CALGARY, Tuesday, March 8, 2005

The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence met this day at 10:30 a.m. to examine and report on the national security policy for Canada.

Senator Colin Kenny (Chairman) in the chair.

[English]

The Chairman: Before we start, I would like to take a moment if I could. On behalf of the committee, I would like to extend our thoughts and condolences to the family of the victims of the recent tragic murders, to the RCMP and to the larger RCMP community. Our thoughts are with them at this difficult time.

This is a meeting of the National Security and Defence Committee of the Senate. My name is Colin Kenny. I chair the committee. I would like to take a moment to introduce the members of the committee to you.

On my immediate right is the distinguished senator from Nova Scotia, Senator Michael Forrestall. He has served the constituents of Dartmouth for 37 years, first as a member of the House of Commons, then in the Senate. While in the House of Commons, he served as the official opposition defence critic from 1966 to 1976. He is also a member of our Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs. Beside him is Senator Norman Atkins from Ontario. He came to the Senate with 27 years experience in the field of communications. He served as senior adviser to former federal Conservative leader Robert Stanfield, Premier William Davis of Ontario and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. He is also a member of our Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs.

Beside him is Senator Michael Meighen. He is a lawyer and a member of the bars of Quebec and Ontario. He is Chancellor of King's College and past chair of the Stratford Festival. He has honorary doctorates in civil law from Mt. Allison University and the University of New Brunswick. Currently, he is the chair of our Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs. He is also a member of the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce.

On his right is Senator Nolin.

[Translation]

Senator Nolin is from Quebec. He is a lawyer and has been a senator since 1993. He chaired the Special Committee on Illegal Drugs. At present he is the Deputy-Chair of the Senate Committee on Internal Economy, Budgets and Administration.

Active on the international scene since 1994, Senator Nolin is the Parliament of Canada’s delegate to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and is Vice-Chair of that organization. He also is the General Rapporteur of the Science and Technology Committee.

[English]

On my right is Senator Jane Cordy. She is from Nova Scotia. She is an accomplished educator with an extensive record of community involvement, including a position as vice chair of the Halifax-Dartmouth Port Development Commission. She is chair of the Canada-NATO Parliamentary Association and a member of the Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology.

Beside her is Senator Jim Munson from Ontario. He was a trusted journalist and former director of communications for Prime Minister Chrétien before being called to the Senate in 2003. Senator Munson has been twice nominated for Gemini Awards in recognition of excellence in journalism. Our committee is the first senate committee mandated to examine security and defence. The Senate has asked our committee to examine the need for a national security policy.

We began our review in 2002 with three reports: Canadian Security and Military Preparedness in February; Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility in September; and Update on Canada's Military Financial Crisis, A Review from the Bottom Up in November.

In 2003, the committee published two reports: The Method of Security at Canada's Airports in January; and Canada's Coast Lines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World in October. In 2004, we tabled two more reports: National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines in March; and recently, the “Canadian Security Guide Book, 2005 Edition.”

The committee is currently reviewing Canadian defence policy. During the next few months, the committee will hold hearings in every province and engage with Canadians to determine their national interest, what they see as Canada's principal threats, and how they would like the government to respond to those threats. The committee will attempt to generate debate on national security in Canada and forge a consensus on the need and type of military Canadians want.

We have before us today colleagues, two distinguished witnesses. Dr. David Bercuson is the Dean of the Faculty of Graduate Studies at the University of Calgary and Director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies. He has published in academic and popular publications on a wide range of topics specializing in modern Canadian politics, Canadian defence and foreign policy, and Canadian military history. He has written, coauthored or edited over 30 popular and academic books and does regular commentary on television and radio.

His career was recently recognized and rewarded with one of the University of Calgary's highest honours, a university professorship. He is the Honorary Colonel of the 33rd Field Engineer Squadron, a land force reserve military engineer unit of the Canadian Forces. He is also an officer of the Order of Canada. Recently, he received the Vimy Award from the Conference of Defence Associations Institute.

With him, we have Dr. Rob Huebert. He is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Calgary. He is Associate Director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies and editor of the Journal of Military and Strategic Studies.

Dr. Huebert is an expert on international relations, strategic studies, Canadian foreign and defence policies, circumpolar relations, ocean politics and naval studies.

Gentlemen, welcome to the committee. We understand you both have short statements to make. Dr. Bercuson, you have the floor.

Mr. David Bercuson, Professor, Department of History, University of Calgary: Thank you, Senator Kenny. With respect, I am no longer Dean of the Faculty of Graduate Studies. I also want to note for the committee that we are both fellows of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, which is based in Calgary.

I want to begin this morning with thanks to you, Senator Kenny, and the committee for this undertaking. I feel sure that this enterprise is due in no small measure to a determination by the committee that it need not adhere to the glacial pace with which the government has fulfilled its four-year-old pledge to bring about a new defence white paper.

Last week saw two momentous defence events: first, the ballistic missile defence, BMD, decision, and second, the budget announcement. I believe the two were inexplicably linked. The budget announcement gave the government room to make a U-turn on missile defence while claiming to increase the Canadian commitment to continental defence and the wider global struggle for peace and security.

It remains an open secret that the government all but gave its assurances to the United States that Canada would participate in BMD. There was no cost to Canada whatever in the initial phases. There is palpably no weaponization of space happening at this point. Canada could have proceeded from a positive BMD decision to the truly important issue of the future of NORAD. NORAD is up for renewal in a little over a year and how that future might be tied into whatever recommendations the Bi-National Planning Group will make regarding that future.

Whatever the prior assurances this government gave the U.S. regarding missile defence, they were made largely in a majority government world where polls also clearly showed a majority of Canadians in favour of joining in. They were also probably made with the fervent hope that John Kerry would now be sitting in the White House. Mr. Kerry, as we know, is not opposed to BMD but would likely have proceeded more slowly to deploy it, giving Canada yet more wiggle room.

Today facing a dithering Tory official opposition and an adamantly anti-American NDP/Bloc coalition with a loose ginger group of anti-America Grits, the government needed a way to put BMD on ice. It did so in the shadow of the budget.

In the short run, this was an easy trade-off to make. The budget is backloaded and the real bill for Canadian Forces expansion will not begin to come due for at least 24 more months. By the time the real bills start to come in, this minority government scenario will likely have resolved itself, giving the government the leverage it needs to make whatever long-run strategic decisions it wants without worrying about a fragmented opposition or wayward caucus members. In other words, the political moment the BMD decision was made to serve will have passed.

If there is any realistic long-running thinking in either Department of Foreign Affairs or the Prime Minister's Office — I leave out the Department of National Defence because I believe Mr. Graham was four square in favour of BMD — it follows that someone in government knows perfectly well the BMD decision cannot stand in the long run. It cannot stand in the long run, say, over the next 10 to 15 years because (a) the technology of BMD will be more or less perfected by then; and (b) the weaponization of space will have been done by then by the United States and by a number of other countries, as sure as the air was weaponized in the late summer of 1914.

The government has probably done a rough calculation on how much shattered glass it will have to crawl over to join BMD once it gets its majority back. It has probably decided that it will be more easily done than facing the wrath of the anti-BMD coalition now. In politics, as the saying goes, a week is a long time.

I am worried. If both the government and the official opposition lack the intestinal fortitude to show leadership on continental defence on an issue that demanded so little of Canada, what will be NORAD's fate or the fate of the Bi-National Planning Group's recommendations if we are still in a minority government position in May 2006? Last week's BMD decision gives us little assurance that matters of such great weight will be decided on their substance rather than on their real value to Canadian national interests.

Finally, I worry about the defence budget. Once the budget is passed, the government's only real legislative mandate will be to provide $500 million over the fiscal year 2005-2006. If there is an election between now and the next budget, will a majority Liberal government honour its five-year commitment? After all, commitment, as we saw in 1993, can disappear with the stroke of a pen. If the current minority government still lives and the current political dynamic remains unchanged, will the government get the second year of its promise approved in the face of an anti-American coalition as vocal in its opposition to substantial defence increases as it has been to BMD? Thank you.

Mr. Robert Huebert, Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Calgary: First of all, Senator, may I offer my thanks for hosting and facilitating this type of gathering. The work that the committee has been producing has been outstanding and is probably one of the lone voices in terms of an effort to examine and assess the difficult issues of Canadian defence and security policy. I know your work has been instrumental in inspiring many of our graduate students in terms of the issues that they are looking at ranging all the way from airport security to Maritime security and so forth. In that context, you are to be congratulated.

Part of the reason I wanted Dr. Bercuson to go ahead of me is that I would like to go on the record as saying I am in complete concurrence with his overview in terms of some of the problems that we face for continental defence. I knew that he would be able to speak without me having to necessarily repeat. That allows me to get to the specific issue that I would like to examine and that is Canadian Arctic security.

We face troubling times in regards to Canadian Arctic security because there are several international events, both physical and political, which are gathering steam and will increasingly put Canadian Arctic sovereignty and security at risk. The problem that we face in this particular context is that the problems as they are developing are of an earth-changing magnitude but they are occurring in a time period that has a large degree of variability.

There is a large degree of short-term uncertainty. The type of problems we face range all the way from direct military security problems, which I will get into in a moment, to international sovereignty disputes, to simple law and order security ramifications. Furthermore, what complicates our issue when we face the topic of Arctic security is that each of the necessary solutions is long-term, expensive, and does not have immediate political payoff.

The type of problems we face will not, in some instances, come to the forefront for 20 to 25 years. As I am quite sure the committee is fully aware, the construction of the type of infrastructure and enforcement capability, particularly when it comes to vessels, is 20 to 25 years. In other words, we are talking about a problem that will be of the next generation but needs solutions that begin at this point in time.

What are the major issues? Two driving features are literally changing the face of the Canadian Arctic. The first is climate change, and the second is resource development. The two are interconnected. The major point of climate change and the recent release of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, which more or less eliminated any doubt in terms of the magnitude of the problem, demonstrates that the Arctic, in general, is becoming vastly more accessible.

The estimations are at this point in time that we will see a summertime Arctic ice-free zone between the years 2050 to 2070. This is no longer conjecture. This is no longer speculation but the result of multinational, multiyear and the highest level, scientific examination. There are few naysayers in terms of exactly when this will occur. I would argue that it is really not a question of if, but when.

Related to this, of course, is the resource development of the north. One of the critical points that is being discussed as we speak right next door is a Canadian conference on energy, and specifically, gas supplies. It was noted in that conference, and all the evidence supports it, that Canadians are becoming increasingly dependent on natural gas for energy requirements. It was also noted that our own supplies are vastly over utilized. The same can be said for the Americans, in terms of oil supplies.

The offshore resources of both natural gas and oil off the Mackenzie Delta and the North Slope remain one of the critical North American supplies of this very important energy source. Furthermore, new forms of energy known as hydrates are now also being actively explored.

I can go on and list the rest of the treasure trove that makes up our North to point out, of course, that we have moved in the span of only five years from being a zero diamond producer to being the third largest producer of high quality diamonds in the world. There is a possibility that we may move into the number two rating in the foreseeable future when the third mine comes on line. The bottom line is, the North is becoming more accessible. As it becomes more accessible, the resources are driving a new resource race to utilize them.

What are the issues Canada faces in the context of security? As I said in my introduction, from a theoretical perspective they can be divided into straight security issues, sovereignty issues, and law and order. I would point out to the committee that any realistic effort to try to separate these in terms of different typologies is doomed to fail. The requirements that we face in terms of enforcing Canadian sovereignty are tied into our requirements for Arctic security. Likewise, the type of mechanisms for both enforcement and surveillance for law and order issues will also have a direct relevance to our sovereignty and security issues.

What are the issues facing us today in 2005? Believing that a picture is worth a thousand words, I have provided you with an outline of some of the issues. If you look at the first map that I have provided, you will see that it outlines five major sovereignty and boundary issues that we either currently face or will face in the immediate future.

We still have an ongoing dispute with our American allies over the status of the Northwest Passage. The Americans maintain it is an international strait. We maintain it is internal waters. The issue is one of control. If it is an internal water, we get to say what type of shipping comes in, and under what conditions. If it is an international strait, then the international maritime organizations and the rules under international law will apply to shipping.

We also have a boundary dispute that has recently flared up again with the Americans over the Beaufort Sea extension. There is a triangle. We extend our boundaries straight out. The Americans draw it perpendicular to the flow of their land. Within that triangle are expected substantial oil and gas resources. Two years ago the Americans re-ignited this issue by issuing development licenses, which thankfully for Canada-U.S. relations, were not taken up by industry. As of November this year, the U.S. Department of the Interior once again reissued development licenses within the disputed zone. One of these days a company will take a chance and we will face a diplomatic problem.

We also, of course, have the ongoing dispute with the Danes over Hans Island. I would like to point out that it is something that makes good press coverage. In the overall scheme of affairs it is probably the most minor of the issues that we face but nevertheless is reflective of our overall capability.

Three forthcoming problems that we will face revolve around the delimitation of our continental shelf. Canada, as you are aware, ratified the UN Law of the Sea Convention and as such, we now can apply article 77. Under that article, we can claim a continental shelf under a mix of physical and political identifications. It is my expectation that once we have done the hydrographics necessary, we will find ourselves in dispute with the Danes, the Russians, and the Americans.

The problem that we face is that out of the four countries that are delimitating their northern continental shelf we are by far the furthest behind of the four. The Danes have recently engaged the British to rent one of their nuclear subs to complete their hydrographic services. The Russians, of course, have their submarines engaged. In fact, they have submitted their claim and the Americans, of course, have actively mapped their continental shelf. This issue when we do finally get the science down will be a problem.

In terms of the driving feature, I would also draw your attention to the climate change driver. The second diagram I have provided you with is an observed ice cover. I think this will eliminate any doubt or any naysayers who suggest that this is just some seasonal transformation. That is observed NASA space satellite imagery. You can see for yourself the substantial decrease that exists in terms of ice cover.

The next diagram I have provided is the projected ice extent going from 2010 to 2030, 2040 to 2060, and 2070 to 2090. You will see that we are talking almost a non-existent ice cap. The last diagram I have provided is a simple diagram showing you why the Northwest Passage is, of course, of desirable attention to international shippers.

There are all sorts of technical issues. We can get into some of the challenges facing shippers. The bottom line is that using the Northwest Passage rather than the Panama Canal saves approximately 10,000 kilometres. I would also point out that the Northwest Passage, we know from the voyage of the Manhattan in 1969-1970, can accommodate vessels of at least 120,000 tons, which is approximately 60,000 tons larger than what the Panama Canal can fit.

What are the issues? From a purely military perspective, we will face the recognition that many of the possible ballistic missile threats will follow a transpolar route. If you look at North Korea if, indeed, the Americans are correct on their threat assessment, it will be over the North. Is that a high probability? Not currently. Is it possible? I would argue, yes. There is also the secondary aspect that the Americans believe that is the route. Even if we come to our own strategic analysis that this will never be a threat, we have to recognize they are facing it.

There is the terrorist possibility of entry into our North since it is, of course, the most undefended boundary, as you so rightly pointed out in your own reports. In terms of sovereignty, I have already addressed the issue. All that needs to be said is that it is an issue of control and resources. The third issue is law and order.

Regardless of what happens to each and every one of these boundary issues, the north is becoming more accessible. We will have to deal with more and more people both within Canada and internationally entering the North. That is a fact. That is not an issue of debate. We will have to deal with all the challenges, and I dare say opportunities.

That means three major requirements. I will conclude on this. First, we need a long-term sustainable Arctic strategy. Fortunately, we have seen some suggestions within the two recent throne speeches that this government is actually thinking about developing this course of action and I applaud it. It is something that is necessary, and something that needs to be developed. It has to be forthright, strong, multi-disciplinary and multi-level governments. I dare say it needs to also incorporate the needs and political responsibility of the northern people, both the indigenous and settler population.

Second, we need surveillance capabilities. We need to know what is going on in the North. There is some effort through the development of RADARSAT-2 to give us that facility. As you are aware, we constantly face setbacks in terms of when we launch RADARSAT-2. It is already two years behind schedule. It is fortunately due to Canadian technology that RADARSAT-1 continues to provide us with the information we need. However, one radar system is not sufficient. We need to tie it into other systems.

That also means that ultimately in the long term we will have to deal with updating the north warning system. It has gone so far that when one of the stations burned down, we have not even bothered to replace it, merely allowing us to have more substantial holes in the system.

The third and last is enforcement. This is the long-term issue. Our coast guard fleet as you have so correctly, pointedly, pointed out is, in fact, aging, undercapitalized and much too small for what we need. There needs to be rapid recapitalization and that needs to begin earlier rather than later. We also have to ensure that we have the multi-commitment from various departments to work in the North. No one department represents the North. This is one call for multi-department cooperation that is absolutely required. In conclusion, we face a security and sovereignty problem in the north. We might be able to paper it over in the immediate future, but it is one that most assuredly will become substantially worse before it becomes better. Thank you.

Senator Meighen: I think it fair to say that all of us are particularly pleased that you are here today and particularly pleased by the quality of your presentations. They certainly are both thought-provoking. I do not know where to start, to be honest.

I will start with Dr. Huebert, if I may, with a couple of specific questions, and then perhaps paint with a slightly larger brush when I ask Dr. Bercuson a question or two.

I was a child of the Cold War and was around with the DEW Line and the Pine Tree Line and all that, but I have no knowledge of the Northern Warning System. Can you tell me what it is? Can you tell me also whether you think there is an opportunity here for the military to get involved with the development of UAV's.

Mr. Huebert: Absolutely. The North Warning System was the automation and modernization of the DEW Line. This occurred in 1985 and represented a very important updating of the system.

As you will recall, the strategic threat in 1985 was evolving to the Soviet cruise missile technology. What was recognized within the context of the Distant Early Warning, DEW, Line is that it provided surveillance in terms of bombers and intercontinental ballistic misslies, ICBMs, and any submarine-launched ballistic missiles, SLBMs, that were launched within the region but lower flying threats were more problematic. The DEW Line represented our participation once again with it being on Canadian soil, but also on Alaskan and Greenland soil, of our overall continental commitment to responding to this threat.

We upgraded the system with new technologies. We were able to de-man many of the personnel issues, and the system was a reasonably good technological solution at the time. I must point out that it still continues to be a trip wire. We cannot track. We know when something goes by, but it ends at that point in time.

In terms of your suggestion about unmanned aerial vehicles, UAVs, that is, indeed, one way that Northern Command, for example, is interested in terms of being able to extend its surveillance. There are two problems, however. The first one is, will we have enough for the type of day-to-day surveillance that is necessary. The problem that we face is, how do you balance your domestic requirements for surveillance capabilities with our commitments overseas? The problem that is expected to develop is we simply will not buy enough of them.

It is a technical solution, absolutely. It needs to be tied into the overall surveillance picture. In other words, the intelligence capabilities that we have on the East and West Coasts have to be tied into this system. It could conceivably offer a very good solution particularly, I might point out, since the Aurora aircraft are pretty well not used for northern surveillance overflights.

We went from an average of 18 to 22 until 1990. In 1990, we reduced the sovereignty patrols to about two a year and then from about 1995 it has been usually about one to zero each year. We need something in terms of on spot surveillance and UAVs may, in fact, be the answer.

Senator Meighen: You referred to the hydrographic mapping that is going on by other nations, and the need for us to do likewise. I realize there are limitations to our conventional submarines in their operating capacity under the Arctic ice but could they perform any useful function with regard to hydrographic mapping?

Mr. Huebert: Unfortunately not. Even if we expended the necessary resources for AIP submarine capability, there is no sub commander that will take the risk of putting a non-nuclear sub under ice cover. If you run into an emergency, if there is a problem, you do not have the power capability under the existing technology to punch through the ice. You need the power that you get with nuclear capabilities. It has to be a nuclear-powered sub under the current existing technology and I dare say the technology for the next ten-year window at this point in time.

Senator Meighen: I guess we will have to hope that Arctic warming moves at a faster space so we can keep our hydrographic mapping elsewhere than under the ice cap.

Mr. Huebert: Absolutely.

Senator Meighen: I think we all agree that the coast guard does not guard. Our coasts are vulnerable. Would you see the navy being given solely, perhaps a brown-water and a blue-water role and that the coastal surveillance should be done by the coast guard? If that is the case, should they be armed?

Mr. Huebert: The first response I would have is in terms of capability. The navy, as it stands, has lost most of its Arctic capability. The two recent exercises have been important relearning operations. Narwhal I and Narwhal II represent very important actions. I think one of the major findings of the after-action reports is how difficult operating in ice-covered waters are. If the coast guard has the resources it is an expertise that I dare say is better suited to the coast guard to perform that function.

In terms of being armed, we do not currently face the type of threats that requires us to think about arming our coast guard vessels. We need presence, we need surveillance and we need immediate law-and-order enforcement capabilities in that capacity. I think we can dodge the issue of arming the coast guard, but I would say that the problem is that the coast guard is by far the best trained to be able to facilitate operations in the north. That responsibility should be left with the coast guard, particularly where the ice will remain, and we should give it more capabilities in my assessment.

Senator Meighen: You said the coast guard should have a law-and-order function but it need not be armed?

Mr. Huebert: It needs small arms in that context.

Senator Meighen: You would not put a 50-calibre on the bow anywhere?

Mr. Huebert: No, not at this point in time.

Senator Meighen: Dr. Bercuson, this is an unfair question because it is so broad but somebody has to tackle it. The government is obviously unwilling to do so. We have not had a foreign policy review paper, as you well know. We have not had a defence policy paper that would flow from the foreign policy paper so we are, at least the level of this committee, struggling to come up with a recommendation for Canada's defence and security policy based on our national interests. What are our national interests in broad strokes other than protecting the security, safety and well-being of Canadians?

Mr. Bercuson: I think in our liberal democracy — and I do not mean large “L” — values and interests cross over at many different points. When you talk about the national interests we are talking about national values, or we can talk about serving Canadian pride and Canadian interests, which I think we also do.

I would start with the number-one national interest, which is that we share a border with G1 and all that it implies. The number-two national interest is that 40 per cent of our GDP is earned by trade dollars, most of that to the U.S., and the rest elsewhere.

Third, we need a world that is as open as possible to the free flow of people, ideas, and products across international boundaries.
That is the world that best suits our economic growth potential and allows us to create the kind of standard of living that we enjoy. It supports not only our various welfare systems in this country but also our ability to have properly functioning courts, police systems and so on. In other words, if you take 40 cents out of every dollar that Canadians earn or spend, we can ill-afford many of these things because we are a small country with a very large space.

Our national interests are, in a sense, exactly the same as those that began to emerge in the early 19th century when Canadian political leaders, business leaders and others recognized that if Canada did not trade foreign, we were not going to be able to build a liberal-democratic society in this country. I submit that our national interests have not fundamentally changed since the 1820s and the 1830s — Reciprocity, the Annexation Manifesto of 1849: I can give you a whole history lesson. More specifically, and I will end with this, is that in the Second World War when we were forced by the war to define our national interests very sharply as a nation, we defined them as a more liberal world. I will not say we were instrumental in creating organizations like the World Trade Organization or what it was called at the time, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT, and the International Monetary Fund, IMF, and the rest of these international institutions that were designed to spread the wealth more evenly across the globe. However, it was certainly one of our major national aims to help build those institutions. I think it remains the same.

Senator Nolin: What about the humanitarian rights of other people?

Mr. Bercuson: That is exactly what I meant by free flow of people, ideas, trade and goods. It is a liberal world. I believe and I think we have believed since 1942-43 that democracy is indivisible.

Senator Nolin: Let us go a sentence more. Can we enforce it? Let us say that we have the power to enforce it; what about international laws? Where do we draw the line?

Mr. Bercuson: You have to be realistic about world politics. We had to draw the line when it came to the Cold War, the Soviet Union and all of its satellite countries. We did not, the West did not and the United States did not have the capability of rolling back Communism. It was decided very early in the Cold War by 1946-47 that the main policy would be containment and not a policy of offensive aggression against the Soviet Union. We had to live in a world with them.

There are certain areas of the world where democracy does not exist. I think we need to constantly push for democratization. We, Canada, have a limited capability to force anything on anybody. If we are talking about the Western world, I think that if there is a choice and if the capability exists then, yes, we should attempt to create democracies and liberal societies. I believe that can be done because I believe that once you solve the security problem — that is, you remove the police state apparatuses, the strong men and so on — it seems to me that the natural order of people is that they will want eventually to create a free society for themselves. It may not be the same kind of free society that we have, but it will be something that is not subject to the wiles of dictatorship and violations of human rights. That is simply a belief I have. I cannot prove it.

Senator Nolin: It means we would pursue, as a member of the UN, the proper amendments to the UN charter.

Mr. Bercuson: I am not sure what you mean specifically. Do you mean the ones that came out of the Brahimi report?

Senator Nolin: Yes, some were there. Internationally, in a coalition of democratic countries where we share those values we would be empowered to impose with other free states our values.

Mr. Bercuson: Absolutely, because I believe that some of our fundamental values are that fundamental, the responsibility to protect, which this government strongly endorses.

The problem is that I do not believe the UN mechanism will ever be effective to do that. I think the Brahimi report was a dead letter as soon as it hit the table, partly because members of the Security Council, in general, would not be happy to see the Brahimi report recommendations implemented, I believe. Second, there are too many conflicting national interests to allow that to happen with any degree of regularity. You do what you can. You solve whatever problems you can in the world. You do not have a need to solve everything. In a way it is like enforcement of criminal laws, for example.

Senator Meighen: Due to the time, let me turn to another area. You mentioned, as I understood, that in your view the government will probably have to crawl over broken glass to reconsider its decision on BMD. You may well be right. Leaving aside the politics of the matter, if that is possible for a second, what would be the implications for our defence arrangements with the U.S. of this decision on BMD? Specifically, do you see any particular impact on our role in NORAD when it comes up for renewal for the Bi-National Planning Group and the attempt, as I see it, by that group to fold in maritime and civil defence into the responsibilities of NORAD? Is that something that, by this decision, is now put on hold; unless it is reversed, is it unlikely to come about?

Mr. Bercuson: Given what happened politically with this decision, if the current dynamic in Ottawa remains unchanged a year and a bit from now in May of 2006 when the NORAD renewal comes up, I fear for the NORAD renewal. I also fear for whatever recommendations the Bi-National Planning Group will bring forward.

Let me be very specific. The mandate of the Bi-National Planning Group is to come forward with substantial recommendations to fold in sea and land continental defence in some fashion into the structure or something like the structure that now exists with regard to NORAD. Let us face the facts. What that will mean is American paramountcy over Canadian military forces that are assigned to continental security. That is what it will mean. It cannot possibly mean anything else.

If the government, I will include the official opposition, did not have the guts to show leadership on BMD, which cost us nothing and would have involved us in nothing except a political endorsement, what will they do when the Bi-National Planning Group says we are now going to place certain Canadian maritime forces under overall U.S. command? We are going to arrange certain methods by which U.S. land forces will be able to assist Canadians and Canadians will be able to assist Americans. Obviously, there is a lot more of them than there are us. What will they do when those recommendations hit the table because they will hit the table in about 14 months. That is my fear.

Senator Meighen: It is too bad there are fewer and fewer people who remember the experience during World War II when our forces were largely under the control of British or American commanders.

Mr. Bercuson: It is a fact that our forces are always under someone else's control because they are small. We have learned to live with that since the Boer War. We have done very well under those situations.

When I speak of American paramountcy, I do not mean that an American general will be giving commands to a Canadian colonel. I mean the very top level of the command structure will be very much like NORAD. Canadians will be in the structure, but we will be secondary in the structure because the contributions we will make will be quite small compared to the Americans. That will go for sea and land continental security arrangements, just as it has gone for NORAD since 1958.

Senator Meighen: Finally, Dr. Bercuson, if that came to pass, do you see that as impinging in any substantial way on our ability to participate in multilateral — and by that I mean other nations obviously — NATO-type organizations that might be commanded by the French, Germans or whomever?

Mr. Bercuson: Absolutely not.

Senator Meighen: You are talking about North America?

Mr. Bercuson: I see it as something like the current arrangement in Europe where an American commands United States European Command, USEUCOM, and an American commands NATO, but there is a difference in the two roles regarding the deployment of national forces under that commander. Let us say the Dutch or the Belgians who are integrated into the NATO structure, for purposes of the defence of the NATO perimeter, they were under U.S. command. For purposes of whatever else they want to do in the world, they are perfectly free to do whatever they will do under whatever constraints they have made upon themselves.

Senator Meighen: In furtherance of their own national interests?

Mr. Bercuson: Exactly.

The Chairman: I have a brief question for Professor Huebert. We have proved the hydrocarbons in the Beaufort Sea. It was a Calgary effort. It was Dome, Gulf and Imperial. The situation you described in the Beaufort, right now it is not accessible to commercial shipping and will not be unless you have an icebreaker escort. Once it is available to commercial shipping, then conventional navy ships will also be able to function there quite adequately.

You commented on the U.S. border issue with Alaska. We are not going to resolve that with an icebreaker or even a naval ship. That will be an issue that will be litigated somewhere, but it will be a diplomatic solution of some sort.

I guess the most troubling thing I have with a renewed focus on the North is a resource-allocation question. When you consider all these issues, will you take resources away from the high traffic parts of North America and move them into the Beaufort, which is so remote from the population and so far from the areas that may really be threatened?

Mr. Huebert: To a large degree, you have addressed the central theme of what I was saying in context of the nature of the threat. It is not a pure security-military threat. It crosses over to these other issues where, for example, you point out that it is, indeed, a boundary issue that has to be delimitated.

The point is, in terms of climate change the Beaufort is already the area of one of the most significant melts. We already are seeing the opening in terms of the ability to get there to engage in the various resource development that is now, once again, increasing.

The type of capability that we are talking about for northern sovereignty security, and law and order in the face of increased accessibility, are capabilities that are fungible. In other words, you make a valid point. It ties back to the point I was making in terms of the UAVs. There will be very serious decisions, and there is always the problem of actual resource allocation. As the North becomes more accessible, we do not have an understanding of the type of entries that will come into it. That is where the enforcement and surveillance capabilities become so critical.

Another point, just to make it even more complicated, we are talking about periods when ice may increase in some of these regions. We are talking about a high degree of variability. We may go through three or four years when, rather than witnessing a decreasing ice cover, we may see an increasing ice cover. All these are short-term changes that make the type of question you ask that much more confounding for political leadership.

Senator Forrestall: Professor, I have the answer. There is probably no problem in the North at all for either of you. I have the Halifax Rifles ready to be re-stood and go to work.

Funny, I was just looking at an article written by John Gellner when we opened the northern region establishment at Yellowknife in 1970, late-1960s, in that area somewhere. He makes the same arguments with respect to sovereignty that you have just made some 35 years later. If anything, we have less to assist us there: a smidgen more experience but less than we had even then.

I want to talk about the defence of the Arctic. I want to talk about the mix of whether you see any viability in a restructured Canadian Coast Guard divested of its buoy and tendering services, maintaining perhaps some of its ice breaking capability certainly for the interim period. It is the only branch of government we have with ice breaking capability. You have to retain some of it if you are serious about a maritime or sea defence of the northern border.

Does it make sense to hive off from the Department of Transport the Canadian Coast Guard? I view it with its own statutory authority, perhaps something akin to the legislation that has for so many years served well the role of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. It links the activity of the police force very closely but at the same time gives it that type of autonomy, that type of inner self direction that has made it what it never could have become under direct government control, one of the finest military or police forces in the world.

If we had a coast guard, I do not think just of the Arctic. I think of the Great Lakes, the great rivers of Canada, and the East Coast.

I am looking at economies of scale. The Canadian Reserve Force probably will have to change direction a little bit. I can see no better direction than this type of service role; homeland defence, if you will. Is there any major conflict in your thought, either of you, with respect to pushing in that general direction?

If Senator Banks were with us, as he usually is, I would throw in a couple of the horse regiments from Alberta and those Highlanders from British Columbia. There is a lot of useful work reservists in Canada can do. I see their presence in our Arctic together with a year-round capability. You will recall, without getting into it, I go back with some nostalgia to the work that was done and the dreams that were seen for the Arctic with the presence year-round of what we called in those days a Polar A to Class 8. Could you comment?

Mr. Huebert: I would be hesitant in the current environment to place too high an emphasis on the reserves. I am talking about the 20-year period. The reality is that, as I mentioned previously, ice conditions will still be treacherous. In one regard, when you suggested perhaps moving away from day-to-day buoy activity, that, to a certain degree, is expertise development for the type of capabilities that we need. It is the individual ice capability of the individual sailors that is so critical at this point, in conjunction with the forces.

In terms of using reserve personnel at this point, I would argue that it is probably too dangerous to place them in some of the circumstances because we need people that clearly understand the real vagrancies of ice conditions. It will remain like that for probably about a 20- or 25-year period.

In terms of hiving, should the coast guard be with the Department of Transport, should it be its own, call me a cynic but I really do not see that being the important question. I see the important question as, will we provide it with the necessary resources for the requirements we need? We can leave it with the Department of Fisheries and Oceans or we can put it back with the Department of Transport. It is a question of getting them literally enough hauls that as the time comes when the Louis S. St. Laurent has to be retired, we have enough medium level icebreakers in that 20-year period when it becomes more open, we have that capability. That in my mind is the critical point still.

Senator Forrestall: I think it will be a 20-year period to train and equip that kind of a presence. I was in Svalbard some 30 years ago and watched the face of the ice floe fall into the water. It was one of the Seven Wonders of the World I think. At that site with all their scientific array were Japanese, Chinese, Australians, Americans, and most European countries; 15 or 20 different nationalities. There were probably 40 or 50 universities at that site and able to go there a week in advance and be there in plenty of time to set up and prepare for the timing of that chunk of ice falling off. That is 35 years ago. The 20 or 25 years that you suggest is tomorrow.

Mr. Huebert: You would have to maintain the political will.

Senator Forrestall: Not next year, it is tomorrow in terms of our capacity to do things.

I appreciate that candour. I am trying to find something to do to bring your sites down to where we have eight or ten months ice-free. Does the concept seem to work there? I am trying to find employment basically for the reserves and to a certain degree satisfy our America neighbours that we are trying, with one of our great resources, to provide their country with clean people transiting, just as we expect the rest of the world to provide us with clean people transiting our nation.

Mr. Huebert: It is a possibility. In regard to the reserves, it is the semi-reserves that probably provide you with your best capability. That is, of course, the Canadian Rangers because there have been important strides in expanding the Ranger capability over the last ten years. That, once again, I applaud. Perhaps some form of expansion in that particular capacity in conjunction with southern-based reserves in terms of the necessary training might, in fact, be the route to go that you are suggesting.

Senator Forrestall: Back up north, I was not aware we were down to one, or less than one, sovereignty patrol a year. I think there are some adventuresome squadron commanders around that would go north more often than that. What would constitute in either of your minds significant air surveillance? You will have to impress somebody that Canadians do give a damn about what is going on up there. They are up there every week.

Mr. Huebert: It is beyond just making the symbolic gesture. What we need is the capability of knowing, and then responding. For example, when the Chinese research vessel Xue Long shows up in Tuktoyaktuk and somebody gets it wrong in the Canadian embassy so that we are totally unprepared, we actually have the capability from a combination of air and space assets that we have the necessary RCMP, customs, health officials waiting at Tuk to do the necessary clearance.

In the case of the Xue Long that was a relatively innocent voyage. The Chinese were still not sure why they were coming up there. The Chinese did give us notification. Once we got notification and it was bobbled, we had no independent capability. When the Xue Long showed up at Tuktoyaktuk, it got a deal. It gets down to the ability to actually have those assets so we have a proper intelligence picture of what is going on, so we can then respond to whatever level.

It gets back to Senator Kenny's point, if it is simply having someone from customs there waiting when someone comes ashore, it could be as simple as that. It could be perhaps something more nebulous in terms of the possibility of individuals coming that we do not want. That means an RCMP law-enforcement response. That is really what I am talking about in this context.

Senator Forrestall: I share that because I was, of course, part of the concept of permanent presence waterborne, the capacity to use that seaway.

My son is a veteran ice pilot and he spends a lot of his life in the ice. Transiting the passage now is no great trouble. It would be interesting to see some of the results of the trials of the MV Arctic. I appreciate your comments and observations. I think I agree with the thrust of what you are saying that some form of surveillance must happen. Given my experience, I am sure the experience of anybody who watches and follows it is that 25 years is a very short time. If we wait even half of that to start to prepare, we will be 10 or 15 years late getting there.

Senator Atkins: Dr. Bercuson, on February 7 after you heard the budget and you were scrummed, I am curious what your reaction was in relation to the budget on defence.

Mr. Bercuson: I guess you are referring to February 23?

Senator Atkins: I am sorry, yes.

Mr. Bercuson: I am a sceptic unfortunately. I may say I am a little disturbed by the fact that the Canadian Forces, for example, have repeated the government's rhetoric about this being the greatest infusion of cash, et cetera. I do not think that is the role of the forces.

I have told friends of mine in the forces that it is not their job to be the messengers of a particular political message. Although we have a declared intention, which is certainly better than what we have seen for a long time, of substantially increasing the budget, the way the governmental system in this country works, as you well know, is that we budget from an annual basis. There is no five-year budgeting in this country. We have a $500-million commitment this year. Presumably the government will come back next year with another $600 million.

If I want a business loan and the bank says, we will give you 2 per cent this year and 2 per cent next year, and we will give you a post-dated cheque for 24 months from now, I say, will I start a business on that basis? Of course not, because will you be there in 24 months? Will there be money in the account? Will your priorities change?

Senator Atkins: As you pointed out in your opening comments, the budget is backloaded. Since the budget, we have heard from the expenditure review process that they are about to take back from defence somewhere between $150 million and $200 million. Does that mean we are back down to $300 million?

Mr. Bercuson: I wish I could say what it means. One of the problems I have with defence budgeting in this country, with what is really the most important subset of defence budgeting in this country, which is procurement, planning, and budgeting, is the almost total lack of transparency in what is going on. I think it is virtually impossible for anyone who is not a full-time expert to know exactly from one minute to the next what is being paid for, what is being planned, what programs are long range, which initial expenditures are being made, and where programs are within the process of planning from the initial announcement to the final actual delivery of the item. I could give you example after example of that lack of clarity.

This is not a partisan political statement. That lack of clarity has been there for decades. Unless someone makes a significant effort to clear it up, it will continue to generate more fog than it does anything else. I do not know what it means, quite frankly. I look at what the budget promised and I see there are certain items in there. For example, this year's budget said utility aircraft. What is a utility aircraft? Last year's budget promised fixed-wing search-and-rescue aircraft and clearly they were relating to that category such as the C-27 Spartan twin engine, et cetera, et cetera, and allocated $300 million dollars to it. A lot of people were asking up to two weeks ago what happened to that program. Is this part of that program, or is it not? I can give you more and more examples of the same thing.

The whole process is clouded. I wish I could give you an answer. I do not think more than five people in this country could answer that question.

Senator Atkins: Last year we were waiting to hear what the budget was for helicopters.

Mr. Bercuson: Exactly.

The Chairman: Senator Atkins, do we think it is all part of the long-term security plan of the Canadian Forces?

Mr. Bercuson: If I may say, Senator Kenny, I have a copy here of the Strategic Capability Investment Plan, “Capital Equipment Annex 2004.” The reason I have it is because I am engaged with a couple of very bright researchers from the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary, Mr. Ray Szeto who has a Master’s degree and Mr. Aaron Plamandon who is a Ph.D. student. We are trying to isolate some 38 to 40 commitments that were made between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2004 that involved at least $100 million and were designed to increase the operational capability of the Canadian Forces or improve the administrative capability of the Department of National Defence. We are having a heck of a time trying to track some of these programs down. The Strategic Capability Investment Plan is really a mix of wishes. It is a mix of some things that have already begun. It is a wish for what the military hopes will happen sometime in the future but no one knows if it will happen, and on and on.

The Chairman: I think we were agreeing with you, professor, and I think the problems extend to the National Defence Headquarters in the Pearkes building where the confusion also exists.

Senator Atkins: As I understand it, you are a strong supporter of national defence. What would you see as an ideal budget for this year and for the next two years?

Mr. Bercuson: I think we did not need to have the hockey stick approach to the backloading of the budget. I know that it is being said in certain circles in the Canadian Forces that they could not have used more money. That may be true to a certain extent in the first or second year of this budget process. This is what the slope looks like. I do not really understand why this slope is so slow in the first couple of years. I would like to see a steeper slope than that.

I would also like to see, and this is yet may happen, that once we get a defence review coming out in the next month, some kind of a legislative tie-in between the recommendations that are made in that defence review and budgetary steps. If there is as much of a lock-in or as much of a commitment that you can have with an annual budgeting process, then it would give me some encouragement that what the government says it will do at certain steps along the way that it actually, in fact, will do. Right now it is too loosey-goosey as far as I am concerned. I do not think I can put it any better than that. We do not have a five-year budgeting process. That is all there is to it.

Senator Atkins: As you know, governments are generally motivated by public opinion research. If you ask the question, what are the most important issues facing Canadians today, you would get the economy, health, and education. At the bottom, you might get defence on the radar screen. How do we convince Canadians that this is a leadership issue and that regardless of what their sense is, where their priorities are, we can make it an important issue in the interests of the country?

Mr. Bercuson: There are many groups and organizations in the country that are trying to do just that. There is a public debate over the issue, as there should be. There are opinions that are counter to my opinions. They are perfectly legitimate opinions. I think the problem lies in the fact that we need a government to make a certain decision in a certain time frame, and to then sell that decision to the Canadian people. I have not seen much of that happening. Maybe now it will begin. They have made the commitment. We will see if they follow up on it.

Senator Atkins: You say that BMD would not cost Canadians any money. Are you really sure of that?

Mr. Bercuson: It will not now. It will eventually, absolutely.

Senator Atkins: The last question: The American-European command you talk about, do you think that the Americans in view of our decision are thinking about having an American-Canadian command?

Mr. Bercuson: I do not know what they are thinking because there is probably a great deal of understanding right now in the White House for Mr. Martin's political predicament which is why I think the American response has been very tepid. I think that the problem has been explained as a partisan problem. The statement that was made in the House said “at this time,” and one never knows what other statements are being made to the U.S. government at the highest levels at the moment about any future commitments to BMD.

Senator Atkins: I have one question for Dr. Huebert. You mentioned in your opening comments that the gas supplies are, I do not know whether you said, diminishing. I think Canadians have been under the impression that we have loads of that stuff up there. That is not true?

Mr. Huebert: No. This is one of the core aspects of this conference that is going on literally across the street right now. It is also in the literature that with known resources — of course, you always have to take with a certain grain of salt when we say “known resources,” there is always the ability to push beyond — they are expecting that there will be substantial shortages. The growth that is going on in terms of the increased utilization of natural gas, particularly for energy production, is one of the major drivers. It is also related to home owners switching to natural gas. They are saying that in about nine years we will probably start feeling a major supply crunch in terms of known resources at this point in time.

They are looking to the Mackenzie Delta as one of the most probable locations because once the pipeline is developed, if it goes through, then the infrastructure is in place to develop marginally economically acceptable resources. It will increase in that context but on the assumption that the pipeline does, in fact, go through that we are currently preparing for in the Mackenzie Valley.

Senator Meighen: You and Senator Atkins touched briefly on the question of procurement. Procurement for the Canadian Forces is the biggest dog's breakfast; the most convoluted, the most lengthy, the most misunderstood and totally incomprehensible process that has ever been invented. It is possible this committee might gird its loins and decide to look into that question.

You said that it would require a high degree of expertise. I am fully prepared to admit that I, at least, do not have that expertise. Do you think we could look into it usefully and engage expertise to guide us, or do you think it is something that should be done by a non-parliamentary group?

Mr. Bercuson: I am not trying to butter this committee up but I do not see any such inquiry ever coming out of the other defence inquiry committee. It is simply too partisan an issue. Procurement is as much in this country about politics as it is about providing the military with the best possible stuff at the best possible price. That is number one.

Two, the expertise does exist. Some of it would be Canadian but a lot of it would be outside Canada. Other countries have many of the same problems that we have but their defence budgets are larger than ours. You have a greater pool of expertise working on the problem. Can it ever completely be fixed in a democracy? In peace time, I do not think so. I think we can do a better job than we are doing.

You probably know as many examples of programs that have gone awry as I do. When you see things such as $300 million being thrown away on an M113 life-extension program and now they do not know what to do with the M113s that they have life-extended and you see money put into the Tribal Update and Modernization Project, TRUMP, destroyers and know one of them is tied up and it has been hollowed out and on and on, you say to yourself, that money could have been spent in a better way. I know there is no doubt about it amongst people who know anything about it.

Senator Munson: Professor Huebert, I am really fascinated by your paper this morning. I think you should come to Ottawa with it and I think you should try to sell this in Eastern Canada, the whole idea of the new frontier and the North, because it is a fascinating document that you have presented to us today.

You talked about companies laying claim one of these days in these disputed areas. Is there an international mechanism in place now to resolve this sort of thing? When this does happen, will countries flex their muscle and lay claim to whatever lies in the ground or the ocean?

Mr. Huebert: First, to back up to your first observation, I will be participating in a meeting and it is hoped to have the three northern ministers at it in mid-March — I think it is March 20 to 21 — to look at this whole issue. I think they have done a very good job. I think it is being spearheaded by the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs precisely to discuss this factor, so there are movements in that regard.

In terms of mechanism, theoretically you can take this to the International Court of Justice. One of the interesting things about international politics is never look for consistency. Maybe if you want to be a cook go there, but in terms of the Canadian-U.S. positions, our positions were exact mirror images. When it came to the Gulf of Maine, we used the perpendicular principle and the Americans used the extension-of-natural-land progression. Now, it is reversed in terms of the Beaufort Sea.

I think there is a general dissatisfaction with what the International Court of Justice came out with vis-à-vis the Gulf of Maine, and I see a real reluctance from both Canadian and American officials to go that route. What I suspect will happen is that we will probably try to ignore the issue. We probably will try not to bring it to a head.

The problem I see, though, obviously the highest levels are giving permission to the U.S. Department of Interior to once again re-ignite the issue. This may be a political ploy. They may simply be leaving their marker. That is a possibility. In fact, this may be in conjunction with the overall American strategy towards having domestic energy security. It could be tied into that. There are no indications whether it is a minor little flare-up or part of a larger plan. That is not at all clear.

Theoretically there are mechanisms under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, but as the committee is aware, the Americans have not ratified the convention. There are signs that they are moving in that direction, but I seriously doubt that we would avail ourselves, or the Americans would avail themselves, of the five or so instruments that the convention provides for the adjudication of conflicts. At this point, it will be an ad hoc internal negotiating process, not an international body, that adjudicates it.

Senator Munson: Very briefly to Dr. Bercuson, does multilateralism conflict with our closer relationship with the United States?

Mr. Bercuson: I think we are all multilateralists to a certain degree. How multilateral we are at any given time depends very much on the lineup of the stars politically under international circumstances. It should not contradict our relationship with the United States, but our relationship with the United States is too important to allow a vision of multilateralism, in my view, to impede the reality of the everyday cross-border ongoing relationship we have with G1 in a zillion different ways.

Senator Cordy: I am from Halifax which is a navy town, so the navy is extremely important to the people who live there. Dr. Huebert, with the information that you have given us on the changes in the North — certainly we have read and heard information about that in the past, but you have presented it in a very succinct manner this morning — will we need a different navy? Keeping in mind defence of North America, changes to the north and opening up the north, do you see changes that will have to be made?

Mr. Huebert: For the next generation the vessels, I would say it probably requires minimal changes in the context of the navy. We should have some of our new units coming on line, and whatever combination we decide on for the new re-supply vessel should have icebreaking capability. This is currently in the specs. In other words, before we got into this whole debate about having more Wasp or amphibious capability, the replacement for the Provider and Protector, et cetera, were, in fact, to be given ice strengthened capabilities. That would give us at least marginal capability as the ice recedes.

In the long term, what it means is probably a greater expansion of ice capability because we will always retain some ice in the Arctic. What is going to change is we are going to go from multi-year ice to single-year ice. As it becomes more accessible, as we deal with more and more people entering the North, that is the type of capability.

Should it be a major focus? At this point, I would say no. In 20 to 30 years, it still should not be a major component; but it should be one of the capabilities that it becomes inherent in the construction of the vessels, very much along the lines of what the Danes have done with their newest frigates. They have given them ice-strengthened capability. That is not their major raison d'être. It does give them the capability of going as far north as Hans Island; whereas, our ships would have incredible difficulty as they are currently configured: so addition, yes; replacement, no.

Senator Cordy: I am glad to hear that you are speaking to three federal government departments in the future. When you look at the opening up of the North, there will be a lot of government departments affected by the opening up and the accessibility of the North to whomever and whatever, considering our lack of security in that area. How do you see all the departments coming together? Currently, I think the department is the Department of Northern Affairs but I do not think it was ever intended to deal with the types of issues that you are talking about. Do you foresee one department overseeing it all, or do you see all government departments coming together and working together?

Mr. Huebert: There was a rumour circulating about six months ago about a possible reorganization of northern departments into a department that was specifically dedicated to sovereignty and security issues. That was downgraded in the throne speech to having a sort of focal point.

The ideal would be to have almost a mini-department in this capacity. The problem is, would it become toothless in the capacity of resources?

What we truly need is an over-arching Arctic strategy that very clearly sets out the delineation of what we need to do and how to proceed. Unfortunately, I am a cynic enough to recognize that what will actually drive us is one of the periodical crises that we have in the north. In other words, if you look historically all the way back from the second world war actually where we really get our act together in terms of having a coherent strategy in the North is always in response to the actions of the others who are coming on the inside.

In terms of the inter-department cooperation, it even goes beyond the departments because, of course, you have to involve the territorial governments. You also have to involve the various land-claim agreements because they also pertain to the issues overall, and you have to involve the people. It gets further complicated because there is, of course, the legal difference between a territory and a province.

Under Canada's Oceans Act, provinces have the right over internal waters. If the Northwest Passage was ever successfully established as an internal water, there is a very real question. Does that mean then that it comes under the jurisdiction of the three northern territories? Territories are not covered under the Oceans Act, so I do not know the answer to that. It is an interesting thought in terms of actual management.

Senator Cordy: Are the processes being started at all?

Mr. Huebert: The territories are very interested. I know from personal involvement with the officials, they are looking at this issue very closely because they are seeing the change. They are trying to get prepared. It comes down to resources again, and how much they are being supported.

Senator Cordy: Dr. Bercuson, in your speech to us this morning, you talked about ballistic missile defence. I guess that decision has been made. Whether or not we come back to it is another story. Are we, as Canadians, contributing to the defence of North America. Since 9/11, what we have been hearing over and over again is that we cannot just be concerned about our country. We have to be concerned about North America as a unit. Are we doing our share?

Mr. Bercuson: It is hard to say what doing our share means because there is no objective measure of what our share is. Clearly, we are doing more. We are doing a lot more on the non-military side. We are doing a lot more on the security side, working more closely with the United States in areas such as border clearances, customs, port security and so on. Whether it is adequate by their measure or by ours is another story.

I think that the government, by promising to increase Canadian military capability, is promising in a sense to increase our military contribution to North American security. In the actual amount of the assets that we bring to the table, for example, the diminishment of the CF-18 fleet, detracts from our ability to help with continental defence. The long and the short of it is, I do not know what is adequate.

I think what is adequate is, if a Canadian government can say we are doing the best we can, and the Americans then feel that we are doing the best we can, that is a very loose measurement but I think it is the only one we have ever used since the end of the Second World War.

The Chairman: Before we bring the session to a conclusion, I would like to take this opportunity to thank Professor Bercuson for the work that is being done by the Security and Defence Forum. There are people in this room who have written papers for us. We have been receiving the papers. The committee is in the process of analyzing them. We are grateful to you for coming up with the suggestion in the first place, and then helping us organize and connect with it. It is proving to be a valuable resource for the committee. I wanted to publicly acknowledge that the genesis was here in Calgary, and you then invited us to a conference so that we could talk about it directly with people. Thank you very much. It has been helpful and we are grateful.

As for this panel, we are pleased that you could come before us. You have brought forward timely and useful issues that clearly have captured the imagination of members of the committee. We appreciate your assistance in helping us move forward with the defence policy review. We are grateful for your contribution to that work.

The committee adjourned.

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