Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
Foreign Affairs
Issue 29 - Evidence
OTTAWA, Wednesday, April 9, 1997
The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs met this day at 3:23 p.m. to examine and report on the growing importance of the Asia Pacific region for Canada, with emphasis on the upcoming Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) conference to be held in Vancouver in the fall of 1997, Canada's Year of the Asia Pacific.
Senator John B. Stewart (Chairman) in the Chair.
[English]
The Chairman: Honourable Senators, during the last few months, we have been examining Canada's relations with the Asia Pacific. One of the principal topics that has concerned the committee is human rights. This afternoon, we have a witness who I think will be very helpful to the committee, Dr. Amitav Acharya.
Dr. Acharya is Associate Professor in the Department of Science at York University, and he is also the Associate Director of the University of Toronto -- York University Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies.
Dr. Acharya was born in India. He received a Master's degree in Political Science in that country. In 1987, he was awarded the degree of Doctor of Philosophy from Murdoch University in Perth, Australia.
He began his professional career as a Fellow of the Institute of Southeast Asia Studies in Singapore during the 1987-89 period. From the 1990-92 period, he was a lecturer in the Department of Political Science in the National University of Singapore.
Dr. Acharya is a specialist in international relations. His research focuses on the politics and international relations of Southeast Asia and the Asia Pacific region. He has written many monographs and articles. I am told that he is a real authority on the whole question of human rights. As a forward to his presentation, I will ask him to say a word or two on why he personally is interested in this topic, and then perhaps he could proceed to the main part of his presentation.
Please proceed, Dr. Acharya.
Mr. Amitav Acharya, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science at York University, Toronto; Associate Director of the University of Toronto-York University Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies: Honourable senators, it is a great pleasure for me to appear before this committee to present my views on human rights in Asia.
As the chairman pointed out, I am the Associate Director of the Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies between University of Toronto and York University. We at the Joint Centre are very interested in human rights and democracy issues in Asia. In fact, on May 16-17 of this year, which is the year of Asia Pacific, my centre is organizing a major international conference on human rights and democracy which brings together scholars and policy makers from Canada, the United States, China, Indonesia, Thailand, India, Singapore and several other countries.
If you are interested in attending the conference, I extend you a warm welcome. This is funded by the federal government, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and it is open to anyone who is interested.
First, I will address the question Senator Stewart put to me about why am I interested in human rights. After that, I will make a set of initial comments focusing on the human rights debate in Asia, and I mean debate. I will not tell you about the human rights situation in individual countries. For that, you must rely on Amnesty International, Asia Watch and many Canadian NGOs which monitor these issues much more closely than I do, although I read their reports.
There is a debate going on in Asia about the meaning of human rights, whether human rights are universal, whether they are culturally specific, whether rights to economic development are more important than civil liberties or political and civil rights, whether human rights are helpful or detrimental to economic development, and does economic development promote human rights as a matter of course. Finally, is international pressure, such as the Canadian government's role in promoting human rights, really useful, effective and helpful?
A whole range of issues are debated in Asia, but I do not think anyone has reached a definite conclusion. I would like to alert you to this debate which I believe will be extremely important to any foreign relation of Canadian policy towards this region.
Let me begin with the question of why am I interested in human rights. In fact, I must confess that I am quite late in studying this issue. I began my career as a student of international relations, looking primarily at the development of multilateral institutions, the United Nations and regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. In fact, much of my professional reputation is built on my work on the role of ASEAN. However, I became increasingly aware and convinced that you cannot study foreign policy, international relations and multilateralism just by looking at issues of security, military security, or the issue of what states talk to each other about.
You cannot study foreign policy by looking at economic transactions, trade and investment. In a sense, international relations theory tells us that human rights or human rights questions are internal to a state. They are the internal affairs of a state, and since we still live in a world where the principle of state sovereignty is considered sacred, we are not supposed to study human rights issues. However, the world is changing. Today, almost any major foreign policy issue, whether it is facing Canada or any government, does have an underlying human rights component as well as the related issue of democracy.
What goes on between these states and the violation of human rights by governments of their own citizens is closely linked to the foreign policy, the international position and the standing of that state. Therefore, as an international relations scholar, I cannot ignore questions of human rights and democracy. I also found that as a student of multilateral institutions.
As you know, Canada is an active player in Asia Pacific institution-building. It is a founding member of two of the most recent and most prominent regional multilateral institutions. The first one is the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation group, or APEC. Its annual summit meeting will be held this year in Canada. The other institution is the ASEAN Regional Forum, which deals with security issues.
Canada has played a major role in the promotion and the building of these institutions, particularly the ASEAN Regional Forum. It is a leading player, not a player in the sense of forcing countries to join these institutions, but providing ideas and a mediating role in these institutions. The very first meeting of the ARF was held in Bangkok in 1984. I monitored it very closely. The whole meeting threatened to unravel over the question of Burma. Countries such as Australia, Canada, the United States and the European Union, all of which are members of the ARF, had a major fight with the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, which is the driving force behind the ARF. The fight was over the question whether Burma should be isolated for its continued violation of human rights or should the neighbours of Burma and the international community play the role of "constructive engagement". That term is similar to the policy that the United States and Britain pursued in relation to South Africa in the era of apartheid. The whole air of the meeting was threatened by this issue.
We have noticed that when the ASEAN Regional Forum meets every year, this issue of Burma is raised. In July of this year, the ARF will hold its meeting in Kuala Lumpur, and you will find that there will be another major fight. ASEAN is inviting Burma to become a member of the association, and some countries find this very unsavoury because of the reputation of its regime.
I cannot study ASEAN, Canadian foreign policy interests and multilateral institutions without looking at human rights. I am professionally interested.
Luckily, I have never suffered human rights abuses myself, but I have been associated with people who have. If you teach at a university in Toronto, a city considered to be one of the most multicultural cities in the world, you find refugees and victims of human rights abuses from all over the world. In fact, one of my second-year students is a member of the government in exile of Burma. He was operating for 10 years on the Thai-Burma border before he sought asylum in Canada. I hear their stories and they come to me.
In studying international relations, of course, human rights has to be very important. These are some of the background issues. I wrote this report in my role as a consultant to the Canadian International Development Agency, to help them think their way through the human rights situation in Asia.
Asia is a very important part of the world when it comes to human rights issues. There is no shortage of bad news about the human rights situation in Asia. Most of you are familiar with this debate. In fact, of the many Nobel Peace Prizes that have been awarded on the question of human rights, three have been won in the Asia region: the Dalai lama; Aung San Suu Kyi, who is the leader of the opposition in Burma, and most recently; and Hose Ramos-Horta and Carlos Belo of East Timor. That in itself says that Asia in general, and Southeast Asia in particular, is a region of the world which merits attention. The situation in East Timor and the situation in Burma makes these key areas of the world when you look at human rights violations.
Thousands of people actually are killed because of human rights abuses. Therefore, whether it is domestic politics, foreign development assistance, or international relations, one cannot look at these without studying human rights and paying attention to human rights.
Let me move very quickly to three or four themes I would like to address before I take questions from the floor.
First, as I pointed out, there is a debate going on in Asia today about the meaning of human rights. Those of us living in the West take human rights for granted. We think it is a universal concept, that human rights are rights that every human being is entitled to by virtue of simply being human. There are no exceptions.
However, in Asia, as Asian economies prosper, there is a view that human rights are not as universal as they are made out to be. After all, Western countries drafted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reflecting their preferences and their ideals. Now that we live in a much larger, complex international system, maybe one should think of human rights in terms of one's own cultural beliefs, one's own political system and one's own level of socio-economic development.
Asian countries argue that human rights are communitarian in the sense that the interests of society stand above the interests of the individual. They do not like the emphasis which is placed on individual liberty in many Western societies.
More than that, governments believe that political stability and economic growth justify restrictions on human rights. While it may be okay for countries such as Canada or the United States -- the developed countries -- to observe human rights norms as they are defined in the Universal Declaration, countries which are still developing and which are still very unstable from within must place some limitations on human rights in order to maintain economic growth and political stability.
Some government leaders have even gone to the extent of saying that democracy is inimical to development. Others have asserted the primacy of economic rights, such as the right to development over civil and political rights.
The Asian view on human rights -- and the "Asian view" here means views held by Asian governments -- has been challenged not just by Western commentators but also by sections of their own societies, especially NGOs in their own societies. In general, human rights NGOs in Asia, particularly in Southeast Asia, which is the region I am more familiar with, are weak and subject to strict government control. Although we have very active NGOs in countries such as Thailand, the Philippines or India, the power of the NGOs to organize is very limited in countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia or Brunei and the like and, of course, China and Vietnam. Whatever their relative influence or status may be, they have rejected the Asian view on human rights propounded by their own governments.
The problem is that the NGO community is not only weak in terms of organization, but many of the NGOs in Asia are very dependent on financial support from the West; therefore, their governments find it easy to discredit them. In an area where nationalism is still a very strong force in politics, if you depend for your activities on foreign donors, whether they are foreign government agencies like CIDA or whether they are foreign NGOs, it is easy to discredit you by saying that you are an agent of foreign influence and therefore a liability. Nonetheless, I believe in the years to come that NGOs will be increasingly active in defining the parameters of the human rights debate.
One of the most interesting developments in Asia today is the growth of a regional network of human rights. For example, in countries which do not have a strong NGO community because of government restrictions, their neighbouring states are taking up the issue of human rights violations in their own countries. A good example is that when a group of ASEAN NGOs organized an international conference on East Timor in Malaysia. This conference could not be held in Indonesia, of course, because Indonesian NGOs are very weak and the state is very strong. The first meeting was held in the Philippines, which is a more open system, and the second meeting was supposed to be held in Malaysia, although a political group associated with the Malaysian ruling party physically broke up the meeting by stopping the whole effort. Several people were arrested.
The regionalization of the NGO community is very interesting. For example, NGOs in Thailand are not only concerned about what is happening in Thailand, but they are also very concerned about the question of human rights abuses in Burma and in Cambodia and environmental degradation in Cambodia, Laos and Burma. They are very active regionally.
Let me go quickly to the situation in Burma and the situation in East Timor.
Burma is called Myanmar these days by the government, although the leader of the opposition does not accept Myanmar as the official name of Burma. Aung San Suu Kyi calls Burma as Burma. This country has been a major source of international concern, including Canadian concern, about human rights and democratic change.
The crisis in Burma is due to the refusal of the Burmese military to hand over power to the duly-elected representatives and the continuing repression of pro-democracy activists who are demanding transfer of power to the elected civilian government. Although the leader of democratic forces, Aung San Suu Kyi, has been released from house arrest, that is only a formality. She is, in reality, still surrounded by security forces and her political role has been limited. She is actually, in a sense, under virtual house arrest.
The State Law and Order Restoration Committee, which is called the SLORC, has imposed increasing restrictions on her movements. The SLORC has adopted a strategy of wearing down the pro-democracy activists.
The SLORC is doing something that you should be very aware of. While suppressing human rights, civil liberties and refusing to hand over power to the elected representatives of the people, the SLORC has adopted a very pro-market economic strategy -- a new investment code to attract foreign investment. As a result, foreign investment is pouring in from neighbouring countries and also from the West.
The hope of the SLORC is that over a period of time, as investments come in and economic growth takes off, people will forget about human rights, much in the same way as we see in China. In the case of China, its attraction as a destination of foreign investment because of the size of the Chinese market and its attraction as an economic power has led many Western countries to forget about human rights somewhat and emphasize trade and economic relations.
Burma is saying this is a great strategy. All that we need to do is to come up with a new investment code, a liberalized economy and invite foreign multinationals. As they come in, people will not pay much attention to human rights.
In fact, unfortunately, I must say this strategy is succeeding. To this day, the Burmese economy has achieved admirable economic growth. This is the year of tourism in Burma and the "Visit Burma Year". It seems like the human rights agenda has been put on the back burner, except within Burma itself, where Aung San Suu Kyi continues to call for the boycott of Burma and leads the opposition movement.
The United States government recently imposed a ban on visits by officials of the Burmese government to the United States for any reason, and that has made some difference. It is a concrete step. Several counties and metropolitan governments in the United States, such as the metropolitan government of Berkeley, have imposed a ban on any trading activities with Burma by companies located in that area.
There has been an international campaign to boycott companies which deal with Burma. As a result, some of the multinationals have been forced to pull out of Burma.
East Timor has been much in the news all year because two of the East Timor leaders, Hose Ramos-Horta and Bishop Carlos Belo, were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for 1996.Ramos-Horta actually visited Vancouver last month as part of a North American tour. He called for the self-determination of East Timor.
The East Timor situation is complex. It is not just a human rights situation; it is also a question of self-determination. The status of East Timor as a former Portuguese colony is something that has not been finally settled. The Indonesian government invaded East Timor and incorporated it as one of its provinces, and the former colonial marshal of Portugal has refused to recognize Indonesian sovereignty, as has the United Nations. The European Union, because Portugal is a member of the EEU, has maintained some sort of pressure on Indonesia. The question of self-determination remains undecided.
In the meantime, the heavy presence of Indonesian military forces in East Timor and incidents like the Dili massacre of 1991 have attracted attention to the human rights abuses.
What is very interesting is that the East Timorese are very divided about whether to integrate with Indonesia or whether to declare independence. An integrationist camp thinks it is okay to be part of Indonesia, and another group thinks no, they will have nothing to do with Indonesia. Both sides agree that it would be better if the Indonesian military presence in the region, and prospects for any human rights violations thereof, were eliminated, and that even if East Timor remains part of Indonesia, it must be free from the kind of abuses that have gone on for a long time in the province.
There is one other issue that you may be interested in, and this is the question of labour rights.
Labour organizations in the West argue that Asian governments gain an unfair competitive advantage by keeping wages artificially low and denying the rights of their workers to organize labour unions and engage in collective bargaining. I should know because my university is on strike over collective bargaining.
The pressure of the Western trade unions, especially the AFL-CIO on the American government and the Clinton administration, have led Western governments to push for what they call a "social clause" in the negotiations within the framework of the World Trade Organization. The idea of the social clause is to institute a core group of labour rights: minimum wages, restrictions such as a ban on child labour, and the right to organize trade unions.
The United States and other Western governments want the WTO to deal with these issues and create a provision where these issues can be discussed and, in fact, made part of international trade negotiations on a regular basis. However, at the recently concluded meeting of the WTO in Singapore, the Asian governments strongly, and I believe successfully, opposed any such clause being inserted into the WTO framework.
This is not an issue that will go away. This is something that Canada, among other countries, will have to deal with in any future trade negotiations.
I told you earlier that the reason why the issue of human rights is important is because it is not just a domestic issue for the country where the violations are taking place; it also affects international cooperation. Canada's involvement in the ASEAN Regional Forum or the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation group is undermined if human rights becomes a very contentious issue. These are multilateral organizations designed to promote free trade and regional stability. Security and prosperity are the main goals of these institutions. If human rights issues continue to disrupt the spirit of regional cooperation in these institutions, Canada will be a loser.
As you know, Canada is not a big player in Asia by virtue of military strength or economic power. It is not a super power. Canada cannot unilaterally make a difference to the policies of ASEAN countries, whether in relation to security, human rights or trade, but Canada can act better if it goes to multilateral institutions. Canada can influence regional stability and regional trade relationships better if it promotes the concept and practice of regionalism. That is the logic behind Canada's deep engagement in both APEC and ARF.
However, there is time to think about what should be the shape of Canadian policy. Quite frankly, I do not know what is the philosophy or the basic framework underlying Canadian policy on human rights. It is driven partially by episodes. When the Indonesia forces shoot down demonstrators in East Timor, the Canadian government comes down with condemnation. When Chinese forces crack down on demonstrations in Tiananmen Square, we break off economic ties and political relations are strained.
These episode-driven policies, however, are not adequate. What is needed, I believe, is a more sustained, continuous, "normal" discourse and dialogue on human rights. Instead of waiting for crisis situations to happen, it is better to maintain continuous dialogue and make them appear as if they are part of the normal course of diplomatic interaction, both bilateral and multilateral, that Canada maintains with the regional countries.
It is true that Asian governments resent any open criticism and pressure from Western governments over human rights issues. Several leaders of Asian governments have told me in my interviews that they do not mind a country like Canada talking to them about human rights as long as it is quiet. The question for us is how quiet is quiet? Is it so quiet that no one knows about it? If so, how can we believe that anything significant is going on there?
Let me draw a parallel with the policy of constructive engagement that is the official policy of ASEAN towards Burma. In fact, some people use the same term to describe many Western government policies towards China and the policy of constructive engagement that the United States pursued in relation to South Africa.
The South African regime under apartheid was internationally isolated. A policy of constructive engagement was championed by the Reagan administration and Margaret Thatcher in Britain. However, what brought about political freedom in South Africa and the end of apartheid is not constructive engagement but sustained, multilateral, economic sanctions.
I read an article recently by Bishop Desmond Tutu where he compared the situation in Burma and the situation in South Africa under apartheid. He rejected the view that the policy of constructive engagement is what brought about the end of apartheid in South Africa. He said that we would probably still have an apartheid regime had it not been for sustained and increasing economic pressure. He advocated that something similar should be done about Burma.
Now, the countries of ASEAN, which include Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, Brunei and Vietnam, believe in constructive engagement, although I must point out that they are not quite united on this. Some countries believe more in constructive engagement than others. Some countries advocate sanctions.
Some countries advocate at least a diplomatic boycott of Burma. Their logic is that if you deal with the government economically, if you encourage political stability and economic growth, over a period of time this will bring about an improvement in human rights, much in the same way as some commentators say that it is better to engage China economically so that if Chinese living standards increase, there will be more democracy and freedom.
My view is somewhat in between. I do not think economic growth and development bring about human rights and democracy on their own. They may facilitate conditions for human rights and democracy, but this needs to be pushed.
The issue of human rights and democracy must not be forgotten in the agenda of international relations. Otherwise, the governments who are not allowing human rights or democratic transition in those countries will become complacent. They will see no need to do anything about it. Therefore, constructive engagement may be useful, provided it comes with an active policy of engagement, and that engagement cannot be absolutely quiet. There have to be some deliverable, identifiable goals.
I have no problem with governments talking behind closed doors. However, at the end of the day, there must be some deliverables. There must be some defined goals and principles that one uses to measure progress in terms of human rights. I do not see that happening in the policy of constructive engagement in relation to either Burma or China.
While every country has a right to advance its economic interests, they should not be and cannot be delinked from a concern for human rights. Political instability resulting from suppression of human rights has the potential to undermine economic prosperity of Asian countries, as well as Western countries, because once the economic prosperity of Asian countries is undermined, countries such as Canada lose the opportunity to exploit those opportunities.
I conclude my presentation by quoting from Aung San Suu Kyi, who is the leader of the opposition in Burma: These days when economics and politics are closely linked, those who are involved economically can hardly avoid being more positive in bringing about the necessary changes. Economic growth without political change could be quite short-lived and could be quite counter-productive.
I will stop here and welcome your questions.
Senator Carney: Thank you for your presentation.
There are three areas I would ask you to clarify. One of them is where you say that Canada has more influence through multinational institutions than we do on our own. I think we have heard that line of argument consistently through these hearings. You suggest we can be more influential in the multilateral institutions.
We have been told that we are not properly represented on multilateral institutions, that Canada's share of the desks or seats or positions is not proportionate to our contribution. Do you agree with that?
Second, if that is the case, how does that support your argument that we are more influential in the multilateral institutions? If we are not at the table, how can we be effective?
Mr. Acharya: What I meant by that statement is that it is relative to bilateral contacts. Canada could actually use its membership of regional multilateral institutions to promote human rights in a more constructive and probably productive way.
Senator Carney: We are not represented properly on institutions such as the Asian Bank, so could you be specific? If we do not have the positions, we are not in a position to influence. How do we translate that influence when we do not hold proportional roles in the institutions?
Mr. Acharya: The two multilateral institutions I am most concerned with are the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation and the ASEAN Regional Forum. Canada is represented exactly the same way as the United States. These is basically one vote for one country, and these operate on the basis of consensus.
I am not talking about global multilateral institutions such as the World Bank or even regional financial institutions such as the Asian Development Bank.
A lot of the concern about human rights today is reflected in these new multilateral institutions. The ASEAN Regional Forum has debated Burma over a long period of time, and Canada's representation there is the same as any other countries.
Senator Carney: When you talked about institutions, I took you to mean institutions other than APEC and other groups, so that clarifies that.
Second, could you clarify your view about Canada's inconsistency in applying pressure on human rights? You made the point that we have acted sharply in areas such as Indonesia, but that in the case of China, we have not been as clear in defining our human rights objectives. You have made the point that there should be a middle way. You support the idea that we cannot ignore human rights and should push it along, but does that not contribute to this image of inconsistency in our approach to human rights?
Mr. Acharya: I agree with you that there has been some inconsistency. If you compare policies towards China, policies towards Burma and policies towards Indonesia, they are not quite the same. Canada has come down very hard on Burma compared to maybe China. I am not talking about the immediate post-Tiananmen situation but the subsequent phase.
Canada was one of the two countries which either threatened or actually cut off development assistance to Indonesia after the Dili shooting in East Timor in 1991. The point I am trying to make is, in my view, consistency does not mean reacting to episodes. Consistency means maintaining a regular dialogue and making human rights a normal part of your diplomatic activity rather than something you do when there is a major shooting incident or demonstrations. I think that is where more work needs to be done.
Senator Carney: Do you think criteria can be developed if we are looking for more consistency? We are looking for advice in terms of reporting on this. Do you think consistent criteria can be developed for assessing the amount of pressure that should be exerted by Canada in this area, or do you think it has to be done on an ad hoc basis?
Mr. Acharya: Yes, I believe one could develop such criteria. First, you are talking about not just pressure but also about dialogue. Pressure here means economic sanctions or the threat of economic political sanctions.
Dialogue means continuous engagement, not only with the government, but also with other elements of civil society within the state and making Canadian concerns known at every possible opportunity.
One criterion I could suggest is that whenever there is a meeting at the highest level, such as the foreign minister's level, the leader's level, or even at the bureaucratic level, human rights concerns should be made known to the government which we see as not having a very good record on human rights.
Sometimes human rights issues are not even raised in some of these meetings. There is a perception -- and I do not know how true this is because I am not privy to meetings between Canadian government officials and some of the Asian governments -- that some of the meetings in the recent past have not even touched on human rights, whether they are at the highest level or at the junior level. I think that would be one.
Another one would be to develop a consistent set of principles to promote civil society and devote development assistance to those elements of civil society which are most likely to champion human rights.
The perception I have today is that human rights issues become important only if there is a major incident, and they fade into the background when life is normal and there is no major shooting. That is not very healthy because that puts governments in the region on the spot when there is a crisis and makes them complacent when there is no crisis.
Senator Carney: Mr. Chair, knowing your interest in civil society, you or other senators may wish to follow up with the witness on that.
In the context of what you have been saying, Dr. Acharya, what can the Canadian government, as chair of the APEC summit this year and as manager of the APEC agenda, do to encourage APEC governments to protect human rights and strengthen the rule of law, knowing that it cannot, we have been advised, be addressed directly? What can it do at the APEC meeting?
Mr. Acharya: APEC is a very new institution and many people are convinced that it will last. Not everyone has taken APEC for granted. As you correctly pointed out, it is very difficult to introduce human rights as part of the agenda of APEC, but nothing prevents the government of Canada from doing it in other ways. For example, one of the ideas I have in mind is that there could be a human rights conference, not an intergovernmental conference, but something we call Track II.
Senator Carney: An NGO conference?
Mr. Acharya: I would not call it entirely an NGO conference. We have this term "Track Two", which involves government officials in their private capacity, academic institutions and think-tanks, and members of active NGOs who could gather together. We have a great tradition in relation to security issues where we have meetings hosted by academic institutions. They invite NGOs and representatives of business. As well, they invite government officials but only in their private capacity, and they have a free discussion about those issues.
Such a meeting could be held a month or two prior to the APEC summit and human rights could be discussed. It does not have to be held in Canada. It could be held in another APEC member country, such as Japan or Indonesia.
The Chairman: I should like to explore the foundations of the position which you are now enunciating. You mentioned initially that there are those who say that what is important for some of these countries at this stage in their history is economic prosperity and domestic peace, in the old English sense of the justice of the peace, and that one must not bring in ideas of human rights prematurely which might jeopardize the peace and prosperity of these societies.
If you go back to the history of England, for example, it can well be argued that peace and then prosperity came long before people started talking about civil rights, if they use that term in England to this day. The rights of man, which I suspect is the antecedent of human rights, is a concept going back all the way to 1789 and the French Revolution. That is where you find the concept formulated.
Using that as an example, what is wrong with the position taken by thoughtful people in some of these countries that, despite their good intentions, what the advocates of human rights are likely to bring about is poverty and anarchy?
Mr. Acharya: Two things are wrong with this policy, if I may put it very bluntly. First, when countries such as England, the United States and European countries were going through a comparable stage in their economic development at a time when they emphasized peace and stability over human rights, they were living in an international environment where no one cared about human rights. The international norm of human rights was not there.
Today, Asian governments make the same point that you are making. They say, we are new states. We have had about 40 or 50 years of independent existence. European countries have existed for centuries. They have had their own fights and wars. They went through a lot of turmoil. There were no human rights then. Who are they to tell us to observe human rights which they learned to observe after centuries of evolution?
My answer to that is that the world has changed. We have international norms and standards of behaviour which are very different from the kind of behavioural norms that we had in the 17th and 18th centuries. International human rights today is an accepted norm of international politics and, therefore, I think one can learn it much faster. One should try to adapt to it much faster.
My more important concern is that I do not think there is a negative correlation between human rights and prosperity. Until recently, people used to say look at Southeast Asia. Singapore has done very well. It is economically prosperous partly because of a kind of soft totalitarianism. The leaders of Singapore used to say look at India; look at the Philippines. They have a lot of civil liberties, but, economically, they are left far behind Singapore.
Today we see that the Philippines has a vibrant democracy and has almost comparable economic growth as its more successful ASEAN neighbours. Under Ramos, it has both democracy and development. Similarly, India has done very well in terms of economic development while allowing democracy. It is very difficult, therefore, to sustain the proposition that by allowing human rights, you somehow undermine economic development. It is true that countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore did attain considerable economic growth at a time when the governments were totalitarian, but that may not be a universal paradigm. As the case of the Philippines shows today, you can have a very open political system and you can also have a very vibrant economic dynamic.
Even if I concede your point that it is necessary in the beginning to have some restrictions on human rights in order to allow political stability and economic growth, you cannot continue to do that forever. Some countries in Asia have now reached a stage where they are prosperous. A certain level of prosperity is assured. In fact, the per capita income of countries such as Singapore exceeds that of many Western countries. Back in the 1950s and 1960s when they were struggling with their political life, they could say that they could not allow a lot of civil liberties, but what about today? Why do they continue to have the same policies in the 1990s? This is why there is a contradiction.
Senator Stollery: Mr. Chairman, it is very interesting. I was reading an article the other day which said that the UN made one of its greatest errors when it called the Declaration of Human Rights universal.
I find human rights very much like subsidies when you get into trade matters. I am not clear what the definition is. I do not know what the definition is of human rights in my own mind.
I suppose the Malaysians would argue -- and I am not saying I would necessarily agree -- that in countries with ethnic tensions, a person should not be allowed to inflame ethnic passions. Other people would say that is a human right, and yet we know where that can lead.
We talk about democracy. In the last U.S. election in November, 48.2 per cent of eligible voters voted, which is the lowest turnout since 1920 and the women's suffrage movement. Is that democracy? All of the other democracies in the world run about 75 per cent.
My question is this: Do you not have to come up with something that you can get your mind around? The only thing I can come up with that seems to be consistent in the Asian countries and in the Far East is the question of an independent judiciary. Without an independent judiciary to decide legal cases, I do not see how you can have any kind of business atmosphere. This is the first and most basic building block of what I would think of as a legal society. What do you think about that?
Rather than get into the vague term "human rights", maybe our committee should concentrate on something that is real, which is Indonesia, or pick your country. I am not singling out one or the other, but what we should be pressing for is an independent judiciary and all that that means.
The Chairman: Perhaps I could put a footnote on your question. Tell me if my footnote is irrelevant.
You talk about an independent judiciary. That seems to imply a body of law which that independent judiciary would invoke. Do you mean to suggest two things, first, a body of law such as the common law as supplemented by statute, and, second, an independent judiciary?
Senator Stollery: To give you some clarification, I think that even the Soviet Union had a body of law. There was just no independent judiciary. I am sure that in Burma and Indonesia there is some kind of legal system. Now, I could be wrong, and maybe what Senator Stewart said is very relevant. I am sure it is very relevant because everything Senator Stewart says is very relevant. Maybe the two go together. What do you think?
Mr. Acharya: I think the questions of judicial independence and also the rule of law are extremely important. I think you have touched on a very important issue and, in fact, it is quite helpful to see the rule of law as an objective in itself, given equal status as an objective to promote with the question of human rights.
I agree with you that human rights is too vague, too broad and too confused a notion to be the basis of action and policy. However, having said that, if we look at the situation in Asia, we find a very mixed bag. Some countries have the rule of law when it comes to economics. There is no question that your investments will be protected. They have elaborate legislation. In countries such as Singapore or Malaysia, you can have guaranteed property rights. There is the rule of law in that respect. However, when it comes to politics, the rule of law becomes much weaker, if it does not disappear completely.
Senator Carney: You have to define "politics" in that context.
Mr. Acharya: Let me give you an example.
Until recently, the Singapore judicial system allowed appeals to the Privy Council in London. If you are not satisfied with the decision of the highest court, the Singapore Supreme Court, then you can go to the Privy Council. Then what happened was the leading opposition candidate in Singapore successfully appealed against the Singapore Supreme Court in the Privy Council and the decision came down in his favour. It is about an alleged corruption that he was implicated in and was convicted of by the Singapore court, and the Privy Council said this conviction was unfair.
The next day, the Singapore government amended the Constitution and said political issues could no longer be appealed to the Privy Council. The Privy Council has no jurisdiction over political matters, only economic matters and investment.
I think even the rule of law in itself is important, but to come back to your earlier question, I do not think it is entirely possible to ensure the independence of the judiciary in the absence of a free and open political system. For example, who appoints these judges? How can they ensure an independent judiciary when the government has supreme control over issues like appointing judges?
Senator Doody: Would you not say that the judiciary in Hong Kong, which enforces or interprets a very comprehensive and, in my opinion, a fair and just rule of law, is an independent group, even though they are appointed, just as the Canadian judiciary is appointed?
Senator Stollery: The colonial system.
Senator Doody: Not by the widest stretch of the imagination can you say that Hong Kong is your great democracy, but, nevertheless, it has had a fair and just judiciary, a great independent police force, and an open society with great freedom of speech, and an open and free press. There are all sorts of nuances in these arguments when you try to define what is a democracy and how the rule of law applies.
Mr. Acharya: I believe the judiciary in Hong Kong is very independent, although it is appointed, but that is because it is appointed by the colonial system which, in itself, at home, is a democracy. If the judges of Hong Kong are appointed after July 1997 with intervention from a very different political system, they may no longer be independent. In fact, all indications suggest to me that the Hong Kong judiciary is beginning to lose its independence even before the hand-over of power. I met with Martin Lee, who was in Toronto two days ago.
The Chairman: That is a fair comment.
Senator Stollery: Mr. Chairman, I think that confirms my own, emerging view, which is that we should be pressing for an independent judiciary. I am not personally clear on how political the judiciary is in Singapore and Malaysia. In other countries, it is practically non-existent as an independent judiciary. It is certainly something that is not lost on me.
Senator Doody has made the point, but I think it can be made in an even larger way, that the withdrawal of the colonial system time and time again has meant the withdrawal of an independent judiciary.
The Chairman: Now, Senator Stollery, think of the American colonies and democratically elected judges.
Senator Stollery: I am not promoting a return to that, but it is a fact that Malaysia, Singapore, Burma and India had access to an independent judiciary. It is a fact. I do not know the story as well in the Philippines. You have said that they have had civil rights in India for a long time. It is a legacy of the colonial tradition. Is that not correct?
Mr. Acharya: Yes.
Senator Andreychuk: I want to touch on the definition of human rights. Certainly, people in the business sector of Asian circles say that human rights are foreign to them because they are concepts brought from Western civilization.
This was very much what I heard from leaders in Africa. When I studied those cultures, I found that the expressions may be different and the languages may be different, but the rights inevitably were the same. There were no cultures or religions that really said that a leader could, without justification, take the life of another human being. Notwithstanding that, the conclusion in Asia is do not touch us with all of these terms because they are foreign to us.
What is your understanding of the indigenous quality of human rights within those cultures that may or may not be the same as the expressions used to exemplify them in the UN?
Mr. Acharya: My definition of human rights is rights that every person enjoys simply by being human. There are no cultural conditions attached to this.
I agree with you that every culture has its own conception of human rights that is very compatible with a universal definition. Every culture is compatible with the kind of definition of human rights that I offered to you.
There are many positions on the question of how relative human rights could be, and relative to culture and economic development. Some of the Asian governments, such as the Singapore government, would say, yes, we agree that certain core human rights must be observed; we do not believe in the right to organize trade unions, but we do believe that a person should not be tortured. Some of the more enlightened intellectuals in Singapore concede that, yes, they have to have a core group of human rights. However, they see that the concept of individual freedom has gone crazy in the West. It has become too broad, and they cannot afford to do that. This is partly because of the concerns you raised about multi-ethnic societies, and if we allow freedom of the press, what will happen to our social stability? I agree with you on that.
However, although one can to say that human rights are universal, one cannot be blind completely to the cultural inferences of human rights. These are very complex issues which I cannot even begin to address.
Taking as an example the issue of the status of women in Muslim societies, I have never found one Muslim commentator who says that Islam degrades women. They think Islam actually honours women, but we know from reports and experience that, while these rights are theoretically there in the holy books and the tradition, they are not observed in practice.
Governments will say that there will be a core group of human rights, but whether they observe it in practice is another question. The issue becomes very complicated.
Much research has been done on the question of human rights in different cultures, and they have come up with the same point that you made -- every culture acknowledges and respects the dignity of human beings. We just have to make sure that political authorities do not abuse it.
Senator Andreychuk: Is there some way of approaching Asian communities where we could have a more constructive dialogue? If we come with what we might call more modern interpretations of human rights or the rights of women and those that we have now acknowledged -- although some of us thought that certain basic rights such as freedom from torture were there all the time -- is there some way that we can start a dialogue of consensus on those that we agree on and then carry on a dialogue on the interpretation?
For example, in the African cultures, I am finding that you can sit down and say the approach to women is different, and we will then see how we have interpreted the rights of women differently and historically and where they are evolving.
We agree that we are all evolving on the issue. Are we evolving in the same direction or differently? We start out with the premise that there must be rights for women and a place for women. We were able to find some common denominators because we carried on a dialogue. How do we get a dialogue going in Asia?
Mr. Acharya: That is a very interesting and very tricky question. There are dialogues going on across cultures, cross-cultural dialogues on human rights involving NGOs, academics and scholars. However, when it comes to having a dialogue like that between governments, it is impossible because governments simply cannot concede any ground from their respective positions, partly because they are beholding to domestic constituents.
I cannot imagine the American government openly going to a conference on human rights and even giving an inch on the question that culture may have something to do with human rights. They use the most flamboyant and provocative language in characterizing even some of their allies, such as Singapore, in international meetings.
Every government tends to get as much mileage as possible and seeks to position itself in the moral high ground on human rights issues. I do not know if it is possible because of the nature of politics in Western societies, whereas civil organizations or NGOs have a major influence on policy. You can have this kind of dialogue quietly, but as far as intergovernmental dialogue is concerned, it is highly politicized, and that is part of our problem. I do not know how it can be constructed. I simply have not seen many constructive exchanges on human rights issues in intergovernmental meetings.
If you go to the UN Commission on Human Rights meetings, it is hardly constructive because everyone wants to speak to their domestic audience back home. Everyone wants to score a point, and the governments are simply not capable because of the nature of their domestic constituencies.
Senator Andreychuk: Certainly, Canada has been a leader from time to time on a constructive dialogue. I recall many years before I was at the Human Rights Commission that a leader of our delegation simply admitted for the first time that we have human rights problems in Canada and, in fact, enumerated some of them in a very open way, and said this is what the United Nations is all about, the scrutiny of ourselves as well as the opposition. That led to more breakthroughs on a more honest dialogue.
I appreciate that the majority of governments have not done that, but certainly the Canadian government has done that from time to time.
You have said that we should have had consistent constructive dialogue, yet you are telling me that, politically, it is impossible. I am sorry I came in halfway through your presentation because I had another duty to fulfil, but when I came in, you were at the point of saying that the government should not just go to the Asian governments at times of crises; rather, we should have a consistent and constructive dialogue. Now you are saying it is not possible because of politics. Which is it?
Mr. Acharya: My comment was addressed specifically to multilateral fora. My answer to the question "Can you go to an international conference on human rights and try to accommodate a relativist position that human rights might have something to do with culture and that Asians like society over the self", is that you could do that at times in a bilateral conference. You could also do that in a multilateral forum.
One of the basic problems in promoting human rights is the lack of trust. Many Asian countries believe, and quite genuinely, that Western countries have a double standard when it comes to human rights and democracy. The United States is singled out for this kind of criticism a lot, that it cultivated all kinds of dictators during the Cold War, and today it is talking about expansion and promotion of democracy and human rights.
For example, when Algeria had an Islamic party voted into office through genuine democratic elections and the military staged a coup to overthrow that government, the United States said fine. I think one of the Singaporean commentators has specifically pointed to the question of Algeria.
Why should the United States defend Kuwait when Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are some of the most closed regimes in the world, to put it mildly? There is a mentality in Asia that the West is not sincere about human rights and that it follows its economic interests. What is needed is trust and, I think, some sort of a mutual conference.
I think the example you gave was a fascinating one. If the Canadian government goes to a forum and says "We have human rights problems," I think many people will be persuaded by everything else Canada says on the next go-round.
Similarly, one of the demands that Mahathir Mohamad, the Malaysian prime minister, made is that now we should have a U.S. Watch. The Chinese government's human rights reports contain a report on the United States. I think they would like to see some equality, and I think that is quite healthy.
Maybe a country such as Canada could promote that sort of direction. I think it would be fresh and healthy.
Senator Kinsella: To bring some specificity to the issue of human rights, how many Asian countries have actually signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948?
Mr. Acharya: I cannot answer that question, but I can talk about the covenants. There are two major covenants of the three. The two I know of are the covenant for international civil liberties and the covenant on socio-economic and cultural rights. Only two countries in Southeast Asia have them. The Philippines is one. I do not know about the rest of Asia.
Senator Kinsella: Would you not agree that both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as the two international covenants, have become part of the international customary law of nations?
Mr. Acharya: I would not go as far as to say that from the perspective of ASEAN countries. I personally believe they are, but I think some of the Asian governments question the legitimacy of the universal declaration.
Senator Kinsella: Would you not think there is a very important distinction to be made between the standard of human rights which has become part of the corpus of international law, on the one hand, and the various justifications that are given to sustaining the rights which are part of international law?
Mr. Chairman, this is what happened. Right after 1948 when the United Nations General Assembly proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in Paris -- it was but a proclamation of the general assembly -- UNESCO convened an international gathering of the great thinkers from around the world because everyone recognized that the world community had ratified and proclaimed a standard of human rights, notwithstanding the great diversity of political ideologies and political systems. There was common ground on a statement of human rights standards.
When UNESCO convened its conference of great thinkers, they could not come up with a common justification as to why the right to life was a human right or why the right to an independent tribunal was a human right. There was great divergence of explanation. This is why I think it is terribly important to make that distinction between the standard, on the one hand, and the freedom and liberty the people need in terms of cultural history, et cetera, to find their justification for it. It would be very poor Canadian policy to go against the standard which is part of the international law of nations, such as the two covenants.
In terms of our foreign policy, which is what this committee is interested in, and in our relations with Asian countries and other countries around the world, do you think it would be good policy on our part to promote the adherence and ratification of the two international covenants with the ratification of the International Covenant in Civil and Political Rights and that there should be a ratification of the optional protocol attached to that particular covenant?
Mr. Acharya: I am not an international legal scholar to really have an informed opinion on the status of the covenants and their impact. What I understand is that even if you sign the covenants, it does not mean you respect the terms.
The problem is that even though governments have guaranteed human rights in their domestic constitutions, these are not adhered to. For example, Indonesia was one of the first countries in the developing world to have a comprehensive range of human rights in its 1947 Constitution, which is no longer in existence, by the way. It has been superseded. It does not mean that they actually abide by it.
Here, the question of the rule of law and judicial independence becomes important because an independent judiciary could guarantee that both constitutional problems and international legal norms be adhered to. We do not have that.
Governments in open fora will say, "We have signed these covenants; we have signed the international declaration; we respect human rights."
Senator Kinsella: We have gone a step from the declaration in 1948 to the opening up or ratification of the covenants in 1966. It was not until 1976 that the two covenants had sufficient ratification to come into force, and it is the covenant, particularly the one on civil political rights, which has the enforcement machinery provided for in the optional protocol.
The economic, social and cultural rights covenant also has enforcement machinery. It is by way of a social audit, and it is progressive. My question, therefore, is do you not think it would be good Canadian foreign policy to be promoting the ratification of these instruments so at least we would not have this discussion of what are human rights?
There is no doubt in my mind that human rights are those rights contained in the two covenants. I am not searching for a definition. We know what are human rights. We know what are human rights as far as international civility is concerned because they have been articulated under international treaty law.
As part of our foreign policy, would you not agree that we should be promoting the ratification of those UN human rights instruments and, indeed, encouraging the development of regional special instruments? Do you not believe that if the Asian community wants to develop an Asian international covenant or multilateral covenant within that community, we should encourage that as well?
Mr. Acharya: Those are very good points. I think it would be good Canadian policy to do so. I completely agree. I am not sure it will stop the debate about the meaning of human rights because countries will continue to debate what these covenants actually mean, although they all accept the definition formally.
It is something similar to the law of the sea treaty. Southeast Asian countries love the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea because it gives them many more rights that they did not have before, but no two countries will agree on the meaning of some of the provisions.
One of the Canadian initiatives today in the South China Sea Project is to get some agreement on what the law of the sea actually means, although countries in that region have ratified it.
Your question about the regional system is very interesting, and I think we should spend some time discussing it. Every region in the world, except Asia, has a regional mechanism for human rights issues. Even Africa has one. It is a weak one, but still it is there. Asia has never succeeded in doing that, despite periodic efforts.
Why is that? I often ask myself this question. Part of the reason is because Asia is very big and diverse. South Asia is different from Southeast Asia, which is different from Northeast Asia.
It is also partly because it is internally diverse. Many countries are multi-ethnic, and they are afraid that if they start a regional human rights mechanism, what happens if ethnic minorities get a chance to make complaints, as they could do in the case of Europe?
Asian governments are also divided. When I said there is an Asian view of human rights, I do not want to give the impression that the government of Singapore has the same view as the government of the Philippines or the government of China. In fact, there are very progressive, forward-looking Asian governments, and there are very conservative, status-governed Asian governments.
It is interesting that when ASEAN countries go to an international meeting, they forget their differences. They see this as collective bargaining -- united they stand, divided they fall. They will be swept aside by the Americans and the Europeans. It is a tactical defensive reaction. If you can make them more comfortable in these international fora, then probably they will be more amenable to dialogue and discussion.
One of the interesting proposals made recently about human rights in Asia is the idea of a regional human rights commission for Southeast Asia. In 1992, the foreign ministers of ASEAN countries actually agreed to the creation of such a mechanism, but very soon they realized that it was a mistake. Nothing has been heard of this regional mechanism ever since. I talked to some people in the foreign ministries of certain countries. They said it was a bad mistake and they could not wait long to bury it.
Another thing you can talk about are the national Human Rights Commissions. In Southeast Asia, Indonesia and the Philippines each have one. I find them extremely useful.
When Indonesia first had its national Human Rights Commission, many people were very sceptical. They thought it was government appointed and government controlled, so it would not really bark. Well, the commission has been surprisingly independent.
The vice-chairman of the commission in Indonesia will be in Ottawa next week to attend a CIDA conference. We are trying also to invite him to our conference. They have been surprisingly active.
Something else Canada can do is share expertise on human rights commissions, if not regional, maybe on a national basis. Canada can continue to encourage the creation of a regional human rights commission, or if not a commission with legal powers, at least an advisory committee or an eminent persons group. APEC used to have an eminent persons group to advise member countries on trade. Perhaps you can have an eminent persons group on human rights and democracy.
You can use the concept of good governance to promote human rights. In fact, one could make a case that although good governance is different from human rights, it subsumes human rights to some extent because it calls for accountability, and that could be another way of addressing human rights.
The Chairman: You said earlier that what was necessary in the case of the Union of South Africa were sustained, multilateral, economic sanctions. Is that what you are advocating in the case of Indonesia? Do you think it is a realistic prescription?
Mr. Acharya: I do not see East Timor in the same light as I saw apartheid. A more comparable case would be Burma. I believe that you cannot simply have constructive engagement to change Burma. I support Aung San Suu Kyi's prescription that you must have economic pressure in conjunction with dialogue.
Indonesia's East Timor is a different case. East Timor is one part of the human rights situation in Indonesia. Other people in Indonesia are suffering as well, although many atrocities have been committed in East Timor. We should not be blind to the fact that it is a big country. In fact, the Indonesian system is surprisingly open in some ways, and it does allow for the growth of non-governmental organizations to a much greater extent than some of its neighbouring countries.
I would not say that the self-determination of East Timor justifies economic sanction, no. Self-determination is a political, diplomatic issue which has to be negotiated politically and diplomatically.
The Chairman: I am afraid by my reference to Indonesia that I may have sabotaged my own question.
Looking back on the situation in the Union of South Africa, we had an economy which was highly dependent on exports to certain countries such as the United States, Canada and the U.K., all of which had agreed to sanctions.
How realistic is it to think that in the case of "Country A" in Southeast Asia or the Asia Pacific that there will be sustained, multilateral, economic sanctions? Is this not a dream? For example, is the United States of America going to participate in sustained, multilateral, economic sanctions in relation to any one of its major Asian economic partners? I think the answer is no.
I see you are nodding.
Mr. Acharya: I agree with you.
The Chairman: We might as well forget about it in the case of Canada.
Mr. Acharya: No, we should not. What I am talking about is not necessarily the kind of sustained pressure that was brought to bear on South Africa but something maybe less drastic, instead of forgetting the issue completely and doing nothing about it.
Once again, I am applying this to Burma. I am not applying this to Indonesia because I think the Indonesian situation is completely different. Also, Indonesia has a much larger economy than Burma. You can make a better case for Burma because there is a more blatant violation going on there than, I would say, in Indonesia.
The Chairman: The problem I am trying to confront is the following. There are people -- not on this committee, I think -- who say we should not trade with any country that does not measure up to our principles of human rights and to hell with the consequences, even if it means that this port is closed down and that port is closed down in this country.
Senator Stollery: It is not doing any good anyway.
The Chairman: That is the question. What is the point? That is what I am trying to get you to address.
Mr. Acharya: I think it would be counter-productive. To try to judge countries in terms of Canadian standards would be simply impractical.
The Chairman: That is helpful.
Senator Kinsella: At the end of the day, would you not agree that the sanction to enforce human rights standards is international public opinion or international moral opinion and, therefore, Canada must stay engaged as part of the world's moral public opinion?
The Chairman: But moral public opinion, senator, tends to be episodic in its expression. It is like reciting the apostles' creed -- it is a great thing, but six days of the week and Sunday afternoon does not mean anything.
Mr. Acharya: May I add that international opinion and international pressure have been effective in some cases in Southeast Asia. For example, the creation of the Indonesian International Human Rights Commission was very directly linked to international condemnation of the crackdown on East Timor and the pressure that was brought to bear on the Indonesian government. This was a clear case of international pressure being effective, at least to some extent.
The Chairman: Am I correct in thinking that you said that Canada should not attempt to put human rights on the formal agenda of the Vancouver APEC conference? Is that correct?
Mr. Acharya: Well, it would not work. It will never work. I am just being practical here. I am not taking a moral position.
The Chairman: That is what we want. We want practical advice.
Mr. Acharya: No, it will not work.
Senator Kinsella: Mr. Chairman, in your concept of placing it on the agenda, do you mean as a discrete item: "Human rights. Let us talk about them"?
The Chairman: I do not know if there is an alternative. Will you have sneaky conversations out in the corridor? Is that what you are proposing as an alternative?
Senator Andreychuk: No, but I think when we talk about dialogue, compromise and two countries working together or ten countries working together, our agenda has to be on the table as much as theirs. Our values have to be on the table as much as theirs. By wilfully saying that human rights will not be part of the agenda, you are taking away something that is very Canadian.
Consequently, I hope that our Prime Minister would come armed on agenda items one, two, three, four, five, six, seven and come with Canadian perspectives.
The Chairman: With human rights on the agenda?
Senator Andreychuk: Should the issue of human rights be necessary, then it would be part of the dialogue, but it would not be a separate item.
The Chairman: Why are you so cautious about hiding it so that it is not a separate item?
Senator Kinsella: Because you cannot deal with it that way.
Senator Andreychuk: Other countries have said they do not want it on the agenda as a specific item. If we accept that, fine, but they equally should not hear from our Prime Minister that he will not bring it up in the discussion when necessary and where necessary.
I do not see human rights as a separate issue. I see it as part of the Canadian psyche.
Mr. Acharya: There is no reason why the minister cannot have a paragraph in his speech on human rights at the plenary session. It cannot be a negotiable position.
The Chairman: Mr. Acharya, I want to thank you very much for a lively and thoughtful discussion. What you have said has been most helpful to the committee. I am sure that we will continue to debate these matters on our own.
The committee adjourned.