THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS
EVIDENCE
OTTAWA, Monday, February 26, 2024
The Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs met with videoconference this day at 4 p.m. [ET] to examine and report on issues relating to national security and defence generally.
Senator Tony Dean (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: Welcome to this meeting of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs. I’m Tony Dean from Ontario, chair of the committee. I’m joined today by my fellow committee members, who I welcome now to introduce themselves.
Senator Oh: Senator Oh, Ontario.
[Translation]
Senator Carignan: Good afternoon. Claude Carignan from Quebec.
[English]
Senator R. Patterson: Rebecca Patterson, Ontario.
Senator Anderson: Senator Anderson, Northwest Territories.
Senator Dasko: Donna Dasko, a senator from Ontario.
Senator McNair: John McNair, a senator from New Brunswick.
Senator Yussuff: Hassan Yussuff, a senator from Ontario.
Senator Kutcher: Stan Kutcher, Nova Scotia.
The Chair: Thank you, colleagues. The clerk of the committee is Ericka Dupont, and the Library of Parliament analysts who assist us so well are Anne-Marie Therrien-Tremblay and Ariel Shapiro.
Today, we welcome two panels of experts who have been invited to provide a briefing to the committee on the current security and defence situation in Ukraine, Canada’s military support to Ukraine and the implications for Canada’s defence operations.
We will begin by introducing our first panel of witnesses. From the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, we have Major-General Paul Prévost, Director of Staff, Strategic Joint Staff; and Major-General Greg Smith, Director General, International Security Policy. From Global Affairs, we welcome Alison Grant, Director General, International Security Policy Bureau, who has just returned from Ukraine, which is very timely.
Thank you all for joining us today. We now invite you provide your opening remarks. We will begin with Major-General Smith, who will deliver the opening remarks on behalf of the Department of National Defence.
Major-General Greg Smith, Director General, International Security Policy, Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces: Mr. Chair and members of the committee, I am honoured to appear before you today.
[Translation]
Thank you for the opportunity to update the committee on the situation in Ukraine.
[English]
As you know, last year’s counteroffensive did not produce the results Ukraine desired. That was due, in part, to strategy but also to the West’s ability to support Ukraine’s efforts. The war has now slowed to attrition, with very little movement along the lines of contact. This is unlikely to change in the short to medium term.
While Russia currently holds an advantage in personnel, neither side has sufficient forces or ammunition to make significant gains. You may have heard that Russia recently captured the town of Avdiivka. The town itself is strategically unimportant, but the battle is typical of the current war: Russia continues to attack, and its advantage in artillery ammunition is causing losses in Ukrainian personnel. However, the Ukrainian army has and continues to defend itself valiantly. It has inflicted heavy losses on the Russians but at a high cost to Ukraine, too.
[Translation]
It’s important to point out that Russia is not winning this war — far from it. For the time being, Ukraine is not winning it either, but with enough support, it can. Western partners are taking steps to fill gaps in military aid, and with enough support, Ukraine can offset Russia’s significant advantage.
[English]
To ensure Ukraine can build the force it requires to win the war and deter future Russian aggression, allies have now launched eight new coalitions to develop the long-term capabilities that Ukraine’s army needs. Canada has announced that we will initially focus our contributions on the armour and air force capability coalitions.
This is in addition to the $2.4 billion in military aid that Canada has already committed to Ukraine. With this funding, we have provided a long list of equipment to Ukraine, such as M777 howitzers, Leopard 2 main battle tanks, armoured combat support vehicles, hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition, high-resolution drone cameras, thermal clothing, body armour, fuel and more.
[Translation]
The Canadian Armed Forces will also continue to train Ukrainian military forces. Under Operation UNIFIER, Canadian Armed Forces instructors have trained over 40,000 Ukrainian soldiers since 2015. I should mention that this knowledge transfer is increasingly becoming a two-way street now that Ukrainians have become experts in Russia’s tactics and weapons. Our training efforts will continue at least until our authorities under Operation UNIFIER expire in 2026, or as long as it takes for Ukraine to win the war.
[English]
This brings me to the latest developments regarding Canada’s support to Ukraine. The support provided to date has been critical, but we also know that Canada must do more. That is why, as we entered the third year of this war over the past weekend, Canada signed the Security Cooperation Agreement between Ukraine and Canada. This agreement, through which Canada committed to providing broad multifaceted support to Ukraine for 10 years, is a clear demonstration of Canada’s commitment to stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes.
[Translation]
Although my Global Affairs Canada colleague, Ms. Alison Grant, will talk about the agreement as a whole, I can give you an overview of its defence-related aspects. Under the agreement, we’re going to continue strengthening our defence cooperation with Ukraine through military assistance, training, capacity building and professionalism. We’re also going to keep working together on information sharing, research and development, physical cooperation, reform support and more.
[English]
Critically, we also continue to support the development of Ukraine’s military capabilities. With our latest announcement, military assistance committed by Canada has reached $4 billion. Through these efforts and those of our allies and partners, we will help Ukraine build a strong and sustainable force, fully interoperable with NATO, and capable of regaining and defending its territory now and deterring Russian aggression in the future.
Mr. Chair and members of the committee, thank you for your time. I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Major-General Smith. Next, we will hear from Ms. Alison Grant.
[Translation]
Alison Grant, Director General, International Security Policy Bureau, Global Affairs Canada: Mr. Chair, committee members, thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the security and defence situation in Ukraine. As we enter the third year of Russia’s illegal aggression against Ukraine, the Kremlin’s efforts to reduce Ukraine’s capacity to defend itself continue. Moscow is still using every means at its disposal to try to weaken international support for Ukraine as well.
[English]
Both sides are in a race to rebuild offensive combat power, and that process will take time. The first half of 2024 may bring few changes in terms of controlling territory, but the materiel supply and personnel development efforts of each side over the next few months will help determine the longer-term trajectory of the war. I fully align with the commentary from Major-General Smith.
Sustaining Canadian and international efforts is critical because Russia is banking on the idea that Ukraine’s partners are growing tired. The Kremlin believes that it can wait out the West’s sustained military, financial and political support for Ukraine. That is why Canada, alongside our partners and allies, is focusing not just on Ukraine’s immediate needs but also on long-term, multi-year support.
This weekend, marking two years since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Prime Minister Trudeau reaffirmed Canada’s ongoing and unwavering support for Ukraine through the signing with President Zelenskyy of an agreement to establish a strategic security partnership. This agreement builds on the G7 Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine, signed at the 2023 NATO Summit, in which signatories pledged to work with Ukraine to conclude specific, bilateral, long-term security commitments. You will have seen that a number of other countries have also signed those bilateral agreements, and there will be more to come. Canada has been heavily involved, diplomatically, in shaping this joint approach, which is intended to reassure Ukraine of continued support and also signal to Russia our lasting commitment.
With the Agreement on Security Cooperation between Canada and Ukraine, both countries agree to establish a new consultation mechanism in the event of future Russian aggression following the end of current hostilities. The agreement states:
In those circumstances, and consistent with its domestic legal framework, Canada will: provide Ukraine with swift and sustained security, military, and economic assistance; . . .
Canada’s 10-year agreement includes military support and training; defence industrial cooperation; cybersecurity assistance; demining support; cooperation in countering disinformation, as well as countering organized crime; and energy cooperation, among other areas. You can really get a sense of how comprehensive it is.
The agreement also commits Ukraine to continue to implement reforms, recognizing the requirements of both EU and NATO accession processes, as well as IMF benchmarks. It also commits Ukraine to transition from martial law as soon as circumstances permit.
This new agreement is valid for 10 years, with both sides deciding on its future status should Ukraine become a member of NATO prior to the expiry date. There is a review required within three years, which is important, as some key Canadian funding will expire in 2026. Importantly, it also commits us to substantial macroeconomic support for this year, 2024, reinforcing commitments made by G7 partners and other allies who plan on signing similar bilateral agreements shortly.
While in Ukraine, you will have seen that the Prime Minister announced that Canada will provide $3.02 billion in financial and military support this year, including $75 million in peace and security assistance in areas such as demining and cyber resilience, as well as the allocation of over $18 million to support other peace, security and stabilization projects, up to $39 million allocated to development assistance and over $22 million in humanitarian support. This brings Canada’s overall commitment since 2022 to $13.3 billion.
After two long years, the people of Ukraine are continuing to valiantly defend their sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. This was very evident to me while I was in Ukraine over the past week. We will continue to stand by Ukraine throughout this fight and will do so over the long term, as indicated now in our new bilateral security agreement with Ukraine.
Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Ms. Grant.
We will now proceed to questions. We have our guests with us for one hour today, colleagues. To ensure everyone can participate, we will limit each question, including the answer, to four minutes. Please keep those questions succinct and identify the person you are addressing the question to.
Senator Patterson: This is probably directed to Major-General Smith, but Major-General Prévost may also have something to input.
This is a very positive outlook on where we’re going in the strategic and geopolitical space, but the reality on the ground is that the Canadian Armed Forces are still participating in ways beyond training in Ukraine. This is looking more at the longer term. There are many outcomes.
Can the CAF fulfill its NATO high readiness commitments, especially if the West fails to support Ukraine and the Russian forces expand their imperial mission to adjacent countries? In other words, are we ready? We are two years in, this is a grinding war of attrition, and there are only so many people within Ukraine to fight. Are we ready?
MGen. Smith: I’ll start, and my strategic joint staff colleague may want to jump in.
The first thing we want to identify is that we’re looking to the future. This is not the kind of hand-to-mouth support we’ve given in the past. We’ve moved into capabilities and, therefore, helping Ukraine in the long term. I said there were eight, but we’re looking now at drones or UAS, unmanned aerial systems, as well. There’s a lot of capability. I’m talking about institutional-level help.
Beyond that, we’re obviously doing a considerable amount in Latvia to go from an enhanced forward presence battle group up to now what’s now called a forward land force brigade, and that’s going well. It is progressing very well. I’ll defer to my SJS colleague to put more detail on that.
Major-General Paul Prévost, Director of Staff, Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces: That is a good question, Senator Patterson. Greg pretty much answered the question. We need to modernize; we need to reconstitute; we need more people and more equipment. We have talked about the four land brigades that we’re putting in Latvia. Right now, we have about 800 troops on the ground, and we’re going to mount to 2,200 persistently deployed in Latvia. This will provide Russia a strong message. This is not only Canada moving into Latvia. This is all countries building the defences along the NATO line there. We’ve made other announcements in terms of NORAD modernization. You have seen the P-8 as well. These are all contributions that increase our readiness and send a strong message to Mr. Putin that we’re ready to react should he do something stupid.
Senator Patterson: You’re telling me we’re on the road to meeting our NATO high readiness commitments. I know I can’t ask you to predict the future, but what kind of support do you need to reach that penultimate high readiness requirement from Canadians and from your government?
MGen. Prévost: We have quite a bit of commitment to NATO, other than what we’re actually going to build on the ground. We have forces that are on the hook to deploy at any moment. We have about 3,400 NATO-specific troops that are ready to deploy there. They’re not all ready to go. We need to train yearly on this, we need to recruit more, but we could come up with 3,400 troops to supplement Ukraine.
What we need more of are spare parts. It’s always the same. The state of the CAF is what it is. It’s not only in the CAF, but with our allies it is kind of the same. We’ve taken some risks over the decades, and we just need to rebuild what we have in bins in terms of spare parts, weapons and ammunition, which is one of the challenges we have in supplying Ukrainians because of our own shortages.
With time, we will be able to recapitalize, but we’re confident we can get the 3,400 troops across to respond to the high readiness commitment we have.
[Translation]
Senator Carignan: My question is for representatives of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. Senator Patterson and I were at NATO last week, and we received a lot of information. It’s quite concerning. A number of countries have emptied their storage depots to help the troops, but the need for munitions and equipment is still causing a lot of problems. Virtually everything is in short supply.
A CBC television program reported yesterday that soldiers have received medical training but lack the equipment they need to apply it. The situation seems serious enough, and we’re having problems keeping our promises. It’s hard to get the equipment we need, even when that equipment exists.
I confess that I felt a little sheepish last week in Brussels when I heard how much other countries are spending on their military. Canada spends 1.38% of its GDP, even though the minimum target is 2%. We don’t even have a plan for reaching 2% here in Canada. Belgium passed legislation to reach its 2% target.
Are you confident that we’ll be able to achieve our mandate and move on from words to action? We talk the talk, but do we have the means to uphold the principles that we’re promoting?
MGen. Smith: I’d like to say two things. First, almost all of our allies are in roughly the same boat, to varying degrees. Every one of them with a weapons depot has searched it for weapons that it could send to Ukraine. All of them are empty now. Our situation is not unique.
Senator Carignan: I know. That’s what worries me.
MGen. Smith: Like our allies, we are now in the process of rebuilding, to various degrees.
As you said, Canada’s defence spending this year amounts to 1.38% of GDP. Thanks to the Strong, Secure, Engaged defence policy, defence spending is up by 70%.
We are looking into whether we can do more, but decisions are in the government’s hands.
Senator Carignan: Considering the shortages we face, how do you think we can achieve our goal of supporting Ukrainians?
I understand the long-term principle, but they’re in the trenches. They’re under fire. They need to shoot back but there aren’t any more bullets. For them, the short term is a matter of life or death. I’m afraid the long term would be too late.
In the short term, can you reassure us that we’ll be able to supply weapons, meet our commitments and move from words to action?
MGen. Smith: I can give you a list of tanks, armoured vehicles, and so on. We’re still supplying them and we’re trying to do more. As the government announced on the weekend, we’re going to send more money. We keep sending more, but our situation is no different than many of our allies. Everyone is searching, everyone is looking to its manufacturing sector, to its army, navy and air force, to see if we can give more.
[English]
Senator Oh: Thank you, witnesses, for joining us today. I have a question for any one of you.
How does Canada’s support for Ukraine align with our international commitments? What consideration has been given to collaborating with our allies in the region?
General, you mentioned earlier that $4 billion has been spent. How much more do we have in reserve to support Ukraine?
MGen. Smith: Chair, I missed the first part, but I can speak to the $4 billion part. That is a combination of the $2.4 billion that was previously committed and the $1.6 billion that was discussed this weekend by the Prime Minister. That combined is a governmental choice of how much there are challenges there are here in Canada. It’s the government’s choice to decide what will go externally, what will go to Ukraine and what will, of course, be spent here in Canada. We will make good use of what we receive.
Ms. Grant: Senator, I can answer the first part of your question on how we’re working with partners.
The key to success here is working with our partners. We are fully aware that we’re not going to be able to support Ukraine without working together as a group. We do that in a number of different forums, primarily the G7, NATO and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, or OSCE, which is the world’s largest regional security organization. We work in all of these bodies through the provision of military and political support as well as by working on issues like justice and accountability. As well, within some of these groups of like‑minded countries, we take that force to the United Nations to try to bring together a larger international consensus on ending the war in Ukraine. I would say that a key principle in all our work in Ukraine is making sure that we are aligned in those groups.
Senator Oh: As we all know, corruption is a big problem in Ukraine. How do we ensure that our agreements and our supplies get to the front lines for the soldiers?
MGen. Smith: I’ll start, and maybe my colleague wants to follow up.
We have end-user agreements. That is part of what we do. When talking about $4.2 billion, it’s a lot of money. It goes with agreements. We make sure it’s going to be used properly. From what I’ve seen, the Ukrainians are taking that very seriously. They realize the strategic risk of corruption and are trying to work with it.
Ms. Grant: I would only add, senator, that corruption is real in Ukraine. Even in January, the Ukrainian government revealed procurement fraud within the military. This is serious, and they’re taking it seriously.
In terms of what we’re doing, we are working with Ukrainians on anti-corruption efforts. We were at it for years before the current conflict became a full-scale war. We have seen improvements. We’ve also worked this into our new bilateral security agreement with Ukraine. Ukraine makes its own reform commitments in our agreement, including on corruption. We are ensuring that some of our assistance — in particular on the development side — is focused on building up the judiciary and other Ukrainian institutions that support anti-corruption efforts.
Senator Oh: Thank you.
Senator Kutcher: If I run out of time, maybe I can go on second round as well, if there is a second round.
Thank you all for being with us. I’d just like to ask a question on a slightly different area in terms of Canada’s role in influencing our allies in NATO. Specifically, Chancellor Scholz said a clear no to the Taurus missiles. They can reach the Kerch Bridge, which is a major supply point for the Russian military. Without that capability, the Russian military can resupply itself easily, particularly in the south. What role does Canada have, and what is Canada doing to actually encourage our allies to provide this kind of capability to Ukraine?
MGen. Smith: I’ll start, and then my Global Affairs colleague can speak.
We have the Ukraine Defense Contact Group as one example of regular discussions with allies. We talk about what we’re doing. I talked about the eight capability coalitions — nine if you start counting this drone coalition. Those are examples of us working with allies. I said we’re working in the armoured and in the air. We’re one of many countries doing that. We’re doing a part, and many other countries are involved as well. That’s one example of where we talk with like-minded allies.
NATO is not involved in the war in Ukraine. That being said, different countries are involved. That’s another important area for discussion in how we can aid the Ukrainians. I would say we’re involved very widely in discussions.
Ms. Grant: Yes, I would agree. I would point to those capability coalitions as being really critical in terms of where the real talk is on matching what Ukraine needs with the capabilities of allies and others around the table. Our perspective and approach to providing our own military support has, of course, been matching Ukrainian needs with specific Canadian capabilities. Within a more allied discreet forum, we do talk to our allies about what is needed. We are very aware that fire power is what is required — long-range fire power — and those discussions take place.
Senator Kutcher: Is there a reluctance to provide Ukraine with long-range fire power? They seem to have been asking for this for a long time. The international community has not really stepped up to provide that kind of capability. Could you help us understand if there is a reluctance? If there is, what is the rationale for that reluctance?
MGen. Smith: I haven’t been involved in those specific discussions about long-range precision fires, which is perhaps the more technical term for it. We have been doing some. You’ve heard of terms like ATACMS — these are different American-made missiles — and the SCALP. A number of systems have been given and have been used to very good effect. We can get very focused on those prestige-type weapons. That being said, there’s a wide amount of support going on from an air, land, maritime, cyber and informational space. There’s a lot of support being given, and that’s just one element.
Ms. Grant: The only thing I would add is that the war is dynamic, of course. It’s not linear. I think that allied and like-minded considerations have changed throughout the war as well. You’ve seen that just in the types of support that’s being provided. All along, of course, there’s been a lot of consideration about escalation, like what escalation is and what would contribute to an escalatory situation. On the other hand, there is also the consideration of what will support Ukraine in its victory and ensure that Russia doesn’t win the war. The situation is complex, but I do think considerations have changed. We’ve seen that. I can’t speak for decision making in other capitals, of course, but it’s been ongoing.
Senator Yussuff: Thank you to the guests for being here. Thank you for all you do on behalf of our nation. It is a very difficult war that we’re two years into right now.
My question is more to do with the issue of demining operations. We’ve been supporting and aiding Ukrainians in their effort to demine the country. It’s been suggested that the country is heavily mined compared to Syria and Afghanistan. This is obviously a consideration in that it has an impact on the whole spectrum: the military strategic concern, the humanitarian concern and economic concerns, such as farming and the food supply. The Canadian government committed millions of dollars to aid in this regard. We’ve been at this for quite some time around the world, and other countries have been trying to demine. Can you share more about the progress of this operation with our committee and the ongoing Canadian plan with respect to helping Ukrainians clear the mines? This is so desperately needed for them to get their country back into a state where they can access their country but equally provide safety for their citizens.
MGen. Smith: Mr. Chair, I will start, and I may have some colleagues here that want to jump in.
There are two different times when we’re talking about mining. First of all, the well-discussed Ukrainian counterattack ran into a giant obstacle belt, which included mines. That’s more of a combat-focused demining capability. We’ve been involved in some of that. We’ve given them both capabilities and the training to do that, and we have world-class engineers that can do that.
I’ll look to my colleagues to speak more widely about post‑conflict demining. These are mines left behind to injure civilians and non-combatants and unexploded ordnance, which is a problem, unfortunately, worldwide. Ukraine will experience it as well.
Ms. Grant: Thank you, General.
Yes, we see demining as critical for reconstruction efforts, but we’re already investing in demining. As you mentioned, senator, it is critical. There is both the military and civilian sides. On the civilian side with regard to humanitarian demining, there have been a number of different projects. One in particular, for which we had good feedback from the Ukrainians, is the provision of remote-controlled vehicles. I know in the announcements the Prime Minister made this weekend, there is one to extend support to those vehicles over the next year for repair on the ground. A number of them have already needed repair. That’s just one area we are supporting. If I also look through the projects announced, I think there are about four or five that touch on demining, and, of course, we have a new influx of $35 million for new equipment, new training and new capacity building for both the Ukrainian government on the civilian side and non‑governmental agencies. This will be a big focus, I think, for Canada going forward. In the new bilateral security agreement we signed, we also ensured there was quite a robust section on demining covering all aspects.
Senator Yussuff: I just want to focus on the next aspect, which has been in the media. Again, Canada has rightfully provided a considerable amount of artillery to Ukraine. Their needs are very high both in terms of artillery shells and small arms. Ukraine itself is now running very low. This is not unique to war. But our stocks are also becoming very depleted. I think I have seen coverage in the media. There is a serious concern about our capabilities and capacity to supply our own troops. Can you shed some light on what we’re trying to do to increase domestic production? More importantly, how soon can we expect this to happen, and what can we do to bring a message to our elected leaders saying that we must get on with this sooner rather than later?
MGen. Smith: I’ll start, and my SJS colleague will undoubtedly have some things to say.
I would go back to my analogy that everybody has a weapons lock-up, and they have all reached back and given everything they could. Depending on the size of your country, that’s how much you have to give. Canada has equally done so. There is not as much in the lock-up anymore.
We have done some work domestically to give money to industry to go from 3,000 rounds a month to 5,000. That’s a start. There are other things we are doing right now to see what we can do to continue to raise that number.
I’ll defer to my SJS colleague if he wants to add to that.
MGen. Prévost: We have been working hard with industry since the onset of this — I would say within a few months of the start of it — because we could see the global demand. It’s not only a Canadian problem; it’s a global problem among our allies. We have all shipped a great deal of ammunition in terms of artillery rounds to Ukraine.
We have been working toward some positive developments. Greg just announced going from 3,000 to 5,000 per month in Canada in terms of the capacity to produce the shells. That’s positive news. We are continuing on other fronts as well. There are obviously critical materials that need to be involved, long‑lead items, so it’s a complex file to do.
It’s not only Canada that has that problem. We’re talking with NATO countries about this — our allies. I’m part of discussions with Five Eyes and Fourteen Eyes alliances as well on that specific issue. It’s something that we’re working through right now.
Senator C. Deacon: Thank you, witnesses, for being here.
I’m just back from both the OSCE in Vienna and the Munich Security Conference. While there, I met with a number of Ukrainian ministers and fellow parliamentarians. The question is really for our generals here: There was a lot of talk about the strategic landscape changing with the fall of Avdiivka. There was nothing left to claim in Avdiivka except to put a Russian flag on the rubble. Yet, by the same token, it’s a symbolic victory for Russia. A lot of blood and treasure went into that — I think probably more blood than treasure. And now smaller villages are being taken. I would be interested to know whether you see the strategic tempo changing with a slight change in the strategic landscape. That’s one question.
Colleagues have asked questions about shells and providing projectiles. I was told that the barrels on these guns — particularly the 155-mm guns — are beginning to wear out, and, as a result, this will have an impact on accuracy. Although we focus so much on providing the projectile, there is, of course, the vehicle that fires the projectile. I think they are trying within their own industrial capability to change that. That’s the second question.
The third question: Minister Blair was, of course, also at the Munich Security Conference and heard much of the same things that I did. Afterwards, he made an announcement about fast-tracking the delivery of 800 drones, so a different type of warfare than the traditional artillery side of things. What does fast-track actually mean given the circumstances? Through the Ramstein group you have all these coordinating measures in place, but what is the typical duration of a process — if you could tell us — to ensure that from announcement to production to delivery to use, it actually makes sense to provide 800 drones?
MGen. Smith: There is a lot there.
First of all, the type of warfare we’re seeing right now, at this moment, I think, is more of the grinding warfare that we think of in World War I: heavy use of artillery and infantry assaults grinding forward. Not to diminish in any way the tragedy of the people that died around there, but the strategic value of that particular town is relatively low. There was no big industry in it. There are no key roads nearby that if you capture it you get them. None of that. So they have it. It’s a public affairs victory perhaps, but other than that, it’s a Pyrrhic or “Putinistic” victory. That’s what we will continue to see. I don’t think it’s a change. We will continue to see that. I go back to the fact that that is land warfare. There are important things happening in the sea and air that we hear being announced all the time. I don’t even know what is happening in the cyber world and in space, but there are important battles occurring there every day that are less visible.
Barrels: Yes, the 155-mm M777, which was out of production — we gave four. The rest of the world gave a number of them. I’m actually not sure at this moment when you ask the question whether or not they have reopened the production line. But we had previously worked to give money to the U.S. companies to start producing more spare barrels because you do wear them down. They become less accurate, have less range, et cetera. We had done that previously because they were simply wearing out.
Last of all, drones: Dynatech is a world-class drone. The Ukrainians asked for them. They are very good. We are working with a company. Things have to happen. The moment the minister says that’s how I want to spend $95 million, we have to do proper contracting, of course. That is Canadian taxpayers’ money. It must be used properly. I have a lot of smart people working on it. They work with CCC Canada to move that forward as quickly as possible. Of course, the company has suddenly been given $95 million to start producing drones. I have confidence that this is a great system. It’s a great Canadian system. We do it very well. We’re going to see how fast they can produce those.
Senator C. Deacon: You don’t have an estimate as to how long?
MGen. Smith: I have actually heard how many per month they are doing. It doesn’t come to the top of my mind. But we’re going to be producing those pretty quickly. They probably have some on the shelf, but the rest will be produced fairly rapidly.
The Chair: Thank you.
Senator Dasko: Thank you to our witnesses for being here today.
My question is about Russia, and I’m interested in your analysis of the Russian situation. I’m interested in your assumptions about the Russian military and their ability to continue to wage war. For example, bearing in mind the analysis from Global Affairs and from the military, do you assume that the Russians can continue to put forward resources for cannon fodder? Do they have the ability to keep throwing resources at this war, or are they going to run out of resources? Is there going to be a point where they will lose steam, or are there other contingencies involved? I’m very interested in your answer to that. What are the assumptions that we work with — and that you work with — in analyzing the Russians, their capabilities and their ability to continue to wage war?
MGen. Prévost: I’ll start here and then link the last two questions.
In terms of what we see in the strategic landscape now, I’ll get to that question later. Right now, the fall of Avdiivka is just one fall along the contact line. For sure, it’s a psychological victory for Russia. At the same time, what we see now — and Greg has mentioned this — is attrition warfare along the line. We don’t see much movement. What we see now is the two camps falling into defensive positions.
Coming back to your question, in the short term, we don’t foresee big changes or shifts because of that fall, for instance. It will just be more of this. On the Russian side, they are going to reconstitute. They are going to use that defensive position to try to get more people recruited and trained and more resources produced in Russia in order to feed their side of the contact line. It’s important for us to do the same thing because now it’s time for Ukrainians to reconstitute as they are both in the defensive camps. It’s time for us to do the same and galvanize the troops to produce more and to train more of the Ukrainians so they are ready for any counteroffensive coming that way. In the meantime, you will see that both sides will try to find other alternatives to change the tide on this conflict.
There was a good question from the senator from Nova Scotia about long-range precision strikes. There has been a lot of long-range precision strikes, but instead of using missiles, they are using drones. The character of warfare is changing through that conflict. We have to adapt. We have to galvanize the troops. We have to invest all together in order to be better than Russia. While there is no doubt in our mind that Russia is very resilient, there is no doubt in our mind as well that Western might is greater than Russian might. We have to put it all together.
Ms. Grant: From a Global Affairs point of view — that is, with more political analysis — even authoritarian systems are responsive to their populations. In Russia right now, the war is supported. Under those conditions, I think that Russia will continue to deliver as many resources as their population allows them to deliver to the war effort. We know they have ramped up their munitions production and that they are searching for these supplies from partners. The quality of some of those goods, whether it’s from Iran or from North Korea, is questionable, but that will continue. Russia has tight control over its information space and has clamped down on all opposition. That said, the war does remain supported. As you see the war effort impact lives of ordinary Russians, this will be a challenge, I think, to the Kremlin.
Senator Dasko: Can that happen? Is there a turning point in terms of the public, of the citizens? Do you think this is a realistic scenario?
Ms. Grant: I don’t have a crystal ball. It’s hard to know. In the past, in other wars that Russia has waged, there has been public opposition, whether it has been in Chechnya or Afghanistan or elsewhere. Of course, it was a different time when there was much more freedom of information and opposition voices. It’s hard to know. In the short term, it doesn’t seem so.
Senator Dasko: You’re all pretty much assuming that Russia can continue to feed resources into the war?
MGen. Smith: All wars will end. When does it happen? As my colleagues have said, the West has a vast amount more resources than Russia does, including its cronies, allies, whatever. We have to reinforce. As we do that, we’ll see what happens to both sides.
Senator Cardozo: My apologies for being late. I was at another meeting. Excuse me if you answered this question already.
In terms of the 2% target on defence spending that NATO requires, with the expenditures that we made on Ukraine, are we not moving in that direction, or is it just in a small amount?
My second question is, in part, a follow up to Senator Dasko’s points. Are we getting anywhere nearer to a point where Russia gets tired and maybe is prepared to either have a cease-fire or peace talks? Who would initiate that, or who would the neutral party be?
MGen. Smith: I’ll let my colleague talk about negotiations or such.
As I said, we are currently operating with the defence policy called Strong, Secure and Engaged. Since 2017, our defence spending has gone up 70%. This year, it’s at 1.38%. That’s still below 2%., but it is definitely climbing. It’s my understanding that these extra amounts of money we have just discussed don’t get cost accounted against that. Nevertheless, it has increased a lot, and it’s continuing to go up.
From a perspective of when does Russia get tired, again, as I have said before, wars will end. We are now at a grinding style of warfare — at least from a land perspective — in which both sides are losing people, equipment, et cetera. Inherently, there will be a negotiation at some point in which it will be somewhere between what we want and what they want.
Senator Cardozo: To clarify, the $9.7 billion, or something like that, that we have spent on Ukraine, does not get counted towards the 2%?
MGen. Smith: The military aid we have given with the announcement on the weekend by the Prime Minister is about $4 billion. That is not added against our yearly expenditures.
Senator Cardozo: Why is that?
MGen. Smith: Because it’s for the defence of Canada.
MGen. Prévost: The NATO 2% is for what is invested in Canadian defence and not Ukrainian defence.
Senator Cardozo: Okay.
Ms. Grant: On negotiation, senator, I would only add that Russia is holding firm on its maximalist goals and objectives for the war. Whether it’s really changing its goal posts or not, it is hard to know. They are saying they are willing to talk. They have said this at random times throughout the war, but their insincerity is clear. In terms of our analysis, credible peace talks are difficult to envision in the short term due to the fact that Russia is looking to entrench all gains that they have made and don’t show any flexibility.
Senator Cardozo: We haven’t heard reference to the nuclear option recently. Is that not being talked about much?
Ms. Grant: It’s true that hasn’t been in the media or talked about recently. There was a period where we saw this reckless and irresponsible sabre rattling from Russia. There was an international outcry after that and a pretty broad condemnation of it. The taboo against nuclear weapons use is still pretty strong internationally, so it’s good that we have seen the sabre rattling go down. However, it is obviously something that we need to keep an eye on and call out if it happens again.
Senator Cardozo: Thanks.
Senator McNair: Thank you, panellists, for being here today.
I understand that at the 2023 NATO summit, NATO members reaffirmed their commitment to Ukraine becoming a member of NATO. Canada has advocated Ukraine joining NATO as soon as conditions allow. From Canada’s perspective, what are those conditions that have to exist?
Ms. Grant: Thank you very much, senator. That’s right. That was the language from Prime Minister Trudeau and President Zelenskyy’s joint declaration right before the NATO summit, “as soon as conditions allow.”
There is no list of specific conditions. Canada alone does not set them. There would be a number of them. I think some of the key ones would be, of course, when all allies agree and Ukraine is ready. Part of this is a reform process as well. At the same summit, we removed Ukraine’s requirement for a membership action plan in NATO. That removed one sort of step toward NATO membership. We did make their annual national program an adaptive one, which makes it more robust and helps progress towards interoperability with NATO. These are all good signs of progress. Those reform benchmarks would need to be met as well. Frankly, I think we need to understand the outcomes of war that we’re in right now. There is a range of political and technical reform conditions that allies would be looking at.
Senator McNair: Perhaps the hardest question for all of you: What are the things that are keeping you up at night? Put another way, what are you worrying about most with the Ukraine-Russia conflict?
MGen. Smith: This is about the rules-based international order. Since the Rooseveltian era of setting up how the world works right now, big countries aren’t allowed to invade small countries and you can’t change borders at will. That is what we are seeing happen right now — a big country attacking a smaller country, one that got rid of its nuclear weapons in the early 1990s based on agreements. This isn’t solely about Russia. This is about the way the world works right now. If it is allowed to happen with Ukraine, what happens to the rest of the world? There is a line being drawn here saying that’s not how we work internationally.
Ms. Grant: I agree. There are two things for me, one more professional and one more personal.
Professionally, I agree; it’s the impact of the war. If Russia is even perceived to win this war, I don’t think we fully understand the impact that will have in other areas of the world, with other aggressor states and other situations of authoritarian regimes taking advantage of weaker neighbours where there is an imbalance in military power and respect for territorial integrity is lost. That does concern me because it’s hard to put into words and it’s hypothetical. I think it’s hard for analysts to provide certainty on that sort of analysis.
On the personal side — and professional too — I would say that there are generations of trauma for Ukrainians who have suffered in this war. The suffering is immense. I heard stories of it personally last week — all sorts of trauma and sexual violence. It takes generations to come to terms with that.
The Chair: We are rapidly running out of time. I have four senators. I’m going to ask you to briefly state your four questions up front, and our witnesses will then do their best to cover as much ground as they can.
Senator Patterson: I would like to shift into the reconstitution that Ukraine needs to do and Canada’s contribution to that. Specifically, I’m going to put a women, peace and security lens on it.
President Zelenskyy has more or less stated there have been 31,000 Ukrainian soldier deaths. We also know that Ukrainian forces are made up of about 25% of women in all combat roles, including on the front.
I have two questions for both sides. What are we doing to try to help equip women soldiers effectively? Canadians know that one size does not fit all, and your survivability is related to how your equipment fits.
Secondly, in terms of Canada’s commitments to looking at everything from gender-based violence, et cetera, how are we funding various projects for the eventual redevelopment of Ukraine? Thank you.
Senator Kutcher: My question is more on the artillery issue. I understand that Ukraine requires about 200,000 shells a month. During World War II, Canada was producing about 500,000 shells a week. Now I hear that we are going to have about 5,000 shells a month. That’s a big difference in number. What are we actually doing to increase our capability, and when will we be able to get to a footing that we need to get to?
[Translation]
Senator Carignan: My question concerns procurement. As we all know, we’re having a lot of procurement problems. The delays are very long and purchases are complicated. Procurement is an issue.
Do we have an expedited procedure? Do we have a system they could use to buy equipment faster, and sidestep the procurement delays that have plagued us for years?
[English]
Senator Boehm: This is a question for any of you. Given the urgency surrounding military support to Ukraine, do you see any linkages or implications between expedited military assistance efforts and the provisions outlined in Bill C-57, which is the Canada-Ukraine free trade agreement implementation act, also coming to committee — not this one — this week?
The Chair: Okay, so women, peace and security; ammunition supplies, can they be fast-tracked; and Bill C-57. That is the ground to be covered in four and a half minutes. Good luck.
MGen. Smith: I’ll begin, and my colleagues will want to jump in. I’ll pick a couple of questions that I can take a swing at.
Equipping women, absolutely. That is part of the equipment we’re giving that is gender focused. One size does not fit all. We have women who are serving proudly on the front lines, and they are getting specific equipment. That is one of our efforts.
[Translation]
I’m also going to talk about procurement. The system we’re using to supply Ukraine with equipment is not the same system we use in Canada. My group can provide equipment and materiel to Ukraine fairly quickly. The procedure is relatively fast, and uses a different system. We don’t have to follow the procedure involved in a competitive process.
[English]
I’ll leave it there, and my colleagues may want to jump in with other comments.
Ms. Grant: On women, peace and security, I would like to add that we have taken great care to integrate gender perspectives in both security policy on Ukraine and with Ukraine, and also on security programming. For our bilateral security agreement that we just signed, we were careful with Ukraine to integrate women, peace and security and gender perspectives throughout. You’ll notice them in a number of different areas, which I think makes it quite strong in the objectives as well as in the defence section, where we agreed to integrate a WPS agenda in military operations and institutions. That is part of our agreement. We have also announced new projects just this weekend, for example, on gender-inclusive demining, so both policy and programming.
MGen. Prévost: Senators will remember that just before the war started, we had begun training Ukrainians under Operation UNIFIER. Before this part of the conflict started, we had begun training and integrating WPS in Ukraine’s armed forces. Since the conflict started, we’ve shifted more to recruit training, and we have talked about sapper training, engineering, medical training and the rest. As we progress in our training over time, we are moving up the value chain of the training we are doing into leadership training, and at one point we will get into institutional building again. We will restart that piece as well.
On the artillery shells, we made small gains after talking a lot with industry, going from 3,000 to 5,000 a month. I doubt that we’ll get to 500,000 a month like in World War II, but we’re still working with industry to increase this. It’s a complex issue. There is a storage issue; there are long-lead items and critical materiel. We are working hard on that file. Our ADM of materiel is more versed to talk about that file. We are interested, obviously, to be able to both supply Ukraine and refill our own bins inside the CAF.
The Chair: That brings us to the end of our first panel, and what an ending that was. Thanks for covering so much ground so quickly. Thank you to Ms. Grant, Major-General Smith and Major-General Prévost on behalf of the Senate of Canada and, indeed, people across the country who collectively owe a great debt to you for the work you do every day and night. Thank you for finding the time to come and chat with us today. It’s very much appreciated. You can tell how much interest there is in this subject and the degree of concern. Thank you so much. We will no doubt see you again. We appreciate the update.
We welcome, for our second panel this evening, by video conference, Dr. Alexander Lanoszka, Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Waterloo; General Dominique Trinquand, Former Head, French Military Mission to the UN and NATO; and with us in the room, Lieutenant-General D. Michael Day, Former Commander of the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command and Fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute.
Thank you for joining us today. I invite you to provide your opening remarks, to be followed by questions from committee members. We will start this evening with Mr. Dominique Trinquand.
[Translation]
General (Ret’d) Dominique Trinquand, Former Head, French Military Mission to the UN and NATO: Thank you very much for the invitation this evening. Ukraine is in a difficult situation. After the 2023 offensives that allowed troops to regain some lost ground, the summer 2023 offensive proved to be a failure, with troops coming up against extremely strong Russian defences set up between the Dnieper and Kharkiv. Since the beginning of the year, after Russia had already captured Bakhmut in May, the recent Russian victory in Avdiivka generated some pessimism, especially in Western capitals.
I would like to emphasize that these events are creating pessimism, because I think things need to be put into perspective. The city of Avdiivka had been held by Ukrainians since 2014 and had never been taken by the Russians. It took the Russians four months to capture the city, which was destroyed. Russia probably lost 16,000 men in the battle.
This meant a tactical victory for Russia, but President Putin himself, in his assessment of the facts after the victory, said it would take time to rebuild its military power and be able to continue. Hopefully, as was the case with Bakhmut, this tactical victory will not be followed by an operational victory in the aftermath of the battle of Avdiivka.
What is the situation today? There’s a Russian front line that is extremely well defended, and a Ukrainian front line that is being rebuilt after Avdiivka. As you know, an election will be held in Russia in about 15 days’ time, and I don’t think we should expect very much before the election. After the election, the Russians will try to gradually chip away at more territory, by doing what they did at Bakhmut and Avdiivka, specifically the well-known strategic principle of “concentration of effort”. This means combining the efforts of Russian artillery, air force and infantry, all focused on one target. By this method, Russia can hope to gain a little more ground, since President Putin’s strategic objective is probably to capture the territories of the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts, territories he had supposedly annexed to Russia in September 2022.
At present, Ukraine needs to hold its positions. A meeting is taking place today at the Élysée Palace in Paris in a bid to coordinate European resources. The Europeans are especially concerned about the U.S. election, which could result in the American president wanting to negotiate quickly with Russia. This would leave Europeans on their own to support Ukraine. The point is to send President Putin a strong message that Europe is behind Ukraine and will support Ukraine in the short, medium and long term. That’s the position I can give you today.
Now, of course I haven’t.... The meeting in Paris is not quite over yet. All I can say is that Europeans have woken up after 25 years of relative peace after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and are getting the wheels rolling.
Unfortunately, it takes time to recover from 25 years of declining military budgets. That’s why I’m saying that by 2024, Ukraine will have to make do with whatever help we can give it, but by 2025, European industry will finally have taken off. Thank you.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you very much, General Trinquand.
We will now hear from Dr. Alexander Lanoszka. Hello again, Dr. Lanoszka. Please go ahead when you’re ready.
Alexander Lanoszka, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Waterloo, as an individual: I would like to thank the chair and members of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs for inviting me to testify again. It is an utmost honour and privilege for me to take part in these discussions with you.
[Translation]
It’s too bad I can’t appear in person this time.
[English]
In preparing for my statement today, I looked back on what I discussed with you last June. At that time, I said that we could allow ourselves some optimism given the military support that Ukraine had received to date as well as the counteroffensive that the Ukrainian Armed Forces had just begun. Nevertheless, I tempered my remarks by noting that counteroffensive operations are extremely difficult to do and that Russia has dug in deep on the territory it occupies while remaining able to bring plenty of mass to bear despite what operational and tactical challenges it has faced so far.
The mood has shifted dramatically since we last spoke in June and, indeed, for the worse. Ukraine’s counteroffensive delivered only a handful of marginal tactical successes. It fell well short of those expectations that many had for it. It does not look like it can impose strategic defeat on Russia, at least not now. Russia remains well fortified on Ukrainian territory. Russian war aims remain maximalist. Just last week, former Russian President and Deputy Chairman of the Security Council in Russia, Dmitry Medvedev, explained that Russia still seeks regime change and wants to make Ukrainian territory Russian, and he singled out the city of Odesa in particular.
Worsening matters is that munition shortages have become much more acute. The European Union has fallen short of its delivery targets for this year. The United States has been unable to provide more military assistance due to some Republican opposition in Congress. One recent estimate holds that Ukraine requires at least 75,000 shells per month to hold what it presently has. It needs at least double, if not triple, that amount if it were to engage in renewed counteroffensive operations to liberate lost territory. Ukraine, on average, has expended at least 100,000 shells per month.
To be clear, Russia has had its own struggles in armaments production, forcing it to seek ammunition from North Korea as well as a suite of weapons from Iran. How much longer Russia can maintain its operational tempo is very much unclear. One silver lining is that, despite Ukraine being on the back foot in the last several months, Russia can only make very modest territorial gains at great cost, as what we have seen lately in Avdiivka in the Donetsk Oblast.
What does this mean for Canada’s military support to Ukraine or its defence operations more generally? I will be very brief in terms of saving time. Ukraine’s current difficulties reveal a major failing on the part of the Canadian government. Though Ukraine is ultimately fighting an artillery war, Canada has balked at significantly expanding ammunition production above 2021 levels because of the associated price tag. Whatever savings this decision would produce for us will pale in comparison to the costs associated with this war lasting longer and will be increasingly to Russia’s advantage. I think we are saving pennies to pay dollars much later, and I believe that the Euro-Atlantic community will be less secure as a result and our collective military needs will grow.
In sum, as I have said to you before, the war remains far from finished. Russia is relentless, forcing Ukraine no other choice but to resist by force of arms. Our indecision in regards to ammunition production in particular is only making a bad situation worse.
Thank you, and I look forward to our discussion.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Dr. Lanoszka.
Our next witness is Lieutenant-General Day. We’re waiting to hear from you.
Lieutenant-General (Ret’d) D. Michael Day, Former Commander, Canadian Special Operations Forces Command and Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, as an individual: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. Senators, I appreciate the opportunity to speak in front of you.
My opening comments are designed to create a lens through which I would like you to consider any responses I might provide to your questions, and they are also informed by my previous experiences not just as Commander of our Special Operations Forces, but also as the Commander of NATO’s response force, previously as the lead strategic planner for capabilities for the Canadian Armed Forces, as well as leading the International Security Policy Division in the Department of National Defence. I pay very close attention to this issue and engage on it on an almost daily basis.
I will start by saying wars are perpetuated when two conditions exist. Firstly, there needs to be a will to continue to fight. Secondly, there needs to be sufficient materiel to fight with. As that latter condition decreases — less materiel — so too must the will increase. It is important to note that the materiel is decreasing significantly.
In Ukraine’s instance, they have demonstrated a remarkable resilience and capacity to retain the will to fight. The materiel issue, as other speakers have noted, is almost wholly dependent on international support. I wish to be clear that, at this stage, it is my assessment that, given the ongoing fickleness of Western support, the unpredictability of it, the lumpiness of that support that has been provided, with insufficient materiel, as such, Ukraine is now losing the war. Not a popular view, but one that I believe can be adequately argued.
Western political rhetoric notwithstanding, empty words, unmet promises and late delivery all create a situation that makes it nigh on impossible to plan effective operations. As such, it’s given Putin sufficient time to re-energize the Russian economy and put it on a war footing where he’s now not only able to backfill battle losses but augment the force on his western border.
The responses to date by Western politicians, both elected and in opposition, have demonstrated they either do not sufficiently care, they don’t understand the strategic impact of a loss by Ukraine and/or are impotent or, quite frankly, merely incompetent.
Concurrent to this, and here in Canada, we are once again reminded that decades — by all governments — of underfunding with meaningless postures predictably resulted in Canada being seen as a net pariah on defence, security and intelligence issues.
I talk to colleagues on a weekly basis in national capitals across NATO, including the Five Eyes communities. These are individuals at the highest levels of diplomatic experience, multi-decade diplomatic experience, and defence, security and intelligence officials. Without exception — without exception — they offer the opinion that we are not considered to exert any influence at any level on any issue with regard to Ukraine writ large.
Furthermore, none of them — without exception — believe that Canada comes close to carrying its share of the load on defence, security and intelligence issues writ large.
When looked at in light of Canada’s economy, we should be embarrassed as we rely totally on a security system that allows us to engage in global trade as the basis of our economic well-being. Relying on this system, we are users and takers with very little contribution.
The Ukrainian-Russo war highlights this reality but is only illustrative as opposed to a single instance. China, Iran, North Korea and other pariahs are watching carefully what the Western world does and what Canada does. They have drawn some obvious conclusions.
The return to Great Power competition, concurrent to ongoing violent extremists continuing to prosecute campaigns of terror and outrage, layered upon the existential threat of climate change and the associated impacts, especially for Canada, serves to highlight how utterly inadequate every part of Canada’s federal government’s response has been in properly serving the needs of this country and its security. To date, we have been able to successfully ignore the impact by refusing to acknowledge our diminished role in the world, but the ability to do so going forward is fast becoming so constrained as to make that wilful blindness impossible.
Again, and as a final note, the Ukrainian-Russo war is merely illustrative of our generational naïveté and unwillingness to be part of a solution.
As to political rhetoric, the act of posturing merely serves to further highlight the reality of Canada being inconsequential. We’re not just inconsequential as a country. We shamelessly benefit from the contributions and efforts of others who have the political courage to recognize and pay the costs associated with maintaining whatever security and safety the global commons currently enjoys.
I look forward to any questions you might have.
The Chair: Thank you, Lieutenant-General Day.
We will now proceed to questions. Our witnesses are with us for another 40 minutes. In order to ensure that each member is able to participate, again, we’ll limit each question, including the answer, to four minutes. Please keep your questions short and identify the person you’re addressing the question to.
Senator Oh: Thank you, witnesses, for joining us today.
What humanitarian aid is Canada providing to help alleviate the impact of the crisis on Ukraine’s civilian population?
LGen. Day: I would have no idea, senator.
Senator Oh: Can anyone answer the question?
Mr. Lanoszka: Off the top of my head, Canada is providing significant amounts of humanitarian assistance and has been helping out, especially with victims of violent trauma. Indeed, Canada has expertise to share in this domain. The most recent security assistance deal struck between the two countries promises even more cooperation in this particular domain. Canada is an economic powerhouse, and so it does have a pocketbook with which it can support humanitarian economic efforts, notwithstanding the situation with its own armed forces.
The Chair: General Trinquand, any thoughts?
[Translation]
Gen. Trinquand: I’m sorry, but I haven’t been following Canada’s efforts very closely.
All I can say is that the EU’s efforts, which were agreed on in December, amount to 50 billion euros. These 50 billion euros will essentially go towards support for civilians, meaning that this sum will support the country’s administration and allow Ukraine to survive and provide humanitarian aid.
[English]
Senator Oh: Gentlemen, the war has gone on for two years, and many young people have been sacrificed on both sides. We have hardly heard how many young people have died on each side or the casualty numbers. Is there any possibility that the war might be coming to an end?
LGen. Day: No, absolutely not. There is no possibility in the foreseeable future that this conflict comes to an end.
The Chair: General Trinquand?
[Translation]
Gen. Trinquand: I would add that your question is existential for Ukraine.
I’d like to give you three figures. Before 1990, Ukraine had a population of 52 million. Today it has a population of 34 million and a fertility rate of 1.2. Demographically, it’s dying as a country, so it’s up to Ukraine to know where to draw the line between victory and defeat.
Earlier I heard the general talking about victory or defeat. What is victory or defeat? Russia has not succeeded in annexing Ukraine, nor will it. That’s what we would describe as defeat. Will Ukraine be able to regain its 1991 borders? That’s what Ukrainians need to ask themselves.
[English]
Mr. Lanoszka: I would add that so long as Vladimir Putin lives, I do not see the war ending. He has no interest in finishing this war. Those around him do not seem to have an interest in finishing this war either. What happens after he were to go away — because, of course, he is going to die one day — that remains to be seen, but so long as he is in power, this war will not end. Ukrainians would like for the war to be over for the reasons that we have discussed, but considering that Putin does not have such an interest — and, indeed, we have seen already just this past week with Alexei Navalny’s death that apparently there was some sort of exchange involving hostages or prisoners with several Western capitals, and he, in fact, reneged on that agreement. That goes to show that even if there were to be an agreement struck with Russia and with Putin in particular, it would probably not last for very long.
The Chair: Thank you.
[Translation]
Senator Carignan: My question is about its ability to rebuild.
You talked a bit about Russia, which is getting weapons from Iran, North Korea and China. We know they have a huge amount to offer, so it’s not an issue for the Russians to rebuild in terms of weapons.
As for the population, obviously, the Russian population is much higher than the Ukrainian population. I don’t have the exact Russian population, but it’s certainly a much higher number.
Currently, Ukraine is having problems replenishing its weapons supply, because we can’t provide enough. There’s probably also a problem in terms of replenishing its troops. We’re seeing trench warfare, almost like the First World War with this model.
If we don’t help Ukraine quickly with sophisticated weapons, is there any risk that NATO will be forced to put troops on the ground to support Ukraine in that way, rather than with weapons?
LGen. Day: I’m sorry. I would like to answer you in French, but I’ll do it in English, so as not to miss any nuances.
[English]
There were four things that I’d like to address, senator, in your questions.
First of all, I would gently push back on the assumption that it is easy for Russia to rearm. They certainly have shown a remarkable ability over the last 16 to 18 months to energize their economy to get to that point. I don’t believe that that has been cost free. At the moment, estimations are between 6% to 8% of their GDP is being devoted to that rearmament program. Notwithstanding that they are now receiving more income from their oil profits than they did previously, they are still very much reliant on China, Iran, North Korea and other pariah states to continue to support them. This is not a cost-free rearmament, and there is some reasonable discussion on how long they would be able to sustain that — but certainly for the foreseeable future.
With regard to the Ukrainian effort — and you mentioned the trench warfare — I would say that it’s always difficult in the middle of a conflict to unpack exactly what we’re seeing in terms of the nature of the conflict. At the moment, I think you would be right to characterize elements of it as being reminiscent of World War I, but I would layer on top of that some of the maneuvering we saw in World War II, some of the logistical challenges and maneuvering from Operation Desert Storm in Iraq, and certainly some of the high-tech elements we are seeing in a number of other theatres where violent extremist organizations prosecute through drones, et cetera. We’re seeing, if you will, an amalgamation of all those things, so it is difficult to draw a pure analogy between a previous conflict and this one, as is always the case.
With regard to the armament, I would make the comment that sustaining the Ukrainian military at its current level will continue to mean that they will, in my opinion, lose a war of attrition. It’s not about sustaining what we are currently giving them; it’s about augmenting them to strengthen that defence, and — as one of the other panellists has suggested — actually increasing that support to allow them to go on the offensive. The maintenance of the current level of support will inevitably lead to a loss by attrition of Ukrainian forces.
Your last comment regarding whether this would then force NATO to go into Ukraine, it’s inconceivable to me that NATO would agree to do that. NATO works on the requirement to have a unanimous position on any vote, on any action taken. There are still a number of states that need to be encouraged to support, and so at the moment, there is no Article 5 requirement because Ukraine is not an applicant, let alone a member of NATO, and neither do the political conditions exist, at least as far as I see, that you would get the unanimous agreement at NATO to allow for an incursion — essentially, the understanding or agreement that you’re about to engage in direct conflict with another nuclear power.
Senator Patterson: Some of my comment has been covered by my predecessor, so I will push to the next thread.
We always talk about Canada meeting our high readiness commitments. Whether we like it or not, it’s people and stuff. I liked your first two points, Lieutenant-General Day, in terms of the will to fight of the Ukrainian people, but then it’s sufficient materiel to fight with that will.
I will go back to the people question. There will be a point, especially since we know how many people have exited Ukraine, and we know there is the debate in parliament about reducing the conscription age from 25 and lower, but humans are also an expendable material resource. What do you think the will is — this may also go to some of your counterparts — about allowing Ukraine, in the worst-case scenario, to fall? Because one of the key components to defence of Ukraine and moving forward is people.
LGen. Day: Senator, I think you’re absolutely right to focus on the numbers game. The debate, internal to Ukraine, with regard to reducing the age for conscription will have to be resolved. When you look at not just the overall reduction in the national population of Ukraine, but when you extract from that those individuals who could be within a recruiting pool in order to fight, there is just no numerical equation that gets you to a sufficient number of fighting human beings unless they do a complete mobilization based on their current population. The math does not work. If you assume that Western powers have been helping them train tens of thousands of soldiers to get ready for future operations, you should also assume that that is an increment of what will be needed based on what we are seeing in terms of the Russian uptick and what we are assuming will be their force posture on Russia’s western border, Ukraine’s eastern border, which is numbered in the hundreds of thousands. The only way that Ukraine can get to that number is to lower the age not just to 25 but, likely, significantly lower in order to get to the several hundred thousand more service members that they will need to not just win but continue operations at the current level.
Senator Patterson: So this is a time equation as well. This is where I bring in the other materiel and the fits and starts of Western support going in and what they actually need. Then there are people on top. Does anyone on the panel imagine a tipping point where the world or NATO has to make a decision about supporting the boots on the ground?
LGen. Day: The equation — I go back to Senator Carignan’s comments with regard to whether there is a point — under the current conditions, it is implausible to me to believe that NATO membership writ large would agree to engage in direct conflict with another nuclear power. The consequences, however, of letting Ukraine fall will not just be to Europe. Quite frankly, China is watching, Iran is watching, and the conclusions they are reaching are that we, the Western world — NATO writ large — have a finite span of attention and support that they can wait out, and as long as they wait that out, they will be good. The calculation, therefore, is, for example, if you were China looking at Taiwan, if you were looking at the Nine-Dash Line, if you’re looking really at the pacing item for Western civilization, which is Asia-Pacific, your conclusion is that we can outwait you, and as long as we play that game, you will eventually tire providing materiel support.
To quote one of the other panellists, it is cents on the dollar in comparison to the cost associated with involving NATO in a ground war with Russia. It would cost trillions. It’s costing us tens of billions. I do not understand the strategic calculus to say we potentially suffer the possibility of committing the coin and the blood of the realm of NATO because we’re not willing to spend a fraction of that cost in the near term, and there are some obvious conclusions from that.
The Chair: I sense our two other panellists want to contribute to this and probably the last question. Let’s start with you, General Trinquand, if you would like to supplement.
[Translation]
Gen. Trinquand: I get the feeling that, when I hear talk of NATO, I am hearing it from the other side of the Atlantic.
I would like to point out that, today in Paris, President Macron stated that there will likely come a time when Western soldiers will have to go to Ukraine to fight Russia. I’m just repeating what he said. I just heard about it because I was just asked to give an interview on the subject, so this is definitely something that Europeans are thinking about.
[English]
Mr. Lanoszka: There are two things I want to say.
The first is to nuance the notion of Ukraine losing the war. I think it depends on what we mean by the war and losing it with respect to the war aims that Russia has. I don’t see Ukraine falling. I just do not. I don’t think Russia has the capacity to make Ukraine fall at this point in the war. I don’t necessarily think Ukraine can recover its lost territories to the extent that people thought maybe last year, but I think that’s a wholly different matter.
To answer Senator Patterson’s question, I think NATO was, in fact, prepared for Ukraine to fall. That was more or less the case in February of 2022, and it did not fall. But the expectation, certainly, was for Ukraine not to survive the Russian onslaught. Ukraine did, and here we are. We are in some ways victims of our own success, but we have not done a good job of building on the successes that we have had in 2022. Part of it is because of the lumpiness, as someone put it, of the military aid that we have given it, timidity involved with giving some particular forms of platforms. The German Chancellor today announced he will not provide Taurus for reasons that seem to defy strategic logic. We just have not been training adequately Ukraine’s forces. There have been anecdotes that they are training to do operations in Iraq as opposed to fighting against a very powerful, determined peer competitor such as Russia. In that respect, I would say NATO has been prepared for Ukraine to fall. We’re not in that situation anymore. But Ukraine might not necessarily achieve the things that it thought it could achieve given the successes that it had in 2022.
Senator Kutcher: All of you are very helpful.
It can be argued that this war of attrition is in part due to an inadequate and untimely Western response: not quite enough and not quickly enough. I would like to focus on the lack of robust supply of long-range precision artillery to Ukraine, which is necessary, as I understand it, to cut off Russian resupply capability, whether it’s through the Kerch Bridge or the Donetsk front, and as has just been pointed out today, the Chancellor of Germany denying the Taurus is a good example of this. What is the strategic thinking in the West to deny Ukraine provision of long-range precision artillery which would allow them to at least make a substantive impact on the resupply capacity of Russia? I can’t understand this. I’m not a military strategist, so I am asking people who are. I don’t understand why this would not be something that one would quite robustly support.
Mr. Lanoszka: I can answer that question at the outset. There has been some degree of support using these particular platforms. France has provided SCALP-EG; Britain provided its own variant, Storm Shadow; the United States has provided limited amounts of ATACMS, albeit with shorter ranges and lesser warheads. The concern, it appears, at least with respect to the United States and Germany, is fear of escalation, that somehow, notwithstanding all of the military assistance already provided to Ukraine, that it would be the Taurus or more ATACMS at greater ranges that would tip the scale and force Russia into a position where it would have to escalate or widen the conflict beyond what is desirable. There have been other considerations too. There have been arguments about how the United States has been reluctant to provide ATACMS because of needs in the Indo-Pacific and did not want to compromise on those particular needs. I think the main argument — which I don’t personally find convincing — is that we need to refrain from doing things that could potentially widen the conflict.
Senator Kutcher: As a comment on that, I heard the same thing about the Leopard tanks. Before that, I heard the same thing about other stuff. Before that, I heard the same thing about other stuff even when they were getting Molotov cocktails ready in Kyiv. I don’t understand it.
Mr. Lanoszka: I don’t understand it either.
[Translation]
Gen. Trinquand: With regard to long-range armaments, we were talking about ATACMS missiles. Of course, the Americans are the ones who have those weapons at their disposal, and they are concerned about strikes on Russian territory. The issue is not that Ukraine is not being given the weapons. The issue is that there is concern that there will be strikes on Russian territory.
As for the SCALP and Storm Shadow missiles, as you know, France decided to provide several hundred SCALP missiles. The problem is that they have to be launched from planes. Ukraine does not have a lot of planes, and the F-16s will arrive only in a few months. These missiles are currently being used and that is mainly how Ukraine was able to destroy the Russian fleet in the Black Sea. We are always talking pessimistically, but let’s not forget that the Russian fleet in the Black Sea was basically destroyed, even though Ukraine does not have a navy. That is a rather extraordinary feat.
The blow to the Russian fleet and this air defence make it possible for Ukraine to continue to use the grain corridor between Odessa and the Dardanelles by passing through Romania’s and Bulgaria’s waters. As far as long-range armaments are concerned, the only limit that has been set is not to strike targets in Russia. As for the German Taurus missiles, as you know, Germany’s decision-making process is complicated, particularly when there is a coalition government. In France, the president decides and gives, whereas in Germany, you need parliamentary approval, which is extremely complicated with a coalition government.
[English]
LGen. Day: I have a couple of quick comments.
You used the phrase with regard to the materiel being not quite enough. I would have the view that it’s exponentially not enough. It’s not “not quite enough.” It’s not missing by 10% or 20%. It’s missing by orders of magnitude. Just so we understand the difference between what is currently being supplied and what is actually needed, it is that much of a difference at the moment.
With regard to the specific question, senator, about the strategic rationale, certainly the general referred to it with regard to some of the domestic pieces, and I would say that there are three arguments.
First of all, there is no broad consensus internal to the coalition of the willing to support. There is a general understanding of what is needed, but the specifics of what they should do remains, quite frankly, debatable. That’s why we see some of this episodic type of support as they can’t come to common agreement, et cetera.
Second, there are places such as Germany — and the general has referred to it — that have tremendously challenging domestic circumstances that make it very difficult, whether it’s a coalition or not. As you know, Germany has tried to increase defence spending by legislation, and that’s been voted down. There are a series of other issues.
Also, with regard to the Americans, there is not only the domestic situation, but as we have seen in the Canadian instance where we have essentially emptied out the cupboards, a number of these weapon systems are high-demand, high-value, low density. There are, for any theatre, a series of contingency plans. With those contingency plans comes a detailed listing of what would be required to execute that plan. With regard to Asia-Pacific, my assumption is that the Americans have made a strategic decision not just to not rattle the sabre. I don’t believe in the American case that’s the defining moment or the defining metric they are using, but rather, with China being their pacing item and the carrot with regard to near-peer competitor, they are preserving that strategic arsenal for their own purposes.
Senator Cardozo: My question is for Professor Lanoszka and General Day.
I want to talk about the spending issue. You mentioned Canada is not taken seriously. I take it it’s about our spending level with regard to NATO. I would add, when we are talking about Ukraine, doesn’t the billions that we’re spending there count for something?
My larger question is this: Is there a changing political climate in Canada and the U.S. where there seems to be less interest politically across the spectrum to spend more either on NATO or Ukraine? Do you have concerns about a Donald Trump presidency in terms of what his approach to Russia would be?
LGen. Day: I’ll let the professor go first.
Mr. Lanoszka: Thank you.
Canada has given quite a bit, but I think if you compare it with other NATO allies, it has not really done that much, or at least not as much as you might think it has done. It’s at best middle of the pack, in part because years of underinvestment have constrained the ability of Canada to provide military assistance.
In a study that I’ve conducted with Jordan Becker at West Point, we have basically shown that a very good predictor for military assistance to Ukraine in 2022, and really since then, has been the level of defence spending and those levels of operations and maintenance spending. Those countries that invested in themselves achieved a level of strategic preparedness such that when it came to supporting Ukraine after the events of February 24, 2022, those countries were well positioned. Canada responded and gave lots of aid to be sure, but the data do show that Canada is middling. To put things in perspective, Sweden has one third of Canada’s national economy but has given two thirds more than what Canada has in terms of a dollar basis. Again, that helps show that is not so much a matter of guns versus butter or whatever else, there are just some countries that decided to make these sorts of strategic decisions that have left them better prepared to address these particular secure challenges as they have arisen.
Senator Cardozo: Quickly on Trump?
Mr. Lanoszka: Trump would not be good for Ukraine. That is the short answer. I would say that the Europeans are becoming much more alert to this issue. We haven’t talked about the European Union finally unlocking that major military and economic assistance package just a few weeks ago. Germany is ramping up ammunition production to produce about 200,000 shells per year. France and the United Kingdom are also increasing ammunition production. I think there is a stronger sense now that things could go sideways in the United States, so they are trying to achieve some level of preparedness in a way that would not necessarily have been thinkable in 2021. Again, these capabilities take a while to mature and develop, and so do politics take a long time to develop, as General Trinquand says.
[Translation]
Gen. Trinquand: I will begin at the end. I think that President Trump would like to resolve the problem in 24 hours, which is how he usually does things. The negotiations would go something like this: “Listen, Russians. You are good where you are. Ukrainians, we are not going to support you any more.” The whole thing could be resolved rather quickly like that. That’s what Europeans are worried about. You are right to point that out.
I think that Europeans, and I referred earlier to the meeting that is being held today — Sorry, but President Macron’s announcements are coming through live as we speak. President Macron was chairing that meeting and saying that it would not be surprising if there comes a time when European soldiers have to go to Ukraine and help in the fight against Russia, so you can understand why people are so concerned.
With regard to armaments, as I have already said, we have fallen way behind. It takes time to make up for 25 years of declining military budgets. You spoke earlier about ammunition production in Germany. To give you an example, France has a foundry in Tarbes that operates around the clock, seven days a week, and a second foundry is being built next door to double production. The production of ammunition tripled in one year in Europe alone.
We are not producing enough to keep up with today’s consumption. That is why I was saying that 2024 will be a hard year. It takes a month to build an anti-aircraft missile. Even doubling production takes time. We are late to the game. We need to hold out in 2024 and try to do better in 2025.
[English]
LGen. Day: I will respond to your first question about whether the rest of NATO or the rest of the world views our contribution to Ukraine as significant or offsetting, the professor talked in terms of relative contribution compared to GDP, compared to defence budgets, et cetera. Certainly, none of my colleagues around the world would suggest that we have done anything but stayed the course, meaning being an underperformer throughout. Also — and this is by no means belittles the necessity, the urgency of humanitarian aid, and there was a question previously about the amount and I don’t track that, but, quite frankly, humanitarian aid will be absolutely irrelevant if they don’t win the war. This is about priorities, right? We can close the gate on the horse, but if the horse has already left, it just doesn’t matter. I have received no sense from any colleagues around the world that our contribution to Ukraine is seen to be extraordinary. In fact, it seems to be absolutely consistent with how we approach defence writ large, which is that we want to believe that we can get by with a minor contribution. We want to believe that contributing in other areas equals actually contributing to the fight. In the end, some Ukrainians are facing terribly hard days. We seem to have a culture in Canada that wants to appreciate that you can do other things. In fact, they are fighting. You need to help them support the fight.
With regard to your comment about the changing political climate, certainly, I am the least qualified to comment on that except to say that the Western world, including Canada, is entirely consistent about losing attention, focus and priority on any issue after a handful of years. We are unable to think strategically in terms of time. That was the case in Afghanistan, and it was the case in Iraq. It was the case in dealing with China. There is a phrase, “We’re telling time and they’re building clocks.” It is a completely different span. Putin, by all indications, is happy for this to go on for as long as possible, as long as he continues to make gains. We’re already tired and forgetful. We’re having to debate the issue. The fact that we have to debate the strategic value of preventing Russia from engaging in land warfare in Europe is a remarkable statement. We actually have to have that debate.
With regard to Donald Trump, I obviously, like many people, have fairly strong views on that. Nothing in the defence-security-intelligence domain suggests that he cares at all, that he has any intellectual curiosity that would allow him to care, or that we can safely predict what any decision would be. It would be pure speculation and invariably be wrong.
Senator Dasko: Some of my question may have been answered, but I just want to pursue it a little more. Lieutenant-General Day has said that NATO will not, as NATO, participate in the Ukraine war. My question is about the Europeans then, setting aside America and Canada as members of NATO. I’m a little puzzled about the Europeans because I’m hearing different things from our witnesses today.
I’ll just phrase my question in a very general sense: How far will Europeans go to defend Ukraine? How far will they go to help Ukraine? The Europeans seem to be motivated. They seem to be working together in various ways. They seem to be concerned. They seem to understand the threat. Of course, Europeans have a history different from our history. They know what can happen. They know what did happen just a few decades ago with World War II. I have heard from the other witnesses, first, that Europe is slow but also that Europe seems to be working on this. We’ve heard that Europe has fallen short, yet seems to be motivated and seems to be working on a plan or whatever. I would ask our three witnesses to comment on whether Europeans will, at some point, do what is needed. I understand that the Americans obviously have a huge role to play, too, but this is Europe. That is my question to all of the witnesses.
[Translation]
Gen. Trinquand: You are right to ask that question, because the history is not the same on both sides of the Atlantic. Europe does not have the same history. Keep in mind that many European countries were occupied by the Soviet Union from 1945 to 1990, and they remember that. When we hold discussions with Poland and the Baltic states, they remind us of it. They are next. We have to take that into account.
Let me give you two examples. First, Transnistria, which borders on Moldova, is supposed to vote today or tomorrow on whether to join Russia. That means that Russia could find itself right on the NATO border between Romania and Ukraine. Second, Kaliningrad, a Russian enclave in the middle of Europe, is in the middle of NATO, on the Lithuanian border. These are extremely dangerous points, which are being monitored by Europeans and NATO and which could become a flashpoint and lead to escalation against Russian forces in Europe, Transnistria and the Kaliningrad enclave.
From what I understand today — and once again, I did not hear the speeches at the end of the meeting in Paris since I was here with you — I think that this problem is being taken very seriously in Europe given that we are not just talking about war with munitions, planes and ships. We are talking about the communications war, the cyberwar, that is already under way in Europe.
[English]
The Chair: Let’s get Senator Yussuff’s question on the table and have our witnesses cover everything.
Senator Yussuff: Of course, as long as the war drags on, public opinion is shifting, and it will shift in a major way. It requires the public to have tolerance for their political leaders to continue to engage in and to support the war. The reality is that public opinion is shifting in the wrong direction in regard to support for Ukraine. How long will it be before the crisis point where this war cannot be sustained despite the best intentions of our political leaders?
The Chair: Thirty seconds each.
LGen. Day: For both questions?
The Chair: Yes.
LGen. Day: Senator, with regard to NATO countries but not NATO writ large, I do think that is a possibility. That’s where I would parse out the difference in terms of engagement. They obviously have a different point of view. But I would draw a distinction between defending Ukraine and deterring Russia. Nobody who is involved in this believes that Russia will stop when it finishes with Ukraine. My certification exercise as commander of the NATO response first was the Baltic states, specifically Estonia. It was predicated that they had already started and were moving all the way through to include Moldova, Transdniestria, Kaliningrad, where they already have a presence. I think that is a good question. The question would be for Canada. However, because Canada refuses to have either a foreign and/or a security policy, your guess would be as good as mine on what we could possibly do because we just refuse to commit to having a transparent, knowable, intellectually defendable policy on what would happen.
With regard to public opinion, it’s not an area on which I feel qualified to comment.
The Chair: I am very sorry, but we have reached the end of our time. We have to now move into the Senate Chamber and our other business.
My sincere thanks to Dr. Lanoszka, Lieutenant-General Day and General Trinquand, who have guided us through an enormously important discussion. We’ve had wonderful questions from senators around the table and equally thoughtful and deep responses. Witnesses, you’ve helped us considerably, and we thank you very much for that.
Colleagues, our next meeting will be on Wednesday, March 18, at 4 p.m. Thank you all for your participation. I wish you all a good evening.
(The committee adjourned.)