Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
National Security and Defence
Issue 14 - Evidence - Morning sitting
OTTAWA, Monday, May 6, 2002
The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence met this day at 10:00 a.m. to examine and report on the need for a national security policy for Canada.
Senator Colin Kenny (Chairman) in the Chair.
[English]
The Chairman: It is my pleasure to welcome you to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, whether you are here in the room, watching on television or following us on the Internet. This morning we begin our first meeting on our new study on the need for a national security policy.
This committee is the first permanent Senate committee with a mandate to examine subjects of security and defence. We recently concluded a seven-month study of major issues facing Canada, and we produced a report entitled, ``Canadian Security and Military Preparedness.''
During our study, we met for 170 hours with 204 persons from coast to coast and in Washington. As the committee hearings proceeded, it became increasingly evident that executive direction and coordination of activities is required when dealing with national incidents, whether natural, such as ice storms, floods or earthquakes, accidental, such as toxic derailments, or premeditated acts of terror, such as those we saw on September 11.
We found that there is no national security policy that agencies at all levels of government can use to effect standard operating procedures.
Given the importance of national security issues and the need to have procedures and policies in place before incidents happen, our committee recommended that a study be undertaken to develop a national security policy that would examine the roles of all levels of government. The Senate agreed with our recommendation and asked the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence to examine the need for a national security policy.
We begin this study today.
Our first witness is VAdm. Greg Maddison, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff. He has had a distinguished naval career and has served as Commander of Maritime Forces Atlantic, Chief of the Maritime Staff and was promoted to his current post last June. He is accompanied by Col. André Deschamps, Director, Continental Operations.
One aspect of our current study is to examine the capability of the Department of National Defence to defend and protect the interests, people and territory of Canada, and its ability to respond to, or to prevent, national emergencies or attacks. VAdm. Maddison has been invited to speak about how the military responds to emergencies.
I would like to say at the outset that the committee was very impressed with the quality of material that was forwarded to us. We appreciated it very much. We would ask that you extend our thanks to those who assisted you in the preparation of that material.
Vice-Admiral Greg Maddison, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, Department of National Defence: Honourable senators, it is a real pleasure to be here today to discuss with you domestic security issues as they relate to the Canadian Forces.
As the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, I am responsible, on behalf of the Chief of the Defence Staff, for coordinating, planning and controlling our contingency operations both abroad and at home. These include operations, currently, as you are well aware, in Afghanistan, the Balkans, the Middle East and Africa. I am pleased to be accompanied by one of my principal advisers on domestic issues, Col. André Deschamps.
[Translation]
I would first like to make a brief statement about CF domestic security capabilities and then turn the floor over for any questions you may have on this subject.
[English]
Mr. Chairman, the Canadian Forces has three main mandates in regards to domestic operations. The first mandate is the provision of capable and ready forces to counter any military threats to Canada. The second is the provision of aeronautical search and rescue. The third mandate is the provision of assistance to civilian authorities during emergency situations.
The Canadians Forces has conducted, in the past, and continues to this day to execute routine duties such as search and rescue, and air space and maritime surveillance of Canadian sovereign territory. In addition, we have land forces spread across Canada who can respond to domestic security concerns.
The Canadian Forces maintains resources across the country on stand-by readiness for the sole purpose of providing the Government of Canada with the ability to generate a rapid response when faced with an external threat to national security or to other domestic crisis situations that may require the use of the unique Canadian Forces capabilities.
Some examples of such response capabilities can be summarized as follows: The army has four immediate readiness units across the country. Each of these units has approximately 350 troops that can be called out on very short notice to respond to any incident. We also have ships and maritime surveillance aircraft on both coasts that can similarly be called out for contingency operations.
Our CF-18 aircraft assigned to NORAD are on constant alert and are ready to respond to airborne threats. We also have an ongoing commitment to provide aircraft and helicopters on rapid response — anywhere from 30 minutes to two hours — to conduct national aeronautic search and rescue tasks. We maintain the capability to respond to a major air disaster in a remote location in this country by the use of air deliverable response kits and, indeed, a paracapability to put in search and rescue technicians.
Finally, we have some specialty forces, such as the Joint Task Force 2, which is part of our national counterterrorist capability; the Nuclear Biological Chemical Response Team, NBCRT; and the Disaster Assistance Response Team, DART, all of which are capable of reacting to domestic crises. The response and performance capabilities of these high-readiness assets are regularly tested through real life missions and operations or through regular training and exercises.
Since September 11, the Canadian Forces has taken many initiatives to increase our domestic capabilities to be able to better respond to future terrorist threats. Working in close cooperation with our allies and with a number of other government departments, our intelligence personnel have made efforts to increase what we call our situational awareness on potential terrorist activities. We have also taken steps to increase our domestic capabilities to respond to chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear threats by creating what is called a joint NBCD Company that will be stood up at its initial operating capability this summer.
We are also expanding the size and capability of our counterterrorist unit, the JTF2. We have increased the number of CF-18 aircraft assigned to NORAD in order to provide for increased response capabilities. We also have the ability to rapidly expand and deploy this force if the situation warrants.
Given this, the Canadian Forces offers the Government of Canada and the governments of the provinces and territories wide-ranging response capabilities to potential domestic security emergencies.
However, it is important to remember, Mr. Chairman, that the Canadian Forces is not the responsible department when it comes to domestic issues such as terrorism and other such criminal activities or, indeed, reacting to natural disasters. We are not the first responders.
Although the Canadian Forces has been used in the past to assist provincial and federal authorities in a variety of situations, the use of Canadian Forces resources on Canadian soil must always be considered carefully, and only as a force of last resort when dealing with issues normally within civilian jurisdiction. Although possessed of a broad range of capabilities, the Canadian Forces must judiciously consider requests from outside agencies for support in order to insure that our resources are employed to the maximum benefit of all Canadians.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would thank you for the opportunity to discuss our response capabilities with your committee.
I would also add that the Canadian Forces is committed to providing Canadians with the most flexible and capable force possible.
That concludes my short opening remarks, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to answer questions.
Senator Forrestall: Admiral, I would join with the Chair in expressing appreciation for the detail that you have gone into. We regret that we did not have this sooner, but that is understandable and quite acceptable.
My questions have to do with the availability of men and women to fulfill the tasks that you have outlined.
In response to the appropriate authorities, for example, in British Columbia or in Newfoundland and Labrador, how would you move troops in a timely fashion to those regions which do not have land force bases, and how would you sustain them in their work? What would you rely for airlift capacity? Do we have the numbers?
VAdm. Maddison: Thank you for your question, senator. Just to try to put this in some sort of context, if you will, at the moment close to 5,000 people of the Canadian Forces are deployed abroad. These are primarily regular force individuals, although there are some reservists as well. That then leaves us with quite a number of our total 60,000 regulars and 30,000 reservists back here in Canada. Many of them are support folks, however. As we rotate in and out of our operations abroad, there will always be one third who are being trained specifically to replace those, and another one third who will have just come back from most of our missions who need a certain period of personal stability, if you will, a quality of life period with their families and so on. The number of people available to respond within Canada is not the 60,000 and 30,000 total figure, it is a lesser number. For example, in the Ice Storm of 1998, we deployed 18,000 people across eastern Ontario and western Quebec. In terms of the Y2K possibility of a challenge, we had another 25,000 people at various places ready to go.
One of our biggest challenges, however, is to be able to move people rapidly across the country. Currently, we have approximately 32 Hercules aircraft, which are tactical airlift aircraft that can go into many remote areas in this country because they do not need a long runway and they can land in pretty austere conditions. However, many of those aircraft are in maintenance profiles because of their age. We also have Airbus aircraft, however, which can move people and cargo. We have the capability to move people across the country. However, it is a significant challenge for us to move large numbers of people and large amounts of equipment with those two air fleets.
Just to give you one example, to move the full capability of the disaster assistance response team in Canada, including the medical component, the freshwater component, the military police component, the engineers and so on, would likely take something in the vicinity of 24 Hercules aircraft. It would take a couple of days to be able to move all of that.
When we are assigned to respond or to assist a group in Canada, one of our biggest challenges is to find the right level of airlift to move our folks and equipment.
Senator Forrestall: There is, of course, always a difference between a regional requirement and a national requirement. There is also a major difference when dealing with an earthquake, for example. You may have some lead advice and lead time to prepare for an earthquake. You can see a flood coming for weeks. We usually have lots of time to prepare.
VAdm. Maddison: I would only add, of course, that on these occasions, the local, municipal and provincial authorities have the responsibility to be the first responders. As the situation develops and critical analyses are made as to what capability is required, that is the time we become engaged in that we think we will be asked to respond. We do not wait until we are formally asked. We begin preparing our plans in case we are asked for support.
Senator Forrestall: The mayor of Toronto calls and the military responds. Many Canadians did not appreciate that, given the dark humour that flowed from it.
We have impressive resources, but they are taxed. Where would we find the resources to carry out government initiatives with respect to joining European ''security,'' if I may call it that?
VAdm. Maddison: My simple answer is that it is all part of risk management. That is the business folks like me are in. We must predict what will be the greatest risks and, from that, prioritize what our capabilities are to respond to a particular incident. We cannot do all things at all times simultaneously, but we assess where the risks are and try to develop and maintain our capabilities so that we can respond to high-priority risks.
Senator Forrestall: For example, we have a responsibility with respect to search and rescue. Should I ask whether the Cormorant fleet is available to you? I know what the answer is.
Let me put this question: Is the Sea King capable of picking up this vacuum? I recognize that, so far it has, but for how long can it do that?
VAdm. Maddison: Yes, so far it has. The main reason is the dedication, experience and capability our maintainers and pilots have in terms of flying Sea Kings. I have personally been involved in many search and rescue incidents, both at sea and over land, where the Sea Kings have been a valuable asset and have saved lives.
Senator Wiebe: I would like to start with your comment that the Canadian Forces are not first responders. That is true. Perhaps, we, as a committee, should be looking at whether it should remain that way. That is for the politicians to decide more so than the army.
The question I have relates to the ability of the military today to respond to a national problem. Let me go back a number of years to when I was a young man. I remember then that CN and CP Railway workers were on strike, and the Armed Forces was called out to keep them operating, which it did, very effectively. If CN and CP workers went on strike tomorrow, would we have the capability in our Armed Forces to do the same thing?
VAdm. Maddison: That is a very good question. I will answer it by telling you that, of course, we provide assistance to provinces and municipalities in a host of areas, including, for example, law enforcement agencies, particularly prisons and penitentiaries. We respond regularly to forest fires by bringing in people to support professional firefighters and thereby relieve them of mundane tasks so they may do the frontline work. We responded to past incidents such as the Saguenay floods, the Winnipeg floods, the Ice Storm and so on. If a request came to our department to provide assistance in the scenario just outlined by Senator Wiebe, we would obviously look at that seriously in terms of what kind of capabilities we could bring to the table, and I rather suspect that there would be some assistance we could provide for that.
Senator Wiebe: I am a little bit disturbed by that answer — and I do not fault you for that — in that you say you could provide ``some'' assistance. We have to look at what is happening nationally. We will not have riots — at least that is my hope — in each of our prisons at the same time. We will not have forest fires all over the country at the same time. The military can adapt to respond to those individual situations. However, what would happen if there were a national rail strike that would require armed services personnel from each part of this country to keep trains running across the country? This is a minor point, but do we have the resources? From a manpower point of view, I do not believe we have the resources to be able to handle something like that.
VAdm. Maddison: One would have to balance the demands on our people at that particular time. As to the number of folks we have available to respond in various regions of the country, we have immediate reaction units, 350 in each, which could respond to a number of contingencies that might arise. We may very well be able to provide a level of support in this regard.
Do we train for that scenario? No, we do not. As to risk management, where we think our resources may be required, we have a trained for and have a fair bit of experience in responding to calamitous events such as floods, the Ice Storm and the Swissair disaster on the East Coast. Running trains is not something we have spent a lot of time training for.
Senator Wiebe: I appreciate that. My recollection is that, when the army ran the trains, and I say this with no hesitation, the trains were much better run when they took over than was the case before, and I do not think our Armed Forces personnel were trained to run trains. A situation may arise in wartime or in the defence of our country where the Armed Forces may not necessarily be trained for a specific problem, yet, because of the training its members have, it has demonstrated it can adjust to deal with the situation. Perhaps the current problem, if we are unable to meet that capability, is that we do not have enough bodies to handle something like that.
I come from the Province of Saskatchewan, which has, you could say, no regular army presence whatsoever. Canadian Forces Base Moose Jaw is slowly being taken over by Bombardier. Basically, the Armed Forces have a housekeeping group there to run a small portion of the bases This disturbs me because we have headquarters for the army located in Edmonton that covers three and a half Prairie provinces — B.C., Alberta, Saskatchewan, and I think that there is some contingent in Manitoba. How do we move people those distances? You could bring a Hercules into Saskatchewan on a snowy day the countryside is flat, but you would have a heck of a time doing that in Vancouver or other mountainous areas. Perhaps 30 minutes is the time required, not two hours. Again, it is a problem, I suspect, of budgets and manpower.
I am very disappointed that our regular forces do not have a large presence in each one of our provinces. Is it a problem of financing and lack of manpower?
VAdm. Maddison: Let me start by saying that some of those decisions are well above my pay grade. Certainly, as the head of the navy for the last four years, before I took over this responsibility nine months ago, I can say that any commander will tell you they would prefer flexibility in terms of the resources and people available to them because the more folks you have, the more flexibility there is in being able to reposition capability, equipment, people and so on.
We went through a period of time in this country where it was decided by the government that the fiscal reality was that a number of savings had to be made over the course of the late 1990s. Our department was one where some of those savings were found.
In your province, senator, yes, there are folks in Moose Jaw, but there are also a number of militia units and naval reserve divisions. I think you have publicly visited those many times in your previous appointment. I am referring to Saskatoon, Regina and the naval reserve division. There is a core of people in Saskatchewan who, when push comes to shove, can respond.
When we were preparing and ramping up for the possible impact of Y2K on January 1, 2000, all of those people were trained and ready to react to support the people of Saskatchewan if they needed to do so.
Senator Wiebe: That is very true.
However, I would point out that Saskatchewan no longer has a brigade. The 38th Brigade is headquartered in Winnipeg. From a reservist's perspective, we are starting to fear this ongoing neglect of our reservists and regular army personnel in the province of Saskatchewan. I would certainly like to see that rectified in the future.
We must look at the future policy of this government towards Armed Forces and Armed Forces personnel. We are a defence bureau. It is called the CND, Canadian National Defence. The last time we performed a defence function was in 1812, and we were not even a country at that time when we were called upon to defend our borders.
We have played more peacekeeping and offensive roles ever since then. We are one of the largest countries in the world. We have a tremendous amount of area to defend. We have a small population. An honourable senator made a speech in the Senate the other day in which it was said that we should be diverting more of our funds toward health care and education and less and less on defence because there is no one in the world who is mad at us. That sounds good and I think it is true that no one is mad at us. However, when one nation decides to attack another nation, nine times out of 10 it is not because they are mad at them, it is because that nation has something that the other one wants.
We have a tremendous amount of natural resources in this country. We have some wonderful people in this country. We have some tremendous programs and tremendous knowledge. Somewhere down the road someone who may not be mad at us might decide that they cannot get what we have any place else so they will come in and take it. I do not think we can defend ourselves very well.
VAdm. Maddison: That is a difficult question to respond to. I say that, because you are correct when you say that nations need to have a capability to provide a level of defence, no matter what nation that happens to be. We do have a capability to do quite a number of things. However, how much capability is required is, at the end of the day, up to the government to decide. The Armed Forces are based on the white paper of 1994. Much has happened since 1994. Certainly, a lot has happened in the last seven or eight months. I believe that it is our minister's view that it is time to update our defence posture and capability. I assume that, at the end of that, some decisions will be taken as to what level of defence and security capability the nation needs.
The work and views of this committee will be very important as to what kind of defence Canada should have.
Senator Banks: In your opening remarks and in answer to Senator Wiebe, you said that the number of Canadian Forces members was 60,000. I know that is the mandated number. How many do we actually have?
VAdm. Maddison: We actually have about 60,500. However, those are not all trained. We are at about 53,000 or 54,000 personnel whom we would call fully trained to be able to execute operations. That number is high because we had gone well below the 60,000 about a year ago and we developed a fairly aggressive recruiting campaign. We now have up to around 60,000 or 60,500 but many thousands of those are not quite trained to go off and do jobs at sea, air and on the ground.
Senator Banks: However, that is in process.
VAdm. Maddison: It is, indeed.
Senator Banks: The number of bodies that we consider to be members of the Canadian Forces is either at or just a little above or in the vicinity of the mandated number.
VAdm. Maddison: That is correct, yes.
Senator Banks: Are we up to 30,000 with militia as well?
VAdm. Maddison: I do not think we are. I do not have the numbers at my fingerer tips. The recruiting campaign for reservists has gone well. We have actually recruited more than we thought we would over the course of the last six to nine months. However, I do not believe that we are at the mandated number for reservists for all three services, namely, army, navy and air force. However, I do not have the number at my fingerer tips.
Senator Banks: I am glad to hear that the recruiting campaign has worked. A short while ago, we did not have 60,000 members.
VAdm. Maddison: That is correct. It is not a one-shot deal. It is something into which we must continue to put effort and visibility.
Senator Banks: I would imagine that we still have the problem of people performing tasks above their rank.
VAdm. Maddison: There are some examples of that. Probably our biggest challenge is to recruit those folks who actually have the technical and engineering skills in a number of our trades. Some of the trades do not need a certain level of capability, and we have done very well in terms of recruiting in those areas, but, in a number of trades we have yet to get the numbers we want. I am talking about computer technologists and some of the weapons censor technologists. We are seeing improvements but we are not getting the numbers we need just yet.
Senator Banks: Senator Atkins has reminded me that there is enormous pressure because of the pending retirement from the services of large numbers of highly trained people. Are the people who are coming up trained well enough to fill those positions?
VAdm. Maddison: That is an excellent question. I wish I could say that the answer is definitely yes. However, we do not know that yet.
I am part of the baby boom generation. Over the course of the next three, four and five years, many of us — and not only senior officers but also middle level officers, senior sergeants, warrant officers, and so on, who are all of the same age — will be reaching that point in our careers when it is time for retirement.
Senator Banks: It is warrant officers that I am really worried about.
VAdm. Maddison: We are all worried by that. Those are the folks who really get the job done at the middle levels, whether they are petty officers or warrant officers and so on. Part of our recruiting campaign has focussed on identifying people who have engineering and technical skills, but who may be a little older, and then to focus on their leadership training, and so on, over the course of the next three, four or five years so that they can actually step into some of these positions as our people retire.
The other step that we have taken in this regard is to allow people to stay on until age 60. That will probably only solve a small portion of the problem, but that does give us more flexibility.
Senator Wiebe: There is no doubt that we will be losing some highly-skilled personnel. Are there any incentives in place that would allow these individuals to become reservists, if they so wished? A number of our senior reservists have applied to go into the regular force and have been encouraged to hold off because of a lack of officers in the reserves to train personnel. Could there be some kind of incentive to encourage some of these retirees to go into reserve units and provide some continuity there?
VAdm. Maddison: Senator, that is an excellent idea. You must understand that I am not the ADM (HR-MIL). However, my sense is that group, under the leadership of General Couture, is very much looking at some of these option to allow that to happen.
Over the course of the last decade or two, we have built in bureaucratic hurdles for people moving from regular force to reserve and back. Those hurdles do not reflect the reality of the young people today who wish to be moving in and out more quickly than my generation did. That factor has been well-recognized.
We are now in the process of trying to remove some of these barriers to allow people to be full-time reservists for a while, then part-time and back to full-time to meet the needs of their families and their lifestyles. In many cases, if we do not do that, we lose the people. We recognize that that is not in our best interests at all.
The Chairman: Before I recognize the next senator, could you translate for the committee and the audience watching ``ADM (HR-MIL)''? Evidently you have not heard about our system of fines here, but I think that was a ``50-center.''
VAdm. Maddison: One of our great downsides is that we are an acronym-ridden organization. ADM (HR-MIL) is the Assistant Deputy Minister (Human Resources — Military). My apologies.
Senator Atkins: My question is similar to that of Senator Wiebe. Is the military now putting into effect reenlistment incentives that compete with the private sector? Are there incentives not only for those who reach their twentieth year and wish to retire, but also for those who are going through as junior officers?
VAdm. Maddison: Yes, we are, senator, is the simple answer.
I am not so sure that we will ever compete with the private sector in terms of benefits like compensation. There may be the odd person in our organization who would join for that reason. However, I would have to say that most people do not join the military for that particular reason.
For some of the shortages within our medical community and those to which I have already alluded in our engineering and technical areas, the minister has recently approved a number of signing bonuses to determine if that will attract the numbers of people we are seeking. At the moment, it appears relatively encouraging. However, we will not know the result of that until some many months down the road. We have done exactly that which you have suggested.
Senator Forrestall: We learned that, in spite of our hopes, the government has not seen fit to extend to reservists who serve off-shore one of the benefits that they extend to reservists who serve here in Canada. The comfort of job protection is not provided. Upon return, the reservist, if he has been off-shore, should have some reasonable hope or expectation of being able return to his old job.
Why have we not provided that benefit? Do you see this as an impediment to recruitment, particularly for reservists who undertake off-shore duty?
VAdm. Maddison: I am wandering in an area about which I do not know that much, senator. However, it is my understanding that one of the bills that is being debated in Parliament deals with some job protection legislation.
Senator Forrestall: That is the reason for my fear. That job protection in that legislation does not apply to reservists who serve off-shore.
I have heard of the experience of a senior reservist being denied access to his job because he served off-shore.
Colonel André Deschamps, Director, Continental Operations, Department of National Defence: Honourable senators, there is a discussion currently to provide for fines and penalties to companies that would not give these returning service members the benefits of their old jobs or seniority. I am not sure where the discussion is at as far as the legal process of approving this bill is concerned. However, I believe it covered reservists in general. It was not specific.
Senator Forrestall: It excludes off-shore reservists.
Col. Deschamps: I was not aware of that.
VAdm. Maddison: I can get an answer to that question and sent it to the committee.
Senator Forrestall: I do not want an answer; I want you to fix it.
VAdm. Maddison: I am not sure that I have the power to do that.
Senator Wiebe: We may have to fix it with an amendment.
Senator Forrestall: We will certainly do that if it is not fixed.
The Chairman: Senator Banks has been very patient. That is a testament to the questions that are being asked. You now have the floor.
Senator Banks: We have asked these questions of General Couture. However, we wish to hear the answers from the operational side, as well.
I have a matter that I should like you to clear up for me. It is on the topic of aid to the civil power.
There are four different areas. The first is aid to the civil power; the second is principles for federal military assistance to provincial policing; the third is Canadian Forces armed assistance direction in the case of disturbances of the peace; and the fourth is aid to correctional services. The latter I understand completely. The first three seem to be different words to describe the same thing.
I note that, in the question of aid to the civil power, in the National Defence Act —
VAdm. Maddison: If I could make one small point, it is aid ``of'' the civil power.
Senator Banks: Aid of the civil power is the correct term. When that is referenced in the applicable section of the National Defence Act, that aid is obtained by the attorney general of a province requisitioning — not requesting — military assistance. The other two areas, aid to provincial policing and aid to restore public order, are responses to requests. Could you tell me how to define the difference between those three things, please?
VAdm. Maddison: I will address aid of the civil power last. The other two are requests that can vary quite extensively from support for the search for a lost child and looking for search parties, to assisting during floods and, say, assisting the province of Nova Scotia at the time of the Swissair disaster. We can offer to help with those.
There are various categories. Operational commanders in various parts of the country have the authority to respond to some of these requests. If the request deals with a certain number of assets, it is raised to the national level. In some cases, the request must go to the minister for a response. The level required for response is fairly clearly articulated in a number of our publications.
Aid of the civil power is where, as you are quite correct in saying, a provincial attorney general will ask the Chief of the Defence Staff of the day for support, and it means that the chief must answer. He must respond. The chief will decide what level of support is required in response to the request from the province.
Let me give you a recent example. There were difficulties in the community of Oka in 1990. The attorney general specifically asked the Chief of the Defence Staff for help. Our operation was the result of that.
Perhaps it is semantics, but the chief must respond to a request in aid of the civil power.
Senator Banks: I understand that. However, with respect to disturbances of the peace and a perceived insurrection, as opposed to searching for a lost child or helping to put out a forest fire, could they also fall within the other two descriptions, that is, aid to the provincial police, and armed assistance direction? Both of the notes on those kinds of interventions refer to disturbances of the peace and things that could be taken to be insurrections. Is there a definable difference between those?
Col. Deschamps: The best way to group these categories is this: Insofar as the admiral just mentioned, it is a requirement under law for us to be able to provide those services to the provinces.
The other categories are grouped under section 373.6 of the National Defence Act. This part of the legislation deals with public service deemed necessary by the government. We can be called upon to do many things under that broad section.
To further define some of these processes, Orders in Council have been passed to define separate processes for challenges, for example, at the provincial level for assisting police forces. There is also the one to which you refer, namely, armed assistance, which is strictly concerned with counterterrorism. Those are more specific processes which have been worked out through Order in Council. This was a fallout from the public service requirement of the Canadian Forces.
In terms of assistance to law enforcement agencies, as the admiral mentioned, it could be anything from loaning equipment to loaning personnel, if it is deemed necessary by a police force. The police force would make the request of the province's attorney general. If he sees a requirement for it, he will then push the request up to the federal Solicitor General because he has resources at the federal level that he may be able to employ. They must look within the normal police services to find the resources to meet their specific needs. If it is found that they cannot satisfy their needs from their resources, both federally and provincially, then they may come to the minister to make a formal request for military assistance.
Armed assistance is specific. That is an order that directly concerns the counterterrorist force that would be employed or deployed in reaction to a terrorist threat or incident. That is a separate component.
Other actions may not involve armed personnel. They may be resources or other forms of assistance to law enforcement to help them contain or to deal with a situation.
Senator Banks: I think I understand what you said. I understand the difference between the nature of the requests that are made as opposed to requisitions. I think you have partly answered my question. What twigged my question was the description under ``Aid of the Civil Power'' which talks about a riot or a disturbance occurring. The description under the principles for federal military assistance to provincial policing deals with a situation where a disturbance is occurring. Armed assistance refers to where a ``disturbance of the peace may occur.'' I was looking for a clear definition and I think you have partly given that to me.
In the last situation you mentioned, the response to a terrorist threat, I assume that that may involve people like JTF2, depending on the nature of the threat; is that right?
VAdm. Maddison: That is correct.
Col. Deschamps: That is right.
Senator Banks: I know when you are responding in aid of the civil power that military people thereupon become peace officers. Would a JTF2 person become a peace officer when responding to a terrorist threat?
Col. Deschamps: Anytime a service person is asked by the Solicitor General to provide support to police forces, whether it is in assistance to territorial, provincial or federal law enforcement agencies, they have the protection, if you will, of peace officer status. If they are not doing a specific duty but are performing other support functions, then they do not have that power, if you will.
Senator Banks: If they were searching for a lost child, they would not have that power; is that what you saying?
Col. Deschamps: That is correct. However, if they are asked to provide an armed assistance response of some sort to police agencies, or if they are asked to protect police forces, then they would have the mandate of a peace officer.
Senator Banks: Would another way to put that be that whenever they were armed in the pursuit of what they were doing they would likely be police officers?
Col. Deschamps: Anytime they are armed and in such duties, they would have to have that mandate. However, they may be unarmed and still be asked to perform some police-type functions which would require that protection.
Senator Banks: If they were armed, they would be peace officers.
Col. Deschamps: That would normally be the outcome of having to be armed to do a job for the police, yes.
Senator Banks: I will close with a question that I have asked of every witness who has testified before us. We began asking ourselves this question almost a year ago. Let us consider a situation in which all available forces of all three orders of government are involved and have been properly requisitioned. Municipal first responders, provincial people, and the Government of Canada and its resources are involved in response to, not a natural disaster, for example, but to some cataclysmic terrorist-related type of event. I think everyone understands that the likelihood of flying a plane into something is now substantially reduced because they have done that. We have kind of fixed it. Everyone knows that the next thing will be something different. However, when that happens, when all three orders of government are involved, who is in charge?
VAdm. Maddison: When an incident occurs, the municipal or local authorities respond. If they recognize that they do not have the resources to be able to deal with a particular incident, they would then turn to their provincial authorities who would respond. However, they may recognize that they do not have the resources to deal with the situation, and the federal authorities are asked to respond. We then go in. If we have the capability, and more than likely we will, to be able to respond, we will take charge.
Senator Banks: In that circumstance, would the management/command resources of the Government of Canada by convention, agreement or law supersede the authorities of the two other orders of government?
Col. Deschamps: If it is a man-made or a natural disaster, the distinction is moot once the disaster has occurred. At the federal level, the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness has the mandate to coordinate, at the federal level, support to provincial authorities in the management of a crisis of that nature. As I mentioned before, the federal level would look at exhausting their in-house resources, such as police, first responders, or transportation. They would look at trying to resolve those issues within federal-level agencies.
If it becomes a federal issue, the Privy Council Office would be the manager, if you will, of the crisis. At some point in the crisis they would identify the lead department. If it became clear that it was more than just a response to a disaster for which OCIPEP has the mandate to coordinate at the federal level, then they might decide at the PCO level which department should take the lead. For instance, if it were something in which law enforcement or other departments would be involved, then another department would come in in support of that department.
At some point, the CF would become involved in this negotiation and bring our special capability to fill the gaps in those departments' needs. However, we would be in support. We would not be in charge, if you will, in that we would set the rules and tell other departments what to do. We are still supporting them in the sense that we are bringing what we can to the table to help them resolve their issues.
Aid of the civil power is the only time the military is in charge. It is clear-cut. The difference is night and day. Aid of the civil power means the military is in charge of all operations in that area.
Senator Banks: That brings me back to my first question. In the event of a terrorist attack of some kind, once it is determined that that requires the intervention of the Canadian Forces under the rubric of ``aid of the civil power,'' in that circumstance — and only, I gather, in that circumstance — the command would be in the Canadian Forces. Am I hearing you say that otherwise the Canadian Forces would be in support of and, in some sense, subject to the command or direction of someone else?
Col. Deschamps: Canadian Forces personnel always retain the national military chain of authority.
Senator Banks: I understand that.
Col. Deschamps: In terms of the leadership role, under certain criteria, the government can make a declaration under the Emergencies Act. What you describe would probably qualify. That act may be declared for massive natural disasters, war or widespread disruptions to government. In that respect, if it is a security issue, the military may be the lead department when other resources may have been exhausted. In addition to aid of the civil power, there is legislation that could be invoked by government in a major crisis where it is clear the military must be involved.
Senator Banks: I have a comment and an observation.
The reason I am pursuing this question is that I do not have a real sense of confidence, and I am asking whether you do, that, in any imaginable circumstance, there is a clear understanding that, when we respond to something, whatever it is, someone will define it under the various columns you mentioned and someone will decide, in short order, who is in charge. There has to be a local level, however big that local level is, but someone has to drive the bus. In our discussion with OCIPEP, for example, I did not feel confident that anyone knew who was going to drive the bus.
VAdm. Maddison: That is one of the reasons the Office of Critical Infrastructure and Emergency Preparedness was initiated a year ago.
When I said, if the local and/or provincial resources could not deal with an issue, then we would respond, the ``we'' is the federal government, not necessarily the Canadian Forces. The government would determine the lead department, whether it be the RCMP, the Solicitor General, the Department of National Defence or whatever other department, except in the case of an aid of the civil power when we automatically become the lead department in dealing with something like the Oka crisis.
Senator Banks: In that case, by ``we,'' you mean the Canadian Forces.
VAdm. Maddison: Yes.
Senator Atkins: Was the military or the federal government involved in the recent accident in Manitoba where a train ran into a truck and there was a major chemical problem?
VAdm. Maddison: We were certainly not involved in terms of having to make any national decisions about providing support. It is possible, if there were a minimum level of support, that the local commander may have authorized some support assistance, but I am not aware of that. My belief is that we did not provide support in that particular incident.
Senator Atkins: The military has how many Challengers?
VAdm. Maddison: We have six Challengers.
Senator Atkins: The six listed can be used for moving reconnaissance forces quickly to areas under threat. Are those the same ones that are used by ministers and by the government?
VAdm. Maddison: There are two Challenger fleets. The white Challengers are there to support the government transportation, and the grey Challengers belong directly to the department and can be used for a whole host of different things related to reconnaissance. One Challenger at the moment has an air medevac team on board to repatriate a soldier who was hurt in Bosnia.
Senator Atkins: The government has more than six then.
VAdm. Maddison: We have six that we control within our department.
Senator Atkins: What is the capacity?
VAdm. Maddison: They can accommodate about 16 people when all the different seats are in. They are not large aircraft that can move great numbers of people around. We use them in doing strategic and even tactical reconnaissance when you need a small team to go in, make a quick assessment, and come out and describe what is needed. We have done this on many of our operations.
Senator Atkins: You told us that you are going to expand the size and capability of JTF2. Can you give us some further information on that?
VAdm. Maddison: Over the course of the next five years, we hope to double the number of people that we have, and to provide them with the associated equipment to do their primary task, which is to be part of the national counterterrorist team in Canada, and to deploy them, as they are currently deployed in Afghanistan, in special forces missions. These are extremely well-trained individuals. They are not just physically very well trained, but they are also psychologically and mentally very well trained. As a result of those requirements, we have fewer recruits. They need to possess certain skills that they can bring to the table and that we can develop. That is why it will take three to five years to increase our current capability.
Senator Atkins: Would they be similar to the British commando or the American Ranger, or are they more highly trained?
VAdm. Maddison: There are a number of tiers in terms of capabilities. There are the conventional forces, for example, the PPCLI that we have in Afghanistan at the moment; then there are unconventional forces, and they are like the Rangers, like the Green Berets. They have additional skills, such as sniping capability and the ability to deal with the locals in remote, austere and severe conditions. Then you have Tier 1. They have tremendously refined skills in a whole host of areas. They are like the 22nd Special Air Service, the Navy Seals and Delta Force. That is where our people fit in terms of capability.
Senator Atkins: Are they in Afghanistan right now?
VAdm. Maddison: Some are deployed in Afghanistan. We have quite a large number remaining in Canada who could respond if needed.
Senator Atkins: You say that they are adding CF-18s to the NORAD. We were told there would be four leading up to our report. Are you saying that more than four will be committed to that assignment?
VAdm. Maddison: I would rather not get into specific numbers as to what we have at the moment. I will, however, confirm that before September 11 we had four on alert. We have quite a number more now.
Senator Atkins: I assume you welcome the fact that there is to be a new white paper?
VAdm. Maddison: We are encouraged that there will be a defence update. As I said earlier, a lot has happened in the last eight years, and it is probably the right time to do a review and decide, for the next 10, 15 or 20 years, what sorts of capabilities we should have within Canada that can be used both domestically and abroad.
Senator Atkins: If you were to get what we recommended, namely, a $4 billion increase, how long would it take you to spend that money?
VAdm. Maddison: We would take a measured approach to this. We would be looking at what types of capabilities and probably the numbers of people that should be in the Canadian Forces, given that sum of money.
Senator Atkins: We are recommending 75,000.
VAdm. Maddison: That seems like a reasonable number to me. It provides us with more flexibility in terms of being able to respond to a number of different things that occur and it provides our people with a level of quality of life in terms of being able to pause after they have been deployed. However, people are expensive. We would need a fairly significant increase to our budget to allow for that number of people to be in the Canadian Forces.
Senator Banks: One reason for our recommendation that there be 75,000 people relates to the question of rotation. Given the present resources, the number of people involved, and the level of training required, can we sustain the present commitment in Afghanistan indefinitely?
VAdm. Maddison: Yes, we could, if we were in such a crisis that would cause us to put people in on a rotation, but it would have a tremendous impact on our people if we were to do that. People would be involved more often in these sorts of operations.
Senator Banks: The rotation would not be acceptable in the long term, would it?
VAdm. Maddison: We cannot replace the current battle group with ease at all. It would have a significant impact on the army if we were to do that.
The Chairman: I did not understand that answer, admiral. Are you saying that you could keep the 2,000 troops in the Balkans, continue with the troops in Afghanistan, and sustain them both indefinitely?
VAdm. Maddison: We could do that, but we would be hurting our people if we did it. By doing that, we would have people who would be going immediately from one rotation to the next one. They would not have any breaks at home. They would be under tremendous amount of pressure by being in a combat zone and being returned to a combat zone. Statistically, we could do it, but it would have a tremendous negative impact on our people.
Senator Banks: As a practical matter, moving people from one theatre to another without a break is not sustainable for any length of time, is it?
VAdm. Maddison: No, it is not.
Senator Banks: It is not a question of inconveniencing them; people cannot function well for any length of time in such a scenario.
VAdm. Maddison: That is right.
Senator Day: Admiral, your notes will be helpful to us in our review.
Following on Senator Banks' question about who is in charge, I have a lot of unease about all of these memoranda of understanding and Orders in Council and special side agreements. Depending on the emergency, how does someone decide who to contact? How does the word get to the right person? Who has all of these memoranda and knows who makes the decisions? Would it not be easier to have someone in charge of, say, resources deployment or personnel deployment, for example, the deputy CDS, rather than specifying that, at a certain level, someone else has to make the decision?
Col. Deschamps: Domestic operations involve a fairly complex interaction because of the jurisdictional issue of who is the lead partner or who is responsible under the law to perform certain duties.
The MOUs and the Orders in Council were designed to facilitate the process. Without them, if a high level requirement arises, it must be staffed at the ministerial level with specific processes being laid up. We must find out what the departments want and decide how we want to implement the request. The instruments were put in place to facilitate that. They codify the process so that we can quickly put procedures in place. One of those procedures could be a quick phone call from the minister saying that he or she will invoke a particular instrument. We know who is responsible to do what, and the costs and recovery have all been outlined.
In a crisis situation, it saves a lot of time to have some of these instruments in place so that you are able to quickly respond to what the other person is asking for, and we know what we are willing to do in a particular scenario. However, when the situation does not fit within any of those instruments, we must find out what the departments making the request want, and we must negotiate with them. At the ministerial level, an agreement is struck and it is formalized through an exchange of letters. The staff work well ahead of the paper process to ensure things will happen in due course. Whether it involves counter-drug operations or a crisis that erupts and has a short timeline, using these mechanisms, we can move the process along quickly.
Within the departments, not many individuals are involved in this process, and the relevant people in other departments know those individuals. The requests come in at the senior management level and we untangle the details and decide where it will be dealt with most quickly and efficiently.
VAdm. Maddison: There is an education issue in terms of the provinces and the territories, in particular. One of the mandates that Ms Purdy has, as head of the Office of Critical Infrastructure and Emergency Preparedness, is to educate people across the country who ask for assistance from our department. That will probably be an ongoing process. Could some of these things be written a different way? Perhaps, they could, and that is one of things that Ms Purdy is also looking at.
Having said all that, that particular group has only been in place for less than a year and they want to consider and assess a fair number of things.
Senator Day: Is someone at NDHQ the keeper of the book which contains all the memoranda?
Col. Deschamps: I am ``keeper of the faith,'' if you will. The instruments are kept by the legal staff. They track the validity and the upkeep of those instruments because they are legal documents. We have embedded those guidelines in the documentation that we issue to our commanders. We reflect those instruments in our own documentation in ``military speak'' so that they know the rules.
By the time the federal level gets involved, we have exhausted the provincial level. We have area commanders to educate and liase with the provincial and municipal governments to ensure that they understand the capabilities. They have liaison officers embedded in the provincial level. They have very good knowledge of each other's needs and requirements.
Normally, that is worked out at the provincial-territorial level. If they cannot deal with something because of the scope and magnitude, we get involved at the federal level. A lot of work goes on at the provincial level between the area commanders and the provincial-municipal agencies.
VAdm. Maddison: To answer your question, although the lawyers provide legal advice, which is extremely important, they keep track of all the various instruments which cover the arrangements between the provinces and the various regulations.
Senator Day: Let's say that you get a call from the Montreal municipal police because there is a major hostage- taking, and there may be some chemicals involved. The provincial police in Quebec are involved as well. Someone goes to the CFAPPFD and, from that direction, the decision is made about what the Armed Forces can do.
Col. Deschamps: You are talking about municipal and provincial police forces having a situation. If it is strictly assistance, extra bodies or manpower equipment, the municipal force would seek assistance from the provincial-level police. If they cannot provide the assistance, then the attorney general would turn to the Solicitor General, who is, in effect, the senior police officer for the country responsible for providing police services. Perhaps he cannot respond because they do not have the assets in the case of, say, a nuclear or bio-chemical issue.
The request would then come to us to provide the team that we have to go work with these individuals. The agreements are in place for that particular process. It would come under armed assistance, although they are not armed. It comes under the same mandate as counterterrorism.
The provincial attorney general would go quickly to the federal department if that is what is needed. The request would then come across to us.
Senator Day: The request would come from the political side down to you.
VAdm. Maddison: Exactly. It would go from attorney general to the Solicitor General, from there to our minister, and from our minister to the Chief of Staff.
Senator Day: Presumably, you would do what you could do. This must happen in a matter of minutes?
Col. Deschamps: We are not first responders. If we know ahead of time that there is a terrorist threat that may require chemical warfare specialties, we could deploy people to help mitigate and prevent. If it is going to occur in the very near future, the local responders take the first steps. We can then come in and assist.
VAdm. Maddison: We have done this quite a number of times between the Solicitor General and ourselves. This process is very streamlined and can be done quickly indeed. We have done it literally in hours.
Senator Day: Do you simulate these kinds of situations and practice dealing with them?
VAdm. Maddison: Yes, we do.
Senator Day: Perhaps we could see such an exercise sometime.
You are setting up a chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear joint group this summer. I hope that you saw our suggestion in our most recent report. We suggested a meaningful role for the reserve army. Is there any discussion or contemplation of that?
VAdm. Maddison: There is indeed. We have taken that particular suggestion, and a number of others, and tried to figure out how best we can do this. There is a good role for our reservists in developing niche skills and some expertise that we could use as part of our capability to respond.
As you are aware, we are part and parcel of a joint NBC response team led by the RCMP. We have certain skills, and we can currently add about 29 people to the response team.
We are now developing a joint company that will basically double those numbers by this summer. Within another year or so, we will have well over a company's worth of people, which is approximately 120 folks, who will be able to respond to not just one incident but to two simultaneous incidents, as rare as that might be, right across the country. We are spending much effort in this area to be able to provide that capability.
Senator Day: Does that involve militia?
VAdm. Maddison: Involving reservists.
Senator Day: Does it include stockpiling equipment in different parts of the country?
VAdm. Maddison: We are looking at positioning equipment across the country. One of biggest questions is where would we stockpile equipment. We do not have the answer to that yet.
Senator Day: If it is determined to be a good idea, would the matter of dollars prevent you from doing it? Perhaps you have not yet decided whether it is a good idea.
VAdm. Maddison: We have not figured out the best location to store equipment that offers a certain level of security. The biggest issue is training the people to the level of capability required. It will take some time to do that.
Senator Day: Are you confident that the money will be available when you decide which plan to pursue?
VAdm. Maddison: We have earmarked funds to allow that to happen. I have confidence in that, yes.
Senator Banks: We will be speaking to the Chief of Police, Toronto Police Services later today. We have a letter from him in which he complains about the lack of exercises involving first responders. You just said to Senator Day that you do exercises and training that involves, I presume, the other orders of government and their resources. Can you help us out with what to tell the Chief of Police?
VAdm. Maddison: I was speaking about ``tabletop'' exercises amongst the Solicitor General and his people, the RCMP and our people.
Senator Banks: The exercises do not necessarily involve the first responders?
VAdm. Maddison: Not yet. We want to engage more and more with the municipal and provincial agencies so that there is much better coordination and understanding of the capabilities on both sides.
Senator Banks: Are you satisfied with the pace at which that inter-operability integration is moving?
VAdm. Maddison: We probably could do better.
Senator Day: You use the term ``joint.'' Is it joint with the RCMP or joint to describe the various areas of possible problem?
VAdm. Maddison: It is joint with the RCMP.
Senator Day: My last area of questioning relates to something we observed when we were in Winnipeg with respect to NORAD and the air force assistance in drug enforcement on a North American scale. A Canadian aircraft was scrambled to help intercept another plane. It was flown over the United States because the suspect aircraft was coming from the United States into Canada.
We have seamless operations through NORAD for air defence, and we understand that the navy has a fairly good working relationship with our neighbours, although perhaps not as integrated as the air force in NORAD. The army seems to be quite a bit further ahead.
One of the roles we were contemplating for the army, especially the reservists, would involve them playing a meaningful role in homeland defence.
I understand that the northern command is a policy issue yet to be decided by the executive branch. Do you contemplate an expansion of roles? Could we possibly not try to have everything within the Canadian Armed Forces to respond in homeland defence? Is it possible that we might share some of the expertise with our neighbours and develop expertise in certain areas beyond NORAD, that is, in the navy, the coastal patrol and the army?
VAdm. Maddison: The short answer is: It is possible. I believe you the Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff has been invited here to talk about these kinds of issues. He is the one within the department, along with our policy folks, who is working on this particular file. I am not. I deal with current operations and so on. I cannot give you a more detailed answer than that, senator.
I will say, however, in terms of your drug enforcement or drug interdiction example, senator, that both the air force and the navy do a lot of work with our various police forces in Canada, and there is intelligence sharing with our American partners.
As a result of our partnerships with our American friends and the police forces in Canada, on a number of occasions we have been quite successful in being able to interdict those who were trying to smuggle drugs into Canada.
Senator Day: Does it also work well with the immigration authorities?
VAdm. Maddison: Yes.
The Chairman: VAdm. Maddison and Col. Deschamps, you have been very helpful to the committee this morning. You have heard several comments from committee members about the quality of the material you sent over to us, which material we will go through in further detail. As a result, we may come back to you with more questions in written form.
Thank you very much for appearing today and for your assistance to the committee in this matter.
Our next witness is LGen. Macdonald, Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff. He has a distinguished career in the Air Force, and served as Deputy Commander in Chief of North American Aerospace Defence in Colorado Springs immediately before assuming his current duties.
During the committee's trip to Washington last February, we had an opportunity to discuss the future of NORAD and a possible Canadian role in the homeland defence command. Plans for a CINC North have progressed. Thus, today, we have invited our witness to provide us with a status report.
Lieutenant-General George Macdonald, Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff, Department of National Defence: Honourable senators, it is a pleasure to be here today to answer your questions in regard to the enhancement of North American security and the U.S. Unified Command Plan.
[Translation]
In the interests of time, I would now like to draw your attention to the document that was distributed to committee members. It contains a summary of the announcement made by the U.S. on April 17. It also includes a section on the potential impact of these changes on Canada. Clearly, this subject has captured the attention of academics and parliamentarians alike. As well, general requests for information have increased, as has the desire to initiate a dialogue on this subject.
[English]
We have also provided this morning to your staff a series of speaking notes that is somewhat longer than those I will use this morning. Unfortunately, they are only available in English today. We will provide the French in the next day or two. They address in more depth Canadian-U.S. defence relationships, the issues around asymmetric threats, how NORAD itself works, what the UCP process is in more detail, and some of the Canadian issues and objectives surrounding this overall issue. I will not go into detail. That will be available to you for your reading as you wish.
Let me note that the government has yet to make a decision on this issue. However, the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defence have on several occasions openly described the process of informal discussions with our U.S. counterparts and our openness to consider enhancements to continental security and defence. This is the proper thing to do.
We must examine the case for action for what we have called ``enhanced North American security,'' consider the potential gaps in our security posture, and examine alternative methods to fill those gaps. Our government will then be in a position to consider its options for potential enhanced cooperation, the scope, means and mechanisms, and then to make its decision. Thereafter, should there be a need to formalize these arrangements, negotiations can commence.
Time is of the essence. The United States, as the chairman has indicated, has publicly stated that they wish the new command, U.S. Northern Command, to stand up with an initial operating capability on October 1 of this year. The so- called high level working group comprised of Dr. Ken Calder, the Assistant Deputy Minister for Policy in DND, Mr. Jim Wright, the Assistant Deputy Minister for International Security Relations from the Department of Foreign Affairs, and I have worked closely with our counterparts in the United States to explore our respective views on these vital issues.
Before I close, I should like to comment on the nature of the public debate, especially the recent academic study entitled, ``Canadian Armed Forces under U.S. Command'' by Dr. Michael Byers. I can elaborate on the errors and exaggerations if you wish. However, let me say that it is unfortunate that so significant a subject topic has become emotional and, to a degree, anti-American. Canada-U.S. defence relations are vitally important for both countries. They are extensive and well-established, but they can be improved. I am confident that, despite some reporting on this issue, we can continue this debate with the facts, with clear reasoning, and with full realization of its significance to Canada and Canadians.
The often-stated threat to our sovereignty is unfounded. We have proven that we can cooperate militarily without compromising our sovereignty. Our NORAD experience demonstrates that clearly. Further cooperation need not be any different. We can and will ensure that we retain independence and command over our own military forces.
I will close by noting our three objectives in this overall process. Our first objective is to ensure our efforts enhance the security of Canada and Canadians. We are not seeking enhancement just for the sake of cooperation but, rather, to improve Canada's abilities to defend effectively against conventional and asymmetric threats.
Our second objective is to protect the sovereignty of Canada and the policy independence of Canadian government. Any enhancement in our defence cooperation would have to respect criteria such as these.
Our third objective is to maintain a dynamic and positive relationship with our neighbour and our most important ally economically and militarily. It is in Canadian interests to continue sharing with the United States the responsibilities of defending the continent. We must do so as sovereign nations.
Thank you for the opportunity to make my opening remarks. I look forward to your questions.
Senator Day: LGen. Macdonald, more for our viewers at home who are following this than for us, because we have had some time to study the our aerospace relationship in NORAD and we recognize that it functions very well, it would be helpful if you could explain briefly the command structure in NORAD and who can order Canadian Forces into action.
LGen. Macdonald: The command structure in NORAD is clearly one where our two countries are bilaterally equal partners. We have an integrated headquarter structure in the United States, in Colorado Springs, where the headquarters of North American Aerospace Defence Command is located. We have Canadians and Americans working closely together to command the structure of NORAD.
The commander-in-chief has always been an American four-star officer, with the deputy commander being a Canadian three-star. I was in that position before I returned to Ottawa. That is not written in stone. The rules say they should be alternate. Due to the proportion of commitment of resources to NORAD, the United States has had the commander-in-chief position since the beginning of NORAD in 1958.
We have, through a long series of procedures that we have developed, I think a fairly robust and well-understood command structure when it comes to identifying how we deal with any particular situation. Since we are dealing with aerospace threats, threats through the air — a bomber aircraft or cruise missile aircraft — or indeed threats from space, a ballistic missile warning situation, time is always very short. It is a requirement to know exactly what you will do when a particular event occurs and how to deploy your forces to respond to that. Our procedures are very well- rehearsed and specifically identified.
In all cases, Canadians and Americans retain the right to employ their NORAD forces in the way they see appropriate.
We in Canada have agreed that we will have a certain number of aircraft on daily alert to respond to an air threat, a target penetrating our radar for which we do not have an identification, or a potential threat. We employ those in the way that we have specified in the context of NORAD. If there is a threat and we have to deploy those aircraft, then they respond through the NORAD chain to both the United States and Canadian authorities equally, so that both countries are kept in the loop and are continually able to express their views or their wishes in how they wish their forces to be employed.
I would suggest that the important thing to note is that we do retain our own legitimate right of commanding our forces. We do commit some forces on a day-to-day basis to be used within the NORAD context, but under the rules that we specified. We have people at all layers, from the lowest layer right up to the command authorities themselves, who participate in this on a day-to-day basis.
Senator Day: When we were in Colorado Springs and in Cheyenne, we were told that, on September 11, in Cheyenne Mountain, which is where the control centre is located, Canadians were in charge at that particular time.
LGen. Macdonald: That is true. By coincidence, Canadians were there with their American colleagues participating in a NORAD exercise. The senior Canadian in charge was the two-star MGen. Findley, the director of operations for NORAD. The command director, the person who deals tactically with things going on within Cheyenne Mountain, happened to be a Canadian, Capt. Mike Jelinek, a captain, navy, equivalent to a colonel. When the events of September 11 occurred, they were the people who made some of the initial calls and decisions, handled the communications, informed the commander-in-chief and so on. There was no irregularity with that. They were the people on duty and they did what they needed to do, just as an American would have done in the same circumstances.
Senator Day: That illustrates the degree of integration between the two forces in that particular NORAD structure.
LGen. Macdonald: Very much so.
Senator Day: When we visited Washington, we were led to the believe that the issue was still open as to whether we, as Canadians, could join Northern Command in a broader sense than just aerospace, in the broader sense than just NORAD. Is that still open as far as you are concerned?
LGen. Macdonald: Our discussions do not specifically include Canadian participation in Northern Command but, rather, how we can cooperate in our mutual defence interests. Northern Command, under the Unified Command Plan that the United States has, is a new creation that they have had to address homeland security issues. Of course, the UCP, the Unified Command Plan, is an American document to do as they wish with their own command structure. They have not formally invited us to join one of their unified commands but, rather, to explore with them ways in which we can address our mutual security needs, as we do in NORAD and in other areas as well.
Our discussions are not specifically about where we would be located or how we would integrate with any existing command structure, but they are about exactly what opportunities they have.
Senator Day: Is that an ongoing discussion?
LGen. Macdonald: Very much so. We began our initial discussions not too long after September 11, in October. However, to be fair, this UCP initiative, to establish some homeland security command, has been ongoing in the United States for a couple of years, well before September 11. Of course, it took on a renewed focus after September 11. We have been in discussion at various levels since then to explore what those opportunities might be.
Senator Day: Regarding the homeland security issue, is Northern Command part of a broader picture that involves not only military but also other non-military agencies?
LGen. Macdonald: The full mandate and makeup of Northern Command is still being developed by the Americans. We do not have that many details. However, it is clear that the command will have a responsibility for land, sea and some air defence issues for the United States as well as what they call ``consequence management,'' which is dealing with an incident that might occur, be it a chemical, radiological, nuclear, bacteriological or natural disaster of some kind, in a way that is coordinated among American agencies.
The consequence management element of this new homeland security command must clearly have many tentacles to other U.S. agencies that deal with those things, so that there is a coordinated response to whatever happens. The exact makeup of how that is done and how that co-ordination takes place is yet to be determined. Certainly, there is a fundamental requirement for the Department of Defence activity to be closely linked with, for example, Governor Ridge's activity and his agency for homeland security.
Senator Day: Presumably, there are many agencies in Canada similar to those in the United States that would be involved in the situation outside of the military and which would already have some degree of cooperation between them. Has that functioned well up to now to the best of your knowledge? That is, has the communication with the agencies outside of the military and the military's interaction with those agencies been open?
LGen. Macdonald: Many linkages have been established. A significant amount of cooperation occurs from Canada to the United States at various levels within the Department of National Defence. The Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness has links to the Governor Ridge's responsibilities in the United States. We have links with customs and immigration and policing agencies. We have extensive intelligence links, be they military or civilian, with our American colleagues.
To say that these are totally organized in a harmonious homeland security posture, where everyone knows everything they need to know and understands their exact responsibilities, would be an exaggeration for either Canada or the United States. That is something on which we continue to work.
Senator Day: Governor Ridge is working on that as well, presumably, in the United States.
LGen. Macdonald: He is. I do not envy his responsibilities. He has a tremendous number of agencies that have some relationship to the provision of homeland security, and the co-ordination between them is a major undertaking. The Department of Defence is just one area of concern.
Senator Day: In relation to the issue of Northern Command and the military's role beyond NORAD, are you the lead person from the Canadian point of view in regard to that discussion?
LGen. Macdonald: I would not say I was the lead, but I certainly participate with Dr. Ken Calder, our ADM for policy and Mr. Jim Wright in the Department of Foreign Affairs. We three have formed a high-level working group that is the core of the Canadian discussion that deals with the United States at our level.
Col. Williams is also the chair of a working group that addresses most of the detailed issues and works equally with American colleagues and Canadian stakeholders to sort out some of these issues on a broader front.
Senator Day: I believe that Northern Command is to commence operations in October. In the event that we have not worked out any relationship other than the existing NORAD relationship, do you envisage any change in the operation of NORAD?
LGen. Macdonald: No, I do not. The NORAD function as we know it now and the relationship that we have now will remain essentially the same as it has heretofore.
I would hope that we would come to some understanding bilaterally about some of the opportunities that we might explore before October 1. However, that would not be a showstopper for NORAD.
Senator Day: In terms of change, I was thinking of reporting, lines of reporting, and the extra ``hat,'' as we like to describe the extra responsibilities, distinct responsibilities that the Commander in Chief of Northern Command will have. He or she will continue to be the NORAD commander, but will have these other responsibilities. Will the reporting lines get fuzzy as a result of that or will they stay the same?
LGen. Macdonald: I am confident they will stay the same. As you have well pointed out, the chief for Northern Command will be ``double-hatted'' as the Commander in Chief of NORAD as well. That is not a dissimilar arrangement to what we have right now with the Commander in Chief of U.S. Space Command being double-hatted as the Commander in Chief of NORAD. Many Canadians think that the double-hatting arrangement in a military context somehow diffuses the authority or complicates the actions of that command. In fact, that is not the case.
When I was commander of 1st Canadian Air Division in Winnipeg, I was also double-hatted as Commander Canadian NORAD Region. While I was same person, often with the same resources, doing different missions, it was very clear what my NORAD responsibilities were as opposed to my purely Canadian responsibilities.
In many ways, there is a synergistic opportunity to use your Canadian capabilities for NORAD purposes and vice versa. We should not presume that the change in command structure in the United States will have any impact on our ability to continue to participate in NORAD, nor will the effectiveness of NORAD be compromised in any way.
Senator Forrestall: I want to follow-up on Senator Day's initial thrust in an area that has been of great interest to all of us in connection with the unified command structure as it relates to everything that may or may not take place.
You mentioned that there were 80 treaty level defence agreements, more than 250 memoranda of understanding and 145 bilateral fora under which defence matters are discussed. Is it possible for this committee to review those treaty level agreements and the memoranda? Is it possible for us to physically have a document that is a précis of all those documents?
LGen. Macdonald: I had not thought of that before, senator. I am not sure that we have that right now. One of the difficulties here is that many of these 250 memoranda would relate to issues that are quite separate from your main focus on national security. Those memoranda deal with procedural matters or test and evaluation issues that we cooperate on with the United States.
We do have a database that relates to these documents. If you like, we will ask our staff to look into that and see if there is a useful extraction from that data base that would be of benefit to you.
Senator Forrestall: Is any of this material restricted?
LGen. Macdonald: My guess is that there probably are some memoranda that are not openly available, but I would suggest that those are a very small number. That is just my gut feel; I really do not know the answer to your question.
Senator Forrestall: It is difficult for this committee to make useful or meaningful recommendations to the government if we do not know where we have been. If we do not know where we are, how can we recommend where we should be going?
I, for one, would very much appreciate it if you could have your staff respond to that and give the chair or our clerk, in written form, an indication of whether it is possible for us to review those documents. I would welcome your professional judgment as to whether it would be of service to us.
Senator Banks: You mentioned just a moment ago, LGen. Macdonald, that you think some of those memoranda or agreements might be outside of our interest. Since our interest is national security and defence, what would be the nature of an agreement between Canadian and American forces that would be outside our interest?
LGen. Macdonald: These agreements touch on everything that we do. Some agreements are about test and evaluation procedures, arrangements on using an American range, industrial relationships, processes for acquisition and procurement, and environmental issues.
You could make a broad argument that those do touch on national security, but I am not sure all of them would have direct import to the issues with which you are directly concerned. That is your judgment, and we would make them available for your own edification.
I am hopeful that our military cooperation committee database is the source of the information that you are seeking.
Senator Forrestall: LGen. Macdonald, you mentioned in your presentation the enhancing of North American security. You spoke about what it could be and what it will not be. You said that it will not be a standing command and control structure akin to NORAD. That suggests to me that on the maritime side we would possibly not be looking for any lead, either territorially, geographically or as it relates to command and control. Could you elaborate on that?
LGen. Macdonald: As I mentioned in my answer to Senator Day, due to the immediacy of the way events happen in an aerospace context, we have committed to have some forces available to NORAD on a day-to-day basis. I mentioned that our fighter aircraft are made available for NORAD purposes. That is because we must respond in minutes rather than in hours or days.
Senator Forrestall: I was thinking of, for example, the importation into North America from elsewhere of abusive substances. We have taken great pride in the contribution that our submarines, surface ships and air surveillance have made in terms of interdiction, tracking and prosecution. Are you suggesting that these are areas in which we would not be as active? Are you suggesting that we would not continue to share information at the highest level?
LGen. Macdonald: My point was that, for aerospace defence, because of the time factor involved, we have to cooperate on an immediate basis. In other areas, such as maritime surveillance, to which you refer, we would not need to have standing forces committed to a homeland security command on a day-to-day basis but, rather, we would share information on surveillance and on the intelligence that we have about potential maritime-based threats to North America, be they a direct threat or information related to a suspected smuggler.
We would take a decision bilaterally how to deal with that. We would decide whether to have Canadian aircraft or submarines involved in the surveillance or prosecution of that particular threat or whether to do it with our American coast guard or navy colleagues.
One of the opportunities that warrants exploration through our discussions is to consider what level will we make our current maritime cooperation a little more robust and a little more formalized and organized to contribute to our mutual security.
Senator Forrestall: Have you no conclusion with respect to the question that you pose?
LGen. Macdonald: No, our discussions are at the point of exploring the opportunities. Ultimately, it will be the Government of Canada that will take a position on which way we will go in this area.
Senator Forrestall: Will you be making recommendations in a this regard to the government prior to mid-October?
LGen. Macdonald: We would hope that our discussions and exchanges with the United States will be used as advise for the Government of Canada in giving us direction on how they would wish us to proceed. As I have indicated, we are not negotiating with the United States now, but that may be a follow-on step, should the government wish to pursue this further.
Senator Forrestall: I am concerned about Canadian participation in the European Union's rapid reaction force. What will the process be in this regard? Is there a formal process in place to consider this proposition? More important, and more practically, where would the funding and the human resources come from? Are we able to do this? What impact will it have on an already very finely balanced utilization of our human resources?
LGen. Macdonald: Senator, I am not that versed in the details of our current discussions with the European Union and the rapid reaction force. Obviously, we are exploring it. We are looking at the opportunities that might exist. You have put your finger on the most important issue, namely, what resource implications might there be in such an initiative? More important, how would we balance that resource requirement against our other resource requirements?
I have said that the defence rubber band is stretched a little tight right now, given the pressures that we have with our ongoing peace support operations in the Balkans, for example, as well as the pressures of having to deploy additional forces to the Middle East and to Afghanistan. Those, combined with all of the other things that we are trying to do domestically, such as training and keeping our readiness and preparedness up, would make it difficult to assume any additional responsibilities.
Senator Forrestall: Can we afford it?
LGen. Macdonald: At the current time, we could not accept additional commitments like that without exchanging them for something else in some other area.
Senator Forrestall: We have concerns about the state of equipment and the state of the Armed Forces. The ultimate question is: Are you able to meet the tasking that government has given you? In this respect, is there anything you can say about the current defence review? Should that defence review specifically lead to the development of not just a white paper but a new policy on National Defence, or is it enough at this point in time to do a review? Should a review be done two or three years down the road? Is now the time for a new defence policy?
LGen. Macdonald: You have asked me a question about which I could go on for some length of time in answering, but let me try to connect the two questions you have asked into a fairly succinct response.
The minister has stated publicly that the current white paper, which was published in 1994, probably has the same sort of mission described in it that we will maintain for the longer term. I refer to the protection of Canada, the protection of North America and international participation. Those three missions will continue.
We will also continue to have a multipurpose combat capable force requirement. We will also continue to have an army, navy and air force in some proportions. There are some givens that would preclude a full-scale review of defence policy. Perhaps a defence update is more along the lines of what we are thinking of now, or what the government may choose to do. I believe it is important to do one because of the other issue that you mentioned, which is the need to be able to sustain what we do now.
At the current time we are stretched. The difficulty we have is, perhaps, not so much in mounting a one-time operation for a short period of time, but sustaining it in the longer term. I mean sustaining it from an equipment perspective, as you mentioned, to maintaining training and readiness but, perhaps most important, to maintain the people we need to do that. Recruiting individuals, providing them with the proper training and skills to perform that mission and then to put the demands on them to deploy internationally, if that is the case, and to do that on a fairly frequent basis, is where we have run into difficulties with what we call our personnel tempo. Of course, that has a price attached to it. While we may be able to do some one-time missions, to do them on a repeated basis over a longer period of time is difficult on our military members and their families.
Senator Forrestall: Earlier this morning I had the opportunity to ask VAdm. Maddison a question about the reserves. Presently, there is proposed legislation before the House of Commons which, eventually, will be before the Senate, which, in part, would exempt reservists from any additional benefits. I refer to the benefit of simple job protection. The bill exempts reservists who serve on active duty, overseas or outside Canada. Why would we do that to these reservists who are so important to maintaining even the slightest semblance of our capacity to rotate? Why would we deny them that? Is it an oversight? Is it an accident? What is the explanation? Why are we refusing them these benefits?
LGen. Macdonald: As you correctly pointed out, the reserves are a critical element of the Canadian Forces. We count on them to augment our regular force in the same way we deploy regular force members to have a community footprint across Canada and to contribute to homeland security issues. The proposed legislation is focused on trying to find the balance between having full protection for reservists in their jobs on a regular, rotational basis to some protection in an extreme circumstance. That is where the government has focused the protection issue. It is a balance between not compromising the reservist in his or her civilian position and encouraging employers to employ reservists. If you have a hard stated policy which says, ``We will protect reservists,'' then any time we ask them to do something, that may compromise their ability to have and maintain a civilian job; or it discourages civilian employers from employing a reservist.
The government has selected to do it in a more specific way. If there is an emergency declared, then that job protection will be invoked, but only in the case where it is considered to be an emergency.
We have established the Canadian Forces Liaison Council in which employers can participate voluntarily to understand the pressures on individual reservists in their employ. We are encouraging them to become more familiar with reservists and the role they play. We have been successful in getting the sort of thing we are looking for to allow reservists time away from work to do their training and their deployments without compromising their jobs.
Senator Forrestall: We have with us an expert who might want to touch on that question.
I find it a matter of deep regret. I trust the same answer is not applicable to why we have not extended, in law, the protection of reservists fighting in a war zone. Why did we not amend the pertinent regulations and extend these additional benefits and protection to these men and women? I do not expect you to answer that question. However, I hope it is not the same negative reason you have just given me. Surely, there is a positive reason for doing it, and a good one. If there is, I would love to hear it.
Senator Wiebe: I would like to return to our discussions from earlier in regard to the defence of North America as it relates just to North America. I know that in his comments the U.S. president was looking at including Mexico and some of the southern islands. As a country, our concern should be the defence and security of Canada and the northern aspect of that.
The negotiations and discussions you are having now with the Americans appear to be a fairly watered-down approach to northern defence. Are you proceeding with these discussions at the direction of the minister, or is it something you are doing in conjunction with the American military?
LGen. Macdonald: Senator, we are responding to the direction Mr. Eggleton, our minister, has given us, in consultation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Our minister initially talked to Secretary Rumsfeld in November, followed up with a letter in December, in order to come to an understanding of exploring our mutual concerns. Our work in the fall and since then has been done on the understanding that we would discuss issues bilaterally to exploit or find opportunities related to the increased emphasis on homeland security.
Senator Wiebe: Does the navy have the flexibility within those directives to explore working arrangements similar to what the air force now has under NORAD?
LGen. Macdonald: It would be an overstatement to say that we have been asked to find the maritime and land equivalent of NORAD, but certainly we have been discussing in what ways we can increase our security from a maritime and a land perspective.
I mentioned in an earlier answer to Senator Forrestall that one of the things the two countries have is a very close working relationship in the maritime reaches. Our navies work together closely and have common procedures and are able to communicate effectively, but that is not enough to develop a maritime picture of what possible threats are out there, to exchange intelligence, to decide how to deal with specific incidents as they arise, to decide how to partition the workload and how we cooperate with the coast guard and navy. That is an opportunity we can explore. We do not expect it to be the maritime equivalent of NORAD, because NORAD is a more robust command and control structure based on the immediacy of aerospace operations. This could be done in a more routine way where each country can decide how to deal with an incident in the pre-established way that we would arrange with the United States.
Each area is different. The Atlantic and the Pacific are different, and each element of the Canadian Forces and Department of Defence in the United States is different. You deal with air differently than with maritime or with land.
Senator Wiebe: With all respect, I beg to differ with your comments about the urgency and need for similar arrangements with our navy as we have with NORAD. I believe NORAD has demonstrated to all Canadians that it functions extremely well and that, under that arrangement, our sovereignty is maintained. My belief is that the reason the minister is tip-toeing on the directives he has given you is he feels there is someone that will cry, ``We will lose our sovereignty if we make any more deals with the Americans.''
We have demonstrated that it can be done under NORAD. I believe we can do it with our navy as well. The greatest threat today to our country is not from the air, it is at our shorelines and our ports. Who plays the biggest role in that? It is our navy. Our navy should be working in conjunction, just as it is in NORAD, with the American navy.
A far-fetched example may be where you have a submarine off our coast, and there is a ship that we believe is detrimental to our security. The Americans have a submarine there as well, and they notice the threat. Some communication is missed because we do not have a stringent action plan as we do under NORAD. We run the risk of not only losing the ship but also of losing our submarine as a result of the Americans being unaware it was there. Under NORAD, that problem would not be exist.
I hope that those discussions are taking place with the Americans. I can see problems and concerns in having joint armed forces because those are ground troops, but when it comes to the security and sovereignty of our country, we can accomplish the same with that.
Are you allowed the freedom to explore things like that, to make recommendations to the minister, or must you stay within your guidelines?
LGen. Macdonald: We have discussed those sorts of things with the Americans. We are all concerned about security from a maritime perspective, the fact that we really only have the ability to inspect a very small number of the containers that enter each country, and the wide-ranging potential from a maritime threat.
When I referred to the immediacy or the urgency of the issue, I was reflecting more on a tactical situation. In an air situation, you may have to respond in a couple of minutes to whatever you suddenly detect on your radar screens, whereas in a maritime situation, it is likely that, with the proper intelligence and surveillance capabilities, you can track a potential threat for quite a long period of time and you will have the luxury of being able to decide how to address it without having to respond in a matter of a couple of minutes.
By the same token, you are right. When you do have an identified threat or a target that requires further exploration, you must have rules, protocols and guidance for procedures that both countries would deal with in a consistent way. You must be able to communicate what that threat is, where it is and how we will deal with it based on a contingency plan of some kind. That is what we are talking about: To find a more formalized way of exploiting the close cooperation we enjoy between our two navies in a way that will more effectively address the homeland security issues.
Senator Wiebe: Why then do we have to reinvent the wheel? We already have a system with NORAD that works well, and I am sure you can take the same scenario from NORAD from air and apply it to our sea defence. Why are we not doing that? We could be spending millions of dollars trying to figure out another way to do the same thing when we already have the guidelines there. That is my frustration, when I see what is happening.
LGen. Macdonald: I would certainly agree that the 44 years we have been involved in NORAD has given us a great amount of experience and precedence in how to deal with this sort of thing. To directly translate it to a maritime or land perspective, though, is much easier said than done. Replicating many of the procedures, the communications, the protocols that NORAD has established between both Canada and the United States is much easier said than done.
The national command authorities, the idea of surveillance and response, the idea of fusing data to decide what a particular threat is, developing the rules for how to deal with various types of targets that might come up on our surveillance screen, how to define areas of responsibility and rules of engagement, are all great lessons we can learn from NORAD. Does that then equate to an in-place command and control structure that deals specifically with those? Does that equate to standing forces that are required to be there at a moment's notice to deal with those threats, or can that be done in a less resource-intensive way? Can that be done with the establishment of protocols and contingency plans that address how we deal with those, and then having a particular event occur, in discussing how we will deal with it for that specific instance and then putting that into place? Do you need the high-cost, high-readiness response that NORAD can give you, or can you go with something that is more routine in the context of a maritime event?
Senator Wiebe: I do not want to take too much time, but this is something that is very important to me.
Again we are saying that this will cost less money if we approach it from a small, least requirement point of view. The entire problem with our Armed Forces is because we have tackled every problem from a least-expensive or a least- frustrating point of view.
In this country, we must start thinking bigger when it comes to the defence of our country. Thank heavens we stay thinking big with NORAD. It is not a tremendous drain to the taxpayers of this country. We have an opportunity to think big relative to the defence of our shorelines, which are subject to as great a threat as anything I mentioned earlier. Why are we even contemplating thinking small? We must put in place what we need to defend our coastlines. If it is in place and proper, then we will earn the confidence of the taxpayers. They will say, ``Yes, they are doing the right thing.'' It will work. It is a two-way street. We must sell this idea to not only the governments but also to the taxpayers out there. The best way to sell it to the government is to sell it to the taxpayers. I do not like to see us going at something half hog when we have already developed something that has worked perfectly well for us and could be applied here just as well.
That was more of a comment than it was a question. I do have a couple of questions on a different subject, but I will wait for a second round.
LGen. Macdonald: In the military, we are frequently faced with a situation where we have to analyse the threat. We must take all the intelligence that we have and do that analysis and project it into the future. Ultimately, we are involved in the exercise of identifying the threat, the gap within which we must deal with that threat, and what options are available to us. When you get to the option stage, ultimately you are balancing operational effectiveness with the resources that you have. We do that daily.
We are continually trying to find way to extract the most defence capability for the defence dollar that we have. This is no different.
Senator Banks: I will continue the line of thinking that Senator Wiebe was following. It is important that Canadians understand when there is a genuine threat to our sovereignty. You know better than we, I am sure, that many Canadians who now see the possibility of integration, whatever that means, as somehow being synonymous with a loss of sovereignty.
I am assuming that you have an interest in military history as far as Canada is concerned. I certainly do not pretend to know much about it, but the most vivid, most important and most significant expressions of our sovereignty, when it comes to the application of armed force, has always been in an integrated effort. Can you think of an instance in which Canada has gone to war by itself against any one nation since 1812? Even then, that was really the British.
At the height of our expression of national sovereignty, we have always gone to war in close concert with others. Most often, in those events — that we say to some extent have defined us — our forces have been under the operational command of officers of other forces. In the First World War, it was General Hague; in the Second World War, when we were attacked at Juno beach, we were under the command of General Eisenhower. Those seem to have increased our standing in the world, not lessened it. Do you see it that way?
LGen. Macdonald: Mr. Manley recently said about this issue of North American security that cooperation with the U.S. on continental security is not an abrogation of sovereignty, rather it is an exercise of sovereignty.
When people talk about integration of forces, they immediately assume that means, in this context, that all Canadian Forces will suddenly come under the command of a U.S. authority — that is, a general officer in the United States. Furthermore, they assume we will have to forget about doing anything internationally because we will be committed and we will lose the prerogative of defining how our forces are employed. That has not, as you have indicated, been the case in the past, nor will it be in the future.
Any discussion that we have in the context of participating for our mutual defence with the United States will be to retain our sovereignty to ensure that we retain the full command of our forces, to decide how they will be employed, how many will be employed, when they will be employed and under what rules of engagement they will be employed. We will retain all of that. There is no loss of our sovereignty in the context of all of this.
As you have indicated, our history is replete with examples of how we have cooperated and participated with other coalition partners or our allies and still maintained our national prerogative and our sovereignty and command of our forces. This is no different from that.
The people who jump to the conclusion that we are somehow losing some control or command of our forces or compromising our sovereignty are misguided or misinterpreting what is intended here.
Senator Banks: In that respect, I am happy to tell you that, when we were in Washington meeting with our American counterparts, our chair was quick in each case when the question of interoperability let alone integration was raised — which it was, frequently — to clarify that it was understood that, as has always been the case, Canadian participation will depend on a case being made that convinces Canadians, and the Government of Canada in particular, that it ought to happen.
We met with General Mires, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld, and with the president's senior security advisers and others. Secretary Rumsfeld in particular indicated to us that, with respect to the North American unified command, which we were talking about some months ago, they would be looking for contributions of Canadian people. However, it would not be in the form of a standing force, because as you have said there is no such thing as a standing force under that unified command. That does not exist. It will draw on other existing forces of the United States and of Canada, if we decide to participate.
Are you aware of any requests being made for the participation of Canadian officers in the joint command?
LGen. Macdonald: The simple answer is no. I return to previous the questions about our potential cooperation in the Maritime front. If you are to do that, presumably you need some centre of coordination or some area where you do the planning and hold the discussions that come to the conclusions that you eventually come to. Presumably there would be a need for an integrated staff or combined cell where Canadians and Americans would sit together and work those things out, probably on a continual basis, and to manage them.
We have not had any specific discussions about who they would be or where they would be. There has been no overt invitation to join NORTHCOM, per se. NORTHCOM is a United States unified command and it would be quite extraordinary for us to participate directly in that. That is not being discussed right now.
Senator Banks: It is important that Canadians know that unified commands exist in every other part of the world. They have unified commands in France and that does not mean that they will take over the defence of France by themselves necessarily.
Please tell us about the Maritime Command situation. There is a high degree of interoperability in the Atlantic fleet between the Canadian navy and the United States navy. We are told that there is a great capacity to put interoperability into place very quickly. We are also told that it frequently happens.
While it is not at the level of NORAD, is it not the case that there is a North Atlantic understanding in place that involves the Canadian and American navies working together on many things on an ongoing basis?
LGen. Macdonald: You are quite right to say that we have a high degree of interoperability so that our Canadian ships, for example, can participate directly with American ships in manoeuvres and exercises. We can essentially replace an American ship in many cases. It is not an add-on to their capability; it is something they can actually supplant. That is not unique to the Atlantic coast, that occurs on the Pacific as well.
There are many opportunities for us. We are NATO participants. We do have a common requirement to participate on the Atlantic coast together, in the case of NATO, to maintain that interoperability. The ability to do that has allowed us to participate in certain niche areas with Maritime forces.
That is ever more evident in the context of what we are doing now on the Arabian Sea and in the Persian Gulf with the Americans. We are able to cooperate fully with them without compromising any of their capabilities and certainly adding to them with our own.
Ultimately, this has been a very positive undertaking. It is one that we would like to continue, and one that could be expanded to be more formalized in the context of existing maritime approaches to North America and homeland security efforts.
Senator Banks: The Arabian Sea effort that you referred to is one that was decided by the government. In respect of NATO, when the Canadian fleet, or elements of it, is involved in operations or exercises in the Atlantic, it is often the case that we are operating under the control of American admirals, I am assuming. Is that correct?
LGen. Macdonald: It changes. The appropriate terms we use are ``operational control'' and ``operational command.'' In the standing naval force Atlantic, we operate with other allies in patrolling North Atlantic waters. There is one in the Mediterranean in which we have participated.
Sometimes, we are the command of the standing naval force; sometimes, we are not. It is a rotational thing. We operate directly responding to other commanders, and they respond to us, as the arrangement dictates.
Senator Banks: Am I correct in saying that, when we are operating under someone else's operational control, it has not yet so far affected our sovereignty?
LGen. Macdonald: It never has. The operational control arrangement that we have with the Americans in the North Arabian Sea and in Afghanistan are an excellent example of that. We maintain full command over what our forces will do. We decide what kinds of actions they will be deployed in and what specific missions in which they will participate, and how many will be there and for how long. We are not compromised in any way regarding our sovereignty or our ability to dictate what our forces will do.
Senator Banks: In your view, when we are pursuing the kinds of things of which Senator Wiebe spoke regarding our American counterparts, we are not jeopardizing sovereignty. Do I understand you to be saying that?
LGen. Macdonald: I would say that absolutely. We are not jeopardizing our sovereignty or independence of action in anything that we are discussing, as has been the case for NORAD.
Senator Atkins: I get the impression that you certainly do not see any arrangement that we might have on the Northland Command that would threaten sovereignty?
LGen. Macdonald: Not at all, senator. The real issues about sovereignty relate to whether Canada will lose some control over making choices on our own, or whether our security somehow be less than it was before or beyond our immediate control or influence. That is not the case with NORAD, and I do not think it will be the case in the future.
Senator Atkins: Could you not argue that we cannot afford not to sit at the table?
LGen. Macdonald: I would personally agree with Mr. Manley when he says that participating in the discussions that relate to homeland security issues is an exercise of our sovereignty.
Senator Atkins: We have a big stake in anything that relates to North America. If we are not part of it, we would be very vulnerable.
In our trip to Washington, we certainly got the impression that the Americans would not stop doing what they felt needed to be done even if we did not participate. I would argue that it makes more sense for us, if we can, to have some input into those discussions.
You have read our report and our recommendations. I am curious to know your reaction to the recommendations that we increase the budget by $4 billion and increase the number of military to 75,000. What was your reaction to our report? How do you feel you would use that money if it were to be available?
LGen. Macdonald: If you allow me, I will comment on your first remarks before I answer the specific question.
We must all realize that terrorism is a real threat to us. It only makes sense that we continue to work together with the U.S. to find ways of enhancing our security as partners based on our mutual interest where it makes sense to do so.
Mr. Graham, our Minister of Foreign Affairs, said that it is important to be inside the tent on those issues. The extent to which we participate will be a government decision.
We have reviewed your recommendations on increasing the size of the military and capital expenditure. Any military officer, when asked if he would like more resources will always says that he would.
Major weapons systems and capital programs in any military context are not easy things to implement. They are very involved affairs. It takes time to establish the requirements and determine how to fulfil them. You cannot procure large capital programs overnight. Certainly, over a period of time, you can build up to a point where you can maintain a fairly high level of capital spending.
Our level of capital spending is not what it should be if we are to sustain ourselves indefinitely. This relates to the previous question that I answered about our ability to commit to things that we can sustain for the longer-term and how a defence update might address that sort of situation.
Regarding the numbers of people we have, again, while most military responses would be that they would like to have more people, we must always keep in mind the need to balance the number of people with the equipment, the level of activity, the availability of training and the current infrastructure. To peg a level of human resources and to go from there is one way of doing it. Ultimately, we must ensure that all those pots, if you will, are balanced and that our defence budget is balanced in the way that we spend on those various areas so that we get the best capability that we can and not an equipment-rich or poor, or people-rich or poor area.
We have done tremendously well in the last few year in balancing those pots. Ultimately, it has been at a level that has caused some difficulties when an Afghanistan commitment comes up, for example.
Senator Atkins: The military has done a remarkable job. Everyone who appears before us makes the same point that the rubber band is being stretched too far. Much of the $4 billion could be invested in human resources right off the bat. It may take seven years to produce a helicopter, but it does not lessen the worth of investing in human resources.
If we were to make any commitment in Northland Command, it would be another draw on military resources unless they were to withdraw from other commitments in which they are involved. It seems to me that we have no choice but to face up to some of the realities with which we will have to deal.
If we were to participate in Northern Command, do you see a tremendous draw on our resources?
LGen. Macdonald: Frankly, no. We have, obviously, our ongoing commitment to NORAD. The discussions that we have had relate to the other points I enunciated earlier, such as maritime surveillance, exchanging information, and so on. The fact that we do not intend to commit standing forces to do that but, rather, use existing forces in a different way, if you will, or when they are required, would not impose an inordinately high demand on our resources. It may on our readiness and training. We may have to maintain them in a different way.
Surely, that is a better investment than even considering providing it on our own. NORAD has proved that. Our commitment to NORAD has been on the order of 10 per cent, plus or minus 5 per cent, from our proportion of our contribution to the overall resources of NORAD. The benefit that we have achieved in terms of national security from that relatively small contribution when compared with the United States is phenomenal. I would hope that a relatively small contribution to homeland security in a larger form could be leveraged equally.
There is a great opportunity. The fact that we are not talking about standing forces and ongoing, everyday, minute- by-minute readiness commitments is something we could do in the context of what we do now with a marginal increase in resources.
Senator Banks: You are talking about investment. You, gentlemen, know that we have gone to bat for more money for the military because we think it needs to be done. However, we occasionally strike knots. Before we leave the subject and return to Senator Atkins' other questions, I would like you to comment and, perhaps, arm us on the planning with respect to capital acquisitions.
In 1991, I believe it was, the forces bought, for $173 million, a satellite communications system for the purpose of communicating with deployed forces. It turned out to be too expensive to operate and is now obsolete. In any case, it is not being used. I understand that it is now being mothballed and might end up being scrapped or worse. Do we often make that type of acquisition mistake, that kind of planning error? That would appear to me to be a very short-sighted thing. We all know how exponentially fast ``Future Shock'' has overtaken the acquisition of technical equipment. Do we have to worry about a repetition of the lack of foresight that bought that system which has never been used and which is now not usable?
LGen. Macdonald: I have great confidence in our procurement system. Having said that, it is slower than we would like it to be. We would like to speed up the timelines from the start of identifying our requirements to when we actually have the piece of equipment in operational use.
Certainly, for information technology-related projects, the demands are very high because of the turnover in generational changes. You can go through three or four generations of an information technology during the course of a program, if you are not careful.
The specific program you mentioned, the very long-range communications system capability, was a victim of circumstances and a victim of this procurement cycle that we have. If you were to go back and look at every decision that was made in regard to it, I think it was the best decision at the time with the information that was available. Ultimately, the technology was overtaken by a commercially available technology that was cheaper and easier to field. In our need to put this capability in the field and our difficulty with the original plan, we bought these commercial systems and put them out there.
They are not as rugged as the original. They do not have the same bandwidth or capabilities that the original one had; but they provided us with something we could use, which was our primary requirement at the time. Ultimately, that proved to be a misguided approach when you consider what happened in the subsequent seven or eight years since the requirement was established. However, that is an exception.
Senator Banks: Is it less likely that we would make that kind of procedural mistake again?
LGen. Macdonald: I think our process is rigorous. We look at the risks more objectively than we have done in the past. We try to identify the time risk, the cost risk, the technological risk of everything we do in a more managerially astute way. Certainly, there is no guarantee that we could entirely avoid that kind of decision. Fundamentally, our process is better and would be less vulnerable to that type of decision, given that this particular one we are talking about was a matter of circumstances, in many ways.
Senator Banks: To oversimplify, I think it would be fair to say that when we got the thing we ordered it was no longer applicable. Are we heading in that direction with helicopters? We have been after these helicopters for years now. When they are delivered, will they be applicable and useful?
LGen. Macdonald: The maritime helicopter project will produce a very operationally important capability for us. The entire weapons system here is not the helicopter and not the frigate but them working together. We have the frigates which are world class and able to do their job extremely well. What they need is a more capable helicopter to complement them.
Senator Atkins: We were told this morning that the number of CF-18s to NORAD has been increased. Was that decision made before or after September 11?
LGen. Macdonald: That decision was made on September 11. We had an ongoing commitment, as I mentioned, in terms of our standing alert forces on a day-to-day basis. On September 11, we increased it to a higher level. We have maintained not that higher level but a slightly reduced one ever since. It is still higher than it was originally.
Senator Atkins: That proves the command system can work.
LGen. Macdonald: That is what I would submit, yes.
The Chairman: LGen. Macdonald, what mechanism do we currently have with the Americans to coordinate naval activity on each coast in terms of homeland defence?
LGen. Macdonald: We do have some sharing of maritime surveillance information. Obviously, just by the linkages that occur operationally between our navies, we have a sort of ad hoc level of cooperation and understanding.
We do not have what I would suggest is a coordinated view of the information that is out there, what I would call a common operating picture of who is where at what time. Nor have we sorted out the differences between Canada and the United States and their relative responsibilities concerning the Coast Guard and the military navy. That is something that is quite different on both sides and would have to be worked out in some detail.
The Chairman: Did you say that there would be a dedicated Canadian staff to coordinate activities with the CINC North?
LGen. Macdonald: No, I did not, Mr. Chairman. If I did, I did not mean to convey that. When I referred to dedicated staff, I said one of the ideas that is being discussed is the possibility of some cell of Canadians and Americans that would address these issues that I just mentioned, for example, on maritime surveillance and coordination. It would not necessarily be with NORTHCOM or at any particular location.
Most people would feel that there is a requirement to have some ongoing coordination, planning and exercise capability that would have representatives from both nations.
The Chairman: If I understand you correctly now, what you are saying is not only do you not anticipate a dedicated staff to deal with NORTHCOM issues, but there is no contemplation of an integrated staff. Is that correct?
LGen. Macdonald: I am not sure of the answer to that question. I think the spectrum of possibilities is still available to us.
Yes, we could establish some integrated staff that would work together to address these issues of homeland security. Presumably, they would be a dedicated staff. Where they would work and how they would work together are the kinds of details we are now discussing with the Americans.
The Chairman: The information you gave us for our briefing suggested that Canadian involvement with the American military would change in focus from the Joint Chiefs to CINC Northern Command. How will this affect our influence with the American military?
LGen. Macdonald: When you talk about homeland security, my personal view is that this will improve it in some respects. The change from the Joint Chiefs to Northern Command reflects the fact that, previously, Canada was not assigned to any command. It was held centrally by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The fact that Canadian territory is now, for U.S. purposes, part of the concern of CINC North will give us a better point of focus to deal with those issues that concern the Canadians and the Americans together, rather than dealing with the central authority which deals, obviously, with a much broader range of issues.
Senator Forrestall: At a jointly sponsored Department of National Defence and Canadian Defence Industries Association conference called ``Air Force Outlook'' held here in Ottawa a few months ago, the conference was told that the United States, through NORAD, had plans to purchase 12 or so new AWACS aircraft, four of which would be permanently based in Canada. What can you tell us about this?
As well, please tell us about the NORAD plan to purchase a stratospheric airship, permanently located, unmanned and remotely controlled for aerospace interdiction identification.
LGen. Macdonald: On your first question about AWACS aircraft, I have no knowledge of that. I have never heard of it, and I suspect it is a plan that someone may have but it is not subscribed to by anyone in authority because I have never heard of that possibility.
The stratospheric airship is an initiative that NORAD took upon itself a couple of years ago to try to increase the ability for surveillance of our air space in North America. It is a technology demonstrator or a prototype. It is planned to build a subscale stratospheric airship that can carry radar and other communications packages that could be positioned so as to provide continual surveillance of our airspace in a large area. The stratosphere is about 730,000 feet up, and this airship would have the capability of being launched to that altitude and essentially park in a particular spot or be moved around. The winds there are low, normally 30 or 40 knots, so the ability to park is a reasonable thing to do. It would have an endurance of up to a year, so you could put it at 70,000 feet for a year and provide radar coverage to a specific area.
It is not technology that exists today, but the various elements of it exist, and the proposal is to build an airship to test the capability. NORAD is seeking funds to do this. They have had some discussion with our research and development agency in Canada, but no commitment has been made and no agreement reached about any Canadian involvement in the actual funding of this activity. It certainly looks like a promising opportunity for the future, though.
Senator Forrestall: Go for it.
Senator Day: This will be a brief comment. It flows as a follow-up question to the earlier discussion that took place in relation to the satellite control matter that came to our attention through the Auditor General. I am glad to hear that you have implemented checks that will avoid, to the degree possible, that type of problem again. I think we have learned, and I hope that you in the Armed Forces have learned something from that.
This Senate committee — it must be obvious from our questions — is supportive of the important role that the men and women of the Armed Forces play in Canada and the role that we ask you to perform, and it seems to me it would be a lot easier for those proponents of the Armed Forces to support you if the kind of problem such as that which arose from the Auditor General's report could come out in a manner other than through the sensationalism of the Auditor General's report. I am suggesting we recognize that, from time to time, mistakes are made, and we try to learn from them and move on. There are different ways the problems may become public, and I think you could learn something from a public relations point of view in the future from that.
LGen. Macdonald: Thank you for your comment. I am sure we can.
I would like to thank the members of the committee for your support. The Canadian Forces are proud of what we are capable of doing now. We hope that, over the course of the next several months, in a defence update, we will find a better balance between the resources and capabilities. We hope to keep our operational tempo at a level we can sustain, and not pay too high a price in terms of the individuals who are participating in foreign deployments. We feel we are doing an excellent job in many ways, but there is always room for improvement. We appreciate the support you have accorded us in your reports.
The Chairman: Thank you for coming this morning and for the information you have given to the committee. We look forward to seeing you again in the future.
This committee adjourned.