertly obtain. . ., analyze, process. . ., report, communicate or otherwise deal with information,'' potentially leaving the committee in the dark regarding the very work it has been charged to oversee.
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More generally, the bill falls short of what I would consider ideal, in that national security could be invoked by the government to limit the committee's mandate, clause 8; access to information, clause 16; and the ability to report findings to Canadians, clause 21.
However, I acknowledge that the bill was improved in the House of Commons, in that reliance on national security as a limit to the committee's activities will have to be explained by the government in formal reasons. This should serve as an important safeguard against overreliance on the national security exception by the government.
Finally, I know that my office is not among the listed review bodies. Given the fact that information, including personal information, is the lifeblood of national security agencies, my office has a relevant role to play in ensuring that a proper balance is struck between security and human rights. Consequently, in my view, it would be desirable if my office were added to the list of oversight bodies with which information could be shared by the committee. If this cannot be achieved in the current bill, we hope it will be in the legislation the government has promised to amend the Anti-terrorism Act, 2015.
However, I should like to point out that even with the shortcomings identified this bill represents important progress and will address a long-needed gap. On balance, my recommendation would be to adopt it now; assess its effectiveness when it becomes reality; and amend it, if necessary, after a few years of implementation.
There is a risk that limitations to mandate and access to information would deprive the committee of the tools required for effective review, but these risks were reduced through amendments made by the House of Commons.
Importantly, in my view, overreliance on exceptions would likely come at a political price for the government of the day. Ultimately, while the bill before you is not perfect, it represents important progress and in my respectful view you should adopt it.
I would be happy now to answer any questions you may have.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Therrien.
Senator Jaffer: Thank you very much, Mr. Therrien. Thank you for always being here and making yourself available.
Most of us are appreciative of this bill. In the enthusiasm of wanting to pass this bill, as you mentioned in your opening remarks as well, one of the concerns I have is that just this year the government expanded the Five Eyes intelligence network to share 1.2 million confidential Canadian files per year with its international partners.
Worse yet, at least from my information, it expanded the program without even having to conduct a simple privacy impact assessment, despite the very sensitive nature of the files we are sharing. These assessments are considered mandatory for the Treasury Board, yet they never happen.
My concern, Mr. Therrien, is under subclause 8(b), to which you referred as well, the committee of parliamentarians cannot review any subjects related to ongoing operations if the appropriate minister deems the review would be injurious to national security. As you know, these ongoing operations could be for a very long period of time.
We are under the impression that the committee is not able to oversee many things. I'm worried the restrictions in subclause 8(b) will prevent the committee of parliamentarians from truly acting as an oversight body. I would like to hear how you feel about this.
Mr. Therrien: As I said, the bill is not perfect. One way to look at parliamentary oversight is to analogize it to court review. You have three branches of government. With this bill, Parliament would be given the mandate to oversee national security activities conducted by the executive branch. When courts, another branch of government, review these matters as to their remit, i.e. the legality of these activities, the courts see sensitive information of a national security remit subject only to ministerial certifications under the Canada Evidence Act which are exceptionally made.
The courts review national security sensitive information, protect it, consider it and in their judgment only refer to principles that would not jeopardize national security imperatives as a consequence. Ideally, one could see the parliamentary oversight committee as having similar rules: essentially no limits, subject to exceptional limits, to access to information and no limits to mandate. The parliamentary committee would then be in a similar situation as the courts currently in their review function. That would be perhaps the ideal system.
My ultimate position is that even though that shortcoming means the bill before you is not perfect, in my view, it still represents very important progress. We have been waiting for parliamentary oversight and more comprehensive expert oversight for many years. It would undoubtedly be important progress if this bill were to be adopted.
On the question of whether the limitations this bill presents to access to information and the mandate of the committee, the proof will be in how this is actually used. At the end of the day, I would recommend that you adopt this bill, see whether the executive branch overrelies on these exceptions or uses them prudently, and based on what the government's conduct will be over the next few years, you have an opportunity with the five-year review to amend the then legislation as need be.
The Chair: If I could follow up on your question, Senator Jaffer, I think what you just described here is important: the information provided over the last week in respect of the fact that 1.2 million files were made available to our Five Eyes allies without any mandatory privacy assessment.
What are the consequences of not having the mandatory assessment? It's in the law that it's mandatory. What are the consequences?
Mr. Therrien: Actually, it's a directive. It is not a legal requirement that privacy impact assessments be conducted. It's a directive from Treasury Board that new initiatives of the government which have privacy implications be sent to us for an assessment. Nevertheless, we should have received this proposal before it was actually implemented.
There is no legal consequence because it's a directive and not a law. In the context of potential amendments to the Privacy Act, we have proposed that this requirement become a legal requirement because we think it's important that privacy risks be assessed early on in the development of programs such as this one.
There is no legal consequence at this point, but there is obviously a risk that privacy violations or sharing of information with other states would occur that might not be consistent with privacy legislation. We are told by Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, IRCC, that we will receive an assessment from them shortly.
We're happy with that, but at this point we don't have information on the expansion of this agreement beyond the U.S. to the other three members of the Five Eyes.
The Chair: Just to clarify, you're about to do a privacy assessment in respect to the information that has already been distributed.
Mr. Therrien: We are, as soon as we receive the information from the immigration department. We have not received it yet, but this was promised to us by the immigration department.
The Chair: What time frame are you looking at in respect to that so we have some idea?
Mr. Therrien: In the weeks following receipt of the information we'll proceed with that assessment.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: Thank you for your presentation, Mr. Therrien. My question will be brief. Could you give us three points that might undermine the trust the public should have in this kind of committee?
Mr. Therrien: I think I stated two in my preliminary remarks, including the limits on the committee's mandate. Under the bill before you, that mandate is subject to an exception. A minister could produce a certificate to prevent a matter that would be injurious to national security from being reviewed. In a way, it is somewhat contradictory for a committee charged with reviewing activities related to national security to have certain activities removed from the scope of its mandate on the ground that the matter may be injurious to national security. Once again, everything depends on the way that limit is exercised. In the House of Commons, the bill was amended to require the government to provide reasons for that decision. I consider that a significant protection from abuse.
At any event, the committee's access to information would be limited in some cases under clause 16 in particular. Once again, national security could be invoked to ensure the committee does not have access to certain information that otherwise would be necessary for its review. In theory, this is a significant limit that might raise questions about the integrity of the process. Everything will depend on how that is exercised.
The bill would create a committee of parliamentarians rather than a parliamentary committee, the distinction being that the committee in question would report to the Prime Minister rather than directly to Canadians or to Parliament. In Great Britain, for example, the equivalent of this committee reports directly to Parliament and to the public without going through the Prime Minister. This also raises questions. Once again, the bill is not perfect. I think the exceptions that are made could be problematic. I do not want to presume or speculate as to whether those exceptions will be abused. Ultimately, I think we will have to wait and see. Having this committee constitutes significant progress. Despite some reservations we might have relative to some ideal, I believe the time has come to adopt this kind of mechanism.
Senator Dagenais: Would you say there is no problem if the control comes from the Prime Minister's Office?
Mr. Therrien: When you look at the bill's provisions, you see that the Prime Minister's Office would exercise control in certain ways, in particular by withdrawing certain matters for national security reasons. Once again, if the government abuses its power, there will be a public debate and presumably a political price to pay. That is possible if the Prime Minister, through his officials, restricts information that is used in a public committee report, but, once again, there will be a price to pay.
The Prime Minister has an important role to play from a mechanical standpoint. In practice, it will depend on how those limits are exercised. I think we will have to wait and see about that.
Senator Dagenais: He should not abuse his power in the interest of national security.
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Senator Beyak: You answered most of my questions with your responses to Senator Dagenais.
I was wondering if you think the redaction powers of the Prime Minister are a little excessive. How would the public be made aware of the reasons the Prime Minister redacted information?
Mr. Therrien: The public would not be made aware of the reasons because that's the whole point. The Prime Minister would say that it would jeopardize national security interests, such as the protection of sources or methods, if the information were released publicly.
That is why ultimately the decision, according to the bill, rests with the Prime Minister. The committee would have the reasons. Although the committee could not speak to the facts behind the Prime Minister's decision, the committee would be completely able to say that in its view the Prime Minister has overstepped the bounds of national security.
I think that's an acceptable balance.
Senator Beyak: What would be your office's involvement in it?
Mr. Therrien: Not according to the bill as written.
Senator Beyak: That's a concern I have, that you're not involved.
Mr. Therrien: It's a relationship between the executive branch and the parliamentary branch. We would not have a role. Ultimately, the counterweight to the Prime Minister's powers under this bill is that the committee itself would be able to speak publicly to whether it agrees or disagrees with how the exceptions have been used by the executive branch.
Senator Beyak: Thank you very much.
Senator Lankin: Just following on this conversation, I hear you say that at the end of the day, on balance, this is progress forward. You made reference to the U.K. committee. Of course, it started off as committee of parliamentarians as well. The government expressed the desire to establish some norms, relationships and protocols and to build trust. That is exactly what happened in the U.K., to the point where it is now a parliamentary committee and operates very effectively and without some of the concerns.
Until people have exposure to the information and understand the nature of the restrictions that will be placed on it, until we have that experience, we won't actually know where the government will land on this.
I'm interested in the point you raised, though, about your office's role. Does it require a change in the Royal Recommendation if you were to be brought into the legislation? Without being in the legislation, is there anything that prohibits the committee from inviting you to come and talk about scope of work or any area of concern?
Lastly, in the nature of the work you do now, as I've seen in the past, you interact where a member of the public has a concern about accessing information or a concern about redaction that has taken place in a particular report dealing with them or the protection of their privacy where it hasn't been redacted.
Do you get a chance to look into the operations of the various national security departments and agencies that would give you a heads up or a concern about breaches of privacy of members of the public?
Mr. Therrien: Would the Royal Recommendation need to be amended? I must say I have not spent a lot of time on this, but I would think, if the statute listed the Office of the Privacy Commissioner along with the three existing review bodies as review bodies with which the parliamentary committee could share information, this would provide the appropriate legal authorization for that sharing of information to occur.
Could the committee call on my office even though it is not mentioned as a review body? Yes, at the policy level. There could be a discussion between the parliamentary committee and my office on policy matters, but these discussions would not be informed by a common understanding of the factual underpinning of the discussions, which I think is a real issue. There could be a level of discussion between the parliamentary committee and my office.
If I can reformulate your third question, I'm ad-libbing here. Tell me if I exaggerate the scope of your question. I take it to mean: What is the added value of the OPC to parliamentary review and the review by other oversight bodies?
A robust oversight or review system for national security agencies must be composed both of parliamentary review and expert review. There are three expert bodies listed in this legislation. They are absolute experts in their field. They have some expertise in privacy, but we are the experts in privacy. I think robust review comes from adding the expertise of a number of players, Parliament being one because it provides democratic legitimacy. Expertise in relation to some national security agencies will be more often before the committee. Those are SIRC, OCSEC and the RCMP review committee.
It also means the Office of the Privacy Commissioner because I think we have something to add, which is privacy expertise. What is at play often in the activities of these national security agencies is personal information. That is directly our domain of expertise and, for that reason, I think we should have a role to play.
Senator Jaffer: Privacy Commissioner Therrien, you have in the past talked about the Protecting Canadians from Online Crime Act and how government and law enforcement can spy on activities online and over telecommunications with nothing more than reasonable grounds to suspect that an offence will be committed in the future.
I heard what you said earlier on. Yes, this exists and we need to give it time. Would you still repeat the same, "Let's give the oversight committee some time to see how it works?'' Are you still comfortable with business as usual?
Mr. Therrien: With respect, it would not be business as usual. It would not be ideal. There are a number of shortcomings, but it would not in my view be business as usual. That's why I say that on balance, even though this is not exactly the bill I would have drafted, it is very significant progress. It is not business as usual.
My recommendation is to proceed with this bill to see how it's applied, what kinds of benefits it presents, and whether certain exceptions are overused by government. You would have an opportunity in five years' time to review the legislation.
Senator Jaffer: The concern I have is that all of us will go away thinking that now we have oversight and sleep more comfortably knowing that there is someone protecting our interests. Not really, because if there is an ongoing operation the government or intelligence agencies can still spy. There is no oversight because it's an ongoing operation. In that ongoing operation they can still share your information with partners; they can still spy on you; and because it's ongoing operations, there is no oversight.
Mr. Therrien: I guess we're back to how these exceptions will be used by government. Yes, the fact that ongoing operations, certain ongoing operations, could be removed from the committee's jurisdiction is less than ideal, but even during the time when this ongoing operation is happening the committee would be able to hear from government, from ministers, and from officials on the laws and policies relevant to the operation in question.
Some of the operational details would not be reviewed, but the mandate of the committee includes laws, whether policies are effective and whether agencies have the right financial framework for their operations. All of these important issues could be reviewed by the committee even during an ongoing operation, but some of the very specific details would not be subject to review during the period of the operation. As soon as the operation was no longer happening, then even that would be subject to parliamentary review.
Yes, there are limits to what the committee would see, but I see the glass as more half-full than half-empty.
The Chair: We're going to come to a conclusion, but I just want to make a point. The legislation that has been brought forward has taken the United Kingdom model into account. Just so everyone understands, one of the mandates of the United Kingdom's committee includes "oversight of operational activity and the wider intelligence and security activities of government.'' I think that has to be of concern.
Senator Jaffer said it very well in respect to where that balance will be found and the ability of the parliamentary committee, which at this stage doesn't have a secretariat reporting to it. They report to the secretariat by the sounds of how it is set up at the present time. In my judgment they will be handcuffed to some degree with respect of trying to do the job that Parliament is asking them to do. Yet the legislation works against their being able to do that.
Another point I would make is that you do take an oath and you go through the procedures to get the necessary clearances. You have the top clearances, once again, to be able to do the job that Parliament is asking parliamentarians to do in this legislation. Yet at the same time they're being excluded from certain areas, and maybe from even from asking questions, so I think it has to be of some concern.
Mr. Therrien: Particularly with respect to your last point, parliamentarians are the only ones who can offer democratic legitimacy to this process. The parliamentarians in question would have the appropriate security clearance, so it would certainly be possible for the committee to receive the kind of operational information at play. It would be extremely legitimate to conclude that this could be protected and should be in bounds, but Senator Lankinreferred to the fact that in Britain the evolution toward greater involvement of parliamentary committees has been a gradual process.
To me, there is no reason in principle why parliamentarians could not see operational data and information, particularly, as you say, Mr. Chair, if they have the right security clearance. The question then is: Is that something to strive for in a number of years? Is that something that is necessary for effective review to occur? Is it your sense that you would have effective review right now without this and this should be something to strive for? Ultimately it's your decision. My sense and my recommendation would be that what you have before you is important progress that should occur.
The Chair: Thank you very much. I would like to thank our witness. We very much appreciate your taking the time to come before us. I will excuse our witness.
We will take a very brief break and will go into an in-camera meeting to deal with Bill C-44, so the committee members can stay here for those purposes.
(The committee continued in camera.)