THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY
EVIDENCE
OTTAWA, Tuesday, September 24, 2024
The Standing Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry met with videoconference this day at 6:30 p.m. [ET] to consider Bill C-275, An Act to amend the Health of Animals Act (biosecurity on farms).
Senator Robert Black (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: Welcome to this meeting, everyone. Thanks for coming out this evening.
Before we begin, I would like to ask all senators and other in-person participants to consult the cards on the table for guidelines to prevent audio feedback incidents. Please take note of the following preventative measures in place to protect the health and safety of all participants, including our interpreters.
If possible, ensure that you are seated in a manner that increases the distance between microphones. Only use the approved black earpiece. Keep your earpiece away from all microphones at all times. When you are not using your earpiece, place it face down on the sticker on the table. Thank you all for your cooperation.
I would like to begin by welcoming members of the committee and our witnesses, both in person and online, as well as those watching this meeting on the internet. My name is Rob Black, a senator from Ontario and chair of this committee.
Before we hear from the witnesses, I would like to start by asking the senators around the table to introduce themselves.
Senator Simons: Hello, I’m Paula Simons from Alberta, Treaty 6 territory.
Senator Sorensen: Karen Sorensen from Alberta, Treaty 7 territory.
Senator McNair: John McNair, New Brunswick.
Senator Burey: Sharon Burey, Ontario.
[Translation]
Senator Oudar: Manuelle Oudar, Quebec.
[English]
Senator Klyne: Marty Klyne, senator from Saskatchewan, Treaty 4 territory.
[Translation]
Senator Dalphond: Pierre J. Dalphond, senatorial division of De Lorimier, in Quebec.
Senator Petitclerc: Chantal Petitclerc, Quebec.
[English]
Senator Pate: Kim Pate. I live in the unceded, unsurrendered territory of the Algonquin Anishinaabeg.
Senator McBean: Marnie McBean, Ontario.
Senator Richards: Dave Richards, New Brunswick.
The Chair: Thank you. I want to welcome our new clerk, Raymond St. Martin. It’s great to have you with us. We look forward to working with you.
Today, the committee continues its examination of Bill C-275, An Act to amend the Health of Animals Act (biosecurity on farms). On our first panel, we will be hearing from government officials on this bill. We welcome, from Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, Donald Boucher, Director General, Sector Development and Analysis Directorate, Market and Industry Service Branch. From the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, we welcome Dr. Mary Jane Ireland, Executive Director, Chief Veterinary Officer for Canada and Delegate to the World Organisation for Animal Health, or WOAH; and via video conference, Rick James-Davies, Director General, Western Operations.
Welcome, witnesses. We appreciate your being here. We will begin by hearing from Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, or AAFC, followed by the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, or CFIA. You each have five minutes for your presentations. When you have one minute left, I’ll put up my hand. At 30 seconds, I’ll put up the second hand. That means it’s time to wrap things up.
Donald Boucher, Director General, Sector Development and Analysis, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada: Honourable senators, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to appear before this committee to discuss animal biosecurity. This is an extremely important component of animal health and of the Canadian agriculture sector more broadly.
Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada supports the sector from the farmer to the consumer, and from the farm to global markets. Biosecurity is essential through all phases of producing, processing and marketing farm, food and agri-based products. The department works closely with provincial and territorial governments to develop and deliver policies, programs and services, some of which pertain directly to biosecurity.
With such a significant animal production sector that feeds Canadians and consumers across the world, as well as providing one in nine Canadian jobs, biosecurity and emergency disease preparedness are critical.
AAFC recognizes the significant impact a large-scale animal disease would have on the sector and the need for governments and industry to work together to both prevent and prepare for these risks. To that end, over the past several years, AAFC, along with the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, has been an active player in establishing and supporting Animal Health Canada, or AHC. The collaborative nature of AHC allows the sector participants to learn from one another and share resources, and provides a cross-sectoral lens to One Health approaches. Federal-provincial-territorial (FPT) and industry preparation for African swine fever and the development of an industry-government collaboration under AHC are good examples of our collaborative efforts.
AAFC recognizes that the risk of disease can be largely mitigated through robust biosecurity standards and protocols. In support of a proactive risk-based approach, significant AAFC funding and resources have been invested in the last 15 years to address biosecurity and emergency disease preparedness, as well as supporting the development of surveillance networks and traceability systems.
Under the Sustainable Canadian Agricultural Partnership, Sustainable CAP, both federal-only and cost-shared programs have helped to protect the health of Canada’s animal resources and limit the economic impact of animal health incidents and emergencies. Between 2009 and 2018, AAFC provided financial support to the CFIA to develop voluntary sector-specific national biosecurity standards for animal agriculture with a goal of mitigating risks and limiting the potential impact of animal disease outbreaks. As a result, national biosecurity standards are available for a variety of different farmed animal species and for the transportation of livestock, poultry and dead stock.
In closing, AAFC has demonstrated and will continue to demonstrate a strong commitment to advancing and improving biosecurity. The government continues to work and employ resources that contribute to animal biosecurity preparedness. These initiatives contribute to the sector’s sustainability, growth and competitiveness while enhancing resiliency and public trust.
Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Mary Jane Ireland, Executive Director, Chief Veterinary Officer for Canada and WOAH Delegate for Canada, Canadian Food Inspection Agency: I am very pleased to appear before this committee as part of your study on the private member’s Bill C-275, an Act to amend the Health of Animals Act (biosecurity on farms).
The CFIA is a science-based regulatory agency and is dedicated to safeguarding animal health, plant health and food safety to enhance the health and well-being of Canadians, the environment and the economy. In this capacity, the CFIA administers and enforces a variety of legislation, which includes the Health of Animals Act, which Bill C-275 seeks to amend.
Last year, I appeared as a witness before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Agriculture and Agri-Food during their study of Bill C-275.
To begin, I would like to take a few minutes to outline the objective of the Health of Animals Act and the federal government’s role in supporting animal biosecurity. The primary objective of the Health of Animals Act is to protect animals and prevent the transmission of federally regulated animal diseases and toxic substances to both animals and humans.
The CFIA employs highly skilled veterinarians, veterinary inspectors and other inspectors who administer and enforce the Health of Animals Act. Under the act, CFIA inspectors have the authority to conduct inspections, seize and detain animals or things, investigate cases of non-compliance and recommend prosecution where it is appropriate to do so. It is important to note that CFIA inspectors are not peace officers; they do not have the authority to detain persons who violate the Health of Animals Act.
The CFIA works with various stakeholders, including farmers, to help protect animal health and prevent the spread of disease. This includes developing and implementing animal biosecurity measures on a farm. Animal biosecurity is an area of shared responsibility. It involves federal, provincial and territorial governments; industry associations; and farmers.
Federally, the Health of Animals Act and its regulations contain biosecurity-related requirements for federally regulated diseases. For instance, a person cannot bring an infected animal onto a farm. Provinces and territories may also develop and enforce their own biosecurity requirements. Further, provinces and territories provide funding to producers to improve biosecurity measures and to support certain disease-control activities.
In addition, the CFIA, industry, academic institutions and provinces and territories have worked together to develop voluntary national biosecurity standards. These standards outline the practices and protocols for farmers to routinely implement to prevent animals from being exposed to disease at the farm level. In Canada, most on-farm biosecurity standards are voluntary, and farmers are responsible for implementing biosecurity standards on their premises.
While on-farm biosecurity standards are voluntary, several industry associations have integrated parts of these standards into their mandatory on-farm programs. This collaborative effort has promoted the use and adherence to on-farm biosecurity measures, and these biosecurity measures, combined with other regulatory requirements, help to reduce the threat of disease spread and maintain market access.
While the objectives of Bill C-275 are commendable, there are a few points I would like to highlight. Almost every province has legislation to address trespassing, and six provinces have passed enhanced private-property legislation to prohibit trespassing at a location where animals are kept. At the federal level, the Criminal Code includes prohibitions related to trespass, such as mischief and breaking and entering. These provisions have been successfully used to convict individuals who have engaged in that type of activity.
Finally, it is important to note from an enforcement perspective that CFIA officials are not peace officers. The police of local jurisdiction would still need to respond to trespassing incidents.
I hope this provides a general overview of the CFIA’s role in animal health and biosecurity, as well as some challenges with the current text of the bill. We welcome any questions the committee may have. Thank you very much.
The Chair: Thank you very much for your testimonies.
Senator Simons: My first question is for Dr. Ireland. Has there ever been a confirmed case of an animal disease outbreak caused by trespassers or protesters, as far as you’re aware?
Dr. Ireland: The CFIA is not aware of any confirmed cases of animal disease in Canada due to trespassers.
Senator Simons: How serious is the risk of trespassers bringing in a disease?
Dr. Ireland: The risk of trespassers really needs to be considered in a very fulsome way. There are a number of questions you would have to ask in order to determine their level of risk. For example, did the individual or individuals have previous contact with other animals, possibly picking up a virus or a pathogen and bringing it onto a farm? Did the person follow biosecurity protocols? Did they wash their hands, change their footwear; did they have clean clothing on? Had the individual travelled internationally to an area where there was a foreign animal disease? How infectious is the agent that might be transmitted? Every pathogen is different. Each situation is very different; it would need to be taken into context through those series of questions. Thank you.
Senator Simons: I don’t think we have heard this before — what would the role of CFIA officers be in enforcing this legislation? You said more than once that they are not peace officers; they are not equipped to enforce legislation. Can you elaborate on your concern about what an amendment to this legislation might require of CFIA officers?
Dr. Ireland: I will refer that question to my colleague, Dr. Rick James-Davies, who is with the operations at the CFIA. Thanks.
Rick James-Davies, Director General, Western Operations, Canadian Food Inspection Agency: Thank you for that question. I think there are a few elements to consider. As my colleague, Dr. Ireland, has pointed out, much of biosecurity is a partnership endeavour. I think the use of the powers that are proposed in this act would be no different. We would certainly envision that if an incident occurred on a farm, the farmer’s first phone call would be to the local police — the RCMP or provincial police, depending on the jurisdiction they are in. For most livestock producers in Canada who had a concern about their animals, their next call would be to their private veterinarian. We would see working in partnership with both of those entities. If, in fact, an incident occurred, and there was actual concern about the introduction of a pathogen or a noxious agent, that would be the cue to the CFIA to be involved, to support the farmer, the private veterinarian and law enforcement as necessary.
As Dr. Ireland has said, it would be situation-specific. It would depend on the information that was available, the observations of the private veterinarian or the farmer himself or herself about what might have occurred and what risk there might be to the animals. At that point, if the CFIA becomes involved, it very much becomes the normal authorities and powers that we would have on a farm — conduct an investigation, take samples, make observations, interview the farmer and any of the workers there, as appropriate, and seize and detain product if necessary. In the event that a non-compliance had occurred, any time we look at enforcement, again, it is in partnership with Crown prosecutors. The CFIA doesn’t actually prosecute cases; that’s done by the Justice Department on our behalf.
All of that is a partnership. I think the actual actions we would take on any given farm would really depend on the circumstances that each step revealed to us.
Senator Simons: This amendment, this bill, doesn’t say that there has to be an infection in order to be prosecuted under this act. But for practical purposes, do you think the CFIA would ever proceed if there were not already a criminal trespass action going forward under provincial trespass law or in the case that there is a protest but no pathogens are brought in?
Mr. James-Davies: It’s hard to speculate without specific details of any given case. Again, I would really think it would depend on the findings. In the event that it seemed appropriate to move forward with enforcement, that would certainly be an option, but I think it really depends on each case and what we found on the farm.
Senator Simons: Thanks very much.
Senator Sorensen: Thank you very much to all of you for being here. I was going to direct my question to Mr. Boucher, but Ms. Ireland, I think, started to answer my question. I’ll leave it out there. This really is about some clarity on Ms. Ireland’s comments.
At our last meeting, it was stated by one of the witnesses from Animal Justice that the CFIA does not actually have jurisdiction over animal welfare on farms. He stated the CFIA’s jurisdiction only extends to livestock transportation and slaughter of animals under the Health of Animals Act. In his words, “There are no government inspections of farms to proactively monitor animal welfare, including by the CFA.” Is that true?
Dr. Ireland: Thank you for the question. Canadian provinces have the primary responsibility for protecting the welfare of animals, including farm animals and companion animals. All provinces and territories have laws to ensure animal welfare interests are protected.
The Canadian Food Inspection Agency has two areas of responsibility around animal welfare. The first is under the Health of Animals Act and regulations around the transportation of animals. Transport regulations serve to put a suite of rules in place to prevent avoidable suffering during transport into, within and out of the country. The second area of responsibility is under the Safe Food for Canadians Regulations, where we have rules around the humane treatment of livestock in federal abattoirs. These are the two areas of responsibility. Of course, we work with the provinces and territories and other stakeholders in the animal care community when there are animal welfare issues that are raised or identified.
We work with industry to establish standards of care and biosecurity, as we were discussing today. We also establish requirements, as I mentioned, during transport and at federal abattoirs, and we verify that those standards are met. That is the CFIA’s role in addition to the responsibilities that I mentioned around the provinces and territories. Thank you.
Senator Sorensen: So if a complaint were made of concern, would the CFIA be one of the organizations that would go in to check the farm?
Dr. Ireland: Animal welfare would be a provincial responsibility, and it would be the province.
Senator Sorensen: Okay.
Again, this is a comment made at previous committee meetings: Some committee members expressed concern that this bill seems to target protesters but not farm workers who fail to follow biosecurity procedures. I wonder if the issue of workplace negligence is already addressed under another existing law. If a legitimate worker on a farm, for example, didn’t wear proper equipment and inadvertently contaminated the animals, are there any existing laws in Canada to penalize that worker?
Dr. Ireland: Biosecurity in Canada is voluntary, and producers set the biosecurity standards, procedures and policies for their own premise that address the risk, their location, their type of production and the physical nature of their facility, that is, where animals are housed, how it is set up and designed. Biosecurity is a voluntary practice, but it has served us very well in Canada to avoid the introduction of foreign animal diseases and to keep animals healthy. There are no rules that would be imposed or forced on someone who violated a biosecurity principle, because they are voluntary.
Some producer associations and farmers who are part of those associations are required to follow biosecurity standards. You have heard that Chicken Farmers of Canada, Turkey Farmers of Canada and Dairy Farmers of Canada have set biosecurity standards built off the federally established and collaborative standards we have established. For example, Dairy Farmers of Canada has the proAction program, which includes elements of biosecurity.
[Translation]
Senator Petitclerc: I’m going to ask my question in French. I’m trying to figure out exactly what problem this bill is trying to solve. Dr. Ireland, at the beginning of your answer earlier, you told us that we have no documented cases of disease transmission after unauthorized entry. You also told us that all the provinces have laws regarding this unauthorized entry. My question is this: Is there any reason to doubt that the provinces are doing a good job preventing unauthorized entry? Do we have any reason to doubt their ability and effectiveness?
If not, what does this bill do that the provinces aren’t already doing?
[English]
Dr. Ireland: Thank you very much for the question. I won’t speak to the provincial authorities. What I would say is that the movements of people, equipment and animals are disease transmission routes in animals, so direct transmission, for example, from a sick animal to a healthy animal. The movement of people into a farm includes service providers, veterinarians, hoof trimmers, maintenance workers and visitors. They are all potential pathways for disease introduction into a farm. Biosecurity measures, control points really aim to reduce these risks. For example, someone coming to a farm would need to wear clean clothing or go through a foot bath or write down that they arrived at the farm.
So I would say that moving animals, moving people and moving equipment are all risk factors in introducing a disease onto a farm, and that is why producers work very hard to achieve high biosecurity standards — because we all collectively understand the importance of those standards in preventing disease introduction and spread and also a disease leaving a farm and potentially infecting another farm. So these are all key principles of biosecurity in Canada. Thank you.
Senator Petitclerc: Was I correct to understand that — we heard it before as well — the standards and protocol are voluntary? Because they are voluntary, are we able to somehow track or collect data on the quality or the efficiency? What do we know about that, I guess, is my question. How many producers are actually following those standards and protocols? Are we keeping data on quality, efficiency?
Dr. Ireland: Biosecurity and biosecurity standards are voluntary, yes. Federally, we do not collect information on adherence to biosecurity, but we work with industry, provinces, academics and producers to make sure we have the tools, the standards, the checklists — all the information they need to look at their own premise and determine what biosecurity steps should be taken to prevent disease in their facility.
We do not collect that federally. In our experience, for example, over the last several years with highly pathogenic avian influenza, or HPAI, we know that poultry producers have made a significant effort and investment to increase biosecurity to keep that disease out of their flocks.
We have a number of other initiatives on the go right now trying to keep foreign animal diseases out of this country, including African swine fever and highly pathogenic avian influenza in dairy cows. All of these diseases have as a fundamental pillar high biosecurity standards. We work very well with industry and provincial and territorial governments to make sure that our producers have all the tools at their disposal and are practising the highest biosecurity standards possible.
Now, in terms of data collection, that might be a better question for the producer associations, for example, that have audits and other tools at their disposal for their producers that are members, and that may be a better question for them. Thank you.
Senator Petitclerc: Thank you.
Senator Klyne: Welcome to our expert witnesses here. Thank you very much for your presentations.
There are a number of infectious disease specialists who might say that the true intent of this bill is to have a chilling effect on undercover investigations of potential animal abuse with a very serious penalty. Could this raise constitutional issues, including Charter issues, if the stated purpose of the bill is not its actual purpose, and has the Department of Justice looked at this, if you’re aware?
Dr. Ireland: Thank you for the question. I’m a veterinarian and not a lawyer, so I’ll stay in my veterinary lane. That is to say, I won’t speak to the intent of the bill. The expertise that I bring to this committee, Mr. Chair, is around biosecurity and animal health and disease transmission, and I can say with full confidence that biosecurity is critical and key and a massive tool in the tool box to keeping diseases out of farms and out of Canada. Thank you.
Senator Klyne: Okay. You have had a couple of conversations here already around things being voluntary, and in Canada most on-farm biosecurity standards are voluntary.
While these standards are voluntary, several industry associations have integrated parts of them into their mandatory on-farm programs. This collaborative effort between industry associations and producers has promoted the use and adherence to on-farm biosecurity measures, and these measures combined with other regulatory requirements help to reduce the threat of disease spread and to maintain market access.
Would you say the bill is void of that kind of understanding about how they can collaborate and come together with voluntary plus the industry associations and their mandatory on-farm programs?
Dr. Ireland: Mr. Chair, I won’t speak to the bill, but what I will say is that it has been a long-standing tradition in Canada for AAFC, CFIA, provinces, territories, industry associations, academics, veterinarians to work together to develop standards for biosecurity that achieve some consistency, that are useful for associations to then incorporate into their own programs — like proAction, as I mentioned, and there is “Raised by a Canadian Farmer” by the Chicken Farmers of Canada, the Turkey Farmers of Canada. Collectively, we’re working very hard to make sure producers have the tools they need to implement strong biosecurity on their premises.
Senator Klyne: Can you maybe speak to why there seems to be a lack of regime of a coordinated approach to this from all stakeholders to have a piece of legislation, I suppose — I guess that’s from the outside in — but within themselves, to say these are the rules if you want to be on this property or work in this organization? And it would be a combination of a lot of these good things that are there which help to reduce the threat of disease. Why is there no standardized approach to that?
Dr. Ireland: Right. If I understand the question correctly, why are biostandards not required?
Senator Klyne: In a standardized —
Dr. Ireland: So the standards are standardized within the species, so there is one for cervids, bees, dairy, beef. There are a number of them, and they are applicable to that sector. But every farm is unique. How they raise animals, what their risks are, what diseases they are trying to keep out or manage are all very unique. So we would want each producer to look at their risks, look at their own operations and tailor these standards to their premises.
That is the intent of the standards. That is why the elements of those are put into the national association programs, and then producers implement them.
Voluntary in nature or not, they are a cornerstone of agriculture and the way we raise animals and keep diseases out. Producers are best equipped to decide on their premises which protocols and practices they should put in place.
Senator Klyne: Thank you.
Senator Dalphond: Welcome to the committee. Do I properly understand that your agency is responsible for the enforcement of the Health of Animals Act? Normally, when you operate for transportation or an abattoir, you will send inspectors who will see the situation and find there’s a breach of the regulations or the law, and they will report it to somebody at the Justice Department or, as a matter of fact, most likely to the federal prosecutor’s office. You will make a report, and that will trigger the legal process. That’s my understanding. Am I correct?
Dr. Ireland: Yes.
Senator Dalphond: So if this bill were adopted, who would trigger the process? Because you’re not on the farm; inspectors won’t be there to witness what is happening and do their report in order to trigger the federal prosecutor’s office to get involved.
Dr. Ireland: I’ll pass that question to Dr. Rick James-Davies for his operational perspectives.
Mr. James-Davies: Thank you for the question. Similarly to what we discussed earlier, really, the CFIA’s role would be in partnership on those things. When an event occurs on a farm, particularly if it is related to trespass, we would expect that law enforcement would be the first responder on the farm. Again, with most livestock producers in Canada, their second phone call is going to be to their veterinarian. We would expect it would either be law enforcement or the private veterinarian who would then call the CFIA and bring us in if they felt that what had occurred on that farm fit the requirements of this bill, and that would be a discussion that the CFIA would have. We would triage that call and have a discussion with either law enforcement or the producer to better understand what had happened and then begin with an investigation or an inspection. Really, at that point, the facts are what lead us —
Senator Dalphond: I’m sorry to interrupt. I have limited time, but I understand that it would be something to work on.
You said biosecurity is a voluntary practice in Canada, and no rules are imposed on producers. You work with some associations of producers to develop protocols, and if these protocols are complied with or not, you’re not responsible; you’re not involved in that.
I understand that feeding minks with raw ground lungs was a practice your agency said shouldn’t be used. You advised against it, but it was being practised in Ontario to feed minks, and it resulted in a huge case of disease.
Don’t you feel that you need more power in the legislation to compel people to follow your instructions? And don’t you feel that these turkey, chicken and hog producers should be forced to implement what you’re suggesting?
Dr. Ireland: That’s an interesting question. The agency’s tradition of working with producers, their associations and the experts has served us very well in terms of preventing incursions of significant diseases, for example, African swine fever, which marches across the globe. Fortunately, we don’t have that disease here today. Fundamentals of these diseases require strong biosecurity. For the foot-and-mouth disease, also not in this country, a fundamental preventative measure is good biosecurity.
It’s to everybody’s advantage, including producers, to keep diseases out of their farms. These are economic units. It’s their livelihoods, and their health and well-being are important to them, as it is to the agency and the provincial governments.
So I think that collectively working together, finding solutions and understanding that different farms require different measures are important, and it’s how we have approached biosecurity in Canada, I would argue, with some success. Thank you.
Senator Plett: I apologize for being late. Being in a small group caucus, I have to run to a few too many meetings, so I apologize for that.
I did watch you, Ms. Ireland, on the television screen in my office for the last part of your comments and some of the questions. You’ve already answered some of the things that I was thinking about, but I want to clarify a few of them.
Senator Simons asked you at the very outset a question about whether there has been proof or evidence that trespassers have brought disease onto a farm. You said there’s no clear evidence, and we’ve heard that in the past. I would like you to simply give me an observation here.
With somebody who follows all the protocols that are required before he or she goes on a farm to make sure that their vehicle is disinfected, that they go through all the necessary protocols, shower in and shower out of the facility, versus somebody who tromps across the field from some other facility and trespasses onto a yard, goes and opens a barn door and walks in, who would you think poses the bigger risk of bringing in a disease: the person who has followed all the biosecurity measures or the person who is illegally and without due care and caution on the farm? Who do you believe poses the bigger risk?
Dr. Ireland: Thank you for the question. Individuals who enter a farm and are following biosecurity principles, including changing their clothing and footwear, disinfecting, washing their hands and bringing equipment that is clean, pose a lesser risk than those who do not. Those are key biosecurity considerations that a farmer would put in place in what I would call the containment zone, the area outside a farm. Then within a farm, in areas where animals are kept, that’s what we call a restricted zone, and their requirements would probably be elevated, for example, making sure that hands are clean when touching the animals, et cetera.
Certainly, individuals entering onto a farm and anyone in contact with an animal can transmit disease, but those following good biosecurity protocols would be my preference. Thank you.
Senator Plett: Thank you for that. Just further to what you’ve mentioned — and Senator Dalphond and Senator Klyne also talked about it — about the protocols being voluntary, to what level are they voluntary? In my previous life, my family plumbing and heating company — my boys still run it — worked on farms, more on hog farms than chicken and turkey, but nevertheless, on all farms. I know the hog industry fairly well with their pyramid schemes. They have sows, of course, and then they have weanlings and feeders, so it’s a pyramid. Even going from one barn to another in the same pyramid, there are protocols as far as how many days you have to be out of a barn before you can go in.
Two of the largest producers or operators in Canada are clearly Maple Leaf and HyLife, and they set these protocols. When they’re voluntary, to what point are they voluntary? They weren’t voluntary for my company; if we wanted to work for them, then we followed these protocols. They weren’t voluntary for us. I don’t believe they’re even voluntary for the farmer. They might be voluntary for Maple Leaf; I’m not sure. Can you elaborate a little bit on how voluntary they are?
Dr. Ireland: When I say they are “voluntary,” I mean they’re not regulated. So if they fail to adhere to a biosecurity standard, the CFIA is not involved. But you are right; producers will have established protocols in place and would most likely insist that people entering into the farm adhere to those, including service workers, veterinarians and their own workers. So the responsibility rests with the farmer to establish the protocols, enforce the protocols, communicate the protocols and make plans for biosecurity that are appropriate for their facility. Thank you.
Senator Plett: One last question, chair.
The Chair: I’ll put you on the next round.
Senator Plett: Are you sure that was five minutes already?
The Chair: Thirteen seconds short. Thank you.
Senator Burey: Thank you for your testimony.
I just have one simple question: Would this bill improve biosecurity on farms?
Dr. Ireland: Thanks, Mr. Chair. I won’t speak to this bill. I think I will circle back to my premise and insistence that strong biosecurity on farms is important. These measures are implemented by producers who have an important driver for keeping diseases out of their facilities. This is their livelihood. These are their animals. The CFIA, Agriculture and Agri-Food, provinces and territories and associations are all working together to give them the tools they need to put the appropriate biosecurity protocols in place. Thank you.
Senator Burey: Mr. Boucher, any comment?
Mr. Boucher: Thank you for the question. We do believe at AAFC that biosecurity on farms is very important. This bill in particular is not for me to speak to. I’m not a jurist, but definitely understanding that biosecurity threats and breaches on farms have a tremendous impact on farmers and producers as well, and anything that can be done to reinforce biosecurity on farms is definitely a desirable measure.
Senator Burey: That’s it. Thank you.
Senator McBean: I’m totally picking up from Senator Burey because it was exactly my question. Both of you said you weren’t going to speak to this bill, but that’s exactly what we’re doing: We’re speaking to the bill right now.
To start with you, Mr. Boucher, you said in your first five minutes that the goal of the AAFC was to mitigate risk and protect biosecurity. I know you’re not a jurist, but would the passing of Bill C-275 be a welcome tool? Do you think it would be helpful?
Mr. Boucher: Thank you for the question. Our interpretation in terms of what this bill is trying to achieve is just to reinforce the need for those who have legitimate concerns about biosecurity breaches on their farms to be able to work with the government authorities to be able to address those concerns. So from the point of view of that purpose, we do believe it is helpful, but I would not be able to speak to the labelling of the bill itself.
Senator McBean: Thank you.
Dr. Ireland, you said that the CFIA is responsible for inspection and has the authority to inspect and seize infected animals, I believe, amongst other things. Have you ever found that whistle-blowers or undercover investigators have provided valuable information to you that has led to an inspection? Have you ever gone to inspect somebody because someone has given you a tip?
Dr. Ireland: Mr. Chair, I’ll pass that question to Dr. James-Davies; thank you.
Mr. James-Davies: Thank you for that question. I think it really speaks to the partnership that Ms. Ireland outlined earlier; the main responsibility for on-farm welfare rests with our provincial counterparts and some of the organizations in each of the provinces. So it is absolutely true that in cases where evidence comes forward that suggests there might be a problem on an operation, the CFIA has worked in partnership with our provincial counterparts to be part of an investigation that happens on that farm to better understand what is going on. If there’s a linkage to transportation or federal abattoirs, again, we take all of those sources of information very seriously and use them in a way that further protects Canadian agriculture. So it would be absolutely true to say that those sources of information have been used in the past to trigger inspections and other actions.
Senator McBean: Just taking that, so would you say in the absence — if Bill C-275 were to pass, you would have fewer sources of information to lead you in investigations? Would you have fewer tools?
Mr. James-Davies: That would be really hard to speculate on because, again, each source of information is sort of unique. We get information from many sources. We hear from international trading partners; we hear from industry; we get trade complaints; we get complaints from private citizens in Canada. All of those form sort of a rich source of intelligence that we sift through; we triage and decide which of those are credible and worth following up on.
Senator McBean: Thank you.
Senator Pate: Thank you to the witnesses.
My question is along the same lines as those of my previous two colleagues. Is there anything that is needed to improve biosecurity in Canada on farms, and, if so, how and where would you see that improvement, and what would you recommend?
Dr. Ireland: I think the complex thing about biosecurity is that it needs to be consistently and rigorously done in order to keep infections out of farms, for example, or reduce the risk of transmission. That can be challenging. Days are busy for producers — new staff, new animals coming in. So it’s the consistency, the rigour of implementing biosecurity protocols that I think are key.
I think there’s space for new technologies, moving forward, that help producers. Certainly, we have learned a lot about biosecurity over the last three years with the incursions of highly pathogenic avian influenza. Over 400 premises in this country have been infected over the last three years. Over 11 million birds have been humanely euthanized or have died as a result.
As I mentioned earlier, in preventing HPAI into poultry flocks, a major tool is strong biosecurity. And it’s challenging to do, for sure. But, you know, we have learned a lot from that experience. Producers have made an incredible effort to increase their biosecurity in a space where there is high environmental contamination. Highly pathogenic avian influenza was brought into North America on wild waterfowl — that’s their natural host. And as they occupy fields and areas around farms, the contamination can happen on equipment or people’s footwear or infected birds.
The poultry producers have been through a very hard time over the last three years, and it’s underscored the importance of high biosecurity standards to be consistently applied, day after day, and it’s tough.
Senator Pate: That makes me think of something. When I’m travelling, there are some countries — I’m thinking particularly of the Global South and places like Australia and New Zealand — where they don’t just rely on you to advise them whether you’ve been on a farm. They’ll actually sometimes inspect your footwear and require that you take them off and have them cleaned. Are those types of measures things that Canada should be looking at as opposed to some of what is in this bill?
Dr. Ireland: Import controls are an important part of how we keep foreign animal diseases out of the country. The next time you’re in the airport, you might see a “don’t pack pork” sign. That is specifically targeted to travellers so they do not bring pork products from areas of the world that have African swine fever.
We have other import requirements: You will put on your declaration whether you’ve been to a farm in the last 14 days. We recently introduced new requirements for lactating dairy cattle reentering into Canada from the U.S. to avoid the accidental introduction of highly pathogenic avian influenza into our dairy herds.
We have a number of import requirements in place to help prevent foreign animal diseases from coming into this country, and those have also served us very well. Thank you.
Senator McNair: Following up on my colleague Senator Pate’s question and a little bit more pointed, Dr. Ireland, you’ve made it clear that biosecurity is critical for Canada, for our agriculture industry. In your opinion, should compliance with a minimum level of national biosecurity standards be made mandatory? If so, why, and if not, why not?
Dr. Ireland: Thank you for the question. Do you want to tackle that, Donald?
Mr. Boucher: Thank you for the question. As Dr. Ireland indicated, we have evidence that working with the provincial and territorial authorities with regard to on-farm practices has been serving us fairly well insofar as, again, farmers are the primary ones impacted. There’s a strong business case to have very strong biosecurity measures on farm. Whether there’s any data that suggests that making a certain minimum level mandatory would achieve more than we’re achieving right now, I think it’s more a matter of having a positive and constructive approach with those stakeholders to ensure that they continue — because it’s an ongoing effort — to maintain good biosecurity practices on the farm, and the positive collaborative approach has been quite successful so far. Thank you.
Senator McNair: Thank you.
Senator Richards: Thank you for being here. Do we have enough qualified men and women veterinarians to do the proper inspection in the various provinces, or are we always up against it in that regard? We seem to be up against it in the medical regard. I’m just wondering about veterinarians and inspections because it’s an ongoing thing. You must probably always be on your toes over this.
Dr. Ireland: Thank you, Mr. Chair. I’ll start and then pass it over to Dr. Rick James-Davies.
As Chief Veterinary Officer, I’m proud to represent here and in other places the over 600 veterinarians who work for the Canadian Food Inspection Agency coast to coast. They are highly trained, professional individuals who work very hard to keep animals healthy in this country, flocks and herds, and they work tirelessly on behalf of agriculture and to keep markets open, keep animals healthy and keep diseases out of this country.
I think part of the question, Mr. Chair, alluded to veterinary shortages. In Canada and other parts of the world, there is a general shortage of veterinarians, and the CFIA is not immune to that. We are working with our provincial colleagues, the Council of Chief Veterinary Officers, and also through what I call the Quads Alliance — that is the U.K., the U.S., New Zealand and Australia — to find solutions, to come up with innovative ideas to address the global shortage of veterinarians.
Before I pass it over, I did really want to underscore the important work that our CFIA veterinarians do each and every day to keep our animals safe.
Rick, over to you.
Mr. James-Davies: To answer very quickly because I know time is short, veterinarians are a rare commodity in Canada nowadays, whether it’s the ones we educate here in Canada or those who choose to move to Canada. The CFIA is always looking to hire good veterinarians, but also my private practice colleagues as well. It is difficult at times to find enough veterinarians to do all the things that they need to do.
Veterinarians are having to evolve and really focus on the places where they can make the single biggest impact. Historically, biosecurity — I’m old enough that we used to call it “on-farm animal health programs” — was a cornerstone of that. We recognized decades ago that working to prevent disease is a more sustainable model than what we used to call “fire-engine practice,” which was racing around to the farms to solve problems.
Senator Richards: What I was trying to say is that you guys would be the first to know if animals in a certain situation were being abused or maltreated, wouldn’t you? You guys in the veterinarian practice would be the first to know that, wouldn’t you?
Dr. Ireland: As I mentioned earlier, the oversight of animal welfare, with the exception of two areas, is a provincial responsibility, and veterinarians would be called upon if there were cases of animal cruelty because they are best positioned to understand the situation.
Senator Richards: That’s what I wanted to say. Thank you.
Senator Simons: We all agree biosecurity on farms is important, which is why I’m disquieted to hear you say that our standards are voluntary and that you’re not tracking the data. So we don’t actually know how big the problems are.
It would seem to be common sense that the bigger source of contamination might be from farmers not observing any standards than from protesters who have never been shown to track disease onto farms.
But let me ask you quickly: What about other jurisdictions? The United States, Australia, New Zealand, the U.K., the EU — are there any comparable jurisdictions to ours that have actually enforced standards for biosecurity?
Dr. Ireland: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Just to address the earlier point, my comment was related to whether the federal government tracked biosecurity or collected data, but as I mentioned earlier, the associations who have biosecurity as part of their mandatory programs for producers might be in a better position to advise on the data that they collect and the compliance with the standards because many of these programs are audited.
I will say that, in my experience, the United States has a similar approach to biosecurity as we do. I’m unable to comment on countries such as Australia and New Zealand, for example, but I would take a risk in saying that our approaches are similar.
Senator Klyne: While we have those thousands of viewers out there, I want to remind them of the mandate of the CFIA, which is to regulate the humane transport of animals and the humane treatment of food animals in federal abattoirs, and all slaughter of food animals is subject to the requirements for the humane treatment of animals in order to be licensed under the Safe Food for Canadians Act. I won’t get into the interprovincial and international trade.
With reference to the CFIA mandate, what are the current regulatory frameworks in place to ensure compliance with the best animal welfare practices on farms?
Dr. Ireland: As I mentioned, animal welfare in the CFIA mandate is around humane transportation as well as the humane handling of livestock in a federal abattoir. The purview of animal welfare falls to the provinces and is a joint responsibility, obviously, between animal owners and the provinces.
Senator Plett: Clearly, this bill is intended to keep people who shouldn’t be on the farm off the farm without permission or without protocols. The reason these people want to be there is, they tell us, because there is cruelty to animals.
Would you agree with me, Dr. Ireland, that the CFIA’s, the farmers’, the producers’ biggest reason for wanting to keep trespassers off of their property is because of fear of diseases, as you’ve already mentioned, or because they want to prevent people from seeing how they are farming, cruel or not cruel?
Dr. Ireland: Mr. Chair, I won’t speak to the views of others on this bill.
I think individuals going on to a farm should respect the producer’s standards for biosecurity and entry requirements. I think producers have a role to make sure they have biosecurity standards in place, signage for example, and other measures that present the entry of disease. It’s not limited to visitors; it’s other individuals coming on to a farm, workers, movement within a farm.
My answer is that it is important they have biosecurity measures in place and that people who go on to those premises follow those. Thank you.
Senator Dalphond: Ms. Ireland, before the House of Commons committee you said the current wording proposed in this bill poses legal risk. You refer to the Criminal Code, including prohibitions relating to trespassing and mischief and breaking and entering. You said:
There is a risk the prohibition may not be a valid exercise of federal agricultural power, which is understood to be limited to agricultural operations that are inside the farm gate.
You said that. Were you relying on some legal opinions to say that, because I understand you’re not a lawyer?
Dr. Ireland: Certainly, comments I make at committee are well informed, not only by science but by technical requirements around bills. Yes, I did say that. That would be accurate. My words at that time were accurate. Thank you.
Senator Dalphond: Thank you.
Senator Petitclerc: Briefly, I understand the standards and protocols are voluntary. When there is a biosecurity incident, are we keeping track of where, how and the sources? Is that even possible?
What are the causes and sources of those biosecurity incidents? Maybe it’s a long answer. Maybe we can get that information in committee?
Dr. Ireland: I need some clarity on the question. Are we keeping track?
Senator Petitclerc: If there is a biosecurity incident somewhere on a farm, for example, do they have a duty to report?
Dr. Ireland: No, because biosecurity is voluntary. There is no duty to report.
Senator Petitclerc: So we don’t know the sources of those incidents because they don’t report?
Dr. Ireland: If a producer had a disease identified, they would contact their veterinarian. They would be the expert to give them guidance on it.
The Chair: Witnesses, I would like to thank you for your participation this evening. Your testimony and insights have been appreciated.
Colleagues, for our second panel today we welcome in person Dr. Angela Rasmussen, Principal Research Scientist, Vaccine and Infectious Disease Organization, University of Saskatchewan. Thank you very much. Appearing online is Dr. Amy Greer, Associate Professor, Department of Population Medicine, Ontario Veterinary College, University of Guelph; and Dr. Jan Hajek, Clinical Assistant Professor (Infectious Disease Specialist), University of British Columbia.
Welcome, witnesses. We look forward to your testimony today. You’ll each have five minutes for your presentations, followed by questions. One minute out, I’ll raise my hand. When it’s close to wrapping up, both hands will be raised.
The floor is yours, Dr. Greer.
Amy Greer, Associate Professor, Department of Population Medicine, University of Guelph, as an individual: Thank you for the invitation to speak to the committee today. My research program is focused on understanding the introduction, spread and control of diseases, including in agricultural populations. This includes a strong focus on biosecurity research.
My interpretation of Bill C-275 is that it aims to impose penalties on individuals who unlawfully trespass on private agricultural property/attempt to gain access to agricultural animals housed on private property.
In the case of this proposed amendment, the penalties for such activities appear to be more significant and more consistent at a national level than those already laid out by individual provinces and territories and the Criminal Code of Canada.
Bill C-275 would do this by amending the Health of Animals Act. The amendment is being justified as a necessary step to improve external biosecurity on farms. The justification appears to be rooted in the idea that people entering farms “without lawful authority or excuse” represent a risk for introducing pathogens into herds or flocks because these individuals are unlikely to engage in the required biosecurity protocols to reduce the risk of intentionally or unintentionally introducing a pathogen.
The working assumption appears to be that this is in direct contrast to individuals on the property for lawful reasons, such as employees or service workers, who engage in specific biosecurity practices upon entering the property that aim to reduce the risk of introducing a pathogen.
I am certainly sympathetic to the mental stress and anguish experienced by Canadian farmers when individuals without lawful authority enter their private property, especially when a family calls that same property their home.
For me, it is important to recognize the actual risk of a pathogen being introduced into a herd or a flock, so a failure of external biosecurity, is a combination of two things: It is a combination of the probability of pathogen transmission given an effective contact and the frequency of occurrence of the effective contact.
Even for easily transmitted pathogens, the current frequency of these trespass occurrences at a national scale, to me, would be incredibly low compared to the frequency of the occurrence of farm contacts for lawful reasons.
As a result, the biosecurity risk associated with these trespass events is quite low. I am not aware of any documented events that are sufficiently supported by evidence that is available in the public domain of an external biosecurity breach initiated by an unlawful visitor or trespasser that has led to the introduction of a pathogen to a Canadian herd or flock leading to transmission within that herd or flock. Is it possible? Yes. Is it probable? I would say likely no.
So while I agree with the proposed Bill C-275 amendment as a possible mechanism to deter unlawful visitors from coming onto private property, it is difficult to say that the amendment would significantly improve external biosecurity within the context of the Health of Animals Act.
Under current conditions, the risk of pathogen introduction from trespassing is low just as a result of the significant difference in the sheer number of effective contacts. Adopting the amendment would certainly further reduce the frequency of trespass events but may not meaningfully improve external biosecurity, because these occurrences are incredibly rare. In this case, I expect the risk would likely go from being low now to being still quite low under the amendment. The change would likely be minimal.
Adopting the amendment does not in any way increase risk or change the risk profile of a pathogen introduction occurring in this way. The amendment would likely act as a deterrent for people considering trespassing, reducing an already small biosecurity risk further but not likely in a meaningful way compared to what that risk is currently. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Jan Hajek, Clinical Assistant Professor (Infectious Disease Specialist), University of British Columbia, as an individual: Thank you. I am an infectious disease doctor currently working in Vancouver. I worked in Toronto during SARS, in Newfoundland during the 2009 influenza pandemic and in West Africa in response to Ebola in 2014. I am concerned about the risk of future outbreaks and pandemics, and I take the issue of biosecurity seriously.
The majority of new outbreaks of infectious diseases are related to our interactions with animals, from the 2009 influenza pandemic, which was linked to pig farming in North America, to the COVID-19 pandemic, which was linked to animals sold and slaughtered in a live animal market in China. I don’t work directly with animals; I’m an infectious diseases doctor for people. However, there are a lot of similarity and interdependence between human and animal health.
Over the years, doctors have had an important role in improving agricultural policies. For example, we were instrumental in the introduction of restrictions on the use of medically important antibiotics for growth promotion on crowded farms. Prior to 2018, farming businesses did not need prescriptions from veterinarians and could import large quantities of antibiotics for animals on their farms without any government surveillance. These issues — antibiotic resistance and biosecurity — impact both animal and human health.
Regarding Bill C-275, last year, there was an open letter signed by 20 infectious disease specialists from across Canada, raising concern about the bill. This letter was sent to the House of Commons committee, and I have included this letter in my submission to this Senate committee.
The doctors were concerned that the way this bill was promoted misrepresented infectious diseases risks and misused people’s genuine concern about biosecurity to pass additional anti-trespass legislation. In stating the need for this bill, some individuals repeatedly made unfounded claims that trespassers had introduced infectious diseases on farms and pointed to devastating impact of diseases like BSE, or mad cow disease, a disease whose introduction had nothing to do with trespass.
It’s useful to consider the specific incidents. For example, in 2019, several people entered a pig farm in Quebec. These people sought to call attention to the conditions on the farm, but they did so illegally. They trespassed, broke the law and were arrested, prosecuted and sentenced for breaking and entering.
After the incident, the Quebec Ministère de l’Agriculture, des Pêcheries et de l’Alimentation investigated the farm. The report documented multiple biosecurity and welfare breaches on the farm. There was a sick animal present in need of medical attention. There was the accumulation of manure, overcrowding, a fly infestation and inadequate ventilation. I’m not saying that trespass is the answer here — it’s not — but I think this points to the benefits of more oversight and government inspection.
We’re often told that all farms in Canada adhere to strict and mandatory biosecurity measures, but the majority of these measures are voluntary, and they are not legally binding. Moreover, published peer-reviewed studies, including those that used video cameras, have repeatedly shown that adherence to biosecurity measures by workers on farms is variable and is often incomplete.
Fur farming is a case in point regarding biosecurity. Minks on fur farms can be fed raw ground-up pig lungs or chicken entrails despite the fact that this practice has led to influenza transmission to the minks. It’s important to note that unlike some other diseases, influenza typically does not cause severe disease in minks or lead to severe economic losses to those producers. In separate incidents, there were cases of COVID-19 that spread from workers to minks, acquired mutations and spread back to workers again.
In closing, trespassing is illegal. It should remain illegal. But I think it’s a lost opportunity that after all we have been through with COVID-19 — over 7 million people dead and massive economic losses — that this is the amendment to the Health of Animals Act that our governments have chosen to pass. This bill targets trespass on farms, which is an important issue, but it’s already illegal, and based on current realities, I don’t think this bill will substantially improve the health of animals.
I also want to address the issue of sweeping statements about trespassers versus workers being more at risk of biosecurity breaches. I think it’s very difficult to make that sweeping statement. For example, it’s duck hunting season now, and a worker who goes duck hunting has to be extremely careful to reduce those risks of transmission to chickens on the farm.
I don’t think trespass is good, but oversight and undercover reporting have led to the largest food recall in the United States, and has shown some — I think I see your hand up, so I’m going to stop. I apologize.
The Chair: You have 26 seconds.
Dr. Hajek: I was just going to say that undercover reporting and these kinds of things — I think they improve practices in hospitals and businesses as well as on farms.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Angela Rasmussen, Principal Research Scientist, Vaccine and Infectious Disease Organization, University of Saskatchewan, as an individual: Thank you very much for the invitation to come here and provide you with expert testimony today. I’m Angela Rasmussen. I’m a virologist and a principal research scientist at the Vaccine and Infectious Disease Organization at the University of Saskatchewan. I’m also an adjunct professor in the Department of Biochemistry, Microbiology and Immunology.
My laboratory studies emerging zooanthroponotic viruses — these are viruses that can be transmitted between animals, between humans or between both — and their impact on their human and animal hosts. Over the past five years, a major focus of my research program has been the interface between humans and animals where viruses can be transmitted between them. Specifically, this entails using both experimental and computational approaches to investigate the complex interactions that occur between viruses and their hosts.
Currently, I’m working on projects to assess pathogenesis — that’s the process by which viruses cause disease — and cross-species transmission risks for SARS-CoV-2, that’s COVID-19; MERS-CoV; the Mpox virus; and H5N1 avian influenza in the context of the U.S. dairy cattle outbreak.
In addition, I have worked on viruses that require high biocontainment, such as Ebola, for more than a decade. I previously held select agent clearance in the U.S. for six years. I held Human Pathogens and Toxins Act, or HPTA, clearance in Canada for two years, with my current renewal pending, and I have provided advice and contributed to the literature on biosafety and biosecurity policy in the U.S., where I’m originally from.
Relevant to the bill under consideration today, I have several ongoing projects that you might want to know about. I lead a pillar within the Canadian Institutes of Health Research–funded Coronavirus Variants Rapid Response Network, or CoVaRR-Net, to assess the risks of establishing new animal reservoirs for SARS-CoV-2 in North America.
In the course of this work, I have also co-authored research that investigates the origin of the COVID-19 pandemic, which evidence indicates occurred via zoonotic spillover from animals to humans associated with the wildlife trade in Wuhan, China. Our latest study showing the presence of live animals at the Wuhan market was published last Thursday in the highly regarded journal Cell.
I have also contributed to phylogenetic and virological analyses of the H5N1 dairy cattle outbreak in the U.S. On this topic, I served as a witness to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Agriculture and Agri-Food earlier this year, as well as briefed the Public Health Agency of Canada’s expert group on avian influenza.
I am also regularly briefed in closed sessions with the U.S. Department of Agriculture, or USDA, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, or CDC, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, or FDA, and the Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response in the U.S., or ASPR, on the H5N1 outbreak specifically in cattle.
My lab is currently supported by the Canadian Institutes of Health Research as well as the U.S. National Science Foundation and the U.S. National Institutes of Health, specifically the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, or NIAD.
Today, I’m really honoured to be here and provide witness testimony for you as you discuss this bill. Thank you very much.
The Chair: Thank you to our witnesses.
Senator Simons: Thank you very much. Three such extraordinary witnesses, and you have really underlined for us that this isn’t just a question of animal health but of potential impacts on human health.
I want to ask you this: If you were listening to our last round of testimony, you heard, along with us, that to a great extent biosecurity on farms is voluntary, but if there are outbreaks on farms, farmers are not required to report that to the CFIA, and the CFIA is not tracking data on the number of farms that are observing biosecurity protocols.
If we’re serious about biosecurity and preventing zoonotic transmission, can you think of things other than this bill that might be of more practical use to mitigate the dangers of outbreaks on farms? Maybe, Dr. Greer, I’ll start with you.
Ms. Greer: When we come to the idea of biosecurity being voluntary, I think it’s important for us to recognize that “voluntary” essentially means that there is a whole suite of possible biosecurity measures. There is very good evidence for the sorts of things that we know work to create strong biosecurity.
What happens is individual producers, as we heard in the earlier panel, work in very close contact with their individual veterinary advisers, so their flock or herd veterinarians. They work with that individual to come up with a biosecurity plan that is tailored. It relies on the voluntary kind of suite of possibilities, and each of those producers is working with their veterinarian, their Canadian veterinarian, who is very professional and very well trained, to identify the suite of tools that they as a production unit will use for their facility in order to maintain high levels of biosecurity.
As we also heard, that is further enhanced by the fact that many of the producer groups also have additional biosecurity best practices that are a part of that process. While they are voluntary, they are certainly well informed by the science, in my opinion. They are well informed by the practice of veterinary medicine, and, in my opinion, most producers are really making important and considerate decisions about the implications of failures to biosecurity within their farm. So I think that’s important to consider when we think about biosecurity.
Ms. Rasmussen: I strongly agree with what Dr. Greer just said, and I would like to highlight something that Dr. Ireland said in the previous session, and that is the point that every farm is unique. Every pathogen is unique. Every species of host is unique. So the measures that we would take to protect, say, a poultry flock against highly pathogenic avian influenza are different than the measures that we would take for a pork producer or, at this point, a dairy producer.
One of the reasons, I would say, from my experience with the H5N1 dairy cattle outbreak in the United States, is that there were no biosecurity measures in place for those dairy cattle because there was no evidence, and it was thought, scientifically, that dairy cattle were not at risk of contracting avian influenza. That’s not the case for poultry, and that’s not the case for swine.
So this changes, and it can change depending on the type of operation. It can change — there are big differences, for example, if you have a dairy operation of thousands of dairy cows versus a small family farm.
The issue I see with this bill, in terms of what would be better, is that this is a broadly applicable bill, and this is not a one-size-fits-all type of problem.
Senator Simons: What do you think about the fact that these diseases are not reportable and that the CFIA is not tracking biosecurity protocols on farms? Would you prefer to see something stronger?
Dr. Hajek: So I think people are experts in biosecurity on farms, and that’s not my particular expertise, but I could say that surveillance and monitoring for things are very important. I do think that if there are industry groups who are doing this, it should be kind of surveyed with the government. It should be reported to the government. We should be testing for flu on minks and have more surveillance, more testing and more monitoring, with measures to document if that adherence is being met to try to help people maintain good standards.
Senator Simons: Thank you very much to all three of you. This has been most helpful.
Senator Klyne: Welcome to our guests here, and thanks for your presentations.
My first question is for Professor Greer. To what extent does the current legislative framework in Canada allow for enforcement of biosecurity measures during a zoonotic disease outbreak despite the voluntary standards?
Ms. Greer: Certainly, I can speak to the area of this question which is within my expertise. I’m not a legal expert. If the pathogen of interest here were a notifiable disease, there is very clearly a process in place whereby that would be very rapidly actioned. So if a producer identified that they had a problem on the farm, their first call is going to be to their veterinarian. The veterinarian is going to come; they are going to observe the situation, and they are going to collect specimens if necessary. All of that sets in motion a very specific and robust process for further action should that be required.
So it really depends on whether or not the pathogen is a notifiable disease, in which case there is already an existing framework for addressing that.
Senator Klyne: Thank you.
Dr. Rasmussen, do you agree with the statement from MP Barlow that anyone entering a breeding site, enclosure or biosecurity zone without authorization should be deemed to pose a risk, even if they comply with the biosecurity protocols? Why or why not?
Ms. Rasmussen: That’s a tricky question because, technically, I suppose, you could have somebody who is not authorized to normally access an area like that but who is a guest who is being supervised, and that is allowed. That would not be a risk — a higher risk — if that person was supervised, was following all those biosecurity procedures and had been trained in those biosecurity procedures.
Again, this is going to be very site-specific. It’s going to be very facility-specific. So it’s a tricky question to answer because the answer is “maybe.”
Senator Klyne: Professor Hajek, what specific biosecurity gaps are left unaddressed by Canada’s voluntary approach, and how might these gaps contribute to the risk of zoonotic disease transmission? In particular, what role does Bill C-275 play in addressing biosecurity risks? Does it sufficiently close the gaps left by the voluntary nature of the national standards?
Dr. Hajek: I think, as we heard in testimony, that there was no disease outbreak that was caused by a trespasser, as far as we know, that they were all related to other industry practices and that trespass is already illegal. So I’m not sure — I do not see how this bill addresses a gap. I don’t see it. I think there are many ways to improve biosecurity measures. I think we’re always improving, and more monitoring, more surveillance and more oversight would help strengthen our biosecurity measures.
Senator Klyne: Professor Hajek, in an article you co-authored with another infectious disease specialist which appeared in the National Observer, you said:
In justifying the need for Bill C-275, several politicians repeatedly stated that trespassing protesters caused infectious disease outbreaks — including diarrheal disease at a Quebec pig-breeding operation.
These are serious allegations that prompt a response. But they are also false and not supported by evidence. . . .
Could you please elaborate on this and whether, in your view, this bill represents an instance of fair, evidence-based legislation?
Dr. Hajek: Yes. That sentiment was also shared by other infectious diseases doctors who co-authored and signed a letter to the House of Commons committee. We were concerned that people are using people’s genuine concerns about infectious diseases.
If we heard that trespassers were introducing diseases on farms — that there were some gaps in that — it would be important to address that. I think that was misrepresented.
Senator Klyne: Thank you.
[Translation]
Senator Oudar: I’m going to ask my question in French, but the witnesses should feel free to answer in their preferred language.
I’m going to continue with the question asked by Senator Simons, because as I listened to the previous speakers, I must confess I was quite concerned about the agency not monitoring, not having any data and saying that each farmer must make their own biosecurity standards. I’m learning this now, and I don’t think Canadians are aware of it.
It’s worrisome, in a way, because the agency is not tracking incidents either, which means we don’t have a picture of the situation. We don’t have one, legislators don’t have one, and you don’t have one either as scientists, because incidents aren’t being tracked.
In the same vein as what Senator Simons said, what do you think about that? Is this what we should be doing as a state or as a country, or should we have a different approach?
Should we give farmers the freedom to create their own biosecurity standards? What if there were no universal standards to protect herds, animals, people and, ultimately, Canadians?
The question is for all the witnesses, starting with Dr. Greer.
[English]
Ms. Greer: I have to say that my French is quite terrible, unfortunately, and since I didn’t have the translation, I’m a bit fearful to answer a question that I only think I partially understand.
The Chair: You could have gotten translation through one of the buttons at the bottom. We’ll move on to Dr. Hajek.
[Translation]
Dr. Hajek: I didn’t get the translation either.
[English]
However, I speak some French, and I think I understood the question.
There are some biosecurity laws in Canada. For example, we cannot feed pigs meat, and we can no longer feed cows bone meal. That practice led to mad cow disease, or bovine spongiform encephalopathy. However, many of these are linked to industry. There should be more monitoring and surveillance of those kinds of things. It is like antibiotic use. These are public health issues and in the interests of all Canadians; these are not just local issues for one particular business.
So I do think more oversight, monitoring and legal standards would help us improve our biosecurity.
The Chair: We have now fixed interpretation services for our witnesses. Senator Oudar, please briefly ask the question again.
[Translation]
Senator Oudar: I’ll rephrase my question and try to be brief.
So, if I may, the question I asked earlier had to do with my surprise at hearing the previous speaker say that biosecurity standards were not national standards, that they were not only voluntary, but developed by each farmer at their own discretion, according to each one’s production.
We continued the discussion with the agency, asking for monitoring and data, and advised us that they didn’t have any. So we were astonished to hear that everyone was setting their own biosecurity standards, but that there was no tracking of safety incidents that occurred in the past. As legislators, we have no data, and as scientists, neither do you.
if you can’t rely on data produced by the agency, data produced after incidents that have occurred, how can you reassure the public? As scientists and experts, you told us at the beginning that biosecurity was important to you. Are you suggesting that there should be national standards? Should we be doing something other than voluntary standards? What do we need to do to protect people, animals and all Canadians?
Finally, what are other countries doing? Do farmers have to decide which standards to apply or not? Are inspections done elsewhere?
I’d love to hear what you have to say about this.
[English]
Ms. Greer: Thank you for the question, and my apologies.
It’s important to differentiate between “voluntary” where a producer just picks whatever they want to do. That’s a misconception. Essentially, if a producer said, “Hey, there are these biosecurity recommendations, and it’s a thick book, and there are many recommendations, so I’m only going to do one of these things. I’m going to wash my hands and not do any of the other recommendations,” that’s not going to fly with their veterinary provider.
It’s important to recognize that although we say the standards are voluntary, it is not that producers are picking the lowest option and doing that. Biosecurity is in the best interests of producers. Biosecurity is in the best interests of animal health and welfare, and biosecurity is in the best economic interests of producers as well.
As was said earlier, many industry groups do collect data. They do audits and a number of things to quantify biosecurity. Those groups would be able to provide, I expect, additional details regarding what those audits tell us. Certainly, though, biosecurity is important.
When we talk about it as voluntary, it undermines the seriousness of the situation. In our research, when we talk to producers, producers really understand biosecurity; they know what is important. The vast majority of them are implementing very rigorous biosecurity.
Dr. Hajek: I tried to answer it before, but maybe I would say “legally binding” — say, for example, I was a farmer, and it’s duck hunting season. I went hunting ducks, and I went home, and I rushed into the farm — perhaps I was a worker — and it led to an H1N1 influenza outbreak on my farm. I could legally apply to the CFIA for support to deal with that outbreak, and I wouldn’t be faced with legal penalties for biosecurity breaches. I think the idea is that the fact they are voluntary means that they’re not legally mandated.
Ms. Rasmussen: I defer to Dr. Greer on policy matters, but I will say from my observation of the U.S. H5N1 outbreak that it would be very challenging to impose legal requirements that would suit every farm and would be appropriate for every situation to regulate biosecurity. There are so many potential ways that biosecurity can be breached, and not just by humans.
The H5N1 outbreak in dairy cattle began from an undetected zoonotic spillover from a wild bird onto a farm in Texas. It was not detected for four months, which is why it’s so widespread. There’s excessive movement of cattle in the United States, which is why it’s now all over the place in geographically distant areas. Imposing a one-size-fits-all legal framework to try to enforce this doesn’t address risks like that at all, and it doesn’t even address the biosecurity needs of different producers in different states with differently sized operations.
I think it’s very challenging to make policy for this, but as Dr. Greer said, voluntary policies aren’t self-regulation and completely voluntary either.
Senator Pate: To follow up on your last point, what would you recommend? We have the responsibility of looking at legislation. Are there laws that would potentially assist in this process?
Ms. Rasmussen: Unfortunately, because I’m much more familiar with the American legal system, I can comment more on American policy. I can also, because I’m a U.S. voter and not a Canadian voter, comment on what I don’t like about it.
I think one of the biggest problems in the U.S. facing this outbreak, maybe to a degree shared by Canada, is that the states and the federal government are somewhat disentangled, and they have different responsibilities for different aspects of the outbreak. Some states have been extremely proactive — like Michigan, Colorado and California now — in terms of implementing testing and epidemiological measures to contain the outbreak in their states. The federal government has certainly been heavily involved in supporting all of this work, but some states haven’t necessarily responded the same way, and even though the federal government remains supportive, it’s very difficult sometimes to get the producers to want to participate in some of the containment measures that are needed.
That’s a real challenge for passing laws if you have a law that effectively doesn’t provide support for the producers, which is the case in the U.S. Now, the ELAP program, or Emergency Assistance for Livestock, Honey Bees, and Farm-raised Fish, has been expanded by the USDA, which partially compensates farmers for their losses in production. I think measures like that are the types of laws that can provide some incentives to enhance biosecurity and outbreak response. Right now, in many states, there’s an incentive not to test your herd at all, because you don’t want it to be positive because you’re going to lose money in production. That’s not a good way to respond to an outbreak, and, certainly, if you’re in that position, you’re not necessarily going to be inclined to implement biosecurity measures just because the federal government tells you to.
Considering legislation that can improve this can also improve some of the logistical details on farms. For example, there were several human cases in the U.S. on poultry operations where people were culling a lot of poultry — thousands of birds all at once. It was extremely hot, in the middle of the summer, in the south, over 100 degrees Fahrenheit — that’s over 40 degrees Celsius — and people were not comfortable. It’s not safe in some of those conditions to wear the appropriate personal protective equipment. In my opinion, the legislation that’s actually going to be effective needs to be flexible and needs to provide support to the people, the workers and producers, who are going to be most affected and incentivize adhering to these biosecurity standards and practices.
Senator Pate: So it is not just prohibitions; it’s actually providing the supports.
Ms. Rasmussen: Exactly because as Dr. Greer pointed out, biosecurity is something producers want to do. They have an economic interest and an animal health care and welfare interest in adhering to biosecurity procedures. Nobody wants an animal disease on their farm, so if you make it so that there is an incentive to participate and to cooperate with regulators and with biosecurity practices and recommendations, including collaborating with industry, then, I think, you’re going to be much more successful at implementing effective biosecurity measures than if you just outright prohibit people from coming on to a property if they’re not following ill-defined biosecurity procedures.
Senator Pate: Thank you.
Senator McBean: I need to put my hand up faster because it’s the second time I’ve been somewhat pre-empted by the person right in front of me. I was going to ask you to compare Canada and the United States. I think you kind of have that with the provinces and the states, but maybe I will take it further. Are there programs internationally, for example in Europe, where they have come up with similar practices or legislation that would be helpful in this discussion?
Ms. Rasmussen: I can’t speak to legislation in Europe, and I can’t speak to legislation in Canada either, since I’m still a permanent resident learning about the Canadian legal system.
However, I am part of several consortia that include a number of European investigators, so I’ve certainly talked with them about their biosecurity practices. They are specific to, of course, law both within the EU and within the individual European countries that are implementing these. But they’re similar to things that have been done in the U.S. and Canada in the sense that it’s more carrots than sticks, I suppose, and it is somewhat voluntary.
Again, it is difficult also to effectively legislate this. There are going to be different needs from farm to farm, from operation to operation and, in my business, from lab to lab. You have to take those facility-specific, pathogen-specific and species-specific things into account when you’re designing an effective biosecurity plan if you want it to work.
You can pass laws that seem as though they’re going to work, but that doesn’t mean that they’re going to work for everybody. Viruses, unfortunately, as we’ve seen many times now, are increasingly occurring. All it takes is one infected host to create an outbreak and sometimes a pandemic. Would I argue for passing rigid legislation that will address maybe one thing for one subset of these farms in any country? No, I’m going to advocate for the most effective way that’s going to work for everybody.
Senator McBean: There seems to be a chorus on this panel on that.
Dr. Greer, you said in your research that the vast majority of producers are observing strict biosecurity measures. I took that “vast” as not being everybody. Is this gap ignorance or intent? Do you find that people are intentionally not observing strict biosecurity, or are they ignorant to it and looking forward to stepping it up?
Ms. Greer: Thank you for the question. I think it is neither ignorance nor — I can’t remember what the other one you said was, but I think it’s neither of those.
We’ve done a number of biosecurity studies where we sit down with producers and talk to them about their perceptions and attitudes around biosecurity. One of the most interesting things that emerges is that they understand biosecurity, and they work very hard to implement high levels of biosecurity for their specific situation, whatever production group they’re part of and whatever is recommended for their specific species. What tends to be the biggest challenge is the logistical and operational issues. High staff turnover means that you’re continually having to train new employees, and that takes a lot of time. On many of these farms, there’s a lot of work to do; it’s an agricultural property. That’s a key component. Most of the issues are logistical or operational, and certainly not because of ignorance or intent.
Senator Dalphond: Thank you. I find myself in the same situation as Senator McBean, which is that I had a very good question. I will follow up on this: Dr. Hajek, you’re one of the signatories to this interesting letter; on the second page, you refer to the practice of feeding minks raw ground lungs from pigs, which has led to influenza, despite the Canadian Food Inspection Agency advising against this practice. So how do you explain that? Everybody is supposed to be mindful of biosecurity; the Canadian Food Inspection Agency advised against that practice, yet the practice continued.
Dr. Hajek: Yes, I was concerned about this. Minks are very susceptible to influenza, and they’re at risk of getting influenza from humans and bird influenza or swine influenza. There was an outbreak on a fur farm in Nova Scotia that was traced to feeding minks raw pig lungs. In B.C., when we had outbreaks of COVID on mink fur farms, they tested the minks for COVID, and they found there was also influenza on those minks. It wasn’t definitively linked, but those minks were also fed raw poultry.
We’ve legislated against raw meat for pigs; we’ve legislated against bone meal for cows. I think it would be beneficial to give the CFIA strength to make some of those things legal requirements. I appreciate there are many differences in farms, but if there are some strictly mandated things by industries, maybe we could make those legally binding or make those publicly available or monitor them. It’s also a challenge for hospitals. You can imagine washing hands. We have to follow biosecurity measures here quite a lot, too, and we do have things like auditing and practice improvements to help us all better adhere to biosecurity measures.
Senator Dalphond: Thank you.
Senator Petitclerc: I have a question for Professor Hajek. I’m hoping it’s not too much speculation, but I want to have your input on that. It has been documented, and we’ve heard it in committee as well in some of the letters that we received, that the work of undercover journalists has played some role in raising the bar when it comes to animal welfare. When we look at this bill, we’ve been hearing that it may not have a significant impact on biosecurity, but because we’re focusing on the trespassing, it could have a negative impact on animal welfare.
Dr. Hajek: First, I don’t like the idea of misusing infectious disease risks to pass legislation. I think that should not be happening. We should use legitimate infectious disease risks and target those, but not use threats of infectious disease to pass anti-trespass legislation. Undercover investigations are helpful, and my understanding from some of the testimony is that there is a concern that if there are provinces with legislation against undercover reporting, that would make people who enter farms undercover subject to this legislation. That’s my understanding of how this could impact undercover investigations.
Senator Petitclerc: Thank you. I don’t want to push it, but if we have an impact on undercover investigations, can we say that we possibly would have an impact on animal welfare?
Dr. Hajek: I think so. For example, in B.C., the largest dairy farm had an undercover investigation, and undercover video showed horrendous abuse. The industry didn’t like it, the owners didn’t like it, and it helped having that undercover investigation document this. I don’t think trespass is the way to do it, but some kind of surveillance and monitoring would improve things. We can question why all the trespass is happening. What are the reasons? Some people have concerns that there is a lack of transparency in the industry, to try to cover things, and perhaps having more transparency, more openness and third-party investigations would help with that.
Senator Petitclerc: Thank you.
[Translation]
Senator Oudar: My question is for Dr. Greer.
You stated in your opening remarks that the risk of a pathogen being introduced into a herd was low, that it was possible but unlikely — you will correct me if I’m wrong — and that incidents were rare.
When I look at article 9.1 of the bill, since we are here today to study the bill, I see that the end of the article — I think you will be reassured by the wording at the end — reads as follows:
No person shall, without lawful authority or excuse, enter a building or other enclosed place in which animals are kept, or take in any animal or thing...
Imagine a camera.
...if their entering such a place or taking in the animal or thing could reasonably be expected to result in the exposure of the animals to a disease or toxic substance that is capable of affecting or contaminating them.
A triple test practically has to be done. I think the precautionary principle applies. I wanted to hear what you had to say about the wording of the article, which seems to me to be in line with what you said — I don’t want to misrepresent that — but you told us that while incidents were rare, there had to be potential for contamination. So the article would not apply if there was no likely risk of exposing the animals to a toxic disease that could contaminate them. How do you see the wording of article 9.1 in relation to what you said in your opening remarks?
[English]
The Chair: Dr. Greer, would you prefer to send in a written response to that?
Ms. Greer: I can if you would prefer me to do that.
The Chair: We are coming to the end, so could we ask you to send a written response to the clerk within the next couple of days?
Thank you, Senator Oudar. I just have to keep to the time and the end of the committee meeting.
Colleagues, that brings us to the end of this testimony.
Witnesses, thank you very much for your testimony and your participation. It’s very much appreciated.
Colleagues, thank you for your active participation, as always, and your thoughtful questions. My goodness, the questions are very thoughtful, and I really do appreciate that. We might have to extend our committee meetings.
I also want to take a moment to thank our staff who support the work of this committee — the interpreters, the Debates team transcribing the meeting, the committee room attendants, the multimedia services technicians, the broadcasting team, the recording centre, the Information Services Directorate and our page, who is very capable. Thank you very much, Elliott.
Colleagues, I’ll be asking you at the end of the next meeting, on Thursday, whether we’ve heard enough testimony. Think about this: Are there other witnesses we need to hear before we move to clause by clause? I’ll ask you that at the end of the next meeting.
(The committee adjourned.)