THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
EVIDENCE
OTTAWA, Wednesday, March 20, 2019
The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met this day at 4:15 p.m. to study foreign relations and international trade generally.
Senator A. Raynell Andreychuk (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: Honourable senators, this is the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. We are here to continue our examination of such issues as may arise relating to foreign relations and international trade generally.
Under this mandate, the committee will hear today from a government official at Global Affairs Canada, who will provide us with an update on the situation in Turkey since the publication of a report by this committee in 2013 entitled, Building Bridges: Canada-Turkey Relations and Beyond and a subsequent government response.
Government officials were also asked to provide the committee with an update of the new developments in Ukraine or developments affecting Ukraine.
Accordingly, I’m very pleased to welcome to the committee Ms. Alison LeClaire, Senior Arctic Official and Director General, Arctic, Eurasian & European Affairs, Global Affairs Canada.
You carry a great weight on your shoulders. Welcome to the committee.
I’m going to ask the senators to introduce themselves. Before I do, would it be the wish of the committee, since Ms. LeClaire will be handling both the Turkish briefing and the Ukraine, to do Turkey, have questions, and then do Ukraine and have questions? Would that be more acceptable? Would you like to separate them or have the two presentations first?
Senator Massicotte: Separate them.
The Chair: Separate them. I think I heard Senator Sinclair. Yes, I always do what he says.
Senator Sinclair: Yes.
The Chair: We work together on too many committees.
I’m going to ask senators to introduce themselves.
Senator Housakos: I’m Leo Housakos from Montreal.
Senator Coyle: I’m Mary Coyle from Nova Scotia.
Senator Ngo: Thanh Hai Ngo from Ontario.
Senator Dean: Tony Dean, Ontario.
Senator Sinclair: Murray Sinclair, Manitoba.
Senator Bovey: Patricia Bovey, Manitoba.
[Translation]
Senator Massicotte: Paul Massicotte from Quebec.
Senator Dawson: Dennis Dawson from Quebec.
Senator Saint-Germain: Raymonde Saint-Germain from Quebec.
[English]
The Chair: And I’m Raynell Andreychuk, senator from Saskatchewan and chair of the committee.
Ms. LeClaire, I know that you have not testified before us before but have testified before committees of Parliament. Welcome to the committee. You can do your opening presentation on Turkey and then field some questions from the senators before we turn to the next topic. Welcome.
Alison LeClaire, Senior Arctic Official and Director General, Arctic, Eurasian & European Affairs, Global Affairs Canada: Thank you very much, Madam Chair and honourable senators. It really is a pleasure to be here, and I hope that I can satisfy your appetite for an update on these two very interesting and complex countries. I will do my level best to answer your questions.
I will start with Turkey, as you have suggested, to give you an overview of our relations with Turkey, as you say, Madam Chair, since the last report of this committee. Then I would like to give you a sense of our engagement, our priorities and how we advance with Turkey.
[Translation]
Much has happened since 2012, when the Minister of Foreign Affairs last spoke to this committee about Turkey. While prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan was elected as president in 2014 and was then re-elected in June 2018. Following a narrowly approved constitutional referendum in April 2017, President Erdogan has centralized power over all three branches of government under a new executive presidency.
[English]
An attempted coup in Ankara in July 2016 resulted in the death of over 200 people and injured thousands more. Turkey, of course, has a history of periodic coups, which have left a deep and lasting trauma within Turkish society. The 2016 coup attempt is no exception. The visceral and wide-reaching government response that followed has led to the arrest of over 78,000 people, the dismissal of over 150,000 public servants, the closure of over 1,500 civil society organizations and increased targeting of media outlets and journalists.
Peace talks aimed at ending the government’s decades-old conflict with the Kurdistan Workers Party or PKK, as it’s more commonly known, began and then failed, sparking renewed violence and instability in Turkey’s southeast and, indeed, across the country in 2015, culminating in at least 4,000 people killed, with leaders of the democratic pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party, also known as the HDP, imprisoned. A resumption of the peace talks looks unlikely and a further escalation of the conflict is ongoing.
What has happened in Syria, of course, has played very much into the security picture. The revolution there spiralled into a civil war that has killed hundreds of thousands and has displaced millions. Turkey now hosts more than 4 million refugees, 3.5 million of whom are Syrian, making it host to the world’s largest refugee population for four consecutive years.
That conflict incubated Daesh, whose violence spread to a number of Turkish cities, killing hundreds, including, notably, the 2015 Ankara railway station building, the 2016 Ataturk Airport attack and the 2017 Istanbul nightclub shooting.
You will recall that this last incident resulted in the death of one Canadian and it was the last major terrorist attack to have taken place in Turkey.
[Translation]
The fluidity of the geopolitical and domestic landscape, coupled with Turkey’s growing global role, have honed our minds on the nature and potential of our relationship with Turkey.
[English]
Last year we celebrated the seventy-fifth anniversary of our diplomatic relations. Those relations have historically been fairly modest, but punctuated by periods of enhanced cooperation and, on occasion, deflated by political irritants. They are, first and foremost, rooted very much institutionally in our common membership in NATO, so an allied relationship.
We’re also partners in the United Nations and in the G20. Like Canada, Turkey has also been pursuing closer ties with Europe. You’ll know from the news headlines that this has been going on for quite some time, and more recently I think the narrative you hear is that Turkey is moving away from that. The relationship is certainly unsettled, but Turkey remains committed to that goal, as it has since 1959.
[Translation]
In the last several years, our relationship has been enhanced by closer cooperation in NATO missions such as in Afghanistan and Iraq, mutual interest in supporting Syrian refugees, diversifying our commercial ties, expanding cultural ties and reinforcing common positions in response to the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi.
[English]
Relations have recently been bolstered by frank dialogue. At the end of January, Deputy Minister Ian Shugart was in Turkey for productive consultations with his Turkish government counterparts and meetings with Turkish society, academics and opposition figures.
Also in January, Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a cross-ministry delegation to Ottawa to discuss enhanced security and counterterrorism cooperation. I would say, having participated in that consultation, that it was a very good opportunity to build a mutual understanding of our perspectives on security issues. I’m happy to go into more detail later.
In 2018, we hosted delegations from Turkey’s Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Migration Management to discuss refugee integration.
On the commercial side, since 2002 our bilateral merchandise flow has increased by over $1 billion dollars, from $2.4 billion to $3.6 billion in 2018, so a significant percentage rise as well as dollar value.
Canadian companies are now the largest foreign investors in the Turkish mining industry, with some estimates placing investment at over $8 billion in assets.
Export Development Canada has lent over $11 billion in the Turkish market in the past eight years, making it one of its largest international portfolios.
Canada is also becoming one of the most popular destinations for Turkish students to study abroad: 2018 saw over 4,400 Turkish students study in Canada, and the institutional ties between our countries’ top-tier education and research centres continue to multiply.
In April 2019, Canada and Turkey plan to sign a memorandum of understanding to establish a joint economic and trade committee, or JETCO, as it’s more commonly known, committing to more regular high-level engagement to reduce trade barriers and increase commerce and investment between parties.
In 2018, our missions held the inaugural Canada-Turkey infrastructure and energy forum, where top firms gathered with the aim to partner with Turkish firms to improve Canadian companies’ access to projects in emerging markets. During the same week, the Canadian association Women in Renewable Energy launched its first international chapter in Istanbul, strengthening ties between Turkey and Canada while promoting women’s participation in the senior level of management in the energy sector.
Amid all of these positive developments there have, of course, been irritants. Canada’s 2006 recognition of the Armenian genocide froze relations. Consistent and respectful dialogue since has steadily thawed that state of play. In the aftermath of the 2016 coup attempt, we were among the first countries to condemn the attempted coup.
We acknowledge the very real security threats that Turkey faces, but we recognize that at the same time that freedom of expression and a free and vibrant society are foundational for any democracy. As such, we have expressed our concern that the widespread arrests and dismissals have extended far beyond those responsible for the coup attempt.
More robust engagement is, for us, the most effective means through which to register those kinds of tough messages that can influence, we hope, Turkey to remain anchored in the west, especially given increased efforts by Russia to breed discord between Turkey and its NATO allies.
Our engagement with Turkey is therefore done on a very realistically basis. We recognize our differences and our shared interests, but we accept that Turkey is of long-term importance to Canada.
It is geographically and politically central to several of the most important global issues facing the world today, so it’s fundamentally important to a short list of our preoccupations. I’ve mentioned those in the course of my remarks. Of course, there is prosperity and diversification of our trade but also in combatting violent extremism, in addressing issues around mass migration, regional energy security, failing states, illiberal democracies and the nature and future of Europe.
It is also of deep commercial significance. It is already a G20 economy with a strong entrepreneurial tradition, and its population of 80 million is 75 per cent urban. It’s also quite young. Thirty per cent of the population is under 20, so demographically it’s among Europe’s youngest population.
I feel like I still have a long way to go, and I’ve already taken up a great deal of your time with this. I think I’m going to try and skip ahead a little bit.
[Translation]
Despite the recent economic downturn, Turkey offers promise if we are serious about diversifying our economic relations. The signing of a bilateral economic framework with Turkey will not only promote two-way trade and investment, but also encourage more partnerships to compete effectively in third countries.
[English]
Rather than challenge Turkey’s right to robustly defend its security or prejudge its intentions, our aim is to advocate for our values with empathy for the daunting problems that Turkey faces, given its unique and complex geographic location and history.
With that, I will conclude my opening remarks and will do my very best to answer your questions.
The Chair: You indeed have been before committees. I appreciate that you’re giving us time to ask questions.
Also, if there’s more of your brief, you could file it with us and it can be disseminated afterwards to the committee.
Ms. LeClaire: Of course. Thank you, chair. I believe it has been provided to the clerk. I’m happy to circulate it in any event.
The Chair: Thank you.
[Translation]
Senator Massicotte: Thank you for being here today. You gave us an overview of our relationship with Turkey. I’d like a better sense of its strategy. The Turkish expressed an interest in NATO, but have pulled back somewhat, although they claim to still be interested. A conflict has arisen in their relationship with the U.S., with Turkey growing closer to Russia. A conflict has emerged between Turkey and Saudi Arabia. What is the president’s strategic direction for the country?
Ms. LeClaire: That’s a great question. In terms of NATO, I would say the strategy is more region-oriented. Turkey remains a NATO ally, and having that relationship become vulnerable is out of the question. At the same time, Turkey wants to make sure it has room to manœuvre in a highly complex geopolitical landscape involving fairly aggressive actors. In our view, then, Turkey’s relationship with NATO is an important one, but the country may see other relationships as valuable and important in advancing its objectives.
It has a relationship with Russia and is in talks with other regional actors. The Turkish want to keep their options open. Domestically, Turkey is also experiencing some political challenges, not to mention the impact of the war in Syria and its relationship with the Kurds. It’s a complicated situation, so I wouldn’t say Turkey is pursuing a specific strategy in relation to NATO or Russia. Rather, I think the country is navigating a highly complex landscape. NATO is a tool, a very important relationship to Turkey, but the country also sees the merit in leveraging other relationships.
Senator Massicotte: Is it feasible for the country to continue working all those angles at the same time, in the long term? They’ve already purchased military equipment that goes against our interests, calling into question the benefits of working with them and sharing information. They’re playing every side. Clearly, they have some strategy against the West. Can they keep juggling all those interests without hurting their future prospects? Their economy is hurting and the value of their currency has dropped significantly. They’re experiencing an economic downturn and high inflation.
Ms. LeClaire: We’ll see. Consider the situation in Idlib. The circumstances are such that Turkey has to work with Russia to maintain some level of stability and achieve its objective of combatting Daesh, to tackle terrorism and not amplify the refugee problem. Turkey already has 3.5 million Syrian refugees.
To avoid another disaster, another crisis, Turkey had to engage with Russia. Its approach is based on its assessment of the situation and the tools it has available. Is it sustainable in the long run? The geographic situation is excessively complicated. We’ll see.
Senator Massicotte: Thank you.
Senator Saint-Germain: Thank you for your presentation. I noticed how well you spoke French. I know expressing yourself in a second language isn’t easy, so kudos to you. You highlighted the complexity of the issues related to Turkey — a critical strategic and geopolitical context, a sphere of influence involving the European Union and the Middle East, and an increasingly concerning human rights record.
My first question is about the European Union’s decision this month, in March, to suspend accession talks with Turkey. Under the circumstances and given the uncertainty of Brexit, do you think Turkey’s desire to join the EU is strong enough that it will take meaningful steps towards improving its human rights record and respect for civil and political liberties? That’s one of the European Union’s main concerns, prompting its decision to suspend accession talks.
Ms. LeClaire: That was your first question?
Senator Saint-Germain: It was a bit of a long lead-up, I’ll admit. Essentially, what I’d like to know is whether the Turkish government wants to join the EU badly enough to do better when it comes to upholding civil liberties, political freedoms and human rights. After all, Turkey knows it’s the main reason that the EU suspended accession talks.
Ms. LeClaire: My apologies, senator. I understood your question, but I wasn’t sure whether you wanted to ask your second question before I answered.
Senator Saint-Germain: No, that’s okay. I’ll come back to it. It pertains to something else.
[English]
If it is easier, you may answer in English as well.
Ms. LeClaire: I enjoy the challenge of answering in French, if you don’t mind.
[Translation]
We really see Turkey as a part of Europe. It is really European in spirit. At the same time, it is true that Turkey has a European side from a geographic and Asian standpoint. I would say Turkey’s desire in that regard hasn’t changed, but it isn’t quite as important to the government right now as domestic stability. The government believes domestic unity is under serious threat and considers the Gulen movement a real threat to the country. We’ve made our concerns clear to the Turkish government numerous times regarding how it has responded. Bear in mind, though, that the Turkish government really views the movement as a threat. The government’s priority is to deal with the threat, which is significant in its view, while pursuing the president’s political priorities and addressing the political dynamics at play within its borders. That is what it’s focusing on. In terms of its priorities, stability is number one.
Senator Saint-Germain: You mean domestic stability.
Ms. LeClaire: Yes.
Senator Saint-Germain: My second question pertains to the free trade agreement negotiations between Canada and Turkey. The talks seem to have broken down or are moving along slowly, to say the least. I believe they began in 2013. As far as Global Affairs Canada’s approach to the negotiations is concerned, how far can trade talks with Turkey really go while Canada is, at the same time, trying to get the country to cooperate and address its justice- and rights-related challenges? Do you think it’s possible to achieve both of those objectives in the context of the talks?
Ms. LeClaire: I want to start by saying that Canada isn’t engaged in any free trade agreement talks with Turkey. Efforts are currently under way to enhance our economic cooperation under the memorandum of understanding to establish a joint committee for cooperation. It will serve as a platform for businesses, in other words the private sector, to get to know the country and build partnerships. Our position is that all avenues for cooperation and dialogue present an opportunity to impart our values, which include respect for human rights, freedom of expression and freedom of the press. The committee will bring together businesses and government, providing another opportunity to advance dialogue on all the other issues of concern, given that businesses are more likely to succeed in places where stability, the rule of law and human rights principles reign. All of those factors are relevant to economic cooperation.
Senator Saint-Germain: I gather from your answer that your openness to economic and trade cooperation goes hand in hand with more institutional, governance-oriented, cooperation, especially as regards the country’s justice system and human rights efforts. Is that right?
Ms. LeClaire: Not in any formal way.
Senator Saint-Germain: I see. In principle, but not in practice.
Ms. LeClaire: Yes. Bear in mind, though, that our efforts towards greater engagement and cooperation with Turkey are not focused solely on economic cooperation. Turkey is a country of influence in our view, so it’s important to build platforms and stronger ties so we can discuss shared global priorities, mainly terrorism, refugees, immigration and human rights. At the working level, the dialogue is ongoing, but we are also hoping to find those opportunities at a more senior level.
Senator Saint-Germain: Very good. Thank you.
[English]
Senator Coyle: Turkey is a complicated place. The situation is quite fluid, as you’ve expressed it.
One of the things you’ve mentioned that concerns me greatly, and I think it concerns all Canadians, is the issue of human rights. You mentioned the impact on civil society, media, journalists and some politicians. You have not specifically said much about the universities. Could you enlighten us on the impact of the various clampdowns on the university sector in the academic field in Turkey?
Ms. LeClaire: It is a good question, and we all know the important role that universities play in exchange of ideas and fostering dialogue.
When I spoke about the arrests post-coup in the hundreds of thousands, many of those were academics. Along with civil society, academics too have faced this chilling effect that cascades. Whether it is in the judicial sector, in academia — yes, we are seeing a shrinking democratic space, a shrinking space for that free expression of ideas. It is part and parcel of our concerns. What we hear from the Turkish government is that they are carefully reviewing many of these cases and that many have been reinstated; so we have a very effective embassy.
While I didn’t speak about our diplomatic representation — maybe you all know it — we have a fairly large embassy in Ankara and a consulate general in Istanbul. Their engagement and reporting enables us to reach out, to remain aware but to also build bridges and relationships and to maintain contact with those academics.
I don’t know if I can answer your question in any other way other than to acknowledge that, yes, this is part of our concern.
Senator Coyle: I am curious about anyone with Canadian citizenship who may be detained and what the current situation is.
Ms. LeClaire: We have five Canadians who have been detained and convicted. Their cases are now under appeal. We have followed those closely and offered consular services where possible. It has been difficult because, as I’m sure this committee is well aware from previous work, Canadians who may also have citizenship of the country in which they are detained, it can be very complicated with the government. We have five Canadians who are in detention in Turkey, and we are doing our best to follow their cases. Of course, I can’t say much more than that, but that is the status.
Senator Coyle: Thank you very much.
Senator Housakos: Thank you, Ms. LeClaire, for being here and for the briefing. To say that our relationship with Turkey has had its highs and lows and has been a rollercoaster is an understatement. You are putting it politely. I appreciate my colleague Senator Coyle saying she is concerned about what is going on in Turkey.
Every so often we get concerned with what happens in Turkey in various stages and circumstances. We were concerned with Turkey half a century ago when they illegally occupied an island in the Aegean. They still occupy that island, and they have ignored time and again United Nations calls for them not be on that island.
The West has tolerated that and accepted the song and dance that they play every so often about showing this intense interest in joining the EU and becoming westernized. Then all of a sudden we have the Five Eyes and various intelligence forces telling us from time to time that Turkey engages in activities that call into question their support of Western values or if they support some of the extremism in the Middle East and around the world.
While they say they want to join the West and embrace the EU, they sometimes go and play a very negative role in the Middle East. We’ve seen recently the brutal suspension of civil rights in that country, probably incomparable to other countries around the world. We are talking about tens of thousands of people whose civil rights have been destroyed. During an election campaign we had Mr. Erdoğan campaigning and throwing fuel on the fire when it comes to reaching out to extremist Islamists in that country. We’ve seen some of the ads he has been running in these election campaigns, again fanning the flames of that extremism.
These are values that are not Canadian in any way, shape or form, yet we continue to acquiesce as Canadians. We continue to exercise our soft power, but we continue to be more accepting of Turkey’s egregious behaviour in these areas than we are of some of our other allies.
My question is, number one, why are we so acquiescing of this particular ally compared to others? We have shown a lot less patience with some other allies when it comes to this type of behaviour. Can you tell me what the difference in approach has been between Turkey and this current Trudeau government and the previous Harper government in your experience as a member of the department?
Ms. LeClaire: I’ll answer the second question first because it is a shorter answer. You are putting it in terms of this government versus the previous government, but I would also say that Turkey five or ten years ago was different than Turkey today. That has to be taken into account.
I’ve been in this job for almost three years. That has been under the current government, and so I’m only qualified to speak to that.
Senator Housakos: Let me ask the question in a different way because I have a view on it, but my view is not the one that counts here.
Is it fair to say that this current government has been extremely tolerant, given the circumstances of the breaches of civil rights and the brutal suppression of civil rights in Turkey right now? We really haven’t, as a government, stepped up to condemn them in a vigorous way, other than to say we are concerned and we are following it closely and we have maintained our diplomatic dialogue in trying to get them to come around. Is it fair to say that we really haven’t taken any solid sanctions against this behaviour and we have not condemned them in a harder way other than diplomatic channels?
Ms. LeClaire: You are hearing from Minister Freeland tomorrow, and she will be able to speak in far more specific terms about the conversations and the concerns she has expressed and the calls for action she has made.
There has been a consistent approach by the government to use engagement as a tool to express concern and seek to influence and to transmit our values while expressing concern. I would say that in the work that I have done, and that I’ve seen the minister do, we have not shied away from expressing those concerns. I would say that, in the work that I have done and that I’ve seen the minister do, we have not shied away from expressing those concerns. I would add our mission in Ankara as well.
Senator Housakos: May I ask a short question, or can you put me on round two?
The Chair: I think you had two questions and you went to the second one. I forget what the first one was. Perhaps you have two, Senator Housakos. Do you want to restate your first question?
Senator Housakos: At the end of the day, I guess these are questions I can pose to the minister. She is the one who has the ultimate authority to answer them. You answered my question that we’ve used diplomatic channels in order to express our displeasure and all the rest of it. I’m simply saying, given their behaviour has become more egregious, I think we’re compelled to do more than just basically say, “please behave yourself.”
Senator Dean: Thanks very much for a very rich and interesting overview.
From a Canadian perspective, from the perspective of the department, as you look at the very complicated situation in Turkey, what are two or three of the risk factors, both regionally and geopolitically, that you would worry about?
Ms. LeClaire: I would say that the situation in Syria is the greatest risk factor in that what is going to happen there in the future is related to that. The second one is those 4 million in total, but 3.5 million Syrian refugees. I think that Turkey is doing remarkable work in accommodating those refugees and providing health and education, mitigating the risk that this becomes a lost generation and, therefore, a risk of terrorism.
Terrorism is a serious risk. It continues to be a serious risk. With radicalization of populations and terrorist incidents, I mentioned three major incidents over three years. Those have had a huge economic impact. You can see the risk posed by terrorism to its success in the future.
I would have to flag the shrinking democratic space and everything that goes along with that. The trajectory in Turkey is a worrying one to us. The centralization of power in the president, the issues that have already been raised with respect to human rights, freedom of expression, freedom of the media, and this is also one that concerns us as a risk.
Senator Dean: Thanks very much.
Senator Sinclair: I’m a visitor to the committee today because I’m filling in for a permanent member. Some of my questions may be more basic than others.
Having read the briefing document that was circulated ahead of time and listening to your presentation, I was curious about the question of the continuous turmoil going on within the country and what appeared to sound like military efforts to control the population and the coup responses and things such as that.
What is the evidence that there’s involvement from the United States or Canada, or both, in armament sales, military equipment sales, to Turkey or to another country that would end up in Turkish hands? Are you able to share any information?
Ms. LeClaire: Senator, does that qualify as an easy question? I’m not sure. I feel like taking a poll.
No, I don’t think I am. Turkey has a history of military coups entrenched in its culture. I think it is probably fair to say in Turkey that the military has a particularly sacred, special role in guarding the constitution and therefore has felt throughout Turkey’s history that it can remove a government.
That has led to this trauma in society. I don’t have the numbers in front of me, but there had been some time between the 2016 coup and the one before that. It was a coup that was perpetrated by certain figures in the military.
Having said all of that, I’m not sure that I would consider Turkey a militarized society, which I think was the point that you were making, if I understood you correctly, and that the population exists under an overwhelming presence of the military. I’m not sure I would agree with that assessment.
In terms of arms sales, with apologies, I can’t speak to that, but I would certainly be happy to follow up with the information I can provide to the committee. I don’t have it off-hand.
Senator Sinclair: Thank you.
The Chair: I am going to follow up on that. Having been involved in NATO, they have a highly competent military. They’re selling more than they are receiving. They have a special relationship with certain countries in Europe and with the United States. The concern has often been their military equipment perhaps ending up somewhere else in nefarious hands. That’s the problem.
I’m going to permit myself a couple of questions. Historically, Turkey, being partly in Asia, partly in Europe, has always had this conundrum of one foot in Asia, in the eastern world; one in the western world. Sometimes one leg is higher and shorter than the other. It has been a difficulty. When the negotiations with the European Union and NATO flounder — it isn’t so much NATO as European Union — they seem to go elsewhere. That had been the dynamic. It isn’t helpful that countries in Europe have said Turkey’s not European. The debate has been both ways. It’s a difficult one.
Our report in 2013 said that we understand this continuing long struggle for accession to European Union. Then Turkey says they’re not interested in going recently, but they’re very bound with Europe.
The dilemma is we have Brexit on the one hand, and we have question marks all over the place. In 2013, we were saying that they have special trade arrangements already with Europe and we had not been maximizing those. We saw opportunity after opportunity go astray because we weren’t focusing in on it. On our trip there, it was absolutely true, it wasn’t on our radar for any development, even though they had a strong banking system, a pretty good commercial court for doing business, et cetera. We should maximize that. Our one qualifier was it’s all dependent on governance. We know where that’s gone now.
Are there opportunities and should we be thinking more? Are they opportunities or impediments with the current state in Europe? Turkey has turned to the world. They’re leading into the Middle East. They are rediscovering themselves in Africa, where there’s been a vacuum from Egypt and elsewhere, and they are very much into the issues in the Middle East.
Is this the time for us to be developing our relationship more strongly, other than putting on the record and being part of whatever processes, internationally or bilaterally, to reinforce the democratic process being in their interests and the rule of law and human rights interests, or should we be assessing where they’re really going, because this is a time of flux for them?
Ms. LeClaire: I will start by saying, yes, there are opportunities. Since your last report, CETA has come into force. Because Turkey does have close economic ties with Europe, which I think is relevant when we think about Turkey’s future when you look at where their ties are. Their ties are with Europe, their economic cooperation is overwhelmingly with Europe. With CETA coming into force, it creates new opportunities.
Turkey’s growing role in different parts of the world creates both challenges and opportunities. Speaking from a commercial standpoint, we have mutually identified opportunities to work together in Africa. I mentioned in my opening remarks that Turkish and Canadian firms have complementarities that can create win-win commercial opportunities in Africa.
Their regional role, their growing global role, their membership in the G20, their large, growing population, all of these things point to growth in Turkey’s regional and global influence. Therefore, they are an actor on the international stage and interests are at stake, and we need to be aware of them. We need to identify where our differences are and our common priorities are.
To say, “Where is Turkey going in the long run,” as you say, it is in flux. From our standpoint, we want to influence that transition. We want to ensure a direction that is anchored in the values that we have talked about. I think it is difficult. We would say that the indicators point to that, and we want to play our role in working with them to ensure that future. There are, unquestionably, challenges facing Turkey, both regionally and globally.
The Chair: Since I identified myself as being from Saskatchewan, we have great opportunities with pulse crops and associations with Turkey, and it’s the staging ground into the Middle East. We have turned around a lot of our agriculture through a connection with a company in Saskatchewan. Starting out very small, it has become dynamic and is spreading more and more, and using Turkey as a base. That’s a comment. You don’t have to answer.
One of the impediments, everyone said, was the Turkish language. Very few people in Canada speak it. We pointed to the fact that more commercial opportunities are in English, so the business community works that way, and there are more opportunities for young Turkish people to come to Canada to study English. That had not been utilized. It seems to me that there are better figures now for that. There is a Turkish Canadian Chamber of Commerce. There are pockets of improvement since 2013, but there are these overwhelming governance and direction issues.
Senator Bovey: This has been very interesting. Thank you very much.
You mentioned students. I missed the number of Turkish students who were studying in Canada or maybe you didn’t give an exact number.
Ms. LeClaire: 4,400 last year.
Senator Bovey: Are they studying all across the country?
Ms. LeClaire: I’ll find out.
Senator Bovey: What I wanted to ask about, tying in with the students, is the other side of the coin. What about Canadian researchers in Turkey? I’m well aware that a number of archaeologists have ongoing projects there. I believe I’m right when I say that last October the University of Toronto announced the establishment of a research centre and archaeological park in conjunction with Turkey’s Ministry of Culture and Tourism, and that’s in the Amuq Valley. I think it is aimed, in part, to provide training to preserve, protect and celebrate the cultural heritage in this particular part. I believe it is Iron Age. I also think I’m right when I say that this January there was another major discovery by Canadians in southern Turkey.
Can you tell us how these cultural agreements and serious archaeological explorations tie in with Canada’s role with UNESCO for preserving heritage sites? How does that tie in with all these other issues that are boiling up in Turkey?
Ms. LeClaire: What I can speak about most is what we see as a very exciting area for growing our cooperation. To quote somebody I heard recently, researchers work together because they want to work together.
This is a growth area. It’s one that also has its complications. To thrive it needs support and assistance from government offices, because of permitting and land use requirements. That’s an example where it is very exciting, but we need permissions from the ministry of culture. Having a government-to-government relationship with the ministry of culture matters in order for that non-government cooperation to thrive. Hopefully it will be a contribution to the greater preservation of human history that is UNESCO’s remit.
Another example that we have been working on between the two embassies is to memorialize Canadian military engagement in Gallipoli, particularly the regiment from Newfoundland. That’s another project that is going well which really speaks to the people-to-people ties that we have with Turkey and can celebrate them and contribute to the preservation of our own history, telling our own historical stories, and contributing to the expertise of our own educational institutions and to global institutions, such as UNESCO.
Senator Bovey: This is one of these important opportunities where soft power has a strong foothold in probably some of the terser conversations that go on. Thank you.
Senator Housakos: You said in your briefing, and it’s well understood through the years, that Global Affairs Canada views Turkey more of a European force or part of that European pocket. For Canada, Turkey has always been part of our network of expanding our trade approach. That’s what Canada’s foreign policy is based on. We’re a trading nation and wherever we see business opportunities we pursue them. This is my own humble opinion, but I think sometimes we pursue them regardless of some of the infringements of other values and principles that we hold dearly are carried out, yet we turn a blind eye to them. We’ve seen it time and time again.
Canada is a country that believes in the rule of law. We believe in international law. We believe in civil rights. We’re a pluralistic society. The reality of the matter is Turkey is not a pluralistic society. We’ve seen clearly they don’t respect civil rights like we do. They don’t respect the rule of law internationally. We’ve seen that time and time again, or at least they do whenever it’s convenient.
My question is the following: Can you name me 1 or 2 of the 28 EU countries that you think are comparable to Turkey? Outside of the economic comparables, if you look at the political, social and values comparables that we build our society on, what country in Europe would be the equivalent to today’s Turkey?
Ms. LeClaire: In terms of those kinds of complexities, senator?
Senator Housakos: I’m talking about the basic structural values of a society, such as supporting democracies, supporting civil liberties and supporting the principle of pluralism. Every European country today is basically a pluralistic democratic state if you look at any one of the EU countries. That’s why Turkey keeps getting hung up on certain checkpoints whenever the EU says that if you want to join the EU you have to check this box and that box. There are always empty boxes.
What I’m saying is it’s nice for us to have the view that we need to pursue a relationship with them because they’re an expanding, growing economy, yet they’ve shown time and time again that they don’t fit into the realm in terms of political and social values that European and North American countries cherish as so important.
Why do we continue to pursue it when it clearly doesn’t equate? Those two principles are diametrically opposed. They’re not like any other European country. They’ve been trying to join the EU for how many decades and they keep getting blocked because of these obstacles. Why is it that we turn a blind eye to those obstacles and hindrances in our pursuit of economic trade opportunities?
Ms. LeClaire: I don’t think we turn a blind eye. I think that we have very frank dialogue about our differences and we express our concerns. I think that is true of European countries as well, a number of whom have a very challenging relationship with Turkey. But I think that European countries, like us, recognize that Turkey is a global actor where we have common priorities.
For us, the outstanding example of that is Turkey’s response to the Syrian refugee crisis and what they’ve done hosting those millions of Syrian refugees and the humanitarian response of what they have done. Regarding some of your other qualifications of Turkey as non-pluralistic and freedom of religion, there are many of these attributes, Beyond all of that, I think every country has its own particular circumstances and their own particular challenges. Turkey’s particular challenges relate an awful lot to their geography and the geopolitical forces that surround them.
We may not like how they deal with those and express ourselves accordingly. They remain a NATO ally and they remain deeply engaged economically and in other ways with Europe.
The negotiations, of course, for many years have been a push/pull, but in sitting down with Europeans on accession, you are talking about values. For the Europeans, that is a way to engage with Turkey on those questions of values to move the dial, and there is value in that.
The Chair: Thank you. We’ve gone over time. I think we’ve explored many areas and need to continue to explore it. I think you started out that Turkey is a very complex country in a very complex region. Our discussion today points out that we’ve gone a little here and a little there, but we’ve gained more information on the current Canadian situation towards its relationship with Turkey, but also regionally, so we thank you for that.
Do you have enough breath to continue straight into the Ukraine file?
Ms. LeClaire: Absolutely.
The Chair: It’s an easier one only because we have studied it more often. Again, it’s a region that is very difficult at the moment and very complex. You agreed to continue, and I appreciate that. We’ll now switch to the briefing and update of Ukraine and Canada’s relationship.
You’ve given us a pretty good brief to remind us of the relationship with Ukraine from 1992, when we were the first western country to recognize the independence of Ukraine, and the many special partnerships we’ve had.
We’ve all been riveted to the situation in the Donbas and Crimea. We would appreciate if you could centre in on some of the more recent issues in Crimea and in Ukraine; our UNIFIER role, which was recently announced as having been extended; the election coming up in Ukraine, which is very pivotal, and the involvement of Russia and the ongoing very difficult relationship between Ukraine and Russia.
If that could focus your presentation on any one of those that you think is current now that parliamentarians should be briefed on, I would appreciate that.
Ms. LeClaire: I’d be happy to. I will try and make this very much an update. I can focus it to the last year in my remarks and we can go further back in questions if you want. This will probably be choppy, but it will be short.
Since the Maidan demonstrations, our financial commitment to Ukraine has been in the neighbourhood of $750 million in multifaceted support. That is to support their reform effort.
Moving to the difficult security situation, of course, there is lots happening on it. Most recently, in Kerch Strait, I’m sure everyone read attentively about what Russia did last November, endangering lives and detaining 24 Ukrainian soldiers who remain in detention. This is another example of Russia’s troubling behaviour. In our unwavering, steadfast support to Ukraine, we continue to undertake measures to respond to that, using, of course, our voice and our role last year as the G7 president to speak in solidarity.
Of course we always try to do that whether we are speaking out or whether we are looking at economic measures to respond. We have been responding with economic measures since 2014. Most recently, you’ll have seen the announcement last week, which we did in concert with the United States and the EU. Canada announced economic measures against 109 individuals and entities. We already had economic measures in response to the building of the Kerch Bridge, and last week it was to respond to the Kerch Strait incident, as well as adding to our list public officials who are supporting the illegitimate councils of government in Donbas and Crimea.
In other words, we are seeing ongoing support, troubling behaviour by Russia and ongoing insurgency in Eastern Ukraine. Of course we remain concerned about it and that means that we are maintaining our comprehensive support.
UNIFIER was renewed last week. We’ve now trained more than 10,000 Ukraine armed forces members. The renewal was for another three years.
On the reforms, our assessment is that Ukraine is making progress. We work very closely, both with Ukraine and partners such as the EU and the U.S. Progress we have seen include health, decentralization, pension reform, gender equality and police reform, where we have invested a lot in assistance to Ukraine.
Also in promoting women’s political participation, building public confidence in the electoral process, strengthening the electoral system, deterring fraud, countering corruption, countering electoral intimidation and violence. That’s really important this year because of the elections in Ukraine. So we have the presidential elections taking place on March 31. We anticipate a second round. Then there are parliamentary elections in October.
We are very concerned, of course, of the prospect of Russian interference in those elections. We have put together a package of assistance to Ukraine on electoral support. It is valued around $24 million. That includes electoral observation, both long-term and short-term, multilateral and bilateral. There will be a contribution of Canadian Parliamentarians to the OSCE Parliamentarian observation mission. We are keenly watching that election this year, recognizing that we need to work with Ukraine to stay the course on reform, while engaging in the democratic process in providing free and fair elections to its citizens. So working very hard along that path.
We are co-hosting with Ukraine in July a conference on reform, the third in a series of three conferences. The first was co-hosted by the British, and then the Danes. We are doing it in Toronto in July. The focus of that discussion is on reform and to demonstrate solidarity with Ukraine in pushing the kinds of reforms that will endure and deliver security, prosperity and democracy to Ukraine.
I have not really touched on, and should have, the trade side. We had the entering into force of the Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement in 2017. So another really important foundation of our relationship. We are working hard to build up that commercial relationship, recognizing that it is about supporting reform, delivering prosperity, improving governance — that these are all important pieces of building a better future for Ukraine and for Ukrainians.
Recognizing that there remain huge challenges, Ukraine being at the front lines of challenges to democracy and troubling behaviour by Russia in the region and beyond. So in terms of our work with Ukraine, also looking for opportunities to support the region in their efforts to secure a democratic, prosperous and secure future for their citizens.
I have really tried to focus it and not given you what I hope you will regard as the “doesn’t need to be said” support for Ukraine so that we can get right to the discussion. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you. You responded very adequately, and that gives us a lot of time for questions.
[Translation]
Senator Saint-Germain: Thank you for your presentation. The Minsk II agreements, which were signed just over four years ago, in February 2015, set out a number of measures that Ukraine has yet to implement or comply with adequately. Constitutional reform and amnesty for separatist leaders are two examples that come to mind. The state of governance in the country, as you described it, seems more optimistic than media reports would suggest.
I’d like you to connect some dots for us, if you would. Could you tell us how the slow progress on the commitments that were made in relation to sound governance and respect for rights ties in with the recent decision by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to extend the military mission in Ukraine until March 2022?
In light of the circumstances, is there a link between maintaining security within its borders and peacekeeping? Can we draw a connection between the domestic situation — which still requires significant improvement as far as respect for rights and constitutional reform go — and Canada’s extended military mission?
Ms. LeClaire: To begin with, it’s important to recognize that Ukraine is not a country at peace. The conflict hasn’t cooled; it’s very heated. Despite the ceasefire, violations at the contact line are constant, and progress under the Minsk agreements is very much stalled. No progress is being made.
You referred to Ukraine as a party that had still not implemented certain measures, but the talks are stalled. Ukraine’s position is that it’s difficult, if not impossible, to fulfill its Minsk agreement obligations without —
Senator Saint-Germain: Russian cooperation?
Ms. LeClaire: Yes. Consequently, everything is at a standstill. At the same time, though, it’s important to continue down the path of reform where possible.
Senator Saint-Germain: That includes constitutional reform.
Ms. LeClaire: Yes. Governance reform, and all the related societal elements, must be kept up, and that’s where the government can make progress. That’s why I was talking about the reform dimension earlier, but there’s no doubt about the difficulties and very big challenges. For instance, there are no indications that Crimea will be returned to Ukraine in the future. The conflict in Donbass is ongoing. The security situation remains very uncertain. Ukrainian security forces need assistance. Their capacity doesn’t exceed Russia’s.
Senator Saint-Germain: I see. Would you go as far as to say that, if Canada had withdrawn its military support, it would have undermined Ukraine’s security? Could Canada’s withdrawal have had such a serious impact that extending the mission until 2022 was very much necessary?
Ms. LeClaire: Absolutely.
Senator Saint-Germain: Very good. Thank you.
[English]
The Chair: Can I just follow up on those questions? After a number of attempts at changes at the presidential parliamentary level — and we have been working at it for 20 years — there was a renewed effort from the international community, most notably, Canada, the United States and that, when there seemed to be more optimism, but it was two-pronged. On the one hand is this solidarity with Ukraine, its sovereignty, its territorial integrity, but it was always matched with statements saying that that cannot be a use of a defence towards further progress inwardly and on the democratic scale.
More recently, I have not been hearing that debate or that kind of two-pronged approach from either the United States or Canada, to be quite frank, but I still hear more of it in Europe. Are we more preoccupied now with Russian interference, not only in Ukraine but around the world, so that we have softened our public statements about the fact that Ukraine needs reform as much as it needs stability and reintegration of its sovereignty?
Ms. LeClaire: I don’t think we see those as two separate things. We see reform as essential to Ukraine’s future. I don’t think there is any acceptance that governance practices that would be unacceptable here don’t need to be changed because they have a security situation.
Our view is that in the long term their best way to peace, prosperity and security is through reform. That’s going to sound a little naive. There is a caveat to that, and that is they live in a difficult neighbourhood. Reform is the path that we see most open for Ukraine to achieve long-term security, prosperity, democracy, and therefore reform needs to continue.
Reform is hard, and we are there to support that reform, and we’ve done so and will continue to do so in a comprehensive way. We do it with the U.S. and the EU. It is joining those up, recognizing that a prosperous, democratic Ukraine presents a big challenge to Russia, and that becomes a big challenge to Ukraine.
[Translation]
Senator Massicotte: In a few weeks’ time, Ukraine will be holding an election, as you mentioned. I think that, under Mr. Axworthy’s leadership, we have a strong team to oversee the election and make sure the process is free, democratic and sound.
As you know, today, vote manipulation is no longer a manual affair. Actors like Russia prefer to use social media to manipulate elections, and election outcomes can be influenced in other ways as well. Does the election observation team Canada is sending use the same methods as in the past? Are we also sending computer experts to help Ukraine guard against potential election manipulation by Russia to influence the outcome?
Ms. LeClaire: If I understand your question, and please correct me if I’m wrong, I would say that the support our team will be providing includes programs to help Ukraine build resilience against manipulation and disinformation efforts through social media, so that Ukrainian media and civil society are able to recognize potential disinformation attempts. Further to the assistance we will be providing, our observers will be active not just on election day, but also in the long term to identify possible issues. NGOs will also be supporting Ukraine’s resilience to counter disinformation. Does that answer your question?
Senator Massicotte: Yes, that’s fine. Thank you.
[English]
Senator Dean: To the uninformed observer, things seem very quiet in Ukraine right now. We are not seeing footage of conflict. However, you did make a reference to the ongoing insurgency in Eastern Ukraine.
Before hearing that, my question was going to be a port was blocked, Crimea was annexed, was that it? Was that mission accomplished for Russia? Was there any ongoing activity? Could you tell us more about where Russian forces might be poking and probing and continuing insurgent activity?
Ms. LeClaire: There is, as you may know, a monitoring mission along the very long line of contact that divides the Donbas, where the insurgency is, and the rest of Ukraine. That’s an OSCE mission, and they provide daily and weekly reports on violations that happen along that line of contact.
I don’t have the recent numbers in front of me, but I do get those reports daily. They may be greater or lesser and may not hit the media anymore, but shootings and bombings are happening regularly along that line of contact. That is that insurgency in the east.
As far as Kerch is concerned, the sailors remain in detention, and that’s a big problem. And they are being charged with crimes and are looking at years of detention. We’ve been following that trial, and they’ve been moved to Russia. That is an ongoing violation — arbitrary detention — and there are a lot of problems around there.
Ukraine’s access to the Sea of Azov through that Kerch Strait, that remains impeded. While I have not seen systematic reports, there are certainly reports of ongoing harassment of various kinds of cargo traffic into the Sea of Azov. That’s very important for Ukrainians who live along that coast. Ukrainians’ access to that is being impeded, and in that line of contact there are regular violations.
Senator Dean: Thank you very much.
The Chair: Speaking of Crimea, which is still part of Ukraine for Canadians and the Canadian government, the plight of the Tatars continues to be an issue. They are not only marginalized, they have been victimized, jailed, tortured, and there was, of course, a UN resolution, but we are not hearing much about it now even though it is very difficult for anyone to exist in Crimea who does not totally support the Russian position.
Is there anything more we can do to bring more light on this situation? Because it was a human rights issue. The Tatars had returned after the war. We’ve got pictures of how they were deported in horrific positions to the north and died en route. They came back, they were starting to flourish, to be part of the community, and now, of course, they are in a desperate situation.
Can we penetrate it enough, because the borders are off to us, of the state of the average citizen in Crimea, and particularly the leadership and the community of the Tatars?
Ms. LeClaire: Sadly, it is very difficult. It is close to a blackout situation. We certainly look for all opportunities, and it would be an example of where there could be a conversation with Turkey, because they, of course, are also concerned about the Tatars. We seek to gain what information is available, but it is very difficult to get information.
The Chair: So it is not any better? It may be worse? We are simply not having the access we need to assist them?
Ms. LeClaire: To the extent that information is available, it is not better.
The Chair: On another flank, the initiative of Russia bringing gas through the north, the Nord Stream 2, which will bypass Ukraine, Poland and the Baltics, will make Ukraine, the Baltics and possibly Poland much more vulnerable. We see that Europe is supporting that initiative. At least certain countries are: Germany, among others. Have we been engaged at all in those discussions that, if you want to secure Europe, if you want to have a secure region, that this is going to be destabilizing further an already fragile country and region?
Ms. LeClaire: It is a very controversial topic. As you say, Germany has positioned itself. I think with the Baltics and the Nordics it is more sensitive and there are ongoing conversations. There has not been an articulated Canadian position on Nord Stream 2.
I know the Americans are very concerned, so there are discussions about it. They advocate against it. That is as much as I can tell you, senator.
The Chair: I think we had a good session on Turkey and the start of a good session on Ukraine. I think it is difficult to have you go on as long as you have. I think senators are being very kind to you, knowing that you have put in a full day of questioning, therefore I think it is an appropriate time to conclude. We want to thank you for the effort. I know that you are at the table but that you do have help in the back, so we appreciate the department responding on these updates.
I think it is incredibly important that we continue to focus on Ukraine. Canada has been seized with supporting Ukraine, but being an honest and frank partner. I hope it will continue in that way to point out the needs that Ukrainians have on the ground, and to differentiate that from the government and its initiatives. The government is under watch with support and cooperation, I would think. I think it is going to be a focus for Canada, and I find that in Canada I often hear it is the diaspora. It isn’t. I think that Canadians — as I know through other election monitoring — are seized with it, and they get why the eastern flank of Europe is important to NATO, and why it is strategically important for our security. I appreciate that you brought some updates. I think we will want to hear more about the election, the outcome and continue to follow it.
With respect to Turkey, I think you have quite adequately pointed out that it is not easy. There are opportunities and there are difficulties, but that’s not unusual. It should be a challenge for Canada to find a way and a place in the dialogue with both countries, because I think both are very significant to us.
Thank you for giving us more and new information.
(The committee adjourned.)