---

THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

EVIDENCE

---

OTTAWA, Thursday, October 26, 2023

The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met with videoconference this day at 11:31 a.m.  [ET] to conduct a study on foreign relations and international trade generally.

Senator Peter M. Boehm (Chair) in the chair.

[Translation]

The Chair: Good morning, honourable senators. My name is Peter Boehm, I am a senator from Ontario and the Chair of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

[English]

Before we begin, I invite committee members to introduce themselves.

Senator Housakos: Senator Housakos, Quebec.

Senator Gerba: Amina Gerba, Quebec.

Senator Ravalia: Mohamed Ravalia, Newfoundland and Labrador.

Senator Coyle: Mary Coyle, Antigonish, Nova Scotia.

Senator Greene: Steve Greene, Nova Scotia.

Senator Boniface: Gwen Boniface, Ontario.

Senator M. Deacon: Marty Deacon, Ontario.

Senator Woo: Yuen Pau Woo, British Columbia.

The Chair: Welcome, senators and those who are watching us across our country today.

Colleagues, we are meeting today under our general order of reference to continue our discussion from yesterday on the situation in Afghanistan. For our first panel, we are pleased to welcome, by video conference, Arif Lalani, former ambassador of Canada to Afghanistan, Jordan, Iraq and the United Arab Emirates. In full disclosure, Mr. Lalani and I worked together at our embassy in Washington some years ago. We also welcome Lauryn Oates, Executive Director, Canadian Women for Women in Afghanistan.

Thank you for being with us. Before we hear your remarks and proceed to questions and answers, I ask members and witnesses in the room to please refrain from leaning in too closely to the microphone or removing your earpiece when doing so. This will avoid any sound feedback that could negatively impact the committee staff and our interpreters who wear headsets for interpretation.

We are now ready to hear your opening remarks, and this will be followed by questions from senators.

Mr. Lalani, the floor is yours.

Arif Z. Lalani, Former Ambassador to Afghanistan, Jordan, Iraq, United Arab Emirates, as an individual: Thank you, Mr. Chair. It is good to see you again, Senator Boehm, and other senators whom I’ve known.

I wanted, first of all, to commend the committee for taking up the issue of Afghanistan and for shedding some light on a very difficult issue. I thank you for the opportunity to comment today.

I will be brief. I want to quickly speak to you about what has been achieved, what has been lost, why, and some recommendations for the committee and for Canada.

As many of you know, I served as the Canadian Ambassador to Afghanistan over a decade ago. Hamid Karzai was president. NATO had tens of thousands of troops stationed there. Casualties for troops and civilians were high. Corruption existed then and certainly continued. But despite the many injustices perpetuated by previous governments, with Western presence, pressure and support, incredible progress was made over a 20‑year commitment to and — I think this is important — by Afghans.

In 2020, nearly 10 million Afghan children, 40% of them girls, were enrolled in schools, compared with less than 1 million in 2001, and only boys at that time. The number of women in higher education had increased almost 20 times during the 2001-18 period. Before the recent suspension, only last year, one out of three young women in Afghanistan were enrolled in universities by 2018. More broadly, women comprised 25% of Afghanistan’s parliamentarians. Some 150,000 women have held some form of public office in Afghanistan. In 2003, by my recollection, there were more women elected to the Afghan Parliament than in the U.S. Congress.

What has been lost? In the situation in 2023, close to 80% of school-aged Afghan girls and young women, 2.5 million people, are out of school. In December 2022, university education for women was suspended until further notice, affecting over 100,000 female students attending government and private higher education institutions. The financial institutions are generally not functioning. Seventy-five per cent of the economy was dependent on aid, most of which is now not being sent. The majority of international assistance has been cut. Forty per cent of a $4-billion UN appeal has not been answered.

Unless we take difficult decisions now, we risk condemning a new generation of girls to the denial of education and independence because we cannot manage to continue our assistance to Afghans.

Why has this happened? In 2020, an entirely incredulous treaty was negotiated with the Taliban, a terrorist organization, and then implemented without receiving any demonstrable undertaking of the protection of human rights, particularly for girls, from the Taliban. It is not as if we did not know what most likely would happen, given the record of the Taliban from 1989 to 1999.

In a conflict zone and in peace negotiations, it’s been my experience that it’s never a good idea, even in theory, to withdraw your troops and then to negotiate. And that’s exactly what the West did. We withdrew 5,000 to 7,000 U.S. and other troops. That number is important — 5,000 to 7,000; it wasn’t 20,000 or 100,000. The average military loss for the four previous years before the agreement was signed with the Taliban was approximately 15 soldiers. Now, every soldier lost is too many, but the number 15 is not the number that we had in 2012, in 2014, et cetera. In other words, there was a peace that was holding. Of those 15, on average, not all of them were lost in combat. In the chaotic withdrawal of Western troops in August 2021, the U.S. lost 13 soldiers. Essentially, that is the average that they would have lost had they stayed.

In this withdrawal and in honouring a treaty with a terrorist organization, we have abandoned a generation of girls who had been educated and who were about to join the economic life in Afghanistan.

We need to come to terms with the responsibility of Western powers. Former U.K. development minister, the Honourable Rory Stewart, put it very bluntly, and I am paraphrasing him: We basically lost and we need to come to terms with that. We withdrew troops, and now we need to come to terms with where we find ourselves.

I would suggest that, at the moment, we find ourselves without a strategy. Essentially, the Taliban seems to have taken hostage an entire society, and our response has been to neither use force nor to use diplomacy. We are at a standstill, and Afghans are suffering. We actually need to take a decision.

Our allies are leaning forward. Germany, the U.K., the EU, Japan — which still has an embassy in Kabul — are all looking at creative ways to find assistance to help Afghans and coming to terms with the fact that, if we’re not going to fight, if we’re not going to arm those who are trying to fight the Taliban, we must come to terms with the fact that the Taliban exists as a result of a treaty that we have all chosen to honour. More strategically, our competitors, China, Russia, Iran, all have embassies there. Pragmatic states, such as the United Arab Emirates and others, also have a presence on the ground, and we’re not there.

There is also hope in this circumstance. From the people I speak to on the ground, women continue to work, in the private sector, behind the scenes, but they are employed. Women continue to be educated by digital learning and other means. What little economic development is taking place, though, will slide backwards unless we start assistance to support the Afghan people.

I would like to make some recommendations in hope that we can take some difficult decisions.

First, I think the government needs to stretch the bandwidth. I understand that we are in a time of tremendous conflict between wars in the Middle East now and in Europe and elsewhere, but we must honour the billions of dollars of investment over 20 years that Canada has made and the over 150 lives, military and civilian, that have been lost. I would add the over 60,000 Afghan military and police who have lost their lives in this struggle. Please, let’s stretch the bandwidth and try to make this a priority.

Before recommendation number 2, I would like to commend Canada for the fast movement on refugees and setting a target of 40,000. I understand that we’re likely to meet that target; hopefully, we can do more. I would also like to commend the government for moving to amend legislation — I think it’s Bill C-41 — to allow economic assistance to flow more easily to Afghanistan. I hope that will be executed swiftly when it is tested in the aid projects that I believe are coming forward to that committee.

Recommendation number 2 is to be on the ground. There is no way that we can have an effective strategy and comment and evaluate effectively without seeing for ourselves. When I served on the United Nations Security Council the last time Canada was there — unfortunately, 20 years ago — then minister Axworthy, who was the foreign minister at the time, wanted us to know for ourselves what was going on in Iraq because we sat on the sanctions committee. We did not support the Saddam Hussein regime. We did not want to deal with it, but he sent a fact-finding mission. We went to Iraq to see for ourselves what was going on, to inform our decision making and our development assistance. I would urge Canadian officials — I would urge your committee, Mr. Chairman — to find ways to get on the ground, even periodically. We can be creative about this, and I am happy to discuss how we might do it, but we need to see for ourselves. We can’t be on the sidelines.

The Chair: I will interrupt you. I am sorry, Mr. Lalani, but are you close to the end of your recommendations? You have gone overtime, and I want to be sure we get a good round of questions in.

Mr. Lalani: Yes, I am sorry. Third is to increase humanitarian assistance. Fourth is to increase economic development, which is different from humanitarian assistance. Fifth, convene more stakeholders at home to get better ideas. And, sixth, convene multilateral donors. We have the weight to do that, and we should be looking at more creative ways. I will stop there.

The Chair: Thank you very much. We will now go to Ms. Oates, please.

Lauryn Oates, Executive Director, Canadian Women for Women in Afghanistan: Good morning, dear senators. Thank you for inviting me to address you today, regarding the dire and worsening situation in Afghanistan. There, nearly the entire population is food insecure. Fifteen million out of 43 million people depend on humanitarian assistance in order to eat. Unemployment is rising exponentially. An earthquake struck the western province of Herat on October 11, followed by a second quake on October 15. Together, the quakes have killed an estimated 2,000 people and injured 1,800. The first earthquake destroyed several villages completely, flattening some 25,000 buildings. Survivors have been left homeless, just as the colder weather is intensifying.

In the short time I have, my main message is to emphasize that these humanitarian challenges cannot be understood in isolation from the country’s human rights challenges, including its system of gender apartheid. The earthquake situation is just one case in point. Over 90% of those killed were women and children. Women are, of course, confined to their homes, not allowed to work or pursue higher education, and girls over Grade 6 are not allowed to go to school. The country’s economic crisis has driven many men to become migrant workers over the border in Iran. Many child survivors of the earthquakes had their mothers killed, but their father is outside the country.

Similarly, we see the economic consequences of the Taliban’s system of discriminatory policies exacting its heaviest price from girls. Bride prices, even at the low end, are typically thousands of dollars, and can constitute the largest single amount of funds a family can gain in one transaction, so as poverty increases, child marriage increases. Per the latest data, on average, one in three girls is married before the age of 18, and in some provinces, half of girls are married before the age of 18; fifteen per cent are under 15 years old.

Mariam Safi leads an Afghan research organization that recently conducted a study on child marriage there. She is quoted as saying:

There is a clear link between the return of the Taliban in 2021 and the increase in child marriage, especially in urban centres, where, since two decades ago, there had been an evolution and families no longer felt they had to marry off their daughters as soon as possible, because girls were getting opportunities to work and study and were also contributing financially to the household . . . .

She goes on to say:

The Taliban harass them and the parents become afraid that a Taliban will take their daughter to make her his wife. So, they prefer to marry them off to anyone first . . . .

The education situation continues to deteriorate, with several new restrictions announced over the summer, including the demand that education activities supported by international NGOs be handed over before the end of this year and the closing of girls’ schooling past Grade 3 in some areas.

On the other hand, I can report that by our count, there are over 100 virtual schools operating and at least that many in‑person schools still providing education to women and girls. These independent efforts may be the country’s best hope for girls’ and women’s education, and we are calling for support to assist this growing community of learning providers to form into an independent education system in exile for those who cannot rely on the state to provide them an education.

I would also like to mention another concern related to education, which is the Taliban’s overhaul of the basic education curriculum. They have been explicit about their intention to rewrite textbooks to reflect their ideology, including by their own account, to propagate violence and to condemn tolerance and pluralism and the West. Secular subjects like the sciences will be gutted. Aside from the implications for learning outcomes among boys and girls, a militant Islamist terrorist group mobilizing the curriculum explicitly to seek to indoctrinate several million children and youth to embrace and act out a violent ideology ought to be of profound concern to those concerned with the prevention of terrorist violence in the future.

Poverty, joblessness, the lack of educational opportunities, the suppression of rights and the threats to girls in the family are among the reasons driving Afghans to attempt to leave the country. The UNHCR estimates there are 7.9 million Afghans displaced in neighbouring countries, a number which we can expect to continue to grow. This does not include Afghans displaced beyond the region, including hundreds of thousands in Turkey. Very few of these people have refugee status, and very many are so-called illegal migrants. Even the small minority of people lucky enough to have opportunities to get to other countries still have to pass through Pakistan to get there, requiring enormous visa fees and exposure to many layers of corruption — an enormous financial burden on families that have often already lost jobs, homes and assets.

At the beginning of this month, Pakistan’s government said that 1.73 million Afghans there who lack legal documentation have until November 1 to leave voluntarily or face deportation, as well as the confiscation of their property and assets. They announced a tip line will open for people to inform on suspected undocumented Afghans. Already, we have heard from Afghan women who have had housing leases cancelled by landlords in Pakistan or who have been evicted at short notice because of this situation. There are many Afghans in Pakistan seeking a durable solution in another country, or whose cases are already being processed, including in Canada, but who are at risk of being deported back to Afghanistan where some of them will be at extreme risk of detention, torture, sexual violence and death because they worked for the previous government or the armed forces, collaborated with NATO or are known to have dissented against the current regime. We have even heard of deportations of Afghans holding valid visas.

As a foreign aid donor to Pakistan, Canada must speak up about this egregious violation of international norms when it comes to the protection of refugees.

I close by saying that it’s well established that tragedies impacting significant numbers of people are often less likely to draw empathy because we can’t easily see the human story behind the statistics. But I ask you for a moment to try to see it. See the 10-year-old told she’s going to be married to a 50-year-old, leaving her childhood home, her siblings, her mother, her dolls behind and all that she will endure from that moment onwards. See the 16-year-old thinking about suicide because she can’t continue her high school education, can’t dream about going to university, about the career she had once hoped to have. And of all the parents who want a better future for their children, but are literally trapped in an increasingly dystopian and dangerous situation because few doors are open to them to leave. These are the stories behind the numbers, and more than our empathy, they need our concerted action. Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Ms. Oates. Colleagues, I want to inform you that you, as usual, have a maximum of four minutes for the first round. This includes questions and answers, so I would encourage you to be precise and concise in your questions. That goes for our witnesses, too, with respect to your answers.

Senator Housakos: Thank you, Mr. Lalani and Ms. Oates, for being with us. In 2015, the current government proclaimed that the world needs more of Canada, and, unfortunately, eight years later, we have never seen so much less of Canada on the world stage.

My question, Mr. Lalani, is the following: Where did it all go south? We invested billions of dollars in an operation with all the goodwill in the world, and when the going got tough, it seems to me, we abandoned it with haste. Is it a simple case that we are very half-hearted when we commit ourselves to these international operations? Is it a problem for western democracies from the sense of not having a strategic plan that’s solid? Are we lacking financial, political or military resolve? What elements failed in this operation in order for us to get the results that we needed?

Mr. Lalani: Thank you, senator. I think we were achieving results. I think the challenge now, to be fair at least to the Canadian government, is that, as you know, there was an agreement signed, in which we were not participants, between the U.S. and the Taliban.

I think the challenge now is coming to terms with where we find ourselves. We have a government in Afghanistan that no one likes, that is doing incredible damage to its own population. But we need to now think about the Afghan people, as opposed to, I think, our own sense of outrage. We need to find a way to get development assistance back to Afghans. It is ironic that, from all accounts, there is more security in Afghanistan now than before, so it would actually be easier, in some ways, for our development people to be there and to get the assistance there. I think that’s the first challenge. The second challenge is, look, we have a bandwidth challenge globally because of so much instability at the moment.

But I do believe, as you said, senator, that Afghanistan is one of the few places in the world where, for whatever reason, we have made almost a generational investment of billions of dollars, of soldiers and of time. It doesn’t make much sense to abandon that effort now. I think we need to give more urgency and more creativity to this problem.

Senator Housakos: As I understand from your answer, we are lacking cohesiveness on the part of democratic allies around the world when we go into these operations because in the end, I do recognize that we try to punch above our weight, but at the end of the day, there are governments to the south of us and our European partners, who have a bigger say. Should we curtail our involvement in these types of operations or make more space in terms of our leadership roles in these operations?

Mr. Lalani: I think we need a better idea of what success and victory look like, right? I think the problem for two American administrations, the Trump administration and then the Biden administration, was that, for whatever reason, they decided after 20 years that they were not achieving, “victory.” But, in fact, they were, because according to the statistics that I just pointed out, tremendous progress was being achieved, with five to seven thousand troops on the ground, with an average of 10-13 soldiers dying, not all in combat, every year. By many measures, we would say that that was a successful operation. Five to seven thousand troops were actually keeping the peace as it was, girls were in school and the economy was funding. I think there were other domestic and political reasons for countries withdrawing, and that’s unfortunate.

Now, we need to look at how we deal with self-inflicted defeat, which is what this was. I think we have to make the humanitarian crisis an imperative now.

I hope I’m not doing a disservice to Rory Stuart, the former U.K. secretary of state for international development, in continuing to refer to him, but he has made it clear: We lost. Get over it. Now we have to deal with it.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Senator Ravalia: Thank you, Ambassador Lalani and Ms. Oates. My question is for you, Ambassador Lalani. Firstly, I appreciate your insightful commentary. I have a three-part question: In your term as ambassador to Afghanistan, did you have any contact directly with the Taliban? If so, do you see any opportunity to hold dialogue with factions within the Taliban that are potentially more progressive? For example, we have recently heard of an Afghan activist, Matiullah Wesa, who was released after seven months of detention; he was an active supporter of women’s education. Secondly: Do you continue to maintain contact or dialogue with former president, Hamid Karzai, or any of the other opposition parties in terms of what support we might be able to give them? Finally, do you feel that if we were to open an embassy in Kabul that our principles of not dialoguing directly with this terrorist-misogynist organization would compromise our own principles? Thank you.

The Chair: You have three minutes for that.

Mr. Lalani: Thank you, senator. No, I did not have any dialogue with the Taliban while I was there, but there was a legitimate Afghan government in place that we dealt with.

Second, with regard to contact with former president Karzai and others, I have been in contact with them since I completed my time there and have the ability to be in touch with them, as well as with the former minister of foreign affairs, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, and other ministers. Third, in terms of opening an embassy there, I think there is a way for us to do this gradually. I think there is a way for us to follow the example of others who have opened offices or are on the ground, such as the Japanese, the EU and others. I think we have to balance our humanitarian imperative, and I would suggest, even obligation here, with how we deal with a government. Global Affairs Canada has often said, rightly, that we do not recognize governments; we recognize states. I think in that statement, there is a way for us to be true to our principles, not recognize the Taliban government, see for ourselves where our development assistance is going, but also to see how we can directly help Afghans, precisely because we have a problem with this government.

I think it can be done, I think it takes political will and I think if others can be creative, certainly Canada can.

Senator Ravalia: In your dialogue with former president Karzai and minister Abdullah, do you get a sense that they have foundational support to actually re-enter the political arena within Afghanistan? Or is that pretty well a no-go zone at the moment?

Mr. Lalani: Senator, I didn’t want to be unclear. I have had contact with former president Karzai and others in the past, but not in the last couple of years. But I certainly am able to. So, I don’t know. I couldn’t comment. I would observe that president Karzai never left the country, and I think that probably gives him a certain amount of credibility in political circles.

The Chair: Thank you.

Senator Coyle: Thank you to both our witnesses. I have a question for each of you if time permits. First, Mr. Lalani, thank you for your service in Afghanistan. I know it wasn’t an easy place to be, even then. I want to further probe a little bit on what my colleague Senator Ravalia was getting at. I think it was your second or third recommendation: Canada being on the ground and seeing for ourselves. Could you describe for us, not ultimately, perhaps, where you would see that going, but what the steps would be for Canada being on the ground, either initially on a look-and-see kind of basis, and then where that might go. Could you tell us more of what you’re thinking about there?

Mr. Lalani: Thank you, senator. I think it can be done gradually and at a low level to start. I can conceive of us sending officer-level people in development and humanitarian programming to go and look and see what is really going on. It’s a good idea to have first-hand information. I believe that there are ways to do that without suggesting that we’re recognizing a certain regime.

So much else can flow from that depending on what they report back in terms of what could happen next. We can certainly speak to the countries with embassies there to see how they’re navigating this question, but we should not let the Taliban hold its population hostage because we can’t find a way to go on the ground and provide assistance.

Senator Coyle: Thank you very much. Dr. Oates, you spoke about support being needed for this clandestine, independent education, in-exile network or effort. Could you speak a little bit more about what that would look like and what kind of support you think would be most helpful?

Ms. Oates: Yes, certainly. This is an interesting community evolving of independent actors, which includes established organizations but also volunteer-based smaller groups, and we’re trying to support this emerging community through another alliance called the Alliance for the Education of Women in Afghanistan, an initiative of the UNHCR, the American University of Afghanistan, Arizona State University, and our organization, Canadian Women for Women in Afghanistan.

Concretely, we need infrastructure support for these groups. For instance, very pragmatic support that would help is satellite internet, supporting alternative means of connectivity. There is currently pretty good connectivity in the country, but we have to be prepared for if that were to become unavailable, to make sure that all of the great virtual learning initiatives that are under way can be sustained.

We also need support for quality standards around curriculum and teacher certification, and very importantly recognition of learning credentials. The majority of these 100-plus virtual initiatives, as well as the in-person initiatives, aren’t certified or issuing diplomas, for instance, upon graduation; and that’s really important for women and girls who are trying to use their education to earn an income, to get out of the country, to support their families under these really difficult circumstances.

It’s also an obligation on our part, in a way, because the human right to education is being violated, and when a member state of the UN does not uphold that right, it’s incumbent upon other member states to intervene and find alternative means of upholding that right. In addition, because these actors are working there, we have an opportunity to do exactly that.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Senator Boniface: I have a comment to Ms. Oates. Thank you for the information. I know you find it encouraging that there are some schools operating. I must say the numbers really depressed me to think of those who are going without, so thank you for putting that on the record.

My question will go to Mr. Lalani. From your knowledge, how do you advise governments to reinvest in Afghanistan? In terms of how the withdrawal was done, it was a lot of pressure, at least for the Americans, on the time is up and it’s time to get our people out of there. How do we deal with the fatigue that comes from long-term commitments like that, and how should it be rethought for the future?

Mr. Lalani: Thank you, senator. As I said, it’s ironic that we now have the ability to make investments without having a military commitment, and in some ways that might make it easier for our publics. Second, from the people I have spoken to who are in the private sector — and there is one that exists in Afghanistan — we need to invest in economic and commercial development because humanitarian assistance only goes so far. If we don’t invest in the economy, there will be more trouble ahead.

Third, these people point out to me that the Taliban is also finding a different Afghanistan than it had in 1989 because Afghans are more educated. They are more connected to the global economy. They have run businesses, and so they’re not as likely to simply succumb to the Taliban. They need that connection to us and Western investment.

We can promote commercial investments in agriculture, telecom, wherever it is, and one way to do that is for us to convene some stakeholders and figure out how we do it. What are the options? It’s certainly possible, and I would say our strategic competitors are certainly doing it.

Senator Boniface: Can you give any insight, particularly given there is a government that most governments don’t recognize, at least those from the Western world, into how you would deal with or minimize the issues of corruption that will take place with money coming in and out of the country?

Mr. Lalani: You can’t avoid corruption. It’s unfortunate. When I was there, there was corruption, and it probably got worse over the years. I guess you have to have a certain discount factor on what you’re going to invest. I am a broken record on this, but your chances of fighting that corruption are better if you’re on the ground and seeing for yourself. We just have to find a way, frankly, to do business.

I’ve always said the weapon of the Taliban and extremists is poverty. Keeping people in poverty is what works for them, so prosperity has to be our response, and that means finding ways to invest.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Senator M. Deacon: Thank you to our guests for being here today. I’m gutted when any child can’t attend school anywhere in the world. The plight of young girls and children in Afghanistan is beyond even our imagination, and we have to thank you for keeping the information relevant and up to date.

It’s encouraging that Afghan girls who have come to Canada are relentless about this. I’m working right now on standards, accreditation, development, sharing of curriculum translation, and I don’t think I would be working as hard as I am if those gals in Canada weren’t pushing our buttons to help. I want to publicly acknowledge that and thank you.

Today I would like to come back to your opening remarks when recommendations were being made, and two were elaborated on. Being on the ground, we completely understand and hear, but I want to first check with you on recommendations number four and five. I think it was humanitarian and stakeholder, but it was said quickly, and I didn’t know if there was anything you wanted to add to elaborate on those two goals. Then I have a second question.

Mr. Lalani: Thank you, senator. I think I had said one was increased economic development, and we’ve just spoken about that.

I spoke about convening stakeholders at home, and what I mean by that is that we would benefit if the government would convene, as we do in other places, stakeholders — people like Ms. Oates and others — that are on the ground — Care, the Aga Khan Foundation, the Red Cross, others — to look at this issue of how to provide more direct assistance to Afghans. A lot of that is maybe just a question of bandwidth and capacity, but I think we need to find a way to do it.

Similarly, we could be taking a slightly more active role in convening around multilateral donor meetings at the World Bank and elsewhere.

I have to be very honest here. My former colleagues may not appreciate it, but there is a tendency for us to what I call “Canadasplain” to a lot of countries. We talk a lot and there’s a lot of rhetoric and high principles but not a lot of delivery at the moment.

We need to find a way to deal with multilateral players but be willing to do more.

Senator M. Deacon: Thank you very much.

I want to take up something that was touched upon yesterday. I’m not sure if you saw our witnesses, but they mentioned that the further that someone is from, or the people are, or they get away from Kandahar, the more uneven the Taliban rule seems to be. Is this a symptom of a lack of resources and something that will get worse with time, or do the Taliban have a tenuous hold on the country that maybe wasn’t there when they were in power in the 1990s?

The Chair: Thirty seconds, please.

Mr. Lalani: I did hear some of that testimony yesterday. I think what people are referring to is the fact that many of the interlocutors that speak to government officials are not from Kandahar, they’re in Doha, or somewhere else, and don’t have a lot of influence and power. You really do need to get to Kandahar and speak to the people who do have that influence.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Senator Woo: Thank you to our witnesses. I’d like both of you to respond to what I’m going to characterize as a theme in your presentations, which is a return without re-engagement. That is to say, a return to Afghanistan, and in a nuanced and finessed way of going back to achieve some specific goals, particularly humanitarian goals, but to hold your noses when it comes to dealing with the Taliban.

Is that really possible? Does there have to be some recognition so that, even as we try to do this, the finessing will include some measure of restrained re-engagement, if I can put it that way? The basis on which much of the argument is being made for what you’re doing, particularly in the area of education for girls, is the sort of humanitarian intervention, along the lines of what we used to call, R2P, responsibility to protect — not in the case of genocidal activities, but in the case of gross human rights violations against women. I’m hearing that we have to go above the heads of the current regime to provide universally accepted education standards and materials, even though the current regime has explicitly said that’s not what they want for their people.

Again, that’s a R2P-type of reasoning. I wonder about the international law around this. I wonder about the danger of repercussions for the deliverers of that kind of programming, and I wonder about repercussions for the learners, who are, of course, in the country and subject to punitive measures.

The long and the short of the question is this: How do we do this without any re-engagement whatsoever with the Taliban?

Ms. Oates: To be clear, I am advocating to circumvent this regime. It is not considered a legitimate regime by the majority of Afghans, given the way they took power. I also draw a historical lesson from having seen this movie before. Our organization is celebrating its 25th anniversary this year. We were founded during the first Taliban regime. We saw them come into power, we saw them fall out of power and I think we need to look to the future.

In my mind, this is an interim situation. It might be a long interim situation, but it is not a permanent situation. We need to hold and preserve an educational system and educational progress so things don’t have to start from scratch when we’re back in the same kind of situation we were in late 2001. It is an unusual situation but not entirely unprecedented. There are some models to draw from.

In Canada, we have public education systems, we have independent education systems and international education systems like the International Baccalaureate, also known as IB. Then you have situations like Tibet, where there are Tibetan schools for Tibetan nationals from all over the world outside of Tibet. I think there are models that we can look at to figure out how to do this, but it’s absolutely not business as usual. We have to get creative and innovative and be able to do things a bit differently in a situation where we must be extremely cautious about working with the regime that is in power at the moment.

Things can be done. We’re doing things. It is absolutely possible and we should remain engaged with the people of Afghanistan.

[Translation]

Senator Gerba: I thank our guests for being here. I note that we have many recommendations from Ambassador Lalani. Thank you very much.

I am wondering about the Taliban’s effective control over the territory and the opposition activity against the Taliban. In particular, Ahmad Massoud, leader in exile of the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan and son of former commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, has explained that his movement has grown from 1,200 to 4,000 men and is engaging in urban guerrilla warfare. What’s your take on Massoud’s position?

Mr. Lalani: Thank you, senator. If you don’t mind, I’ll speak in English.

[English]

Right now, we seem to have no policy. We don’t want to support the resistance of Mr. Massoud; neither do we seem to want to engage directly in the country on development and humanitarian assistance. In some ways, I think we should be prepared to do both. There should be some support for those who want to oppose the regime. Frankly, that is leverage to be able to do more inside the country in terms of development and economic assistance. Standing still is not really a strategy. We need to make some tough decisions.

Second, I don’t think we should be afraid to speak to members of the resistance. On the west, there’s maybe a bit of a reluctance to engage with them. They’re outside of the country. We can be in contact with them. Maybe the government is, but I think we should not be afraid to at least speak to them.

[Translation]

Senator Gerba: Thank you very much for the answer. My next question is for Ms. Oates. You’ve painted a picture of Afghan girls and women. Unfortunately, all the progress that was made has been lost. How could Canada help Afghan women?

Ms. Oates: Thank you very much for the question.

[English]

It’s important to recognize that the progress is not all lost. I felt that way in the initial days after August 2021 and a friend of mine who was working on the ground pointed out to me, “What do you think all those women who went through literacy classes and went to school are going to do? They’re going to teach in their living rooms. They’re going to teach their daughters and their neighbours, just as they did during the first Taliban regime.” I know many women who lost rights during that time in the 1990s who went on to get an education, sometimes through clandestine ways or after the Taliban fell, and to make sure their daughters were educated. We have this significant number of educated people in the country, as Ambassador Lalani pointed out. This is a different situation than it was when the Taliban took power the first time. They’re really struggling. Ultimately, I think they will be unsuccessful in suppressing people’s desire to get an education.

In terms of what we can do, —

The Chair: I’m afraid I have to interrupt, because we’ve exceeded the four-minute mark. Sorry, Ms. Oates.

Senator MacDonald: I am thankful for these two witnesses. I certainly have empathy for your sentiments about what is going on in Afghanistan. I’m extremely disappointed about what occurred in Afghanistan.

I recall about a decade ago, going to a Remembrance Day service and people asked me to speak about Afghanistan. I said that we can’t judge Afghanistan today; we have to judge it the way we judge South Korea today, 50 years later. What a great democracy South Korea turned into because we were willing to stand up for democracy in South Korea. Yet here we are, just over 20 years after we’ve been in there, and the Taliban are back, pretty much in full control, apparently.

How realistic are your ambitions in regard to education and investment as long as they’re in control? I mean, isn’t the only solution armed resistance inside the country to take them out; isn’t that really the only solution?

The Chair: That sounds like a question for Mr. Lalani.

Mr. Lalani: What we need to do is focus on the outcome. We seem to be very afraid to invest because the Taliban might do X or Y or might not. In my experience, we just need to test it. We can go in there, devise very clear and specific development programming and see what the outcome is. We should be much more driven by the outcome.

There are investments to be made on economic development and further ones on humanitarian and education. What is the alternative? I think the alternative is us sort of standing still from the sidelines and pretending that we’re going to do more.

I would say that if we can’t do more, which I would understand, then let’s not pretend that we will.

Senator MacDonald: You mentioned investment. Are you referring to government-funded investment or private-sector investment? What investment are you referring to?

Mr. Lalani: Senator, I think it would be both. Often, the private sector will want to invest. They will require certain financial and other guarantees, but we have institutions for that in terms of insurance and export development credit, et cetera.

It is also about partnerships. There are opportunities here to partner with the private sector in other countries that are already investing there, so I think it’s a combination of both.

Senator MacDonald: Thank you.

The Chair: Before we go to the second round — and it will be a short one — I’d like to ask a question of Ambassador Lalani.

You may recall — I certainly do — 20 years ago when we were working together in Washington at our embassy, we were quite engaged as an embassy in meeting with President Bush’s special representative for Afghanistan, Ambassador Kalilzad, who later became ambassador to Afghanistan. You and I met with foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah in the Afghan embassy. We bumped into President Karzai. We did a lot of those things.

It seemed that some of the other countries, notably the U.S. administration, were quite interested in what we had to offer, whether it was how to harness a loya jirga meeting or assembly — all new terms for us at the time.

Of course, with the position of the Canadian Armed Forces and development offices in Afghanistan —

So my question goes to what Senator Gerba was asking as well: Has Canada somehow lost the creative spark to look at new solutions? You’ve made a few proposals. Are you finding there’s an openness to look outward a bit more and working with allies to come up with some creative ideas?

Mr. Lalani: Thank you, senator.

I do remember that time well. What I do remember — and I think we both can now say it — is that we might have been freelancing a little bit in reaching out and making some contact there. I think my colleagues in the ministry still have that inkling, but I think we need to let our diplomats take more risks.

The Americans actually valued what information we had at the time, because unlike them, we had kept some operations going in Afghanistan on the humanitarian front and they had not. There is a value in, again, being on the ground.

There is a role for Canada in convening other countries and other stakeholders to just brainstorm and see what we can do creatively. I think that’s a role that is still relevant for Canada.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

We have about three or four minutes left, and we have five senators. It’s a challenge for any chair to try to bring this together, but if any senator wants to withdraw — Senator Woo, Senator Ravalia. Okay, that brings us down to three senators. I will give you a moment to pose your question — hopefully, a very concise one — and see if we have a moment for our two witnesses to respond.

Senator Housakos: I’ll try to be uncharacteristically brief.

We’re having economic challenges in the country. Resources are being stretched to their max. As much as there’s a willingness to be humanitarian and help all these wonderful causes, Canadians are also tired of seeing a lot of our dollars going to support, directly and indirectly, dictatorships, tyrants and rogue countries that don’t necessarily always align with our values.

It seems to me this is a classic case where we’re trying to achieve what we couldn’t achieve. As you and the U.K. secretary said in your statements, we lost. Let’s get on with it, and accept that and move on.

Senator Coyle: Mr. Lalani, could you cite any examples of Canada engaging with other states during periods of difficulty where we could learn something from that and cite as precedents? For Dr. Oates, would it help your work if Canada were on the ground in Kabul?

Senator Gerba: I just want Ms. Oates to finish her answer, because I would like to know if we can adapt our international foreign policy for Afghanistan.

The Chair: Thank you very much. We’ll give you a minute each, starting with Ms. Oates.

Ms. Oates: Thank you for the opportunity.

Where Canada could show very significant leadership globally in talking about how to be more forceful in asserting our values and actually acting them out is in advocating for the codification of gender apartheid as an international crime against humanity. There’s very significant momentum for this right now. Other UN member states are supporting it. I would urge you to consider having Karima Bennoune as a witness, who is the current leading scholar who has laid out the case for this. Please consider that. That would be an excellent way to stand by our foreign feminist international policy.

To complete my answer about what could be done practically, I think we could draw from the interesting example of Germany’s support to scholarships in the region, not to Germany. It’s far more cost-effective. They paid for 5,000 Afghan women to go to university in Bangladesh. That would be one interesting precedent to look at — scholarships, supporting remote work opportunities and supporting both Afghan women and men on how to access this growing landscape of remote work opportunities when they can’t find jobs in the country.

Finally, if we’re interested in gender-equitable education, it’s important to also support boys’ and men’s education. I made comments regarding my concerns about the curriculum. I would be pleased to submit further information detailing exactly what the changes are going to be and what the implications might be. But quality, modern, secular education that promotes critical thinking is resistance; it’s not armed resistance, but it’s cutting off the source of that really dangerous jihadist terrorist violence ideology that can be either propagated through an education system or ended through an education system. That’s one thing we can do to resist and undermine things.

The Chair: Thank you very much. If you do have anything written you’d like to submit, please send it to our clerk. I’m sure we would look at that with great interest.

Mr. Lalani, you get the last word.

Mr. Lalani: I understand the sentiment entirely of the investment we’ve made, and dollars are scarce. We should focus on a return on whatever investment we make, and maybe that means focusing on private sector investment facilitating it.

Second, we can take the position that we lost and let’s move on. And if we take that position, let’s please stop the selfies and hashtags and suggest we’re going to do more and we stand with Afghans because we’re not. Let’s really move on and let them move on to other countries who are willing to invest.

I would caution that the cycle of alliance and abandonment in Afghanistan, which we’ve seen since 1950, has always led to us returning at higher costs and more lives lost. There is a hardheadedness in continuing to make investments but test for outcomes. I’m not suggesting we open the door completely.

It is a great question, examples of where else we might have done this. I would look at how we dealt with the regime of Saddam Hussein, which was under sanctions. We found ways to provide humanitarian assistance and work with the energy sector. I don’t know if we can learn from Myanmar.

The expansion of Bill C-41 is a good innovation. We should test that and see if we can make those exemptions wider. In other words, we have had regimes in the past that had been under sanctions and we had exemptions. Can we make those exemptions wider as we test the outcomes of our investments? Maybe that’s the way to go.

The Chair: Thank you very much. On behalf of the committee, I would like to thank our witnesses for joining us today. It was a rich discussion and much appreciated. We will now turn to our second panel. Again, thanks to our witnesses.

Mr. Lalani: Thank you.

The Chair: Colleagues, we are pleased to welcome Nipa Banerjee, Senior Fellow, School of International Development and Global Studies, University of Ottawa; Usama Khan, Chief Executive Officer, Islamic Relief Canada; and by video conference, Nader Nadery, Senior Fellow, The Wilson Center. Welcome to all three of you. We would like to hear short preliminary statements from you, and then we’ll move into a question round.

Dr. Banerjee, could you start please?

Nipa Banerjee, Senior Fellow, School of International Development and Global Studies, University of Ottawa, as an individual: I decided to write down my points to start with because it is easier for me, because the subject is too huge. I don’t know how to make an opening comment, and I don’t know what questions you will have in mind, so I will read from my comments.

I will briefly reflect on the aftermath of the collapse of the Afghan Republic, the fall of Kabul, and the impending need for the international community to talk to the Taliban.

Over two years ago, the world watched the collapse of the Afghan state and its economy. Poverty in Afghanistan was a problem even before the Taliban takeover. The economy was fragile and overly dependent on foreign aid to support the country’s development and operational budget. Over two years after the fall of Kabul, the country’s economy is in a deepening spiral of impoverishment and destitution.

The Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 2021 triggered U.S. sanctions. Foreign reserves of the Afghanistan Central Bank were frozen resulting in the closure of banks and money transactions. Most bilateral donors and the international financial institutions — World Bank and IMF — suspended aid to Afghanistan.

Findings from my frequent conversations with Afghans still residing in Afghanistan are that the country feels safer and less violent as fighting has stopped and common crime has been controlled. Overall, the law and order situation has improved. Mind you, I’m saying what I’ve heard from the people I know in Afghanistan.

Food insecurity is at its height. The hardest hit by the crisis are the women and children. For updated reporting, I should mention the recent reports on insecurity returning to Afghanistan with the violent activities of Islamic State Khorasan, also known as ISK. For the latest development outlook, the World Bank report of October 2023 should be reviewed.

Deprived of crucial international assistance, the Afghan emirate has failed to ease the economic stress, bring relief to the Afghan people, and thereby gain domestic legitimacy. The current de facto government, the Islamic Emirate, is thus desperate to gain recognition from the international community and get access to foreign aid and bank accounts.

The Western powers gave up an opportunity to talk to the Taliban at the Bonn Conference of 2002 when reconciliation with a defeated, broken, and weak Taliban would have helped mitigate future insurgencies and conflict.

Instead, shut out from Bonn in 2002, the Taliban used the following 19 years to strengthen their movement and regain territorial control over Afghanistan, which they have now achieved.

Not grabbing the opportunity to talk to the Taliban again now will isolate the Taliban and the innocent Afghans along with it. The isolated Taliban could quickly return to the reign of terror of the mid-1990s.

The Western powers should engage in diplomatic talks with the Taliban, using diplomatic leverage to promote Taliban cooperation for improving the country’s base conditions, including women’s rights.

Talking to the Taliban does not imply immediate recognition or legitimization of the de facto government. Instead, the talks should be understood as consultations with the current Taliban leadership to promote quick and direct access to the people of humanitarian assistance, for the supply of food, clean water, clothing and shelter, and to prevent abuse of fundamental human rights, especially women’s rights.

Via its statements, announcements and conversations with the world powers, the de facto Emirate government has tried to reassure the world powers that it is committed to upholding people’s legitimate rights. However, the Taliban government has yet to walk the talk, especially in the gender rights arena.

For Western donors, the Taliban’s quest for legitimacy continues to serve as an opportunity to negotiate Taliban support to promote the quick and effective distribution of immediate humanitarian assistance and the introduction of mid- to longer-term governance reforms, inclusive of women’s rights.

I draw the attention of those women’s rights activists who are against any engagement with the Taliban to the hard reality that Afghanistan needs immediate humanitarian and economic relief, the promotion of women’s rights and longer-term development pursuits.

A balanced approach demands humanitarian and financial relief to go hand in hand with women’s rights. A strategy balancing these needs will yield sustainable results. A prerequisite is consultation with the Taliban. Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you.

Usama Khan, Chief Executive Officer, Islamic Relief Canada: Thank you, senators, for convening us here today for this important topic. By way of introduction, my name is Usama Khan. I am the Chief Executive Officer of Islamic Relief Canada. Islamic Relief is a global charity in Canada. We represent, last year, 93,000 unique donors from coast to coast.

We raised $83 million last year. About 95% of our funding is from individual donors from across the country. About $35 million from federal government grants, including a recent one specifically for Afghanistan.

We are also a member of the humanitarian coalition here in Canada. Islamic Relief played a significant role in the #AidforAfghanistan campaign which led to people using their voice to raise awareness through the media, but also to the elected officials which led to Bill C-41. I will talk about some of the challenges with the implementation of Bill C-41 in a few minutes.

I had the opportunity to visit our field office in Afghanistan in August. I was there for three days. I would be happy to share some of my reflections from my visit there. I would like to echo some comments from Ms. Banerjee.

The opportunity for us to continue engaging in Afghanistan is incredibly important. There are some opportunities for us to do that. Obviously, we know the challenges, not just the humanitarian crisis that existed but has been exacerbated further by the recent earthquake, which has made an already difficult situation for many women and girls in Afghanistan even more difficult.

Right now, there is an opportunity that presents itself. The first one I will talk about is humanitarian access. As Islamic Relief, we have projects in many conflict areas in the world. And not just our organization, but when I met the sector in Kabul, the access for humanitarian actors is fairly good throughout the country. Again, that’s not something we can say in a lot of different hotspots around the world. That is an opportunity.

The other situation is the law-and-order situation and the prevailing security situation. Last year, my trip was not possible because of the security risks to our teams. As I said, I met many expats, people from Western nations, humanitarians, who are able to work in Afghanistan. The security and law-and-order situation, again, is quite stable. That, again, improves the access that we have as international NGOs to continue operating there.

The two biggest challenges and frustrations from a humanitarian community standpoint, number one, is the education ban for girls. Visiting with orphans that we are supporting in Afghanistan, and hearing from boys and girls about the dreams that they have, but that have been made difficult because of the education ban, is a concern. It is probably at the top of the challenge that’s there for the global community.

Second, NGO female workers are banned from coming to the office. From my experience, when I visited our head office in Kabul, I met with our female staff there. It is important to note that in a context like Afghanistan, it is impossible to reach women and girls — the people who deserve the most need aid and support — without our female NGO staff. From talking to our team there, I know that each province is implementing the rules from the federal government a little bit differently. It is more lax in certain provinces compared to others, in some cases. Again, this makes the work of humanitarian agencies incredibly difficult.

I will close my opening remarks with my ask for this committee, the government and Western governments.

Number one, we need to continue to invest in the citizens and civilians of Afghanistan. Long-term prosperity, economic prosperity, hope in the future, is the best way we can ensure that lives that Canadians have lost in Afghanistan do not go wasted.

Also, to ensure that the peace and security of that country, and the world — in terms of ensuring that people are not pulled toward extremism — investing in their socio-economic development is incredibly important.

Also, the challenges with Bill C-41 in its implementation, more clarity, legislative clarity around questions that the sector has had about it is something we have not seen come through.

Last, for Canada to continue to show more global leadership working with its allies. A statement I heard from colleagues in the humanitarian sector when I was in Kabul is “Engagement does not mean endorsement.” Canada should show leadership on that work with its allies to make sure we are not absent from engaging in Afghanistan.

Thank you so much.

The Chair: Thank you. We will now go to Dr. Nadery, please. You have the floor.

Nader Nadery, Senior Fellow, The Wilson Center, as an individual: Thank you, honourable chairman, honourable members of the Senate.

As an Afghan, allow me to thank you for the support you have provided to Afghanistan throughout many years. I also want to commend you and your colleagues, and Canadians in general, for their generosity in welcoming thousands of Afghans at risk for the past two years.

As a former human rights commissioner, I would also like to commend Canada. I appreciate and thank you for your continued support for the causes of human rights.

In the first panel and also in this panel, we have heard, both from former ambassador Lalani and others, what we have lost. Allow me to add quickly a few more points to what we have lost in the past two years.

The first thing we have lost is a young but very fragile democracy. It had its shortcomings, a lot of shortcomings, but it could have been an example for a troubled region. That is now lost. It became, at the time, an example of others in the region to not follow that path of representation and the people’s role.

The second thing that is lost that is so precious and often spoken about in a different way is that 70,000 Afghans lives were lost just in the course of two decades. Sixty thousand of those were security forces who gave the ultimate sacrifice to protect that constitution and that Islamic republic. We do sometimes hear words or statements that the Afghans didn’t fight to protect their constitution or their country or to compare it with Ukraine. I think they forget about those 60,000 men and women in uniform, and those statements could be a disrespect to their heroism. That means we have also lost the narrative of their heroism.

Third, we have lost an entire generation of Afghans who grew up with liberal values post-2001, who were about to take on leadership roles and counter radicalism in the very region that is known for that element.

I can, with a lot of confidence, say, as the former chairman of the civil service of Afghanistan, that we have lost at least 30% of the capable civil servants who were female, who were delivering services in very difficult environments and to the advantage of other women who were receiving those services. That 30% of the female civil service part of the country’s 400,000-person civil service is lost.

As a former human rights commissioner, I can also say that most of the rights and freedoms are rolled back and lost. Afghanistan also lost two decades of very vibrant and growing civic space. That’s diminished today.

Since assuming power, the Taliban, on August 15, 2001, implemented 86 new rules that profoundly affect all aspects of society but especially the lives of Afghan women in society. As we heard from other witnesses, the restrictions cover not only education but health care, employment, economic opportunities and media presence. Their access to justice has been restricted significantly.

They set up an enforcement mechanism such as the vice and virtue ministry. The systematic nature of these policies and practices aim to eradicate women from society entirely and diminish their role in public life and basically control them. As Afghan women advocates rightly say, it is gender apartheid. Apartheid crime that is defined in international law is very visibly seen and is present in the policies of the Taliban. Therefore, it is right for Afghan women to call it a gender apartheid, a crime against humanity.

There is another trend in violation of human rights, extrajudicial killings of former security forces, influential community leaders, targeted attacks against activists and former government officials. Hundreds of people documented by the UN and other agencies are being targeted and extrajudicially killed. These are systematic and indicate all the patterns of an organized action and, therefore, are clearly crimes against humanity.

Freedom of the press is restricted and, therefore, also political rights completely. Activities of political parties are completely banned. The honourable senator earlier asked about former President Karzai and Dr. Abdullah. No one, including them, have any rights to political engagements. Officially, the Taliban announced that all of this is banned.

As a member of the peace negotiation team, I negotiated with the Taliban for one year, 2020-21, and at the end, unfortunately, we failed.

Of course, the U.S. and Taliban deal was primarily a withdrawal deal. Along with the failures of Afghan political leaders and their shortsightedness, the U.S.-Taliban Doha deal, the Doha Agreement, was primarily responsible for the final collapse and the way things have gone.

The hope, currently, is for those Afghans, community leaders and the civil society activists who are fighting on a daily basis. Each time I see the girls on the streets demonstrating, I feel proud as an Afghan, but I am also very much embarrassed. I am proud because of their courage, dedication and resilience, and embarrassed because I, and people like me, are not there with them on the streets.

Those who are running schools, individuals like Wesa, who were just released after 215 days in prison, are very much examples of those whom you can support.

The Chair: Excuse me, Dr. Nadery. I have to interrupt you. You have exceeded the time. I’m sure you have other points that you can bring up in the question-and-answer period.

Mr. Nadery: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much. Colleagues, we will stick to our four-minute rule. Please keep your questions succinct. That also goes for our witnesses in terms of your answers if you can.

Senator Coyle: Thank you to all of our witnesses today. My first question is for Dr. Banerjee.

I think you’ve written about talking to the Taliban. Could you elaborate further on what you think Canada should be doing now in terms of engagement, which does not necessarily mean endorsement, with the Taliban? You said that the world community made a mistake back in 2002 when the Taliban were shut out of conversations at Bonn. How do you think Canada should be engaging with the Taliban? What exactly would that look like?

Ms. Banerjee: Our special envoy now, David Sproule, who was the ambassador — I served under him as well — is in Doha and is participating in whatever conversation is going on in Doha between the international community and the Taliban.

The services of a special envoy are indeed very useful in this instance, but what Canada should do, first of all, is the resumption of humanitarian aid for immediate relief of the humanitarian condition. It is very much required. Canada should quickly get to that path of support for humanitarian aid.

Second, Canada should start discussing with the international community the strategies that could be followed to support, particularly, women’s issues in Afghanistan. If we have time, I have some ideas about the strategies that can be used to help alleviate women’s repression. We can discuss that.

It’s not what I say, but Canada has its policy of feminism, and we could pick that up and apply it in the case of Afghanistan. I’m not suggesting only that, but strategies of assisting women are things that should be tried in concert with other international organizations and also the world powers.

I don’t think it is possible for Canada to do it singly, by itself. It has to work with the international organizations as well as other powers, other communities.

Senator Coyle: Thank you.

Ms. Banerjee: But, you know, I did not give any specific instances on Canada.

Senator M. Deacon: Thank you both for being here today. It’s very important, and we are really glad to see you in person.

I have two questions, and one is a question about leadership. I’m wondering, from your perspective — and you have spent some time in Afghanistan — if there are any notable differences that we should understand more deeply about the Taliban government that was deposed 20 years ago and the one we have today? Are they emboldened by their survival? Are they looking to present themselves as a legitimate, credible government by contrasting themselves with groups like the Islamic State?

Ms. Banerjee: Are you asking me?

Senator M. Deacon: Both of you. Why don’t you go ahead?

Mr. Khan: I can start.

For us, commenting on that as a humanitarian organization, I can give you my personal views on it. I didn’t get to engage directly with the de facto authorities or with the Taliban on my visit, so it’s not necessarily first-hand, but what I am hearing from conversations from my visit there, I have heard sentiments that they are open to discussions. They, obviously, don’t want to be embarrassed. I’ve heard sentiments that they are more concerned with what is happening within Afghanistan as opposed to interfering with matters outside of Afghanistan. In addition, they’ve learned lessons from the first time around. That’s the sentiment I’m hearing.

Again, I’ll reiterate the point about the access for humanitarian organizations — not just Islamic Relief Canada as a faith-based organization, but other faiths as well as secular organizations — that generally, it is fairly easy for them to have access and to work on that. All of which leads to some hope.

Senator M. Deacon: Thank you.

Would you like to add anything to that?

Ms. Banerjee: Well, I think that the Taliban has changed. Your question was what they were and what I find them to be now?

It seems that they have changed. There are members of the Taliban who are still very strongly the way they were before, but now there are some leaders who have changed positions, and they are supportive of this idea of talking to the world powers for getting recognition.

Again, I would say that the world powers may not necessarily agree immediately to recognize them. That’s not the issue right now, but they could be given to understand — and I think, it seems to me, that they have started moving a little bit.

They are very interested in legitimacy and that the people of Afghanistan give them legitimacy. The law-and-order situation, as Mr. Khan pointed out, has improved, and so the people are becoming favourable to the Taliban.

I talk to people in Afghanistan, and they say things are very different. In fact, I used to go to Afghanistan almost twice a year up until 2019, and it’s the Afghans who told me, “Nipa, don’t visit anymore, because things don’t look very secure, and you are travelling by yourself.” So 2019 was the last time that I visited, but some of my friends are saying that I could consider travelling again, but I wouldn’t.

Because recently — and, yes, that should be mentioned, Mr. Khan — the law-and-order situation is better, but I saw a United Nations report, and they are asking their own workers not to travel too much, because it’s getting — it’s not the Taliban, but it’s ISIS-K.

The Chair: Thank you very much. We’ll move on to the next question.

Senator Ravalia: Thank you to our three witnesses. My question is for Mr. Khan.

I’d like to just get a little more context and information with respect to your field office visit. Did you have an opportunity to collaborate with other relief organizations from partner countries that are working there? You mentioned that you didn’t have any direct contact with the Taliban, but did you get a sense that there’s some influence in the manner in which your aid is distributed directly related to the Taliban? To what extent is corruption, then, an issue for your relief work in that part of the world?

Mr. Khan: Thank you for your question. The first part of it — and this applies not just to Afghanistan but in all humanitarian contexts — as aid agencies, it may seem from the outside that we are competitors, but there’s a very strong collaborative spirit among the aid agencies, knowing the challenges and problems are way more than any one agency could solve. With respect to Afghanistan, specifically, there’s a very strong cluster system for the aid agencies to learn lessons from each other, to share notes and to then be complementary in terms of the services provided and the regions.

Even though my visit was for 72 hours, I spent 3 or 4 hours connecting with other agencies. Some of them were from Canada — at least 8 to 10 in total — and we got together for dinner and had a very frank discussion. I think the collaboration is strong, and that was great to see.

With respect to your second question, in any context you do need to get permission from the de facto local authorities to operate. Again, this is not just for Islamic Relief Canada, but I think I speak collectively on the sector. There are very strong controls in place from an anti-diversion standpoint that aid is to be spent only where the donors intend it to be spent, and having strong anti-bribery policies and strong due diligence. Especially as a Canadian charity, I think, compared to all other Western nations — I’m a chartered accountant by training, and I was at KPMG auditing charities before joining Islamic Relief Canada — Canada’s requirements for charitable organizations are very stringent, and so abiding by that is the top priority.

That means that our local teams will have to get approvals and permissions, but I think independence in terms of where the aid goes and how that beneficiary selection happens, the robustness of that, by and large, is intact.

Senator Ravalia: I have a quick follow-up. Given the large number of Afghan refugees at the Pakistan border and on the Pakistani side, sort of, being forcibly relocated into Afghanistan, have you had an opportunity to work particularly with that group and the vulnerabilities they face?

Maybe, Ms. Banerjee, you would be able to answer that question?

Ms. Banerjee: I had difficulty following what you said. Could you speak a bit louder, please.

Senator Ravalia: Sure. I was just thinking about the Afghan refugees who sought refuge in Pakistan and are now being forcibly repatriated into Afghanistan. Is this a particular group that is vulnerable both from the perspective of the Taliban, but also in terms of basic humanitarian assistance?

Ms. Banerjee: I agree; yes, they are. You know, there are displaced people in Afghanistan, and this particular group you’re talking about are definitely vulnerable.

Senator Ravalia: Are organizations reaching those groups as well? The relief organizations, Mr. Khan, are you able to work in that arena?

Mr. Khan: Obviously, this is recent. In the last few months, the Pakistani government has indicated that Afghan refugees there need to go back. Again, similar to Afghanistan, the climate in terms of getting approvals and working in Pakistan is also not easy. Not only do you need a no-objection certificate to operate as a charity there, but it’s by the project and the region that you work with — both from the government and also the intelligence authorities — to be able to work.

Our agency hasn’t yet worked with the refugee population there, but it’s an area that we’re actively looking into.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Senator Gerba: I’ll be asking my question in French.

[Translation]

You both mentioned that Afghanistan is experiencing a very significant humanitarian crisis and that international help was needed. You also stressed the lack of contact with the Taliban in this respect. Among the international initiatives currently active in the country, are there any that Canada can learn from to better help Afghans, especially women and girls?

[English]

Ms. Banerjee: One thing I want to mention is that it is difficult these days to get information, and there is contradictory information, and what they call misinformation and disinformation is going around, so it’s difficult.

However, from what I understand, the NGOs — and Mr. Khan also mentioned this — are doing good work, and they’re the only ones that can do the development projects now because the donors would not fund the Taliban, the de facto government, directly.

But I want to mention that John Sopko — I don’t know if you all know about him — he is the independent commissioner that the U.S. has appointed. Since 2008, he’s been monitoring activities in — U.S. activities mainly — in Afghanistan, and he said that there are instances where — through his audit functions — he found out that there are instances where money is ending up with the Taliban. And one needs to be careful, and Canada in particular is very concerned about that. And you know, they would take care of that so that this doesn’t happen.

The Chair: Dr. Nadery, I don’t want you to think for a moment that we’ve forgotten about you. So, I have a question for you, and of course, you are down there at the Wilson Center in Washington.

You, of course, have been a former commissioner and negotiator. Are you seeing any movement in the conversations that you have with the U.S. government? The U.S. government, of course, is internally distracted, externally distracted and engaged with two belligerent situations going on in Ukraine and in Israel and Gaza. Are the developments in Afghanistan on the radar? Are there any missions going out, any activity that you’re aware of that would suggest that the United States wants to take more of a role?

Mr. Nadery: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On this specific question, the U.S. State Department’s Special Representative for Afghanistan, Thomas West, regularly travels the region and different places, but there’s no direct presence on the ground, and there’s no policy orientation or internal deliberation to that effect. The U.S. Chargé d’Affaires is based in Doha and operates from there. However, most of the focus currently is on humanitarian assistance, and allocation of a notable amount of humanitarian assistance by the USAID is there. There are meetings happening in Doha, where the special envoy of the United States does attend; however, they are not on a very regular or routine basis. In the past few months, it has not happened as regularly or as often as it did last year; this year, it’s been very limited in that regard.

If you would allow me, Mr. Chairman, I would like to raise two additional points that were discussed in previous questions. One about law and order, the perception of law and order. There is no doubt that there is less violence. There’s no bombing blowing up schools, streets or centres; while the Islamic State of Khorasan, or Da’ish, continue doing that, the frequency of that is not as it was before the Taliban took over. It has gone down because the Taliban themselves are now in charge.

And second, security and law and order for those Afghans living in the country is very different from what somebody visiting for 75 hours or an international visitor for a short period of time would experience. There are continued illegal arrests. A flag of caution there, as the Taliban have developed the same practice as neighbouring countries and Hamas, in which they arrest people on the pretext of an illegal act, without clear charges, and then engage in negotiating for ransom. The hostages that they have released — I call them hostages — to the U.K., were U.K. citizens, and they had to negotiate and issue a statement, a transactional process. So, I encourage people to be careful when they talk about the level of law and order, and the new methods that the Taliban are developing there.

On humanitarian aid, I encourage Canada to engage in humanitarian aid, and provide it. If it is through the United Nations, I very much emphasize that an independent monitoring mechanism needs to be developed, because certain programs run by the United Nations do not meet its core objective, and there are unintended benefits to the Taliban. In places, the Taliban are interfering even in appointments. I hear and talk to people across different parts of the country, and I hear in Jalalabad, for example, that staff of aid communities and NGOs are introduced by the Taliban local governor, and they are forced to recruit them, and public announcements of recruitment are being cancelled. So, those are areas that require independent monitoring, and there are different methods to do that.

But I’m in favour of collective engagement with the Taliban; not to recognize them, rather, keep the informal consensus of not recognizing them. That’s the only leverage against them these days. The key is to collectively negotiate on technical access of delivery of aid, decouple them from the political aspect of it, but keep the political aspects at the more senior level, at the capital, raising the issues of women’s rights, gender and human rights, and also representative government, Those two need to be kept separate.

The Chair: Thank you very much, I’m going to use my prerogative as chair to follow up with another question. You have your roots in Afghanistan, and there’s been a tremendous exodus over the past few decades of Afghans to various countries that welcome them, including Canada, the U.S. and countries in Europe.

Is there a degree of coordination among the diaspora communities in terms of how to deal with onward developments? Are there organizations that are somehow connected, in particular in dealing with the governments of the host countries who can, in fact, exercise pressure?

Mr. Nadery: Thank you. The Afghan diaspora has grown, especially in the last two years. There is now also a movement of developing some sort of a common platform. In the last two years, there was a lot of grief and anger at what happened. It really affected a lot of people, and a lot of us are coming out of that. The grief will remain for a long time, but with the kind of anger that we need to look forward.

Therefore, there are two initiatives that are going on. One, the Afghan diaspora is organizing themselves. For example, in the United States, in different social and activist groups, creating advocacy. The Afghan women’s groups are much broader and have created a group internationally. That’s why I also joined the call to ask you, honourable senator, and your distinguished colleagues to join their demand in recognizing the definition of gender apartheid to elevate the appalling aspects of it so that civic engagement internationally on this can be much greater. There’s a process in the UN, and I also join them to ask you to concede on that. The women’s movement is very strong. The rest is picking up. There are political coalitions in different regional countries, but also in the United States, in the north and in Europe.

There is a lot going on inside the country, too. For example, the civic engagement space has diminished, but there are groups on cultural issues that come together. They have been perhaps created in different provinces, and some of us are directly involved. I say those deserve support and moral backing. It’s very localized, very domestically driven. They’re pushing for a non-violent, bottom-up change. They are a longer-term perspective in that sense.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Senator Coyle: Thank you very much to Mr. Nadery, that was very helpful.

Mr. Khan, I wanted to ask you this question earlier. As a member of the humanitarian coalition, you worked hard to get us to pass Bill C-41. You mentioned at the beginning of your remarks that you had more to say. Could you tell us what more you have to say about Bill C-41?

Mr. Khan: As you know, it was incredibly important for there to be a resolution on the issue, because after the crisis, when the Taliban took over, for a long time some of the biggest aid agencies in Canada had money available for Afghanistan, but because of fear of prosecution, they weren’t able to send it. I think both the sector organizing as well as Canadians coast to coast were able to have that pass.

The application and the understanding of exactly what Bill C-41 looks like and the process of the authorization regime, some of those details haven’t been fleshed out. It’s to the point where I’ve heard directly from some aid agencies that it’s still status quo in terms of not being able to deliver aid because there is no clarity on what is allowed and not allowed, clarity on definitions of humanitarian versus development, depending on the department you ask, or clarity on privacy of the information that goes there.

It’s a request to expedite clarity on exactly how aid agencies can operate there without that fear of prosecution and without breaking the rules.

Senator Coyle: Is the sector engaged in helping to develop that language?

Mr. Khan: They are, but it’s not moving fast enough.

Senator Coyle: “Expedite” is the word. Got it.

The Chair: Thank you very much. On behalf of the committee, I’d like to thank Nipa Banerjee, Usama Khan and Nader Nadery for joining us today. Your comments were very comprehensive and deep, and they increased our knowledge of the present situation in Afghanistan and our movement toward the future. We will come back to this file in the future in this committee, but I’d like to thank you for your contributions today.

(The committee adjourned.)