NOTES

1. See Foreword.
2. See for example, Lewis MacKenzie, Issue 39, p. 1-3.
3. This can be understood as the tendency to be concerned about events appearing on television, with those not covered being "out of sight, out of mind."
4. Peacekeeping has been defined by the United Nations as "the deployment of international military and civilian personnel to a conflict area with the consent of the parties to the conflict in order to stop or contain hostilities or supervise the carrying out of a peace agreement." Peacemaking "refers to the use of diplomatic means to persuade parties in conflict to cease hostilities and to negotiate a peaceful settlement of their dispute. . . . Peacemaking . . . excludes the use of force against one of the parties to enforce an end to hostilities, an activity that in United Nations parlance is referred to as ‘peace enforcement.’" United Nations Department of Political Affairs, at dpa@un.org. See also Appendix 1: Glossary.
5. The current 16 members of NATO at the end of the Cold War were: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined on March 12, 1999, becoming the first new members of the post-Cold War NATO.
6. This aspect of the Treaty built in part on the base established by the Marshall Plan, which was created by the U.S. to encourage the recovery of the Western European economy.
7. Stanley R. Sloan, "NATO’s Evolving Role and Missions," CRS Report for Congress, March 1998, p. 2. See also, North Atlantic Treaty Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, April 27, 28, 29, May 2, and 3, 1949.
8. Ibid.
9. The significance of Article 5 for NATO in the 1990s and beyond is discussed briefly in Chapter IV and in further detail in Chapter V.
10. Sloan, p. 3.
11. Michael Howard, "An Unhappy Successful Marriage," Foreign Affairs, May/June 1999, p. 173.
12. Sloan, p. 3.
13. Ibid., The policy of "flexible response" suggested that battlefield nuclear weapons might be used early in any European conflict. Such weapons were deployed well forward in West Germany to ensure that they were seen as part of NATO’s first line of defence.
14. David Bercuson, Issue 40, p. 2.
15. Ibid.
16. Sloan, p. 2.
17. Robert Bothwell, Issue 37, p. 2.
18. David Haglund, "Where Have We Been? Where Are We Going?", Conference Address, Toronto, February 1999, p. 5.
19. Ibid., p. 8
20. See Europe Revisited: Consequences of Increased European Integration for Canada, Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, November 1999.
21. John Beck, Director, Directorate-General I, External Relations Directorate, European Commission.
22. Another remark by an EU official amounted to the suggestion that Canada’s role in NATO was to "just send troops."
23. Robert Bothwell, Issue 37, p. 41.
24. David Bercuson, Issue 40, p. 2.
25. Rick Mofina, "Military set up to impress friends, not enemies," The Ottawa Citizen, February 10, 2000, p. A5.
26. The Committee also heard arguments that bringing Canadian troops back from Europe was a positive move in that it strengthened Canada’s capacity to undertake peacekeeping missions. Moreover, it was noted that Canada was not alone in reducing its commitment of troops to NATO at about that time.
27. David Long, Issue 33, p. 7.
28. Denis Stairs, Issue 40, p. 6.
29. David Bercuson, Issue 40, p. 3.
30. Lewis MacKenzie, Issue 39, p. 3.
31. The idea of a European defence union dates back to the Brussels Treaty of March 17, 1948; the Western European Union was created in 1954. On the history of the WEU, see François de Rose, "A European Pillar in the Alliance," Susan Eisenhower, ed., NATO at Fifty (Washington: Center for Political and Strategic Studies, 1999).
32. David Long, Issue 33, pp. 1–13.
33. Denis Stairs, Issue 40, p. 4.
34. The ESDI is the subject of Chapter VII.
35. Rome, November 1991, para. 9.
36. See Chapter VII.
37. Washington, April 23-24, 1999; para. 6.
38. Ibid., para. 12.
39. Ibid., para. 3.
40. Ibid., para. 20.
41. Wade Boese, "NATO Unveils Strategic Concept at 50^th Anniversary Summit," Arms Control Today, April/May, 1997, p. 1.
42. Ibid.
43. Thus the new Strategic Concept retains the mutual defence commitment of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty while adding new possibilities of achieving security through humanitarian intervention outside NATO borders. As Kosovo demonstrated, these concepts are not always clearly differentiated in the various rationales for action given by NATO members.
44. Boese.
45. Nicola Butler, "NATO at 50: Papering Over the Cracks," Opinion and Analysis, June 1999, p. 4.
46. Ibid., p. 5.
47. Ibid.
48. Boese, p.1
49. "The Alliance’s Strategic Concept," NATO, April 1999, para. 30. See also, Butler, p. 4.
50. Butler, p. 4. See also, Washington Summit Communiqué, para. 10-11.
51. A route that does not entail many of the high costs of expanding the European Union, such as agricultural subsidies.
52. Arms Control Today, April/May 1999, p. 2.
53. Washington Summit Communiqué, 1999, para. 27.
54. David Long, Issue 33, p. 10.
55. Though as the make-up of Canada’s population evolves, and as our cultural links with the rest of the world expand, the European heritage is becoming a less dominant factor than it once was.
56. Indeed, American heavy lift capability would be essential for a deployment of any size.
57. See Chapter VIII for a discussion of the role of Parliament.
58. The other three are security, consultation, and deterrence and defence.
59. Article 4 is sometimes offered as another source of authorization. However, it speaks only of an obligation of NATO members to consult one another whenever there is a threat to the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any one of them.
60. These were: Maritime enforcement of the UN-imposed arms embargo and sanctions (1992-96); enforcement of no-fly zones and the provision of close air support for the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1993-95); leading the multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) to assist in the implementation of the Bosnian Peace Agreement (1995-96); leading a smaller successor mission, the Stabilization Force (SFOR), to remain in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the elections (1996 to the present); and, most recently, leading the multinational peacekeeping force (KFOR) in Kosovo (June 1999 to the present).
61. By "traditional" peacekeeping, we mean an operation where an outside military force is deployed with the consent of the host state or the concerned belligerents. See footnote 4.
62. In fact, Canada has participated in at least four non-UN peacekeeping missions over the years: the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Indochina (1954-74); the Commonwealth Observer Team for Nigeria (1968-70); the International Commission for Control and Supervision in Vietnam (1973-74); and the Commonwealth Monitoring Force for Rhodesia/Zimbabwe (1979-80).
63. This was done by the General Assembly in 1946 in Resolution 95(1) and by the International Law Commission in 1950.
64. Article 8.
65. In addition, the Helsinki process of the 1970s led the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to adopt a comprehensive approach to human rights within the 55 participating states. Thus members of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact reaffirmed their commitment to such obligations. While not legally binding, these commitments have considerable political significance.
66. The Security Council has, over the years, adopted a number of resolutions under Chapter VII to protect human rights within states: South Africa in 1976, 1977, and 1980; Iraq in 1991; Somalia in 1992; Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992-93; the Former Yugoslavia in 1993; Haiti in 1993-94; Rwanda in 1994; Zaire in 1996; and Yugoslavia (Kosovo) in 1999. Moreover, in the cases of Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Haiti, Rwanda, Zaire, and Kosovo, the Security Council authorized the use of "all necessary means," including the use of military force, to enforce its resolutions.
67. Annan, "Two Concepts of Sovereignty," p. 49. See also: Annan, Report of the Secretary-General, pp. 21-22, para. 67 and recommendation 40.
68. Annan, "Two Concepts of Sovereignty," p. 49.
69. General Assembly Resolution 377(V), adopted on 3 November 1950.
70. The "Uniting for Peace" resolution has been used by the General Assembly to deal with the following international situations: Suez, 1956; Hungary, 1956; Lebanon, 1958; Congo, 1960; Bangladesh, 1971; Afghanistan, 1980; the Middle East, 1980; and Namibia, 1981. In the cases of the Suez, Lebanon and the Congo, the General Assembly authorized the establishment of peacekeeping operations under Chapter VI of the Charter.
71. As discussed in the Conclusions and Recommendations section below, some members of the Committee would take this position.
72. Black Lamb and Grey Falcon. A Journey through Yugoslavia. New York,Viking,1943.
73. Estimates at the time put the number at around 1,400 killed and 400,000 displaced. Such numbers have proved very difficult to verify, however, and must be considered only estimates.
74. UN Security Council Resolution 1199.
75. These two missions were endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 1203.
76. The Contact Group consisted of the United States, Russia, Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy.
77. Some observers saw the proposed accord as untenable.
78. The United States provided the bulk of the force, drawing on air force, navy and marine aircraft. Canada and Spain contributed F-18 fighter-bombers, and the UK flew both Tornados and Harriers. Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway and Portugal contributed F-16s. The French flew Jaguars and Mirage aircraft, and Germany and Italy flew Tornados. Turkey also contributed combat aircraft.
79. Over the entire campaign, Task Force Aviano executed 224 missions of which 167 were air-to-ground and 57 were air combat patrols. Missions consisted of between two and eight sorties – a sortie being one aircraft. In terms of individual sorties, Canadians flew a total of 678 of which 558 were air-to-ground and 120 were air-to-air. The 678 sorties represented 70 percent of the tasking, with most cancellations having been due to weather.
80. There were also a number of fatal accidents to Allied aircraft outside Kosovo.
81. Gwynne Dyer, Issue 42, p. 6.
82. Ibid.
83. Jonathan Eyal, "Air Strikes in Kosovo: An Undisputable Success?", Newsbrief, Royal United Services Institute, Vol. 19, No. 7, July 1999, p. 51.
84. Anthony H. Cordesman, "The Lessons and Non Lessons of the Air and Missile War in Kosovo," Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 1999, p. 3.
85. Gwynne Dyer, "War Without Casualties (Sort Of)," London Times, April 1, 1999.
86. Michael Mandelbaum, "A Perfect Failure: NATO’s War Against Yugoslavia," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 5, October, 1999, p. 3.
87. With respect to civilian deaths caused directly by the bombing, a recent report "concludes on the basis of evidence available . . . that as few as 488 and as many as 527 Yugoslav civilians were killed as a result of NATO bombing." Human Rights Watch, "Civilian Deaths In The NATO Air Campaign," Washington, D.C., February 7, 2000.
88. Mandelbaum, p. 5.
89. Ibid., pp. 3, 5.
90. Ibid., p. 5.
91. Ibid., p. 5.
92. Joseph Nye, "Redefining the National Interest," Foreign Affairs, July/August, 1999, pp. 24, 31.
93. Ibid., p. 32.
94. Ibid., p. 33.
95. Dale Herspring, Issue 37, p. 14.
96. See Chapter VI for further discussion.
97. Richard Ullman, "The U.S. and the World: An Interview with George Kennan," New York Review of Books, August 12, 1999.
98. Ethnic cleansing was stressed by David Wright, Canada’s Ambassador to NATO, in a CBC interview on November 10, 1999. Earlier that day Carla del Ponte, Chief Prosecutor of the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal, reported to the Security Council that so far the Tribunal had exhumed 2,108 bodies in Kosovo, far fewer than the number – up to 100,000 – publicized earlier.
99. Javier Solana, "NATO’s Success in Kosovo, Foreign Affairs, November/December, 1999. The Deputy Assistant to the U. S. President for National Security Affairs, emphasizes the non-humanitarian consideration: "In fact, 19 NATO allies, with all the diversity of their political cultures and historical relationships with the Balkans, felt they had a compelling interest in ending the violence in Kosovo. A prolonged conflict there would have had no natural boundaries." James B. Steinberg, "A Perfect Polemic," Foreign Affairs, November/December, 1999, p. 131.
100. Kofi Annan, "Two Concepts of Sovereignty," The Economist, September 18, 1999.
101. Influence is of course the result of many contributing factors. While military capacity is clearly important, so too are international trade, contacts between our citizens and those of other countries, the skill of our diplomats in international organizations, and a wide variety of other forms of interaction.
102. One can make the same observation about the Canadian armoured reconnaissance force that entered Kosovo after the cessation of hostilities. Our troops were well equipped and were able to perform a vital monitoring task that no other allied army could carry out. They were there when it mattered, and they made a difference.
103. "Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World," Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa, April 1999.
104. The Honourable Lloyd Axworthy in The Intellectual Journal, LII, Spring 1997.
105. Paul Heinbecker in Behind the Headlines, 56:4-9, Spring, 1999
106. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security, 1994-1995), "Redefining the National Interest," Foreign Affairs, July/August, 1999, p. 24.
107. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, "Human Security: a Refugee Perspective," speech at the Ministerial Meeting on Human Security Issues, Bergen, Norway, May 19, 1999.
108. See "Meeting New Challenges: Canada’s Response to a New Generation of Peacekeeping," a report presented to the Senate by this Committee in 1993.
109. Behind the Headlines, 56:4-9, Spring 1999.
110. Formal Statement By Ambassador. Robert R. Fowler, Emergency Security Council Meeting On The Situation In East Timor, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa.
111. The Globe and Mail, September 23, 1999, p. A20.
112. Ogata, ibid.
113. Gwynne Dyer, Issue 42, pp.12-13; also pp. 23-24.
114. Michael J. Glennon, "The New Interventionism," Foreign Affairs, May/June, 1999, pp. 2-3.
115. "G-8 Foreign Ministers Reach Agreement On Security Council Resolution For Kosovo," Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa, June 8, 1999.
116. "Backgrounder: Canada and Kosovo," Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa, June 17, 1999.
117. The Globe and Mail, February 28, 2000
118. Rome, November, 1991 NATO Mini Comm., para. 2; see also para. 21.
119. Information on the development of the ESDI is taken in part from "Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense," Department of Defense, Washington, March 1999.
120. Elinor Sloan, "The United States And The Revolution in Military Affairs," Department of National Defence, Canada, Project Report No. 9801, 1998, p. vii.
121. Sloan, p. viii.
122. "Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense."
123. Ibid.
124. Richard Medley, "Europe’s Next Big Idea," Foreign Affairs, September/October, 1999, p. 20.
125. "Robertson’s War," The Times, 5 August, 1999.
126. William Drozdiak, "U.S. Seems Increasingly Uncomfortable with EU Defense Plan," International Herald Tribune, March 6, 2000, p. 8.
127. Ibid.
128. Medley, p. 20.
129. The two pillar view is also characterized as the dumbbell model (David Bercuson, Issue 40, p. 11).
130. Talbot is quoted by Peter Riddell in The Times, November 8, 1999.
131. Recently, however, both United States and NATO officials have expressed concern that the development of the ESDI could destabilize the Alliance. Secretary of State Albright, for example, has stressed that the ESDI must not be allowed to decouple the U.S. from Europe, duplicate NATO structures and capabilities or discriminate against NATO members that are not members of the EU. William Drozdiak, "U.S. Seems Increasingly Uncomfortable with EU Defense Plan," International Herald Tribune, March 6, 2000, p. 8.
132. David Bercuson, Issue 40, p.11.
133. Since 1989, the UN has authorized more than 30 peacekeeping operations compared to a total of 17 in the previous four decades.
134. Kim Nossal, Issue 41, p. 22.
135. Col (ret’d) Douglas Fraser, Issue 41, p. 29; and Kim Nossal, Issue 41, p. 22.
136. Constitution Act, 1867, sections 15 and 9.
137. Emergencies Act. sections 29, 39, 41 and Part VI.
138. Emergencies Act, sections 61 and 62.
139. R.S.C. 1985, c. N-5. Section 31 (1) of the National Defence Act enables the Governor in Council to place the Canadian Forces, or any element thereof, on active service whenever "it appears advisable to do so" by reason of an emergency or for the defence of Canada, or "in consequence of any action taken by-Canada under the United Nations Charter, the North Atlantic Treaty or any other similar instrument for collective defence that may be entered into by Canada."
140. Active service status is not a prerequisite to the deployment of military forces within or outside of Canada, or to the liability of Canadian Forces members to serve. Active service status does, however, have implications for soldiers in terms of coverage for benefits under the Canadian Forces Superannuation Act; the timing of release from the forces; the application of the Code of Service Discipline to reserve members in certain circumstances; and the applicability or aggravation of certain military offences.
141. For example, in Supplementary Estimates (A) see: Citizenship and Immigration, Votes 1 and 10; Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Votes 1, 5, and 20; National Defence, Votes 1 and 5.
142. House of Commons, Debates, 1 February 1923, p. 33.
143. House of Commons, Debates, 21 June 1926, pp. 4758-59.
144. In contrast to the paucity of debate, and the complete absence of a parliamentary resolution, on the accession to NATO of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary in 1999, the debates in the House of Commons on German membership occupy almost 200 pages in Hansard.
145. United States Code, Title 50, Sections 1541, 1542, 1544 and 1547 (the War Powers Act of 1973); and Article 19(2) of the Danish Constitution.
146. Commonwealth of Australia, Review of the Treaty-Making Process, Canberra, August 1999.