Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
National Security and Defence
Issue 15 - Evidence
OTTAWA, Monday, May 27, 2002
The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence met this day at 7:00 p.m. to examine and report on the need for a national security policy for Canada.
Senator Colin Kenny (Chairman) in the Chair.
[English]
The Chairman: It is my pleasure to welcome you to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, whether you are here in the room, watching on television or following us on the Internet.
On my immediate right is our deputy chair, Senator Forrestall. He has served the constituents of Dartmouth for more than 36 years, first as a member of the House of Commons, then as a senator. He has followed defence matters throughout his parliamentary career.
On my far right is Senator Atkins from Ontario. He came to the Senate in 1986 with a strong background in the field of communications. Furthermore, he is also one of the committee members with direct experience in the military, having served in the United States Army.
Senator Wiebe is the former Lieutenant Governor of Saskatchewan. He has a strong interest in the reserves and has served as the Saskatchewan chair of the Canadian Forces Liaison Council.
On my extreme left is Senator Taylor, from Alberta. He has joined our committee for this meeting. He is a geologist, currently serving as chair of the Standing Senate Committee on Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources.
Our committee is the first permanent Senate committee with a mandate to examine security and defence. Recently, we concluded a seven-month study of the major issues facing Canada and produced a report entitled ``Canadian Security and Military Preparedness.'' We met for over 170 hours and with 204 persons from coast to coast, and in Washington.
As the committee proceeded, it became increasingly evident that the executive direction and coordination of activities is required when dealing with national incidents, whether natural, such as ice storms, floods or earthquakes; accidental, such as toxic derailments; or premeditated acts of terror, such as those of September 11.
We found there was no national security policy, that agencies at all levels of government can coordinate their efforts effectively.
The Senate asked our committee to examine the need for such a national security policy.
Our first witness this evening is Mr. Jack Granatstein, who is chair of the Council for Canadian Defence and Security in the 21st Century. He served in the Canadian army from 1956 to 1966 before moving on to a distinguished academic career in the history department of York University, retiring in 1995. From 1998 to 2000, he was director and chief executive officer of the Canadian War Museum in Ottawa. He then became special adviser to the director of the museum and is now chair of the museum's advisory council.
Mr. Granatstein writes on 20th century Canadian national history, the military, defence and foreign policy, Canadian-American relations, the public service, politics, and the universities. In 1995, he served as one of three commissioners on the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Canadian Forces Reserves. In 1997, he advised the Minister of National Defence on the future of the Canadian Forces.
He is also joined this evening by Mr. Douglas Bland, chair of the defence management program at the school of policy studies at Queen's University in Kingston. Mr. Bland retired from the Canadian Armed Forces as a lieutenant colonel in 1990 after more than 30 years of service. He held command appointments in Canada and Europe and staff positions in Europe and at the Canadian national defence headquarters.
In his research, Mr. Bland has concentrated on the field of defence policy making and management at national and international levels, the organization and functioning of defence ministries, and civil-military relations.
Mr. Jack Granatstein, Chair, Council for Canadian Defence and Security in the 21st Century: Honourable senators, the Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century, or CCS21, is now about one year old. It was founded by Professor David Bercuson, of the centre for military and strategic studies of the University of Calgary, to make the case for a defence review. Last November, the centre published ``To Secure a Nation,'' arguing this case and laying out the key subjects that any such review needed to examine.
CCS21 began its research before September 11 and published its report after that terrible day. In truth, little had to be altered. The weakness of the Canadian Forces was already clear, the threat of terrorism real and the pressures in the United States for national missile defence and homeland defence already strong. September 11 only ratcheted up the tension.
The former Minister of National Defence indicated that a review of defence policy will take place, to report this autumn. There will be some form of public consultation, though to date we do not know how serious this will be. There is also an in-house foreign policy review underway in the Department of Foreign Affairs. Whatever the results of these reviews, there is certain to be a continuing debate on Canadian security.
To this end, CCS21, originally intended only to support publication of ``To Secure a Nation,'' has decided to continue. Its members now include people as various as Sonja Bata, Dr. Janice Stein, Fred Mannix, Jocelyn Coulon, Stanley Hartt, Peter Newman, Dr. Gilles Paquet, Arthur Smith, Tom D'Aquino and Margaret Wente. They are united only by the belief that defence matters, that Canada must defend itself, its values and its friends, and that Canada and the United States must work together if North America is to be secure in a dangerous world.
Let me now turn to the one issue that will be certain to dominate the defence and foreign policy reviews. The key question is that posed by the creation of Northern Command, the new U.S. military super-command announced April 17, 2002. Northern Command is to be activated on October 1, 2002 and led by the U.S. Air Force four-star general who commands NORAD. The command will also be housed alongside NORAD at Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado.
Such an organization, created largely for purposes of coordination among the fractious American services, had long been suggested in the United States, such proposals beginning well before the World Trade Center attack. Homeland defence is obviously of great concern to Americans and should be equally so to Canadians. Northern Command, however, is an American national command. It is very unlikely that Canada will be invited to participate in its planning or command structure, as Defence Minister Eggleton made clear in Parliament on May 7.
However, it makes sense for Ottawa to press for the creation of an expanded NORAD arrangement that builds on the many agreements already in place and fully covers both nations' land and naval forces. At the same time, the goal must be to preserve and enhance Canada's status in the binational NORAD organization. Such suggestions probably run up against Foreign Affairs' concerns about sovereignty and autonomy, and quite likely the finance department's fear that, if Canada expands NORAD to cover homeland defence, American pressures for much greater defence spending might be too strong to be ignored.
The question, however, must be approached with realism. The U.S. is determined to improve its homeland defence and is certain to approach this subject, as it must, from a continental perspective. The news release announcing Northern Command declared its area of responsibility to be all of North America, including Canada and Mexico, and gave its commander in chief the task of ``security cooperation and military coordination'' with other nations.
Canada thus can choose to either stand back and allow the Americans to plan for the protection of Canadian territory, or to participate in the decisions. The Prime Minister's instinctive response was to say, correctly, that Northern Command was the Americans' own business, but he then added that, ``The defence of Canada will be assured by the Canadian government and not by the American government.'' His office issued a fact sheet that suggested that ``informal'' discussions thus far ``do not include the possible creation of a new joint command with standing forces attributed to it.''
The foreign minister was more circumspect, noting that the government had advised the U.S. ``that once they have announced their plan...we will study it and determine to what extent we wish or whether it would be good for Canada to participate.'' Published reports suggested that the cabinet was to respond to the U.S. by the middle of May. To date, no public announcement has been made.
I suggest that we have no real choice. Nationalists will claim that Canada is tying itself to the American chariot wheels if it expands NORAD, or even posts officers to Northern Command. However, the basic question is simple: Do we want some consultation or none on matters that concern Canadian security every bit as much as American? Some have pointed to the existing differences in Canadian and American policy in arguing against closer defence cooperation. The Hon. Lloyd Axworthy asked: What does a Canadian soldier do if asked to handle landmines on Canadian soil, in contravention of our treaty undertakings? What do we do if we apprehend someone considered a war criminal, because U.S. law would prevent the person from being turned over to the International Criminal Court while our obligations require it? The former minister also complained that, ``Those guys in Ottawa are talking about putting our Armed Forces under U.S. command, which would mean that we would not be in a position to exercise our authority in the Arctic even if we wanted to.''
These are all important questions, though it is difficult for me to contemplate the scenario in which Americans would order Canadians to handle landmines in Canada or to understand how closer defence ties could undermine sovereignty in the Arctic. These questions might have more force if the Canadian and U.S. air forces had not successfully worked together in NORAD for 45 years and if the Canadian and U.S. navies had not seamlessly integrated, daily resolving problems of equal complexity.
So long as our troops remain under Canadian command, with Canadians able to decide what they will do and when, if ever, to place them under U.S. operational control, the nation will have more than sufficient power over its military destiny. If operational control is granted to American commanders, it can be withdrawn at any time. Moreover, an expanded NORAD would be obliged to request Canadian forces for particular missions and the Canadian government would have to agree or not after assessing all the factors. This is the case in NORAD now.
Very simply, Mr. Axeworthy's concerns are groundless and certainly not in the interests of Canada and continental defence. By all means, Canadians need to raise their concerns about further integration with the United States military. However, in their desire to stay a sovereign nation, they must not forget what it is stake: Canada's security and economic well-being.
We must cooperate as fully as possible with the United States, because the Americans are deadly serious about homeland defence and only utterly foolish Canadians will ignore this. The Americans want Canadian cooperation, and it must be offered, because the U.S. will act alone if necessary. They would naturally prefer that Canada cooperate in defending our common territory.
The price of support in continental defence is relatively small. The price of opposition, however, would likely be severe. Washington regards Canadians as close friends, their nearest and best neighbours. If Canada hangs back, the costs might be very high indeed. To participate more fully in continental defence is a Canadian choice; to cooperate with the United States in such defence, I would submit, is a Canadian requirement. I will stop there, honourable senators.
Professor Douglas Bland, Chair of the Defence Management Program, School of Policy Studies, Queen's University: Honourable senators, when I spoke to your committee last October, your investigation into Canada's security and defence policy and related issues was surrounded by the September 11th attack on North America. We spoke, however, at that time about the nature of national security, and I suggested to you a Canadian definition of what that term might mean. I also spoke about six elements that ought to frame a national security policy for Canada.
Tonight, I will speak briefly about three related themes, aware that some of my remarks may repeat what I offered in October. My three areas of concern are: first, the need, as I see it, to index Canada's vulnerability to better manage the application of scarce resources to security problems; second, the continuing need to concentrate responsibility for national security policy under a designated federal minister; and third, the amendments to the National Defence Act set out in Bill C-55, now before the House, relating to ``aid to the civil powers'' in the provinces.
In October, I stated that the debate on national security is too often hindered by the close focus on threats. In most other situations, building policy solely around defence against threats can be misleading and wasteful. The point was that threats exist everywhere, but Canada ought not to build defence simply against threats, but against real vulnerabilities. I recommended that the committee concentrate on means to mitigate threats and redress vulnerabilities. The critical objective of a national security planning policy should be to allocate resources to security problems effectively and efficiently. To do so, however, requires first some idea of the vulnerabilities Canada faces and a decision on which of these ought to be addressed and in what priority.
In this regard, it might be worthwhile for the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence to lead an investigation into Canada's security vulnerabilities aimed at developing what I would call a ``national security vulnerability index'' to guide policy planners and policy makers. Such an index would separate general threats from real vulnerabilities and identify those vulnerabilities that could be redressed by national means from those that would require external and international efforts. For example, the vulnerabilities of ports — as already identified by this committee — might be addressed by a combination of national policies on ports and international regulations controlling shipping. Without such an index, however, I am not confident that real problems can be properly identified among the plethora of threats that are out there in the world or that resources are being managed to good effect.
The second issue I would like to mention, as at our last meeting, deals with security organization, especially at the federal level. First, let me frame my remarks around this notion: the war on terrorism is essentially a war of organizations or between organizations. Specifically, the war can be seen as a contest between terrorist organizations characterized by secretive, closely controlled, organizationally simple structures under unified leadership with clear aims, and governmental organizations characterized by information and policy transparency — perhaps to the point of impairing security, though not intentionally — multifaceted sub-organizations and scattered responsibility under many leaders with many aims, all of which may be in competition one with the other.
Where terrorists are bold and offensive, government organizations are defensive. Where terrorists are nimble, governments are clumsy and bureaucratic.
Arguably, since September 11, governments in Canada and the United States have responded to dangers by becoming even more bureaucratic, and thus requiring even more effort to decide and to act. If Canada hopes to win its part of the war on terrorism, then it must first win the battle of organization. The federal government's machinery in this war must become lightning fast in decision, offensive in spirit and style, and must be directed by a unified policy under one leader.
We could start this process — again, as I suggested earlier — by following our traditional model of parliamentary government and bringing all the apparatus for security policy and operations under one minister, who would be responsible for building a unified national security policy, developing a unified national intelligence agency and constructing a truly state-of-the-art national operations centre.
My third issue this evening concerns Bill C-55. As honourable senators are aware, the federal government has tabled the bill in the House as ``an act to amend certain acts of Canada to enhance public safety.'' My unease is with Part 11 of Bill C-55, which amends the National Defence Act, NDA, and will, among other things, alter section 278, which deals with Canadian Armed Forces' ``aid to the civil power'' in provinces. In my opinion, it would fundamentally change the way in which the Chief of the Defence Staff would respond to provincial requisitions for Armed Forces in a future crisis.
Section 278 has a long history, dating from 1867 when the Fathers of Confederation decided that the federal government would control matters of national defence, except in cases where provinces determined that they required military forces ``for the purpose of suppressing or preventing'' riots or disturbances. According to some research, this constitutional arrangement was devised as an alternative to the formation of provincial militias outside federal control. The arrangement was codified in various militia acts over the years and in the unified National Defence Act in the early 1950s. Section 278 of the act reads as follows:
On receiving a requisition in writing made by an attorney general under section 277, the Chief of the Defence Staff, or such officer as the Chief of the Defence Staff may designate, shall call out such part of the Canadian Forces as the Chief of the Defence Staff or that officer considers necessary for the purpose of suppressing or preventing any actual riot or disturbance or any riot or disturbance that is considered as likely to occur.
Section 278 has been used often, and most famously in recent times during the FLQ crisis of 1970 and the Oka crisis of 1990.
In these times of heightened concern for internal security, provinces may be interested in improving cooperation with the Canadian Armed Forces and may expect to be able to requisition defence resources during local emergencies. However, the amendment to section 278 of the National Defence Act proposed by the federal government under Bill C-55 may change this relationship dramatically, and therefore may require provinces to review and change their emergency plans as well.
The proposed amendment to section 278 would place the Minister of National Defence between the requesting attorneys general and the Chief of the Defence Staff, thus eliminating from the National Defence Act and regulations the provincial governments' right of unfettered access to Armed Forces in aid of the civil power. The proposed section 278 reads as follows:
... the Chief of the Defence Staff, or such officer as the Chief of the Defence Staff may designate, shall, subject to such directions as the Minister considers appropriate in the circumstances and in consultation with that attorney general and the attorney general of any other province that may be affected, call out such part of the Canadian Forces as the Chief of the Defence Staff or that officer considers necessary for the purpose ...
The amendment may change Canada's constitutional law and/or customary laws and subject provincial security decisions to review by or the concurrence of federal ministers. Certainly, the response of the Chief of the Defence Staff might, in the future, be very different from responses to provinces in the past, such as at Oka. That is simply because the Chief of the Defence Staff may be required to modify his decisions and opinions based on how the minister of the day may see the situation. Moreover, the tentative nature of aid implicit in the proposed amendment may require provinces to prepare other means to address their internal security problems on a prudent assumption that aid from the Canadian Forces may not be assured once this amendment is passed into law.
The amendment, in my view, is significant not only because it appears to amend Canada's constitutional arrangements, but also because it may result in a fundamental reorganization of the way in which the federal and provincial governments manage internal security policies and crises. The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence might seek clarification of the origins and intent of this amendment, which one might, unkindly, say is buried in Bill C-55, by asking the federal and provincial governments four central questions:
First, assuming that this amendment does change Canada's constitutional arrangements in matters of aid to the civil power and that such changes usually require federal-provincial consultations, were provincial governments consulted before this amendment was tabled in the House of Commons?
Second, does the present law, section 278, adequately meet provincial needs and requirements in the new security environment, or will they be better served by the proposed amendment?
Third, what additional policies, procedures and resources do the federal and provincial governments anticipate would have to be developed as a result of this change to the National Defence Act?
Fourth, is this amendment intended as one step in the development of a national security response system involving all three levels of government in Canada? If so, what is that system or strategy?
I will end tonight on the same theme as my closing comments last October. In my view, Canada's national security policy and national security system ought to be constructed on a foundation of decisions about ends and means; on the location of political authority and accountability; on the method for national policy coordination; and on how Canada's involvement in international efforts to combat terrorism can be made effective and efficient.
It seems that, despite the fine work of this committee and that of other eminent persons inside and outside government, we are not much closer to building a comprehensive security policy in Canada. As well, we are not close to creating an agile organization capable of bringing all levels of government into effective, coordinated operations. These basic elements are essential if we are to deter determined terrorists from targeting Canada or using it as a safe haven from which to launch terrorist acts elsewhere.
Getting to the point where terrorists are either deterred or defeated because they are cowed by the effectiveness of Canada's internal security policy and apparatus is, in my view, an objective in need of concerted public and extraordinary political attention.
Senator Forrestall: I want to ask both of you the same question. I may ask one or two other brief questions concerning dollars and cents, about which I have some concerns.
Do either of you believe that Canada does not have a cohesive defence policy that encompasses what role the military should play in foreign policy? Some of us might prefer to believe that we have a foreign policy with something of a split personality. We want rapid reaction forces capable of meeting crises as defined in our relationships with other regions of the world and under the United Nations. Mr. Lloyd Axworthy referred to it as ``soft power.'' Where do we stand? Do we have a cohesive policy? Do we have a defence policy that meets and merges with that, or do we have a continuing dilemma?
Mr. Granatstein: We have a continuing dilemma, without question. We have a defence policy that is underfunded, undermanned and overstretched and that tries to respond to the foreign policy wishes of the government, when those wishes are clear, which they are usually not. To my mind, we have a government policy that is crisis driven and that responds to demands made upon us by our friends, allies and the United Nations. Usually, the response occurs before determining if the Canadian Forces have the capacity to carry out the wishes of the government.
The result of this is very clear: We have Armed Forces that are seriously overstretched. We have units that seem to go overseas once a year for six months and wear themselves out in the process.
The simple truth is that we are pulling our people out of Afghanistan because we do not have the capacity to replace them after six months. That is an indication, to my mind, of a foreign policy that accepts commitments without regard to the capacity of the Canadian Forces to carry them out. There does not seem to be evident coordination between foreign and defence policy.
Some of us hoped that, as there were coincident defence and foreign policy reviews underway, we might get that. What we have, however, is a foreign policy review taking place behind closed doors at Fort Pearson. We have a defence policy review that is supposed to be public, but thus far has not got off the ground and has not released the basic paper that was supposed to lay the groundwork. With the appointment of a new minister on Sunday, it is entirely possible that we may not have a defence review now until such time as the minister feels he is up to speed on defence questions.
It sounds to me as if we will be continuing our ``discoordinated'' policy. In those circumstances, the only kind of policy we can have is soft power. We have no other power.
Mr. Bland: I have often said in lectures that, in my view, the chief characteristic of Canadian defence policy is surprise. The politicians continually surprise the military with requests to go hither and yon or to do things with less when it is clearly not possible. The military surprises the political community by saying, ``We cannot actually do what you are asking us to do,'' although they try hard.
If we mean by ``national security policy'' a set of decisions that joins ends and means, then we probably do not have a national defence policy in that regard. We have a statement of intent, a declared policy, but the actual policy is determined more or less by the resources that are made available to the Department of National Defence. The other key characteristic of defence and policy making in Canada is that defence ministers are asked to make do with what is available, not what is necessary. In other words, the budget is set first and then the policy is constructed, rather than the other way around.
I know of no other person in the country other than the Prime Minister who does not think that there is a financing problem in the Armed Forces. Every report I have read and every eminent person with whom I have spoken over the last few years has made that same point. We should not concentrate merely on the problems with the present force. I think that we are rapidly approaching the problem of the future force. What are the Armed Forces going to look like in five or six years from now, to say nothing of 10 years from now?
As I have said here before, if the Prime Minister opened the treasury doors tomorrow and asked CDS to help themselves to the money, it would still take four or five years of downward spiralling before we could bring new equipment and forces online. We have no policy for operational readiness or for the future force. We are just clinging to the present.
Senator Forrestall: Is it a question, post 9/11 in Canada, of defence capacity leading external policy? That is something that has always been alien to my nature. I have always believed that you devised foreign policy and then set about to institute and protect it with the necessary military means.
At the start of this century, at least here in Canada, if not elsewhere, should we not be examining that question, namely, what should be leading?
Mr. Granatstein: I do not think there is any doubt that defence policy is not leading at this point. I do not think it should, either.
Senator Forrestall: Is it reacting?
Mr. Granatstein: There is no visible sign of reaction. Most people in the Canadian Forces, and certainly the chiefs of the services, thought there would be money for defence in the December 2001 budget. We were at war, after all. There was not very much at all. That was quite striking. That was a clear indication of the government's priorities, and they did not lie in defence.
I think that foreign policy should set our defence policy. Obviously there should be coordination, but I think the foreign policy of the country should determine our defence policy. You want them to work hand in glove. However, they have not often seemed to be in that kind of relationship. When you have a minister, as we did, who called for soft power, and you have Canadian Forces that were gathering up to fight wars as well as to do peacekeeping, you do not see much sign of coordination. One wishes that we would have that coordination. One wishes, as I mentioned before, that we would have a defence and foreign policy review underway at the same time, with the issues being debated. If we do this in foreign policy, what does this imply for our defence policy? However, we do not seem to be able to do that in this country.
Senator Forrestall: Do not seem to be able, or do not seem to want to?
Mr. Granatstein: I think they probably go together because we do not want to pay any attention to defence.
Mr. Bland: I would say that in the best of all possible worlds, if we could start from zero, you would write a foreign policy — we are talking about only the application of military capabilities outside Canada, of course — and then build the various parts of your foreign policy and defence establishments to meet those objectives. However, we are rarely at that start-up point. We are somewhere else in the continuum of foreign-defence policy. However, the lesson for Canada is often that where foreign policy planners, ministers and cabinets all of a sudden wish to do something interesting in international affairs, either because it is good for other aspects of national policy or because it is forced on us by war or crises, they find themselves trapped by the fact that they do not have the capabilities. In that sense, military policy, defence policy, leads foreign policy. If you have an absence of capabilities, then your foreign policy will be directed by what you have at hand. Mr. Granatstein knows much more about military history in the First and Second World War and in Korea. There has been ample evidence that that has been the case for us.
For the most part, foreign and defence policy in Canada is coordinated on a day-to-day basis by Canadian officials. Some idea pops up: ``Let's go to Zaire.'' Officials work as diligently and honestly as they can to construct some force to carry out the government's policy, and that becomes our defence policy for the moment. You can see the problems of a foreign policy of intentions and wills and objectives being, if not hamstrung, at least slowed down by a lack of military and defence capabilities, and other capabilities, in our return from Afghanistan. If it was in our interests to go in the first place, it obviously should be in our interests to stay, but we cannot because we do not have the military means and you cannot create them overnight. That is the problem I see in foreign-defence policy relationships.
Senator Wiebe: I have three questions. The first is a follow-up to Senator Forrestall's question about a lack of resources.
There is no doubt that our Armed Forces do suffer from a lack of resources. That was quite evident in the decision to pull our troops out of Afghanistan. I do not think you will find too many on this committee who will argue with that.
One problem for the Armed Forces in any country is the politicians who happen to run it. For some reason, they like to get themselves re-elected. How do we go about convincing the general public of the need for a strong defence for our country? I ask both of you to make a brief comment on that.
Mr. Granatstein: It is difficult, no doubt. There is widespread public support for the men and women of the Canadian Armed Forces. However, it is about one inch deep, and it fluctuates.
At the moment, I think it is very positive. The quite extraordinary response to the deaths of the Princess Patricia soldiers in Afghanistan was an indication of public support. The reaction to September 11, not from some elements of the CBC and some academic quarters, but the general public response, was such as to suggest that Canadians realize that they are part of North America and under threat at this point. I think ordinary Canadians recognize that this requires some strengthening of the military. The polls suggest this.
I find it difficult to understand why the government, which is usually pretty responsive to public opinion, does not see this. Perhaps they have their own focus groups that are telling them that people much prefer to see the money spent on advertising at functions in Quebec, or it may be that there are some other reasons that I cannot fathom.
However, I think governments are playing with our lives at this point. They are playing with our futures. Professor Bland made the point that it will take substantial time to build up the forces and equip them properly, even if the treasury were opened tomorrow. It would probably take three to five years to rebuild to the point that we can do something. This has serious implications, because we are facing major choices in our relations with the United States. The Americans see us, to be blunt, as freeloaders. We sponge off them and do not carry our weight. They have put up with us for a long time. I am not personally convinced they will put up with us any longer.
One of the signal contributions of the paper that Lloyd Axworthy's centre produced on Canada-U.S. defence relations was that it legitimized linkage. It was always an article of faith in the Department of Foreign Affairs that issues were not linked. You could talk about trade with the United States, and that did not affect defence. Mr. Axworthy made the point that if we have closer defence relations with the United States, this means that our water and our Arctic might be in jeopardy. I think this is nonsense, but he was deliberately espousing the idea of linkage.
You can take it the other way and say, ``If we do not carry our share of defence in North America, where will the linkage hurt us? Where will the Americans put the pressure on us to make us do what they clearly want us to do?''
I do not know where that will be, but if, for example, I were the president and I was upset at Canada, I would call for an extra half-hour on customs inspection and watch Canada crumble in about three days as the lineups at the border became unmanageable, as they did shortly after September 11. It is easy for a country to which we send 90 per cent of our trade goods to apply pressure on us.
I fail to comprehend why our governments cannot see the situation that we are facing more clearly. We must, it seems to me, take a much firmer stand on defence questions. We must start this process of rebuilding soon, before it is too late.
Mr. Bland: Wilfrid Laurier, speaking about national defence, stated an axiom of Canadian defence planning in the political community. He said words to the effect that there is no threat to Canada, and if there were one, the Americans would save us. I believe every Prime Minister has, in his quiet time, said the same thing to himself. However, as Mr. Granatstein has said, we are imposing taxes on American citizens. They are paying the bills, and we had better watch out for the consequences of that.
Senator, with respect, I would pass your question back to the committee and to Parliament. How are we to convince the Canadian people that national defence is important for all sorts of reasons? I think it will take acts of political leadership and persuasion. The political community needs to lead the conversation in convincing people of the importance of national defence and to make what would be, I suppose, difficult, partisan choices to spend money on defence at the expense of some other, more desirable item on the shopping list.
It would also be important for the political community to get together and develop a non-partisan national defence policy for Canada. It really cannot be that difficult. When I look, over time and even recently, at the defence platforms of various parties, there is hardly any difference, except, perhaps, in how much money and effort will be spent, which is not an inconsiderable issue. However, if the objectives and the roles and missions of the Armed Forces, our place in the world, are well understood, then it should not be too difficult to lead Canadians to understand that. Getting Canadians to buy into national defence is largely a political problem.
Senator Wiebe: Before I go into my second question, I should like to go back to a comment you made about a former Prime Minister saying that if our country is ever attacked, not to worry because the Americans will defend us. Is it fair to assume that the majority of people in Canada hold the same view?
Mr. Bland: I think that is true in the context of the defence of Canada on the North American Continent. However, I do not think most Canadians believe that is a worthwhile way to think about national defence when we are talking about supporting foreign policy, operating in other parts of the world or acting, heaven forbid, as an independent leader of coalitions. Why can Canada not lead coalitions? Why do other nations? Why do we have to follow all the time? We led them in 1956 in Suez, but we failed to lead them in Zaire in 1996.
Mr. Granatstein: I have great regard for Prime Minister Laurier, but I have always been more attached to Mackenzie King, who stands number one in the list of great Canadian Prime Ministers as judged by historians. This may surprise some of you, but it is nonetheless true.
Mackenzie King responded to Franklin Roosevelt's speech at Queen's University in Kingston in 1938. Roosevelt said that the United States would not stand by and let any other empire threaten Canada. King's response two days later was to say that Canada would conduct itself so that it could not be used as a route for anyone to attack the United States. That is the fundamental bargain that has governed Canadian and American defence policies in North America since that time.
I would suggest that while the Americans have carried out their end of the bargain, this country has not. We did when we set up NORAD. We have not done it in the last 10 or 15 years. We have not carried out our share of the responsibility. This, it seems to me, is eminently clear after 9/11.
Senator Wiebe: My second question deals with your comments on page 3 of your presentation. You say that the war on terrorism is essentially a war of organizations.
You also say at the bottom of the page:
If Canada hopes to win its part of the war on terrorism, then it must first win the battle of organization.
That leads to a favourite question of mine. It is my sincere belief that we have far too many police forces in this country. There is a tremendous duplication of resources and knowledge, and slow communications between forces when something happens.
That is not the case, as you state here, with the terrorist organizations. They are well organized. They are not dealing with a country. They do not have any rules of war. Any rule goes, or can be broken, in a terrorist organization.
What is your feeling about our security forces in this country? Are we too fragmented? Are there too many? Should we be looking at consolidating some of them?
Mr. Bland: At the municipal level, you are right. A certain degree of fragmentation puts our cities at a disadvantage in dealing with terrorist organizations, mainly because police departments, fire departments, paramedic organizations, and so on, all grew up from a different set of concepts. It would be important in the future to look at the municipal level in national security planning.
We are fragmented to some degree at the operational level, but in comparison with the problems of the United States, we are very well off. We have a united armed force under one leader, not several armed forces. We do not have provincial militias to deal with, whereas the U.S. President has to deal with national guards, governors who have command of armed forces in their own territory, and any number of security agencies.
The United States has no real standing structure to handle these kinds of problems, whereas in Canada, we have military regions across the country under the direction of one person, the Chief of Defence Staff. We have one national police force, of course, as everyone is aware, and in the last few months, it is starting to bring together its command and control systems so that it can act more like a united force.
The level of discontinuity is at the municipal level, with all sorts of police forces with little training, little background and not many resources for these kinds of problems. That needs to be brought together.
My concern, in this paper and in these brief remarks, is with the national planning level, whether we are swift enough. The battle goes to the swift, someone said. We need to be able to outpace the thinking of terrorist organizations, to get ahead of them and to let them worry every night when they go to bed that someone might be coming to get them. You cannot do that if committees, with respect, run the entire defence, foreign policy and security planning organization.
Senator Wiebe: Enlarge on that, please. You used the term ``committees.''
Mr. Bland: There will always be committees. However, it is important to start cutting down ruthlessly on the number of people involved in making decisions about what resources we need, where we need to be deployed, how we need to operate against terrorist organizations, who needs information, and so on.
Right now, these responsibilities and authorities are scattered through the justice department, the RCMP, the Armed Forces, the defence minister, the transport minister, the air control parts of government, to name just a few at the federal level. My suggestion has been that, wherever possible, we concentrate these matters under a single minister. My suggestion was that matters of national security be passed to the Minister of National Defence, with the appointment of an associate defence minister for national security planning and operations, mainly because it is the defence minister who has the resources that people call on when they want to do something with regard to security. If you have someone else doing these kinds of things and then calling on him for resources, you inevitably end up with problems.
We took an important step in that direction with the enhancement of the Emergency Measures Organization, the critical infrastructure department under the Associate Deputy Minister of National Defence, but we need to examine whether we can make our government organization, in planning, intelligence and operations, quick, smart, and so well organized as to deter terrorists from coming to this country.
Senator Wiebe: Would you include ports of entry, customs, and security at the borders? Would that all come under Department of National Defence as well? We have a tremendous amount of fragmentation now. When you look at the municipal level, you must also look at the provincial and national levels.
Mr. Bland: Yes, and you identify this in your report on ports. Right now it looks like a free for all, with either no security or no one coordinating security. If these are major points of vulnerability for Canada, then the provincial, federal and perhaps the municipal governments need to come together under some direction to sort out how to deal with that. If it requires the secondment of people from Citizenship and Immigration, Customs and Revenue and the RCMP into defence headquarters to help manage these operations over a long term, that would be a good thing. Certainly we should not let departmental boundaries get in the way of those kinds of decisions.
Senator Atkins: I wish to carry on with the same line of questioning, Professor Bland. You say the federal government machinery ``must become lightning fast in decisions, offensive in style and spirit, and directed by uniform policy under one leader.'' You are suggesting, perhaps, that that one leader or that minister would be the Minister of Defence.
Would it not be better to have a separate ministry with one minister in charge, so that these different agencies of government could work under that particular portfolio? I ask that question because last fall we heard from a retired director of CSIS and a former commissioner of the RCMP. When we asked them if they wanted some coordinated direction from a single minister or department, they said no. They believe in a silo concept.
How can you put this responsibility under the Minister of National Defence if it is the RCMP that is reporting, as well as CSIS, defence and other agencies?
Mr. Bland: My main concern in this discussion is to try to find an effective and efficient way to bring together the people who have the resources for security operations with those with the authority to make the decision about how they will be deployed.
I am not wedded to the idea that the Minister of National Defence is it and that an associate defence minister should support him. However, that seems to be the easiest thing to do.
In my conversation with officials in this town and in other places, one thing that the departmental structures and the agencies do not want in this game is another player on the ice, another team. They think there are enough problems with coordinating things as they are now.
An idea worthy of exploration is to draw up various models and look at the advantages and disadvantages to see how we can arrive at an efficiently functioning organization in which we have confidence.
The United States system is much different, but look at what happened when, apparently, an FBI bureau found the notes and could not make its way up through the system to answer the question. I do not know the details, but I heard through the press last week that the Government of Ontario had discovered terrorist cells in their cities, let them go and now no one knows where they are. Maybe the intelligence people will tell you they do know where they are, but is this an example of where these cracks develop in our policy making and our operations through which terrorists move? I believe this is a serious matter that needs to be studied and ``business as usual'' will not work.
Mr. Granatstein, I am sure, will tell you that in other crises, in times of war, it was not business as usual. Governments found ways to cut across these kinds of difficulties.
Mr. Granatstein: You are right; governments did cut across them. I am not convinced that they were ever effective or efficient in doing so. If I can put on my squishy, ``liberal'' hat for a minute, I am not entirely certain that I want them to be all that efficient in doing this.
I hesitate to disagree with my distinguished colleague, but it would worry me if there were one minister with those kinds of sweeping powers — controlling the police, the military, the customs and a whole range of government functions. Our system is not designed to give that kind of power to a single minister. I do not believe our system or our public would tolerate that unless we were facing grave dangers. While I think we are in serious difficulty right now, we are not yet near the point at which the public would accept that kind of concentration of power in the hands of a single minister.
Senator Atkins: At the moment, the way it works is through a committee.
Mr. Granatstein: There can always be better coordination. There can always be better planning. There can always be strategies worked out in advance so that we know how we should respond. We can certainly improve in those areas, and we must improve. However, it is a long step from that to Professor Bland's position.
Senator Atkins: The suggestion was made in October that the Deputy Prime Minister chair this coordinating committee.
Mr. Granatstein: We all thought that was the intention for that position.
Senator Atkins: Mr. Granatstein, do you think we need a new white paper or an update of the one we have?
Mr. Granatstein: Do you mean a white paper on defence?
Senator Atkins: Yes.
Mr. Granatstein: The present white paper is simply fine. If only we had the resources for its implementation. If the government would provide the resources to meet what is laid down as policy, most critics of current Canadian defence policy would whoop and cheer. However, there does not seem to be much indication that the government is prepared to do that.
Some describe the update process that we seem to be going through now as the last chance to obtain resources to implement some parts of the existing white paper. If that is the case, and I suspect it is, then we will have to settle for second best. Certainly, it would be far better, in my view, if the government reaffirmed the 1994 white paper and said, ``We will carry it out.''
Senator Atkins: In view of what happened on the weekend, are you concerned for the new minister, who has really had no cabinet experience, other than maybe three or four months, is in a new portfolio and probably does not know one end of a rifle from another?
Mr. Granatstein: He was a cadet, so I believe he claims he does.
Senator Atkins: He went to TCS, I know.
Having said that, do you think this will slow down the process of addressing some of what I consider to be critical problems facing the military?
Mr. Granatstein: I expect it may. I have no particular insight into what is happening at NDHQ today.
Senator Forrestall: We all would like to know, though.
Mr. Granatstein: I suspect that the question under discussion is, ``Do we proceed with a review or do we wait until the minister wants it to go ahead?'' I do not know what the answer will be, but I think it might make good sense for this minister to say, ``How can I review what I do not know?'' and to want to hold things off. That is, in some ways, a sensible response. It will be very serious for our defence posture, however.
Senator Atkins: In terms of foreign policy, do you believe that there has been a shift in priorities from 10 to 15 years ago to what we are facing today, and if so, where?
Mr. Granatstein: The priority today for us must be relations with the United States. There is nothing else it can be. We have created a situation — Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA, and so on — where this continent is very much our bailiwick. We do not have the military power to make any impact on the rest of the world except in very specific, limited circumstances.
We like to believe that we are the leader of the middle powers. We are no longer. It has been a long time since we had the capacity to exercise influence in the world. Part of the reason is that power comes out of the barrel of a gun, and we do not have many. Part of it is that our foreign affairs structure has been allowed to deteriorate. We pay our Armed Forces very badly. We pay our diplomats probably even worse, by comparison with their peers in other countries. We have been cutting back instead of building up in foreign affairs, just as we have done in defence, and we are paying the price. It costs money to try to be a power in the world. We have not been prepared to spend that money. The result is that the world has closed in on us. All we can do — and even here we cannot do that much — is try to manage our relations with the United States.
We have always benefited from the fact that we employ our best people in dealing with the Americans. The Americans look at us as a third-rate power, which perhaps we are. They do not ordinarily assign their best people to Canadian problems. This means that we can usually win most of the battles. We know we can never win any of the political wars with the United States, but we can win more than our share of the battles, and we can, in fact, do reasonably well in dealing with Washington.
If the Americans want something and assign their best people to it, and if they are determined to get their way — and there are clear indications now that there are areas in which they are determined — then our choice is simple. It is to say, ``Yes, sir,'' or ``Yes, sir, please.'' There is not much else we can do. The automatic nationalist response from many Canadians is to say that we must be independent and play our role in the Arab-Israeli question and every other crisis area of the world. Frankly, that is 10 to 15 years out of date. We have lost that capacity.
Senator Atkins: When we met with the Secretary of Defence in Washington, we got the impression he knew more about Canada than most of the people we met, particularly the people in Congress. I got the clear impression — I do not know whether the panel did — that he would like to see Canada's involvement in the Northern Command. However, if Canada was not interested, they were going it alone.
I was down in Newport last week at the Canada-U.S. parliamentary meeting.
I got the impression that one of the Americans' hang-ups with Northern Command is that they might be able to deal with us, but they have a problem with Mexico.
Do you wish to comment on that?
Mr. Granatstein: I know very little about Mexico. However, they do have a military force that is essentially geared for internal security.
Our traditions are quite different. We have always looked outward, while they have always looked inward. We are much more in the model of the United States than are the Mexicans. We are also — and I hope it is still true — somewhat more modern than the Mexican forces. They may be catching up.
Senator Atkins: Do you think that if we were able to make some kind of arrangement with the Americans, it would demand significant military resources?
Mr. Granatstein: Probably. I have taken the view for some time that the only way we will get the money we need for our defence is if the Americans put the squeeze on us and tell us that we must do this. That, probably more than Canadian public opinion or leadership by our political elite, will do the trick. We will listen if Washington really squeezes.
Senator Wiebe: If they squeeze us gently?
Mr. Granatstein: Even if they squeeze us roughly.
Mr. Bland: Senator, your points are very important. There is sometimes confusion in my circles, when speaking with students and different groups of people, about the notion of gaining influence by building up Canadian Armed Forces and so on. People who want to put you off on that will say, ``Well, we could not possibly spend enough to gain sufficient influence in Washington to make things happen there.'' I totally agree.
Washington is a place where all kinds of people are vying to influence national policy, but the Americans will make their own. People who make this criticism miss the point. In my view, we are not building armed forces so that we can necessarily influence the direction of the world. What we need to do, especially in relation to the Americans, is have sufficient capability to influence decisions the Americans are taking about us. That is the point.
We need to have enough capability so that we are invited to the table. Our capabilities need to be important to American military commanders, who will say, ``We really need the Canadian Air Force to patrol the skies and so forth. You had better ask their politicians to talk to us about that.''
When we have few capabilities, we certainly have no influence in world affairs, the United Nations or NATO. We will have zero influence on decisions being made about Canada by people in international bodies. That is the way that discussion ought to be framed.
Mr. Granatstein: Let me just say that I agree with that 100 per cent.
Senator Atkins: They may be watching the trends and seeing that our commitments are greater than our resources?
Mr. Bland: They can count our ranks just as easily as we can.
Senator Atkins: As a footnote, when we were in Newport, it was interesting to note that all the Congressmen, and there were about 25, said, ``We really have to apologize because we take Canada for granted.'' The other thing that came through clearly is that they have no idea of what we are all about.
Mr. Granatstein: This has been our greatest protection for a very long time.
Senator Atkins: You call it ``protection''?
Mr. Granatstein: Yes. It is when they pay attention to us that we are in serious trouble. Let me say that they are now.
Senator Atkins: Paying attention to us?
Mr. Granatstein: Yes.
Senator Forrestall: We were supposed to have an overview from the government on existing external policy on May 30. It has now been put off until June 15. Of course, this happened before yesterday. The world has September 11, but Canada has ``yesterday.'' Some of us are happier with that than others. Until that translates into helicopters, I will hold my fire.
Do you see anything significant about the delay, and to what on earth could it be related? They have been at this for quite a while.
Mr. Granatstein: Are you referring to the delay in the purchase of new helicopters or the delay in coming before your committee?
Senator Forrestall: Wait until I ask Minister McCallum for his definition of ``soon'' and then I will answer that question.
We were to have had a position paper. Do you read anything into the delay?
Mr. Granatstein: I did not know that there was a delay until you mentioned it, sir. I suspect it is related more to drafting problems in the department than anything else.
Senator Forrestall: Or that the minister is currently away on an extended trip.
Mr. Granatstein: That may well be.
Senator Taylor: I found it particularly interesting that Mr. Granatstein referred to having to beware when the Americans start to pay attention to you.
I have some trouble with your logic, though. You mentioned that we pulled out of Afghanistan because we were not able to replace our troops.
I remember a very strong power called the U.S. being in Vietnam until hell froze over. They were pouring money and troops in and going nowhere. Perhaps we are doing the smartest thing. We might be getting into something that could go on and on. In other words, there is no indication that a good army helps to solve a problem. It seems to become a leech that sucks money out.
What do you want out of our army? Are we supposed to be jumping into every corner of the world and staying there? It seems to me that they should take their wives with them.
Mr. Granatstein: Armies exist to fight wars. We exist as a nation because our army helped to win the First World War, the Second World War and the Cold War. No one wants to fight wars. No one wants to pour the billions of dollars you must into military forces. No one wants to see sons or daughters killed in action.
However, sometimes you must fight. Sometimes the issues involved must be faced. Sometimes, when you are dealing with dictators or crazed religious fundamentalists, you must take up arms. You have no other option. When that happens, you look to your professionals to organize your forces and lead them into action.
The history of this country has been that we fight our wars quite vigorously. We do it, however, as amateurs in the beginning and learn on the job. We pay a price when we do that. Many of our sons have been killed who need not have been because they were led by the banker down the road and the lawyer from the small town who, if they had had four years, would have learned how to do it properly. Arthur Currie is a perfect example, as is Bert Hoffmeister. They are World War II examples of amateur soldiers who became professionals in action. They learned how to do it. They became as good as anyone in the world at fighting wars. While they learned, a lot of Canadians died.
This is like insurance. You pay money to insure your house against fire. You hope you will not have a fire. However, if it happens, you are quite happy that you do have that insurance. The difference in defence is that the insurance you pay in peacetime is money to train professionals.
In wartime, the insurance policy that you are called upon to pay is in money and the lives of your children. I would much rather pay that money in peacetime to develop the professionals in order to minimize the loss of our children — our sons and daughters — in fighting wars. Every penny we spend on defence right now is well spent, provided it is properly supervised and used for the right things.
Senator Taylor: By ``defence,'' you mean developing an army that can put out ``hot spots'' around the world?
Mr. Granatstein: I mean to fight wars, if necessary, and defend this continent.
Senator Taylor: I have trouble following you. You sound very much like the Pope when he sent people on the Crusades.
Mr. Granatstein: No one has ever before said I sounded like the Pope.
Senator Forrestall: There is a first time for everything.
Senator Taylor: I have trouble agreeing with your line of reasoning. Nevertheless, that is not why we are here.
There seems to be a complaint here that we do not have the internal security that we should. I suppose no country ever does. The most powerful military in the world is that of the U.S., and perhaps the fourth most powerful is that of Israel. They have nothing but trouble with terrorists.
What makes you think that if we put together a huge army, we will be any better at handling terrorists in the system than we are now?
Mr. Granatstein: This is really a question for my colleague. However, let me say that no one is suggesting at this point that we need a huge army. We need an army that can fill the ranks in its present units. They are now at about half strength. Essentially, another 10,000 men in khaki would be very useful in preventing our army from wearing itself out on our present overseas missions, let alone future ones.
Mr. Bland: I should like to comment on your important question.
First, in regard to how much defence one gets for how many dollars, what would be the situation in Israel this afternoon if it did not have the type of army it has? The point is that armies do not make defence policy. Security policies do not make countries invulnerable, we understand that, but they make them less vulnerable than otherwise. It is the skill of the Israeli defence forces that has kept the situation at least tolerable for many years. It is important to ask about that.
Why we left Afghanistan is closely related to the question of why we went in the first place. I have said before, usually in the context of the Somalia inquiry and the deployment of people overseas, that Parliament has the responsibility to conduct these investigations before people are deployed, not after they come back.
We need a non-partisan parliamentary debate on why we should go somewhere, how long we are going for, what arrangements are made, what rules of engagement are involved, and what the command and logistic arrangements are for all of these major operations that we undertake.
What interests me in the present context of the controversy, if that is the word, around our withdrawal from Afghanistan is that it is an expression of scarce resources, as we have been told. However, we have policy choices. We have 1,400 people in the Balkans, in many respects standing around. Many of you have been there already. What went on in the last six or eight months in the foreign policy department? When we knew we had this very important commitment to the United States' exercise in Afghanistan, why were we not organizing a withdrawal from the Balkans so we could avoid this controversy? Why did we not phone up the German Chancellor and say, ``Your turn. You have many, many more soldiers than we have. We are coming home in six months and we need the people to carry on this other function.''
It goes to the question of policy and defence coordination. Perhaps the Department of Foreign Affairs is too busy organizing events.
Senator Taylor: You said we pulled out of Afghanistan because we were short of troops and why did we not move some from Bosnia. Maybe they decided that Afghanistan looks like a bottomless hole, whereas Bosnia has some chance of achieving peace. I think you are making a quick assumption based on Southam News coming up with military experts saying that we are getting out of Afghanistan because we cannot hold our end up. It may well be that getting out of Afghanistan is the smartest thing we can do.
Before we get into an argument as to where to put the soldiers, you mentioned that a good military will maybe stop terrorism. When terrorists are suicide bombers, it seems the military is not any good at all. It seems that one needs a good police or intelligence system rather than a strong military. Is that right?
Mr. Bland: In some respects, it is exactly that. We need police and intelligence systems that work efficiently together.
Senator Taylor: You wrote in your last paragraph:
Getting to the point where terrorists are either deterred or defeated because they are cowed by the effectiveness of Canada's internal security policy...
I do not follow what you are saying there. I do not think terrorists will be cowed by effectiveness. What can an effective policy do about someone who wants to commit suicide?
Mr. Bland: The individual who commits suicide may have several motives. It appears from what we know of the Israeli situation that they are very young people motivated by all sorts of different things. However, their bosses, the organizations that direct international and regional terrorism, are usually rational people. That is, they do not spend their resources in useless attacks on the Israeli forces, for instance. There are very few suicide bombers who attempt to run through the gates of an Israeli military camp and blow themselves up. They try to get close, but they do not gain much from that.
If I were a terrorist leader in Canada, or anywhere else, I would look for soft targets.
Senator Taylor: You would not infiltrate a political party?
Mr. Granatstein: That is much too soft.
Mr. Bland: I am suggesting that, in simple terms, if we make ourselves into a tough case, they will go and blow up the Mexicans or the Irish or someone else. It is not my responsibility to take care of those people.
Senator Taylor: Mr. Granatstein, do not forget that our chairman has an Irish name.
Mr. Granatstein, you mentioned that the military might participate in provincial problems.
Mr. Granatstein: That was Professor Bland.
Senator Taylor: In other words, it would be like handling the FLQ crisis in Quebec; the military was moved in there.
Do you remember the troubles in Newfoundland? I am, of course, older than anyone here. We moved the Mounties in there. What makes you think that the military would be better than the Mounties when it comes to dealing with insurrection within the provinces?
Mr. Bland: I remember the forces in Ottawa carrying guns, protecting senators and everybody else during the FLQ crisis. That was a delightful duty.
I do not think we should ever deploy soldiers against Canadian citizens unless it is absolutely necessary.
In the long history of this country, and again I defer to my colleague, provinces and mayors, before and after the First World War, called out the military regularly to break the heads of their political opponents, socialists and union leaders. That calmed down in later years.
The federal government has a standing responsibility to Canadians to use the Armed Forces as a force of last resort, to back up police. One would expect that there would be a cascading use of force at the provincial and municipal level and so on before the Armed Forces are called in. That is what happened at Oka.
The curiosity in our National Defence Act, as it is now written, is that provinces have direct access to the Chief of Defence Staff to call for aid to the civil authority in internal security matters. However, the chief will decide whether he sends a corporal or a battalion.
That is the way the system has worked since Confederation. What is proposed now is dangerous, in that it places a partisan political element in this act. It is not a matter for the chief of national defence to worry about; it is, perhaps, a matter for federal and provincial leaders.
Mr. Granatstein: Regretfully, I again disagree with my colleague on this.
Realistically, the Chief of the Defence Staff will consult the political authorities before he commits troops under the present NDA. I think this proposed amendment recognizes reality. It is not a constitutional challenge, as Mr. Bland thinks, and it changes nothing, other than bringing the law into line with reality. It does not seem to be a threat.
Mr. Bland: We will have to wait for an answer to the letter I sent to the Attorney General of Quebec.
The Chairman: If I understood correctly, both of you were of the view that the Canadian Forces were inevitably facing a wind-down period, notwithstanding what has happened or what happens from tomorrow on. If that is the case, would it be good public policy to consider recommending that we do not send any troops overseas for the next two or three years until we can regenerate, re-equip and refocus?
Mr. Bland: In general, that is a good suggestion. One would hope that in the ongoing defence update, whether or not it is completed, that there is mention of some strategy to rebuild the major elements of Canadian defence capabilities over time.
You cannot do that at the same time that you are off on missions. The commander of the army has made that point. The army is in the process now of re-equipping itself with a complete range of new vehicles, which requires training. The army, and the rest of the forces, is in the process of trying to bring 2,000 to 4,000 people a year into the Armed Forces and train them. The people in the unit are training the new people. All these activities are part of the drain on the Armed Forces. When the former Minister of Defence said that the Armed Forces are stretched, he should know. He was the person who had been stretching them. It is time to relax this process. What we need in a defence statement is a strategy that, over a number of years, will rebuild Canada's Armed Forces to a reasonable state of health and set of capabilities.
Mr. Granatstein: I agree with Mr. Bland's analysis. However, to stress one point he made, it is the politicians who drive deployments abroad, not the military.
One of the great curses for Canada's policies was that Lester Pearson won a Nobel Prize for his role in Suez in 1957. We have had a succession of ministers seeking Nobel Prizes, usually by committing Canadian troops to a crisis, quick as a flash. Paul Martin did that in Cyprus in 1964. We have seen other ministers push policies that are hardly in the interests of the Canadian Forces, again in the same effort to garner support for a Nobel nomination. Frankly, I do not think that makes a great deal of sense. We do not always have policy shaping our decisions; sometimes we have personal ambition in the guise of policy. That has had a very destructive impact on the Canadian Forces.
The Chairman: Every policy option comes with a cost.
Mr. Granatstein: Certainly.
The Chairman: Let us suppose for a moment that we all agreed this was the correct policy option, namely, asking our men and women to stay home for the next couple of years while they reorganize. What are the costs in terms of public support for the Armed Forces and our relations with our allies? How do you weigh the costs? Can you articulate them? I have suggested a couple, but you may see different ones.
Mr. Granatstein: First, the policy is dependent on the requisite funds being assigned to rebuild the forces. That is the first step.
The costs in terms of public opinion might be substantial, because Canadians have been raised to believe we are the world leaders in peacekeeping. At the present time, we are number 34 in providing troops for UN peacekeeping. We are a long way from being the world leaders, whatever our past record. The public, nonetheless, still believes, and has believed since Suez in 1956, that there cannot be a peacekeeping operation without Canadian participation.
The public does not realize that peacekeeping has changed dramatically. It is no longer simply enough to send in a soldier wearing a blue beret; peacekeeping is now peace enforcement. Sometimes it is bloody. We have had 100 dead in peacekeeping. We fought a war in Cyprus against our Turkish NATO allies. We have had serious casualties in peacekeeping operations. You need trained soldiers to do it.
The point can be made to the public that this process of re-equipping, retraining and rebuilding will let us do peacekeeping much better in the future. If we acted to withhold our troops from participation in overseas missions for a period of time, it would require a major effort to sell the public on why we are doing this and what the benefits will be down the road. If that is done properly, I think it can be sold to the Canadian people.
Mr. Bland: One of the costs we should consider is that of not pausing. To return to some of the themes from Senator Taylor's remarks, and Mr. Granatstein's as well, the Armed Forces is one of the few areas where you deliberately spend lives to effect government policy. It is not people being killed in accidents, we deliberately send them into situations where they may be killed or injured. The Canadian people accept that. We expend lives for that purpose. In all honesty, we need to ensure that the risks to our soldiers are minimal. That is where we have been having difficulties.
It is important to mount a campaign to explain to the people and opinion makers in Canada, and to our allies, what this strategy of renewal — if that is what it is — will be about and what the outcome will look like. We will tell people that in three years, we will have the greatest little army in the world and we will be back in the game. People will then ask about the costs and the plan and want to see the effort. It would be a shame to say that the forces are coming home to sit in the barracks and rot away.
We went through one of these reorganizations before, after the 1987 white paper on national defence. Some of you may recall that there was a great effort to reorganize our deployments in Europe. In particular, we cancelled our NATO commitment to the northern region of Norway to concentrate our army in central Europe. It was technically the right thing to do, although politically difficult.
The minister of the day went to Washington to meet the U.S. Secretary of defence and explained that the Canadian forces would be much more efficient and effective if they were grouped together in central Europe. The then minister made the case to the U.S. army people that this was an important thing to do. I know for a fact, because I was there, that the Norwegians did not like it much. However, that was not the point. We needed political courage to make those decisions. What happened after 1987 is another story. We are talking about how political and military leaders and opinion makers in the country can explain radical changes in policy.
The Chairman: You are both reflecting on one of the dilemmas of defence policy; namely, that government expenditures do not result in payoffs that fit within the political cycle. One of the difficulties of this sort of proposition is that the expenditures would be incurred now and the payoff would come under a subsequent administration.
Mr. Granatstein: The expenditures will not just be for now; they will be now and for the future. That is why one would wish for a non-partisan defence policy, so that all parties would recognize that we must do this and we must pay for it. I do not believe we can have a non-partisan defence policy because people will fight for partisan purposes — this is Canada, after all.
On the other hand, let me point out that the defence white paper in Australia — a country that has as vigorous a partisan tradition as we do — committed money for re-equipment over a long period of time. I do not know whether that received unanimous support in the Australian Parliament, but at least the Australian government had the courage to say, ``We will plan for the future. It will cost this much. We need these pieces of equipment and this many people.'' That is a rational way of doing it. We need something like that, so that we do not have governments saying, ``Yes, we have decided to eliminate the helicopters that we need. We will put it off for X number of years.'' We need governments to make firm commitments because they recognize the realities with which they must deal.
Mr. Bland: The reality in policy making is that all governments live off the avails of previous governments in defence matters in some respects. The F18s came on line during the Conservative government period, after being bought by Mr. Trudeau's government. The concept and organization of the LAV III that is currently getting rave reviews originated in the late 1970s and we have been working on the vehicle since then. The present government is also having a great deal of success deploying frigates around the world that were bought many years ago. That is an important reality.
To reinforce what has already been said, if you have a nationally agreed — if not non-partisan — defence policy framed around certain concepts and capabilities, then you can do something in the long term. We built 12 frigates and shut down the shipyards. Now I understand the shipyards are going broke. What kind of system would we have had if we had built one frigate every year for 15 years and just rolled along, replacing them in an orderly fashion and maintaining a shipbuilding capability as a national necessity? These are general ideas that are certainly not new. Part of what we need to talk about in the strategy for renewal is to keep building the forces as the years go on.
The Chairman: Professor Granatstein, I listened carefully to your comments about working out a proposal that complemented the Northern Command. Several issues flow from that. We got the impression in Washington that the Secretary of defence was at least entertaining the idea of making CINC North — or whatever you choose to call it — a little different from the other CINCs. He was considering the possibility of Canadians being integrated into it in a way that has not been done before. I think the committee is curious to know whether that idea was stillborn at some point in the bureaucratic process in Washington, or whether the request was never made because they were concerned that they would not get a ``yes.''
Related to that is the ongoing concern of the Department of Foreign Affairs that generally comes under the category of ``concern about national sovereignty.'' It seems that, by any test, a greater working relationship with the United States will enhance national sovereignty, not put it in jeopardy. How do you explain the fact that one department of government regularly voices this concern and is serving as an inhibitor? Is it because they are reflecting other concerns of Canadians, such as aggravations with the United States over softwood lumber and agricultural subsidies? What is your reaction to that? Professor Bland, could you tell us if you are in agreement with Dr. Granatstein's general thesis about developing closer relations with the United States?
Mr. Granatstein: As punishment for my sins, some five or six years ago, I wrote a book on the history of anti- Americanism in Canada. It is a long history that goes back to the French fighting wars against the Americans, against the Boston states, and to the loyalists. It has been a recurrent theme in our history ever since this country was settled. I argued in that book that anti-Americanism was effectively dead as a political issue after the Free Trade Agreement. It did not take long before I was proven wrong, because it keeps coming back.
To my mind, the response to the friendly fire incident in Afghanistan in the media was to deliberately whip up anti- Americanism and try to make this into something that the Americans had done almost deliberately. I found that reprehensible. However, that was the way it was played in The Globe and Mail, for example. A reporter from The Globe and Mail, who made it clear that he was asking questions on behalf of his editor, called me and asked, did I not think the Americans were showing their distaste for Canadians by sending them to dig up al-Qaeda graves? I blew up at this reporter, who is a very good reporter and quite blameless in this.
There is a powerful streak of anti-Americanism in this country, and it has political weight. There is no doubt that government departments reflect this, as do ministers. There are strong anti-American streaks in most of our political parties. I do not know what you would call Lloyd Axworthy, but he seemed to delight in pulling the tail feathers from the American eagle on every occasion, and he does that in this paper to which I referred earlier. It is deliberate anti- Americanism.
``Everything the Americans do is bad'' is a very strong recurrent theme in our history. It is probably not going to go away. If there are people in Foreign Affairs — which, after all, was Mr. Axworthy's department for a long time — who worry about sovereignty and about the Americans, they are reflecting a strain of opinion in Canada.
Having said that, it is the duty of the Department of Foreign Affairs to worry about our sovereignty, and I worry about our sovereignty. As you suggested in your remark, we will enhance our sovereignty by cooperating with the United States on continental defence, not weaken it. However, I can understand why some Canadians worry about this and why, for example, in 1957-58, Mr. John Diefenbaker worried about NORAD and its impact on our sovereignty.
It is always difficult for a small country to deal with a larger country — a super power — on its border. There are not many countries that have a long border with a super power. We must always be concerned with our sovereignty, but we must make realistic choices and understand that sometimes you serve your sovereignty by saying yes to the great power and harm it by saying no. I happen to think this is one of the times when we would do best to say yes, and work with the United States, because, simply, they will do it anyway. There is no choice. We must do it in our own interest.
There will always be this tension between foreign affairs, which has the task of worrying about sovereignty, and national defence, which tends to be somewhat more practical on the whole and sees the benefits that will accrue to the military and, correctly, to the country, by cooperating with the Americans.
Mr. Bland: I certainly agree with most everything that Dr. Granatstein said. Certainly, the theme is hard to argue against.
One of the reasons for differences between the departments on these matters is that the Canadian Forces and officials of the Department of National Defence tend to look at national defence policy mainly as a technical issue. It is felt that, from any point of view, being associated, interoperable or aligned with the United States Armed Forces is a technically efficient way for Canada to defend itself, especially in North America. It is a way to gain some influence over Canadian matters in Washington. The Department of Foreign Affairs has another agenda, another point of view, and other things to worry about.
I listened to Mr. John Manley when he was the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He explained, as I understood it, that there is no greater relationship for Canada than the one with the United States and that the military aspect of that relationship is an important component of the whole. It is not that our sovereignty would be attacked, but rather that we would just be forgotten. The biggest difficulty for us in Washington, as I understand it, is not to make policy but just to get noticed. Canadians line up with 128 other countries, regions and governors from all over, including lobbyists, et cetera. Getting noticed in a positive way is difficult.
The question takes me back to an earlier answer about how to gain public support for national defence, or for that which is good for the country. I come back to political leadership for the most part. Political leaders, if they believe that being associated with the United States on various aspects is important, then they need to explain that to Canadians and resist the temptation to gain points with the domestic audience by picking on the Americans.
I too was approached, after the bombing incident in Afghanistan, by a national broadcaster. A person wanted me to appear on television to talk about the fact that there must be a scandal here. I was asked if I thought there was and if I would appear to talk about it. I replied, ``Of course not.'' However, they did find another former military officer, a logistician, who waxed on about operational matters in a quite irresponsible way.
There is a need for politicians to take the lead in explaining, if they believe it, that there is a benefit to Canada to be associated militarily with the United States in various ways and to point out how we will safeguard Canada's right to make decisions about our own forces, their deployment, et cetera. I would resist completely the notion of unconditional support for interoperability. That is what got us into trouble during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The then Prime Minister was trying to pull the levers, only to find they were not hooked into anything. Thus, the forces took off in the wrong direction because they thought that was the relationship that mattered — the NATO/American relationship. In this case, we must explain to people why it is important to be connected to the United States; how we will protect and enhance our national sovereignty; and how we will set up organizations, such as this committee, to oversee these kinds of policy decisions and the officials who manage them.
Senator Forrestall: I wanted to comment on one or two things. We went through an exercise 10 years ago, and I do not recall any great dissension or difference of policy among the members of the joint committee.
The Chairman: — except for the Bloc Québecois.
Senator Forrestall: Well, they had differences with everyone in those days. There was no political or philosophical difference. The clash came about when cabinet, although not rejecting it out of hand, paid only lip service to it and failed to do anything about it.
The other day, we heard the senior minister state that the government would no longer be ordering any ships. We have a Tribal class that we should be planning for now. We still do not know where our fleet replenishment will come from. Some 200 or 300 oceanography programs are on the shelf, waiting for the necessary fieldwork if we are to maintain a role in that area. The Coast Guard fleet needs long-term planning.
A group of us sat in a small office over in the West Block, and precisely as you suggested, we tried to divide operations and maintenance from capital equipment. The way to sustain the yards and the way to get around the criticism of Americans is to do things one or two at a time. They have my sympathy. People in Saint John, New Brunswick, will be out of work because they will not have a shipyard, and we will have lost the capacity to move back into shipbuilding. That may be for three to five years. In some fields, rebuilding — to bring together and train people — takes more likely about eight to ten years. That is optimistic.
I become terribly frustrated with our direction on this issue.
My final question comes back to the business of the two papers — the foreign policy review paper that we are now awaiting and the new minister's early statement with respect to a defence policy. Is it just a review, or is it a study that he might ask us to do in support of a new defence policy? Where do we stand if the government says, with respect to the foreign policy review, ``It is low priority right now, but on the other hand, we want you to get on with the defence review?'' Where do we stand when we complete the defence review and we have no foreign policy?
Mr. Granatstein: Where do we stand, sir? We stand where we stand now.
Senator Forrestall: That is what we have right now, is it?
Mr. Granatstein: That is what we have now. We stand in confusion.
Mr. Bland: I would just like to remark that in writings and lectures to students and other people, I always hold the Special Joint Committee of the House and the Senate up as an example of non-partisan policy making, if only for a short period. I was at many of those meetings, and I enjoyed most of the report that was written afterwards. We all noted at the end of the day, when the 1994 white paper came out, that the government had accepted all of the recommendations of the committee except for the one dealing with money, and went on from there.
Again, if there is hope for people who campaign for a unified political approach to Canada's national security problems, I think that is a fine model to look to.
The Chairman: Professor Granatstein, Professor Bland, we thank you for this exchange. We hope to call on you again. Our order of reference runs a good 18 months. We expect to be proceeding with various parts of our work throughout that time.
Thank you very much for appearing before us. We are grateful for your papers and your views.
To those of you at home following our work, please visit our Web site by going to www.senate-senat.ca/defence.asp. We post witness testimony as well as confirmed hearing schedules. Otherwise, you may contact the clerk of the committee by calling 1-800-267-7362 for further information or assistance in contacting members of the committee.
The committee adjourned.