Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Issue 19 - Evidence - Meeting of February 6, 2013
OTTAWA, Wednesday, February 6, 2013
The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met this day at 4:15 p.m. to study economic and political developments in the Republic of Turkey, their regional and global influences, the implications for Canadian interests and opportunities, and other related matters.
Senator A. Raynell Andreychuk (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: Honourable senators, welcome to this meeting of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. We have witnesses before us to aid us in our study. However, before I turn to the study, I want to take a few minutes to do a presentation. I have asked Senator Downe to assist me and come up to the front.
As we know, we have been celebrating the Queen's Diamond Jubilee, and this past year has been a very special one for the Queen and for Canada. We have had the time to pause and think about Canadians who have served Canada very well in exemplary form, in the way that the Queen has performed her duties throughout the years she has been the Queen of Canada.
I am pleased this afternoon to present a medal to Adam Thompson, our clerk. I hope it is a bit of a surprise for him.
Hon. Senators: Hear, hear!
The Chair: I will not give a long bio and I did not have a long introduction — no acceptance speeches, either, I am sure. It is simply that we here in the Senate are served very well by the support staff we have. Without our clerks and without our researchers, pages and the host of workforce here in the Senate, we would not be successful as an institution. Adam has played a part in this long history of public service.
He started as a court clerk in Toronto's night traffic court when he was still studying in university, I must say. He has held other positions and has done parliamentary relations and been a briefing officer. He joined the Senate in 2000. He has worked as a committee clerk and has worked on many committees.
We are very pleased that he accepted to become part of our committee. I must say that I have heard nothing but good comments back that we have been able to handle all the requests.
Clerks are set apart when they are professional, impartial and when they have a grasp of the procedures, the practices and the culture of this institution. Adam certainly has been professional, non-partisan, knows the procedural work, understands the special needs of all senators — that we have different interests and different approaches — and has accommodated all of us in the committee while being true to the practices and procedures of Parliament.
Adam, I know that I could say much more, and I know that individual senators would want to say much more, but I simply have to stand and present you with the medal.
Senator Downe: I want to join Senator Andreychuk in her congratulations and associate myself with her comments. It was her initiative to award one of her allocations to Adam. I fully support it. My only regret is I did not think of it myself. I want to share as well her view about the tremendous assistance we receive from everyone: the Library of Parliament, the Senate staff and everyone else in making this committee effective and for doing a compelling job in the research we are asked to undertake for the Senate.
Adam, congratulations. Senator Andreychuk nominated you, and the good news is that Governor General agreed. I have a certificate from the Governor General to that effect.
Hon. Senators: Hear, hear.
The Chair: I invite the senators to join us for a photograph.
[Translation]
Senator Robichaud: I do not feel quite right about something. It is not that I disagree with giving Adam this medal. I just want to make one point: I think all the clerks of all the committees and the researchers do a wonderful job. Through thick and thin, they are always there. If it were possible and there were enough medals, I would award them to everyone. I think those people do tremendous work and they all deserve recognition.
[English]
The Chair: That is a good point, and I have taken that up. When we have presentations such as this across the country, we, of course, are included in our office, but the unsung heroes around here are the clerks, the researchers and, as I said, everyone else. They need to be noted. Many clerks have been honoured, and I think it was a personal choice of certain senators to do so. I simply thought that Adam had done a superb job. That was the feedback you gave me, so it was a collective choice.
Senator Robichaud: I am not questioning that at all, Madam Chair.
The Chair: We can now return to our study. We are the Senate committee studying the economic and political developments in the Republic of Turkey, their regional and global influences, the implications for Canadian interests and opportunities, and other related matters.
In the first part, we have, by video conference, Mr. Emiliano Alessandri, Senior Transatlantic Fellow from the German Marshall Fund.
I thank you, Mr. Alessandri, for being patient with us before we started. You have been briefed about our study, and if you have some opening remarks, we would appreciate it. We are senators and love to ask questions, so we would like to have your opening statement and then have you accept questions from the senators. We speak in both official languages, so please feel free to use French or English. Welcome to the committee.
Emiliano Alessandri, Senior Transatlantic Fellow, German Marshall Fund, as an individual: Thank you, Madam Chair. I join you from Brussels tonight. I will try to keep my remarks brief, but please interrupt me if you have questions. I will be happy to respond to any questions.
It is indeed an honour and privilege to appear before your committee today to speak about Turkey. As a European representing an institution that promotes transatlantic cooperation, let me emphasize one main point in my remarks. I think that Turkey is a very dynamic country and a very valuable ally for the United States, Canada and Europe, but, in the near future, Turkey will need the support of its transatlantic and European partners as much if not more than they will need that of Turkey. The country is facing instability all around its borders. The various regions, from the Balkans to the Middle East, of which Turkey has aimed to become the centre of gravity, are all going through crisis. The neo-Ottoman ambition that Turkey's post-Kemalist leadership has displayed since the early 2000s is proving to be unrealistic. The post- Ottoman space, if we want to use this concept, is becoming more fragmented and more conflict-prone, not less, as a result of ongoing developments in the region. There are currently no stable international balances in place and no prospect for any one actor to really stand out as a regional leader. Historically, Turkey's attractiveness and influence has rested in its being at the crossroads of different regions and people, but, as instability is widespread across all of its neighbours, including the European Union because of the Euro crisis, this very central position of Turkey has lately become a liability.
Let me focus a little bit on the Arab world. The so-called Arab Spring has created a lot of political opportunities but also ignited new conflicts in an already unstable Middle East. Ankara, at the beginning, deluded itself that it could ride the wave of change in a way, presenting itself as a source of inspiration for the many people in the region who are aiming at higher levels of development by becoming more competitive economically and by adopting more representative forms of government.
However, the falls or protracted crises of long ruling regimes, as we have seen up to and including today, have brought back a lot of the old divides and tensions, have posed a risk of protracted social strife across the region and have seen new violence, not peaceful economic and democratic political transitions.
The Syrian crisis, in particular, has revealed the limits of Turkish influence and exposed the weak grounds of its larger approach to the Arab world. Ankara has been unable to use the alleged influence it had accumulated over years of ever deeper economic and political engagement with the Assad regime since the late 1990s to broker a political solution. Turkey's initial openings were rejected, and later offers were rejected as well. The Assad regime did not respond to Turkish diplomacy, and the strong bilateral relationship that had been built has degenerated into enmity. Currently, Syria poses a lot of challenges to Turkey. Turkey is facing a major refugee crisis and the risk of increased Kurdish terrorist operations from across the border.
Before the crisis, Syria was seen as the key piece of a larger mosaic of relations that Turkey was trying to apply to its own advantage, using a newly acquired Middle Eastern leadership to gain leverage in Europe, influence in Washington and a greater say in regional and international decision making.
As a result of Arab transformations, Turkey is now facing new competitors in its own region — a region that has no stable order and knows no peace. Turkish influence could be easily accumulated in the 2000s, a time when Ankara could distance itself from very divisive U.S. policies and present itself as a different country, as the only actor truly interested in regional development and peace in the Middle East, acting as a bridge builder and as a friend of the region.
This role is much more difficult now in the currently very unstable context. A less ossified, post-Mubarak Egypt can aim to play a similar role to that which Turkey has tried to play in recent years but from within the Arab camp. Iran is already defining its role in the region in the new context. Tehran has sided with the Assad regime, which remains its proxy in the Arab world.
At the same time, there are new players or players in the region with stronger influence. The Gulf monarchies, for instance, have felt threatened by developments in the Arab world, but they also look at the transitions as a way to expand their influence in North Africa and the Middle East. They have a lot of money to back up this ambition, more money than Turkey can offer. The same is true with other players, extra-regional players ranging from China to Russia, which are either entering or re-entering the region, making the Mediterranean a more multi-polar and global space.
Honourable senators, ladies and gentlemen, there has been a lot of talk in European and American capitals about a Turkish model for the Arab Spring. This is not the first time we have talked about a Turkish model. It is probably also not the first time this is done superficially without an adequate understanding of the true strength but also the real weaknesses of Turkey.
Turkey can offer a lot of lessons. Economically, it has gone through a deep transformation, becoming a more competitive market economy. Economic growth, however, has slowed down significantly last year, and many more economists warn against the risk of the so-called middle-income trap. A lot of indicators still speak of a country that is a developing economy, with a vast informal sector, high unemployment and high dependency on foreign capital.
There are a lot of lessons other countries can learn, positive and negative. Turkey undertook significant reforms in the early 2000s to modernize its financial and banking sector, including privatizing banks. These are important lessons for Arab countries if they want to become competitive and grow. However, there are also a lot of areas in which Turkey has to show more work, including greater participation of women in the workforce, which remains at very unsatisfactory levels, and a true commitment to liberalization.
Let me briefly focus on the political situation. Again, Turkey is often portrayed as a model. In fact, the country has overall become more democratic. Ankara has managed to rebalance political and military relations, civil and military relations, which used to be skewed toward the latter, as we all know. Turkey has become a country in which the elite pay greater attention to the preferences of Turkish society, including the lower echelons, the poorer people, yet it is not a liberal democracy. Turkey has a lot of work to do when it comes to checks and balances, freedom of expression, reforming the judiciary and protecting minorities and human rights.
Recent plans to change the constitution are very important. The constitution dates back to a time when Turkey was even less democratic. There are tendencies in the country, within the ruling elite, that speak for giving more power to the president. It is unclear whether these plans will be fulfilled, but, if they will be fulfilled and pursued, Turkey will become a less democratic country, a country with even weaker checks and balances. Which way Turkey will go remains very undecided at the time of our meeting.
All of this is to say that Turkey remains an incomplete model, at best a success story in the making. I think its value rests with being an experience of positive and negative lessons. Transatlantic and European friends of Turkey should present Turkey as an experience, not as a model, and they should be as emphatic about the achievements, which are many, as they should be honest about the failures of Turkey, which are also many.
Let me conclude, honourable senators and ladies and gentlemen, by noting that a more self-confident Turkey has felt in recent years that it needs both Europe and America less than before. Membership talks with the European Union have come to a stall, not only because of European reservations but also because of the unwillingness in Ankara to fully pursue politically costly reforms. At the same time, Ankara has pursued a better relationship with the U.S. and other transatlantic partners, but the stands it has chosen on some regional issues have actually complicated Western strategy instead of facilitating it. The Euro crisis has reinforced the notion that Turkey is rising at a time when Europe is declining and that Europe and the West overall are less relevant and less appealing to Turkey.
I think a more Turkey-centric approach is as understandable as it is imprudent. It is understandable in light of the political and economic achievements of this country, but it is imprudent because Turkey still needs its traditional allies in Europe and the United States.
Very briefly, the Turkish economy has slowed down, as I said at the beginning of my remarks, and this is due in no small part because of the stagnation of the European economies. Turkey still needs European capital and a vibrant European market. Much of its exports are going to Europe, especially those that come with added value. At the same time, as we know, Turkey needs the United States and Canada and NATO for all the security challenges I just pointed out, starting with Syria.
As a matter of fact, to conclude, Turkey's future is still largely staked on its ability to keep in place those political and economic interdependencies with Europe and America that have marked its history in the past centuries. The sooner Turkish and transatlantic elites will come to terms with the potential but also the limits of Turkish power, the better I think it will be for their countries and for the future of neighbouring regions.
Thank you very much for your attention.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Alessandri. You have certainly covered a lot of ground and updated us on perspectives of Turkey. I have a list of senators wishing to ask questions.
[Translation]
Senator Fortin-Duplessis: Mr. Alessandri, I listened intently to your presentation. In regard to the question I have for you, I am not sure whether the fact that Turkey has taken in so many Syrian refugees played a negative role or had some sort of negative impact.
As far as trade and investment in Turkey go, the government has committed to improving the climate, establishing policies to boost foreign direct investment.
What can you tell us about that commitment by the Turkish government and where things stand?
Do foreign investors run into any problems when they want to invest in Turkey?
[English]
Mr. Alessandri: Thank you very much for your important question. I will try to address all the pieces of your question very briefly.
I think that the Turkish leadership, in particular since 2000, has invested a lot in making Turkey an attractive and competitive economy. It has also invested a lot in expanding the trade and investment relations of Turkey and diversifying the portfolio of Turkey. When the prime minister or foreign ministers travel to foreign countries, they always bring with them a large delegation of Turkish businessmen, sometimes in the number of 100 or 200 per trip. They have really put in a lot of effort. It is not only the political backing that economic leaders have received, but these economic leaders have grown more globally minded. Take Turkish airlines and other smaller firms that operate only regionally. They have made a lot of progress in recent years. There is a clear understanding at the political and economic level that Turkey's domestic transformation depends on being an attractive market.
I was trying to point out in my remarks that some of the political processes that are ongoing in Turkey, and some of its foreign policy engagements, may inadvertently — certainly not deliberately — create problems for Turkey moving forward.
If Turkey, at least domestically, becomes less responsive to all the different constituencies of Turkey, if Turkey continues to be a very polarized society where important sections of the population are kept out of citizenship, if Turkey is a country that continues to suffer from terrorism, as we have seen in recent years and recent days, and if Turkey cannot manage relations with Arab regimes that remain problematic, then I think all international investors will have doubts about the sustainability of what has been in the last decade a very impressive story of growth and development.
[Translation]
Senator Fortin-Duplessis: I have another question. Would you say the current government's policy on direct foreign investment is fragile, or conversely, does the policy have the backing of all Turkish parties?
Turkey will hold an election in 2014. Either the current government will be re-elected or a new party will take over and be in Parliament come 2015. If a new government were to come in, would it likely close Turkey off from foreign investors?
[English]
Mr. Alessandri: To respond to your first question, I think that all parties, broadly speaking, agree that the Turkish economy has to remain open. There is a different emphasis on what ``open'' means in terms of attracting foreign investment, but there is a broad consensus that foreign investment is critical for the country, even as the country tries to develop its own domestic capital.
As I said, Turkey has managed to successfully diversify its portfolio — its trading portfolio — and has stronger investment relations with many more countries, including distant countries such as China. It has diversified towards the Middle East but also to the Far East.
I do not think any of the parties currently represented in the Turkish parliament have an opposition to foreign investment. I think that the main opposition party, the CHP, has been a little bit slower than the current ruling party in understanding the value of Turkey's full integration into the global economy. At the same time, the current ruling party, the AKP, as I tried to say in my opening remarks, is really trying to have an impact on society and on the way the political system works. I am a little bit concerned that this very strong interventionist, sometimes populist, stance of the government may in the end interfere with the interplay — which should be free — of demand and supply of private operators in the market.
There is no doubt that the Turkish state has a very strong role in the Turkish economy. For now, that role has been aimed at supporting the Turkish economy and its globalization. What if that changes? What if, simply speaking, the government will have its own preferences as to the way the Turkish economy should develop? We are not talking still about a completely open, fully liberalized economy.
To respond to your second question about the elections, I do not think much will change in 2014. Everyone tends to agree that the ruling party will have a strong majority also in 2014, and that Prime Minister Erdogan will most likely become the next president. If that is the case, it will confirm this approach towards exports-oriented growth and keeping Turkey part of the global economy.
[Translation]
Senator Fortin-Duplessis: Mr. Alessandri, my sincerest thanks for the overview you have given us and for your answers.
[English]
Senator D. Smith: Thank you, Mr. Alessandri. I noted your comments on Turkey in recent years, having been viewed as a political model story and a success story in making it a democratic society. I think the shortcomings in the last little while are valid points. However, ironically, when you look at the neighbours in the Middle East, the only stronger democracy there is Israel.
Last night, by a fluke, I saw this conference from CIGI on the Syrian situation. One of the speakers was Paul Heinbecker. The Turkish ambassador to Canada was also talking. This is about three months ago. At the border, there were 168,000 Syrian refugees living in camps on the Turkish side and about another 80,000 Syrians living with relatives in towns and villages there. On some days, there would be several thousand more refugees per day.
How long can this go on? What is the impact on the Turkish economy if this continues, and what is your view on whether Turkey might be a little more aggressive in doing something to end this ridiculous situation in Syria? What are your thoughts on that?
Mr. Alessandri: Thank you very much. I think you raised a very important question. I tried to point out in my remarks that the Syrian crisis poses at the moment multiple challenges for Turkey. One is certainly the refugee crisis, which has major proportions and is costing Turkey a lot.
Turkey has had a very open approach to its neighbours lately. It has lifted visas with a lot of the neighbouring countries. Of course, now it is becoming more difficult to keep that attitude in place when you are confronted with so much instability and a flow of refugees into your country.
At the same time, there have been complaints in Europe that an offer was made at the beginning to help Turkey with the refugee crisis, but Turkey, at least initially, was very closed to the idea. Again, this was read as a sign that Turkey is becoming more and more proud and sometimes feels it does not really need assistance and support from other countries; it wants to show that it can handle some difficult situations by itself. However, at the same time, we are all here to see a Turkey that has challenges, as I said, that will need more help.
When it comes to the crisis of the political regime in Syria, I think that at the very beginning they really tried to broker a political solution. They realized, however, that their influence on Assad was very limited. Then they went the opposite way; they took it again as a sort of question of honour, and after feeling betrayed and after being so disappointed in the lack of influence, they went the other way and they became more aggressive, at least in terms of rhetoric.
At the same time, they were not ready to really take the lead and to really intervene militarily, let alone to do it unilaterally. Therefore, they hoped that the United States or NATO would show the same type of interest that was shown in other contexts. However, that, too, did not come. They also realized that their public opinion was not particularly excited about the prospect of an intervention in a neighbouring country. Therefore, they are now left in this limbo.
Syria was a very central piece of their Middle Eastern policy. Much of the new trade that Turkey has created with neighbouring countries in the Middle East was through Syria. The fact that now Syria is in a civil war and the fact that the two countries do not really talk to each other that much means that the entire Middle Eastern policy of growing engagement with all these different Arab regimes has become much more difficult to pursue. The impact has been very significant also economically, precisely because the Turkish-Syrian bilateral trade relationship was a very important one.
Then there are other relationships that are important, too. The Turkish-Iraqi relationship is also important, including when it comes to energy. However, Syria was a big piece of this policy and it is now failing. Turkey is probably too proud to really be able to accept support for this and at the same time is faced with allies with their own hesitations and is stuck in the middle.
That is why I pointed out in my remarks that all this should lead to a re-appreciation of the solidarity that should exist between Turkey and other countries that have been with Turkey during the Cold War, on the same side. However, I see some problems in making that cooperation really meaningful and effective. Some of it is due to the fact that there is this growing Turkish nationalism, which is shared by ruling and opposition parties alike, and this idea that Turkey can go it alone, that Turkey is not at the periphery of Europe or of the transatlantic space; it is actually at the centre of the many regions that surround it.
The problem with this view is that, yes, it is at the centre, but it is at the centre of widespread instability. Because if you take Europe, with its Euro crisis, if you take the Balkans, if you take Central Asia, if you take the Arab world, anywhere you look, you see instability and crisis. I think that should lead to a reconsideration of strategy and to more realism on the part of Turkey.
Senator Johnson: I am wondering if we could follow up a bit on their domestic political and economic developments, the focus now, as they lead up to an election. Could you comment on what possible developments regarding Turkey's political situation and its constitutional reform merit particular attention, and which will have particular significance in the months leading to the election, on the election campaign and the results? Of course, folding into that is the whole European Union issue, too.
Mr. Alessandri: Thank you very much for your questions. In terms of political developments, as you probably know, the ruling party has won three consecutive victories since 2002. It has actually strengthened its majority over the past decade, and I do not think that is going to change any time soon. People in Turkey may have different views of the government, but they all agree that their country has changed dramatically, and it has become a more competitive and fast-growing economy.
There is a group in Turkey that is associated more with the history of Turkey before these elites, rooted in Islam, took over in the 2000s, a more Kemalist, secularist group that thinks Turkey is heading in the wrong direction. However, they too would not deny that the country has changed a lot and has made a lot of progress.
I do not think numbers will change dramatically unless all this instability and the challenges I have talked about become really significant, such that the government is overwhelmed and cannot handle it. As long as the leadership of Turkey is able to cope with this instability, I think they will preserve their strong majority in the country.
The prime minister, who, as I said, is likely to become the president of the country next year, is now trying a very bold, risky attempt to negotiate and engage with the PKK, the Kurdish separatist party that is considered by both the EU and the U.S. to be a terrorist organization. This is a very important development. No one knows for sure whether real progress will be made.
Many people point out that this may be just very instrumental that Prime Minister Erdogan wants to build a new coalition to have an even larger majority in 2014 and get as much of the Kurdish vote as he can get. It has already gotten important shares of the Kurdish vote in the past, but it is trying to really broaden this majority so that if he becomes president, he can say to whoever is the prime minister — and he will most probably be someone of a lower stature — ``Look, I really have a wide majority. I am really a new founding father of Turkey. I am really supported by the vast majority of the people. I am not even a partisan figure anymore; I am one of the founding fathers of this country.'' I think that is his goal.
Other developments we may see in connection with this are changes in the constitution. As I said in my remarks, the constitution, as is, is not a fully democratic constitution. However, again, will changes to the constitution make Turkey more democratic or will they deal more power to the ruling elite? There were amendments to the constitution in the early 2000s, when the AKP had just become the ruling party, and those amendments went in the direction of more democracy and more pluralism. They decided, for instance, to get rid of the death penalty. They did even symbolic things that the EU at the time appreciated a lot.
More recent changes to the constitution, including in 2010, made people wonder whether the purpose was really to make the constitution more democratic or to make it more functional for the ruling elite to perpetuate the hegemony they have established over the past 10 years. The reform of the judiciary in 2010 was really a bone of contention, and many analysts pointed out that as a result of the reforms, the judiciary was made more accommodating, more dependent on the executive power, so that the separation of power overall suffered, and checks and balances were weakened.
That is another big trend and development to follow: first, whether these reforms will be actually implemented, if they will be passed in the Parliament in the next few months before the elections in 2014; and if they will be passed, what type of reforms will they be? Will they be truly democratic reforms or not?
Let me say something about the EU. The EU has been monitoring, as you know, reforms in Turkey in the context of the accession process. There was a lot of hope at the beginning that this new social bloc — not just this new political party but this new social bloc represented by the AKP — was really interested in reform. As I said, in the early 2000s they really made a lot of progress, and people with some prejudice and a lot of skepticism about these elites, rooted in Islam, had to really change their minds about these people. They said, ``We are here confronting real democrats who want a different future for Turkey.''
I think many of the same people now have grown a little bit more cynical about all this. Many point out that the reforms were implemented when that served the interest of a rising ruling elite that needed a lot of international support, and they needed a lot of international support because they were engaged in a very difficult contest with the military and the establishment that the military protected. In order to win that contest, they really needed support from the EU and others.
However, under this idea that Turkey was becoming more democratic by rebalancing civil-military relations, they actually pursued other goals. When they became strong enough and when they realized that the military is now largely neutralized, they also showed all of a sudden much less interest in democratic reforms because their goal of consolidating power had been largely achieved.
I am not saying I fully agree with this narrative, but I think there is some truth to it. I think the test is really the new constitution. They have an historic opportunity to get it right, to make a constitution that is not only more democratic and more liberal, but that also fully enshrines principles of pluralism, protection of minorities, starting with the Kurdish minority, of course, in the new charter, or they will confirm fears that they are only interested in perpetrating their power and in consolidating this new establishment, which has become as strong, if not stronger, than the old Kemalist secularist establishment.
The Chair: We are running out of time and we have a long list, so I will ask honourable senators to make short interventions. Mr. Alessandri, if you can shorten your answers, we can get all the senators in who want to ask questions.
Senator Black: May I compliment you on your extraordinary presentation today. It was extremely informative.
You started to comment at the end of your last answer in respect to the question of Senator Johnson on the military- civil balance in the country of Turkey. In summary, are you able to give us your view as to where that balance is today? Basically, is the military in their barracks?
Mr. Alessandri: I think you are right. I think the military is now largely in their barracks, and everyone agrees their political role has been significantly diminished.
Senator Black: My second question relates to that kind of situation. Characterize your view as to the state of rule of law in Turkey.
Mr. Alessandri: As I said, the rule of law is overall in place, but the culture of the rule of law has not been fully absorbed and there are still a lot of things that need more work. When I say ``more work,'' I really mean it. There are recent reports on freedom of expression and media freedom and they are worrying reports. There are a lot of imprisoned journalists. The judiciary has to be reformed further; it is still very much an institution influenced by other powers. Minority rights are also not fully protected, of course, but there is hope. Overall it is a country based on the rule of law, but there are significant weaknesses, and significant progress will have to be made in certain areas.
The Chair: Thank you, Senator Black, you have helped me immensely.
Senator Downe: In my question I want to pursue the suppression of freedom of expression, if you will. Can you explain what has happened over the last number of years, particularly with journalism? In addition to the journalists who have been imprisoned, has there been a chill in the media if they see some of their colleagues being suppressed? Has this changed the type of reporting more to the tone of what the government is interested to be receiving?
Mr. Alessandri: I think again you are right. Many more journalists feel that they cannot freely express themselves. There is a lot of self-censorship, as they call it, because of fear of the consequences. There have also been cases of direct censorship or something close to that, for instance, when some media groups were given significant fines that made their work and their business very difficult.
Then there is the case of imprisoned journalists. The government says almost none of the journalists that are in prison are in prison because they are journalists. However that is, in and of itself, a problem. They are in prison either because they are Kurds and they have been considered involved in operations that were subversive or terrorist in kind or, I am under the impression, because they created problems in different ways.
There is still in the current law of Turkey a broad way of defining what may be an attack on the state or what may be subversive. It is a broad category of things that can be used by a judiciary that is not fully independent to actually go after people who are creating problems for powerful groups. Again, this is not a generalized situation. There is a lively debate in the country. You can read articles about the government that are negative and critical. I am not presenting a country where there is no freedom of expression whatsoever or where media freedom does not exist, but it is a country that has significant weaknesses. When it comes to the Internet, several websites have been closed arbitrarily. Some of the principles that we all cherish in Europe and in North America are still not being fully respected in Turkey. I think the EU and other countries are correct in pointing a finger at this problem.
Senator Wallace: Mr. Alessandri, there obviously is a lot of uncertainty in the region at this time, and the situation in Turkey is evolving. Certainly it seems that, compared to three or four years ago, the political and economic situation continues to evolve.
I was interested in a couple of comments you made. One was which way Turkey will go is uncertain at this time with everything that is in play, and one of your concluding comments was that Turkey should be viewed as an experience and not as a model. From a Canadian perspective and, in particular, from a Canadian business perspective, there is desire in both Turkey and Canada to increase the economic trade opportunities and investment opportunities between us. However, as you well know, business likes as much as possible certainty and predictability.
What would you say about the degree of uncertainty and the degree of heightened risk that may exist in that region and, in particular, in Turkey at this time and what signal that sends to potential Canadian investors or business people? Is it reaching a point that further investment should be considered and viewed perhaps more cautiously than in the past?
Mr. Alessandri: I think that investment should be based on an objective analysis of what Turkey is and what is happening in and around Turkey. Far be it from me to suggest that Canadian or other countries' investments should no longer go to Turkey. That would be detrimental to Turkey and to other countries in the neighbouring region that have benefited from Turkey's growth. I was trying to point out that this country has embraced too fast a narrative that they have accomplished spectacular things. I am talking about the political elite, particularly the ruling elite. They have also made statements about Turkey not really needing the European Union anymore and the European Union needing Turkey more than Turkey needs the European Union. I understand that for domestic political reasons this may resonate with the public, but it is not really true. Turkey is suffering from the fact that the European economy is stagnating, and they know that very well. I think they have shown some overconfidence.
They have achieved a lot. The purpose of my opening remarks was not to say that they did not achieve anything, that it is all false. Actually a lot of it is true, and we should all be happy that Turkey is developing dramatically. I was trying to stress the fact that the work is not over because for no country in the world is the work ever over, especially for a country that has still so many achievements to reach and so many challenges to face.
In order to remain an open, growing economy, Turkey needs a more balanced approach, one that sees opportunities in new markets but is also realistic about new markets. The Middle East right now is an unstable, conflict-prone place. It is hardly the best environment for new businesses and new investment.
Of course, it depends on the country you look at, but overall it is a very difficult context. It is very important that Turkey is trying hard even now to invest in these countries and help with the development in Tunisia and others. As it does that, it should be realistic about the prospect and remind itself about the very valuable relationships it has built over the centuries with Europe and the relationship that it has built more recently economically with countries like Canada and the United States.
I think the balanced approach and the combination of ambition but also realism is what I was suggesting.
Senator Wallace: Thank you very much for that.
Senator Robichaud: You have answered part of my question about freedom of expression. There were some violations. In your answer to two senators, I was led to believe that it was mostly political, but then you said that some were jailed because they were Kurds. Can you go a little further? Is there any religious discrimination?
Mr. Alessandri: The Kurdish issue is not really a religious issue. Actually, religion has brought together, to a large extent, these different groups. One of the reasons the ruling party has been successful in getting some of the Kurdish vote is that they share not identical but similar religious and cultural relations. We are talking here about a minority in Turkey that is a very sizable one. There are no definitive statistics about the number of Kurds residing in Turkey, but there are many, many millions. It is not a small minority. Until recently, there was not even a debate on the Kurds, and you could not even use the term in the country. In that respect, a lot of progress has been made. There is a lot of debate. There are a lot of articles coming out about the Kurdish issue and how to solve it. The government overall has tried to make progress.
Of course, there is a military component of this contest. There are groups like the PKK that for many years decided to use violence against the Turkish state to advance their demands, but there are other Kurds currently in the Parliament, and there are many more Kurds in the country who feel they have a different identity that does not mean they embrace violence. The work of the government has been difficult because on the one hand the Turkish people remain a nationalistic people, and on the other hand they also believe progress has to be made and this question cannot last forever because it brings with it violence and uncertainty and creates a situation of instability within the country, not only regionally but with other Kurdish groups. Kurdish communities live in Syria, Iran and Iraq.
One of the not-much-commented-upon implications of Arab uprisings is that these uprisings have also affected other groups in the area, including the Kurds, who are currently divided among different states. They too want something. This is a very explosive situation for a country like Turkey, which has been afraid since the establishment of the republic in the past century, after losing an empire, of losing a piece of its country. They have to play skillfully, but they also have to be decisive in addressing this question promptly, because it has always been a big problem. In Turkey, not in neighbouring countries but in Turkey, casualties of this confrontation between the state and the terrorist organizations are in the numbers of hundreds in the last year. This is an under-reported, under-documented war that is taking place not all over Turkey but in the more southeastern regions of it. As long as it is managed and there is an attempt to engage these people politically, a solution can be found and it can be contained and hopefully solved, but the Arab Spring has brought with it this additional problem. Other communities have felt empowered, and they are now raising demands that they already had, but now with greater assertiveness, I would say.
The Chair: Mr. Alessandri, we have a few moments left, and I want to put two questions to you.
On the international scene, with this newfound confidence in Turkey, the alliances have been with the BRIC countries, with Brazil, to look to new multilateral initiatives that we have not seen before. This is an emerging issue. Can you comment? Strategically, are they looking to further these, and what will it mean to Turkey and to a country like Canada?
You talked about the near countries, but Turkey has moved rather significantly into Africa, in investment and in opening embassies, and also into Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, et cetera. Are these likely to continue?
Mr. Alessandri: There is a lot of debate about the strategy of Turkey. I never bought the argument that they were drifting toward the east, whatever that means. I never bought the argument that they were after a strong alliance with Iran in a sort of new, anti-Western orientation. I do not think that has ever been on the table for Turkey. They have been trying to put Turkey at the centre of multiple regions instead of being relegated to the periphery of something. To the extent that they have done this as a result of their economic success and great political stability, this was not only understandable but was something to be supported. We do not want a Turkey that is seen by us and others as at the periphery of Europe. We want a Turkey that is able to play the role of a bridge between different countries and communities of countries.
In that respect, the diversification of Turkey's interest is very positive too. We are doing the same. In Europe, Canada and the U.S., we are all trying to engage new partners. We cannot be blind to the reality of a fast-rising Asia or other emerging economies in Africa or Latin America. The problem is to keep a balance to avoid deluding yourself that you can easily shift from one set of alliances and engagements to another, depending on circumstances. It is a little bit worrying, but it is mainly tactical and a question of posturing. Very recently, the prime minister has suggested that if the EU does not accept Turkey in the European Union, Turkey will then apply for membership in the Shanghai Five agreement and he will really seek a more structured alliance with Russia and China. I do not think he really believes in that, but it conveys the message of a populist leader who is playing too much with the pride and confidence that have come with Turkey's achievements in recent years.
To respond to your question, Turkish-African engagement is important. The fact they are present with their firms and private companies in sub-Saharan Africa is very important for African development. They are trying to do the same with Brazil and other Latin American countries. All of this is very positive if it does not come at the expense of a more comprehensive view of what Turkey's interests are, and many of these interests I believe still lie very much in Europe and in America.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Alessandri. You certainly have covered a lot of ground. Your information and experience is extremely helpful. I think we have almost our entire study covered from the points you have made, and we very much appreciate your candid sharing of this information and for being here with us via video conference. Thank you.
Honourable senators, we are here to study the economic and political developments in the Republic of Turkey, their regional and global influences, the implications for Canadian interests and opportunities, and other related matters. We are pleased this afternoon to have now by video conference Professor Henri Barkey, a Bernard L. and Bertha F. Cohen Professor with the Department of International Relations at Lehigh University in Pennsylvania. Thank you for coming. We would like your opening statement, but we would like you to allow as much time as you can for questions. Welcome to our committee.
Henri Barkey, Bernard L. and Bertha F. Cohen Professor, Department of International Relations, Lehigh University, as an individual: Thank you. I will be very brief. I will try to give you a synopsis of what Turkey is trying to do regionally and globally, and then I will open it up so you can ask me as many questions as you want.
Let me start by saying that when you look at Turkish foreign policy, the Turks, from the beginning when this government came to power in 2002, wanted to build a global role for themselves. They are very ambitious in terms of what they want to do. Maybe there are some aspects we can talk about later.
They wanted, first, to build on their neighbourhoods, which are the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East, and based on their existing relationships. At no point do I think they have thought about going east, south, north, et cetera. They have always wanted to be a major act internationally. When you see what they did from the beginning when they came to power, they became more engaged in international organizations and assumed roles that sometimes people did not want to give them, such as being intermediaries in a series of conflicts — sometimes successful and sometimes not. They immediately went for a UN Security Council seat, which they had not had since the 1960s. They will go for one again in the next round, I think.
They want to be a global player. They think the strategic situation, economic performance, alliance commitments to NATO and being a candidate country for the European Union gives them that platform. In the Middle East especially they have been quite aggressive. Initially, they played a role of what I call a ``conciliator'' in that they tried to go into Syria. They tried to play on the fact they had relatively decent relations with the Israelis in the beginning.
Later on, they switched when they felt more secure at home. When the Turkish government managed to defeat the Turkish military and when they got rid of the yoke, if you will, of the military, they decided to play a role of what I call the ``balancer'' — mostly to balance Israeli power in the region, to show that they are strong and that they can stand up to the Israelis. The Israelis essentially play into their hands, too, I should say, both with the famous flotilla incident and the 2008-09 Gaza intervention.
Then the Arab Spring happened. The Arab Spring kind of gave the Turks a strong sense of self. Here is a country that is economically doing exceedingly well — and there is no question about that. It is a country that managed to marry Islam and democracy in its own way. Also, it is a country that leaders in the Middle East kept pointing to as a reference or model that everyone wanted to be like Turkey.
Prime Minister Erdogan, because of his conflict with Israel, was very popular on the streets, and the Turks looked at the Arab Spring as an occasion for them to become the local hegemony. They wanted to show that they were the ones who could be the big boy in the region. I will quote one thing for you. Foreign Minister Davutoglu at one point in April 2012 in parliament said:
Turkey would henceforth lead the movement for change in the Middle East. We will continue to be the leader of this wave. . . . There is a new Middle East. We will be its owner, leader, and servant.
That wave is the Arab Spring. In respect of what the others say, the new leader and spokesperson will be Turkey. Here you have the Turks essentially saying, ``We will rule the Middle East.'' It did not work out that way. The Arab Spring took everybody by surprise, yes. They floundered a little bit in Libya. In Syria, they played it right — they did not have much of a choice.
However, the truth is that the Middle East is not turning out to be the way they expected it to be, especially with the fact that the Syrian regime has survived as long as it has. The Turks thought that once they decided to go against Assad, he would fall. In some ways, it is a lot of hubris on their part.
Now they find themselves in a situation where zero problems they had with neighbours' policies has turned out to be lots of problems with everybody, just about. Ironically, the only people they get along with are the Kurds of northern Iraq. The Syrian crisis has solidified relations with Iraq especially. Relations with Iran are still on par but not very warm. They are not making headway in the Middle East, and their relationships with Israel are in complete shambles and will not improve soon. This is the position in which they find themselves.
The Turks really want some semblance of stability in the region because they really care about doing business. They want to export; the Middle East is a prime export market for them, which is expanding. Turkish companies that have managed to break into the European markets are now producing first-rate televisions, refrigerators and cars — you name it — and the Middle East has money and markets that can easily be accessed by the Turks. However, the crisis in Syria, and also in Iraq, has put a damper on this. If you look at Turkish trade routes to the Persian Gulf, they have been closed. Turkish trucks used to traverse Syrian territory and to Jordan, and they cannot do that anymore, obviously. They cannot use Iraq, so they are using the\\Suez Canal, and now they are trying to find other imaginative ways.
What the Turks wanted was a stable region in which they would be the most important economic, military, diplomatic and political power. Essentially, as has been said in the past, they wanted to make sure that there will be stability and they would run that stable region. That is what their goal is. Maybe they will get it one day, but at the moment they are somewhat in trouble.
Finally, Turkey's Achilles heel is its Kurdish problem, and they realize it. Again, after a hiatus of a couple of years, they are now making a new attempt to resolve it. I think they are serious, but the devil is always in the details and it is not a done deal, in my view. There are many hurdles they have to go through.
The big variable in Turkey at the moment is the prime minister himself. He is amazingly popular, but he has also become exceedingly erratic. He makes statements without checking with his government, and they become the policy, and they have to catch up all the time. You may have heard about his latest statement about the European Union and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, that maybe Turkey will join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. That is a joke, but he just blurted it out and suddenly people are talking about it. That is one of the great handicaps that the Turks have: a very capable Prime Minister but, at the same time, a loose cannon.
Let me stop here, and please ask me as many questions as you would like.
The Chair: Thank you, professor. I must say you are the first one who can pronounce very easily the foreign minister's name. Most of us have struggled with it. Thank you for that lesson, amongst the rest.
Senator Black: Thank you very much for that excellent presentation. It was extremely helpful.
Can you please look into your crystal ball and pretend that you are talking to us 24 to 36 months from today. What would you say? If you do not want to answer, I would understand that, too.
Mr. Barkey: For us academics, making projections is actually quite cheap and quite easy.
Senator Black: Perfect. Thank you.
Mr. Barkey: We are never right; I should warn you, though. I think in my lifetime I was right only once, when in the 1980s I said the Kurdish problem in Turkey would be very serious. I think that is the only time I was right.
With that caveat, 24 months from now I think Assad will be gone, but there will be chaos in Syria. My main worry — and I will send the clerk an article I just published; I should have sent it earlier — is what will happen in Iraq.
In a way, Syria is a sideshow. If you think about Syria, it is a country that is actually rather unimportant. It has no natural resources, a lousy economy, and lousy agriculture. What made Syria historically important and the reason we talk about Syria is because Hafez al-Assad took essentially a barren country and used the fact that it is a neighbour to Israel and parlayed this into an international actor by being part of the Rejectionist Front.
If you think about it, what is there in Syria? It is not that significant. It is not a huge market. Economic policies in Syria have been disastrous over the years, so there is not much of an economy. However, the problem in Syria is that Syria sits on the two fault lines of the region: the sectarian one, Sunni-Shia; and the Kurdish one, the Turkish Kurdish, Arab Kurdish, Persian Kurdish.
What happens in Syria on these issues will have an immediate impact on Iraq. I think the place to watch is Iraq. If Iraq goes south, then we — I mean the United States and the alliance — are in trouble because Iraq, as an oil producer, is expected to produce a great deal more oil, so it is an important counterbalance to Iran. If Iraq splits up, the sectarian conflict in the region will take a disastrous route.
We have already seen — and we see almost on a daily basis — that there is violence between Sunni and Shia, and then you will add the Kurdish element to that, too. The potential for Iraq to split up and for the 1916 Sykes-Picot boundaries to change is quite possible. That is why I would say, going on 36 months, that the impact of the Syrian civil war will be felt not just in Syria but, most important, in Iraq. We will see the Iranians, by the way, who will have lost Syria, doubling up in Iraq.
The breakup of Iraq becomes a real possibility, in my view, and you are seeing already the signs today. The Turks are cozying up to the Iraqi Kurds. The Iraqi Kurds and the central government are not working together. The Sunnis in Iraq are talking about their own, shall we say, federal arrangements, at the very least. The border between Iraq and Syria has disappeared. You are seeing the signs of all these things. I hope I am not right, because a lot of blood will be spilled, but that is what I would watch for.
Senator Black: Thank you very much, sir.
[Translation]
Senator Fortin-Duplessis: Thank you, Madam Chair. Welcome to our committee, and thanks for joining us by videoconference, Professor Barkey.
Other witnesses have told the committee that Turkey's diplomatic and commercial ties are growing with other emerging economies, such as China, Russia, Brazil, countries in Central Asia, North Africa and Africa as a whole. Turkey is also a member of the G-20, the World Trade Organization, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
After being absent for 50 years, Turkey served on the UN Security Council from 2009 to 2010. And in 2011, at a time of critical and rapid change, Turkey announced its candidacy to serve as a Security Council member for another term, from 2015 to 2016.
As we watch Turkey increasing its regional and global presence, what do you think its foreign policy objectives and priorities are? What are its commercial objectives and priorities?
Mr. Barkey: I could answer in French, but I will continue in English if you do not mind.
Senator Fortin-Duplessis: We have interpreters.
[English]
Mr. Barkey: As I tried to say in my opening statement, what the Turks want is to be the single most important power in the region. To them, if you want to call it this, local hegemony is the way to become an important player internationally. That is what the goal is, and it is both political and economic.
The Turks need markets. The Turkish economy, when you look at its performance from 2002 onwards — and most of the credit should not go to this government but to the transformation that took place in the 1980s — but besides, Turkey has transformed itself economically, internally. You have now a new business class that is no longer based in the cities of Istanbul and Izmir, but it is Anatolia-wide. These Anatolian tigers are willing to take risks and to go to places that Istanbul businessmen do not like to go to, and they want to export their goods. For this Turkish government, opening markets is of primary consideration because these Anatolian tigers are the foundation of the government's coalition. They support the government, they think like the government, but they need markets. That is the first policy. The first policy is to open up markets, and it is not just in the Middle East. It is also in Africa, in Latin America, anywhere they can.
To do that, especially in the Middle East, as I said earlier, they need to have some kind of stability. From that perspective, they want an Iraq that is stable and they want a Syria that is stable. If you look back at the policies until the Arab Spring, as I said in my opening remarks, where they see problems were with regimes and not with the people. It was easy for them to do business with Gadhafi, easy to do business with Mubarak. They changed sides very quickly. For them, doing business was priority number one.
In addition to doing business, in terms of what other policies they would follow, the Turks — I should say this government in particular — sees itself as a very important member of the NATO alliance. They think they are far more important than most countries in the alliance. As far as the United States is concerned, they want to compete with Israel for U.S. favour. In a way, they want to displace Israel as America's number one ally in the region.
I think the relationship between Israel and Turkey, as long as the peace process does not restart, will be very acrimonious, very negative, and almost daily you have the Turkish leaders at the various levels attacking the Israelis. They want to show both the region, and they may get good marks in the region by standing up to Israelis, but also the United States by saying we are far more important than the Israelis to you in the region, we should be the number one that you go to. From that perspective, that is also a message to the rest of the NATO alliance, too, but primarily it is the United States.
In general, they want to be more than just a G20 member. They want to see themselves as an actor that gets involved in many different areas where they can play a global role.
When they were on the Security Council, at one point they said that they could also deal with North Korea, because for some reason the North Korean file was in their hands for a short period of time. You see what they are trying to do. This global ambition is really insatiable.
[Translation]
Senator Fortin-Duplessis: What other partners would you say Turkey has diplomatic and commercial ties with? Are you aware of any free-trade agreements with other countries? If so, would you kindly list them?
[English]
Mr. Barkey: First, the Turks are part of the customs union with the European Union, so they have to be careful. They have free trade agreements, ironically, with Israel, and they had a free trade agreement with the Syrians, which the Syrians have put on hold.
Their most important trading partner is the European Union as a whole, but if you look at individual countries, it is Russia. They buy a lot of gas from Russia, so those numbers are a little bit inflated. Russia is their number one trading partner. I think Germany is number two, Iran is third, Iraq is fifth, and I forget who the fourth is. They aim to trade with everyone, and they will sign any free trade agreement that they can, within the limits of the customs union, with any country. That is a general picture.
Senator Wallace: Professor, with all that has happened in that area — politically the problems in Syria, the Arab Spring, the uncertainty you have described — thinking of it from a Canadian perspective, which is somewhat different from an American one and the relationship that the United States has with Turkey and others in that region, Canadian investment and Canadian business, which has a presence in Turkey, very good relationships with Turkey, is this a time that we should be encouraging the strengthening of that relationship? Are there real benefits over the short term and long term that would come from that? Or, with all the uncertainty that exists today, would you see it as a time that we should perhaps take a second look and see how the risks unfold as they go forward?
Mr. Barkey: The regional risks are relatively small for Turkey. Turkey has its own logic, its own dynamism. It has made an enormous amount of progress. It is a very, very large market now. For Canadian businesses it is actually a very good opportunity.
Just to give you a comparison, the Turks keep complaining, for instance, that we, in the United States, do not trade a lot with the Turks. I do not know as I have not looked at Canadian-Turkish trade figures, but what I know at least from the American side is that most of our American companies — think of Colgate-Palmolive, Procter & Gamble, Gillette, all of these companies, they tend to work with Turkey from their European-based subsidiaries. It does not look like the trade is between the United States and Turkey, but between the U.K. and Turkey. I do not know whether Canadian companies work through Europe or do it directly.
I would say that Turkey is, in and of itself, if you forget the Middle East for a moment, a large enough market for Canadian businesses that they should be definitely interested in it. After more than 10 years of actually fairly good economic stewardship, this is a country that has now settled. I think it is not going to go south economically.
The only caveat I put on this is the domestic Kurdish problem. The Turkish Kurdish problem is very serious. If it is not resolved, if the government messes it up this time, there is, of course, a danger that it will blow up. If it blows up, it will blow up all over Turkey. That is my guess, having worked on the Kurds for a while. Even that, I think, is less than a 20 per cent chance. I think the government understands they are sitting on a time bomb and they have to deal with it and they have to manage the situation more smartly than they have in the past.
The bottom line is I would tell your businesses to engage in Turkey. If the Middle East settles down, then Turkey becomes a natural entrepôt, if you want, to do business with the rest of the Middle East. Then Canadian companies can set up subsidiaries to sell to Egypt or to Saudi Arabia or other parts of the region. In that sense, Turkey increasingly has the technical capacity to host subsidiaries of foreign companies when you think of communication nodes. That point is that the Turks, having figured that out, are now putting a lot of money into becoming a transportation hub. Istanbul airport is now a very important place for all kinds of businesses, even Israelis by the way, despite the bad relations between Israel and Turkey. Israelis, if they want to go elsewhere, often go through Istanbul airport because Istanbul has become a transportation hub. The Turkish government will build the world's largest airport in Istanbul because the current two airports are insufficient. I say absolutely you should tell your businesses to do more business.
Senator Demers: Thank you very much for your tremendous input. It is very clear and understandable.
[Translation]
How do Turkey's Islamic and commercial banks differ when it comes to providing financing?
[English]
Mr. Barkey: I think Islamic banks are very significant in Turkey. The Turkish banking sector went through a crisis in 2001. They took a huge hit. It was the worst economic crisis they suffered because banks were under-financed and had huge exposure. They cleaned up the banks in 2001, which enabled them to weather the crisis of 2008 better than most other countries. There are some Islamic banks in Turkey, but they are completely insignificant. They do not play a major role in the Turkish banking system that I know of.
[Translation]
Senator Demers: In light of the Russian president's visit to Turkey this past December, what role do high-level visits play in encouraging commercial ties with Turkey?
[English]
Mr. Barkey: As I said, Russia is Turkey's number one trading partner, especially because of all the gas deals. For the Turks, Russia is also important because Turkish construction companies are very involved all over Russia in building big projects. Putin and Erdogan have a very good relationship. To the consternation of many, they tend to meet with only one translator and no note taker, so some people suspect there are all kinds of side deals being made. The Turkish-Russian relationship is strong despite the fact that in Syria, for instance, discussions with the Turks are on diametrically opposite positions. Yet when it comes to business, they do not care about these other issues.
There is a great deal of pragmatism in the relationship between Turkey and Russia. Both countries need each other. The Russians need to export gas, and the Turks need the gas, obviously. The Turks need the Russian export markets; they need transit routes to central Asia. On many different levels you see that despite the political divisions on certain issues, they actually do get along fairly well. Putin and Erdogan have somewhat the same temperament. They both have authoritarian tendencies. People in Turkey often talk about Erdogan becoming another Putin. In more ways than one they seem to be on the same wavelength.
Senator Downe: I am wondering about the role of the military, which traditionally has positioned themselves as custodian of the state, if you will, in the traditional founding of Turkey. They have been defanged the last couple of years, but if there is stress in Turkey, either from terrorism or from the economy or from some other factor, is there any concern that the military will rise up again and do what they have done in the past, which was a coup in the country and they took over the running of the country?
Mr. Barkey: I recommend you read this past week's The Economist, which had a piece on the Turkish military, not because I am quoted in it but because it is a good piece.
I think the Turkish military is out of the picture. The word you use is exactly apt, ``defanged.'' What is also important to understand about this is that they have been defanged for two reasons. One is overreach. Every time they intervened in politics there was a backlash and they did not understand the backlash because they were so sure of themselves, in a way in which only the military can be. They were completely clueless to political reaction in Turkey. The last time was in 2007, when they tried to prevent Abdullah Gül from becoming president and the government called their bluff and called the election. The elections were fought over whether or not people thought Abdullah Gül should be president, and by an overwhelming margin the country said they did. That was when the Turkish military influence ended.
The other thing that people do not see is that the Turkish military committed strategic blunders, like the one I mentioned, and tactical blunders that were important in undermining people's confidence in the military. The Turkish military always said, ``We are the most popular organization.'' If you look at the polls, this is true. Everyone serves in the military and if you are part of an organization you will like it. If you look at polls in all different countries, the military always comes first. However, because of hubris, they got caught lying and, most important, covering up for simple things. I will give you one example to give you an idea.
A few years ago four soldiers died and the military said it was a training accident. There was one newspaper that emerged in this new era in Turkey that decided to investigate, which was unusual. They discovered that, in fact, it was not a training accident; it was a soldier who fell asleep during guard duty. His commanding officer called him in the next day and, to punish him, gave him a hand grenade, pulled the pin off it and gave him a live hand grenade. This poor kid was running around the base with a live hand grenade and did not know what to do. Eventually the hand grenade went off and three of his friends also died in the process. This is a horrible thing that an officer did, but, again, as we say in Washington, it is the cover-up. The military covered it up and they had to admit later on that they had lied and that they had covered it up. I would argue that this incident did more damage to them. There were plenty of other such incidents when they get caught. When you send your child to the military and there is a war with the Kurds, you ask did my son die because of military negligence or because they were really fighting? Now it comes out that in the last 10 years there have been 964 suicides. People do not trust the military when they say it is suicide.
The military's problem now is that people do not want them to intervene in politics. A lot of the generals have been implicated in coup attempts and are now being tried, and the public no longer trusts them when it comes to the one thing they are supposed to be doing, which is fighting. It would take a miracle for the military to come back. I can only think a civil war in Turkey is the only condition under which they could do so. I do not think there will be a civil war, but that is a different question.
Senator Downe: Thank you. That was a very detailed answer. I subscribe to The Economist but I live in rural Canada. When I get home this weekend the copy will be there and I look forward to reading your quotes in it.
Senator D. Smith: You commented briefly since I put my hand up, but this goes back to your comments about how Russia is Turkey's best trading partner and the good chemistry and rapport that Putin seems to have with Erdogan.
As Syria becomes increasingly dysfunctional, with refugees flooding into Turkey, is there not a point at which Erdogan will say to Putin, ``Look, this has to end. Have you not seen the light yet?'' Do you think he might actually play that role at some point and get Mr. Putin to stand down and say, ``Goodbye, Assad''?
Mr. Barkey: This is a great question. I think Erdogan already tried to do that with Putin, but I do not think Erdogan can move Putin. Putin will not change his mind become someone else tells him to. We are seeing it now in the behaviour of Russia with a whole series of things. I do believe, though, that at some point, Putin will have to say to Assad, ``Enough is enough,'' because Assad will not survive.
When you look at what is going on in terms of negotiations, et cetera, the Russians are still hoping that there may be some kind of semi-orderly transition. They are standing by Assad because they do not have any other interlocutory in the system and they ultimately want to use Assad's future as a card to play in Syria. When they do so, and I think you are right, they will probably not turn to the United States, obviously, or to the Europeans or to you, but they will go to the Turks to help mediate. They would rather see the Turks in Syria, if you look at the example of Iraq, than the Americans or the Europeans. They see the Turks a little bit differently. Erdogan has done a very good job of giving the impression to Putin that he is his own man, which he is, and that he can stand up to the United States and whomever he wants. Putin and Erdogan can strike a deal as Assad is about to fall. It is at that point that Erdogan and Putin will make a deal. At the moment, Putin is playing somewhat of a long game in Syria.
Senator D. Smith: Thank you.
The Chair: Professor Barkey, going back to the businesses that are operating successfully in Turkey, do they have the technologies that they need to continue, or are they looking for businesses where they can expand, utilizing partnerships or joint ventures for their own benefit but also for this export market?
Mr. Barkey: I would say they have become technologically sophisticated, but they still need outside help, and they are always looking for partnerships and always looking to learn and to improve their own production methods. Look at the number of foreign companies that produce in Turkey, from Toyota to a lot of German companies and the French.
The other thing about the Turks that is very different from the rest of the Middle East with the exception of Israel is that there is a great deal of Internet implementation. People are much more Internet savvy and much more globally connected. Yes, there are all kinds of people who believe in conspiracy theories, and the Turks are very conspiratorially minded, but at the same time they are very well connected. I would argue that, compared to the rest of the Middle East, again with the exception of the Israelis, they are far more sophisticated in technology, et cetera.
Actually, your question made me suddenly realize that they do not have enough R & D at home. What is interesting about this government, and from the beginning what they did differently from previous governments, is that they really expanded the amount of funds that now go to universities for basic research in all fields. You are now seeing serious research being done in Turkey, and you are starting to see some of the results. I just read an article about the number of papers that are published in international venues, and you see that the Turks are really creeping up. You are seeing the results of basic research. They have a long ways to go because they did not have any before.
The Chair: I have one final issue on the rising nationalism that Erdogan is propounding. Do the people in Turkey see that as an internal dynamic, or is it a reaction about the slow pace of their development into the EU? At one point, Erdogan said, ``If Europe does not want us, the rest of world may be open to us.'' There were certainly statements coming from Europe that said they were not ready to join, but more often it was around cultural issues as opposed to accession issues. What do Turkish people know about this or think about this?
Mr. Barkey: This is a great question. I will divide it into two, nationalism and the EU, because I think in some ways they are separate.
The Turks are very nationalistic and incredibly xenophobic. It is one of the most xenophobic nations. The minorities have suffered a huge deal, whether you are Kurd or Greek or Armenian. In 1923, there were 1.5 million Greeks, but today there are 6,000, and some people say 1,600, Greeks left. There was World War I and there may be explanations, but nonetheless they have tried to Turkify everything. When I mentioned earlier the conspiracy theories, I spend some time every day reading some Turkish newspapers just to see the latest conspiracy theory. It is the human component of my day, so to speak. You would not believe the stuff that they invent. The Middle East in general is very conspiratorially minded, not just Turkey.
For a country that wants to be part of Europe and the West, that is very problematic, and that nationalism is not necessarily coming from Erdogan, but that nationalism is inherent in the Turkish character. In large measure, it is because the Turks go through a process of socialization at school that makes the Turks more powerful: They are the number one person in the world.
The Turks are not ready to go into Europe. Yes, the cultural issues play heavily in certain European matters, and we should not ignore that, and that is fine, but a country with the kind of minority problem they have with the Kurds is not ready to go into Europe.
Their judicial system is terrible. It is a judicial system where you are guilty until proven innocent, and that may take three or five years, which means you stay in prison for three or five years, and then you find out that you are found innocent, but you have already spent three or five years in prison. The kind of reforms they have to make are gargantuan. They have not made them yet.
The mistake that some in Europe and certainly we in the United States made was to give the Turks the impression that once they got the candidate status in 2004, even in a few years, in 10 years, they will be members of the European Union, when that was not the case. That created a frustration, which you see in Erdogan's statements and in Turkish statements.
We have to be honest. The Turks are not Croatia, and they are not Slovenia. This is almost 80 million people. Europe, especially after the latest expansion and the currency crisis, is in no position to integrate Turkey. The Turks are being unrealistic by pushing this because they feel their pride has been wounded, and I think it is very damaging and will alienate the Europeans even more and make Turkish entry into Europe ultimately much more difficult.
The Chair: I was hoping to end on a more positive note than a negative one. You have made a very helpful comment. We are looking at where Turkey has been and where it is likely to go, and positioning Canada's interest within that. You have certainly covered all the areas we are going to be continuing to study. Thank you. Your testimony has been extremely helpful. On behalf of all the senators, I extend my appreciation for this video conference. You can appreciate that you do not have to face our weather quite as much. Pennsylvania is a little warmer today.
Mr. Barkey: Only this much. Thank you, senators.
The Chair: Before we adjourn, I wanted to welcome a new permanent member to the committee, Senator Dawson.
For committee members, we in the steering committee went around and around about what dates we will be able to travel to finish our study. It looked from a consensus that the week of March 18 was the best. We have yet to hear back from the whips as to whether that is acceptable to them. Senator Downe and I will continue to work on that. As soon as we have some definitive word, we will let you know.
(The committee adjourned.)