THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
EVIDENCE
OTTAWA, Thursday, May 9, 2024
The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met with videoconference this day at 11:30 a.m. [ET] to examine and report on Canada’s interests and engagement in Africa.
Senator Peter Harder (Deputy Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Deputy Chair: My name is Peter Harder. I am a senator from Ontario and deputy chair of this committee in the absence of our esteemed chair. Before we begin, I would like to remind all senators and other meeting participants of the following important preventive measures.
To prevent disruption and potentially harmful audio feedback incidents that could cause injuries during our meeting, we remind all in-person participants to keep their earpieces away from all microphones at all times. As indicated in the communiqué from the Speaker to all senators on April 29, the following measures have been taken to help prevent audio feedback incidents.
I invite you to review the card in front of you. Please ensure that you are seated in a manner that increases the distance between microphones. Participants must only plug their earpieces into the microphone console located directly in front of them. These measures are in place so that we can conduct our business without interruption and protect the health and safety of all participants, including our interpreters. Thank you all for your cooperation.
I now invite committee members participating in today’s meeting to introduce themselves.
Senator Greene: Steve Greene, Nova Scotia.
Senator Ravalia: Mohamed Ravalia, Newfoundland and Labrador.
Senator MacDonald: Michael MacDonald, Nova Scotia.
Senator M. Deacon: Marty Deacon, Ontario. Welcome.
Senator Boniface: Gwen Boniface, Ontario.
Senator Coyle: Mary Coyle, Antigonish, Nova Scotia.
The Deputy Chair: I expect some senators will join us during the course of the meeting. I will introduce them as we get going.
I welcome you all, including those who may be watching on ParlVU. Colleagues, we are meeting today to continue our special study on Canada’s interests and engagement in Africa.
Today, we have the pleasure of welcoming, in person, Professor Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé of Bishop’s University in Quebec; and, by video conference, Geoffroi Montpetit, Senior Advisor to the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change. I thank all our witnesses for joining us today and taking the time.
Before we hear your remarks and proceed to questions and answers, I would like everyone present to please mute the notifications on their devices, as they might conflict with the current meeting. Before asking Professor Martin-Brûlé to commence, I wish to acknowledge the presence of Senator Gerba, who has joined us from Quebec.
Professor, you have five minutes.
Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, Full Professor, Department of Politics and International Studies, Bishop’s University, as an Individual: Thank you very much for the invitation.
“Skate to where the puck is going to be, not where it has been.” This is how Goldy Hyder, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Business Council of Canada, quoting Wayne Gretzky, started his remarks at a round table on Canada and Africa partnership last year. This quote remains telling, linking hockey, a highly Canadian symbol, to a situation to be decided in Canada as a continent seems to be invisible. As we’ve focused on the Indo-Pacific and the Arctic for the past few years, reinforced in the updated defence policy presented this April, we overlook a continent crucial to the functioning of our world today — one where the influence of China and Russia is now established; where our key partner France is fighting to stay; where our direct neighbours, the U.S., are trying to actively re‑engage; and where other countries, such as Turkey, Hungary and Spain, are increasingly investing as well.
Partnerships with African countries, and both state and non‑state actors, can be mutually beneficial in a myriad of domains, notably information sharing, joint training, exercises at the bilateral levels, youth engagement, the health sector and with regard to climate change.
Canada’s engagement and interest in Africa are paramount to peace and security in our country, but also internationally. The interconnection of our world has shown that threats and risks are not bound by geography. We need to look beyond our next-door neighbours and realize that that both state and non-state actors learn from each other beyond immediate borders. We have a lot to learn from African states; we also have a lot to offer.
My statement will cover three broad questions: Why should we care? What are the threats? What are the opportunities?
Why should we care? In a nutshell — because of already existing, deep but underestimated interconnections with the African continent, composed of 54 states with a wide array of political systems, geographies, cultures and languages.
Why do we care? First, we care because Africa is in Canada, and it is here to stay: According to Statistics Canada, 4% of the Canadian population has African origin, and that number is growing. Immigration from the continent is increasing; therefore, diasporas in Canada are growing in importance. We need to better understand who these diasporas are.
Second, we care because Canada is in Africa, too. We have vested interests, notably in having access to natural resources from Africa on which our way of life depends. Africa has 60% of the world’s solar energy potential and 70% of its cobalt, a key mineral for making electric vehicles. Also, many Canadians have dual nationality and connections there, and have an impact and influence on a spectrum of activities on the continent. In Africa, the total value of Canadian mining assets is estimated to be around $37 billion.
What are the threats? Threats to Canadians are found both in Canada and abroad. These include radicalization and financing of terrorist activities; transnational threats; criminal threats, notably those related to money laundering, trafficking and cybercriminality; disinformation and misinformation; and spillover of humanitarian crises — with climate change effects in the background. All of these represent threats. However, these threats should not push us into isolation and fear of the other, but instead provide more compelling reasons why Canada’s top strategic priorities should consider Africa as a continent to engage with and work within.
What are the opportunities? We can gain visibility, trust and predictability. We have two major advantages. The first, of course, is linguistic. Our bilingualism, English and French, makes it possible to tap into linguistic networks such as la Francophonie. Second, we are not linked with a colonial ideology.
At home, diasporas are a solution to potential threats within Canada and abroad. They are also a significant opportunity in our business and security strategies. They must be considered key partners.
In Africa, we need to tap into lessons learned and build a model of partnership which is not simply transactional, as well as invest in building trust with smarter, more sophisticated partnerships. We need to engage with multiple levels of government — municipal, provincial, national — as well as with diverse state and non-state actors, facilitating links with civil society, educational entities, et cetera.
There is much to learn from grassroots organizations and community actors, which take on much of the groundwork of fostering tolerance, trust in inter-communal relationships and supporting peace processes. We also need to grasp that security is not limited to military terms and can have many meanings. Canada should pay attention to the manner in which its partners and other stakeholders understand security.
We should also embrace opportunities for joint training and information sharing, which enable increased situational awareness; a better understanding of allies’ capacities, capabilities and training methods; improved interoperability; the promotion of the rule of law and internationally recognized humanitarian laws and standards; and the transfer of our norms, notably in terms of human rights and the protection of civilians.
We have much to learn and share with regard to the health sector. For example, African countries have had to deal with many outbreaks, and provided useful lessons during COVID-19.
We also have much to both learn and offer with regard to dealing with climate change and natural disasters. For example, we had South African firefighters helping in Alberta last summer.
In conclusion, we cannot afford not to engage with Africa. It’s the continent with the fastest-growing youth population, and it has essential natural resources. Why would we not engage with 54 states from which we have much to learn, and to which we can contribute, in an area where we are already engaged? Africa faces threats, notably with the Sahel as a global centre of extremist violence, humanitarian crises exacerbated by climate change and rising transnational criminality, all of which is already impacting us and which threatens to affect us further. Africa also offers invaluable opportunities. We need to harness and channel what is happening notwithstanding the current absence of governmental grand vision.
With all the debates on strategy, framework and approach, Canada must focus on leading the way to smarter partnerships in education, security cooperation, small-, medium- and large-scale investment. We must tap into what makes Canada different, making the most of our historical, cultural and linguistic backgrounds. We need to gain better understanding and visibility, both within and beyond our immediate borders.
Peace and security transcend geography. Africa, with all it entails in terms of diversity, wealth and opportunity, has much to teach us including and beyond the philosophy of the palaver tree.
Thank you.
The Deputy Chair: Before I invite Mr. Montpetit to speak, I want to acknowledge that Senator Woo from British Columbia has joined us.
[Translation]
Geoffroi Montpetit, Senior Advisor, Tony Blair Institute for Global Change: Good morning, Mr. Chair and senators. Thank you very much for the invitation.
[English]
I am a senior advisor for the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, or TBI, where I focus on francophone West Africa.
At TBI, we help governments and leaders in over 30 countries turn bold ideas into reality. We do this by advising leaders on strategy, policy and delivery, unlocking the power of technology across all three.
From 2021 to 2023, I served as Administrator of the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie.
Senators, your committee’s study on Canada’s interests and engagement in Africa is timely. I authored a report on the Sahel for the Tony Blair Institute, which was published a few weeks ago, so thank you for inviting us to share our analysis and policy recommendations as you undertake your study.
The devastating consequences of the wars in Ukraine and Gaza continue to demand the attention of policymakers and the public, but on another continent, a decades-old conflict rages on. It has global reach and consequences, including for Canada.
Despite 20 years of multinational security and counterterrorism operations, the Sahel is now the most terrorism-affected region in the world. Violent extremism groups terrorize citizens and have destabilized governments. Millions have been displaced into neighbouring countries. In Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, 13 million people are facing food insecurity. In these countries, 9,000 schools have closed due to conflict and attacks by violent extremist groups. In Burkina Faso alone, 1 million students are now out of school.
No country can combat, deter or eliminate the threat of violent extremism in the Sahel on its own. Regional and international cooperation is essential in addressing the deteriorating situation. I thank your committee for looking at Canada’s interests and engagement in Africa through that lens as well.
The risk of contagion of insecurity beyond the Sahel into neighbouring regions, such as the coastal states, is real. There is increased deadly terrorist activity across the northern borders of Togo and Benin. The number of terrorist-related incidents in those countries has doubled over the years. Familiar predatory agents who are present and have an increasing foothold in the region, such as Russia, fan the flames of extremism, emboldening those who would further destabilize the region.
From our perspective, the solution is not purely military or reliant on foreign mercenaries or civilian militias that operate outside the framework of national and international law and multilateralism. A renewed approach for the security and stability of the Sahel and its peoples requires a bolder development agenda that puts at its centre governance priorities and a reset of the social contract between states and their citizens. This means enhancing the international political and diplomatic dialogue on the Sahel through an expanded alliance of European countries, Canada, the United States and other critical players, such as the Gulf States and Turkey.
This alliance should develop a compact for the Sahel which brings together the Sahel countries and bilateral donors, multilateral development banks, the private sector and philanthropic partners to scale up investments and funding mechanisms in the Sahel that will focus on human development, governance and infrastructure with new dedicated resources.
[Translation]
Canada must play a greater role in the Sahel, in West Africa and on the continent in general. The Canadian Government must reconnect with the clear ambitions and targets of Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy, launched in 2017. In the interest of transparency, I would like to mention that in another life, I played a role in developing this policy as chief of staff to several international development ministers under Mr. Trudeau’s government. The policy called for no less than 50% of Canadian bilateral aid to be devoted to sub-Saharan Africa. However, that target was only reached in 2018. The number dropped to 41% in 2019–2020. Since then, it has risen slightly, but remains below 50% today.
Like its partners, Canada must find ways to work constructively with countries in the region, including their current leaders, with the aim of returning to constitutional order, but also improving the quality and scope of services to citizens. Given that almost the entire Sahel, from Guinea to Sudan and from the Atlantic to the Red Sea, is now living under a form of military rule stemming from a coup d’état, a degree of pragmatism on the part of countries like Canada is required.
I think it would be a mistake to abandon these countries or end our involvement with them just because they are military regimes and it’s difficult to work in these countries. I think it would also be a mistake to transfer our development budgets, which are substantial, important and historic in countries like Burkina Faso, to the coastal states — which, of course, deserve greater support from Canada, but not at the expense of the populations of the Sahel countries.
Senators, it is more important than ever to support the Sahel and its people, especially in this time of geopolitical realignment and Russia’s desire to further entrench its presence in the region to oppose the West, including Canadian interests.
Canada’s interests are at stake. We have been investing in the Sahel since the very beginnings of Canadian cooperation, in the 1960s. We have expertise that is in demand, which Professor Martin-Brûlé outlined well. Our mining companies work in an extremely tense security context. Our citizens have been victims of terrorist attacks and kidnappings in the region. The future of the planet’s climate is also at stake in the Sahel. What’s more, trade opportunities are important for Canada.
Canada has an Indo-Pacific Strategy. I wonder, where is Canada’s Africa strategy when the geopolitical stakes on the continent are just as important to the country? The population of West Africa and the Sahel will double by 2050 to over 700 million. The majority of that population will be urban. The challenges and opportunities for Canada are clear.
Senators, now is the time for Canada to maximize its engagement on the continent and in West Africa in particular. Thank you very much.
[English]
The Deputy Chair: Thank you, Mr. Montpetit.
We will move to questions. Every interaction will be limited to a maximum of five minutes in this round. I hope that we get to a second round. I invite members to address your questions to the witness whom you would prefer to at least begin the commentary.
Senator Ravalia: Thank you to both of our witnesses. My first question is for Mr. Montpetit. You’ve raised the issue of the rising influence of non-Western actors in Africa, particularly in the Sahel region, and you’ve outlined Russia’s involvement there.
Given the context of Russia and Ukraine and our very frayed relationships, is there any opportunity for us to actually dialogue with some of these actors in the Sahel region to somehow minimize the catastrophe and chaos that exists there?
Mr. Montpetit: Thank you, senator, for your question. There is definitely an opportunity for countries like Canada to engage with countries in the Sahel, especially countries that have experienced military coups and are now under a transitional government or a post-constitutional order type of government.
The initial pressure put to bear on these countries by regional organizations through sanctions, et cetera, is obviously very important. We have made a lot of efforts and definitely do have to put that in place to contain the effects of violence and instability in the region. It would be a mistake for countries to now disengage from these countries. As I said, there is a certain level of pragmatism that is required on the part of financial and technical partners in the region.
Senator Ravalia: To follow up, given the very tense and precarious security situation, do you envision a position where we actually need boots on the ground?
Mr. Montpetit: Well, senator, as I have stated, and as a number of observers have also recognized, I don’t think a single country in the Sahel, on its own, could defeat the violent extremist groups that operate in their own territories and through the porous borders in the region.
At some point, we will have to resume this dialogue. We need a clear-eyed view on what it takes to ensure security. But we should not view the response to the insecurity in the Sahel purely through the lens of counterterrorism or military action, although that is obviously also a big part of these security issues.
The lessons from the past 20 years of such military and counterterrorism interventions show that we also have to focus on people and on re-establishing the dialogue and link between citizens and their governments by investing in issues such as governance. We should be helping governments deliver services to citizens and helping governments ensure a minimum level of services across the territory — education, social spending, et cetera. We must realize that massive investments are required in the Sahel, but the opportunities are there, and we shouldn’t view the situation through a purely military lens.
Senator Ravalia: To conclude, given the world’s focus on Russia and Ukraine and the situation in Israel and Gaza, in your dialogue with your partners, are you concerned there may be an element of donor fatigue when it comes to supporting this region of the world?
Mr. Montpetit: That would be a fair comment, senator. The world is not a happy place right now, and I am certainly not minimizing the impacts of the wars in Ukraine and Gaza or any other emergencies that we are facing.
Pressures on governments are real, but Canada plays an important role in the world; it should give itself the means to play the role that it wants to.
Canada has the right policy. It has a feminist international assistance policy. I don’t want to minimize the hard financial choices that a government has to make, but the current trajectory for Canadian international assistance needs to grow. We see pressures in the Indo-Pacific, the Arctic and obviously in Africa. Elsewhere, we see the humanitarian crises in Latin America, et cetera.
Canada wants to play a role, but it has to give itself the means to do so.
Senator MacDonald: I will first direct my question to Professor Martin-Brûlé, but I would like to hear from both witnesses.
Considering China’s role as Africa’s largest trading partner and its increasing diplomatic and military presence in Africa, including participation in the UN peacekeeping missions and the establishment of a military base in Djibouti in 2017, how do you evaluate the impact of China’s military involvement on the stability and security of the region?
Ms. Martin-Brûlé: Thank you. It’s a very important question. We were talking a little bit about Russia being militarily involved, but China is also very much involved. Russia has focused more on security parameters, arrangements and agreements with different host states. China is focusing more on development and providing infrastructure and roads, thereby gaining access to key minerals. They are indeed increasingly involved in peacekeeping operations, meaning that they have more visibility and a better understanding of the different stakes and needs of the diverse host states.
We need to be very worried about China’s presence, as they are gaining access and, hence, we might develop more dependence on accessing China’s access to those resources as well. Their help and support for host states is not conditional — not using the same conditions as France and the U.S. have been using — in terms of types of governance.
I really liked the point made by Mr. Montpetit. He said that this is why we need to become pragmatic and discuss with others who are there, without this condition of upholding these kinds of agreements, because other states, such as Russia and China, are gaining ground, and we need to be present.
There was a question by Senator Ravalia on whether we need boots on the ground. Again, to reinforce Mr. Montpetit’s points, we need to go beyond a military paradigm. I think we need to be on the ground. It will require a little additional investment, but we need more embassies, more consulates, to gain insight into who is there and what types of agreements are being made. China, Russia, Turkey and the Gulf States are there. We need to be there in order to understand and better gauge where we can matter.
Mr. Montpetit: Thank you very much, senator, and thank you, professor, for your remarks, with which I wholeheartedly agree.
China obviously plays an important role on the continent for the reasons that Professor Martin-Brûlé explained. It can be a constructive role at times. I remember Chinese diplomats playing a very effective role in South Sudan, for example, and through their various participations in the UN peacekeeping missions as well.
The question for Canada, to come back to the question of pragmatism, is how can we engage? It is not just with the Sahelian countries that we have to engage. We can and must engage with China and find a common way of moving forward.
We have our interests and way of doing things. They are sometimes at odds with the ways of China and certainly those of Russia, but through the great Canadian tradition of engagement, we should not shy away from that engagement. We should recognize that we may not have the financial means that the Chinese have in terms of official development assistance and providing loans, et cetera. We do things differently. That doesn’t mean that we can’t be there and be present.
To come back to what the professor just pointed out in terms of diplomatic relations, when I left Ottawa in 2020, I was very happy to see that the Government of Canada decided to establish a bilateral cooperation program with Niger. It started out small, but the point is that we should never have exited Niger in the 2000s. It made no sense to me.
The Deputy Chair: We have to leave it there, Mr. Montpetit. Our mutual friend Peter Boehm wouldn’t have been as generous.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: Thank you to our witnesses for being here and joining us online today. My question is for both of you, because each of you has addressed the issue of investment in your own way. You mentioned that Africa is made up of 54 or 55 countries, according to the United Nations or the African Union. However, since we’ve been talking, since we started this conversation, we’ve been talking about the Sahel region, which is obviously deeply affected by issues of security, insecurity and political instability. Of the 54 countries in Africa, there are probably four or five — maybe six at the most — that face a real security threat. We’re talking about a continent that needs to be developed and that offers great opportunities. In all the other countries — Senator Woo and I have just returned…. We met with the Foreign Minister of Nigeria, which has a population of almost 230 million. I’ll put my question directly to Mr. Montpetit, but Ms. Martin-Brûlé may wish to answer it too.
Mr. Montpetit, how do we get Canada to see Africa as a continent in which we can invest and win, without disregarding the security risks that also exist on every other continent in the world, with all the other countries we do business with and invest in, which are very important partners, including the Indo‑Pacific?
The Deputy Chair: You have two minutes.
Mr. Montpetit: Thank you, Senator. I don’t want you to think that Africa boils down to the Sahel. It’s primarily a region I’m working on.
The first thing Canada should do is recognize the continent’s incredible potential. It’s a continent that’s currently developing a free trade zone. There’s still a lot of work to be done at the pan‑African level to ensure that this free trade zone is actually put in place, but the plan is there, and Canada should get involved right away.
The Canadian government’s decision to be represented and establish missions within the African Union is excellent and important. It should have occurred much earlier, but now it’s done and that’s good. We should keep up the momentum and help Canadian companies recognize the importance of the African market and the importance of the free trade architecture being developed on the continent. The opportunities are there and they’re significant, even in the Sahel, despite the difficulties and infrastructure needs. There are tremendous commercial opportunities for many countries and people who have expertise to offer in this area. When it comes to renewable energies, the Sahel and the rest of the continent represent incredible opportunities for Canadian investment.
Ms. Martin-Brûlé: Indeed, we talked about the Sahel, but South Africa is a growing economy. Rwanda is a partner country and Kenya…. These are major economies. I’m not an expert on those countries, but it’s important to recognize the 55 situations in which Canada could find reliable and major partners, and focus on the young people who can represent the population. This is the fastest-growing youth population in the world; they are potential consumers and entrepreneurs with whom we can do business, which is why it’s important to focus on bilateral investments with governments, but also with different non-state actors. I’m also thinking of economic opportunities with Mauritius, which is a much smaller economy.
[English]
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you both for being here. We would like many more hours with you. My question concerns misinformation and disinformation. Many of us view misinformation as something that mainly affects national politics and elections, but your research looked into how this has affected UN peacekeeping missions. There is some interesting reading there.
In the context of these missions in Africa, I’d like to get a sense of some of the challenges presented by this growing phenomenon of misinformation and disinformation and how it affects peacekeeping missions.
Ms. Martin-Brûlé: Thank you for this question. This is growing in importance. We need to be more aware of how information circulates.
I want to return to this idea of having the diasporas as key partners. We are looking at who is defined as a local and who has influence on the information that is shared. Many members of diasporas share information back home that influences the understanding and behaviours of local populations toward external interveners, including peace operations.
That kind of influence is important to grasp, especially in Canada, where we have different diasporas, especially African diasporas, with quite underestimated influences on what’s happening back home in terms of, again, sharing information but also influencing the perception and behaviour of the population.
In terms of peacekeeping operations, it’s key to make a distinction between criticism from the local population on how peace operations are going and disinformation, which is manipulation of information in order to channel, to gear, to influence behaviours toward peace operations.
That’s why, yes, we need to better understand the diasporas here, how they communicate, what type of information is communicated and the real impact on the ground, on local actors, of all the intelligence in terms of the diversity of understanding and behaviours that ensue.
Senator M. Deacon: In the communities in which these missions are stationed, what is the primary method of the spread of misinformation? We have an opinion about this in Canada, but is it the familiar things we know, like Facebook and TikTok, or are foreign governments also taking part in these narratives?
Ms. Martin-Brûlé: Thank you for the question. Here, the distinction between urban and rural areas is key. In urban areas, WhatsApp and Facebook are the most common means, and social media in general. That, of course, is quite different in rural areas, where there is less access to social media. Radio programs may play bigger roles given the level of illiteracy.
I also want to point out the influences on rural and urban zones. One of the key aspects in many countries in Africa — and this is a common point with Canada — is the expansiveness and other geographical aspects of countries. There is a lot of influence and protection of power in the centres, in the capitals, but less so in the border areas that are more remote from the centres of power. There, the populations are harder to reach in order to educate them about the interventions and can therefore be more under the influence of extremist groups who are present in border regions.
Of course, with respect to the Sahel, it’s the case in Mali in the north and centre, where it’s harder for the state to protect its power. It’s not a vacuum of governance; it’s a vacuum of state governance, but certainly criminal networks are flourishing because of this lack of access to information and also internet and social media. Thank you.
Senator Boniface: Thank you very much to both of you for being here. I’d like to touch briefly on UNESCO and UN peacekeeping, which have been in Congo for years. Can you tell me what it will look like? Do you have a sense of some of the handing over of military bases to the Congo military that will take place? How do you see the stabilization following what may take place?
Ms. Martin-Brûlé: Thank you for this question. It’s crucial. I will start with a mistake e contrario, where we should not compare the situation with UNESCO with what is happening in Mali. In Mali, of course, the UN was asked to exit the country quite quickly and comprehensively. This is a different situation than the one in Congo, which I think calls for optimism.
Certainly, there’s been criticism by the government of the mission saying that, because there was a lack of robust action, the armed groups are still flourishing in the country. The peacekeeping operation has been said to be ineffective and hence has been asked to leave the country by, I think, next December.
The exiting is slower as well, and we should not conflate or confuse the exit of the peace operations with the UN agencies that are staying on the ground.
Congo is also different in the sense of, as you mentioned, not only years but decades. Since the 1960s, there has been international intervention in Congo. Therefore, there’s a better understanding of the different stakes and different groups that are there, although they are changing quite quickly as well, especially with radical and extremist groups making their way into the country. That was not necessarily the exact same case 10 or 15 years ago.
I think it will be more important to establish bilateral agreements and channels of conversation with the current government, given the fact that the peacekeeping mission is leaving.
Although UN Country Teams are staying, we also need to appreciate the fact that Congo is maybe five times the size of Quebec. It’s a very large country. Unfortunately, with the exit of peacekeeping operations, we lack awareness on what’s happening in many regions, for example, in Katanga and Kasai. We are more familiar with the east, in Goma and Bukavu, because we have been more involved in that area.
UN Country Teams are staying. That’s why it’s important to keep the conversations going because, of course, Chinese and Russian actors are engaging in conversations. They are present. It’s important to maintain awareness of what’s going on in that country.
Senator Boniface: I’m going to go to the Sahel region. I hear what both of you are saying about the importance of development, and more so investment, but I’m returning to Senator Ravalia’s issue about governments being hesitant unless there is stability.
How do you make investments when you have no assurances, not even remote assurances, of the stability needed in order to see the benefits of those investments?
Ms. Martin-Brûlé: It depends on which investments we’re talking about, in the sense that we need to engage in conversation with those new states, even though they’re not democratic and there have been coups d’état.
We must also understand their frustrations and situations. The discourse is that there have been foreign interventions in their territory for decades now. They have not helped in erasing or eradicating extremist violence. They are taking things into their own hands, with partners that are there and offering their help. We’re not happy with the type of help and the type of partners that they have. Those partners are on the ground and understand the situation. We’re not.
The Deputy Chair: Thank you.
Senator Coyle: Thank you to both of our witnesses. I have a question for each of you. Both of you were talking about more presence and engagement from Canada.
Mr. Montpetit, you specifically mentioned Canada participating in an expanded international alliance on Sahel — that we could play an important role there and that alliance could come together to work on things like human development and governance, including delivery of services to citizens, infrastructure and other areas. Could you go a little deeper on what you see that alliance being and what Canada’s role could be within it?
Mr. Montpetit: Thank you very much, senator. Yes, indeed.
Our executive chairman, Tony Blair, has called for the creation of a new compact for the Sahel. This compact’s aim is to heighten political engagement and discourse around the Sahel and security there.
Compared to the mobilization of the international community during the Syria conflict — when we had millions of children who were out of school — with the international community still mobilized today around this lost generation, to ensure that the generation is not lost, we don’t have that sense of urgency right now around some of the same themes in the Sahel. I mentioned there are 1 million children in Burkina Faso out of school.
The idea of the compact is to mobilize new investments, political consultations and diplomatic efforts around insecurity and development issues in the Sahel — and to unlock and unleash the required investments in the region.
Two thirds of populations in the Sahel do not have access to electricity. This requires mobilization of investments, multilateral development banks, the private sector, et cetera.
I think an international compact where Canada could play a role — convening a role is important — could enact political mobilization around the Sahel and include new partners, such as Turkey and the Gulf States, with which we don’t engage on Sahel political issues but which are obviously keenly interested in the region. The question is this: How do we mobilize this international community for the Sahel?
Senator Coyle: Thank you.
Professor Martin-Brûlé, part of what you were discussing in your presentation was engagement with various levels of government, state and non-state actors and also at the grassroots and community level. Can you expand on what you mean by that in terms of Canada’s engagement?
Ms. Martin-Brûlé: Thank you. I think this is important. I will go back to Canada’s feminist foreign policy, on which I’ve written with colleagues. This is one of the key aspects that we discussed, the fact that we are talking about engagement and, unconsciously, we’re thinking about government-to-government types of arrangements, which are obviously necessary.
But we need to take into account those grassroots organizations. Of course, in the context of Canada’s feminist foreign policy, we talked about feminist groups, for example, to better grasp what local needs are and what the local understanding of security is. We take for granted that our lexicon is the same wherever we go. As francophones, we know that the word “self-defence,” for example, has quite a different meaning and resonance in Burkina Faso, where “self-defence groups” were actually responsible for attacking and preying on civilians.
We have the same thing in English; we think “security” means the same thing elsewhere. Unfortunately, for many actors, “security” is just a word used by the government to justify attacking or preying on their own citizens. We must understand that to be smarter in the partnerships we engage in.
I really like and will emphasize Mr. Montpetit’s point about how development is also a security issue. We need to take that into account and to go beyond. We talked about boots on the ground. We need to be developing on the ground. The Chinese very much understand that as well.
The Deputy Chair: Thank you, professor.
Senator Woo: That’s a good segue, because I heard you say that we should be very afraid and concerned that the Chinese are involved in peacekeeping operations in the Sahel and building infrastructure to access commodities and so on — and that if they bring some measure of peace and stability and provide useful infrastructure for the Africans, that will cut off our access to the same materials.
Maybe you want to correct the record, but if that is what you are saying, how is it in the interests of Africans? I understand that it involves the interests of the West.
Ms. Martin-Brûlé: Thank you so much for giving me the opportunity to rectify.
It’s not so much that we should be afraid, because you are right. Mr. Montpetit was mentioning the importance of Chinese investment, in South Sudan, for example. They built the airport terminal in 2018-19. That was important for Africa. They are also present in the Central African Republic. You’re right: In terms of development, this has had major impacts on the population.
But I think China is playing a smart long game by gaining access to those minerals, which are necessary for all the new technologies that we’re talking about, including semiconductors and even space technologies. The natural resources to make these technologies come from Africa. China is negotiating access to them.
We shouldn’t be afraid but should understand that China is building an influence — and will have more influence on many countries than maybe the West, with its values, would like. They are more invested in peacekeeping. Again, they’re smarter about understanding where both the threats and opportunities are coming from.
That does not prevent Canada from operating alongside China, but we shouldn’t be out of the game or overlooking those advancements, which I think are necessary for Africans to thrive, but we need to have a say and see where the puck is going as well.
Senator Woo: Let me switch tracks; it’s related. I want to turn to Mr. Montpetit now and ask about the perception of opinion leaders and the public in the Sahel in terms of the credibility of the West, and NATO countries in particular, in trying to restore peace and stability in the region. Of course, many people attribute some of the instability to NATO’s own initiative in Libya 15 years ago, of which Canada was a big cheerleader. Would you comment on that, please?
Mr. Montpetit: Thank you, senator. That’s a very complex question.
Certainly, as Professor Martin-Brûlé mentioned in her opening statement, the issue of the perception of France as the dominant European player in the Sahel for generations, for reasons that you well know, has tainted the political discourse around Canada’s own engagement in the Sahel — “If France can’t be in the Sahel, why should Canada be there?” I’m shortening this to a really pithy sound bite, but that is what we hear in Canada.
Canada has always been viewed as a principled, balanced, engaged partner in the Sahel. If there’s been a message that I’ve heard constantly over the years, it’s, “We need more of Canada, not less.” We certainly heard that many times when we were campaigning for a seat on the Security Council. “Great. We love Canada, but you should have been doing more.”
We should build on that reputation, on the good things we have done and on our principled foreign policy that has actually delivered results in the Sahel.
The Deputy Chair: Mr. Montpetit, you have regretted Canada’s withdrawal from certain missions in the past. Professor, you have said that we need to be present. I’d like to be very specific and ask you this: What do you mean by that in terms of governments balancing aid and investment, and regional organization presence with national presence? We have 17 bilateral missions. What do you think we should have? How would you balance out the cost of increased missions with priorities and influence?
I’m going to start with Mr. Montpetit because I can see you when we get to the clock.
Mr. Montpetit: Thank you, Senator Harder. Canada has an official target of 50% of bilateral assistance being spent in sub‑Saharan Africa. It has met that target one year only. That target is there, and government should stick to it for the reasons that we’ve explained. The continent is a strategic place for our country.
It was a mistake to close embassies in Benin and Niger and downsize our embassies in Ivory Coast, for example. I’m glad to see that the government has decided to re-engage, although I think the pace of that re-engagement materially on the ground has certainly been slow. For a number of years, we had one and a half people in Benin. The overall operational cost on the department — and I know you know this much better than I do — is really minimal in terms of the overall budget and the overall size of the international assistance envelope.
Supporting regional organizations and multilateral organizations is fine. Canada is a multilateralist country. Of course we should be doing that, but it’s also the lazy approach. We should be building our infrastructure on the ground with a network of embassies and bilateral development programs.
Ms. Martin-Brûlé: We need to be present in terms of more embassies and more consulates, because we don’t know what we don’t know, and that’s why we should be there.
The Deputy Chair: What are your priorities?
Ms. Martin-Brûlé: Our priorities are especially in francophone countries. We talked about the fact that the Sahel is a global centre for extremism. We are not there. We don’t talk with state actors, so it’s very hard to go there and give them lessons or conditionality of aid if we don’t understand the dynamics there. We need to understand how to be pragmatic and why it’s important to do so.
Reinforcing what Mr. Montpetit said, it’s a little investment but a lot of return. We need to be there in order to see what’s coming.
The Deputy Chair: Thank you very much.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: My question is for both witnesses.
Last July, UN Secretary-General António Guterres called for a global reflection on the future of UN peacekeeping operations. Speaking specifically of Africa, he called for a new generation of operations, namely African-led peace enforcement missions.
How could these operations with African leadership be deployed and should they be promoted? Do you think Canada could play a role in setting up these operations?
[English]
The Deputy Chair: Senator Coyle, you can put your question forward. Then we’ll go to the responses.
Senator Coyle: My question is regarding how we leverage the advantage that we have related to our already significant interconnections with the diaspora and others for this next important stage.
[Translation]
Mr. Montpetit: Thank you very much for your questions, Senators.
Canada can support greater African-led military intervention on the ground. This is certainly the thrust of Canada’s bilateral cooperation in support of the African Union and the various headquarters of countries contributing troops to peacekeeping missions or military operations in Africa, whether Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroon or others. Canada can play a greater role in providing support and training, particularly for staff officer training, as this is an internationally recognized Canadian skill. I look very favourably on the fact that there are more African-led military missions or counterterrorism missions in which Canada could play a supporting background role that is recognized and desired.
Thank you.
Ms. Martin-Brûlé: Thank you very much for the question.
[English]
There’s a saying about how there need to be African solutions to African problems. I think it was the former ambassador of the United States to the United Nations who said that instead, we need to think about African leadership for African solutions.
There are two dimensions to my answer. Yes, there needs to be African leadership in peace missions, but we shouldn’t use that as an excuse to step away from contributing.
One of the big problems with peace operations — especially looking at new peace operations that have been put in place in recent years, notably in Sudan — is the fact that, yes, peace missions were deployed, but they were not listening to stakeholders and actors on the ground.
We need to revisit the way peacekeeping or peace operations are deployed and talk to a variety of actors on the ground.
Canada has a lot to contribute, but we need to take stock of the fact that we are a risk-averse country — we have zero tolerance for risk. That’s why we don’t deploy many people, because the political cost — we’re not even talking about human cost — is too high for us to bear.
We can provide training that is both low in risk and high in value. We are recognized for our professionalism. We can make the most of our professional values as well as our bilingualism. With respect to deploying more women, there are not that many to deploy if we are just talking about the military. Nevertheless, we should provide civilian and military expertise in peace missions.
We must be careful and think about what we mean when we talk about African leadership — that is, we should not use it as an excuse to disengage. On the contrary, we should engage more to support that leadership.
The Deputy Chair: Thank you, panel.
Did you want to add anything, senator?
Senator Coyle: I did not get an answer on the diaspora engagement.
Ms. Martin-Brûlé: Regarding the diaspora engagement, diasporas are extraordinary bilingual partners and interlocutors. I’m not talking about linguistic bilingualism; I am talking about cultural bilingualism. They are key partners at home and abroad who help us better understand and translate what is meant — that is, how operations, interventions and investments are perceived in Canadian terms, as well as Canadian intentions — into their local contexts as well. We should see diasporas as translators or interpreters of the intentions of both sides, not only at home in Canada but also what could be considered home in a country of origin. We can use that bilingualism culturally and linguistically to better translate intentions and perceptions from both sides.
The Deputy Chair: I want to remind colleagues that both our witnesses today have distributed the text of their statements. If they have further inspiration from this conversation, I invite them to share that with our clerk so that it can be distributed to the committee.
With that, I want to thank both witnesses, Mr. Montpetit and Ms. Martin-Brûlé.
(The committee adjourned.)