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THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

EVIDENCE

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OTTAWA, Thursday, March 3, 2022

The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met with videoconference this day at 11:30 a.m. [ET] to study foreign relations and international trade generally.

Senator Peter M. Boehm (Chair) in the chair.

[Translation]

The Chair: Welcome to this meeting of the [Technical difficulties].

The committee members are Senator Boniface from Ontario; Senator Coyle from Nova Scotia; Senator Gerba from Quebec; Senator Greene from Nova Scotia, Senator Harder, P.C., from Ontario, deputy chair of the committee; Senator Kutcher from Nova Scotia, who is replacing Senator Deacon from Ontario; Senator MacDonald from Nova Scotia; Senator Oh from Ontario; Senator Ravalia from Newfoundland and Labrador; Senator Richards from New Brunswick; Senator Woo from British Columbia.

[English]

Also joining us today, I believe, is Senator Dalphond from Quebec. He may not have joined us just yet. I’d like to introduce Ms. Gaëtane Lemay, clerk of this committee, sitting with me here.

Colleagues, as we are conducting a hybrid meeting of the committee, I’d like to remind members to please keep your microphones muted at all times unless recognized by name by the chair. I will ask senators participating via Zoom to use the raised-hand feature in order to be recognized. Those present here in the committee room can signal their desire to ask questions or comment to the clerk.

Should any technical challenges arise, particularly regarding interpretation, please signal this to me, the chair, or to the clerk and we will work to resolve the issue.

Finally, I would like to remind all participants that Zoom screens should not be copied, recorded or photographed. Today, pursuant to our general order of reference, we devote our meeting to the situation in Ukraine.

To discuss this matter, we welcome officials from Global Affairs Canada. We have with us Sandra McCardell, Assistant Deputy Minister, Europe, Arctic, Middle East and Maghreb; Julie Sunday, Acting Assistant Deputy Minister, Consular, Security and Emergency Management; and Alison Grant, Acting Director General, International Security Policy Bureau.

I’d like to welcome our witnesses for the first panel. It’s always great to see former colleagues, and we appreciate the work you are doing during these very stressful times.

Ms. McCardell, you have the floor. Your opening remarks unless your colleagues wish to augment them will be followed by questions from senators.

Sandra McCardell, Assistant Deputy Minister, Europe, Arctic, Middle East and Maghreb, Global Affairs Canada: Thank you, members of the committee. This briefing could not have come at a more important time, and we’re honoured to be with you today.

A week ago today, President Putin invaded Ukraine, bringing an end to Canada and the world’s hope that our collective efforts at diplomacy would persuade him to veer from the march toward war he was on. Instead, he launched a brutal land, air and sea assault to implement his shocking and distorted vision that an independent Ukraine simply does not exist.

We now see the effects of the largest military invasion of any European country since the Second World War. More than 800,000 Ukrainians have fled for their lives to neighbouring countries, and 136 civilian deaths have been reported thus far, although the actual numbers are likely significantly higher and certain to climb. Thousands of Russian citizens are protesting in response to President Putin’s invasion, and similar protests are occurring in cities around the world, including here in Ottawa. Kyiv has survived another night. Kharkiv has not, and Mariupol is on the brink.

Against this sombre backdrop, I’d like to provide you with a brief overview of our main lines of effort, including sanctions, and humanitarian preparations to support Ukraine, as well as our consular response. In close coordination with allies and partners, including the U.S., the U.K., the EU and Japan, Canada has announced several rounds of crushing sanctions to hold President Putin and his enablers to account.

Since 2014, Canada has put in place sanctions against 640 Russian individuals and entities, as well as 248 Ukrainian and 108 Belarussian individuals and entities. Most notably, Canada has sanctioned President Putin himself, his chief of staff, Anton Vaino, as well as Russia’s foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, and other members of the security council. This includes Russia’s ministers of justice, finance and defence.

We have also limited President Putin’s ability to mount war by sanctioning key Russian banks and financial institutions. We’ve imposed a dealings ban on Russian sovereign debt, advocated to disconnect key Russian banks from the SWIFT global interbank payment system, and the Prime Minister has also announced that Canada will impose an import ban on crude oil from Russia. Just hours ago, our Minister of Finance noted that Canada will remove Russia from our most-favoured-nation status and put in place a 35% tariff, a measure in place only now for North Korea. These sanctions and measures are unprecedented both in their impact and their level of coordination with the international community to limit loopholes and safe havens.

Canada is also engaged in intense diplomacy among the broader community of democracies to encourage strong statements of condemnation in response to Russia’s invasion. The UN General Assembly adopted a historic resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, thanks in part to Canada’s outreach to non-traditional partners. With several G7 and [Technical difficulties] in condemnation with 40 votes in favour and only 5 against, with a rogue’s gallery of those opposed to this measure.

Canada has also joined a number of countries in ensuring that the situation in Ukraine is referred to the International Criminal Court — by a record number, in fact, of referees — as a result of numerous allegations of the commission of serious international crimes in Ukraine by Russian forces, including war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Strengthening Ukraine’s defence capabilities has also been a priority. Earlier, we announced $25 million in military aid to Ukraine. Just hours ago, again, it was announced that an additional shipment of rocket launchers and hand grenades are headed to Ukrainian defenders.

We are also preparing our response to the humanitarian crisis. Canada announced an additional $100 million in humanitarian assistance to Ukraine on Tuesday, and we’re working to align our efforts with the EU and the UN in international development assistance, so it may have the greatest impact in response to the growing needs across Ukraine. We currently have a team of humanitarian experts on the ground to look at what is needed in Poland.

We remain deeply concerned by Russia’s attacks and their impact on Canadian citizens and permanent residents still in Ukraine. We are urging Canadians in Ukraine to shelter in place unless they can leave the country safely. Our own staff, who remained in Ukraine for as long as the security situation would allow, are now providing support to Canadians and permanent residents in crossing Ukraine’s borders.

Canada’s travel advice and advisories for Ukraine and the region continue to be updated regularly based on our assessments of the safety and security of the environment for citizens. Due to severe sanctions imposed on Russia’s banking system and airspace restrictions on Russian flights, including to Canada, we are recommending Canadians avoid all non-essential travel to Russia. We advise Canadians in Russia to contemplate whether their continued presence in Russia is essential.

Canada’s diplomatic missions are on the front lines of our response, and our mission in the region has been heavily engaged with host governments. We are witnessing first-hand the delivery on assurances from neighbouring states that Canadians, permanent residents and their family members are able to cross the border freely from Ukraine. We’re overwhelmed by the generosity and support of Ukraine’s neighbours as they assist those who are fleeing senseless conflict.

On behalf of Global Affairs Canada I would like to thank Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, or IRCC, for quickly responding to this crisis with a suite of proposed immigration measures to help Canadian families return to Canada, as well as a recent announcement of a fast track for work and study permits.

The safety and security of Canadians remain our top priority. Our contingency plan continues to be robust. Canada is steadfast in our support for Ukraine. We are united with partners and allies, and we are prepared for a long road ahead. Ukrainians deserve the right to their history, identity, democracy and independence.

[Translation]

Thank you for your attention. I will now answer questions.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you very much, Ms. McCardell, for your statement. Unless there are any augmenting comments from your co-witnesses, we will go straight to questions.

I would just like to remind members of the committee to use the “raise hand” button if you are joining us virtually to be added to the list of questioners, which our clerk, Gaëtane Lemay, will manage.

I also wish to inform members that for this portion of the meeting you will each have a maximum of only four minutes for the first round. That includes questions and answers. My advice to you is to keep the preface to your question rather short to allow for a maximum answer; please be concise.

Ms. Lemay, the clerk, will make a hand signal to indicate the time is up. We can always go to a second or a third round if we have the time.

I’d first like to call on the deputy chair of the committee.

Senator Harder: Thank you to our witnesses. I first want to thank the department and associated departments for the work that is being done.

I want to focus on the medium and longer road ahead that Ms. McCardell referenced, particularly with regard to Russia. It seems to me that the West has responded very robustly, perhaps even more robustly than some would have predicted, and that gives us new opportunities for strategies that, until now, have not been part of our considerations. At the same time, Putin, by his actions, is showing the extent to which he is prepared to drive this to the very end.

What are the prospects here of further Western actions or events in Russia that could help bring an end to this? I’m thinking, for example, of the SWIFT exemption to the payment of gas, which is $1 billion worth of currency to Russia. I know that’s a big step, but if we all focus on ending Putin’s regime, the medium and longer term might look better.

Ms. McCardell: Thank you for the question. Clearly, the hope that we had earlier that we could bring this to a close quickly has passed. Mr. Putin has demonstrated his willingness to sacrifice not only many lives of Ukrainians but quite frankly his own soldiers and the well-being of his own people as sanctions bite.

We have been very united in working with other countries to put in place a sanction regime that will bite, and we mean for it to bite. We are still in contact with all of our partners to look at where we can take this next. I can assure you there is nothing that isn’t on the table and being discussed.

In terms of SWIFT, we’ve been working closely with the Europeans. It’s their regulations that are key to making SWIFT work. The organization is based in Belgium, and the EU regulations are what is essential for putting in place the restrictions on what SWIFT can do.

In terms of energy, we’ve been working closely with Europe to figure out how we can backstop their energy needs so that we can make this a more robust program for them and also give them the strength with their own people and the cost of energy to come with us the whole way.

There will be a number of things we’ll have to look at to push President Putin off his current course, and we’re in the process of looking at all of them right now.

Senator Harder: On the humanitarian side are you doing contingency planning for the fallout of the lack of the supply of, for example, Ukrainian wheat to third countries; Lebanon, for example, gets 50% of its wheat from Ukraine, Bangladesh 21% and Yemen 22%, or so. My point here is that our humanitarian focus should not be just on Ukraine but the collateral damage to other countries that are not in a good position to deal with it themselves.

Ms. McCardell: We are absolutely working with UN agencies to look at food security broadly across the region. The Middle East is already in a precarious position, and that is not just Lebanon but Iraq. There are refugees in neighbouring countries from Syria and in Jordan. There’s a lot of concern over the rising prices and what that will mean for political stability in that region.

So we are certainly looking at contingencies. UN agencies are looking at contingencies. There is absolutely a wide range of fallout from this; it isn’t just going to be about Ukraine and Russia. We absolutely do need to be ready.

Senator Kutcher: Thank you, everyone, for being with us this morning and for the great work you’re doing.

We’ve seen unprecedented levels of Kremlin-aligned disinformation in the past few years, focused on destabilizing democratic states across the Western world, even here in Canada. In the last few months, we’ve noticed an integration of anti‑vaccination, pro-Russian invasion conspiracy theories around the new world order, et cetera. They seem to be making an impact.

I have two questions: What specific actions are the Government of Canada taking to counter Kremlin-aligned domestic information — for example, proxy sites like Global Research, which is all over Facebook — and what specific actions is the Government of Canada taking to counter Kremlin‑driven disinformation within Russia; how do we boost Western world information in Russia?

Ms. McCardell: There are many long-standing concerns about disinformation coming out of Russia. In fact, I visited Ukraine even back in December before this horrible situation began, and they were concerned then about the intersection they had seen even then with anti-vaccination and Russian propaganda.

You’ve heard the Prime Minister call for the CRTC to look at Russia Today, in particular. We’ve seen private companies like Bell and Rogers already take RT off of their stations, so there is both a governmental and a private-sector response to addressing some of the sources of disinformation.

What I can say about going forward is that this is certainly an important topic that Global Affairs Canada is engaged with, from our mandate, but I know the Department of Canadian Heritage is looking closely at the broader issue of disinformation and can probably provide you with a larger perspective on what they’re planning for Canada.

Within Russia, it’s difficult. You’ve seen the Russians use censorship already to ensure their population has absolutely no information about what’s really taking place in Ukraine. What we’re doing right now is using our mission on the ground to spread the truth as best we can and to set an example.

Just a few days ago, our ambassador and her like-minded colleagues went to a memorial for an anti-Putin [Technical difficulties]. Their physical demonstration of support to the opposition — their presence — is helping to ensure there is at least some truth within Russia, but it will be very difficult to crack in country.

Senator Kutcher: If I reach out to your office, is there an office I can reach out to? The reason I ask is because there are academic networks that I have access to, colleagues and institutions, that have long-standing ties within Russia for years and years of research collaboration. I’ve not heard anyone talking about using that network, and I’m happy to look into it if there’s someone you can direct me toward.

Ms. McCardell: I would direct you to me. If you can reach out to me, I’ll connect you with the right people.

Senator Kutcher: Thank you.

Senator Oh: Thank you, witnesses. My question is about humanitarian aid.

On Tuesday, Canada announced some $100 million in humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, on top of $25 million announced earlier. We have been told that this assistance will be primarily for emergency health services, support to displaced populations as well as shelter, water, food and sanitation supplies.

Is the assistance going to be provided directly to Ukraine, or are we directing that primarily to Poland and Romania?

Ms. McCardell: Of the original $15 million that Canada announced earlier that funding has already been disbursed. That funding, which preceded the full invasion, was disbursed to UN‑Red Cross humanitarian partners and a UN-managed Ukraine humanitarian fund.

Of the $100 million recent announcement, we’ll need to see with partners where that is best served. We will be working with the UN. As I mentioned, we have a team in Poland right now that’s in discussions to see how we balance off the needs in Ukraine and the needs in neighbouring countries.

This is really in flux right now, so what’s important is that we understand where the needs are, that we work with experienced partners like the UN who are used to being in these sorts of difficult crises and dangerous situations and that we coordinate with donors so that we’re getting all the funds in the right places.

The UN has launched a flash appeal of $1.7 billion as well, and that’s meant to address the needs of Ukrainians both inside and outside the country. There’s a real focus right now on getting support to the people that need it where they need it.

Senator Oh: We have seen estimates of up to 1 million people now having crossed into neighbouring countries from Ukraine. How many displaced persons do we have in Poland and Romania today? Do you have any projection that you can share on how many we are likely to see?

Ms. McCardell: I would need to get back to you with the details of where those individuals are. We have better figures on how many have left Ukraine, because those who leave are continually mobile. Some are staying in Poland, some are moving on to Germany and other countries. I can’t say with certainty the numbers in each country.

I can say the majority of them are currently in Poland, but they are in the full range of neighbouring countries, Romania, Slovakia, Hungary, and as I said, moving on to Germany.

As for the number that will eventually come to Canada, you heard the announcement today about the facilitated passage that we have for Ukrainians to come to Canada, so IRCC will have a better sense as we start to see a response to that announcement.

As I heard the minister say, there won’t be a maximum attached to that, but they can provide better figures as we get a response.

Senator Ravalia: Thank you to the witnesses. My question is based on whether or not Canada currently has a strategy in place if the situation escalates beyond Ukraine. There are certainly visions and sentiments that Russia wants to recreate the great Soviet empire. Countries neighbouring Russia depend on it economically in terms of gas supplies and so on. What potentially are the next steps if this escalation were to go beyond Ukraine?

Ms. McCardell: I think that’s the big fear, certainly the fear of Ukraine’s neighbouring countries, the Baltics in particular, Moldova. These are countries that understand very much what it’s like to live next door to Russia. They’ve been very concerned.

You saw in the weeks leading up to this invasion that there were announcements of enhanced forward presence, meaning that NATO countries were sending additional forces into some of these countries to demonstrate our support for them, to give them the confidence of NATO’s presence. But longer term, I think this is something that’s going to be discussed within NATO. We’re going to need to be very united on this and working together to support those countries.

I know there’s a NATO foreign ministers meeting tomorrow. Minister Joly will be part of those discussions. The military work is contingency planning, but certainly some of these contingencies are dangerous to contemplate indeed. If you allow me, I’ll turn to Alison Grant, from our regional security bureau, to see if she has anything to add to that.

Alison Grant, Acting Director General, International Security Policy Bureau, Global Affairs Canada: No, not too much. Thank you, Ms. McCardell. Good morning, senators. Pleased to be with you.

I will emphasize that NATO has activated its prudent military planning procedures. This has happened recently. This basically consists of defensive deployments to the eastern flank. This is a process that is ongoing and will be calibrated by NATO’s supreme allied commander.

NATO is, of course, only taking actions that are proportionate to the threat but is very seized of the issue. As Ms. McCardell mentioned as well, we will have a foreign ministers’ meeting tomorrow. We hope we will be able to engage with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Kuleba at that meeting.

Senator Ravalia: My follow-up question is with reference to Ukrainians who are displaced and may want to come to Canada. Do we have any strategy in place to remove or reduce visa requirements? Do we have a concerted effort within the provinces to welcome refugees?

I know that in Newfoundland and Labrador the Association for New Canadians is working on a strategy. We would gladly welcome anyone who wants to come to our province. I was wondering if we have some sort of a national strategy in that regard and can minimize the hassle of them getting here.

Ms. McCardell: I’ll start with what I know, and then I probably think my colleagues from IRCC would be better placed to find that forward plan.

We had a few hours ago that announcement. We already had enhanced measures with Immigration. We had put in place a fast track to ensure Ukrainians were given priority in terms of their permanent resident application, visa applications. We’ve just had that announcement on a fast-tracking which will allow Ukrainians coming to Canada to work or study for two years. That’s in play.

In terms of coordination with the provinces, I would ask IRCC to respond in greater depth on their planning for that.

Senator MacDonald: I’d like to speak to the issue of sanctions. The list of individuals sanctioned by Russia includes individuals or key members of Putin’s inner circle, 351 members of the Russian State Duma who voted in favour of recognizing the independence of some southeastern Ukrainian territories and some others.

But some of the wealthiest Russian business people, so-called oligarchs, are excluded from these measures. Can you explain some of the legal and other impediments in sanctioning such individuals or in sanctioning companies that are owned by wealthy Russians? Do we effectively apply sanctions to these people who are presently avoiding sanctions?

Ms. McCardell: As I mentioned in my introductory comments, we have sanctioned an extraordinary number of individuals involved in the crisis in Ukraine. Two comments with that, first, sanctions matter when they’re implemented and they bite. Also, the impact of sanctions has two parts, the immediate, political, symbolic sanctioning which demonstrates our condemnation of behaviour and isolates an individual, and then, of course, the longer-term economic impact that will take some time to come into play.

In terms of oligarchs, within that number you mentioned, there are a large number of oligarchs who have already been sanctioned. We just announced 10 additional oil business executives who are now on our sanctions list as well. The intent with this has really been to initially ramp up pressure to get very close to Putin, eventually Putin himself, to demonstrate condemnation and to try to steer the regime on a different path.

The other aspect of this is we’ve been working in coordination with our international partners. The idea has been that if we do this together, we’ll be more effective. That’s been a bit of the thinking behind whom we’ve chosen and why, up until now.

But as I mentioned earlier, all things are on the table. Unless Putin veers from his path — and regrettably there’s no sign he will — there’s every likelihood there will be more sanctions.

On the issue of implementation, we are working with Finance on their part to identify any assets in Canada. We are working with U.S. Treasury and coordinating with them, with the Europeans, to put in place essentially a transatlantic task force to identify assets and ensure the sanctions bite the way they should and the people that they should.

In terms of our part in this, we will continue to work with other government agencies to find what there is in Canada. We are doubtful there are yachts, like others have been able to seize, in Germany, for example, but we need to make sure that assets are frozen and that these sanctions have the impact that we intend.

Senator MacDonald: Some western countries have targeted companies with more than 50% Russian ownership. Have we been looking at specific criteria in that regard, perhaps even a lower threshold?

Ms. McCardell: This is an evolving issue, but I spoke to Finance just today about how we will approach any companies in Canada that are only partially owned by Russia.

Senator Greene: Thank you. I would like to ask what our objective is in this war. A month from now we’ll determine whether the sanctions have worked against Russians or not. But Ukraine, it seems to me, does not have a month. It has less than a month. If our objective is to hurt Russia over the long term and bring it to heel and so on, then what we have been doing is right. But if it is to save Ukraine, I don’t think what we have been doing is right. It seems to me that we should be doing a lot more.

You said earlier that nothing is off the table. I hope that also means that a no-fly zone is not off the table. Ultimately we have to do something militarily if our objective is to save Ukraine. Can you comment on that?

Ms. McCardell: Sure. Thank you for that.

Our objective in the beginning was, of course, to avoid the war that we now find Ukraine in. But our approach continues to be focused on responding, condemning and pressuring Mr. Putin to get back to the negotiating table.

In the end, every conflict needs to end with a negotiation. There needs to be diplomacy in the end. This is a part of the pressure to bring him back to the table. We have come close to him with sanctions. We have aimed at those close to him who benefitted from his regime so that they may put pressure on him and redirect him back toward peace.

The other part of this, quite frankly, is about grading capability, and I believe that the senator was referring to that.

In the long term, the economic measures we are putting in place — stock market has not opened in four days, currency collapsing, interest rates climbing — will reduce the funds that he has available to wage his war. But I grant you that is not an immediate solution.

Some of the other things we’ve done beyond focusing on degrading Russia’s capability and isolating them diplomatically has also been about support to Ukraine. That’s where you’ve seen all that we’ve done, but specifically in what you are talking about, the provision of lethal weapons. We’ve also put in place a $500 million loan to help backstop the economic part. There is a bit of a two track there.

Specifically to the question of a military response or a no-fly zone, to be honest, Russia has nuclear weapons. We have heard Putin mention them already. NATO has spent many decades avoiding war with Russia. Some of those measures, including a no-fly zone, could put us in a far more dangerous position than we even find ourselves in now.

Senator Greene: I appreciate the issue of the no-fly zone and the nuclear possibility.

How long does it take for munitions such as extra bullets or missiles, et cetera, to get to Ukraine, to get to the people who are going to be using these after they are announced in Ottawa? If Ottawa is day 1, they have to be transported over there, you have to get them across the border somehow or other and then they end up in the hands of people who can use them. How long is that?

Ms. McCardell: I will ask Alison Grant to respond to that question.

Ms. Grant: Thanks so much. It is hard to put a matter of days on how long each separate shipment or deployment would take, senator. Our Department of National Defence is completely seized with this right now. I know that Minister Anand a couple of days ago mentioned the incredible effort that Defence is putting into military transport, both for the equipment that we have committed to Ukraine, as well as some of the deployments that we’ve committed to NATO, and that planes are already going.

Even this morning, we’ve had new commitments of military equipment, lethal and some non-lethal as well. So they’re going as fast as we can get them on the plane.

The Chair: Thank you, Ms. Grant. I’m afraid that I have to interrupt you, I’m sure that some of this can be picked up in subsequent questions.

Senator Richards: Thank you to the guests for being here today. Ms. McCardell, I will give my second question because Senator Greene actually asked what I was going to ask. But I’m a little worried that we’re already in a state of war with the former Soviet Union. Millions of refugees who are already trying to get into other countries tell us this. Right now we’re watching a horror show unfold before our eyes.

I know we’re trying to do as much diplomatically and under the table with missiles and weapons as we can. I do not think that is going to deter Putin, as you know. I don’t think that our standing shoulder-to-shoulder with diplomatic efforts is really going to stop him from looking at the Baltics or other countries like Finland. Maybe I’m too pessimistic.

It is like watching a Steven Seagal movie on the ground where men as old as me are picking up Molotov cocktails to throw. It is pretty disheartening. I just wonder what your feelings are about that.

Ms. McCardell: Chair, my feelings align very much with the senator’s feelings. It is a tragedy, what is happening on the ground.

If we had a solution to bring this war to an end, we would be using it, as would every one of our international partners on this. The fact is that Mr. Putin has not been dissuaded. He participated with what I think amounted to a great deal of cynicism in international efforts to avoid this, diplomatic visits to Russia to persuade him to avoid this tragedy, and he proceeded regardless.

Now that we are here, we have to do what we can to support Ukraine and to put pressure on Russia. As I mentioned, the military options risk creating an even more dangerous situation.

I will pick up though on the senator’s comment on neighbouring countries and turn to my colleague Alison Grant to address the issue which I think might be part of the answer which is what happens if he attacks NATO member countries. There we do have a clear answer. Alison Grant, I will turn to you for that part.

Ms. Grant: Yes, Mr. Chair.

The NATO alliance, our political and military alliance, is a cornerstone of our security and defence in Canada. The commitment we have to allies is iron clad. At any time it is written into the NATO founding treaty that if there is an armed attack against one member, it is considered an attack against all and that commitment to Article 5 is iron clad.

NATO has been communicating that regularly and will continue to communicate that regularly. As I mentioned before, NATO is in a crisis management mode.

We are bolstering the eastern flank; Canada as well. We have announced the enhancements that we’ll send to Latvia, Poland, Romania and other countries along the flank. At the same time, we’re also communicating that we are a collective defence alliance and that we are not a threat to Russia. If we are threatened, if any of our allies are attacked, our defensive posture is iron clad and those mechanisms will kick in at NATO.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Senator Coyle: Thank you very much, Ms. McCardell, and colleagues, for your testimony today and also for your work at this very difficult time.

As we all know, this unprovoked, illegal, brutal, heartbreaking war was not supposed to happen in today’s Europe, but here we are. Russia has thousands of nuclear warheads.

Since 2018, Russia has consistently voted against the UN General Assembly resolution that welcomes the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, or TPNW. We know over the weekend that Putin gave orders to his nation’s nuclear forces.

What do you think the likelihood is of nuclear escalation? What would the likely targets be if any of you can speak to that? And what are NATO’s plans, if we know of them at this time, in the face of these threats, to de-escalate these threats? Thank you.

Ms. McCardell: Mr. Chair, it is hard to imagine a more horrific scenario than a threat that we need to take seriously in Europe of the use of nuclear weapons. You would have thought it a fantasy months ago and, yet, here we are.

What we are doing through the NATO planning that my colleague has referred to is preparing for every scenario, working in concert with Allies. We have that foreign ministers’ meeting that I mentioned to you, but the reality is that we also need to be continuing that part of pushing President Putin toward de‑escalation. As well, we need to hope that the pressure that we are putting, not only economically but politically, on his entourage, I have to assume that they themselves are very concerned about his rhetoric and his threat of using the ultimate weapon.

In terms of NPT, I will turn back to Ms. Grant on that, but I can assure you that we take all of his threats seriously. We are working hard to veer him from his current path.

Alison, if you want to address that issue of the NPT and other nuclear preparations at NATO.

Ms. Grant: On the TPNW, I can provide extra information after. I don’t have the latest with me right now, but I am happy to provide it through Senate channels after this meeting.

At NATO, we absolutely are seized with this reckless escalation of President Putin. As well, I need to mention the action in Belarus and the recent referendum, which we have high doubts was free and fair, to remove its non-nuclear status from its constitution as well, another reckless escalation. NATO is, of course, tracking and, as Ms. McCardell mentioned as well, aiming to de-escalate and defuse.

NATO has a nuclear study group that meets regularly, and we’re fully having consultations on this issue and will remain seized of it. Thank you.

[Translation]

Senator Gerba: Ms. McCardell, I’m going to go back to the humanitarian issues Senator Oh mentioned. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees has stated that “the situation is quickly becoming Europe’s largest refugee crisis this century.”

You mentioned it yourself. The UN has issued an appeal to raise US$1.7 billion for the Ukrainian humanitarian crisis. I applaud Canada’s efforts, as it has already provided more than $100 million in aid.

Here is my question: How do you ensure that the humanitarian aid you send gets to the people concerned?

Ms. McCardell: Thank you for your question. Indeed, this may well be the biggest humanitarian or refugee crisis in Europe, but I want to assure you that we recognize this is not the only humanitarian crisis in the world. The situation that existed before the invasion of Ukraine continues to exist.

We are mindful of this in our approach, and our intention is to help those who are suffering around the world.

In Europe especially, as we do elsewhere, we work with loyal partners, experienced partners, including the Red Cross. UN agencies have the experience needed to work in tough areas.

Unfortunately, because of their experience in certain countries, including Syria, for instance, agencies know how to work in extremely dangerous situations. By working with these partners, we can ensure that our donations, whether financial or material, reach those most in need.

This effort is very important to us, as I said, and we are on the ground precisely to make sure that we establish good collaborative relationships.

Senator Gerba: Thank you. How can Canada assist in the establishment of humanitarian corridors to facilitate the evacuation of civilians, of which there are many as well?

Ms. McCardell: For now, we can see that Ukrainians are able to get out of Ukraine. People are leaving their country by the millions. For the time being, no one is preventing them from leaving. That doesn’t mean it will not happen in the future. In terms of access to key materials, we will work with the United Nations and those who have experience with rugged terrain to secure that kind of corridor.

As you know, Canada has already pointed out to the UN that, much like in any crisis or war, there must be a way to reach the most vulnerable, including women and children, to deliver aid. We are working with our partners to ensure that.

Senator Gerba: One last thing. Have you looked at the situation of Africans, in particular, who are having problems leaving the country? There have been reports of discrimination and racism in neighbouring countries. They don’t have the option to go elsewhere, like Ukrainians do. I’m talking about foreign students, especially African students.

Ms. McCardell: Absolutely. We are very aware of that. As you know, the border has two sides, the Ukrainian side and Polish side. Our ambassadors in both countries, Ukraine and Poland, have contacted officials at the Ministry of the Interior to point out that it is paramount that everyone’s rights be respected, and to remind them they must eliminate racial discrimination in the way they treat people.

The Chair: Thank you, Ms. McCardell. Your time is up for that question, but I want to point out how important Senator Gerba’s question is.

[English]

Senator Woo: May I ask our witnesses if anyone in the department is giving some thought to the fact that Russia has opened a second front in its global warfare, the first front being, of course, Syria? With this massive distraction that they have created for themselves in Ukraine, what is your thinking on the dynamic in the Syrian conflict and whether we could see a discontinuity develop in the weeks and months ahead because of Russian attention in the Black Sea?

Ms. McCardell: Before coming back specifically to the example of Syria, I would say that overall, we are headed for an important realignment of influence in the world. There is in many ways no coming back from the very clear statements and actions that have been taken to isolate Russia, not just from governments but from private industry.

If you look just at the UN vote to see the five countries that voted against condemning Russia — North Korea, Syria, Belarus, Russia — I do not know why Eritrea, but anyway — it certainly demonstrates that the rest of the world is opposed to Russia. I am not sure what that will mean longer term, but I think it means something important about Russia’s influence in the world.

Specifically on the question of Syria, I am not confident that the shift will bring peace to that country, which has now been at war for 10 years. What I can say is that as our sanctions bite the economy of Russia, as we see declines in Russia’s ability to finance those it supports elsewhere in the world, we may see some of those changes in influence play out.

The Chair: Thank you very much. Because time is advancing, I have cut my prerogative in half, and I will have only one question. It is really a short one.

There has been a lot of speculation about off-ramps. In traditional diplomacy, you always look for a way out. As far as I can tell based on my experience, this will be very, very difficult in this instance. We saw news a few minutes ago that President Macron had another conversation with President Putin, apparently instigated by Moscow, where President Putin allegedly said he was going to go all the way. This makes it even more difficult.

Allowing those economic sanctions to bite and tightening them even further, is this the area of greatest concentration?

Ms. McCardell: Look, there needs to be an off-ramp. Every war needs to end with a peace. We need to provide those off‑ramps and not least because of the nuclear weapons that we just referred to. This is not any country; this is a former superpower.

In terms of what those off-ramps look like, there are a lot of efforts to find them. You have seen the negotiations on the Ukraine-Belarus border; that is one that is official. We will see if there’s anything that bears fruit in that.

I have no doubt that there are back channels being used to try and bring sense to Mr. Putin. The reality is he accepted no diplomatic efforts beforehand. He has shown no response thus far to the real, significant international condemnation.

At this point, we will need to find the moment, whether it is economic sanctions, whether it is pressure from his inner circle, whatever it might be, that actually gets him to engage in diplomacy in a real and substantive way. I think our greatest fear is that won’t happen soon enough.

The Chair: Thank you for that. We’re going to move to a very compressed second round and a soft transition to the next panel. I have two questioners for the second round, Senator Harder and Senator Kutcher. I would ask you to ask your questions as economically as you can. Then we’ll get an answer and conclude the panel.

Senator Harder: I’m going to just follow up on the chair’s question. What in your view is “to the end?” What is “all the way” for Mr. Putin, in your assessment?

Senator Kutcher: Putin’s actions are clearly not predictable. To be ready for the unpredictable, what is next? The three nuclear submarines that surfaced together in the Arctic about a year ago sent us a clear message. In thinking about unpredictability, this is another front. What are the thoughts about that?

The Chair: We’re going to squeeze in a question from Senator Greene as well. As you can see, we’re saving all the easy questions for the end.

Senator Greene: My question is very easy, I think. What are the parallels in this exercise with Ukraine to the China-Taiwan relationship? Do they pose a lesson for President Xi? That is my question.

The Chair: If you can do all of that in about three minutes, that would be great.

Ms. McCardell: Mr. Chair, as you said, all the easy questions are at the end.

I will pick up on the, “Where is the end?” We had long ago hoped that the end was nowhere near where it is now. If we look at his troop movements, they are positioned in Belarus and all around Ukraine. Certainly, Kyiv is a target. How far west will that go? We’ll see, but he is certainly positioned to go quite far.

Indeed, would he go beyond? We’ve talked today about how we prepare for that. His neighbours are very concerned, not just his east European neighbours but the Central Asia Republics. They all heard the invocation of the former Soviet Union, and they are all concerned. Look, we couldn’t have more unity; we couldn’t have stronger messages. We just need to push him back as far as we can.

I will speak to the Arctic and then turn quickly to Ms. Grant to pick up on what we are doing, for example, with NORAD in the Arctic. A lot of attention is being paid. It is one of the issues; it is part of the Canada-U.S. road map.

The Arctic Council has been an excellent forum where we have been able to cooperate with Russia even in what looked like bad times, but those times were great compared to today. We had scientists and Indigenous communities as participants really engaging in the co-management of the North. We kept security and political issues out. Just today, we’ve issued a statement saying we’re putting a pause on that cooperation, particularly because Russia is the president right now, so we have no alternative. We’re also using that pause to think about how we can maintain the positive connections we need to manage our north.

On China-Taiwan, we need to be very attentive to the lesson that China is learning from what is happening in Russia. One of the lessons that China may take is that not just the West but the world can be very unified in a way that maybe wasn’t expected. I will leave it at that and turn to Ms. Grant to speak on Arctic security issues.

The Chair: Ms. Grant, you have about one minute. You have to compress it.

Ms. Grant: Thank you for the heads-up, Mr. Chair. On Arctic security, yes, the focus is on NORAD and what more we can do there. You likely know about plans for NORAD modernization; very important. Global Affairs strongly supports the planning by the Department of National Defence on NORAD. The plan is to make major critical investments in personnel, equipment and to enhance our capabilities in defence of Arctic sovereignty, as well as in other NORAD regions, too.

On the NATO side, for the Arctic, of course, there is very good, strong, situational awareness of the Arctic region in NORAD and in NATO, but NATO’s area of responsibility, of course, covers the European High North. For us in Canada, closer to home, NORAD is where we work on Arctic security. Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you for a very informative session. We appreciate this very much. I dare say, unfortunately, we’ll probably be meeting again to hear from you as this crisis unfolds.

The Chair: For our second panel, we’re pleased to welcome three experts. Roman Waschuk, Business Ombudsman for Ukraine and former Canadian ambassador to Ukraine, joins us from Poland. Professor Maria Popova is an associate professor at the Department of Political Science at McGill University.

[Translation]

We also welcome Professor Dominique Arel, professor and holder of the Chair of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Ottawa.

[English]

Mr. Waschuk, Professor Popova, Professor Arel, you each have five minutes to make your opening statements. Mr. Waschuk, the floor is yours.

Roman Waschuk, former Canadian ambassador to Ukraine, as an individual: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. Two opening perspectives as I speak to you today: In January, I started a new job as Business Ombudsman for Ukraine. The institution itself — funded by the EBRD, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development — is a living example of Ukraine’s efforts to make itself a rules-based and more transparent place.

My team are mostly young lawyers, trained at western law schools or Ukraine’s reformer universities. They are committed to doing the right thing for fairness and to protecting the “little guy.”

Needless to say, the taxes and regulatory issues you were working on two weeks ago are on hold as my team members react to the outbreak of war. Three of our lawyers and our IT guy have joined the Ukrainian Territorial Defence Forces. Our office chat now includes a daily check on whether they’ve made it through the night. My deputy, who stayed behind with her bedridden mother in Kyiv, showed pictures of a missile strikes across the street from her apartment. Other team members, primarily women with children, are on their way west, looking to make their way across the EU border.

As for me, I’m working in Poland with excellent support from our Polish ombudsman counterpart to find them homes and workplaces for an office in exile dedicated to smoothing the crucial traffic and essential supplies across the EU-Ukraine borders.

On a personal note, I’m the fifth generation in our family to be displaced by Russian invasions, both the imperial and Soviet variety. So the problem could be with my family, which keeps getting in the way, or it could be with Russian expansionism, which is again rampant as we speak.

This war is the result of an incomplete process of de‑Stalinization in the late Soviet Union and a reversion to Russian neo-imperial thinking by President Putin and his inner circle of security service veterans. We’re now dealing with a toxic amalgam of domestic authoritarianism — in fact, it’s probably now verging on totalitarianism, since the last quasi-liberal media outlets were closed this week — and foreign policy expansionism.

We see that, for example, the letter today to Finland and Sweden from Russia demanding security guarantees shows that what happens in Ukraine does not stay in Ukraine.

Speaking with my former ambassador hat on, whereas it would not be unusual for a great power defeated in an international contest, such as the Cold War, to want to reassert its interests as its economy and armed forces recovered, the particular animus that Putin harbours for Ukraine and its people’s identity does not correspond to any rational reading of contemporary Russia’s national interests.

Unfortunately, Western analysis did not apply Occam’s razor to Putin and his speeches since 2007 and especially not to his writings over the past year. It turns out that Putin meant exactly what he was saying and is now acting on those words. This means that Russian propaganda articles and Putin’s own statements, including today about the so-called final solution of the Ukrainian question, should be taken seriously.

Unfortunate as it is for me as a former diplomat to say it, diplomacy is not working right now. As President Macron found out today in trying to talk to Putin, according to an Élysée Palace source; indeed Putin expressed his determination to take over all of Ukraine, east and west, and neutralize it. His objective is total capitulation.

Some people have talked about this beginning to look genocidal. I’d say this is obviously not a precise rerun of Nazi racial policies, but his plans to repress Ukrainian identity by eliminating democracy and rounding up and trying — purging — anyone with the type of electoral, democratic, cultural, gender‑equality and LGBT-rights initiatives that Canada has been fostering with Ukrainian civic leaders for the past 30 years — that looks grim for them.

Really, in this case, looking at it in Stalinist terms, this would be the liquidation of Ukrainian democrats as a class and the muzzling of everyone else.

I think Senator Harder has mentioned that in my current job as Business Ombudsman, I’ve become very aware of Ukraine’s role as a top 5 global exporter of most of the world’s food staples. Indeed, what happens today has implications for the bread rations of Egyptians and corn-based food production in China. Stopping Putin’s madness also helps to keep the world fed.

This is also of global significance: Ukraine has 15 operational nuclear reactors, as well as the Chernobyl station, which is now occupied. That includes the Canada co-funded Chernobyl containment facility.

Russian forces —

The Chair: Mr. Waschuk, I’m sorry. You’ve hit your five‑minute mark, but I’m sure there will be other opportunities to elucidate more on the points you’ve made.

We will go to Professor Popova now.

Maria Popova, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, McGill University, as an individual: Thank you, chair, for this invitation.

I will start with the root cause of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It is the view expressed many times by Putin, as Mr. Waschuk pointed out — but also probably held by some portion of Russian elites in society that we cannot really estimate well right now — that Ukraine is not a real nation and should not be entitled to its own state. In this view, the dissolution of the Soviet Union was a tragedy, and Putin is now working to restore it as best as he can.

One key point that I want to emphasize here is that this rhetoric from Russia lays bare the fact that NATO’s eastern expansion did not precipitate nor hasten this crisis. NATO is a secondary issue to Russia, behind in importance to the “reunification,” so to speak, of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples that Putin seeks.

Even former Russian leader Gorbachev has opined that he always thought that the separation of the Ukrainian and Russian people in two states would cause serious problems. I emphasize this to make the point that those in the West who are soul‑searching right now for some Western responsibility for this war are on the wrong track entirely. This is Russia’s war, 100%.

Tragically, this leads me to the next point, which is that there is really no off-ramp here for Putin that is minimally acceptable for the West. He really would not accept any compromise that falls short of reuniting as big a part of Ukraine as possible with Russia. He might be willing to let certain parts of western Ukraine remain as an independent rump state, but this really should not be an acceptable solution for the West. Not only does it abandon Ukrainians who have fought for freedom so valiantly, but it threatens security in Europe in the long term and it makes a mockery of the international rules-based order.

Canada’s and the West’s best course of action is to support Ukraine militarily, press on with the tough sanctions and hope for Russian society to bring down the Putin regime in mass protests as soon as possible. Another Russian leader would not be pursuing the policy that Putin is pursuing in Ukraine right now. Russian opposition leader, Mr. Navalny, has already indicated clearly that he strongly disagrees and has called for mass anti-war protests.

The West also needs to consider fast-tracking, in some form, the countries that are committed to a pro-European, pro-Western orientation. Those are Moldova and Georgia, in addition to Ukraine, that have recently also deposited applications for the EU.

I’ll stop there, and I look forward to your questions.

The Chair: Thank you very much. Professor Arel, the floor is yours.

Dominique Arel, Professor and holder of the Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa, as an individual: Senators, historians have known for a long time that the idea that Ukrainians form a different nation than Russians and therefore decide their own identity is seen by Moscow and a large segment of the population in Russia as being artificial, a creation of foreign powers. It used to be Austria and Poland who were the villains, and now it’s the United States.

They have also known that, since World War II, Russia has associated Ukrainian nationalism, or the right of Ukrainians to self-determination, with fascism. In this view, it’s not merely the Ukrainian insurgents of World War II, who call themselves the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, who are fascists; it is the very idea of Ukrainian nationalism that is fascist.

What we did not know is that a Russian ruler would be willing to wage a full-scale war on this premise. When Putin tells us that the objective of the so-called military operation to protect Donbas is to “de-nazify” Ukraine, what he literally means is that a Ukrainian state that persists in making its own choices, such as aligning itself with the West — the EU, NATO — and maintaining a competitive electoral system, is nationalist and therefore artificial and murderous, since fascism kills civilians.

This is the link between “de-nazification” and the absurd claim of genocide in Donbas. Putin is telling us that in order to stop the genocide in Donbas, an army operation is necessary to overthrow the government and eradicate the very idea of Ukrainian nationalism. The state propagandists are clear. The goal, as Roman Waschuk mentioned in chilling tones, is to bring about a “final solution” to the Ukrainian problem, or reshenie ukrainskogo voprosa, in Russian. In this macabre representation, the virus of Ukrainian nationalism and the fake Ukrainian state can be extirpated, and the “real” Ukrainians will emerge. He appealed to Ukrainian generals last Friday to lay down arms and save themselves from fascism. We are way past neutrality toward NATO and a special status for Donbas. Russia now aims to destroy what it sees as the unreal Ukraine, once and for all.

The real Ukraine, however, is resisting. Before Maidan, Ukraine oscillated between Western-oriented and Russian-oriented governments. In 2014, in the wake of the annexation of Crimea, Russia expected that Ukraine would collapse on its own in all of the east, but that happened only in the territories of Donbas where ethnic Russians prevailed. Now, it was expected that the Ukrainians would not fight and that the war would be over in three days. What happened instead was the vaporization of whatever support Russia had in Eastern Ukraine.

Mikhail Dobkin, the governor of Kharkiv in 2014, whom Russia then counted upon to organize an anti-Maidan resistance in Eastern Ukraine, wrote a week ago, “Much of what I believed in collapsed overnight . . . just burned out” and “May this war be damned.” The imaginary Ukrainians applauding the Russian so‑called operation don’t exist. The opinion polls are suggestive: 80% are ready to take arms, 91% support Zelenskyy, et cetera. Putin aimed to destroy the idea of Ukraine, and he has achieved the total opposite. Everybody is now Ukrainian in the sense that they identify with an independent Ukrainian state.

If we assume the worst, and the Russian army takes control of the large cities at the cost of enormous civilian casualties, what next? We saw in World War II that every state has its collaborators. The Vichy types believed in a Nazi-led project of a new Europe. What can potential Ukrainian collaborators believe in since Russia is waging war on the notion that the Ukrainian state is not real? Judging by military advances, the aim appears to be taking control of Kyiv and everything to the south and east, which roughly corresponds to the fantasized “Russian World,” Russkii Mir, of Putin, leaving Western Ukraine. But how can the Russian military be expected to rule without social support? No matter what happens next, and it’s grim, Russia has lost Ukraine forever.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Professor Arel. We will go to questions, beginning with the deputy chair of the committee, Senator Harder.

Senator Harder: Thank you for the excellent panel. You’ve all spoken directly and frankly. I appreciate that.

It seems to me we’re left with the following proposition: This ends only with Mr. Putin being removed from Moscow, and it ends at a pace that either encourages civilian uprising in Russia, with both elites and average citizens, or the ability of Ukraine to survive, in the short term, the hostile occupation that they will experience.

Roman Waschuk, is that about right? How long will that take, and how does it happen?

Mr. Waschuk: I would say actually that Ukraine’s army is fighting well. You’ve seen counteroffensives being launched in the last day or two. I don’t think they will need to go through the occupation phase. There are at least 16,000 foreigners who have signed up for their legion. There are weapons being pumped in.

What they need is equipment that works to manage their vulnerabilities. They, of course, would like a no-fly zone. I think the government representatives have pointed out that has major escalatory risks. The U.S. is well placed to provide more unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs. Turkey has been a major supplier, but the U.S. could be as well. To help create a kind of virtual no-fly zone, there is potential to persuade Israel to share its Iron Dome technology. Apparently, it’s been reluctant to do so, considering its relations with Russia.

I think those are possibilities to keep Ukraine going while the sanctions pressure increases on Russia. I think upping the sanctions pressure, stopping energy purchases from Russia, is key. At the moment, they’re still getting that billion, and it’s keeping them afloat even though they are going down rapidly.

Ms. Popova: I agree with Mr. Waschuk. The key here is to keep Ukraine’s army afloat for as long as possible until there is potentially a mass anti-war movement in Russia and insubordination within the Russian army.

Mr. Arel: I don’t think we should count on anything happening in Russia. If something were to happen in Russia, it would be a coup within the security services. We basically have a KGB state except that Putin personally controls what we now call the other security services. This is the first time since Stalin that a Russian ruler has had personal control over the security state. We didn’t have that after the war. Really, it has to come from Ukrainians. Ukrainians have to break the Russian army either before or during the occupation, because there’s no social support of any kind.

Senator Coyle: Thank you to our witnesses today. I almost don’t know what to ask you now, because we just had the all‑encompassing question a minute ago. However, we still have to ask these questions.

Professor Popova, this is for you, but also for any other witnesses who might want to weigh in. You spoke about the fact that there really is no off-ramp that’s minimally acceptable to the West. I’d like to drill down a little bit more on what you mean by “minimally acceptable to the West” and what the gradations of off-ramps are that we might be faced with, in this case, to try to bring this war to an end.

What can allow Putin to save face in a way and back off? If anybody has a position on that. What are we facing in terms of some possible trade-offs?

Ms. Popova: Thank you for this question. Potentially, one can imagine an off-ramp situation where Putin believes he’s getting some sort of de facto puppet government because the war is going badly for him. This will not be acceptable for the Ukrainians in any shape or form, so it’s not a realistic possibility as an off-ramp.

Another potential off-ramp for Putin is some kind of partition of Ukraine where most of Ukraine ends up in Russia. That’s what I meant as this is not even minimally acceptable to the West because it pulverizes the rules-based international order if the West were to agree to a partition of a sovereign state that mounted such a valiant defence.

I cannot see what else Putin could agree to as a way to de‑escalate.

Mr. Arel: I would agree with Maria. The Russian position is basically ultimatums, extreme ultimatums, as we all explained in our presentations. If Putin were to somehow moderate his position and start negotiating, that’s the end of his personal regime because he’s the infallible ruler, almighty, who dominates even his own security council. But we have no idea about the situation and it could be very grim and then the Ukrainian army is broken in a month or sooner. Or there could be some kind of military stalemate when the Russian army is also very much weakened. We don’t know that. In this situation, maybe then there could be some kind of a ceasefire, because, of course, the demands are totally unacceptable. The demand is basically to break, essentially, Ukrainian sovereignty.

That would be the only way forward, short of an actual kind of military victory and then an occupation where they cannot rule because nobody will do the job for them. They were expecting the former party of regent types or all the Ukrainian oligarchs to do it and that support has disintegrated. They lost the Russian speakers, those who basically were oriented toward Russia. It’s gone.

Senator Kutcher: As Mr. Waschuk reminded us, the final solution is not new. In my understanding, in Kruschev’s 1956 famous secret speech celebrating the Crimean genocide, he noted Ukraine was next except they had too many people and they weren’t going to be successful.

The question here is what the role of the Ukrainian diaspora is. Currently they’re very active in raising money and raising awareness. Is there anything else that you see the Ukrainian diaspora could come together to do that might have an impact in the conflict?

Mr. Waschuk: Certainly they’re also providing some military expertise. The creation of the International Legion has brought a whole lot of people, including Finns and others with a bone to pick with the Russians, but certainly a lot of interest among veterans in various countries of the Ukrainian diaspora, as well. They’ve also been very involved in what has really turned out to be a very successful Ukrainian information campaign. Ukraine has turned out to be very adept. We all worry about Russian disinformation, and rightly so, but Ukraine has been extremely good at getting out its message, and having a Ukrainian diaspora choir open “Saturday Night Live” is one of the most unexpected ways of getting messages across. The way people have been using social media, the way they’ve been generating English, French, all sorts of other language content, has been a huge contribution to broadening support for Ukraine internationally.

Mr. Arel: The diaspora is incredibly organized. We see it in Ottawa and all over Canada. On the point of social media, it’s pretty clear that Ukraine has overwhelmingly won the information war internationally, but there’s kind of an impenetrable wall in Russia. That is the information war. What is being shown or not shown on Russian TV is delirious, basically. It’s all about the genocide in Donbas. Whenever they show these missiles hitting Kharkiv, the Central Square and so forth, it’s always the “false flag” narrative, that the Ukrainians are bombing themselves to make Russians look bad. That is the hardest nut to crack.

Ms. Popova: I agree. The last point about disinformation from Russia and how to fight it is crucial. We’ll have to deal with that for a long time.

Senator Oh: Thank you, witnesses, for excellent presentations.

Leading into the war, something must have gone very wrong as extensive negotiations for peace were going on for quite some time. Please share your impression of how the West has handled the Ukraine crisis in the months leading up to it. Did we make any promise that we could not deliver or in fact had no intention of delivering? Could someone share your point of view, please?

Mr. Waschuk: I’ll give it a try. There was extensive diplomacy practised especially by the Germans and the French who had various meetings in the so-called Normandy format but also had direct contact, especially President Macron, with Putin. There was also then the American attempt to dissuade the Russians by releasing information about the planned operations publicly in the hope that this would dissuade them.

If you look back at statements issued by the U.S. a month and two months ago, that were widely skeptically derided, what we’re seeing now is exactly what they were predicting. This was the playbook. The unfortunate fact is that President Macron and the French feel that they were duped in these extensive discussions they were having. From what I understand, President Putin had already recorded his message with the ultimatum and announcing that military activities would start while he was still talking to President Macron. So I think there is no great missed diplomatic opportunity that we should all be terribly sorry about. What we should be sorry about is that there is a bitter-ender as Russian president who is obsessed with becoming the next Peter the Great or Ivan the Terrible.

Mr. Arel: Macron, I don’t know how he’s doing it, but he’s still talking to Putin. Basically, there were two fundamental issues. Russia didn’t want Ukraine in NATO. It was less NATO in Ukraine than Ukraine in NATO because NATO was already in Ukraine. We were training soldiers — the Canadians, Americans and so forth. There was massive military aid, lethal, from the Americans and so forth. That’s one.

Second, basically, Russia wanted the reintegration of Donbas within Ukraine in order to suborn or sabotage, essentially, the post-Maidan state. That’s the Minsk accords. The Ukrainians were actually refusing. So despite all diplomatic pressures — Canada indirectly — France and Germany kept saying, “We abide by the Minsk accords,” but essentially you had the impasse.

We know now that two months ago Putin made the determination, “Okay, we’re going to smash the Ukrainian state and that will solve everything.” We know now that all these negotiations were just pro forma; the decision had been taken two months ago.

Senator Richards: Thank you to the witnesses for your expertise on this.

I know this has probably been said before, but it reminds me a bit of what Churchill said after Munich, “You were given the choice between war and dishonour. You chose dishonour and you will have war.” I’m not saying the West is dishonourable in this. I think they’re doing all they can at the present moment.

I would like to ask Professor Arel: Do you think this is just a prelude to a larger war, which I think it might very well be?

Mr. Arel: Everything is moving on so fast that we’re trying to wrap our brains around it. Someone told me yesterday that in a sense there is already a world war III because we — “we” meaning the Western allies and Canada — are waging unprecedented and absolutely stupendous economic warfare on Russia, and also cyberwarfare. We don’t know exactly what is going on.

The tools of warfare have evolved since World War II. We’re short of a direct military encounter with Russia, but we have seasoned military experts who are telling us that the guard rails are being removed one by one. We’re very close to that. Short of that, we’re all in, in that sense.

Mr. Waschuk talked about how even though the Americans were portrayed as alarmist, the intelligence agency was right on the money. Fortunately, the prospects of these agents are very grim. However, worst-case scenario, we could be heading into a new kind of war, insurgencies, and the West will keep on playing a role. It won’t be over any time soon. Indeed, in that sense, I would say world war III is already with us.

Senator Richards: Thank you, professor. That is what I said to the last panel. With 1 million refugees, we’re probably already in the war we didn’t want. Thank you very much for your answer.

Ms. Popova: On the wider issue of the war, let’s also remember that at this point Russia has, de facto, invaded Belarus. Belarussian independence is just a piece of paper right now.

Yes, it is a wider issue beyond Ukraine. Rightfully, all neighbouring countries to Russia are concerned about what is going to happen to them if Russia is not stopped in Ukraine.

Mr. Waschuk: Support for NATO membership is way up in Finland and Sweden, which got those letters today from Russia saying, “You must give us security guarantees, or else.”

I think the escalatory cycle is still under way, and the question may end up being when it is that we decide to call the bluff — which is, of course, partly a nuclear bluff — and that is a decision that I do not envy my colleagues still in government.

Senator Ravalia: Thank you for your excellent presentations. My question is for Professor Arel.

You alluded earlier to the fact that the potential for any resistance within Russia is minimal. In my naïveté, I was hopeful when I witnessed the large number of individuals who came out in Moscow and St. Petersburg and the statements from Mr. Navalny.

Do you feel that sanctions may in some way negatively impact that germinal movement within Russia that is perhaps looking for change, particularly among the youth?

Mr. Arel: Of course, that is an excellent question, and it is always the key question. We have to distinguish that this is not about an anti-war movement not existing in terms of public opinions or general orientation, certainly among the youth, the urbanites, the educated, et cetera. I mean, it is there. We saw it in 2011 and 2012. There were massive demonstrations after the fraudulent elections.

My point, rather, is that the degree of repression — and Mr. Waschuk mentioned totalitarianism — is now so extreme in Russia that it takes enormous courage for young people. A 96‑year-old woman who survived the blockade of Leningrad was arrested yesterday. She was demonstrating and was arrested by these “beefy types.”

The move from the thinking, from the frustration that you want to do something, and actual mobilization is highly perilous because Putin still has a firm hold on his security state. That is why I think that if something is to happen, it has to be a palace coup within the security structure. Someone has to take him out, the same way that Khrushchev was taken out in 1963. But back then there was kind of a collective leadership in the politburo. That’s the only hope.

Ms. Popova: I slightly disagree with Professor Arel in the sense that it can be either a palace coup or a massive popular mobilization — beyond what we saw with the Navalny demonstrations, because they were about corruption. This is more existential. If there is massive social mobilization on this topic, it will affect the likelihood of cracks within the security services. These two are related and may start feeding on each other.

What we know about highly repressive and personalistic regimes — which is Putin’s regime — is that they appear solid until the very last moment and then they suddenly collapse.

This is, for sure, the optimistic scenario, but I think it is plausible.

Senator Woo: This is probably for Professor Popova, and perhaps Dr. Arel as well, and it picks up on the question of off‑ramps. The only off-ramp you have referred to us — and there was some nuance in that last exchange — is essentially regime change, by decapitating the person at the very top.

People have been talking about Munich and the last major European war. In that situation, the regime change, the decapitation at the top, happened when the Allied troops were not far from the bunker in Berlin.

That’s why I want to keep coming back to whether there are off-ramps. I hope for the best. But short of marching to the outskirts of Berlin, so to speak, is there a way of avoiding that?

Can you tell me if there’s anything that might be acceptable to the West, as you broadly described earlier, anything that might be acceptable in the Minsk agreement or the Steinmeier Formula in 2019 that we could perhaps desperately try to revive as a possible off-ramp?

Ms. Popova: Unfortunately, I don’t think there’s anything in the Minsk Agreement that can be revived. The reason is that the Minsk Agreements, at its core, was a Russian attempt to insert a Trojan horse within the Ukrainian state and to use it in order to control Ukraine. At this point, I do not think Minsk is at all acceptable to Russia, either, because they probably know at this point that the only way they can control Ukraine is through full‑scale military occupation. Doing it through this Trojan horse of Donbas is no longer at all realistic.

So I think the Minsk Agreements are dead, for the West and also for Russia.

Senator Woo: Can I ask the others to chime in? This is a question about realpolitik; it is not a question about what we wish or hope for legitimate aspirations for Ukrainians. Might the French, Germans, Americans and Canadians say, “Look, maybe there is something in the Minsk that we can modify or revert to?” I will ask Professor Arel or Mr. Waschuk to comment as well, if there’s time.

The Chair: There is one minute.

Mr. Arel: Listen, there cannot be any kind of post-Minsk without the Ukrainians, and I think that something absolutely epochal in Russian-Ukrainian history just happened. Putin is bombing eastern Ukraine — Russian-speaking eastern Ukraine. There is a bond here. Of course, there is a cultural bond between Russians and Ukrainians, and, of course, there is a linguistic bond. For a lot of Ukrainians, there is a sense of shared history, although that was debated in Ukraine — World War II and so forth.

Something has broken. I was citing the former deputy who was very pro-Russian that his entire understanding of life just vanished. How can you then come to the table and negotiate some kind of compromise about the status of Donbas within Ukraine? This is all gone.

We don’t know about next month or six months from now, but right now, it’s an entirely new situation on the ground.

The Chair: We have run out of time. Mr. Waschuk, I’m sure you can pick up on that in a future answer if you wish, but we must move on.

Senator MacDonald: My first question is for Mr. Waschuk.

Three years ago you hosted me as a part of the international service for the election. We were there for the better part of three weeks, and I wish I had seen you under better conditions, Mr. Waschuk. The place was so full of hope and joy when I was over there. To see this happening is heartbreaking.

I want to go back to the sanctions. You have said that these sanctions today are killer sanctions but there’s more that we could be doing, particularly with respect to the oligarchs. I wonder if you could expand on that.

Mr. Waschuk: Some of that started happening today. The Americans have introduced personal sanctions against the oligarchs. European countries have begun seizing their super yachts. They are being de-legitimized out of the Western space. But ironically, that might also reinforce the “Fortress Russia”- “Putin Bunker” mentality.

Oligarchs are one thing; oil and gas is another. That requires U.S. consumers and European consumers being willing to pay more in the short and medium term for energy to solve this problem. If purchases creased today, Russia would be in deep, deep trouble within days, not weeks or months. Canada is not particularly a consumer of Russian oil products — I think we’ve now banned them — but others have to make that decision. It is certainly less painful than the escalating military decisions that may need to be taken later, so it’s better to try that now than have to come to those other turns in the road later.

If I could just go back to the previous question, if someone proposed — and I don’t think the Russians are there right now — Ukraine dumping Crimea, DNR, LNR — Donetsk and Luhansk — and being left alone to live its life, I think you could probably find a majority who would live with that.

But President Putin isn’t there. He is out for total victory — total capitulation. As much as we might want to find that space, as my other co-panellists have said, that option is not currently available.

Senator MacDonald: To anybody on the panel, I understand that the invasion and these numbers might have changed, but they are costing about $20 billion U.S. alone each day for the Russian army to go into Ukraine. I also understand that you can multiply that by 10 as damage to their economy.

How long can the Russian economy sustain itself before it collapses under those types of economic conditions? Do we have any feel for that?

The Chair: Quick answers, please.

Mr. Arel: Nobody knows. Nobody knows how long the Ukrainian army can sustain the onslaught on so many fronts, and nobody knows how long the Russian army can sustain the economic onslaught on the Russian economy that, of course, feeds it. We’re in uncharted territory.

The Chair: Thank you, professor. We are out of time. We will move to the next senator.

[Translation]

Senator Gerba: I would like to thank all the witnesses for these very informative presentations on the invasion of Ukraine, and what is now a violation of international rights by Russia.

President Biden said two days ago that his country is prepared to respond strongly to any act of aggression against NATO countries. Canada’s Deputy Prime Minister, the Honourable Chrystia Freeland, told Radio-Canada this week that sanctions against Moscow could cause collateral damage in Canada. I understand from this that we must manage this crisis intelligently.

My question is for all of you. How would you assess the situation from Canada’s point of view, and how do you think Canada, as a nation, can help its allies to play with fire? Because we are playing with fire.

Mr. Arel: Maybe the former diplomat can answer first?

Mr. Waschuk: Thank you, professor. Canada has a role to play on NATO’s eastern flank. We have an active battle group in Latvia and we’re now providing indirect support to Ukraine. I believe our government was among the leaders in terms of financial support and financial sanctions against Russia. I feel we have managed our assets pretty well. I think Canadians will be less affected by the energy situation, in particular, than those in other allied countries.

Mr. Arel: If I may add something — obviously, Roman Waschuk and many of my colleagues who come from the Ukrainian community and have worked in government already know this — I feel that Canada has always played and continues to play a role behind the scenes because it has expertise, a comparative advantage because of the Ukrainian community’s experience. Ukrainian immigration is part of Canadian identity. We saw that with Chrystia Freeland, who was once again on the telephone behind the scenes coordinating and briefing. Proportionally speaking, Canada probably has the best knowledge of the ground in Ukraine of any NATO ally. The cost issue is the most politically painful one.

If Mr. Biden were to go with even more serious sanctions on oil or gas exports, it would impact the price at the pump. Elections are coming up in the U.S. Congress in November and the Republicans could take over. That has a much more direct political impact in the U.S. than in Europe.

Then there is the economic impact: What price is the West — and therefore the people of NATO member countries — willing to pay to support Ukraine, which is ultimately seen as the breeding ground for a global issue? It’s not just Ukraine, but everything it stands for, because the international order that has stood since 1945 has collapsed in the past week.

The Chair: Thank you, Professor Arel. I would like to point out that Canada often works behind the scenes. Obviously, that is the case right now.

[English]

We are almost out of time, and there are two senators who have asked to ask questions in the second round. I suggest that Senator Coyle and Senator MacDonald ask their questions quickly, one at a time, and we will wrap up after that.

Senator Coyle: Back to the off-ramp question, and this is a little bit of rear-view mirror — Crimea. You talk about what we wouldn’t tolerate now, but looking at what everybody did tolerate, the West, eight years ago, how big a factor is that? What can we learn from what happened in 2014?

The Chair: Senator MacDonald, your question, please?

Senator MacDonald: I would like to get your perspectives about the Russian nuclear strategy. How should we consider the implications of the strategy and potential responses as we focus on how we can help Ukraine?

Second, the UN vote of 145 countries condemning the invasion, it has to be noted that 40 countries either abstained or did not vote, including China and India. What message does that send? What does that mean?

The Chair: Mr. Waschuk, would you like to start, please?

Mr. Waschuk: Yes. Thank you very much.

On Crimea, we were probably too gentle. I remember at the time the message to Ukrainians from the West was “Don’t shoot. Whoever shoots, loses.” The Russians drew the conclusion from that that they could try these things again and both Ukraine and the West would roll over. As it turns out, they haven’t. They drew the wrong conclusions. We provided, probably, the wrong advice.

Ukraine was much less capable then, so would it have mattered much? I’m not sure, but I think that the precedent was not a good one.

Second, the Russian nuclear strategy, I think that their conventional force performance in Ukraine is so bad, their troops are so under-motivated — a lot of them are surrendering and abandoning their equipment — that conventional missile strikes and scaring us and trying to put us into self-deterrence mode by talking nuclear is basically now their path to victory. They will try to bomb Ukraine into victory, and they will try to scare us into victory, because their ground forces are underperforming in a major way.

The Chair: Thank you.

Ms. Popova: I’m just going to add on the off-ramp and the question about Crimea. I very much agree with Mr. Waschuk’s point about the West being too gentle in 2014. What I will say today is that, for the West, it might be an acceptable off-ramp to offer recognition of Crimea and, perhaps, the Donbas, but, unfortunately, and speaking of realpolitik, it’s not an option right now for Putin. This is the problem. So we will have to continue.

Mr. Arel: I think that if we get to this point, okay, let’s recognize Crimea with everything that happened. It can only happen if Ukraine joins the EU and NATO. That’s the deal. Because we’re in the extreme scenario, in political terms, of 1939 and Russia — a full-scale invasion — there cannot be any more trust. In the future, Ukraine has to be defended against any potential further effects. But we’re not there yet, obviously.

The question on China, there is no, let’s say, rupture in traditional Chinese behaviour on these issues. They prefer to abstain. They obviously do not like the violation of the principle of smashing territorial integrity, so they stay on the side. That has been consistent in Chinese behaviour at the Security Council.

India is a different story. There is no time, unfortunately, to address it.

[Translation]

Senator Gerba: At this point, can we consider this a crimes against humanity situation?

Mr. Waschuk: Canada has already filed complaints with international courts. Amnesty International is in the process of gathering evidence, especially with regard to the missile attacks on civilians.

Senator Gerba: Thank you.

[English]

The Chair: That brings us to the conclusion of this panel. On behalf of all of my colleagues, I would like to extend our deepest thanks for your candour. It is obviously a serious moment that we are living in right now. Your expertise is much appreciated. It will certainly help with our deliberations. We may be, in fact, seeing you again, unfortunately. Thank you.

I would like to add one point for senators just before we adjourn. If everything goes according to plan, our next meeting will be held on Thursday, March 24, when we will start our consideration of Bill S-217. This is the Frozen Assets Repurposing bill, which was referred to this committee on Tuesday, March 1. So that is something to plan ahead for.

(The committee adjourned.)