THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE
EVIDENCE
OTTAWA, Monday, April 25, 2022
The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence met with videoconference this day at 2:03 p.m. [ET] to examine and report on issues relating to security and defence in the Arctic.
Senator Tony Dean (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: Honourable senators, welcome to this meeting of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. I’m Tony Dean from Ontario and chair of the committee.
I am joined by my fellow committee members, Senator Jean-Guy Dagenais, Quebec, Deputy Chair; Senator Margaret Dawn Anderson, Northwest Territories; Senator Peter Boehm, Ontario; Senator Pierre-Hugues Boisvenu, Quebec; Senator Donna Dasko, Ontario; Senator Marty Deacon, Ontario; Senator Mobina Jaffer, British Columbia; Senator Terry Mercer, Nova Scotia; Senator David Richards, New Brunswick; Senator Larry Smith, Quebec; and Senator Hassan Yussuff, Ontario.
Those participating virtually are asked to have their microphones muted at all times unless recognized by name by the chair and be responsible for turning their microphones on and off during the meeting. Before speaking, please wait until you are recognized by name. Should any technical difficulties arise, particularly in relation to interpretation, please signal this to the chair or the clerk, and we will work to resolve the issue. Finally, I would like to remind all participates that Zoom screens should not be copied, recorded or photographed. You may use and share official proceedings posted on the SenVu website for that purpose.
Today we continue our study on security and defence in the Arctic, including military infrastructure and security capabilities. We have two panels of witnesses with us; both will focus on geopolitical competition in the Arctic and its impact on security and international cooperation, and today specifically, Russia’s strategy in the Arctic. In the first panel we’re welcoming Dr. Aurel Braun, Professor, International Relations and Political Science, University of Toronto; and Dr. Paul Stronski, Senior Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. I thank both panellists for joining us today by video conference. We will now begin by inviting you to provide your opening remarks, to be followed by questions from our members. We’re going to open today with Dr. Stronski as we await the arrival of Dr. Braun. Dr. Stronski, welcome to the committee.
Paul Stronski, Senior Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, an individual: Thank you very much, esteemed members. I’m very happy to be able to speak with you today on this important issue, and I thank you very much for the invitation to share these views.
I’m going to focus my remarks into roughly four areas. It is important to understand how Russia looks at the Arctic, both historically and contemporarily. I’m going to focus a bit on its military and diplomatic interests in the Arctic, its economic interests in the Arctic — many of which are tied to both the military and its energy, which is a key source for funding Russia’s military might — and the prospects for Russian success and conflict with the West, particularly in light of the current Ukraine war.
Before the latest iteration of the Ukraine war, I would argue that for the first two decades after the Cold War, Russia approached the Arctic largely as an area of low tension where cooperation between Arctic powers in addressing common challenges was both desirable feasible. However, as relations deteriorated between Russia, Europe and North America over Russia’s annexation of Ukraine — and now the latest war in Ukraine — the Kremlin has adopted a much more competitive and confrontational perspective in the region. Increasingly, Russia sees this as a sphere of economic and military expansion, and a place to showcase its great power ambitions. It has removed its reticence from involving China in the Arctic, although it still prefers to deal with Arctic states on their own. Russia prioritizes military security right now to counter what it claims are growing challenges from NATO to its interests there. Also challenging Russia’s interests there are climate change, although I do not see Russia taking on that threat and acting on that threat seriously.
Russia’s involvement in the Arctic is historical. It dates back hundreds of years and is supported by successive governments, from the czarist to the Putin era, who were eager to extract resources and use them to help fuel trade and the economy. This was particularly important during the Soviet era, when gas and oil were developed first in Siberia both above and below the Arctic Circle. In the 20th century, that offered the Soviet Union wealth and access to hard currency regimes that enabled its domestic consumption and funded its military machine. That really provided the foundation for Soviet foreign policy, and I think much of that continues today in the post-Soviet era.
The exploitation of the Arctic accelerated in the 2000s. Oil and gas became key to Putin’s regime as a source of revenue. The oil and gas from the Arctic and Siberia helped Putin consolidate his hold on power as the leader who took Russia from the crazy, awful days of the 1990s back to an energy superpower. It accumulated funds from the Arctic to hedge against future economic and political problems and it used that money to help rebuild the Russian military and project power.
The rising temperature in the Arctic, however, is also causing problems for Russia. It is making the region more accessible, it is diminishing the natural ice barriers that Russia had along its coast which it now feels it must defend, and increasingly Russia sees the area as a place of geopolitical concern where it needs to showcase and enhance its geopolitical presence.
We’ve seen a sea change over the last several weeks. Russia and the West, I would generally argue, had hoped that helping Russia develop offshore oil and gas projects through technological means and investment would help provide ballast to help keep the relationship between Russia and the West, Russia/Europe, Russia/United States, Russia/Canada, fairly stable, which would make western investment and western stakeholders key to keeping relations stabilized with Russia. But in the last eight weeks we’ve seen numerous companies begin to pull out as sanctions, particularly targeting the tech sector, have been increased. Finally, while there is this growing threat perception of Russia, they still want to engage with the West through the Arctic Council and through the Arctic 5, another venue which they are increasingly interested in.
On the military concerns, the Arctic is closely tied to Russia/West relations and Russia views the Arctic increasingly through a prism of NATO and NATO expansion. NATO started to expand in the 1990s. NATO used to be just in central Europe; then it came on Russia’s doorstep, namely in the Baltic, the Black Sea and increasingly in the Arctic. As the region becomes more accessible, we are seeing more human activity from all countries. With the prospect of Finland joining NATO, Russia will increasingly see this as a contested space with NATO. With the ice melt increasing, I see a need to patrol this region. Often its patrols are escalatory, which is something we need to be watching and to be very mindful of.
Regarding military interests beyond NATO’s growing presence, or what it perceives as NATO’s growing presence — not only its physical presence but also the expansion of NATO into Scandinavia and to Finland, in particular — we are seeing the security of Russia’s second-strike capability of its SSBN missiles. The forces on the Kola Peninsula are key from the Arctic. Russia sees having a robust posture in the Arctic as being important to operating in the North Atlantic and European Arctic in the event of a conflict with NATO in that it can move its fleets into the Atlantic Norwegian seas, where it feels like it needs to operate. Most of Russia’s capabilities there are designed more for close perimeter defence and border protection and much of the infrastructure that Russia is putting in — that is, roads, rails, telecommunications, search-and-rescue — is there to support non-military missions but a lot of it is also dual use and it can be used offensively, if needed. Over the last several years, including recently, we have seen patrols into Danish and Norwegian territory, incursions into Canadian airspace and incursions into American airspace. We are seeing much more robust efforts to escalate and at least show their presence.
Regarding economic interests of the Arctic — and I know that I’m getting close to time, so I will start wrapping this up —
The Chair: If you could hurry it up, that would be helpful. Thank you.
Mr. Stronski: The Arctic accounts for about 10% of Russia’s GDP and 20% of its exports. It is strategic for the Russian economy and for the Russian economy moving forward. Tapping the resources is a key priority. However, those resources are hard and costly to tap and the western sanctions that have been imposed, particularly the latest, will make that a lot harder. These reserves that Russia has there are easier and cheaper to access elsewhere in the world.
Russia also has a history of high-profile plans but underfunding those plans. We’ll see whether this is another example of that. This is an area that is very poorly populated. There are no real population centres up here; no real infrastructure. Russia has grand plans and grand ambitions, but whether or not it will be able to succeed, particularly given the economic contraction caused by Ukraine and the sanctions, remains to be seen. Thank you very much.
The Chair: Thank you, Dr. Stronski. I’m sure that those remarks are going to provoke a number of questions for you.
We now welcome Dr. Aurel Braun from the University of Toronto. Over to you, Dr. Braun.
Aurel Braun, Professor, International Relations and Political Science, University of Toronto, as an individual: As much as the world watches Russia’s unbridled aggression and unrestrained atrocities in Ukraine in horror, there is still an inclination in some quarters to try to compartmentalize and to segregate regionally and functionally. What happens away from the Arctic is not meant to interfere with what is happening in the Arctic.
I think this never worked. It is not working and it is not going to work. It is what I call magical thinking, where one loses sight of some crucial developments. Key among these is the return of geopolitics and the return of geopolitics in a particularly virulent form, where force is viewed by Russia as very important. This is not something that has occurred only this year. We may not have noticed it sufficiently before — and that is our fault — but it has been there for a while. After all, the invasions of Georgia took place in 2008; of Ukraine in 2014, the illegal annexation of Crimea; and Vladimir Putin’s forces went in and saved the murderous regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria — all while Russia has been prodding and probing NATO defences around the world and where, at least since 2019, NATO has been designated as the primary enemy of Russia.
It is important to have the conceptual clarification that any attempt to try to separate soft and hard power does not work in practice. Soft power and hard power are a composite and they work together. It is only what I call magical thinking that tries to separate it and leads to a kind of confusion where negotiations and diplomacy are viewed not as a means to an end but as ends in themselves.
I can appreciate the instinct to try to look at the Arctic as a zone of peace, but that is not how Russia looked at it except in tactical terms. Russia has designated the Arctic as a crucial region and it has to do so because Russia is in many ways a failed state. I use the 30-year rule to look at countries after a traumatic experience. If you look at what Nazi Germany or militaristic Japan was 30 years after the end of the Second World War, by 1975 they were both prosperous, stable democracies with vibrant, competitive economies. If you look at Russia, it is largely a unidimensional economy, dependent to a remarkable extent on energy, and a lot of the energy is in the Arctic.
I hope to come back in terms of being able to answer some questions and entertain dialogue. In the case of the Arctic, three areas are crucial: military threat, economic environmental imperatives, and legal challenges and territorial disputes.
Let me start by saying that Russia’s military doctrine lists NATO at the top of the external dangers and proclaims complete readiness to protect its Arctic security interests. This is not something new. Russia has poured vast resources into the Arctic in terms of ground, air and maritime forces. It has put the S‑400 anti-aircraft missile system in Novaya Zemlya, the archipelago. We have seen the largest Russian military power build-up in the Arctic in decades.
In many ways, the Arctic is governed by what I call the “Rugozin Doctrine.” People spoke about the Gerasimov Doctrine, which was sort of a hybrid approach to warfare. But Dmitry Rugozin is a provocative individual who served as Russian ambassador to NATO and as deputy prime minister. He was at one point put in charge of all things Arctic and is currently in charge of the space program. He made one very memorable statement. He summed up in many ways a Russian policy that we prefer not to believe exists but has been proven, sadly, all too real in the case of Ukraine.
After the 2014 invasion of Crimea and the illegal annexation, there were sanctions. Dmitry Rugozin was asked about sanctions and about the denial of visas. He said, “Tanks do not need visas.” In other words, brute force can achieve certain political goals. Ultimately — and hopefully — Russia will be proven to be wrong, but this is the approach. Diplomatic niceties fall aside when geopolitical imperatives come into place.
Because of shortness of time, I will move on to my second point, which is Russia’s economic interests and the environmental factors in the case of the Arctic. I just heard one assessment that Russia gets about 10% of its GDP from the Arctic. I have seen other estimates that are considerably higher, that something like 20% of the GDP comes from the Arctic. This is where there is enormous potential in resources. Maybe 20, 25% of hydrocarbons are in the Arctic, but, of course, these are extraordinarily difficult and dangerous to extract.
Russia has proven itself to be a poor custodian of the environment. The ecology of the Arctic is fragile and it is dangerous to do extraction in that region. Russia seems unrestrained, unlike Canada or the United States. Especially under the Biden administration and the current administration in Canada, we have been extraordinarily careful in terms of exploration in the Arctic. This has not been the case with Russia. Part of the reason is that they desperately need those resources because Vladimir Putin has not modernized Russia’s economy. He was hoping he could have modernization without democratization, but modernization has not really worked.
There are pockets of excellence in Russians; there is no question about it. They have some remarkably talented scientists. But overall, their economy is not that of a modern state, so reliance on the Arctic is heavy compared to the United States. The United States generates 1% of its GDP in the Arctic. We need to take that into account to understand why Russia is so focused on the Arctic.
The other element is that with climate change, the Northern Sea Route has become more navigable. There is quite a bit of traffic already and Russia hopes to dramatically increase that traffic. The Christophe de Margerie went through in 2021 as a test case. If you can use the Northern Sea Route as a reliable connection, this would save up to 30% of the energy involved in shipping from Asia to Europe. It would also cut down the time and distance that it takes. This creates another kind of imperative for Russia.
The Chair: Dr. Braun, I’m sorry to interrupt. Could you bring your comments to a close fairly shortly? We need to get on with the questions, and I’m sure there will be many for you.
Mr. Braun: Let me just mention the third one quickly, namely that there are legal disputes. Russia claims a large portion of the Arctic, over the objection of other states. Even a flag was planted at one point. There is the Lomonosov Ridge, which Moscow claims would involve Russian control over something like an additional 1.2 square kilometres of the Arctic Ocean. You are looking at this from the perspective of the claim over the seabed.
Let me conclude. The danger is that there are delusions. There is a tendency for Western deference to Russia and inadequate attention paid to deterrence. The West is now trying to restore deterrence. This has been provoked not by the West trying to be expansionist. Russia is not a victim. Russia has agency. Russia is a country that has created fear, that is leading Finland and Sweden to possibly apply for membership in NATO.
In Canada we also need to address geostrategic economic and environmental concerns in the Arctic. We absolutely should use soft power, but we also need to have the military capabilities. Today there was an announcement from Ottawa that more will be done in the Arctic in terms of enhancing NORAD. This is long overdue. We need to have a combination of hard and soft power to remove temptation, in the case of Russia, to send the right kinds of signals, to rebuild deterrence and to understand that the Arctic is an integral part of overall global security. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you, Dr. Braun.
Thank you both for your opening statements. You’ve drawn some important interconnections between things that Russia is doing in various geographic regions, and that is important for us.
We’ll now proceed to questions. We will need to finish at 3 p.m. In order to allow as many questions as possible, we have four minutes allotted for each question, including the answer. I ask my colleagues to keep your questions succinct and that you identify which witness your question is directed to.
I would like to offer the first question, as usual, to the deputy chair, Senator Dagenais.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: My first question is for Mr. Braun. A number of countries have announced economic sanctions against Russia, and we have seen results in some cases, while there is still mystery in Canada over what has really been done. First, I would like to know whether the sanctions will really affect Vladimir Putin and his accomplices or whether the entire Russian population will be burdened by those sanctions. Second, do you think Mr. Putin could be removed from power over the short or the medium term?
[English]
Mr. Braun: Sanctions do not have a sterling history in terms of being effective. Even when President Biden was asked about the sanctions, he said they are not meant to be a substitute for deterrence, and they take quite some time. I think sanctions can have a long-term corrosive effect. However, they don’t work the same way in a dictatorial system — in a personalist regime — as they would work in the case of Canada.
Sanctions work well if they are combined with what is happening on the ground. If Russia is losing on the ground, sanctions will add to that. It will be essential for changing the perception of the Russian people. At the moment, Putin has a huge amount of popular support because of the tendency to rally around the leader in any kind of conflict in all states, but also because he controls much of the media in Russia.
I think if we are going to talk about sanctions, we have to look at the kind of statement just issued by the Secretary of Defense of the United States, General Austin. He said in a very blunt, undiplomatic fashion that Russia has to become weaker and must not be able to rebuild its military capacity to threaten other countries again. This is a rebuilding of deterrence. This goes back to what Boris Johnson put in a better way when he said that Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Russia must fail, and it must be seen to fail. So sanctions need to operate within that context whether in the short term or the long term.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: My next next question is for Mr. Stronski. After the destructive invasion of Ukraine and the sanctions Canada has imposed, are there still opportunities to cooperate with Russia on a strategy for developing the exploitation of the navigable oil passage, or should Canada forget what has happened and try to come to agreements through diplomatic discussions with Putin?
[English]
Mr. Stronski: Thank you for the question. Right now, it’s very difficult to work with Mr. Putin on pretty much anything. In his mind, the war moved from not just being a war in Ukraine about Ukraine but very much a war against NATO. So I think it’s going to be challenging to work with him in any sort of constructive format.
I would say the other issue is that in December during the COP26, there was a delegation that Russia led. It was led by former prime minister Anatoly Chubais. These were the people who wanted to engage with the West on these issues, particularly in the Arctic. Mr. Chubais and many of the people in that delegation have been critical of Ukraine, and Mr. Chubais has fled the country. I think many of the people who would want to engage with Canada on these issues have been sidelined and don’t have the clout to do that. Perhaps if at some point, if Putin is no longer there, that opportunity might re-emerge, but right now it’s very challenging to do anything with Putin.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: I will have a question in the second round.
Senator Boisvenu: My first question is for Professor Braun. You talked a lot about three elements — the military threat, as well as differential and territorial economies.
I would like to hear your thoughts on China. We know that China is renewing its military forces. China has a great deal of interest in the Arctic. The third point is that we know that, for a number of years, China and Russia have been getting closer in terms of cooperation, among other things, in their naval exercises, especially in the Pacific. I would like to know to what extent this cooperation may affect the balance — if there is a balance — when it comes to the Arctic, especially in terms of military activities.
[English]
Mr. Braun: I think China is a crucial factor because China has financial resources that Russia does not have. China has investment capacity and views itself as a near-Arctic state. They have a tremendous interest in navigation across the Arctic — the Northern Sea Route — because if that could be made workable, that would benefit China’s trade enormously.
China has also said that they have a friendship with Russia that is unlimited. That is being tested at the moment. I think what China has to realize — and if it hasn’t yet, it may realize eventually — is that Russia is a poor partner and it is unwise historically to allow a weak or a reckless partner to make decisions for you. Even though this is not a formal alliance, there are those close relations. Though they may have been beneficial to China in terms of getting inexpensive energy and military technology from Russia, I think the cost is likely to increase if the sanctions are maintained. If the sanctions against Russia are maintained and strengthened, at the very least China may suffer collateral damage. That may send a message that the relationship is not one that is benefits only, but rather that there are those significant costs.
I think the sooner China begins to differentiate itself from Russia, the better it will be for China as well as for international security. At the moment, I don’t think this will end well for Russia. Even if Russia somehow manages to turn the situation around in Ukraine militarily, the damage to Russia of this operation is absolutely horrific. One of the things Russia has done is reawaken the dormant NATO. Look at Germany. Look at what Europe is doing to try to diminish its dependence on Russian energy. Look at the possibility that Finland and Sweden are going to join NATO. That will create a tectonic shift in terms of the strategic balance, and China has to recognize that. This is the miscalculation that Vladimir Putin has brought about.
[Translation]
Senator Boisvenu: Your answer is very insightful. Thank you for that. Professor Braun, when you talk about a military threat, it is still a matter of balance between opposing forces; the larger the imbalance, the larger the threat. I would like to hear your thoughts on Canada’s naval presence in the Arctic. How do you view it compared with Russia’s very heavy-handed presence on that territory and do you think the consequences may be serious for Canada if we don’t prepare for a massive intervention of our naval forces?
[English]
Mr. Braun: China is trying to build a vast naval force and global naval capacity, and so has Russia. Canada, by any standard, has not exactly been doing what I would view as adequate in the Arctic. We need heavy icebreakers. We are supposed to be building two heavy icebreakers but they will not be ready until 2030. We have one old icebreaker. Russia has vast capacity; they have nuclear-powered icebreakers. They have something like 40 major icebreakers, overall. We need to enhance our naval capabilities, and we need to enhance them in the Arctic, globally and in collaboration with the other states in NATO.
Senator Anderson: My question is for Dr. Braun. I live in Canada’s Arctic. I’m currently in Tuktoyaktuk in the Northwest Territories. The Arctic has been a strategic military location in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s and had quite a presence during those decades. I would say it has either been feast or famine, and right now it appears to be a bit of a famine. In your professional opinion, how can Canada best optimize military defence and security in the Arctic and continually maintain that presence?
Mr. Braun: Thank you very much for that question. I think “famine” would be a fair statement as to what we have at the moment and have had for quite a number of years.
I think we can appreciate that we cannot match what Russia deployed quantitatively. We need to do something that gives us a qualitative advantage, both in terms of what we do ourselves and in cooperation with others. In terms of what we do ourselves, it is absolutely essential that we get fifth-generation fighters. This is something that Russia cannot match for a while. It appears we will be getting the F-35s; I have advocated for that before. It’s not a done deal because we are still negotiating, but it has been the one selected as the most suitable fighter. We’re supposed to get 88 or thereabouts. The sooner we get them, the better it is; I wish we would have gotten them earlier.
We need to enhance our radar capabilities. We need to enhance NORAD. We work in the Arctic through alliances both in NORAD and NATO. Of course, if Finland and Sweden should join NATO, that would offer new areas of cooperation. There are more changes that I think are taking place. We must recognize that NATO enlargement has traditionally happened not as an offensive action but as defensive. This is what Russia forced on us.
To give us an idea of the nature of the Russian threat and the kinds of miscalculation, there are two countries that have tried so hard to be cooperative and find areas of cooperation with Russia. Finland and Sweden are at the very least seriously considering NATO membership. One other element should be added. There is a temptation to look for functional areas of cooperation, search and rescue, for instance, and all of that is fine. But if you institutionalize it, you give Russia additional legitimacy, and I think this is where we made some mistakes. We have the Arctic Council, which is chaired by Russia, and all of a sudden all the other members don’t want to cooperate with Russia. Well, what is the purpose of the Arctic Council in that case? If it is not feasible, what do they do outside of certain areas where we could have had Indigenous contacts through other means rather than having this institutional type of footprint, which the Russian regime under Vladimir Putin used effectively to try to project an aura of stability and legitimacy? What we have come to learn is that the Putin regime is a current and present danger. It is not going to go away. I think as long as this regime is in power, we have to deal with that danger. It’s not going to go away.
Senator Richards: Senator Boisvenu actually asked my question, but I’ll ask it in a slightly different way. I’ll ask Dr. Stronski my first question. How much do you think a much more sophisticated China is using Russian desires in the North to further its own geopolitical ambitions?
Mr. Stronski: I think China is effectively using Russia to pursue its geopolitical ambitions. I remember about 10 years ago Russia was reticent to allow China to be part of the Arctic Council as an observer, very much pushing back on that. What we also saw during the height of the Western engagement in the oil and gas fields was a reticence to allow China into those. But at least since Ukraine and probably even before then, we’ve seen this relationship grow stronger and stronger, and Russia seems to be on the losing end of this. China is a major investor now and pretty much the only investor. Russia has pivoted to Asia, but it has really pivoted to China, so China is getting the upper hand on this, getting greater access to the Far North, to the Arctic and the Northern Sea Route. I think this is not something that is in Russia’s long-term interests or possibly even in the West’s long term.
Senator Richards: A quick question to Mr. Braun: Putin as a KGB operative in East Germany, a kind of Stalinist throwback, was, I think, naive about what the West was, but I think Canada was also extremely naive about whom Putin was. I think with our sunny ways we put ourselves and this country behind the eight ball, and you mentioned the F-35 and other neglected military things we could have gotten.
How long do you think it will take for Canada to catch up in the North, or will it ever be able to catch up?
Mr. Braun: It will take quite a while because we have fallen far behind what we needed, but the sooner we get going on it, the better the chances are, and I think some important steps have been taken now, and I find that encouraging.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you to our witnesses for being here today. I hope I can squeeze in questions. My first question is for Professor Braun. You mentioned today the Northern Sea Route and the unrecognized Russian claim over it. I certainly don’t like to look at melting ice caps from a strategic point of view, but it is the world we live in. The last I read, the ice melt in the Northern Sea Route was opening up the traffic quicker than the Northwest Passage on the Transpolar Sea Route. What kind of strategic advantage does this bring to Russia? Is it sort of a head start in terms of imposing their presence in the Arctic, and how has the unrecognized Russian claim played out in terms of sea traffic in the Northern Sea Route?
Doctor, the Arctic Council was established in the mid-1990s. This was intended to be an intergovernmental body that represented our globalized and peaceful future. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has disabused us from that notion of the past, and the council now faces an uncertain future.
Is there a future, as we know it, for the Arctic Council with Russia in it? If not, what kind of organization might it look like, if any, in the future?
Mr. Stronski: I’m also happy to take on your first question if you would like. I’ll answer your second question first in case Professor Braun gets back.
It will still be key to have some sort of conversations with Russia, and the Arctic Council is the only one out there right now. The Arctic Five is another one, but the Arctic Council is really the only place where we can talk to Russia on both security as well as climate change issues.
I don’t have a lot of hope. Russia is a government and a regime that has come very late to the game in recognizing climate change and hasn’t shown any real interest in engaging with it. In fact, it feels like climate change could improve its economy by opening up agriculture in the Far North. So they have a very different view of it. I do think it will be important that the rest of the Arctic engages multilaterally between ourselves, but I do still think that this is an area where we do need to at least keep a door open to somehow talk with the Russians.
As for the Northern Sea Route, yes, Russia is getting a head start, but this is also an environment where the Ukraine war is going to slow it down. The environment is already extremely costly to operate in. It has been very costly for the Russians to get any global insurer to insure ships going in there, and because of the war in Ukraine and the atrocities, most insurers are fleeing from insuring Russian cargo ships.
While Russia certainly has ambitions to increase that, it is a difficult operating environment. It’s hard to insure. It’s only navigable for two to three months a year. Most of the shipping is basically to take energy out. It doesn’t really go across the entire route yet.
I do think the issue of insuring cargo shippers and the reputational risks will hurt, because fewer and fewer are willing to insure that route.
The Chair: Thank you Dr. Stronski, for covering both of those questions for us.
Senator Dasko: Thank you to the witnesses for being here. I would like to drill down on Senator Deacon’s question with you, Dr. Stronski.
We heard a suggestion earlier that we should pursue more of a military build-up in terms of NATO, the West, Canada, the U.S. and so on, but you also suggested just now that we should take the route of the Arctic Council and work through those institutions. Should we be doing both? Is this feasible? Should we be pursuing a military build-up and pursuing the other soft processes and institutions?
Mr. Stronski: Military build-up is the reality. We also have to recognize that Russia’s military modernization, as we see in Ukraine, has not been as effective as many people had hoped. A lot of the facilities that Russia has opened up in the last 20 years, they are reopening Soviet-era facilities. They’re paving Soviet airfields. So while we are seeing an increased military presence and activity, I think the problem goes back to one of your colleagues who noted that the West has not been investing in some of this.
I think we’re still ahead, but we’re seeing an unpredictable and aggressive Russia. If Finland joins NATO, we’re going to see a lot more Russian provocation in that region.
At the same time, I think responding to military needs, but also recognizing that Russia might not be as formidable as we think in the Far North. I do think that at some point there will be some sort of change. We need to have some communications open. I don’t have high hopes. I don’t have high hopes for Indigenous peoples’ connections. I know the United States has tried to do that, and the Russians felt that we were trying to cultivate pro-Western populations. So a lot of these soft-power efforts are not there, but perhaps the world is changing. China is now also recognizing climate change. I think that the Arctic Council, open as a potential venue for future discussions, is important.
Senator Dasko: I want to probe on resource extraction. It was said that resource extraction is very important for Russia, but it’s also very expensive for anyone to do.
Does Russia use other means to carry out resource extraction? Do they have forced labour, for example? Does Russia have ways of defying the economic forces that rule the way we deal with resource extraction? Do they sell for lower prices or have other means to price their product in the marketplace, given that it costs more to extract?
Mr. Stronski: It is much more costly to extract, and it will get even more costly because we’re denying them the technology they need. That is a positive, but it is also a negative because they will be operating with subpar technology in the coming years. We know about the impact on the aviation sector. If they are unable to keep up all the technology, if they still try to operate some of these offshore drilling plants, it could be very environmentally concerning.
I don’t know specifically about forced labour in oil and gas, but there are some pretty horrific prisons in Russia. I don’t hear about them being used for mineral extraction, but there is timber, fishing, precious metals up there. Those are other areas we need to think about as well.
The Chair: Thank you, Dr. Stronski.
Senator Boehm: I would like to thank our two panellists for the candid views they are offering today. I have a question for both witnesses if Dr. Braun is still with us. He referenced a recent NORAD announcement at the end of his remarks. It concerns the Arctic Over-the-Horizon Radar, which is to replace the North Warning System. The North Warning System has been there for over 30 years.
Procurement takes a long time. We know that from the F-35 issue and everything else. It is expected that this new system would be in place in 2028.
In the meantime, we have a NATO summit coming up in June. If you believe everything you read, it’s very possible that Finland and Sweden will be joining. This may provoke the Russian Federation to strike out and test us in the Arctic, and we will not be ready.
I would like your comments on what can happen in the interregnum and whether there is greater scope now — I believe there is — for more NORAD and NATO interface.
Mr. Braun: There is greater scope as well as greater risk. What is important is not only what we have right now — we don’t have enough — but what we are projected to have, the direction we are moving in.
One thing that I would like to see is for us to meet the 2% of GDP spending on defence that an increasing number of NATO states are moving toward. We made that commitment. True, it wasn’t legally binding, but nonetheless, we made it collectively at the NATO summit in Wales in 2014. That would send a message as well.
I would add one small comment, and that is that we should be very careful about not blaming ourselves for environmental damage that Russia does. It’s not a matter of Russia having the right kind of equipment. It is a kind of carelessness, the corrosive corruption that pervades under this kind of regime. What Russia has at the moment, sadly, is a kleptocracy that is in search of an ideology.
The Chair: Dr. Stronski, we have about a minute if you would like to jump in now.
Mr. Stronski: Yes. I do not disagree. It is not that we should not be sanctioning dividing these technologies but it is that Russia has no qualms about continuing trying to use outdated technology or broken technology to keep these fears and these activities up because it is so vital toward both their economic viability in the future and their ability to fuel their war.
The Chair: Thank you. Senator Mercer is the last speaker on this round. We will come back to Senator Smith with our next panel.
Senator Mercer: Thank you, chair, and to you two gentlemen for your presentations.
We have introduced new terminology here of “magical thinking” which I found curious. How does magical thinking work when you engage it for Canada and the United States and with respect to defence capabilities and preparedness in the Arctic?
The Chair: Who wants to take that?
Mr. Braun: Pointedly, it involves a kind of pretense that we can substitute diplomacy, which is very important, or that we can substitute a dialogue that these are more than a means to an end; and that we don’t have to have a combination of the soft and hard part that makes up the effective use of power.
Ultimately, it think that is deleterious to our interests.
The Chair: Thank you. I’m afraid we have to end our panel there.
Thank you so much, Dr. Braun and Dr. Stronski, for your direct, thoughtful, helpful and, in some cases I think, provocative advice in terms of the muscularity and breadth of your understanding of Russia’s intentions and ambitions. It has been very helpful.
We will now ask our next witnesses to turn on their cameras for the second panel with our apologies for starting a couple of minutes late.
Senator Mercer: Chair, I wanted to announce that I will not be able to be here for the full part of this panel. I have to catch a plane to join you in Ottawa for meetings tomorrow. I apologize in advance.
The Chair: Senators, we now move to our second panel. For those of you joining us live, this meeting is exploring security and defence in the Arctic, including security capabilities. Our focus today is on geopolitical competition in the Arctic and its impacts on security and international cooperation. We’re looking specifically at Russia’s strategy in relation to the Arctic.
We now welcome Mathieu Boulègue, Senior Research Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs; and Dr. David Auerswald, Professor, National Security Strategy, U.S. National War College. Thank you both for joining us by video conference. I invite you to provide your opening remarks which will be followed by questions from our members. We will start with Mr. Mathieu Boulègue. Please begin when you are ready.
Mathieu Boulègue, Senior Research Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, an individual: Thank you very much, it is Boulègue, like baguette, as I often say.
[Translation]
Ladies and gentlemen senators and members of the committee, it is an honour for me to speak to you today.
[English]
I think my colleagues already mentioned the importance of the Arctic and Russian strategic thinking from the economic side; the impact of climate change. I will also recall the symbolic importance of the Arctic in terms of Russia projecting itself, as they call it, as an Arctic civilization or a hyper-boreal country, with a sense of reappropriation of a new national border because of the impact of climate change.
I will now make a few broad points on Russia’s posture and threat perception in the Arctic. The first point concerning Russia’s threat perception relates to this fear of encirclement by NATO and by its allies. This is not Arctic-specific nor is it the by-product of tension originating from the Arctic itself. I think that point should be clear.
Just like other theatres of operation, Moscow is not excluding the possibility of military conflict in the Arctic and is therefore preparing for all contingencies, including war in the region, which is not, once again, Arctic-specific.
It is very Arctic-specific that Moscow views the Arctic as a strategic continuum stretching from the North Atlantic, on the one hand, to the North Pacific on the other, with the North Pole approaches in the middle. That is, three sectors defining one single Arctic, which is not the way that we are seeing it at NATO level or in the West in general.
From the Kremlin’s point of view, it is pretty simple: The non‑Russian Arctic is basically NATO territory. The expansion of NATO to Sweden and Finland will, in a way, vindicate Russia’s force posture which is, once again, not Arctic specific. What is Arctic specific is that, unlike other theatres of operation, the Kremlin feels in a relative position of strength in the Arctic. Because of geography and because of their recapitalization of military force, they have an assertive force posture and they are signalling aggressively in terms of official documents and of their remilitarization and of their action.
Let’s now look at how this threat perception transcribes to military thinking and the protection of the national interests with a lot of caveats to it. My colleague, Paul Stronski, already alluded to it in the sense that the sea ice around the Arctic and the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation no longer acts as a natural border. For the Kremlin, the equation is simple. The impact of climate change means that there will be, and there is already, more human presence, whether it is civilian or military presence. It means that a new border requires assertive sovereignty enforcement and perimeter control around it.
So, a simple equation. This equation, in Moscow’s terms, is solved through a clear, remilitarization of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, through their revamp and the construction of new bases along the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation; through the positioning of dual-use infrastructure for search-and-rescue, for radar positioning and domain awareness; and also through investment in capabilities, including specifically an Arctic-hardened enabled capabilities.
We’ve been discussing quite a lot about these sort of multilayered protective domes across the eastern and western sectors of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, I call it the bastionization of the Arctic with the presence, as was recalled by my colleagues, earlier of the sea-based nuclear deterrent and the need to protect said infrastructure on the Kola Peninsula in the European Arctic and also in Kamchatka in the Pacific Arctic. It is very much about these multilayered protective domes.
What Russia is doing in terms of remilitarization is what I call a double-dual approach. On the one hand, you have dual use systems, Arctic infrastructure being equally employed for civilian and military purposes with a happy mix in the middle. But also dual purpose, in the sense that Russian military capabilities are increasingly blurring the line of what is offensive and defensive. By the flick of a button, a “defensive” system can be employed for offensive and standoff purposes. Therefore, there is a sort of double-dual purpose.
If we move on to Russia’s military strategy proper, then the Arctic is defined for me as four broad objectives.
First, impose cost on foreign access. They are fears once again of more NATO presence, of more surface deployments and increased submarine activity with an ambition to control access and operation of foreign assets.
Second, protect the Northern Sea Route, as was mentioned already. Russia’s interpretation of the Law of the Sea, specifically the ice clause, is contrary to freedom of navigation and innocent passage and is causing problems for countries like Canada in terms of the future regulation of the Arctic.
Third, defending North Pole approaches. This is very much linked to Soviet thinking in terms of U.S. strategic bombers, for instance, or the presence of NORAD, as it was mentioned. It is very much about strengthening Russia’s position across Arctic North Pole approaches.
Fourth, removing tension from the region itself and extending military capabilities beyond the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, with ambitions of denial and more defence in depth. Nobody wants to fight in the Arctic. Nobody wants to fight both an enemy and the environment. Therefore, the need to push tension away.
Finally, what does it mean for Canada and for NATO and its allies?
First, it puts more pressure on the seams and cracks of governance and security, on specific choke points like the GIUK and GIN gaps, for instance, on North Atlantic sea lines of communications, and on the Bering Strait. Russia wants to deny, to hamper access and evolution of NATO and allied forces in the region, which puts direct costs on freedom of navigation and uncontested access for NATO.
Two, the risks of spillover and horizontal escalation. Russia’s brinkmanship-prone activities and unprofessional behaviour, as well as increased human presence — all these things are feeding a sense of impending doom on managing accidents and incidents that could lead to a vicious circle of escalation and to spillover in other theatres such as the North Atlantic, North Pacific or Baltic Sea. There will probably not be a conflict in the Arctic proper, but there could be conflicts degenerating into the Arctic because of spillover.
Finally, the consequences of Russia’s war against Ukraine. I would argue that Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine has shattered all the hopes we potentially had to uphold low tension and to uphold an exceptional Arctic in terms of cooperation now that Russia’s chairmanship of The Arctic Council and The Arctic Coast Guard Forum has been put into a form of pause or stasis for the time being, and rightly so. Putin should not be allowed any form of off-ramps or trade-offs for good behaviour on Arctic cooperation.
Therefore, this must lead to a concerted approach between the remaining Arctic nations, which will all soon be NATO members, as they are, in order to deal with Moscow’s aggressive posture, rhetoric and actions in the Arctic. I would therefore call for the need to define the rules of the road militarily in terms of what is acceptable or unacceptable military activity, to explore the continuum between hard security — or military security — and “soft security” issues like life at sea and search and rescue, in order to create an Arctic-specific, military-to-military code of conduct or rules of the road in terms of communication, as well as properly defining the role of NATO moving forward in this environment.
This will not be easy. This will have to be done without Russia for the time being. But this is the price to pay to make sure that we do not just repeat low tension as a mantra but that we enact it and make sure it stays alive. Thank you very much.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Boulègue. Terrific stuff, and I’m sure there will be lots of interesting questions that follow.
We will next hear from Dr. David Auerswald.
David Auerswald, Professor, National Security Strategy, U.S. National War College, as an individual: Thank you for the honour of contributing to your deliberations. Before I begin, I have to note that my remarks represent my views and not those of the U.S. National War College or any other government entity. I would like to associate myself with Mr. Boulègue’s great remarks. I echo everything he just said.
I want to focus my remarks on the reaction of Western Arctic nations to Russia’s foreign policy behaviour. My focus is on how Russia is perceived and the actions that result from those perceptions, because those perceptions and the resulting behaviour can have a great influence on whether the Arctic stays peaceful.
To put the current situation in context, it is useful to go back eight years to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Before Crimea, Canada and the northern Arctic states saw the Arctic as a zone of peace, largely insulated from broader geopolitical competition. Conversations among Arctic states were mostly reserved for Arctic Council meetings, focused on non-security issues like scientific research, pollution monitoring and control, and shipping standards for Arctic waters. Agreements seemed possible. For example, Norway and Russia signed a maritime boundary demarcation in 2010, an Arctic search-and-rescue agreement was signed in 2011 and an Arctic oil spill agreement was reached in 2013. The Arctic Security Forces Roundtable and the Northern Chiefs of Defence meetings was started in 2010 and 2012, respectively, to foster dialogue between the West and Russia on Arctic security.
Then, of course, came Crimea in 2014, which changed things for some countries. Politicians began to publicly say that the Arctic can no longer be viewed in isolation from broader geopolitical events. That was a significant rhetorical change. In practice, however, the real worry was that Russia would turn to the Baltic states as its next target after Crimea. The security threat was not to western Arctic territory but perhaps from the Russian Arctic into the Baltic Sea region. Some worried that a conflict outside the Arctic, such as in the Baltics or Ukraine, could spill into the Arctic.
Policies changed as a result. For example, starting in 2018, Denmark focused significant attention, and eventually resources, on improving its ability to support its Baltic state allies. That was manifest in the creation of their army’s deployable 1st Brigade. Norway lobbied for NATO to pay more attention to the high north and hosted the 2018 Trident Juncture exercise as a part of that effort. Norway also began a defence spending increase starting in 2017 for a larger military, new equipment and more intense training.
Sweden became very concerned about a Russian attack on Gotland Island. They began voicing their concerns publicly and eventually increased their defence spending in 2020. But note that Sweden’s focus has been on the Baltic region rather than on the Arctic per se. Nordic countries and the U.S. expanded their information-sharing programs and announced a series of voluntary defence coordination agreements.
Russia’s re-invasion of Ukraine this year has led to some dramatic changes in Arctic geopolitics, which some of the previous speakers have mentioned.
All western Arctic states believe that Russia is a threat to the international order. But there is no panic that Russia will attack the Nordic region militarily in the immediate future, given Russia’s commitment of troops to Ukraine. However, no one can rule out that eventuality at this point, particularly if Russia wanted to engage in horizontal escalation to divide the West or to somehow signal NATO of its intent. No one believes that they can deter or long survive a military confrontation with Russia by acting alone. Even Finland believes in military coordination. Nordic states have pledged to increase their defence spending to at least 2% of GDP.
The Arctic Council has cancelled all future meetings. That is very significant. The Arctic Council, as you know, is a forum to discuss non-security issues. That the Western members are cancelling further meetings over a security crisis is an important statement. The Nordic countries have suspended Russia from the Barents Council, the Nordic Council of Ministers and the Council of Baltic Sea States. As we know, Finland and Sweden have reopened debate over NATO membership. All of that has occurred just in the last two months.
Despite a new sense of urgency when it comes to Arctic security, there remain areas of divergence within the West. These include the prioritization of the Arctic versus the Baltic Sea region. Norway prioritizes the Arctic. Denmark, Finland and Sweden prioritize the Baltic Sea region. These countries have different acquisition policies than priorities, what to buy and from where. Part of that is due to domestic politics, part is due to military needs and part is aimed at the international signalling. They differ in the pace by which each country will increase defence spending by up to 2% of GDP. Denmark has a target date of 2033 and Sweden has set no date. Their timelines will affect their ability to prepare militarily.
They prioritize different international institutions. Sweden and Finland prioritize the EU’s role in the Arctic. Norway and Denmark prioritize NATO. Canada prioritizes NORAD. Such differences can make coordination difficult.
Finally, these countries differ in their willingness to share intelligence data with each other. Here, alliance membership and status within the NATO alliance really do matter. For example, the U.S. shares more with Five Eyes countries than with your average NATO member, and more with NATO than with partner nations.
Looking to the future, Western nations must adapt to the evolving security situation. Let me suggest that they focus on the following things.
First, each country should devote more resources to improving their Arctic domain awareness. Knowing what is happening in this vast region will be crucial for crisis de-escalation and to avoid surprises.
Second, countries could focus on data links within their own systems and the sharing of data across national platforms. Acquiring better sensors is one thing; putting all that data together is an additional challenge. As important, linking data from one country to another is vital to shared threat assessments and defence coordination during deterrence or combat missions.
Third, Arctic allies and partners could consider moving to distributed basing, repair, refuelling, and rearming infrastructure during Arctic crises. As we have seen from Ukraine, Russian forces attempt to mass long-range fires on large military and civilian targets. Distributing assets across multiple smaller facilities might be expensive, but it could also greatly improve survivability during a conflict. The Finnish military has embraced this concept as has the U.S. Marine Corps in the Indo‑Pacific theatre.
Fourth and finally: continue winter training and exercises with Arctic partners. Training and exercises build interoperability and familiarity with terrain and weather conditions and demonstrate resolve to potential adversaries.
These four ideas are obviously not costless, but they will help prepare western Arctic nations for military crises and conflict, should they occur. That ends my prepared remarks. Thank you again for the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing. I look forward to your questions, and I should just note that I will need translation if the questions are in French. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you, Dr. Auerswald and Mr. Boulègue. We will certainly have some questions for you, and we will now proceed to those. We have four minutes allocated for each question, including the answer. Again, colleagues, I ask that you identify which witness your question is directed to and keep your questions succinct in an effort to allow as many interventions as possible.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: My first question is for Mr. Auerswald. In those northern and Pacific fleets, the Russians have about 55 submarines, a number of which have nuclear equipment. We don’t have any in Canada. None of our four Canadian submarines can operate properly under Arctic ice, and the current government does not seem to be about to buy any such submarines.
Can Canada do without submarines in the Arctic? How much help can we expect from the Americans if our army should need it over the short term?
[English]
Mr. Auerswald: Far be it from me to advise the Canadian government. Now, there will be a “but” here. But I would suggest not spending precious dollars on high-budget items like submarines — Canadian submarines — when you could use that money much more efficiently, as it were, by buying unmanned sensors either in the maritime domain or along the Canadian archipelago on the coast or in terms of over-the-horizon radars and also reinforce the information-sharing agreements that you have with the United States for North American defence. I think that would be a much more efficient use of resources. I’m happy to elaborate if you would like.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: Thank you, Mr. Auerswald. I have a short question for Mr. Boulègue, since we have a limited amount of time. Mr. Boulègue, as far as the exploitation of the Arctic territory goes, how much importance should we place on the recent joint exercises the Russians and the Chinese carried out in the Pacific?
Mr. Boulègue: Thank you very much, senator. If I may answer your first question, I completely agree with my colleague’s answer. I would add the need to have underwater listening capabilities — something that has been abandoned since the Cold War. My colleague brought up maritime domain awareness, but we also need to reconcile our capabilities within NATO in anti-submarine warfare, especially in terms of tactical aviation. During the Cold War, that was something we were extremely good at, and we have lost our edge, if you will, when it comes to capability. So there are many less expensive, easier things to implement than a fleet of submarines, should we need to start from scratch.
As far as the exploitation of the Arctic territory goes, I am very happy about your question on the other side of the Arctic — the Pacific. The Russian and Chinese exercises are a form of Russian extension concerning those capabilities. Russia, in Kamchatka and on the peninsula, including in the Okhotsk Sea, is already beyond its comfort zone in terms of maintaining an area of influence. Russian capabilities in the region are limited. Russia is forced to exceed its capabilities, which means that, for Russia, China is a force multiplier to show both a symbolic presence and a form of a challenge. As Russia is unable to do that alone, it is doing it with China in terms of challenging. That is why we have seen, for a few years, that bilateral capability to carry out exercises that help challenge air defence identification zones, such as naval zones and approaches to Japan and Korea, but also to the American territory.
For the time being, those measures are relatively benign. We should not necessarily worry about the number of patrols there may be there, but they show a capability. Capability implies an intention, which could harm allies’ capability of access, including the capability of Canada and the United States in northern Pacific, in the Bering Strait and more broadly across the entire north east Asian zone, which would also lead to security issues for Japan and Korea, both western allies. That equation is even more fragile today, as what happens in the Pacific has a direct impact on Europe and vice versa. Once again, we are talking about a continuum.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Boulègue.
Senator Smith: Thank you to the witnesses. One of the things I have learned by listening to all of the newscasts about the war that is going on is that Russia does not act until they see force against them. Knowing that, here is my question. With Canada’s position in the north, which is obviously not very strong — and I could ask this of both of our witnesses — what would be your three to four steps? I know that you have already mentioned global steps that need to be taken. But for Canada as a country — as a player and member of NATO — what does Canada have to do besides 2% of its GDP? What are the three or four steps that Canada needs to do to strengthen itself?
The Chair: Dr. Auerswald first.
Mr. Auerswald: Thank you, senator. As I mentioned a minute ago, I think Canada could invest money in the renewal of the North Warning System. The last I heard, Canada had pledged roughly $252 million toward its renewal. Outside estimates seem to say it is going to cost at least $10 billion. So a lot more money needs to go to the North Warning System.
In addition, as I mentioned before, the sensor situation in the Arctic is woefully inadequate for almost every Arctic state. I’m talking about manned systems, remotely manned systems and unmanned systems. They can be underwater, at the surface of the water, aerial, satellite-based and ground-based.
There are a variety of things that could be done on that front.
The third thing that I would suggest is to continue and perhaps even accelerate Canadian participation in Arctic exercises. Adults learn by doing. Exercises build interoperability and connections across militaries, and they build muscle memory into a military force. I would urge the Canadian military to continue and accelerate its Arctic training with the United States in Alaska but also with our Nordic allies across the Atlantic.
The Chair: Thank you, one minute remaining, Mr. Boulègue, if you would like to add to this.
Mr. Boulègue: Yes, I won’t have much to add in terms of the military realm. I completely agree with what my colleague just said in terms of playing on comparative advantages and streamlining efforts so that we do not replicate what is out there. In the soft security or more normative realm, something that Canada should champion even more is the respect of the law of the sea. I know this sounds self-explanatory for Canada, but this is something that Russia does not respect in terms of freedom of navigation and innocent passage as per their interpretation of UNCLOS and specifically the ice clause, Article 234, concerning innocent passage — not least in Canada in particular — because of the nature of the Northwest Passage and the nature of the submission of Canada, together with Denmark and Russia, on the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. Recalling the importance of the law and the norms in this environment is a good way to show the Kremlin it is not just about the military. It is about common roles and the commonality of and understanding of said rules.
[Translation]
Senator Boisvenu: My question is for the American representative, Mr. Auerswald. Your presentation was very insightful. I think I read between the line that there seem to be two visions of the Arctic: NATO’s vision and NORAD’s vision. From a strategic point of view, when it comes to American-Canadian supremacy in the Arctic, are our two countries on the same wavelength? Do we have the same vision of an action plan of what should be done in the north to counter the Russian hegemony that has been established?
[English]
Mr. Auerswald: Thank you, senator. That is an interesting question. The way I would answer it is to say that the U.S. and Canada have different horizons when it comes to Arctic security. Canada, as I understand it, is focused principally on the North American Arctic. Certainly, that had been the position of the Harper government and seemingly of the current government — asserting sovereignty and maintaining presence. The United States also has concerns in the North American Arctic, but the United States concerns expand tremendously into the European Arctic, given the global role that the United States plays.
As you think about the different parts of the U.S. military, northern command is going to be mostly concerned with North America. We have European command and Indo-Pacific command that are going to be concerned with other parts of the Arctic. I’m not sure we can compare the two countries equally in that way.
[Translation]
Senator Boisvenu: More specifically, my question is about how we will resolve this difference of opinion between Euro‑Nordic countries and our two countries, as we are facing an opponent, Russia, that is unique in terms of both the European and American action plans, while we have to reconcile the views of numerous countries. How could we better integrate our action philosophy and the investments that must be made to ensure that we can achieve our goals?
[English]
Mr. Auerswald: Thank you very much. One thing I would suggest is that we recognize that not all countries are going to be able to provide full-spectrum capabilities in the Arctic and that we have to accept the idea that we’re going to have to trust one another among the Western Arctic nations. Canada can provide certain capabilities, Norway can provide certain capabilities, and Finland and Sweden, if they join the alliance, can provide other capabilities. What I’m suggesting is a division of labour. In a hypothetical, if we were talking about a ground war in the European Arctic and if Finland were a member of NATO, the Finnish army coupled with the Norwegian army would probably take the lead. If we’re talking about a battle for the North Atlantic, the United States and probably Denmark would take the lead there along with our U.K. partners. If we’re talking about air interdiction in North America, it’s obviously the Canadians and the United States. We have to learn to trust one another and trust that we will be there for each other. We have to accept the idea that we can’t do everything in all places. No country can. The United States certainly cannot. We have to rely on allies.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you to our witnesses for being here for this hearing. I’m going to ask this question with respect to the military and military equipment. Recently, retired military intelligence officer Robert Smol penned an op-ed lamenting how ill prepared we are in the Arctic in the face of an increasingly belligerent Russia. He noted that, equipment-wise, our Arctic presence consists of four non-combat CC-138 Twin Otter utility planes and one Arctic patrol vessel — with another forthcoming — with one mounted machine gun. Keeping in mind budgetary constraints that are realistic and out there, what should our future military procurement look like if Canada is serious about a military presence that can serve as a deterrent?
Mr. Auerswald: Thank you, senator. To answer your question, you have to step back for a moment and think about the most likely attack vector for Canada. What kind of attack do you fear? You then tailor your military capabilities such that you’re meeting that threat.
As I think about the military threat against Canada, I think of things that are going to be flying over Canada, whether it’s aircraft, cruise missiles, ICBMs or submarine-launched missiles. I think about possible harassing behaviour by naval forces, but I certainly don’t expect that Canada will be invaded like in the movie Red Dawn. Russians won’t be invading the northern territories pressing toward Ottawa and Toronto.
What I would suggest is, if you’re going to prioritize, think about the incoming threats. I think that Over-the-Horizon Radar would be good to have for warning of incoming fast-moving objects. I think about a naval presence able to assert sovereignty, and I would think about the continued procurement of the F-35, which you’ve already decided to do. Given the data processing and sensors that are on the F-35 and the ability to link with the U.S. through that system, I think that’s a great system to buy if you want to coordinate both with the U.S. and, frankly, with Danish forces in Greenland. Those would be the three priorities that I would give you in addition to the domain awareness stuff that I talked about earlier.
Senator Yussuff: I’ll start first by thanking our witnesses for being here today and sharing their rich knowledge with us. I have two points. First, wouldn’t a greater militarization of the North, or specifically the Arctic, have a profound impact on the Indigenous population currently living in the Arctic? That could be to either one of our witnesses.
Mr. Boulègue: Thank you, senator, for your question. You’re absolutely right. The main issue — and I’m thinking from a Russian Arctic point of view — is that the impact of climate change, under the remilitarization of the Russian Arctic, is basically stealing budget from the development of local communities and the betterment of local community lives and the Indigenous population. In Russia, Indigenous populations in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation are the first who are impacted and generally the first who are left without any form of assistance from the Russian state. First, because of the very nature of the Russian system, Russia doesn’t care about the population. Second, they care even less about Indigenous populations in general. Third, because of the impact of climate change and because of the very nature of geography, recalling to the panel that 70% of Russian infrastructure, civilian, like military, in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation is already directly impacted by permafrost thaw and climate change. Generally, we are talking about the livelihood of Indigenous and local populations who are not assisted or helped by the Russian state to make sure they cope and deal with these consequences, which have a huge societal cost for local communities, once again, because the budget that should have been attributed to propping up assistance to local communities is generally stolen for the military. We are talking about 4 million of the Russian population impacted directly by the consequences of climate change — 4 million people who are not, to date, taken care of in any form by the Russian state nor helped to secure a better future for themselves.
This is the very problem in the Russian Arctic itself. I won’t talk about the rest of the Arctic coastal states, but for Russia, it is a crucial problem, and it is in a way a place where the other states could reach out directly to these populations through associations of local communities. For instance, through community-based organizations across nations, organized around kinship, community and not around states, to be in listening mode to see how we can assist them and mitigate the impact of climate change on their daily livelihood — because we are talking about the survival of these populations and because we can’t expect the Kremlin to do anything about it. There is space here for cooperation with Russians minus the Russian state and the Russian leadership.
Mr. Auerswald: Two points quickly: First, the Arctic has always been militarized; this is not a new thing. The militarization of the Arctic, if you want to call it that, is not necessarily a bad thing for Indigenous peoples, at least in the West, if — and it’s a big “if” — the military and elected officials listen to the concerns Indigenous peoples.
Take the example of Alaska. Most of the infrastructure in Alaska is centred around the oil extraction industry and the military. Most of the development is around military bases. The military provides most of the infrastructure in Alaska. A greater military presence in the western Arctic is not necessarily a bad thing, from the perspective of Indigenous peoples, as long they and their concerns are listened to by the military and elected officials.
Senator Boehm: I would like to thank both of our witnesses for their testimony. I would like to start with Mr. Auerswald on this one. Three of the Five Eyes countries are members of NATO, and what we have seen in the current conflict is the frequent release of intelligence information, including some cyber by the United States and, in particular, in a way that is unprecedented.
We have noticed in our country — there has been something in the media about this — a real problem in terms of hiring cyber experts. It takes the right level of technical expertise; the technology changes; there are the security clearances to get and the like. I suspect that is a similar thing.
I would like your view, in terms of being prepared for any aggression in the Arctic, on the value of stepping up on cyber questions and whether the Five Eyes could be a bit more open to other eyes, and here I’m thinking in particular of some European countries.
Mr. Auerswald: Thank you, senator. Your question gets to the point of intelligence sharing. Hiring cyber experts is obviously difficult, both because of the vetting that has to occur with them and that they can probably make more money in the private sector than working for the government.
That said, what we’re seeing in the Arctic is creative cooperation on sharing intelligence. I’m running into classification problems here. There are certainly efforts to broaden the pipeline, as it were, of the flow of information back and forth across the Arctic among western countries. That said, the fact that Finland and Sweden are still out of NATO means there is a significant impediment to sharing everything with them that we would share with a NATO partner. That’s not just a U.S. perspective. As I talk to Norwegian officials, for example, they share the same concerns. It’s not that they don’t trust their Finnish and Swedish colleagues; it’s that there are rules in place, and you can’t break the rules. You would have to change, frankly, the classification laws or, at least, the classification protocols in each individual country to overcome those barriers.
Senator Boehm: Maybe Mr. Boulègue has a comment on that as well.
Mr. Boulègue: No, I think my colleague said it all.
Senator Dasko: Thank you, witnesses, for being here today. My question is about the possibility of Finland and Sweden joining NATO, and this is a general question. What will Russia do? What will their response be? Is this going to enhance the possibility of escalation, or is this going to help deterrence? Mr. Boulègue, if you would start, please.
Mr. Boulègue: Thank you very much, senator. The fact that Putin has been implanted by the CIA for the past 20 years to be a secret agent trying to actually strengthen NATO and turning what he fears the most into reality, which is the expansion of NATO’s borders. Joke aside, we have to accept more destabilization, more sabre rattling and more pressure from Russia as Sweden and Finland join NATO. This is inevitable. This will be another last stand, a form of bravado from the Kremlin to show that they are not deterred by it. Of course, this will not be used or understood as a deterrent in the Kremlin. And even if it is working as a deterrent, symbolically, rhetorically and in terms of propaganda, the Kremlin will never show it. They never show and display a weak hand. Even though they do play a weak hand, they always try to play it strongly. So do it by all means, and we are all on board. We should be expecting more information warfare activities, more unprofessional behaviour, more sabre rattling and more completely unprofessional behaviour during military exercises and in peacetime that endanger civilian continuity and operations.
But also, and this is even more important, Russia and Putin himself are toying around this nuclear threshold using the angry red button to deter us, which is leading, of course, to self‑deterrence and limiting our own options because we are scared of nuclear escalation. It is as though we have forgotten 50 years of nuclear deterrence theory. But these are the cards we need to play with, and unfortunately this is very much the threat we have to face moving forward.
Senator Dasko: I would ask Professor Auerswald to try that question as well.
Mr. Auerswald: Absolutely. Thank you, senator.
Finland has obviously not made an official decision yet, but when you talk to their government officials, they will tell you they are prepared for any eventuality with regard to what Russia might do, including militarily and active measures, including cyber and disinformation, the full panoply of possible Russian actions.
The question is how long will the ratification process take to amend the Washington Treaty? The longer that draws out, the more Finland is going to have to defend itself, if not militarily, then in the cyber realm and in the disinformation realm. NATO members need to be thinking about the disinformation campaign and the information operations campaign that Russia will launch toward each NATO capital to try and slow up or derail Finnish membership into NATO during their ratification process for amending the treaty.
Senator Anderson: I want to situate myself before I ask my question. I am Inuk. I’m on the settled land claim of the Inuvialuit, and I’m in Tuktoyaktuk right now where they do have military exercises. They did have a two-week one with the U.S., France and Canada in February of this year. I can see one of the north warning sites from my window. I grew up around the north warning site, and I just have a comment in regards to Indigenous people and the impact.
Historically there was no engagement with the Indigenous peoples on this land before they claimed that space I can see from my window. I agree it is important that there is consultation and we are a part of the process in terms of the military and defence engagement.
My question, Professor Auerswald, is you spoke about the military defence and security systems and some of the work that needs to be done. I also see not just the systems, but I also see military presence or manpower as an essential piece of that. Recognizing that in the Arctic the Canadian Rangers are present in 65 of the 72 communities, I would like to know what your thoughts are of a more heightened presence in the Arctic in terms of the military.
Mr. Auerswald: Thank you, senator.
The Canadian Rangers are sort of the envy of many Arctic states because of the vital role they play in domain awareness. The question, I think, when you look at the future of the Canadian Rangers versus other things, or the Canadian Rangers in complement to other kinds of sensing and presence is what is the international signal that you want to send, and what is the domestic signal that you want to send?
If you want to send an international signal of your commitment to that part of your country, then having a person on the ground or a person in the water of that area sends a stronger signal than having a stationary remote sensing device. Having a person on the ground or boots on the ground, as it were, that says you’re serious.
Now, it may not be the most efficient way of gathering data on what’s up there. A remote presence actually might be much more efficient. It can cover more ground. It can see more things going on, but in terms of signalling, having that ranger on the Ski-Doo that is out there, that says something.
Senator Anderson: Quyanainni. Would Mathieu Boulègue have anything to add to that?
Mr. Boulègue: No, not much. I think my colleague made a compelling statement on it, just recalling the importance of the human element, the human mapping, of human intelligence. It is also about what the rangers and other standing forces in the Arctic can learn from local communities, because they know their environment. They evolve in an environment that is as treacherous as the enemy we would potentially have to face, and there is, I think, a greater learning curve in terms of learning. This is something that Finland, for instance, has been doing with local communities in the very high north and something that maybe Canada has been doing as well, but I don’t know. It is a good learning curve for Arctic nations and NATO nations to actually have an ear on the ground when it comes to evolving, surviving and fighting in this environment.
Senator Richards: Thank you to the witnesses. This is for Professor Auerswald, and it is a very quick question.
We have a very, very close relationship with the United States. I taught in the United States twice. We are very close, but there is competition, and there is competition in the north. What kind of strain does that put on the relationship between the U.S.A. and Canada concerning cooperation in various regards? If you could just answer that quickly, sir.
Mr. Auerswald: Thank you, senator.
I think we have very, very, very good coordination and cooperation on the military front. At the worker bee level, everybody gets along, and everybody values the relationship really well. At the economic level, there is more competition, and that has at times put a strain on the cross-border relationship.
I deal with the security realm. The cooperation could not be better.
Senator Richards: Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much to everyone. This brings us to the end of our meeting.
I want to extend a sincere thanks to all of our witnesses today. I apologize to Senator Dagenais that we could not get back to you.
You shared a great deal of information with us. It has been direct, and a common theme has been that the Arctic just cannot be seen in isolation of past and current geopolitical events anymore. We have to be aware of the possibility of horizontal escalation on the part of Russia. That’s not out of the question. No one state can reasonably act alone anymore, and we have to listen to the voices of Indigenous people.
That is where we ended up today, which I think is very, very appropriate in response to Senator Anderson’s question. Thank you to all our witnesses.
Our next meeting will take place next Monday, May 2, 2022, at our usual time of 2 p.m. ET. I wish everyone a good evening.
(The committee adjourned.)