CHAPTER 7

Airports

Problem 1:  Screening Checked Baggage

All checked baggage is not being comprehensively screened for explosives. Given that terrorists have proven themselves willing to commit suicide in order to achieve their goals, more rigorous inspection of checked baggage is required.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATIONS

The Committee recommended that equipment be installed at airports to be designated by Transport Canada to ensure that all baggage and passengers are screened for weapons and explosives and that, as reliable equipment capable of detecting the presence of chemical or biological or bacteriological agents becomes available, it also be installed. (Report: Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, #12)

The Committee recommended that CATSA should implement full multi-layer screening (vapour detection supplemented by x-rays and other kinds of searches) of all checked baggage, mailbags and cargo by January 1, 2004.  (Report: The Myth of Security at Canada’s Airports, January 2003, # III.2)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Checked Baggage

The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority’s goal is to screen all checked baggage by the end of December 2005.[1]  According to its Director of Operations, the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority currently screens all baggage once every three days.  It claims to be “well on the way” to meeting its objective.[2]

According to the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority, Explosives Detection Systems have been deployed to most of Canada’s largest 89 airports (which handle 99% of Canadian air passenger traffic).[3]

The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority would not specify how many airports do not have Explosives Detection Systems for checked baggage screening.  The reason given was that disclosure of that information would be detrimental to air transport security.[4]

Air Mail and Cargo

Transport Canada has yet to demonstrate to the Committee that cargo and mail is being checked at all.

The Chairman of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority’s Board of Directors said in November 2003 that CATSA “handles the screening of checked baggage while the airlines are responsible for cargo.”[5] This appears to still be the case for air mail as well.

Transport Canada has stated, in its 2004-2005 Report on Plans and Priorities, that it has initiated “a policy review of air cargo and airmail security assess vulnerabilities, threat and risk levels, industry best practices, training, and the harmonization of Canada’s approach with that taken by its trading partners.”[6] And the government stated, in its April 2004 National Security Policy, that it “will identify strategies to enhance the security of air cargo.”[7]

 

Passengers and Cabin Baggage (Pre-Board Screening)

All passengers at designated airports are screened for weapons in pre-board screening.  The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority installed improved X-Ray technology and explosives detection equipment at all pre-board passenger screening stations by the end of December 2003.[8]

In October 2004, Transport Canada and the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority announced they will introduce new document screening equipment that will test for traces of explosives on passenger documentation such as boarding passes.  Operational trials began in Ottawa later that month.[9]

Chemical, Biological, and Bacteriological Threats

In June 2004, the head of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority acknowledged the growing threat posed by chemical, biological and bacteriological agents. [10] It is unclear whether Transport Canada or the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority has made progress in confronting this threat.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

• Give the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority the task of screening the mail and air cargo

Mail and cargo screening needs to be tightened to the same standards as pre-board and checked baggage screening.  Leaving this vulnerable defeats the logic of searching hand and passenger baggage. Responsibility for this process must be clarified and given to the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority.

 

• Accelerate progress on checked baggage screening

The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority has made progress towards screening all checked baggage. Yet it will still be at least a year before all checked baggage that goes on an aircraft is screened for explosives.

• Turn words into programs

Canadian Air Transport Security Authority CEO Jacques Duchesneau’s comments were a positive acknowledgement of the problem.  It is now up to Transport Canada and the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority to design and introduce programs to reduce threats posed by chemical, biological and bacteriological agents.

 

Problem 2:  Inadequate Background Checks

Background checks of airport employees who receive passes into restricted areas have been too cursory and infrequent to prevent criminality in airports.

The Auditor General’s March 2004 report echoed the Committee’s concern about the amount of criminality at airports. According to the report, approximately 3.5 percent of employees at the five airports examined had criminal records, and about 5.5 per cent of clearance holders hired between January 2001 and May 2003 had criminal records.[11]

The checks currently being conducted have limitations. According to the Auditor General’s report, the RCMP “provides only information on whether a person has been charged or convicted of a criminal offence—information that does not identify for Transport Canada whether a person has associations with organized crime or is a refugee claimant.”[12]

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATIONS

The Committee recommended that more rigorous security and police checks be undertaken for all prospective pass recipients. (Report: Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, # 11.C)

The Committee recommended that the current 5-point background check for restricted area passes – Canada Police Information Centre (for criminal record), CSIS (for potential security threats), and Transport Canada (domicile, employment background and credit records) – should be conducted every three years, replacing the current schedule of every five years.  (Report: The Myth of Security at Canada’s Airports, January 2003, # IV.5)

 

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

David Collenette, then Minister of Transport Canada, wrote to the Committee in December 2003 that background checks are conducted every five years and that this practice is “aligned with time periods used for granting security clearances to federal employees, including employees in departments that deal with sensitive national security matters.”[13]

The government announced in its April 2004 National Security Policy that improvements to background checks are planned. According to the policy, “the Government is moving to screen individuals for links to organized crime and other criminal associations.”[14] No announcements following up on the pledge have been made by Transport Canada since the release of the policy.

In October 2004, Transport Canada stated that airport employees will, “continue to be subject to … background security checks” as part of the restricted areas pass issuing process.[15] It is unclear to the Committee whether those checks are the same limited checks criticized by the Auditor General or whether they represent something new.

If they do not represent anything new, then they are not nearly as comprehensive as the full field investigations conducted to provide government officials with security clearances.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

• Act on the pledge

The Committee supports the government’s pledge to strengthen background checks by looking for links to criminal associations and organized crime. The government must now deliver a program that puts a more rigorous checking regime in place.

 

• Address the issue of frequency

The government must increase the frequency of the background checks.  The government needs to address this problem because much can change with an individual over 5 years.

 

Problem 3:  No Leadership on Airside Passes

Canada needs a national system of electronic passes for ground crew and aircrew that is cancellable, incorporates biometrics, and can prevent access to restricted zones beyond the employee’s workplace.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATIONS

The Committee recommended that a nation-wide system of electronic identification (smart passes) be introduced to control the movement through high-risk security areas. (Report: Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, #11.A)  

The Committee recommended that a review be conducted of the entry and exit control systems that monitor the movement within secure areas of terminals and airport perimeters. (Report: Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, #11.B)

The Committee recommended that CATSA issue national passes for aircrew and all other persons who fall more naturally under a national – rather than a regional – jurisdiction. If local airport authorities are permitted to continue to issue passes allowing access to restricted areas at their airports, these local passes should be:

• of national, uniform design, based on national configurations defined by the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority;

• cancellable by Canadian Air Transport Security Authority; and

• validated through Canadian Air Transport Security Authority’s national database.

All Canadian airports should, by 31 December 2003, introduce new electronic airside access passes containing biometric identifiers, that:

• are encoded to prevent access to zones beyond any employee’s work area;

• expire automatically after three years; and

• can be deactivated by a central control mechanism at any time.

The Committee recommended that CATSA be the issuing authority for passes for all employees, contract workers, other personnel and vehicles that operate airside.  (Report: The Myth of Security at Canada’s Airports, January 2003, # IV.1, # IV.2, # IV.3)

 

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority was assigned responsibility for the implementation of an enhanced restricted area pass system for Canadian airports November 2002. Its mandate was essentially to improve the existing system for the management of the restricted area passes.

The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority is in the process of deploying a new system for managing access to restricted areas based on what it calls Restricted Area Identification Cards. The project will use biometrics technology (fingerprint and iris scanners) to support the issuing, verification, cancellation, and tracking of the cards. Doors giving access to restricted airport areas will have biometric smartcard readers installed that can recognize fingerprint and iris information. [16]

The first operational trials began in August 2004 at the Vancouver and Kelowna airports. According to Transport Canada and the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority, they will expand to Montreal and Charlottetown shortly.[17]

The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority will distribute the Restricted Area Identification Cards at Canada’s 29 largest airports over the next several months.[18]

The new system is limited in that it provides only a single layer of security for restricted areas...

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

While the Committee’s deadline for action has not been met, the move to implement the Restricted Area Identification Card system appears to be a sign of progress. The Committee will monitor the implementation of the program. The following significant concerns remain:

• The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority must be the issuing authority for Restricted Area Identification Cards nationwide

The government needs to assign operational control of the Restricted Area Identification Cards to the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority to ensure the program’s standardized implementation.  The new appropriate hierarchy for assigning authority at airports puts security first, not profits. If local airport authorities are allowed to retain control over issuing passes, the Committee is concerned that the interest of airport stakeholders could well trump security concerns.

• Restrict access by zones

One of the weaknesses of the Restricted Area Pass system is that once people access a restricted area, they are relatively free to roam within it. Also, because the passes are not linked to an employee’s work schedule, they have access to restricted areas at any time, day or night. Technology exists that would allow the validity of a pass to be limited to certain areas of an airport at certain times. This is important because the Committee has taken evidence that some employees have used their passes to smuggle contraband after working hours.

Transport Canada should require the introduction of this technology as part of the next set of improvements to the Restricted Area Pass system.

Problem 4:  Unprepared Air Crews

The September 2001 attacks dramatically altered the aircraft hijacking paradigm. The attacks demonstrated that significant numbers of hijackers were willing to commit suicide in the course of taking over an aircraft.

Canadians depend on flight crews to alert them to problems and to help protect them from dangers. However, three years after the September 11, 2001 attacks, these personnel had not received a significant upgrade to their anti-terrorist training.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that by 31 March 2003, Transport Canada finalize and issue training standards programs to equip cabin crews to deal with terrorists and/or terrorist materials. All flight crews would complete training by 30 September 2003. (Report: The Myth of Security at Canada’s Airports, January 2003, # I.1)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

It took Transport Canada more than two years to develop new security guidance material and it was another year before that material was formally adopted.

Transport Canada updated security guidance material for flight crew member training in the fall of 2003. The guidance material described new procedures and training requirements for flight crew members to deal with, among other things, hijackers and chemical / biological threats, and the presence of aircraft protective officers on board the aircraft.[19]

The guidance material was formally adopted in late February 2004. Air carriers have until February 2005 to implement their training programs.[20]

 

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

• Put professionals in charge

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police, not Transport Canada, should be responsible for setting security policy at airports.

 

Problem 5:  Armed Pilots?

U.S. legislation subsequent to 9/11 granted pilots the right to carry guns, sparking a debate in Canada as to the best way to defend pilots against hijackers.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that Canadian pilots should not be armed.  (Report: The Myth of Security at Canada’s Airports, January 2003, # II.4)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

There are no plans to arm pilots.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

The government is doing the right thing. It should continue along this course.

Problem 6:  Alerting Air Crews

Not all aircrew members are informed when an undercover armed law enforcement official (Aircraft Protection Officer) is on board.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that all flight crew should be informed when an Aircraft Protective Officer (APO) is on board. (Report: The Myth of Security at Canada’s Airports, January 2003, # II.1)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

According to Transport Canada, the air carrier, pilot-in-command and lead flight attendant (“the in charge”) are always advised that RCMP officers will be on board. It is up to the air carrier’s internal procedures to delineate whether this information will be disclosed to other crewmembers. According to Transport Canada, “the point of this provision is that the airline has some discretion.”[21]

A representative of the Canadian Union of Public Employees informed the Committee that it is policy at Air Canada and Air Transat to inform all flight crew members whenever an APO is on board.[22]

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

• Require pre-brief for whole flight crew

All crew members need to know if an Aircraft Protection Officer is on board, and there should be a pre-flight briefing of the crew on what to do in the event of an emergency.

The Committee does not believe that such a briefing would risk exposing the Aircraft Protection Officer. The flight crew and flight attendant in charge need to work as a team with regard to security just as they work as a team to provide comfort and safety.

 

Problem 7:  Role of Aircraft Protection Officers

Aircraft Protection Officers are instructed to remain in their seats except when an attempt is made to take control of the aircraft. The Committee was concerned that it was inappropriate for an armed law enforcement official not to react in the event that a passenger or crew member is physically attacked.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that the RCMP should instruct Aircraft Protection Officers to be prepared to intervene in violent disruptions in passenger cabins, and certainly to be prepared to intervene if crew or passengers’ lives are clearly in danger, and not necessarily to restrain themselves until the very moment that any assault is launched on the cockpit.  (Report: The Myth of Security at Canada’s Airports, January 2003, # II.3)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

According to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Aircraft Protection Officers are trained and will respond according to threats of death or grievous bodily harm onboard an aircraft.[23]

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

Challenge met. This only makes sense. These trained officers are intelligent enough to get involved only when it appears that lives are at stake.

 

Problem 8:  Vulnerable Cockpit Doors

Double cockpit doors offer one of the best means of preventing cockpit intrusions such as those that occurred on 11 September 2001. Pilots often leave the cockpit during flights. With a traditional door system, they make themselves and the aircraft vulnerable every time they do. Effective and inexpensive double-door systems are available and would reduce the risk. It is possible that, if double-doors were installed on Canadian aircraft, the need for Aircraft Protection Officers might be decreased except for mandated U.S. flights.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that by 30 June 2003 Transport Canada require design completion of a double door system or systems to protect cockpits, and order air carriers to complete the installation of such systems by 31 December 31 2004. (Report: The Myth of Security at Canada’s Airports, January 2003, # II.2)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government is still studying the matter of double doors.[24] It has thus far not moved beyond requiring the fortification of cockpits through the installation of reinforced cockpit doors.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

• Install double cockpit doors on all aircraft that can accommodate them

Double cockpit doors would allow pilots to go to the galley and the washroom without creating a vulnerability aboard the aircraft.

Problem 9:  Security Training for Maintenance Workers

Maintenance employees working on the airside at airports have not received significant upgrades in security training to identify threats since the September 11th, 2001 attacks. These employees perform key functions all around the aircraft and have access to all its vital areas. With additional training, maintenance workers could become a greater asset to the airport security system.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that by 30 September 2003 Transport Canada ensure that all Canadian passenger airlines are providing training courses to maintenance personnel and other personnel working in proximity to aircraft to help them identify potentially dangerous situations and materials. (Report: The Myth of Security at Canada’s Airports, January 2003, # I.3)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

There is no indication that the government has finalized new guidance material for the enhanced security training of maintenance and other groundside workers.

On 11 December 2003, then Transport Minister David Collenette wrote to the Committee that the Department’s Civil Aviation and Security directorates have “begun an examination of security training requirements and guidance material for other groups of employees, such as ticket agents and maintenance workers, based on preliminary feedback received from industry stakeholders.”[25]

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

Transport Canada is taking far too long to implement this recommendation.

 

Problem 10:  Responsibility for Airport Security Needs Clarifying – Who’s in Charge?

Given the security threats of the 21st century, it is imperative that the government claw back some of the responsibility for airports that it devolved to local authorities in the 1990s. Responsibilities at Canadian airports are far too diffused. Sam Landry, a Royal Canadian Mounted Police Inspector detailed to Lester B. Pearson Airport in Toronto, testified that there were 82 departments or agencies of government that had enforcement or regulatory responsibilities at Pearson.[26]

Too much responsibility is being shared between Transport Canada (the aviation security regulatory authority), the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority (the agency that implements air security programs), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (which enforces federal statutes everywhere and provides policing services in three airports[27]), and local Airport Authorities (which operate individual airports).

Testimony before the Committee made it clear that responsibility for airport security rests in too many places for it to be managed effectively.

Air security demands a more focused approach.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATIONS

The Committee recommended that a federal agency be created to take responsibility for selection, training, and supervision of persons and systems responsible for passenger and baggage screening at airports, and that this agency report to the RCMP. (Report: Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, #13)

The Committee also recommended that the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority should be responsible for the design and delivery of all mechanisms and training to assure air travel security, including the management and security screening of the restricted areas of the airport and the security screening of all persons and things boarding aircraft in Canada. (Report: The Myth of Security at Canada’s Airports, January 2003, # VIII.2)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Both recommendations remain unfulfilled.

The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority came into being in 2002 and is mandated to perform pre-board screening of passengers and their belongings and checked baggage screening. However, it reports to Transport Canada. It does not report to the RCMP.

Roles with respect to aviation security have not changed dramatically since the Committee made its recommendations in January 2003. The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority is the delivery agency for most aviation security programs. It conducts pre-board screening of passengers and baggage (not including air cargo and air mail); manages programs to monitor and limit access to restricted areas; funds the Aircraft Protective Officers program; and contributes funds to local airport authorities for contracts with local police. Transport Canada sets the rules by which it administers those programs. Local airport authorities, in most cases, contract with local police forces for airport policing functions.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

• Change who the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority reports to

The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority should report to Parliament through the Deputy Prime Minister and be under the operational control of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Such a move would foster the security-based culture that is emerging at the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority and provide for a more effective working relationship between the two organizations.

• Make the RCMP responsible for aviation security

Transport Canada needs to get out of the security field entirely and focus on other areas in which it has competence.

Problem 11:  Known Shipper Makes Aircraft Insecure

HIGH PRIORITY

Rigorous screening of all cargo passing through Canadian airports is the only way to assure the optimal security for passengers and crews. The Committee has recommended full screening.  However, until full screening is implemented, the government should discontinue its program designating certain shippers as “safe” shippers, who can get parcels onto aircraft quickly without screening. There is no such thing as a safe shipper, particularly when requirements that these designated shippers screen their staff and customers are virtually non-existent.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that the practice of offering blanket security shortcuts for “known shippers” should be discontinued. The Committee encourages the development of a protocol for shippers based on proven capacity to assure security, similar to the one currently being introduced under the Smart Borders arrangement with the United States. (Report: The Myth of Security at Canada’s Airports, January 2003, # III.3)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

It is unclear whether the “known shipper” shortcut has been discontinued. Little progress appears to have been made on improving air cargo security.

The Government stated, in its April 2004 National Security Policy, that it “will identify strategies to enhance the security of air cargo.”[28] It stated those strategies would be based on, among other factors, the voluntary Partners in Protection program for identifying trusted shippers.

In December 2003, then Transport Minister David Collenette wrote to the Committee in response to a question about progress on this recommendation that his department had “initiated a comprehensive review of air cargo and airmail security to consider possible enhancements.”[29] One year later, that review has not been completed. Transport Canada stated in its 2004-2005 Report on Plans and Priorities that it has initiated “a policy review of air cargo and airmail security access vulnerabilities, threat and risk levels, industry best practices, training, and the harmonization of Canada’s approach with that taken by its trading partners.”[30]

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

• Stop reviewing air cargo security and take action.

Almost two years after the Committee’s recommendation, the government is still studying the issue of airmail and cargo security. By the time the April 2004 national security policy came out, it had been under study for six months. At what point does “comprehensive review” become a synonym for “inaction”?

• Detail strategies for cargo security

The government’s acknowledgement of air cargo security as an issue is a step forward, but only a small one. The Committee will examine the government’s proposals when it realizes a more detailed framework for enhancing air cargo.

The limited information available in the National Security Policy suggests however that if the government plans to introduce a program based solely on voluntary buy-in and best practices.  If so, there will still be more work to be done.

 

Problem 12: Lack of Security at Fixed-Base Operations

HIGH PRIORITY  

Fixed-Base Operations – essentially private airfields attached to major airports for the use of charter aircraft, executive jets and pleasure aircraft – are subject to almost no scrutiny. Fixed-Base Operations need to be screened by the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority because a large private or charter aircraft could be used as a missile and cause massive damage and loss of life.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that Transport Canada require that private aircraft departing airports under the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority’s supervision should not leave until aircraft, passengers and their baggage have been screened. Private aircraft departing from any air facility not supervised by CATSA should be searched on arrival, whether they arrive from private airfields in Canada or any locations in foreign countries in order to ensure the integrity of security at Canadian airports. (Report: The Myth of Security at Canada’s Airports, January 2003, # V.1)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government’s response is revealed in this February 2004 hearing excerpt involving Senator Colin Kenny (Committee Chair), Gerry Frappier (Director General, Security and Emergency Preparedness, Transport Canada) and Marc Grégoire (Assistant Deputy Minister, Safety and Security Group, Transport Canada):

The Chairman: Yes. We have had requests from fixed-base operators that there be security there. You can get on any charter plane at a base without going through any of the CATSA procedures…We do not see much change in the testimony year to year from your department.

Mr. Frappier: As you mentioned, and I agree 100 per cent, there is no screening by CATSA. of charter operations and private aircraft at the FBOs [fixed-based operations].

The Chairman: These are big planes.

Mr. Frappier: Yes, these are big planes.

The Chairman: If they flew into a building, the same kind of damage could be done that we saw happen to the twin towers.

Mr. Frappier: I would not disagree with that.

The Chairman: We are not doing anything about it. Correct?

Mr. Frappier: Right now, we have some awareness programs for the management of FBOs. We have placed a greater emphasis on checking for the appropriate identification of pilots. If you are asking us whether there is a federal screening program associated with it, no, there is not.

The Chairman: We are describing a huge hole, a part of the airport from which people can take off and do all kinds of damage. Yet you are sitting there in front of our Committee saying that everything is fine. It is not fine. You have a problem.

Mr. Grégoire: We are not saying that everything is fine.

The Chairman: You are not saying that you have a program to fix it.

Mr. Grégoire: We do not have a program to fix it. That is what we are saying. However, we are addressing the matter of our program. We are developing our program based on a risk approach. We do not feel this is where the risk is highest at this time.[31]

 

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

• Design and implement a screening program for all fixed-based operations

Fixed-Base Operations on the periphery of airport terminals present the same danger as passenger and cargo terminal operations. As such, they should be a higher government priority than the government has made them. That Transport Canada has not moved to address security fixed-based operations is completely unacceptable given the current security environment.

 

Problem 13:  Small Airports are Weak Links in the Aviation Security

Air cargo originating from less secure local airports is not checked upon arrival at any of the 89 Designated Airports under the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority’s responsibility. Canada has 1,419 airfields or airports in total. Cargo from these flights needs to be screened upon arrival at designated airports because dangerous goods could be transported to the airport undetected and used there or in the city served by the Designated Airport.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

People, cargo and aircraft coming from small airports without sophisticated screening systems should receive a full screening when they arrive at a Designated Airport under the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority’s jurisdiction. (Report: The Myth of Security at Canada’s Airports, January 2003, # III.4)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Transport Canada has reported to the Committee that “passengers arriving at designated airports from non-designated airports must be screened prior to boarding flights destined for another designated airport or a foreign location. Air carriers are required to apply established cargo security requirements to these flights, such as safeguarding of cargo, training for persons accepting it for transport, searching of cargo in certain circumstances, provision and verification of associated documentation and conditions under which it may be accepted.”[32]

Passengers and cargo that arrive at Designated Airports from non-Designated Airports and who then leave the airport area are not screened.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

The Committee notes that useful procedures have been put in place to screen passengers arriving at Designated Airports from small airports. In this sense, the challenge has been largely met.

• Address cargo security

Relying on established cargo security requirements is insufficient considering the state of cargo security generally (see Chapter 7, Problem 16).  Transport Canada must address the issue of cargo transferred into designated airports from smaller airports.

 

Problem 14:  Access to Restricted Areas

Restricted areas of airports are vulnerable and can be exploited by criminals and terrorists. Restricted areas offer access to passenger baggage and air cargo, to critical equipment, and to the cabins and holds of aircraft. Hundreds of people – and in some airports thousands – work in and around restricted areas. The Committee found these people could enter and leave at will without being searched.

The Committee received testimony about how organized criminal groups have penetrated the Lester B. Pearson airport to further their activities.[33]

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority be responsible for assuring that all persons and vehicles are physically searched on entry to restricted areas at Canada’s airports. Persons and vehicles leaving these areas should be searched on a random basis, with provision for more extensive exit searches whenever extraordinary threats are perceived. (Report: The Myth of Security at Canada’s Airports, January 2003, # IV.4)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government announced the Non-Passenger Screening program in February 2004. The program will not be fully implemented until 2005. It consists of random, irregular, spot checks at entry points to, and different locations within, restricted areas.[34]

Transport Canada, the department that set the regulations which constrain the scope of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority’s program, has yet to demonstrate that this non-passenger screening will be effective.

The Committee tried to clarify its questions with Marc Grégoire, Assistant Deputy Minister of Safety and Security Group at Transport Canada, in February 2004, and as the following testimony excerpt demonstrates, the results were less than satisfactory:

Sen. Cordy: When we talk about random searches, how often is ‘random’?

Mr. Grégoire: Random is as often as required. We can crank it up to 100 per cent, if we think it is necessary for specific reasons or threats. We would have the capacity to raise it to 100 per cent.

Sen. Kenny: “…On the matter of ‘random,’ the Committee feels great scepticism when you say that you can move it up to 100 per cent. Simply put, I find it difficult to believe that you have the capacity to search 100 per cent of the airside workers at Pearson on any given day. Pick a day when you could search 100 per cent of the workers and vehicles, and we will come down to see it happen. Until we see it happen, we simply do not believe that that is a possibility. We do not think you have the capability to do it, and we do not understand why you come before us and suggest that ‘random’ means you can go up to 100 per cent.”[35]

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

• Make non-passenger screening mandatory upon entry to a restricted area

The current system has more public relations than security value.  Transport Canada has not demonstrated that the random checks will take place frequently, with sufficient unpredictability, and with enough personnel to test whole airports.  Employees have found ways to avoid the few random spot checks in the past, for instance some have alerted co-workers via cellular telephones.  Terrorists could too.

• Institute random non-passenger screening upon exit from a restricted area

Screening of non-passangers should also take place on a random basis upon exit from restricted areas.

The Committee recognizes the inconsistency in recommending mandatory inspections entering and only random inspections exiting. However, the issue on entry is one of national security, preventing terrorists from getting themselves, or damaging materials, onto aircraft. The issue on exit is primarily one of crime, preventing airport workers from taking advantage of access to restricted areas to smuggle contraband.

Problem 15:  Airmail and Cargo Goes Unchecked

HIGH PRIORITY  

Mail that travels on passenger planes from Canadian airports is not being inspected.

Canada Post ships approximately 15% of the mail it carries everyday by air (approximately 2.5 million pieces), mostly on passenger planes. Its employees are on the lookout for suspicious parcels but do not scan any of them.[36] 

Airlines, Transport Canada and the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority do not scan mail either.[37]

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATIONS

The Committee recommended that the movement of mail and parcels at airports be reviewed to ensure adequate security inspection. (Report: Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, #14).

Dedicated and trained personnel should immediately begin carrying out random and targeted screening of all checked baggage, parcels, mailbags, and cargo.  (Report: The Myth of Security at Canada’s Airports, January 2003, # III.1)

 

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Checked Baggage

The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority’s goal is to screen all checked baggage by the end of December 2005.[38] According to its Director of Operations, the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority currently screens all baggage once every three days. It claims to be “well on the way” to meeting its objective.[39]

Air Mail and Cargo

Transport Canada has yet to demonstrate to the Committee that the cargo and mail is being checked at all.

William Elliott, then the Assistant Deputy Minister, Safety and Security Group at Transport Canada, testified in May 2003, that “generally speaking there is not widespread searching of cargo except for cause.”[40]

The Chairman of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority’s Board of Directors said in November 2003 that CATSA “handles the screening of checked baggage while the airlines are responsible for cargo.”[41] This appears to be the case for air mail as well.

In December 2003, then Minister of Transport David Collenette wrote to the Committee in response to a question about progress on this recommendation that his department had “initiated a comprehensive review of air cargo and airmail security to consider possible enhancements.”[42] One year later, that review has not been completed.

Transport Canada stated in its 2004-2005 Report on Plans and Priorities, that it has initiated “a policy review of air cargo and airmail security assess vulnerabilities, threat and risk levels, industry best practices, training, and the harmonization of Canada’s approach with that taken by its trading partners.”[43]

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

• Stop reviewing air cargo security and take action

Almost two years after the Committee’s recommendation, the government is still studying the issue of airmail and cargo security. By the time the April 2004 national security policy came out, it had been under study for six months. At what point does “comprehensive review” become a synonym for “inaction”?

Problem 16:  The Canadian Air Transport Security Intelligence Gap

The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority does not have the capacity or connections to other parts of the security and intelligence community that it needs to protect travellers in Canada’s airports and on its airlines.

The Committee felt that the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority needed to be able to process finished intelligence product about past terrorist events and future threats, and then also have the procedures in place to share warnings and lessons learned to personnel working on the front lines.

The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority needs an intelligence capability for its training of pre-board screeners and non-passenger screeners. If the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority is to stay a step ahead of terrorists and criminals, its training needs to be shaped, or at least informed, by sound and up-to-date intelligence.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority should develop an intelligence capability in order to effectively carry out its responsibilities. (Report: The Myth of Security at Canada’s Airports, January 2003, # VIII.3)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Transport Canada and the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority have not demonstrated to the Committee that the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority has the well-developed intelligence linkages and processing capacity that it needs. 

In its 2004 Annual Report, the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority implicitly accepted the Auditor General’s criticisms of March 2004 which said the security and intelligence community had poor information-sharing between agencies and departments. The Canadian Air Transport Security said that it was trying actively to increase the sharing of information and experiences both domestically and internationally.[44]

In explaining its layered approach to its “security network,” the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority described intelligence as one of the key elements to security. It also stated that its principal relationship in this network is with its regulator, Transport Canada.[45] It made no mention of relationships with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the government’s new Integrated Threat Assessment Centre.

It is clear that Transport Canada represents a security bottleneck in communicating necessary intelligence to the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority and in permitting it to effectively use the intelligence it receives.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

The government has not implemented the Committee’s recommendation.

• The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority should be directed and funded to create a capability to process and use intelligence relevant to its capabilities.

 

Problem 17:  Airport Policing is Inadequate

After the airport authorities assumed control of their airports, many airports greatly reduced the size of their police contingents. For example, at the Pearson International Airport in Toronto, the number of officers declined from 290 in 1995 to 162 in January 2003.[46]

At the same time, organized crime has a significant presence there. Royal Canadian Mounted Police Inspector Sam Landry, the officer in charge of the airport’s RCMP detachment, testified to the Committee that “criminal activity at Toronto airport that been linked to criminal organizations such as traditional organized crime, Eastern European-based organized crime, Asian-based organized crime and outlaw motorcycle gangs.”[47]

Not only is the number of police at airports inadequate, but policing services at airports are too fragmented. Currently, the physical security of airports is the responsibility of the airport authorities, police forces of local jurisdiction enforce the Criminal Code and provincial statutes, and, with the few exceptions in which it is the police force of jurisdiction, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police enforces federal statutes at all airports.

The RCMP does not have overall responsibility for security at airports. Right now, no one is in charge.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATIONS

The Committee recommended that all airport policing directly related to air travel security be removed from the airport authorities and assigned exclusively to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, who can in turn contract parts of it to the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority.[48]

The Committee recommended that the RCMP be given the authority to contract the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority to supervise all security policing at airports as it relates to passenger, cargo, aircraft and airside security.[49] (Report: The Myth of Security at Canada’s Airports, January 2003, # VII.1 and # VIII.4)

The Committee recommended that local police forces and security guards contracted by airport authorities be responsible for criminal offences that are not related to air travel security. (Report: The Myth of Security at Canada’s Airports, January 2003, # VII.2)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government has not significantly restructured the reporting relationships between airport authorities, the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police since the Committee’s recommendations.

The situation with regards to security remains complex.

The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority does not report to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. It is the delivery agency for most aviation security programs. It conducts pre-board screening of passengers and baggage (not including air cargo and air mail); manages programs to monitor and limit access to restricted areas; funds the Aircraft Protective Officers program; contributes funds to local airport authorities for contracts with local police. Transport Canada sets the rules by which it administers those programs.

Physical security at Canadian airports remains the responsibility of airport authorities. Police forces of local jurisdiction have the responsibility to enforce the Criminal Code and provincial statutes at each airport.[50] In most cases, local airport authorities contract with local police forces for additional police presence.  The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority subsidizes these contracts in some airports.

The RCMP is responsible for the enforcement of federal statutes at all airports, which includes conducting national security investigations and organized smuggling operations.[51]

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

• Put the RCMP on the case

The RCMP should be running security at Canadian airports. It should have the authority to designate appropriate security measure and delegate responsibility for implementing those measures to agencies like CATSA. Airport policing, like port policing, requires specialized knowledge and skills that can only be developed over time. The RCMP has a long history and extensive experience in airport policing and has the capacity for this type of specialization to be developed within the force.

Airport Authorities have not demonstrated any particular competance or inter-authority cooperation in this area, resulting in a hodge-podge of systems with each authority trying to reinvent the wheel.  The RCMP knows all the spokes on the wheel and how to tighten them.

• Suspicions aroused

During the Committee’s investigations, it was noted on occasion that all might not be entirely proper in the dealings between some airport authorities and the outside world. While the Committee has no evidence of any misdoings, it believes that the Standing Senate Committee on Transport and Communications may wish to investigate whether a study of such relations might be warranted.

 

Problem 18:  Lack of Transparency for Security Improvements

The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority has not provided a full accounting of the money it spends. The implementation of airport security enhancements must take place openly and transparently. The need to keep certain issues secret must be balanced with the equally legitimate right of Parliament and Canadians to know how their money is used. The government has this balancing act wrong and has tilted toward too much secrecy with too little openness.

 

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority fully report the amounts that it is spending on its internal administration and report annually how much it has spent at each airport for: passenger screening, mail and cargo screening, airside searching of non-passengers, policing. (Report: The Myth of Security at Canada’s Airports, January 2003, IX.3)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority (CATSA) reported that, for the fiscal year ending March 31, 2004, it will spend $152,540,000 on internal administration, security, non-passenger screening, the enhanced restricted area pass system, and explosive detection systems. It will pay pre-board screening operators—sub-contractors—a further $125,245,000. CATSA’s total operating budget for the fiscal year was $ 277,785,000.[52]

The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority does not publicly break down its expenditures on a per airport basis.

 

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

• Increase transparency by breaking down expenditures and costs on a per-airport basis

“Following the money” gives the clearest indication of what government departments and agencies are actually doing, as opposed to what they say they are doing. Looking at how they spend also gives Canadians an opportunity to compare the effort the government is making at one airport as opposed to another. Without a more detailed breakdown of spending, there is no way of telling whether monies have been spent properly or effectively.

• Release detailed data on a delayed schedule

The secrecy concerns about reporting spending (like security concerns with regard to testing screening addressed in Chapter 7, Problem 21) can be addressed by providing for a delay mechanism – of say a year – giving the government an opportunity to mitigate. For example, initially reports relating to fiscal year 2003-2004 could be made public in 2005-2006.

Problem 19: Air Travellers’ Security Charge

Canadians do not know whether the amount of the Air Travellers Security Charge is appropriate, whether the revenue generated has been well spent, and/or whether it has been entirely spent on airport security.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that the Government of Canada detail how much money is being collected from the $12 Air Travellers Security Charge – better known as the departure tax – and from which airports.

The Committee also recommended that the Government of Canada account for how much of the $12 Air Travellers Security Charge is being spent by the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority and how much is being spent by other departments and agencies and how much is being spent at each airport, and for what. (Report: The Myth of Security at Canada’s Airports, January 2003, IX. 1 and IX. 2)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government provides aggregate data about the revenues it collects from the departure tax monthly and annually (for example, it collected $430 million in 2002-2003). [53] It does not provide a detailed, airport-by-airport, breakdown about how much money it collects.

The government reduced the Air Travellers Security Charge in both its 2003 and 2004 budgets. In 2003, the charge on domestic travel was lowered to $7 for one-way travel; the charge for trans-border (passing through Canada only) and international travel remained the same. In 2004, the charge was lowered to $6 per flight segment to a maximum of $12 per ticket, $10 for trans-border travel, and $20 for international travel. Accompanying both reductions were annexes to the government’s budget that outlined revenue and expenditure models explaining the reduction.

The Department of Finance conducted a review of the Air Travellers Security Charge in late 2002 to “ensure that revenue remains in line with the costs of enhanced security.”[54] Included in this review was public consultation, and independent studies of both air travel demand elasticity and the charge’s effect on low-cost and regional air carriers.

In Budget 2004, the government said that it will no longer review the Charge annually, but instead on the basis of a rolling five-year period. The next review will not take place until around 2010.

In Budget 2004 the government also asked the Office of Auditor General to undertake an audit of the Air Travellers Security Charge. The Auditor General’s Office undertook a “financial audit” of the charge which it released shortly before this report went to press.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

• Itemize revenues and expenditures airport by airport

The Canadian public needs to know. The reports in each of the last two Federal Budgets did provide a general accounting for the Air Travellers Security Charge, but they do not allow the public to easily draw the relationship between the charge and the security that it is paying for on a per airport basis.

• Continue annual reviews of the security charge

The Committee believes that the government needs to evaluate the Air Travellers Security Charge every year. Since introducing the Air Travellers Security Charge in Budget 2001, the government has felt the need to alter the amount of the Air Travellers Security Charge twice.

The government should continue to report annually on the appropriateness of the level of the charge until it can demonstrate over a period of multiple years that it has achieved the right level for the charge.

Problem 20: Unnecessary Secrecy

HIGH PRIORITY

Unnecessary secrecy hides inefficiencies, provides cover for poor administration, and generally fosters weak security.

In early testimony, the Committee was appalled at the way officials from Transport Canada used the need for secrecy in matters of security as a shield against questions designed to determine whether the government was taking appropriate action to safeguard the travelling public.  The Committee finally turned to people who worked at airports, who knew what the thousands of their colleagues knew: the security the government was assuring the public was largely an illusion.

Security that relies on secrecy is weak because as soon as someone inevitably publishes the secret, the security that depended on the secret is forever breached. As Bruce Schneier points out in his book Beyond Fear, the security of a house lock depends on thieves not knowing that the owner keeps a key under the doormat. Once they know… 

At Canada’s airports, we discovered that everybody and their brother knew where the keys were hidden, and which locks were vulnerable. Organized crime long ago opened up huge security gaps at airports that the government said it was filling.  We discovered that it wasn’t.  Once that secret was out of the bag, security began to improve, although it still has a long way to go.

Secrecy won’t fix security problems.  It will delay them getting fixed.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The federal government should design and implement air travel security measures that provide transparency and full financial accountability to the Canadian public.

Airport authorities and the airlines must recognize that security of air travel is the public’s business and be forthright in explaining the measures they are taking to protect against terrorist or criminal activity, on the ground, and in the air. (Report: The Myth of Security at Canada’s Airports, January 2003, X.1 and X.2)

 

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government’s reviews of the Air Travellers’ Security Charge in 2002, 2003 and 2004 added a measure of accountability to Canada’s security expenditures. The government’s Budget 2004 request that the Office of Auditor General conduct an audit of the Air Travellers’ Security Charge and the expenditures for the air travel security system was also a positive step.[55]

However, Transport Canada has not shown that it has overcome the culture of secrecy. Basic data is unavailable. Such as:

• the success and failure rates of screening machines,

• which airports are especially problematic, and

• the results of internal tests to penetrate the security.

 

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

“Don’t accept anyone telling you that secrecy requires keeping details of a security system secret. I’ve evaluated hundreds of security systems in my career, and I’ve learned that if someone doesn’t want to disclose the details of a security system, it’s usually because he’s embarrassed to do so. Secrecy contributes to the “trust us and we’ll make the trade-offs for you” mentality that ensures sloppy security systems. Openness demystifies; secrecy obscures.”[56]

Bruce Schneier
Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly about
Security in an Uncertain World, page 278

 

• Show us, don’t tell us. “Trust me” is a bad mantra

The government should publish more data on the efficacy of its aviation security initiatives so that Canadians can know advocate for their improvement and have faith in the system.

It should start by describing what initiatives it has undertaken to test pre-board screening and those procedures’ failure rates. Canadians need to be kept up to date on how wisely their money is being spent. They aren’t.

• Publish the results of tests to the airport security system without undermining security

The major concern the government has expressed about releasing this type of data is that it would give terrorists and criminals an edge in attempting to penetrate the aviation security system.

It is possible to provide transparency without undermining security. For example, data could be released after an appropriate delay (12 – 18 months). Such a delay would give the government the necessary opportunity to fix whatever problems emerge, while also keeping the public informed.

 

Problem 21: Lack of Financial Transparency

The Auditor General lacks the authority to audit the security expenditures of individual airport authorities.[57]

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATIONS

The Committee recommended that the Government of Canada introduce legislation providing the Auditor General of Canada with the power to audit each airport authority for accuracy, and value received for all security revenues and expenditures made by the authority, which would complement ongoing auditing and supervision by Transport Canada of security expenditures by airport authorities.

The Auditor General of Canada should conduct audits – including value for money audits – of security expenditures both by the federal government and airport authorities (the Minister of Transport should make this possible through new legislation).  (Report: The Myth of Security at Canada’s Airports, January 2003, IX.4 and VIII.5)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The Office of the Auditor General lacks the authority to audit airport authorities.[58]

In its 2004 Budget, the government requested that the Office of Auditor General conduct an audit of the revenue from the Air Travellers Security Charge and the expenditures for the air travel security system.[59]

The Office of the Auditor General plans to release a report in the spring of 2005 on security issues, part of which covers aspects of air transport security.  The “financial audit” was completed shortly before this report went to print.

 

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

• Enact legislation granting the Auditor General the authority to audit airport authorities

Legislation granting the Office of the Auditor General the necessary authority to audit airport authorities is long overdue.

---

CHAPTER 8

Emergency Preparedness

Problem 1:  Lack of Emergency Management

Federal government departments are not being tested to ensure that continuity of operation is possible during and following a disaster or emergency. The problems encountered during the central and eastern Canadian August 2003 Blackout serve as a classic example. The Prime Minister’s Office was working by candlelight.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness conduct evaluations to ensure that all federal departments and agencies are able to continue to operate during a crisis and that their preparedness plans are in effect.[60]  (Report: National Emergencies: Canada’s Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy, March 2004, #17 A)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government stated in its April 2004 National Security Policy that the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness will be designated the body responsible for the testing and auditing federal departments’ and agencies’ key security responsibilities and activities, including their emergency plans.[61]

Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada plans to begin auditing Business Continuity Plans of almost all government departments and agencies in the first quarter of 2005.[62]  

 

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

• Start the audits

Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada has not concluded its discussions with the Treasury Board Secretariat about the transfer of responsibility for this function.[63] Furthermore, whether Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada will receive resources to complete the task is still an open question.[64]

The Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and Treasury Board need to conclude the transfer of the responsibility for auditing continuity plans.

The Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness should be given the resources it needs to undertake the project, either through a resources transfer from Treasury Board that correlates with the responsibility transfer or from new funding.

• Present progress reports for each department to Parliament annually

The Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness should table an annual report in Parliament on the adequacy or deficiency of the preparations made by each department and agency to provide transparency in the government’s emergency preparedness efforts.  Progress made (or lack thereof) in developing and improving business continuity plans for federal department and agencies is important to Canadians.

 

Problem 2:   Emergency Ad Hockery

Six micro-organisms pose the greatest risk to Canadians: smallpox, anthrax, plague, botulism, tularemia and hemorrhagic fever.  With the exception of smallpox, Health Canada does not have a comprehensive emergency response plan in place to deal with any of them.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended Health Canada develop a national plan to counteract potential outbreaks of anthrax, plague, botulism, tularemia and hemorrhagic fever and that it report to Parliament and the public by 31 March 2005 that this is completed. (Report: National Emergencies: Canada’s Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy, March 2004, #1)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Neither Health Canada, nor the new Public Health Agency of Canada, have demonstrated to the Committee they have up-to-date infectious disease outbreak management plans for the range of threats the Committee highlighted.[65]

Health Canada’s generic infectious-disease containment plan, called the Canadian Contingency Plan for Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers and Other Related Diseases, is outdated.[66]  It makes no mention that potential infectious disease outbreaks could be deliberately caused as an act of terrorism.

The focus of preparations for infectious disease outbreaks has been on the purchase of medicine to be used in case of emergency. The federal government 2004 budget provided $40 million over two years for strengthening preparedness against infectious diseases. Health Canada has been purchasing antibiotics that can be used to treat exposure to biological agents including anthrax, plague and tularaemia.[67]

The Canadian Food Inspection Agency is responsible for food inspection and food safety in Canada, and it seeks to protect consumers from some of the micro-organisms listed above, such as botulism.[68]

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

Release the National Outbreak Management Plans by 31 March 2005 or sooner

The purchase of medicines is a step in the right direction but the government should prepare and publicize up-to-date responses plans that reflect current circumstances.

Get the Public Health Agency connecting

The government should also ensure that the new Public Health Agency of Canada becomes more than a name. The new agency should become fully functional, connecting with, and responding to, the needs of provinces and first responders across the country.

 

Problem 3: Inability to Deploy Police in an Emergency

There are agreements in place with eight out of ten provinces (the exceptions being Ontario and Quebec) that would permit the RCMP to redeploy resources anywhere in Canada in an emergency.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that Canada’s Minister for Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness negotiate agreements with the governments of Ontario and Quebec to ensure that the citizens of all provinces in Canada have timely access to additional police to deal with any incident designated by provincial authorities to be an emergency. (Report: National Emergencies: Canada’s Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy, March 2004, #2)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

None evident.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

• Get all provinces involved

Canada needs a national approach to emergency preparedness. The lack of agreements on emergency policing assistance between the RCMP and the provinces of Ontario and Quebec is a gap in the emergency preparedness system. Federal leadership is needed.

Problem 4: No Role for Reserves

The Canadian Forces Regular Force and Reserves are not involved in federal emergency preparedness planning.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATIONS

The Committee recommended that the Canadian Forces should enhance their capabilities to respond to national emergencies by:

a) ensuring that the Regular Forces are equipped and trained to deal with significant emergencies in Canada and that they are involved in regional emergency planning;

b) expanding the role of the Militia to be a civil defence force capable of quickly aiding local authorities in the event of a national emergency;

c) equipping and training the Militia for emergency preparedness operations.

d) involving the Militia in emergency planning and training in conjunction with municipalities across the country.

Further, the Committee recommended that the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness should:

• include the Canadian Forces Militia in the national inventory of emergency preparedness resources; and

• provide first responders with details of the Militia’s assets and capabilities. 

(Report: National Emergencies: Canada’s Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy, March 2004, #3, 10, 11)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government has announced several initiatives which could increase the capacity of the Canadian Forces, regular and reserve, to respond to national emergencies. They include:

• examining ways, under the Land Force Reserve Restructure program, to develop dual-role capabilities for the reserves – such as CBRN defence – that could also be used to deal with domestic threats;[69]

• increasing the Canadian Forces’ holdings of nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) medical countermeasures and improving maintenance of existing countermeasure stocks;[70]

• enhancing the Disaster Assistance Response Team domestic capabilities, especially those it could use in remote regions and in cold weather;[71]

• promising to increase the size of the Reserves by 3,000; [72]

• deploying Community-based Contingency Planning Officers from the Reserve Force to unit and formation headquarters to work with local officials to facilitate inclusion of military support in emergency planning;[73]

• upgrading and coordinating the facilities that provide training, advice and technological support to the Canadian Forces, first-responders, and other government departments;[74]

• directing reserve units to develop plans to form platoon-sized groups (called Security Platoons) in preparation for short-notice humanitarian assistance deployments within Canada;[75]

• enhancing signals intelligence and computer network defence.[76]
   

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

• Must provide adequate support for current role

The government should provide the Department of National Defence with the resources necessary to fund the last 40 reserve Contingency Planning Officer positions.

• Increase the role of the Reserves

The government should increase the future domestic emergency capacity of the Reserves and provide them with the training and resources to fulfil that role.

 

Problem 5:   No Domestic Role for the DART

The Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) focuses on overseas rather than domestic emergencies, leaving Canada without a military rapid-disaster response capability to handle crises.  Even in its overseas role, the DART is clearly underemployed – it has been deployed abroad only twice since its creation in 1996.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that the focus of the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) be changed to domestic disaster assistance, and that to increase its effectiveness all of its personnel should be stationed at a single location. (Report: National Emergencies: Canada’s Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy, March 2004, #4)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The Minister of National Defence wrote to one of the Committee’s members that the Team is expanding its capabilities to respond to domestic incidents, particularly in remoter regions of the country and in cold weather.[77]

Its enhanced domestic capabilities are not fully operational. Additional personnel and cold weather equipment still need to be acquired.[78]

The government has not demonstrated that it can deploy the DART from its Ontario bases to remote parts of the country quickly.

 

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

• Provide airlift for quick DART deployment

The government is moving in the right direction, but the lack of lift capacity in the Canadian Forces makes the use of the DART problematic, both in Canada and abroad.

Canada did not send the DART to Haiti in September 2004, in the wake of the devastating tropical storm Jeanne, even though Haiti was having major problems providing its citizens with potable water, and water purification is one of the DART’s areas of expertise. The government maintained at the time that deploying the DART would be too expensive, which sounds like the requirement to purchase lift capacity was part of the problem.

It costs money to train and equip Canada’s Disaster Response Team. It would be money well spent if the DART showed up at domestic and international emergencies in a hurry and played a helpful role. If the DART isn’t going to be deployed when emergencies arise, what is the point of having it?

The government should ensure that the DART always has easy access to lift capacity and that adequate funds are set aside to move this team when it needs to move.

 

Problem 6:   Emergency Caches Mismanaged

Health Canada’s emergency caches are not helpful to local first responders. First responders usually don’t know where they are or what is in them. First responders are not consulted on whether the contents of the caches match what they need or duplicate what they already have.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that Health Canada overhaul the way it administers and manages the emergency caches it controls, with the aim of more efficiently and effectively aiding first responder agencies to help Canadians across the country. The overhaul should ensure, among other things, that local officials are:

• a) made aware of the locations of any caches in their vicinity;

• b) advised how to access the caches in emergencies;

• c) given a role in determining caches’ contents; and

• d) encouraged to include the caches in their planning and training.

(Report: National Emergencies: Canada’s Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy, March 2004, #5)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The April 2004 National Security Policy states that the National Emergency Stockpile System (the technical name for the caches) will be replenished and updated. It also stated that the national inventory of drugs will be updated.[79] It makes no mention of correlating the caches with the needs of first responders.

According to the new Public Health Agency of Canada, it is implementing a short-term (stock replenishment) modernization process and working on a longer term vision. An internal Strategic Review Workgroup is working on the long-term review. The Workgroup is looking at all aspects of the National Emergency Stockpile to ensure it meets a new Risk and Threat Assessment.[80]

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

• Address the recommendation

The government has not addressed any of parts A, B, C or D of the recommendation.  Local authorities need to be made aware of the caches locations in their vicinity; advised on how to access the caches in case of emergencies; given a role in determining the contents of the caches; encouraged to include the caches in their planning and training.

 

Problem 7:   Lack of Equipment for First Responders

In Budget 2001, the government provided six years of funding for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) training, but only two years of funding for necessary equipment purchases.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The federal government should provide four additional years of funding ($5 million per year) for the purchase of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear protection equipment. (Report: National Emergencies: Canada’s Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy, March 2004, #6)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government has not pledged a sustained commitment to first responders for necessary chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) equipment purchases and training. Independent sources have told the Committee that it is unclear what will happen to this capability when the funding from Budget 2001 runs out.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

• Equipment purchases require funding

The government must ensure that first responders have sufficient money to buy CBRN equipment and that equipment funding matches training funding.

• Funding must continue past 2007

The training of first responders to properly use chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear equipment should continue to be a government priority after 2007. Funding for training cannot dry up or first responders’ hard-acquired readiness to respond will rapidly diminish. 

 

Problem 8:   Institutional “Lessons Learned” Memory Blank

HIGH PRIORITY

Knowing how to act quickly and appropriately in trying circumstances is at the heart of disaster response. Being aware of “lessons learned” in other disasters is one of the keys to quick and appropriate response.

The Committee received testimony from government officials that the government’s “lessons learned” archive was incomplete – it didn’t even contain lessons from major disasters and the information it contains is not being disseminated to first responders.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness must structure its “lessons learned” archive so that it is:

• up to date and historically deep; and

• accessible and helpful to First Responders.

(Report: National Emergencies: Canada’s Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy, March 2004, #7)

The Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness should:

• act as a clearinghouse to assist other orders of government by distributing provincial / territorial and municipal “lessons learned” to other jurisdictions as required; and

• prepare and publish a preliminary public report within sixty (60) days of the emergency followed by a formal public report within one year of any national emergency outlining “lessons learned” from the emergency and various responses to it.

(Report: National Emergencies: Canada’s Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy, March 2004, #17E and #18 G(i))

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

There is no indication that the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness is making a concerted effort to package and disseminate a Canadian “lessons learned” package that would provide object lessons to heighten the awareness of first responders across the country as to how to react in various types of emergencies.

The government has acknowledged that all orders of government have a role in developing and sharing best practices and lessons learned.[81]

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

• Address the recommendation

The Department should treat the assembly of an up-to-date “lessons learned” archive as priority, and then move quickly to disseminate a “lessons learned” package that would help prepare first responders across the country for various types of emergencies.

 

Problem 9:   Lack of Centralized Health Protection  

There has been a lack of centralized focus on how to prepare for and respond to emergencies that threaten the lives of large numbers of Canadians.  This void was documented by the National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health (the Naylor Committee), which made a series of recommendations following the SARS epidemic.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee endorsed the recommendations of the Naylor Committee, and recommended that the government implement them.  (Report: National Emergencies: Canada’s Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy, March 2004, #8)

The Naylor Committee’s most important recommendation was that:

A new agency, to be called the Health Protection and Promotion Agency (HPPA), be created, and that it be headed by the Chief Health Protection and Promotion Officer of Canada (CHPPO). The HPPA would be a legislated service agency that reports to the federal Minister of Health.

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

On 24 September 2004, Prime Minister Paul Martin created a new Public Health Agency of Canada and announced the appointment of the country’s first Chief Public Health Officer (CPHO). The creation of the Agency and this appointment were key Naylor committee recommendations.[82]

The agency appears to be developing international links as recommended by the Naylor Committee.[83]

 

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

Challenge met.  Good progress is being made in this area and it is a hopeful beginning.

The Committee will examine the new Public Health Agency of Canada’s national security and emergency preparedness related functions soon.

 

Problem 10:   Poor Collaboration

The level of inter-jurisdictional information sharing, collaboration and co-operation among different orders of government in Canada is inadequate. The 2003 SARS crisis underlined the fact that this problem was especially pronounced in public health agencies. Provinces, territories, and communities are not being sufficiently included in strategic emergency planning and management.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness negotiate memoranda of understanding between the federal government and the provinces and territories that detail inter-jurisdictional responsibilities for both emergency preparedness and response. (Report: National Emergencies: Canada’s Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy, March 2004, #9)

The Committee recommended that the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness ensure that new effective data-sharing protocols and mutual assistance agreements between federal, provincial, territorial and municipal governments be implemented.

Further, the Committee recommended that Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, in cooperation with municipal emergency response units, provincial and federal governments, and relevant federal departments, develop a set of “best practices” for potential natural and man-made disasters.[84] (Report: National Emergencies: Canada’s Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy, March 2004, #18 B, C)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government, in its April 2004 National Security Policy, stated that federal-provincial-municipal cooperation on emergencies was important.  It proposed a federal-provincial-territorial forum on emergencies, and stated that the federal government was committed, where practical, to co-locating emergency preparedness facilities within provincial and territorial facilities.[85]

The senior level forum has not been created yet, but there is progress. At their last meeting in May 2004, the federal/ provincial / territorial deputy ministers responsible for emergency management were supportive of holding regular meetings involving deputy ministers and ministers. They also agreed in principle on draft Terms of Reference for Deputy Ministers and Ministers Fora.

The federal-provincial-territorial ministers responsible for emergency management have not met since 1993. A meeting of federal / provincial / territorial ministers responsible for emergency management is currently planned for January 23-25, 2005, in Ottawa.[86]

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

• Convene the forum and turn statements into agreements

The government’s commitment to working with other orders of government is a positive step forward. The government should convene its proposed forum soon, and work towards the agreements the Committee recommended.

The government should also ensure that the new Public Health Agency of Canada is establishing fully functional links with provincial and territorial counterparts, and that municipalities and first responders fully understand the responsibilities of all orders of governments and their agencies in responding to emergencies.

 

Problem 11:   Emergency Public Communications

With the exception of Alberta, the provinces and territories have difficulty disseminating emergency-related information to citizens within their jurisdiction.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that, in order to ensure that authorities have the power and the capability to interrupt radio and television broadcasts during emergencies:

• Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness design standards for the establishment of emergency public warning systems for all provinces and territories;

• the Governor in Council, by order, direct the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) to introduce such regulations as necessary to ensure that all public and private broadcasters are required to cooperate in the establishment of provincial / territorial and national public warning systems; and

• a national emergency website with links to provincial and territorial emergency websites be established so that emergency information and instructions can quickly be communicated via the Internet during a national emergency.

• Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness encourage the installation of a system like “Reverse 911®” in all municipalities, funding at least a third of the cost, with remaining costs to be divided between the provinces / territories and municipalities.[87]  

(Report: National Emergencies: Canada’s Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy, March 2004, #12 and 13)

 

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

There is no evidence that the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness has designed standards for emergency public warning systems for all provinces and territories.

The Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission has not been directed by Cabinet to introduce new regulations in response to Part B of the first recommendation. However, the CRTC notes that section 26 (2) of the Broadcasting Act allows the Governor-in-Council, by order, to direct the CRTC to issue a notice to licensees throughout Canada to broadcast any program considered to be of urgent importance. In addition, the Commission has made provision for emergency radio simulcasts on AM and FM stations in section 14 (2) of the Radio Regulations, 1986. Further, the Emergencies Act gives the Minister of Industry Canada the ability to take control of broadcast facilities and transmissions to disseminate public warning in the event that a public emergency be declared by the Governor in Council.[88]

The government’s Safe Canada Web Portal provides Canadians access to postings on alerts and advisories with regards to a range of critical incidents.[89] It also provides access to regional emergency information and a comprehensive set of links of provincial and territorial emergency preparedness websites.

There is no indication that the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness has encouraged installation of a “Reverse 911 ®” type system in all municipalities.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

The Committee accepts that most of the authority to create the emergency public communications systems it recommends exists.  However the system itself remains to be created and that presents three challenges.

• Transfer authority to disseminate public warnings on radio and TV to the Minister of Public Safety

The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness should not have to seek permission from the Minister of Industry Canada to disseminate public warnings via TV and radio. The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness should be in charge of this function because a situation could arise where there was not time for inter-departmental discussions during a major emergency.

• Develop policies and procedures to delegate that authority to other orders of government

The Deputy Prime Minister needs to be able to delegate responsibility for taking over the air waves to disseminate public warnings to provincial, regional, and municipal levels as the situation dictates.

• Tackle the technical challenges

 

Problem 12:   Poor Communications Equipment

The first responder community often does not have reliable communications devices for use in times of emergency.  Such systems need to be put in place by all orders of government.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATIONS

Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness should enter into negotiations to equip the entire first responder community nationwide with handheld communications devices, with the federal government funding at least a third of the cost, with remaining costs to be divided between the provinces / territories and municipalities. Each order of government should create the capacity to communicate with its first responders, within itself and with other orders of government. All systems should have wireless back-ups.[90] (Report: National Emergencies: Canada’s Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy, March 2004, #14 and 15)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

None evident.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

The federal government should work with the other orders of government to ensure that the entire first responder communities have hand-held communications devices and that they can communicate internally and with the other orders of government. Good communications are essential to effective emergency response.

 

Problem 13:   First Responders Out of Loop

Many first responders – including fire fighters, police officers, and emergency health care workers – believe that the federal government does not adequately consult them and does not understand what they need on the ground to do their jobs effectively.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness:

• develop a greater sensitivity to the differing needs of the First Responders in communities across Canada;

• restructure the national emergency preparedness system so that local concerns and needs form the core of preparedness planning and structures.

(Report: National Emergencies: Canada’s Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy, March 2004, #16)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government acknowledged, in its April 2004 National Security Policy, that “first line responders lie at the heart of our emergency management system.”[91] It went onto state that it intended to “launch a process” on how to modernize national system of emergency management. Details were not outlined.

In May 2004, Anne McLellan, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, said that government and municipalities “just have to work a lot more closely together and we have to get a lot more information flowing both up and down in terms of levels of government so that we know our state of preparedness.”[92]

 

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

Turn words into programs

Statements in the National Security Policy and the Deputy Prime Minister’s comments demonstrate that the government is aware of the problem.  Government needs to provide tangible evidence, in terms of programs, that it is listening to first responders across the country, and that it is responding to them.

 

Problem 14:   Weak Central Knowledge Base on Critical Infrastructure

The federal government does not have a central clearinghouse for critical infrastructure protection and emergency preparedness information for communities, and for federal departments and agencies.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness be required to:

• compile and maintain in cooperation with every municipality in Canada lists of the perceived vulnerabilities, emergency response assets, and shortfalls in assets and capabilities;

• hold meetings with provincial / territorial counterparts to discuss the deficiencies revealed as a result of recommendation (b) above; and

• conduct national emergency exercises in cooperation with other orders of government and prepare analyses on the “lessons learned”.

(Report: National Emergencies: Canada’s Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy, March 2004, #17 B, C, D)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government has acknowledged the need to create a more effective framework for critical infrastructure protection, and the need to do so with consultation from provincial and territorial authorities.[93]

The Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness recently released a Position Paper on a National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure Protection (November 2004). The paper represents an early stage in developing a Critical Infrastructure Policy. The policy is to be completed in the Fall of 2005.[94]

In that paper, the government states that it will identify and assess its own critical infrastructure and that it will work with other levels of government and the private sector to ensure that processes are in place to identify their critical infrastructures.[95]

The government’s April 2004 National Security Policy stated that the national emergency management system requires a modern legislative foundation informed by consultations with the provinces, territories, communities, first responders, and industry. It stated that to this end, the Emergency Preparedness Act would be reviewed and likely modernized.[96]

The National Security Policy also highlighted “regular national and international exercises…to assess the adequacy of the national system against various emergency scenarios” as a strategic priority.[97]

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

• Finalize the National Critical Infrastructure Policy on schedule by Fall 2005

The government’s commitment to develop a critical infrastructure policy is a step forward, as is its publication of the position paper. The work needs to be completed quickly.

 

Problem 15:  Lack of Leadership on Best Practices

The federal government has largely neglected first responders and is not playing a lead role in developing “best practices” within the first responder community.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that the Minister and Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness:

• Ensure that Canadian communities are fully informed about the availability of training programs and other resources to help them prepare to respond to emergencies;

• Facilitate and finance a peer review system among emergency managers and first responders to ensure that “best practices” are being implemented and to foster greater interoperability;

• Ensure that all agreements to provide funds to provincial and territorial governments disclose what percentage of those funds will be given to first responders in the municipalities; and

• Prepare and publish an annual report to Parliament on all its activities. This report should emphasize the measures that Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness has taken to upgrade Canada’s capacity to respond to national emergencies and the perceived shortfalls between assets and capabilities of first responders.

(Report: National Emergencies: Canada’s Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy, March 2004, #18 A, D, E, F, and G(ii). Parts B, C, and G(i) of recommendation #18 are addressed elsewhere Chapter 8)

 

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The Public Health Agency of Canada website includes an “Emergency Preparedness & Response Training Catalogue” that lists the federal, provincial and territorial programs directed at emergency preparedness and response. It also indicates the language(s) of availability.[98]

The government acknowledged the need to enhance first responders training opportunities. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Anne McLellan has said that her Department is developing a national training program that will be delivered across the country.[99]

There is no indication that all agreements with provinces involving municipal emergency preparedness itemize how much funding will be earmarked for the first responders.

The Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness has not tabled in Parliament a detailed account of perceived shortfalls in Canada’s emergency preparedness capabilities.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

• Ensure that financial assistance goes to first responders

When negotiating agreements with the provinces, the government must itimize exactly which funds are to go first responders. This is needed to ensure that money intended for local officials actually reaches them.

 

Problem 16:  Large Cities Should Be Helping Regions

Large cities possess the majority of the nation’s resources for dealing with emergencies.  Few of them have a system in place to provide preparedness assistance to surrounding regions.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that commensurately more funding should be provided to the larger communities in return for their agreeing to provide regional assistance. (Report: National Emergencies: Canada’s Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy, March 2004, #19)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government has allotted $3 million to increase Heavy Urban Search and Rescue (HUSAR) capacities in major Canadian cities.[100]

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

Provide additional funding to large cities on the agreement that they be prepared to provide certain specialized functions to nearby communities

Because emergency preparedness resources are limited, the federal government should develop and implement a plan that creates agreements with large cities wherein they receive additional resources for expensive specialized first responder capabilities in exchange for making the capability available to other communities in their region.

The federal government should provide incentives to stimulate cooperative effort on the part of large cities. This should be achievable through the provision of continuous funding that is conditional on those cities developing, assisting, and maintaining regional preparedness networks.

---