THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
EVIDENCE
OTTAWA, Thursday, December 5, 2024
The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met with videoconference this day at 11:32 a.m. [ET], in camera, to examine and report on Canada’s interests and engagement in Africa.
Senator Peter M. Boehm (Chair) in the chair.
(The committee continued in camera.)
(The committee resumed in public.)
The Chair: My name is Peter Boehm, a senator from Ontario and Chair of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. We’ll start with introductions of senators.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: Amina Gerba from Quebec.
[English]
Senator Greene: Senator Stephen Greene from Nova Scotia.
Senator Ravalia: Senator Mohamed-Iqbal Ravalia, Newfoundland and Labrador.
Senator Woo: Senator Yuen Pau Woo, British Columbia.
Senator Boniface: Senator Gwen Boniface, Ontario.
Senator M. Deacon: Welcome. Senator Marty Deacon, Ontario.
Senator Coyle: Welcome. Senator Mary Coyle, Antigonish, Nova Scotia.
Senator Al Zaibak: Senator Mohammad Al Zaibak, Ontario.
The Chair: Thank you, colleagues. I would like to, of course, welcome you and welcome all who may be watching us from across the country today as we continue our special study on Africa.
Before we begin, allow me just a moment to highlight and recognize one of our colleagues here at the table, the Honourable Stephen Greene. This will be Senator Greene’s last meeting with us on this committee. He has been a very skillful and helpful member of the steering committee. We have given him a fond farewell in the main Senate, but I thought it would be appropriate to do it here now. Thank you, Stephen, for your contributions to this committee, to the Senate and to your country.
Senator Greene: Thank you very much. I will miss you all, and I’ll miss it all. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Senator Greene.
Colleagues, in continuing our study on Africa today, we have the pleasure of welcoming in the room with us a very distinguished Canadian. Robert Fowler has done much public service for Canada and abroad. He is our former ambassador and permanent representative to the United Nations. He is a former Deputy Minister of National Defence. He is a former sherpa, or personal representative of the Prime Minister, for the G7 summit. He is a former Foreign and Defence Policy Adviser to the Prime Minister and also the United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Niger. We are delighted that he is with us today in the room.
By video conference, we have Templar Kalundu Iga, Executive Director of the Canadian Centre for African Affairs and Policy Research, and James Yap, Acting Director of the International Human Rights Program, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. Thank you all for coming to the committee and for taking the time to be with us today.
Before we hear your remarks and proceed to questions and answers, I would ask everyone present to please mute notifications on your devices. We are ready to hear your opening remarks of five minutes each, which will be followed by questions from senators and, of course, your answers as witnesses.
Mr. Fowler, you have the floor.
Robert Fowler, Retired Public Servant, as an individual: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
While I expect other witnesses have made the point in previous testimony, it is important to understand the complexity of the African continent. It is big: larger than the combined size of China, the continental U.S.A., Europe, India and Japan. In all, it is 20% of the earth’s surface. Fifty-three states and governments, 50 major tribal groupings, 400 ethnic subgroups, 2,000 languages and many religions make Africa the most diverse of all the continents.
Mr. Chairman, I am going to use the limited time available to focus on the nexus between Africa’s burgeoning population and the migration crisis it portends. When we get to questions, I look forward to ranging more widely across Canadian interests in Africa.
Twelve years ago, there were almost exactly 1 billion inhabitants on that continent. Today there are 1.5 billion. According to the Economic Commission for Africa, the African continent’s population has expanded from 283 million in 1960, when Canada began its engagement with Africa, to more than 1.5 billion today, in 2024, a more than fivefold increase. It is projected to reach 2.5 billion by 2050 and 4.2 billion by the turn of the century.
That 63% increase over the next 25 years will bring Africa’s share of the world’s population, which was 9% in 1950, to 28% by 2050 and to over 40% of the world population of 10.4 billion in 2100. Globally, more than 1 in 4 people will be African in 2050, and 4 in 10 by the end of the century.
As the continent is beset by climate change, particularly desertification as the Sahara streams southwards, those billions will be ever less able to feed or fend for themselves. They will not simply stay put and watch their children starve. Adding to such desperate circumstances is the volatile combination within too many African states of population pressures; violent Islamic extremism; military coups and oppressive, kleptocratic governments; abject poverty; starvation; media suppression; misogyny; incompetent and corrupt leadership; and Western neglect — all of which are contributing to an apocalyptic stew of misery, which only exacerbates the migration challenge.
The impact on European political and economic stability is already roiling the cohesion of the EU and of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO, and it will inexorably get worse. As borders thicken, within and well beyond Africa, and Europe’s northern Mediterranean littoral is recognized to be as penetrable as our famously undefended and indefensible border with our increasingly fractious neighbour, the stability of our world will be sorely threatened. It behooves us, therefore, to do everything possible to mitigate such a looming catastrophe, to redouble our commitment to alleviating Africa’s abundant woes and thereby encourage desperate Africans to stay home.
The European and American relationship with Africa has historically been distinctly unhappy, dominated by the ravages of slavery and often rapacious, mercantilist colonial policies. Canada, however, has shared none of that history and, instead, rather quickly established a relationship with many African countries as a trustworthy partner.
Mr. Chairman, as our world has become smaller and meaner, Canadian governments have turned inward and adopted blatantly “me first” stances, eschewing international responsibility in favour of pandering to short-term domestic advantage. Canada’s standing and proud international traditions have been sorely diminished as a result, and nowhere more so than in Africa.
We Canadians do not, though, have the luxury of picking and choosing which parts of the world we can ignore. The effective service of our fundamental interests demands global expertise, global vision and a global reach, along with proven partnerships and policies, that will enable us to respond with agility wherever and whenever those interests are threatened.
We are not, and never will be, European or Asian or Latin American or, indeed, African, but that doesn’t mean we don’t need to tend those fields to develop and strengthen those relationships if we are to maintain our fortunate quality of life and our very independence. Today, we ought to be all too aware of the potential implications of our imprisonment in “Fortress North America.”
In the face of Africa’s rather dire present circumstances, I believe that Canada should be more present in Africa and that we should bend every effort to increase commercial and academic exchanges, while encouraging greater and more diversified Canadian investment and expanding our diplomatic and trade representation throughout the continent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Fowler. We will go to Templar Kalundu Iga, Executive Director of the Canadian Centre for African Affairs and Policy Research. You have the floor, sir.
Templar Kalundu Iga, Executive Director, Canadian Centre for African Affairs and Policy Research: Good afternoon, and good evening from Kampala. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this committee to contribute to your timely study on Canada’s interests and engagement in Africa. It is a privilege to address the distinguished members of this chamber and offer perspectives on a matter of increasing strategic significance for our nation.
In recent decades, Canada’s engagement with Africa has been characterized by a narrow framework of development aid and periodic diplomatic outreach. This approach often reflects paradigms that fail to account for the continent’s diversity, complexity and evolving geopolitical significance. Such limitations not only hinder the potential or meaningful partnerships but also constrain Canada’s broader diplomatic and economic opportunities in a rapidly changing global landscape.
Canada’s current foreign policy towards the continent continues to prioritize aid over mutual investment and economic collaboration. This model, rooted in post-colonial paternalism, undermines the agency of African nations and fails to address the structural transformation driving the continent’s emergence as a geopolitical and economic force.
Equally troubling is the role of Canadian media in reinforcing a “crisis narrative” about Africa. While economic growth, innovation and governance reforms abound, the continent is often portrayed solely through the lens of conflict, poverty and instability. This distorted representation hinders Canadian public support for deeper engagement and overlooks Africa’s contribution to global challenges such as climate resilience and technological advancements.
Canada’s economic engagement with Africa remains narrowly focused on resource extraction. While this has generated short‑term benefits, it overlooks opportunities in high‑growth sectors such as technology, renewable energy and infrastructure. Canada’s competitors, including China, India and the European Union, have already recognized Africa’s strategic economic potential, leaving Canada at risk of ceding ground in a rapidly expanding marketplace.
Finally, despite recent announcements by the current government, Canada’s diplomatic engagement has yet to fully reflect Africa’s increasing influence in global governance. African states are asserting themselves as leaders in areas such as climate justice, trade reform and multicultural diplomacy. However, Canada’s approach often relegates our African partners to secondary roles, limiting the potential for collaboration on shared priorities.
To address challenges and advance a more sophisticated framework for Canada’s engagement with the continent, I propose the following: First, diversify economic relations. Move beyond resource extraction to prioritize higher-growth sectors like technology, agriculture and renewable energy.
Second, recalibrate development assistance. Shift from a model of aid to a partnership focusing on capacity building, skills transfer and support for Africa’s industrialization and innovation agendas.
Third, enhance diplomatic relations. Expand Canada’s presence in African multilateral forums, particularly the African Union, to engage African nations as equal partners in addressing global challenges.
Fourth, expand media coverage. Foster balanced narratives that highlight Africa’s diverse realities, successes and contributions to global progress.
Fifth, support academic and cultural exchange. Strengthen ties through scholarship programs, research collaborations and cultural partnerships to build mutual understanding.
Canada’s limited definition of the African continent impedes its capacity to build meaningful partnerships with a continent of immense diversity and opportunity for Canada. By adopting a more nuanced and comprehensive approach, Canada can advance its interests while contributing to Africa’s development ambitions. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Iga. We will now hear from James Yap, Acting Director of the International Human Rights Program, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. You have the floor, sir.
James Yap, Acting Director, International Human Rights Program, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, as an individual: Thank you, Mr. Chair and honourable senators, for the opportunity to address you here today. I would like to use my time to make the case that Canada has a very direct and effective way to contribute to human rights and good governance in Africa through its economic relations with the continent. That is by doing more to ensure good human rights and good governance practices by Canadian companies operating in Africa and elsewhere around the world.
There are many Canadian companies doing business in Africa, and, unfortunately, examples abound of them being accused of involvement in serious violations of human rights and good governance standards. For instance, the Canadian oil and gas producer Talisman Energy was accused of aiding the commission of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity in Sudan in 2001.
In 2019, SNC-Lavalin pleaded guilty to fraud and corruption charges in relation to bribes offered to officials in Libya. And in 2020, Canadian mining company Nevsun settled a civil claim over the use of slavery, torture, forced labour and crimes against humanity at its gold mine in Eritrea. There are many other examples.
While many allegations are unproven, this imposes a reputational cost for Canada. Canada’s companies are our unofficial ambassadors in Africa, and their conduct and reputation reflect on us all as a country. Although strictly anecdotal, I can say that this has often been the first thing to come up in conversation when I’ve met people in Africa and told them I’m from Canada.
The good news is that there are at least three concrete things the government can do to address this issue. The first is to enact mandatory human rights due diligence legislation, or mHRDD. This would require companies to take certain affirmative measures to mitigate the negative impacts on human rights, wherever they operate in the world.
Other developed economies, such as the EU, Germany and France, have recognized the importance of such measures and enacted legislation. Canada sadly has been on the trailing edge, but there is plenty of time to catch up.
Secondly, Canada can also enact measures to ensure Canadian companies can be held legally accountable at home. Just last week, an Ontario court dismissed a claim against Barrick Gold Corporation over alleged killings of civilians at its gold mine in North Mara merely because these acts took place in Tanzania. Canada should enact legislation ensuring that Canadian courts are available to judge the human rights impacts of the Canadian business activities that partially contribute to the funding of these courts.
Lastly, the government can temper the unqualified consular support it often offers to Canadian companies embroiled in human rights controversy overseas. To be sure, the role of Canadian embassies and consulates is to protect the interests of Canadians overseas. However, Canada has often intervened in such disputes to help Canadian companies evade their human rights responsibilities. This tarnishes us by associating us with these alleged human rights abuses, and Canada should adopt a more measured approach in such circumstances.
Thank you again for inviting me here. I look forward to our discussion.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Yap.
Senator Coyle: Thank you very much. Welcome to all of our witnesses here. As I listen to the three witnesses, it’s quite an unusual mix in this panel, and I want to try and reconcile that as we prepare our recommendations to the government.
So my first question is for you, Mr. Fowler. I know you went strong and heavy on the issue, and I believe you even talked about the “apocalyptic stew of misery” and the looming danger of not responding, not being prepared, not having a role for Canada. But I know there was more that you wanted to say, which you didn’t have a chance to say.
I guess what I would like to hear from you is how you would reconcile this urgent need for Canada to wake up and pay attention, particularly to the migration crisis that’s coming because of climate change, desertification, et cetera, with what we heard from Mr. Iga, who is asking us to really look at the potential of this continent, look at our relationship with Africa and African institutions in a different way: in terms of economic relations, recalibrating our development assistance to be more of a partnership approach, et cetera. I could go on and on. Could you try to help us reconcile the testimony we’ve just heard from you and Mr. Iga? What would you say on that? How to balance those things?
Mr. Fowler: Senator Coyle, I can’t reconcile all that, certainly not in the time that your stern chairman is going to give me.
I started my association with Africa as a 19-year-old teaching in Rwanda. I visited 37 African countries. I was never there for very long, but holding titles which allowed me a lot of access to key people in those countries. Therefore, I think I have a reasonable understanding of the Africa then and today.
I have a lot to say about Canada’s diplomatic presence in the world — and the lack thereof. That doesn’t extend only to Africa, but indeed to the world. Our diplomacy has suffered terribly through starvation of funds and, indeed, misdirection. I would say I would like to see that change, certainly in Africa.
To understand Africa takes time and effort and concentration. We need to have African experts, not necessarily people passing through the foreign ministry or, indeed, the Foreign Service, who today are doing trade and tomorrow are doing Central Africa. I believe in expertise. I would like to see that restored; otherwise, we’re going nowhere.
The arguments I heard from your other witnesses were not surprising; I’ve heard them before. I’m certain they’ve heard mine before. What Africa needs is lots and lots of direct foreign investment. Already it’s receiving vastly more remittances from their large diaspora, which is getting much larger as a result of that migration crisis that I was mentioning. Remittances are a major source, much larger than official development assistance, or ODA. And direct foreign investment does things that ODA doesn’t; it creates jobs, financial activity, growth, which ODA does not.
The Chair: I’m sorry, Mr. Fowler, to interrupt, but I’m sure we’ll come back to these issues.
Senator Ravalia: Thank you to our witnesses. I’ll come back to you, Mr. Fowler, just extending on what my colleague was saying. Do you see, from your vast experience on the continent, historical or policy missteps that Canada should address or acknowledge to strengthen our strategy as we move forward with this study?
Mr. Fowler: Well, senator, from my perspective, I think the biggest misstep is our kind of on-again, off-again association with that continent and those 53 member states. Africa was very important to us in the 1960s and 1970s. It became less important and then more important. Suddenly, we were going to concentrate on Latin America because Africa was liberal, or something like that.
So I think a little bit of focus and concentration and accumulation of knowledge and experience would be a very good idea. Again, that comment is not restricted to Africa, but it is very much the case in Africa.
In my limited remarks, I mentioned that we seem to be turning inward. Nine percent of total ODA these days is sent to Ukraine. A very large percentage of our ODA in the past went to Afghanistan and Iraq. That’s understandable, from my perspective, but it sure takes away from the most needy and the most needy area of the world.
I’m not against ODA; ODA has a place, and I think increasingly it’s going to be tilted toward humanitarian assistance as, I’m afraid, things in many parts of Africa get worse.
Certainly, an area I know fairly well, that is the Sahel region of Africa. Those 7,000 kilometres stretching between Mogadishu and Nouakchott are in desperate straits at the moment and getting much worse. Thousands of schools are being closed each month as jihadi terrorists take over virtually everything in the region, including governments.
In terms of humanitarian assistance, I had the honour of representing Canada at the three UN food agencies in Rome, among other things. With the World Food Programme — the largest of the UN organizations — I saw first-hand the trending toward ever-greater dependence on food in that part of the world, as there is less and less ground in which to grow stuff as the Sahara streams southwards. We’re going to have to increase our investment in food. As you all know, Canada used to supply wheat to much of the world; we do much less of that these days.
There’s a new scramble for Africa happening. China and Russia don’t care much about the things some of your other witnesses were saying. They simply want the financial assistance. My enthusiasm is limited for endless preaching to the world about what is right and good and proper because we are so terrific ourselves. A little less of that would go well.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you all for being here. I’ll start with Mr. Yap. My question concerns the Canadian Ombudsperson for Responsible Enterprise, an office that was set up by the government in 2019 to facilitate complaints against Canadian companies operating abroad. You talked about that earlier. Since its inception, many have called it a toothless position without the ability to compel documents or testimony.
The government earlier this year said they would complete a review of the office and decide whether to grant it more powers. I can’t find information on whether that review is completed or still ongoing. But my question is this: How effective do you think this office has been, and what powers or autonomy should it be given to make a real difference in this role?
Mr. Yap: To answer your question, and qualifying that this is my personal perspective as best as I can put it together from what the impression of civil society has been and its reaction to the ombudsperson so far — and there has been a great deal of collaboration among civil society to try and engage that office in good faith and try and see what benefits it can offer — sadly, I have to say there has been a great deal of frustration with how that office has played out, culminating in the current sense of uncertainty, as you say, in whether that office has a future.
Again, I think a lot of the impression is that a lot of the shortcomings of that office result from it having not been given a fair chance to really make a meaningful impact with respect to, among other things, as you mentioned, the powers it was given to compel documents or participation on the part of Canadian companies. As well, from what I understand, it is not as well resourced and does not have as much capacity as it ought to in order to deal with the sheer volume of complaints that it has received.
To summarize, in order to build confidence with civil society in that office, certainly offering or granting the core more powers would be an important step. And I would also speculate that granting it more resources in order to deal with claims in a more timely and efficient manner — because there has been a great deal of frustration with respect to a lot of perceived delays that are occurring in processing the complaints — is something that I suggest would also go a long way. Thank you.
Senator M. Deacon: Would the colleague on the screen also like to comment before I lose my time?
Mr. Iga: Mr. Yap is right. The organization needs more teeth, more funding, more talent, and it needs a mandate backed by Canadians and lawmakers alike.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: I’ll start with Mr. Fowler. As a former sherpa, you certainly assisted and advised our government in a number of areas during the various summits. We’ll be hosting the next G7 summit. If you had a specific recommendation for our next sherpa for the summit in Canada, what would it be?
[English]
Mr. Fowler: Senator, I think if I made recommendations, they wouldn’t listen to me, but that’s a separate issue.
Back then I was the G8 sherpa for the last Kananaskis meeting, but for six years I was a parallel thing called the Personal Representative for Africa, or the African sherpa. The regular sherpas hated the idea that there were other sherpas, but for six years there were. We did lots of things, including the centrepiece of the Kananaskis G8 Summit in 2002, which was a very focused commitment to Africa that my French colleague Michel Camdessus called the “110 commandments.” And that was the result of a rather fortunate convergence because five African leaders had just come up with NEPAD, the New Partnership for Africa, and the Kananaskis Africa Action Plan was a response to it.
What I would love to say, senator, is that we should try to resurrect those 110 commandments, but I don’t think that would work today for reasons Canadian and African.
The whole Africa Action Plan and NEPAD were premised on the fact that Africa would do things that we, the developed countries, would respond to, that Africa would take responsibility for its actions and not endlessly whine about colonialism and their colonial past. There’s lots to whine about; I agree with that. But Africans have to get past that, and they have to look to the future and build on the future rather than just worrying about the past.
In NEPAD, they committed to honest, accountable government, to ensuring that women would have a full role in government and media, to fair and unfettered media — to a number of these commitments — and to be accountable and expose their performance to international judgment. Very little of that has happened.
Therefore, it is difficult for me to say, “Forget about that, but let’s focus on what more we can do.” I would like to focus on what more we can do, but I think that African accountability for their current performance is essential to attracting further attention to Africa.
Senator Al Zaibak: Thank you to Mr. Fowler and our other guests. Recent years have seen a decline in Canada’s visibility and influence on the African continent as other global powers, particularly China, have significantly expanded their political, economic and security footprint. While China’s presence often raises concern regarding governance and sustainability, it also represents an opportunity for Canada to explore areas of mutual interest or complimentary engagement.
How can Canada balance its values of human rights and good governance with the complex realities in Africa while identifying areas where strategic collaboration with China might enhance shared development goals and regional stability?
Mr. Fowler: I spent quite a lot of time in Angola in an effort to end the 27-year-long civil war there that had devastating implications for Angolans. Angola today is the country with the greatest Chinese penetration in Africa, and, not incidentally, it’s where President Biden is at the moment.
Canada has participated in the Third World in the extractive industries with some success, but, essentially, China is interested in African resources. They bring no political agenda with them other than that they want to increase their influence and encourage African governments to be supportive of Chinese global purposes. They do not attach to their assistance or their investment any concerns of the kind that we have been discussing around this table and other witnesses have.
I do not believe for a moment that Canadian engagement, commercial investment or extractive engagement in Africa should be utterly unfettered. But if we care about human rights, I would care quite a lot about the increasing billions of starving and otherwise encumbered Africans. That is not to say that I disagree with our wanting to make sure that our companies behave properly wherever they are, but I do think it is vital that the investment that those companies bring and the jobs and the economic advantages they bring to the countries in which they are operating is a significant enhancement to human rights. We should bear that in mind.
I don’t think, senator, there’s an enormous synchronicity likely between Canada and China in Africa. I think our purposes are quite different.
Senator Woo: Chair, I would like to build on your comments around a Canadian approach to human rights in Africa and ask Mr. Yap to elaborate on the idea he has for new legislation around monitoring and enforcing human rights and abuses of Canadian companies outside of Canada. It sounds like a souped‑up version of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of the United States.
How would we do this, and whose standards would we be using? What if — and this is probably a very likely a scenario — our definition and standard of human rights abuse are not the same one that the African country is adhering to? How do we address the very sage comment from Mr. Fowler that, in some ways, Canadian policy writ large is the biggest challenge to human rights problems in Africa, with our callous neglect of the humanitarian crises that are going on across the continent?
Mr. Yap: Thank you, Senator Woo. There is a lot there to unpack. First of all, I will address what I mean when I talk about ideas for legislation. I’ll briefly refer to one such example, which is a private member’s bill. I’m forgetting the number — forgive me — but it would impose standards for mandatory human rights due diligence on Canadian companies and also make failures to meet those standards legally actionable in Canadian courts.
The problem is that there is what the late John Ruggie, a Canadian who was the Special Representative of the Secretary‑General on human rights, called a “governance gap.” In an increasingly interconnected world, there is a gap between the cross-border activities of multinational companies and the ability of domestic institutions of law to ensure their good conduct. This has nothing to do with saying we are better than them or anything else; this is just about making sure there aren’t gaps in accountability as our economy becomes ever increasingly globalized.
To tie that back to trying to answer your question succinctly, there are a lot of logistical, legal and other hurdles to holding Canadian companies accountable for internationally recognized human rights abuses, such as violations of international human rights law that Canada and many countries around the world, including in Africa, have all agreed to adhere by. I mentioned the examples in my opening statement earlier of slavery, torture, crimes against humanity and forced labour. These are all global and universal. But there is still a gap due to logistical, legal and other hurdles in the ability of Canadian courts or Canadian legal advocates to hold Canadian companies accountable in Canadian courts for complicity in such internationally recognized violations of human rights.
In terms of what my colleague has said, I admit I am at a severe disadvantage with respect to his enormous, impressive breadth of experience on the continent, but I do have limited experience in terms of investigating the human rights impacts of Canadian companies on the continent, and I would like to question this impression that Canadian companies are somehow better than Chinese companies in terms of their human rights impacts. I will say again I don’t have as much experience on the continent as my colleague, but to the extent that I have inquired into this topic about Canadian mining companies and Chinese mining companies active in the same country, I have not found that the people I have spoken to with experience to compare have said that there is a noticeable difference in terms of the human rights impacts of the Canadian and Chinese companies.
The Chair: Thank you. We’re out of time, but I did want you to finish your thought on that, and I think you did. Thank you, Mr. Yap.
Senator Boniface: Thank you very much to all of the witnesses. It is always very hard to get everything in four minutes, but I’d like to have an answer from each of you: Who does it better?If we were looking to a country that is doing good work in Africa or advising on the right things, who does it better?
Mr. Fowler: The Scandinavians.
Senator Boniface: So Norway, Sweden, Finland.
Mr. Fowler: Mostly Norway and Sweden. The Fins have a smaller program, but it’s very good. Denmark as well, but Norway would be my favourite candidate.
We should spend a little time on what “it” is. I was really answering on ODA after telling you that I didn’t think ODA was that important. The Norwegians concentrate their ODA. First of all, the Norwegians are now at about 1.2% of GDP; we’re at 0.24%, something like that. But they’re a small country, and we’re a big country. They’re a rich country; we’re less so.
Until recently — I don’t know the facts today; I’m out of date — their development program in Africa was in the single digits of countries. We spread a little bit around to everybody, and we think that makes them love us.
And the Norwegians are in for the long haul. They spend a lot of time thinking about what they’re doing and less time sending endless parades of bureaucrats over to take up the time of the entire government to tell them how nice they are.
Senator Boniface: Mr. Yap, who has legislation that we can look to?
Mr. Yap: In terms of mandatory human rights due diligence, as I said earlier, France has been the pioneer. Germany and the European Union are two examples of jurisdictions that have since introduced similar legislation.
In terms of accountability for domestic courts, actually, the United States has a piece of legislation called the Alien Tort Statute, which has had some success in allowing some kind of accountability, legally speaking, for the extraterritorial impacts of business activities with respect to internationally recognized human rights, once again.
Mr. Iga: I would say Turkey and Sweden are way ahead of us. I will give you a good example. Business Sweden is a perfect organization to look at when looking at how to engage African opportunities for Canadian organizations on the continent. We have our Trade Commissioner Service, but if you compare it what the Swedes do, they are a lot more intentional. They’re on the ground. They’re a lot more visible. They have better branding. And so you can look all around for them. We should consider doing the same.
Turkey, on the other hand, is just a lot more aggressive. It has a lot more presence, many more flights; they’re everywhere. They’re across the continent. They’re not worried about whether you’re a Christian country or a Muslim country; they’re everywhere, and they are very supportive. And as Mr. Fowler said, they don’t preach.
The Chair: We’re into our second round.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: I would like to thank our witnesses on screen. Mr. Yap, I wanted to address the two proposed pieces of legislation that you referred to. France is quite controversial right now in Africa, particularly since French companies are heavily involved in corruption on the African continent. I’m surprised that they have this type of legislation. I would like to know more about it. Is it new and is it really being implemented?
Mr. Iga, I don’t know whether you had a chance to talk about the African Growth and Opportunity Act. It has some quite significant and noteworthy criteria for governance and democracy in Africa. Could we learn from this model?
Mr. Yap: Thank you for your question, Senator Gerba. France’s issues with its engagement in Africa, primarily a legacy of its colonial history on the continent, figure among a number of factors, of course. To clarify your colleague’s question, it didn’t relate to the engagements of countries on the African continent, but rather to the countries whose legislation had been looked at as models for the potential legislation here.
I suggest that you look at the legislation on duty of care to see whether France can set an example for Canada, setting aside France’s issues with its engagement in the continent. Thank you.
[English]
Mr. Iga: Thank you for the question. Regarding AGOA, I don’t think we should consider AGOA as a model. AGOA has been used as a political carrot, as an economic carrot, and we should not even think about establishing any models that look similar.
We need to really think about the agreements that revolve around genuine partnerships. Today, I’ve met with the Minister of Vice Presidency in Uganda; I’m in Kampala. Yesterday, I met with the Minister of Trade. They were very clear here in Uganda that they’re not looking for investments; they’re looking for long-term partnerships. Long-term partnerships need long-term strategic outlooks, and they also need, for lack of a better word, deals, contractual agreements — not just MOUs but free trade agreements and agreements. They were very clear they want long-term partnerships. And I don’t think AGOA fits that.
Senator Al Zaibak: My question is to Mr. Iga. What key areas should Canada prioritize to regain its influence in Africa and strengthen its partnerships on the continent?
Mr. Iga: Thank you for the question. At home, we need to remember we have this fantastic brand. Brand Canada is exceptional. It’s exceptional everywhere, in every space, in every sector. We are misusing our brand. We need to really, really think about how we engage Africa as a brand. We need to sell our brand, sell our values through branding. So that’s the home side.
On the continent, we need to be concerned about our alignment with our strategic partner to the south and our NATO partners to the north. We need to have our own path into Africa. What that looks like, I can’t tell you, but, consistently, the continent views Canada as just another America or just another Europe or just another NATO. We need to ensure that whatever we establish here with our African partners is unique to Canada.
The Chair: Thank you very much. That is a great note to end this meeting on.
On behalf of the committee, I would like to thank our witnesses — Robert Fowler, here in the room; and, by video conference, Templar Kalundu Iga, all the way from Kampala, Uganda; and James Yap from Toronto — for responding so candidly to the questions posed by senators. Your comments have been excellent and will enrich the preparation of our study.
(The committee adjourned.)