THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS
EVIDENCE
OTTAWA, Monday, May 6, 2024
The Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights met with videoconference this day at 4:16 p.m. [ET] to examine such issues as may arise from time to time relating to human rights generally.
Senator Salma Ataullahjan (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: I am Salma Ataullahjan, a senator from Toronto and chair of the committee. Today, we are conducting a public hearing of the Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights.
Before we begin, I would like to remind all senators and other meeting participants of the following important preventative measures. To prevent disruptive and potentially harmful audio feedback incidents during our meeting that could cause injuries, we remind all in-person participants to keep their earpieces away from all microphones at all times.
As indicated in the communiqué from the Speaker to all senators on Monday, April 29, the following measures have been taken to help prevent audio feedback incidents. All earpieces have been replaced by a model which greatly reduces the probability of audio feedback. The new earpieces are black in colour, whereas the former earpieces were grey. Please only use a black, approved earpiece. By default, all unused earpieces will be unplugged at the start of a meeting. When you are not using your earpiece, please place it face down on the middle of the round sticker that you see in front of you on the table, where indicated. Please consult the card on the table for guidelines to prevent audio feedback incidents. Please ensure that you are seated in a manner that increases the distance between microphones. Participants must only plug in their earpieces to the microphone console located directly in front of them. These measures are in place so that we can conduct our business without interruption and to protect the health and safety of all participants, including the interpreters. Thank you all for your cooperation.
I will now invite my honourable colleagues to introduce themselves.
Senator Gerba: Amina Gerba from Quebec.
Senator Omidvar: Ratna Omidvar, Toronto.
Senator Arnot: David Arnot, from Saskatchewan.
Senator Pate: Kim Pate. Welcome. I live here in the unceded, unsurrendered territory of the Algonquin Anishinaabeg.
The Chair: Welcome, senators, and to all those who are following our deliberations. Today, our committee will continue its study on forced global displacement under its general order of reference. This afternoon, we shall have three panels. In each panel, we shall hear from the witnesses, and then the senators around this table will have a question-and-answer session.
I will now introduce our first panel. Our witness has been asked to make a five-minute opening statement. With us at the table, please welcome William Deere, Director, Washington Representative Office, from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. I now invite Mr. Deere to make his presentation.
William Deere, Director, Washington Representative Office, United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East: Thank you, Madam Chair.
Members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear today to discuss the situation in Gaza. I serve as director of UNRWA’s representative office for Canada and the United States. I’d like to request my full statement be made part of the record. I will briefly summarize it now.
On behalf of the 30,000 staff at UNRWA, let me begin by thanking the Canadian people and its government for their ongoing support of the agency. Over the past two years that I have been running the Washington office, necessity has required me to reach out to the Canadian government on short notice several times in search of critical support. Each time, Canada has been there for us, which is part of my motivation to appear here today in person in order to say, “Thank you, Canada.”
UNRWA was established by UN General Assembly resolution following the 1948 war. In the absence of a just and lasting solution to the Palestine refugee issue, the General Assembly has continuously renewed UNRWA’s mandate, most recently until June 30, 2026.
The recent independent review of UNRWA, led by former French foreign minister Catherine Colonna, concluded:
In the absence of a political solution between Israel and the Palestinians, UNRWA remains pivotal in providing life-saving humanitarian aid and essential social services, particularly in health and education, to Palestinian refugees in Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the West Bank. As such, UNRWA is irreplaceable and indispensable to Palestinians’ human and economic development.
Let me pause at this moment to discuss the differences between UNRWA and our sister agency, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR.
UNHCR does not have a mandate over Palestine refugees receiving protection and assistance from UNRWA within our five fields of operation. Unlike UNHCR, UNRWA does not have a mandate to resettle Palestine refugees and has no authority to seek lasting, durable solutions for refugees.
Even if UNRWA were to cease providing protection or assistance to Palestine refugees without a resolution to their plight and they were to fall under UNHCR’s mandate, they would still be refugees and retain their rights, including the right of return, under UN General Assembly resolution 194.
Even prior to October 7, Gaza, with its 1.6 million registered Palestine refugees, utilized the largest amount of UNRWA services. Given that agency’s existing operational footprint in Gaza, UNRWA has led the humanitarian response to the ongoing tragedy.
On April 24, Sigrid Kaag, Senior Humanitarian and Reconstruction Coordinator for Gaza, told the UN Security Council that UNRWA is pivotal in providing life-saving humanitarian aid and essential social services to Palestine refugees.
As such, UNRWA is irreplaceable and indispensable as a humanitarian lifeline and must be allowed to deliver on its mandate.
The UNRWA fields of operation make the agency no stranger to working in conflict situations. In Gaza today, it is UNRWA’s latest, finest hour. Over 2,500, of our staff, most of whom have been displaced multiple times, stay on the job, supported by an additional 3,000 Gazans helping them as part of our job creation program. My UNRWA colleagues are present at border crossings and operating warehouses and distribution centres. They are providing critical support at UNRWA facilities still standing. Our health teams continue to work at our eight remaining health centres and at 86 medical points at 56 shelters, treating approximately 20,000 patients a day.
Making the humanitarian relief mission even harder, the diplomatic privileges and immunities associated with the United Nations, its staff and facilities have been rendered largely meaningless in this conflict. In March, two of my colleagues perished during a drone strike on UNRWA’s main logistics facility in Rafah. One of them, a husband and father of two, died while in the act of stacking diapers for humanitarian delivery.
Today, UNRWA finds its work once again under existential threat. Even with the generous support from Canada, the agency only has funding sufficient to operate through the end of June. UNRWA Commissioner-General Lazzarini recently told the UN General Assembly and UN Security Council that the agency is facing a deliberate and concerted campaign to undermine its operations and ultimately end them. Recall, these are operations that are mandated by the UN General Assembly itself.
UNRWA echoes the call of UN Secretary-General Guterres for a humanitarian ceasefire, the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages and a massive surge in humanitarian aid. UNRWA hopes that the member states of the UN commit to facilitating the long overdue political process culminating in a solution that can bring peace to Palestinians and Israelis and to chart the transition of UNRWA in this context.
Finally, we hope member states will provide the support that UNRWA needs to operate and to close the gap between UNRWA’s mandate and funding model. The agency cannot fulfill the mandate without commensurate funding from member states.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear today. Thank you, Canada. I look forward to answering your questions.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Deere, for your presentation.
We will now proceed to questions from senators. Dear colleagues, you have five minutes for your question, including the answer. We have 45 minutes, and we can always put your name back on second round.
Senator Omidvar: Thank you, Mr. Deere, for being with us.
I just read the headlines. Hamas has accepted a ceasefire. I don’t know whether or not this will actually result in a ceasefire. Could you comment on what it will mean for flowing aid by UNRWA through regular managed channels to people in need in Gaza?
Mr. Deere: Senator, thank you for the question.
I, too, was briefed on that this morning. I mentioned to the chair that I could have written a whole new testimony based on just the news over the last 24 hours. We do hope that it’s a ceasefire that can hold.
To answer your question, it will mean everything. One of the things that folks don’t always understand is that any UN agency — UNRWA, WFP — doesn’t just wake up in the morning and say, “We’re going to go there and deliver that.” Everything has to be coordinated with — “deconflicted” is the term we use. You have seen an incident with the World Central Kitchen, and you have seen the example that I discussed about our facility in Rafah. We have a moving picture of one of our UN trucks — thank goodness it was a double truck because the second one was hit by naval gunfire. We need a cessation in hostilities so we can move freely and bring in continuous aid at scale. That is the important part of a ceasefire.
Senator Omidvar: Do you have the funds available to go to scale at this point?
Mr. Deere: I will have to provide that information for the record. It’s a hard question to answer simply because we recently put out an emergency appeal for $1.2 billion for what we see are the needs of Gaza between now and the end of the year. As I mentioned in my testimony, senator, the agency itself is under existential threat. Right now, we’re living month to month. That’s not to say that some of this burden will be able to be absorbed by other UN agencies. In my full statement, I do make it clear that while it is the finest hour for my colleagues, of whom I’ve lost 182 in this conflict, it is incredible to see the cooperation between UN agencies in delivering aid. As my colleague who heads our Gaza operations said, it’s really hard some days to figure out where one agency ends and another begins because the cooperation is so good.
Senator Omidvar: Would you comment on the accusations that have been made against your agency by various parties about affiliations with Hamas, et cetera, and how that has impacted voluntary contributions to your agency?
Mr. Deere: Yes, senator, and thank you. It’s a hard question, but it’s an appreciated question.
The United Nations has acted, I believe, swiftly and decisively in the face of the accusations that were levied in late January by the Government of Israel. By that, I mean the commissioner general of UNRWA immediately terminated the named individuals, invoking his authority to act for the good of the agency. But we didn’t stop there. Working in cooperation with Secretary-General Guterres, we have brought in the Office of Internal Oversight Services, OIOS. It’s our equivalent of the Inspector General. The Inspector General is on the ground in the region, working with the Israeli government, among others, to investigate the veracity of the allegations that were levied against the 12 individuals. As you have might have seen from recent reporting from the Secretary-General’s spokesperson, Stéphane Dujarric, that number morphs a little bit. Some have been dropped and some have been added. Now, I believe, it stands at 14.
The UN took a second step. Secretary-General Guterres, acting in concert with my boss, the Commissioner-General of UNRWA, also commissioned an independent outside review of the agency. The outside review was led by former French foreign minister Colonna, and it was to look at UNRWA’s neutrality operations. What does it do to teach neutrality to its staff? What does it do in the face of accusations about the staff? The conclusion was that, in a nutshell, UNRWA takes more and better action than any other UN agency or NGO in the space of neutrality. It was also a fair and balanced report. It also said, you can always do better. It laid out a set of approximately 50 recommendations across basically eight tiers of categories. Commissioner-General Lazzarini instantly committed to implementing all 50 of those recommendations. Within the next few weeks, we will be presenting a detailed implementation plan of how we’re going to get there.
Senator, in short, I don’t know what more one could have done in the face of that. We acted swiftly. We acted decisively. One aspect of the Colonna report came back and said, frankly, that Israel has provided no information to support the allegation that there is broad affiliation between our agency’s employees and Hamas.
Senator Omidvar: Thank you.
Senator Arnot: Sir, I just want to give you a chance to amplify what you just said with respect to the allegations. There was no definite proof and none has been presented so far, as I understand it, about the allegations against the involvement of UNRWA employees and any attacks.
Mr. Deere: That’s a very good question, and thank you. When Foreign Minister Colonna released the report, I honestly think we spent about three days clarifying what she was saying.
There are two reports. There is the Inspector General report, what we call OIOS. OIOS is looking into the specific allegations against the 12 employees. Secondarily, in the independent review of how we address neutrality, foreign minister Colonna made a point of saying that there has been no evidence provided by the Government of Israel to support the allegation that there is widespread affiliation amongst agency employees. So there are two separate things going on. I have to admit, the way it was stated when the report was released, it did get a little conflated.
Senator Arnot: I’d like to address another issue as well. U.S. support accounts for a significant portion of UNRWA’s budget. Considering the contentious political environment in Washington, what strategy is UNRWA employing to engage both sides of the aisle in Washington to secure bipartisan support for the necessary work that you’re doing? With respect to the impediment that the pause in funding has given, how is UNRWA collaborating with other humanitarian organizations to ensure continuity of aid in Gaza and other regions where you operate and do such good work?
Mr. Deere: Thanks for the question, and thanks for saying that we do good work. It’s a little bit lonely at the lunch table these days, senator.
With regard to the United States, that’s my job, just like it is for Canada. The Commissioner-General keeps you honest on this one, senator. He doesn’t want you just talking to the echo chamber. I talk to both sides of the political aisle and both the House and the Senate. Just by way of personal background, I was an appointee of George W. Bush and I was a White House staffer. So for me to talk to the Senate is kind of a big deal.
It’s education. We go and tell our side of the story. In fact, if I could elaborate a little bit, that was one of the motivations behind the independent review. The independent review was actually announced by Commissioner-General Lazzarini — his intention to launch an independent review — before Israel brought the allegations to us about the 12 employees. As you can imagine, subsequently, the Secretary-General took it over, but you’ll always see “in consultation with the Commissioner-General.” That’s why. It was the Commissioner-General’s initiative.
He took that step because he looked at the political landscape himself and said it’s very hard for policymakers, at the rate things are going, to decide how to sift through who’s right and who’s wrong. Someone makes an allegation, and we respond, and someone makes an allegation, and we respond. After a while, it does become confusing. That’s why he proffered the idea of an independent review. He wanted to give policymakers like you something beyond — as compelling as I am — something to hang your hat on beyond just the words of UNRWA.
It’s education. I will say that it’s an uphill battle. People are dug in on both sides. Although I look amazingly youthful, senator, I’ve been doing this a long time, and this has been by far the most challenging policy environment I’ve ever worked in.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: Thank you for being here today; it’s very much appreciated.
A previous witness, Ms. Kelsey Norman, called our attention to the fact that the United States is the biggest donor to UNRWA. The funding suspension means significant uncertainty for your organization’s continued operation.
You just said that the very survival of your institution is under threat. I’d like you to tell us more about the consequences caused by the suspension of American funding, given that they are a significant donor. Do you think your organization’s survival is assured? Does the way the institution is funded have to change, since it’s based on voluntary contributions?
[English]
Mr. Deere: Thank you, senator. Those are very good questions.
To your point, the United States was, in 2023, indeed the largest supporter of UNRWA at $422 million all in, up from $344 million the year before. This is by calendar year. This is how we calculate. Right now, the United States is at $71 million for the year but unlikely to go any further. Senator, we’ve been there before during a prior administration, and we have muddled through.
Let me just take a moment to explain. UNRWA is different than other UN agencies because UNRWA is operational. We don’t write cheques to other implementing partners. We run a school system, a health care network and a very large-scale social services program. If UNRWA is not able to make payroll to its 30,000 staff, it stops in all five regions — in all five of our operating fields. It’s more like a business, actually, than anything. You don’t wake up and say we’re not teaching fifth grade today for cost-cutting. We have an employee base of 30,000. They’re unionized, by and large. They have agreements. In many cases, as in the private sector, you have to spend money initially if you want to save or reduce services in the long term. Therefore, we are looking all over the world for contributions to make up the funding deficit of the United States.
I would submit, though, that where your question was going was accurate. UNRWA is actually a source of regional stability. It’s not just a question of delivering humanitarian services in Gaza. It’s also about education and health care in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. It’s why folks like King Abdullah of Jordan is one of our most passionate supporters, because he understands the risk to regional stability that comes if UNRWA were to shut its doors.
You have a very good question about the funding model because you’ve really gotten to the heart of the issue. UNRWA receives very little funding from UN regular dues. There is resistance among the member states to expand that contribution from regular dues. In other words, you’re using a private sector fundraising model to run a business and, even in good years, we have ended in shortfall — between $37 million and $75 million in debt at the end of calendar years. Even if, for example, you end the year at, say, $35 million in debt, that means first call on that first $35 million that comes in the next year goes to paying your debts, mostly to vendors.
When I was telling you about some of the instances where Canada has been there to support us, in one case it was to help us make payroll. I was doubly appreciative, senator, because I had a raging case of COVID, and I was told I had 48 hours. I joined the global hunt for $17 million to make payroll. That’s with the U.S. engaged. It is definitely a fair question to ask if this funding model can continue to operate in these conditions.
Senator Pate: I join my colleagues in welcoming you and thanking you for coming to meet with us.
I haven’t had a chance to go through all the details and recommendations from the reports you mentioned, but I notice they include things like allegations of anti-Israeli and, in some cases, anti-Semitic sentiments. Of the 50 recommendations, are there ones that you feel will be found to be incorrect at some point? You mentioned that an action plan is being developed. What are you looking at in terms of significant reforms coming out of these investigations?
Mr. Deere: In terms of the Colonna report recommendations, both the Secretary-General and my boss, who works for the Secretary-General — truly, everyone has a boss — have embraced all 50 recommendations, and they will be implemented.
With regard to the Inspector General, or what we call OIOS investigation, it’s like any Inspector General investigation, senator. You don’t know until they release their findings. We don’t own it, as it were. We might hear that they are back in the region and have indeed interviewed our folks, but like any Inspector General, they have investigative and budgetary autonomy. Therefore, we will await their findings.
For example, you were talking about the content of textbooks. It is definitely the first thing that seems to come to mind when detractors talk about UNRWA. UNRWA follows refugee best practices in education by utilizing the textbooks of the region. Remember that we only educate grades 1 to 9. It’s not just a sovereignty issue. It’s integration, because eventually our students will take the national exams, and they need to be, as it were, on the same song sheet as students in other schools.
However, we’re also the United Nations, and we have reviewed all 13,000 pages of text. In fact, every time a new textbook comes out, we perform what is called a rapid review. We have indeed found that 3.85% of elements of certain pages — not the whole page, but elements on pages — are outside of UN values. What we do with that is use what is called a critical thinking approach. The teachers have a variety of means of dealing with each of these issues. Sometimes it is to flip the page and keep moving. Other times, they like to have dialogue with the students. One of my colleagues — the former head of Gaza — said that he would challenge folks on this but believes it is better in the long-run to have a conversation with the kids than to pretend it’s just not there.
I will give you a personal example from my own travels to Shu’fat Camp in the West Bank. You walk to school. There are bullet holes in the walls. I was the last one on earth to know what these little tin circles are. They’re tear gas canisters. It’s the most tear-gassed place on earth. Apparently, medical people go to study the long-term effects of tear gas. Because of the geography of the camp, regardless of whether you happen to be the target of the tear gas, eventually you’re going to be impacted by it.
My colleague was suggesting that to pretend that is not part of the kids’ experience is just not realistic. In Gaza, prior to October 7, there was no kid in our schools who hadn’t gone through multiple incursions. Remember, according to our field director, before October 7, they were averaging about three drone strikes a day. Therefore, there is a bigger context.
However, we absolutely agree with you that material outside of UN values in the textbooks has to be addressed. To be honest with you, senator, it’s a little frustrating. There is a piece of legislation down in the United States where you are alternately cited as the expert agency and then told the bill is in order to address your teaching. What they’re essentially asking you to believe is that having reviewed all 13,000 pages and having identified the material, they then want you to suggest that you didn’t do anything about it. That’s the challenge we have. I have to admit that I know Foreign Minister Colonna said something to the effect — correctly — that even one reference is not good. Therefore, we’re going to do a deeper dive into that issue. She has specific recommendations that we will implement.
The Chair: The Independent Review Group’s recent report on UNRWA noted that it is currently unable to provide sufficient humanitarian assistance to people in need and that one option is for UNRWA to partner more with other UN agencies and organizations on an ad hoc and temporary basis in full respect of UNRWA’s mandate. Can you explain why some stakeholders are worried about the weakening of UNRWA’s mandate? What are some of the other barriers and possible benefits for these kinds of partnerships?
Mr. Deere: Let me just take a moment to say that these are really good questions. Thank you all.
I hope you get the opportunity to meet our commissioner-general, because two years ago, he was proposing that very thing. He looked at the lay of the budget land and said, “Look, it’s not getting better. We can’t keep going through life carrying over substantial debt every year.” Part of the problem with carrying over substantial debt every year is that it’s actually a very large physical plant that we have to maintain. There are warehouses, cars, et cetera. There is infrastructure not being kept up. So he looked at the partnership idea with the Secretary-General. We did hear concerns expressed by the host countries.
Actually, senator, there is another discussion in the Colonna report about one of the challenges about the UNRWA advisory commission, which is that, because it is made up of hosts and donors, they have a hard time reaching consensus. According to the Colonna report, the can gets kicked down the road and leaves the agency without direction from the advisory commission, so we do the best we can.
You’re seeing that play out right now in Gaza, where the UN is actually working in incredible partnership with each other. We manage the Karem Abu Salem crossing, and we manage the fuel, but it gets to the warehouses and everybody figures out where it’s going to go and who is going to lead the convoy. Then it gets notified. It is regrettable, at this point, that the Israeli government will not allow UNRWA to lead convoys to the north, but they do allow us to participate in convoys to the north. One of the examples of this incredible cooperation is a World Food Program truck that went to the wrong place. It ended up at our warehouses, but we made sure it got where it needed to go.
Your underlying question is correct. Host countries and Palestine refugees do look upon any reduction in agency operations as being somehow a referendum on the world support for their plight, so there is convincing that would have to be done, not just financing but also for folks to understand why we are doing what we’re doing.
The Chair: Thank you.
We have about six or seven minutes left, and we have two senators on second round.
Senator Omidvar: I’d like to get particular about Canada because this report will ultimately make recommendations to our government. While we can make recommendations to the UN and UNRWA, I think our sharpest point of inflection is actually making recommendations to our government. What do you think the Government of Canada should do with regard to UNRWA, let’s say around funding? My understanding is that the funding is voluntary. What do you think Canada should do to help protect humanitarian workers in Gaza? What do you think Canada should do with regard to providing visas to Canada to residents of Gaza who are in distress?
Mr. Deere: Senator, you have put me in an awkward spot because I am an employee of the United Nations — a proud one — and we love all our member states. We can make suggestions, but we do not tell them. We do not get into the deliberations of their governments.
I will say this: Canada is in the midst of a multi-year agreement with UNRWA. It’s $25 million a year of which I believe $4 million of it is actually earmarked for neutrality activities. That is just off the top of my head, and if that’s wrong, I will provide it for the record. So Canada has taken a leadership role, in my opinion, on neutrality issues. They’re very much interested in what I like to call and what I personally believe in: no surprises relationships. If there is good news, you hear it first from me; unfortunately for me, if there is bad news, you also hear it first from me. I see Ambassador Rae as a leader on UNRWA issues at the General Assembly. I came here in part because I honestly wanted an excuse to come up here and say “thank you.” It’s always about money, senator. We’re facing a hole. We’re about $270 million short because our largest contributor is on pause until March of next year. It’s always about support. I know that Canada not only provided $25 million to UNRWA but another $100 million to the humanitarian situation in Gaza. Of the $100 million, I think $20 million went to UNRWA for that part of our activities.
Senator Pate: Perhaps I’m trying to get at some of the same information that Senator Omidvar was trying to get at, but if you could design the optimal model for funding for UNRWA, what would you propose?
Mr. Deere: Again, that decision is several pay grades above my level, senator.
Senator Pate: I’m just asking for your ideas. I’m not asking you to commit anyone to it.
Mr. Deere: These are my ideas, and my ideas alone. I think this is an operational agency, and it needs to look at the full spectrum of ideas, whether it is encouraging all donor states to enter into multi-year agreements — and we need multi-year agreements that are not what I would say as overly earmarked so that we can deploy the resources as we need them, where we need them. It is also a fair question to ask about the role of other UN agencies, although, in a sense, the money problem doesn’t go away; you’re just shifting it to someone else. But it’s an operational agency with a voluntary donor budget, so there are going to be discussions. There were discussions two years ago, in fact, about having a broader role for regular dues in the operation of UNRWA. We have 170-plus bosses in the General Assembly, and they’re not in consensus about that aspect.
There are options out there, but again, that’s why I thought the Colonna report was so important. It really was fair, balanced and looked at a lot of issues, including the advisory commission and the challenges that come from hosts and donors not on the advisory commission not being able to reach consensus, which leaves us holding the bag, frankly. They just walk away from it, but we can’t. We still have to run a school system, a health care network, social services, et cetera.
The Chair: We’re out of time. However, very briefly, your ask is $1.2 billion. How hopeful are you that you will get that much?
Mr. Deere: Senator, I’m paid to be optimistic. We do always ask for more than we receive. The core of our budget is approximately $860 million in what we call the program budget. That’s where the rubber meets the road. That’s where paycheques are cut from. In fact, the unsung hero of UNRWA — I worked on the appropriations committee in Washington, and I thought I knew numbers — but the real numbers genius is UNRWA is the chief financial officer, because he takes pledges, when they’re going to come in, the bills that are going to come in and, through some magic, makes the payroll every year, every month. It’s a challenge because it’s an operational agency. It’s not that you’re going to write fewer cheques to someone to implement programs. It means that you’re paying teachers, doctors, nurses and the folks who deliver the food into Gaza, for example. Even before October 7, UNRWA was 60% of the basic food commodities that were imported into Gaza every month.
The Chair: Mr. Deere, we’ve run out of time. I thank you sincerely for being a witness and agreeing to participate in this important study. Your assistance with our study is greatly appreciated.
Honourable senators, I will now introduce our second panel. Each of the witnesses have been asked to make an opening statement of five minutes. We will hear from the witnesses and then turn to questions for the senators.
With us at the table, please welcome Payam Akhavan, Professor of International Law and Chair in Human Rights, Massey College, University of Toronto; and Fen Hampson, Chancellor’s Professor, Carleton University, and President, World Refugee and Migration Council, welcome, Professor Hampson. I will now invite Professor Akhavan to make his presentation, followed by Professor Hampson.
[Translation]
Payam Akhavan, Professor of International Law and Chair in Human Rights, Massey College, University of Toronto, as an individual: Thank you very much for inviting me to this meeting of the Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights. Today I will talk about the impact of climate change on forced displacement throughout the world. I do so on the basis of my experience as the Small Island Committee’s legal advisor on climate change and international law, as well as on the basis of my experience with other vulnerable countries.
[English]
The last time I appeared before this distinguished committee was on October 31, 2018, to testify about the Rohingya refugee crisis.
I returned to Bangladesh earlier this year and had occasion to, once again, visit Kutupalong, the largest refugee camp in the world. Almost one million Rohingya have crossed into the Cox’s Bazar region, mainly in 2017, fleeing genocide at the hands of the Myanmar military forces. Yet, on this occasion, I was in Bangladesh to address the human rights impacts of climate change and, in particular, the alarming forcible displacement that has resulted in the arrival of some 2,000 people daily in the overcrowded capital Dhaka.
Bangladesh is a low-lying and densely populated country crossed by many rivers flowing from the Himalayas into the Bay of Bengal. The combination of increasingly high temperatures, melting glaciers in the Himalayas, rising sea levels in the Bengal Delta, unprecedented flooding and erosion, intensification of extreme weather during the monsoon season, salination of freshwater sources, food insecurity and other elements arising from climate change are nothing less than catastrophic.
The government estimates that, by the year 2050, more than 13 million people in Bangladesh will be displaced by climate change. The UNHCR estimates that already, globally every year, more than 20 million people are forcibly displaced because of climate change. That number will only increase as temperatures increase. Climate migration is expected to surge in the coming years, with forecasts from the Institute for Economics & Peace predicting that, by the year 2050, 1.2 billion people could be displaced globally.
Elsewhere, in small island nations such as Tuvalu in the South Pacific, which I had occasion to visit recently, the government has to contend with evacuating its entire population as a result of rising sea levels, submerging the land territory of the country. An entire nation could disappear because of climate change. While we could decide to remain indifferent to the plight of 10,000 Indigenous people on a remote island, what is happening to them today will happen to us tomorrow. The small island nations are the canary in the coal mine of climate catastrophe, a warning that we must act now, while there is still time.
Madam Chair, the reality of global warming and the conspicuous failure of the major polluters to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions has arguably become the biggest threat to human security. It is emerging as the biggest cause of global forced displacement in history, and sooner or later it will radically change the conception that we have had thus far of refugees and migration, indeed of human rights and security.
We know that where human rights are respected, where there’s accountability for large-scale abuses, the likelihood of the mass exodus of refugees is low. We know that we must strengthen international human rights law and institutions such as the UN, the ICJ and the ICC. But that is not sufficient. Climate change has now emerged as a fundamental threat to human rights, indeed, a fundamental threat to life, health and security, and it requires far-reaching changes in the system of global governance that has thus far failed to address the need for an immediate and radical mitigation of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.
The scientific consensus of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change is that in order to avert catastrophic harm, temperature rise must be limited to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial temperatures by the year 2100. Yet, the current trajectory is such that humankind is to achieve 2.8 degrees Celsius, or twice the maximum threshold. The resulting forced global displacement would be far worse than all wars and conflicts combined. We must reimagine human rights and forced displacement in light of this reality.
This is not an ideological debate. It is not a contested truth between right-wing and left-wing politics or what have you. Global warming is an inescapable and irrefutable scientific fact, and it has and will have grave consequences unless we change course. As such, I would respectfully urge this distinguished committee to ensure that this reality figures in its analysis of forced global displacement so that, with this awareness, we could at least begin to think about creative solutions that will help ensure that future generations will live on this planet with dignity and security.
I thank you for your kind attention.
Fen Hampson, Chancellor’s Professor, Carleton University, and President, World Refugee and Migration Council, as an individual: North America is facing a growing immigration and migration challenge. I don’t think I need to remind this committee of that. We’re aware of the challenges at the U.S.-Mexican border, some 2.5 million so-called encounters by U.S. border officials, but the problem is also one at the Canadian border. In 2022, some 40,000 people entered Canada at Roxham Road alone. In 2023, some 92,000 claimants were recorded crossing the Canada-U.S. border.
There’s also a rapidly increasing flow of migrants in the opposite direction. In 2021, there were a total of roughly 27,000 northern land border encounters by U.S. officials. In 2023, that figure had jumped to 189,000 crossings. Now, that includes those who arrive legally and request asylum in the United States as well as those who arrive illegally. In 2023, there were over 10,000 illegal crossings, with migrants from Mexico, India, Venezuela and other countries heading across the Canada-U.S. border in a southern direction.
It’s important to recognize that it’s not just the Central and South Americans who are entering migration corridors, but also Africans, Asians and people from the Middle East.
What explains this unprecedented flow? The search for new economic opportunities, state failure, corruption, repression, sexual violence, exploitation and, as we just heard from my colleague to my right, climate change and ecological disaster.
I’d like to draw your attention to the role of gang violence and organized crime, which are also driving the migration challenge — Mara street gangs, Central American drug transporters and Mexican drug cartels. Those cartels are changing their business models from drugs to take advantage of the relatively stable revenue streams generated by rising numbers of those trying to flee violence and sexual exploitation in their local communities.
Mexican gangs, like the Sinaloa cartel and Los Zetas, are finding Canada to be a hospitable place to do business, not just in drugs and money laundering but also in human smuggling and trafficking, along with other criminal syndicates from India, Iran, China and elsewhere. Part of the problem is that Canadian laws have been weakly enforced, due to Canada’s porous ports, lack of resources for police and intelligent services, political and public inattention and the ineffectiveness of FINTRAC, the agency responsible for trafficking and analyzing information about money laundering.
Current efforts to tackle criminal networks that are directly and indirectly involved in regional and international migration flows, I would argue, are going to require a comprehensive, regional approach that engages law enforcement officials at all levels of government — local, state and provincial, and federal levels — as well as key civil society organizations that work with migrants in humanitarian and conflict prevention.
Such an approach will necessarily require the following:
A better shared evidentiary basis and understanding among the different countries in the region about the role of different criminal groups and networks and their modes of operation, sources of funding and territories in which they operate. To encourage countries in the region to fully implement the UN Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants, and to take all appropriate measures to protect the rights of smuggled migrants, while preventing and combatting the smuggling of peoples.
To promote cooperation among state parties as urged by the Global Compact for Migration.
To adopt a regional convention against smuggling of migrants that addresses the specific modalities of smuggling and trafficking in North and Central America.
To build on Pillar Four of the Biden administration’s plan to counter and prevent violence, extortion and other crimes by criminal gangs, but also to create a new, cooperative regional institutional framework for law enforcement that is led by senior officials in Canada, Mexico and the United States, as well as their Central American and Caribbean counterparts.
To adopt a regional approach to innovative police training and reform to create a new cadre of professional police forces in Central America.
To take a regional approach to prevent youth recruitment to criminal gangs through a new and innovative partnership with civil society organizations that serve at-risk youth and engage the private sector to provide employment and educational opportunities for the young. The example of the League Central America in El Salvador is a useful model that could be replicated throughout the region.
To work more closely on a collective, regional basis with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to understand better the broader role of transnational crime in migration flows.
And, finally, at the bilateral level between Canada and the United States, illegal migration in all of its aspects should be regularly included on the Canada-U.S. Cross-Border Crime Forum agenda. That annual forum is hosted jointly by Canada’s Ministers of Public Safety and Justice and the U.S. Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security. It brings together law enforcement and justice officials to advance cross‑border cooperation on organized crime, and that can serve as a useful basis for a broader regional framework and approach along the lines that I’ve suggested.
The Chair: Thank you both for your presentations.
We will now proceed to questions from senators. Colleagues, as you know, you will have five minutes for your questions, including the answer. If you don’t have enough time, we can always put you on the second round.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: Thank you to our witnesses for being here. It’s very much appreciated. Mr. Akhavan, you were involved in many international criminal law cases, specifically at the International Criminal Court or the International Court of Justice. When we look at the situation of displaced people throughout the world, we can easily see the gap between the rights that vulnerable people have in theory, and how they are actually violated on the ground. What stands out in this observation, and we’re seeing it again today, is that enforcing international criminal law is difficult, and various international courts and tribunals seem helpless in the face of this situation.
How do you think we could reinforce compliance with international criminal law in the context you described today? How can relevant institutions gain more binding authority?
Mr. Akhavan: Thank you for your question, Senator.
[English]
This is a central question, the weakness of the international human rights regime, which is a structural defect that we have inherited, in fact, since 1945 with the adoption of the UN Charter. We have had very significant proliferation of international human rights treaties with weak or non-existent means of enforcement, and that’s by design. States, for the most part, in particular tyrannical states that are wont to engage in widespread and systematic violations of human rights, which in turn become one of the biggest causes of forced displacement, do not want to allow their conduct to be scrutinized.
To a certain extent, one realizes, having worked in the field of international criminal law, that crimes against humanity and genocide, unlike natural disasters, are political choices. Invariably, there is a cost-benefit calculus to using incitement to hatred and violence as a means of acquiring and maintaining power. There is an inextricable connection, one would say, between deterrence of using such large-scale violence as an instrument of power and trying to mitigate, if not arrest, refugee flows, at least in certain instances.
The international human rights system has come under unprecedented strain in recent times. After a period of tremendous growth in the 1990s in particular, when the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda were established, which paved the way for the adoption of the Rome Statute in 1998, we now have an International Criminal Court, or ICC. It is largely weak, marginalized, deprived of resources and becoming increasingly entangled in all manner of political controversy. Now is a very difficult time for this system painstakingly developed but still very fragile, and one may have to give thought to, as in respect of climate change, as I addressed, a bigger picture of where humankind is headed in the coming decades. Are these systems of global governance that we have today sufficient, whether in respect of climate change or the enforcement of human rights, or do we need a bit of visionary politics to get us to move beyond the daily controversies and disputes and conflicts that have consumed so much of our energy?
Senator Gerba: What can Canada do?
Mr. Akhavan: I think one of the questions is, can Canada play a more active role within the United Nations in pushing the envelope when speaking about structural changes and transformation, perhaps together with a group of like-minded states? I remember in 2000, at the Millennium Summit of the United Nations, you had the likes of Václav Havel and other visionary leaders who had the courage to speak about the transformation of the United Nations into a more vigorous organization that corresponds to the contemporary realities and challenges of global interdependence. Perhaps Canada could step up and play a more active role in that space.
Senator Gerba: Thank you.
Senator Omidvar: Thank you both for being here with us. I hope my time will allow for a question to both of you.
Dr. Akhavan, we have heard about climate change in this study before. I will cite Allan Rock, former ambassador to the UN for Canada, and Professor James Hathaway, who both talked to us about current mechanisms and covenants that are sufficient — that’s what I understood from their testimony — to deal with climate change. One was the International Bill of Rights, and the second was the UN Conventions on Statelessness, because most people who are displaced by climate change tend to be displaced in their own nation. Do you think we should be satisfied with that answer?
Mr. Akhavan: Well, in respect of climate change, if one adopts a very positivist approach towards the 1951 Refugee Convention — I know that Professor Hathaway was my professor of refugee law 35 years ago — then it’s difficult to put climate change in the same basket as persecution on grounds of political, ethnic, racial or other persuasions. Even if we were, out of humanitarian instincts, to expand the definition, when you look at the statistics that I shared with you of 1.2 billion forcibly displaced people by the year 2050, the importance of a preventive approach becomes blindingly obvious, which is why I think that a reactive approach is going to be a drop in the bucket. This goes back to what I’m proposing as beginning a process of thinking creatively about the more far-reaching structural changes that are necessary.
My colleague Professor Hampson has also spoken about not just climate change but the whole host of issues that result in refugee flows. The answer always lies in how we can create circumstances where people do not become so desperate that they’re willing to make this arduous journey, very often at risk to their lives, in search of a better life.
Senator Omidvar: Mr. Hampson, maybe you would like to comment on this question as well before I ask you one that is targeted at your presentation.
Mr. Hampson: I’m reluctant to tread on the territory of my fellow witness, but I would make two comments.
Canada can certainly push, perhaps with like-minded countries, to get those who have not ratified the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons because, as Professor Hathaway and Allan Rock would have explained, there is a legal basis there to recognize the rights of those who have been forcibly displaced for whatever reason.
We could also in that vein perhaps follow the model of New Zealand, which, as I understand it, is committed — or was committed under the previous government — to accept those who have been forcibly displaced by climate change and perhaps work with them to look at the low-lying states of the region to not just take a state-based approach but a broader regional approach, particularly for the Indo-Pacific region.
When it comes to climate change and forcible displacement, it’s important to recognize that the most vulnerable communities in Canada are our Indigenous communities in the North. We could be doing a lot more to work in a regional context with our fellow Arctic Council members to not only study how climate change is going to affect displacement of Indigenous communities in the North, but also the appropriate response mechanisms. That’s not just working with communities in terms of relocation; it’s also disaster response.
We’ve seen over the past two summers, with the forest fires in Australia and Canada, countries banding together to fight forest fires. We’re going to be facing disasters of a similar nature, and it won’t just be forest fires. Again, I think a collective effort might be quite important when it comes to humanitarian assistance and relief in those kinds of disaster situations.
Senator Omidvar: I suspect I’m out of time. I will go on second round.
Senator Arnot: Mr. Hampson, you’re suggesting a regional approach with many elements in that approach. Do you see Canada, as a middle power, being currently prepared or willing to take a leadership role in adopting and negotiating a regional approach to these issues that you’ve identified?
Professor Akhavan, you’ve identified weaknesses in global governance and the system we currently have. What signs of hope do you see that nation states will adapt to the pressures that you predicted, which are quite valid, and address the coming crisis in forced displacement through climate change? Where is their hope?
Those are my two questions.
Mr. Hampson: The short answer is yes. I outlined the elements on the criminality side where Canada can do a number of things. If you want to get very ambitious, the idea of a regional convention against the smuggling of migrants is something Canada could take the lead.
I think if we’re going to take the lead on anything, we’ve got to get our own house in order. It’s quite clear we have a federal, provincial and local policing and enforcement problem in terms of how we’re not dealing with the criminal gangs that are involved in smuggling and trafficking of persons. There are push factors, but there are also pull factors. Those networks are growing. They’re getting stronger. They are finding Canada to be a hospitable environment for money laundering and other kinds of activities that support their business model, which isn’t just drugs and contraband anymore. Its smuggling and trafficking of persons.
If we’re going to play any kind of leadership role, we have to get our own house in order. Then we can go to other countries, including our southern partner, and say, “Let’s work on this together.” We’re not going to have much credibility unless we do that.
Senator Arnot: You testified before the Senate on the frozen assets repurposing act. Is that an act that you think could be instrumental in moving other regional states to follow our model?
Mr. Hampson: The short answer is yes. I would recognize the leadership of the Senate here, in particular Senator Omidvar, in moving that issue to the forefront of political attention and the attention of this government. I think other states are certainly looking at the Canadian model. I have just come back from Europe, and it’s quite clear there’s a lot of interest in the Canadian model. I understand that there’s going to be an effort, perhaps, to take that one step further, again led by members of this house, but the short answer is yes.
Senator Arnot: I would like Professor Akhavan to answer the question.
Mr. Akhavan: Thank you, senator.
We are going to have to, sooner or later, address climate change through what will become increasingly radical measures necessitated by the radical consequences of inaction. The question is, what is the threshold of pain beyond which world leaders and the public wake up and realize that filling their SUV for five dollars less a tank is less important than ensuring that future generations have a planet to live on?
There are some promising signs. Bangladesh has phased out 10 coal power stations because the science is very clear that we have to stop using fossil fuels. It’s a scientific fact. As I said, it’s not an ideological debate. I believe about 75% of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions are the result of the use of fossil fuels. If a country like Bangladesh can phase out its use of fossil fuels, what should we be doing here in Canada? Bear in mind the scientific reality that continuing fossil fuels — never mind increasing it and subsidizing it and what have you — is going to certainly result in catastrophic consequences.
One other promising sign in recent times is the initiative of small island states — like Tuvalu with its population of 10,000, as I referred to in my testimony — to raise the issue of climate change before international courts and tribunals. Bear in mind that the ocean absorbs 93% of excess heat. It is the biggest sink by far for carbon and excess heat. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, which is based in Hamburg, will deliver an opinion on May 21 on the obligations of states, including Canada, under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to protect and preserve the marine environment. There is ongoing initiative — once again from small island states — before the International Court of Justice to request an advisory opinion, including on the question of the consequences of climate change on human rights.
Therefore, at the level of international law, we will have very significant jurisprudence in the very near future, which will also shape domestic law insofar as customary international law is directly applicable before Canadians courts. That is one promising sign, but it has come because the process envisaged under the Paris Agreement has failed. It has failed to ensure that temperature rise is kept within 1.5 degrees Celsius by the year 2100. As I explained, we’re now projected to hit twice that target. The small island states are turning toward international law to put some teeth in the otherwise toothless regime of the Paris agreement and the Conference of the Parties, or COP, process. One of the events that I think will happen sooner or later is a Paris agreement 2.0, because it’s clearly deficient.
I have one last thought. Very often, human rights are dismissed as the province of naive idealists, whereas the realists speak in terms of military security, economic growth and what have you. Well, now it’s becoming clear that climate change will also have catastrophic consequences on the economy, security and the capacity of governments, including authoritarian ones, to be able to rule. If you have a hundred million people displaced from the Yangtze River basin in China, for example, that is no longer a human rights issue only. It’s a matter of security. Therefore, the consciousness is coming by necessity even in circles where people are not usually concerned about the environment and human rights.
I will end by saying once again that the question is, what the threshold of pain is beyond which the world leaders will make the radical changes that are necessary? I think Canada has a very important role to play in this space.
Senator Arnot: I have one quick question as a follow-up. Sir, I believe in the power of education. Education creates knowledge, and knowledge creates understanding, and understanding creates consciousness, and that leads to empathy. You’re a big proponent of empathy. I see the link quite clearly as education being the foundation for that empathy. What role does education have to play in getting Canadian citizens to the point where they’ll understand these issues and get behind them?
Mr. Akhavan: You’re absolutely right, senator. As I said earlier, it’s not just the problem of political leaders. It’s also the problem of the public in a consumerist culture where we’re addicted to consuming more and more without really thinking about the consequences on the environment and on our very survival. Therefore, public consciousness is absolutely essential.
Professor Hampson referred to the Arctic. Some of the others have referred to this as well. In the Arctic, temperature rise is about four times the national average. Therefore, the Arctic is in a situation of particular danger. At the same time, I think a lot of the world views of the Indigenous peoples are especially important. When I spoke to the Prime Minister of Tuvalu — population 10,000 — and the local inhabitants, their understanding of the reverence with which we must look at our place in the universe and nature is something that we need to make integral to our public discourse and even our system of education. As I said, it’s only a matter of time before we will be forced to understand that you cannot play with nature in a contest between humankind and the earth. The earth will win every time.
Senator Arnot: Thank you very much.
Senator Pate: Thank you for your testimony and for all of your work.
I’d like to ask each of you about what would be the best recommendations this committee could make coming out of this report that might have some possibility of meaningful change and implementation. I’ll tell you why I’m asking that. So much of what’s happened seems to be rather performative, seems to be motions toward addressing these issues, and yet even with things like the repurposing of assets, we haven’t seen that translate into humanitarian aid or commitments to some of the very issues that you’ve recommended. What would be meaningful recommendations this committee could make as a result of this study? Perhaps we could start with Professor Akhavan.
Mr. Akhavan: There are a number of measures. My distinguished colleague Professor Hampson has made some. I will not speak on his behalf, but the regional approach is certainly very important.
Turning to the focus of my presentation, the first point is that we have to make climate change an integral part of the discourse on forced global migration.
The second point is that we have to realize that catastrophic climate change will result in catastrophic migration flows on a scale that we have not yet witnessed and that we will not be able to control. If we have difficulty now in controlling people being smuggled across the border, imagine what will happen if, by the year 2050, you have 1.2 billion climate migrants who are desperate enough to get in rubber dinghies across the Mediterranean and take the risk of drowning, dying, instead of staying in their countries because of their desperate circumstances.
Therefore, as a matter of policy, we need to shift toward a preventive approach because no matter how many walls you build, you cannot keep desperate people away from your shores. Part of that solution is for Canada to play a much more vigorous role in the COP process and to perhaps join some of the climate-vulnerable states and exercise leadership by example in respect of its own policies on fossil fuels and other environmental issues in order to create a much more vigorous set of commitments and enforcement mechanisms in respect of the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions. There is no other way. As I said, the science is very clear. Even if we have technological breakthroughs on carbon capture and what have you, we must still radically mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. That’s the science. Otherwise, the consequences will be massive flows of climate migrants in the coming years.
Mr. Hampson: Unfortunately, I don’t have a good enough sense of the full range of issues that you’ve been looking at, so I’m reluctant to offer generic advice along the lines that you suggested. It’s really out of a sense of modesty because I think, by the sounds of it and from what I heard from the previous witness, you’re taking on a lot of issues.
One comment I would make is that when it comes to migration, many of the challenges that Canada is experiencing have an important hemispheric dimension. In my testimony that was provided to the clerk before the meeting, I laid out a series of recommendations in terms of a regional framework that tackles the role of bad actors in the migration equation. We tend to think of the problem as one where we don’t pay enough attention to the role of human agency. Yes, there are factors like climate change, state failure and economic deprivation that are forcing people to leave their countries, but there are also criminal networks and opportunistic actors who are taking advantage of that. Part of the recalibration is to look at what needs to be done to deal with those opportunistic actors who exploit those who are forced to move. I think the committee could play a useful role there, particularly in a regional context, as I’ve suggested.
It also has a global dimension. There is a range of international institutions that are now looking at criminality in migration, and that includes the International Organization for Migration, UNODC, among others. It is important for Canada to fund those institutions so they can do more work in those areas.
The committee can also send an important message, as my colleague has just suggested, that we have to get our own act together at home before we go start telling the rest of the world what needs to be done.
Senator Pate: Thank you.
The Chair: I have two quick questions. I know we’re almost out of time, and we do have a senator on second round.
This is mostly to do with my personal experience. Professor Akhavan, you know that I have been involved with the Rohingya. I think I raised it for the first time in 2012 with a delegation from Myanmar. We found great reluctance there; they didn’t want to talk about it. But in 2018, when we were in Bangladesh, they were talking about moving the Rohingya refugees to an island. Some people expressed a concern that that island was sinking. I haven’t been back to Bangladesh. We were supposed to go, but it didn’t work out. Could you give me an update on that, professor?
Mr. Akhavan: Thank you, senator.
From what I understand, perhaps fewer than 100,000 people have been moved to the island. I have not personally visited it, but I’m told the conditions there are better than the conditions in Kutupalong, which doesn’t take much when you think about how squalid the circumstances are.
The reality is that the international community has to help Bangladesh absorb some of those refugees. Given its own circumstances, Bangladesh cannot simply absorb 1 million people, at least not in circumstances where that could be seen as an invitation by countries to push yet more refugees onto the territory of Bangladesh. The circumstances are that the camps have deteriorated since 2018 when you and I were there. There is more violence, desperation and poverty. The Ukraine conflict, and now the Gaza conflict and other conflicts, means the limited resources that are available globally for humanitarian relief are being channelled elsewhere, so there is a noticeable decline in the levels, for example, of nutrition in the camps. All of this is to say that I’m less concerned about people being relocated from Kutupalong. I’m more concerned about what the long-term solution will be. In 2018, I remember meeting a mother who had a six-month-old infant. That child is now six years old, and that child has no future. That child has been brought up in a camp where they have no option to leave. They cannot go back to their home in Myanmar, and they have no option, really, to settle in Bangladesh.
I will end by saying one last thing. As you know, the circumstances in Myanmar now are very complex. There is an intensification of armed conflict. The ethnic insurgents now control about half of the territory, and the military has lost control of virtually all the borders with Bangladesh, China and Thailand. So the question is this: What will happen in my Myanmar? Will there be a stalemate? Will the military defeat the insurgents? Will the insurgents topple the government? That, of course, would have very far-reaching consequences on whether at least a significant proportion of the Rohingya could be repatriated in circumstances of security and dignity.
The Chair: Professor Hampson, I was recently in Costa Rica, and we had an opportunity to go visit a facility where they were housing migrants. From the stories they told us, I don’t think even they imagined how difficult the journey would be. They were fleeing violence, yet they experienced more violence and sexual violence along the way. In fact, some didn’t even want to continue on the journey; they said they would go back. How do we help that vulnerable group? The other things I realized were the disdain and suspicion with which the locals looked at them with. I heard so many times that they’re lazy and don’t want to work. Yet, we spoke to these women, some of whom had young children. I walked away feeling terrible, just hearing their stories and for them to have the courage to share their stories. Is there any hope for them?
Mr. Hampson: Senator, you have put your finger on the issue in a very eloquent way. Many of the migrants are typically, disproportionately, women and girls who are fleeing violence at home in the community. That’s one of the reasons they’re leaving. As you rightly pointed out, they’re being exploited all along that path by various criminal and gang elements.
I would say it comes down to two key components. One is to provide greater support for the civil society organizations that are working with those migrants through our development assistance programs and policies. For instance, we’ve been involved in the North and Central American Task Force on Migration of the World Refugee & Migration Council. We’ve actually produced a whole series of reports on this very complex set of issues. There are a number of recommendations in those studies that are available on our website that I would encourage the committee to look up or we can share with the committee from which you can draw upon. One of the recommendations is to work with civil society organizations to create a stronger institutional framework for those organizations that are working with these groups to be able to mobilize additional resources that they desperately need to help these people.
Second, the reason they’re exploited is because of state failure in the countries in which they find themselves. Again, I’ve tried to suggest in my remarks some of the work that we could be doing around policing and monitoring the violence these individuals are experiencing.
There’s no easy answer.
The Chair: Senator Omidvar and Senator Pate are on the second round. Do you mind asking your questions and the witnesses can send us a reply by email? We have to onboard our other three witnesses who are waiting.
Senator Omidvar: Professor Hampson, we hear that you are a fan of regional efforts on a variety of fronts, not just in fighting the criminalization of regional migration. Why do regional efforts work better than global efforts? I’m referring, in particular, to The Global Compact on Refugees. I don’t think it has gone anywhere. I’d like you to please tell us if anything at all was successful coming out of that huge global effort that resulted in The Global Compact on Refugees.
Senator Pate: My question is for both of you. I’ve worked in and around the criminal legal system for most of my life. Usually, when we focus on criminalization, it tends not to be the biggest actors who are targeted or become ensnared.
One of the challenges that I see — and I see the linkages between the recommendations you’re making — is how these recommendations will work if there isn’t also the kind of climate, economic, health and social requirements that would actually provide the framework that would allow one to go after the largest actors, the ones who are actually making the money on these, as well as change the practices in the countries where folks are originating. I count there climate, economic policies and, as was mentioned, our consumer economy, the fact that we don’t challenge our trade policies to be different and, instead, go after criminalizing those who are then trying to flee because, in part, as a result of the economic policies that have been reinforced internationally. It’s a big question. That’s partly why I was asking earlier what your recommendations were. How do you see those intersections being made palatable to increasing numbers of governments that operate within electoral cycles and often won’t see the benefit of those policies? I hear you that eventually it won’t be a matter of having to prove anything; the planet will prove it to us on the issue of climate disasters leading to migration. Are there recommendations you could make that we could be making that might help address that?
The Chair: I want to thank both of you for appearing before us and being witnesses for this study. Your help is greatly appreciated. If there’s anything you’ve missed, you can always send us an email, and the two senators would appreciate an answer to their questions.
Honourable senators, I shall now introduce our third panel. Each of the witnesses has been asked to make an opening statement of five minutes. We shall hear from the witnesses and then turn to questions from senators.
With us today, via video conference, please welcome, from the United Nations Refugee Agency, Jose Samaniego, Regional Director for the Americas Bureau; and Rema Jamous Imseis, Representative to Canada; from the International Organization for Migration, we have Diego Beltrand, Special Envoy of the Director General for the Regional Response to the Migrant and Refugee Flows from Venezuela; and please also welcome Eduardo Stein, Joint Special Representative for Venezuelan refugees and migrants, United Nations Refugee and United Nations Migration Agencies.
I understand that Mr. Samaniego, Mr. Beltrand and Mr. Stein will give opening remarks. They have been invited to decide who will speak first.
Eduardo Stein, Joint Special Representative for Venezuelan refugees and migrants, United Nations Refugee and United Nations Migration Agencies, as an individual: Thank you very much. I would like to begin by greeting the honourable members of the Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights and expressing gratitude for Canada’s sustained support for the situation of Venezuelan refugees and migrants.
Five years after the establishment of the Regional Interagency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela, which I have the honour to represent, the situation unfortunately persists without relent. Departures from Venezuela continue to surpass returns. Significant humanitarian, protection and integration needs persist, especially among newcomers, those in transit and those striving for stability in their host communities.
Despite notable progress in access to regularization, asylum procedures and other forms of legal status for Venezuelans in many countries in the region, factors such as the growth of xenophobia and national economies in crisis continue to challenge integration and social cohesion. Successive and pendular movements are accentuated, and irregularity remains high.
The latest Refugee and Migrant Needs Analysis, RMNA, estimates that 4.2 million, which is almost 67.8% of the over 6.5 million Venezuelans residing in Latin America and the Caribbean, have unmet needs in food security, housing, access to documentation, employment or education. The current response plan aims to provide assistance to nearly 3 million refugees and migrants, as well as members of host communities in 17 countries through 15,000 activities submitted by 248 organizations.
I would like to highlight a significant increase in the number of partner organizations led by refugees and migrants themselves. Localization, accountability and empowerment of affected populations are pillars of this plan.
The year 2023 saw an unprecedented surge in irregular and multidirectional transit and onward movements, with more refugees and migrants embarking upon dangerous journeys to reach new destinations to find more sustainable integration solutions. In response to this, assistance provided to those in transit by R4V partners in 2023 doubled in comparison to 2022.
Host countries urgently require greater support from the international community to bolster the expansion of rights and promote community stabilization. However, the response remains significantly underfunded, with only 22% of the required funding received so far. Despite this, the aid provided has already reached 2.18 million people in 2023.
The RMRP is increasingly aligned with the Humanitarian Response Plan with Venezuela. The platform is working more cohesively with the Quito Process and other regional mechanisms to promote response harmonization. The Quito Process strives to furnish states with a robust space for fostering inclusive public policies to seamlessly integrate individuals into socio-economic structures while also preventing a spectrum of abuses and exploitations, notably those targeting children and adolescents. Furthermore, it endeavours to guarantee their protection across countries of origin, transit and destination. Costa Rica holds the pro tempore presidency, marking the first Central American country to assume this role. We highly appreciate and acknowledge the important role that Canada plays as part of the group of friends of the Quito Process.
We need to support successful initiatives, maintain visibility and secure timely funding to ensure the continuity of an efficient response that supports urgent needs, facilitates integration of Venezuelan refugees and migrants, and fosters the development of host communities.
Many, many thanks.
Jose Samaniego, Regional Director for the Americas Bureau, United Nations Refugee Agency: In my statement, I would like to complement the words of our joint special representative, focusing on the broader human mobility crisis in the Western hemisphere.
I have some remarks on this unprecedented human mobility crisis in the region. First, there was a notable increase in the number of individuals on the move in the Americas. For example, last year, people crossing the Darién Gap doubled, reaching 520,000 persons, with a predominance of Venezuelans, followed by Ecuadorians, Haitians and Colombians. At the same time, 2.5 million encounters were recorded at the southwestern border of the United States. This trend continued in 2024, with more than 140,000 persons who have already crossed the Darién Gap, with a growing number of people coming from other continents, such as China and Afghanistan.
Behind those statistics, there are people who are facing multiple protection risks. One of the most alarming trends is the prevalence of sexual and gender-based violence which disproportionately affects women, girls and LGBTIAQ+ individuals. Additionally, incidents of robbery, extortion and kidnapping further compound the risks faced by those in transit as criminal actors seek to profit from their plight.
The Darién Gap, however, is only the tip of a deeper multi-dimensional crisis confronted by many Latin American countries affected by violence, criminality, persecution and human rights violations, alongside poverty, lack of opportunities and the adverse effects of climate change. It is also important to remember that the large majority of the persons in need of protection and humanitarian support are still hosted by neighbouring countries in South America and the Caribbean. As some examples of that, more than 84% of Venezuelans are in neighbouring countries in South America, and 80% of Nicaraguans remain in the neighbouring Costa Rica.
I have some words on the regional response. The current human mobility crisis has not only exposed refugees and migrants to severe risks, but it has also put many countries under tremendous economic, social and security strains. Despite these challenges, we remain optimistic by working together to support the capacity of countries and provide opportunities for people. Solutions in the region and the model applied in the Americas are possible if we work in a collaborative and coordinated manner.
The hemispheric approach, otherwise known as the route-based approach, is at the centre of discussions promoted by the L.A. Declaration and the Palenque Summit. It entails initiatives involving countries of origin, transit, destination and return, with common goals such as enhanced protection in all phases of displacement, promoting the stability of communities through socio-economic integration, expanding responsibility-sharing mechanisms and strengthening the humanitarian response.
On that, there are many examples of the efforts made by many countries in the region. At the core of the UNHCR’s mandate, we have strengthened asylum systems, decentralizing the asylum process and improving case management. At the same time, several states in the region have put in place legal stay arrangements and temporary protection processes, benefiting more than 4 million persons in countries such as Colombia, Ecuador or the Dominican Republic. In countries of origin, solutions for IDPs are also a priority, including the total peace process in Colombia and the IDP laws adopted in Honduras and El Salvador. Many countries have also facilitated the access of refugees and migrants to health and education. Brazil and Mexico have also implemented very successful labour-insertion programs, benefiting thousands of refugees and migrants.
On that, the support of development actors, particularly the financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IDB, have also been key to complement the efforts of states through concessional loans — more than $5.2 billion granted in the last four or five years — and the promotion of public policies.
In parallel, we should also commend the efforts made to expand legal pathways to the U.S., Canada, Spain and other countries. Resettlement programs have jumped from 9,000 in 2022 to 23,000 last year. The target for 2024 is 80,000, many of them processed through the Safe Mobility program implemented jointly with IOM.
Finally, on the humanitarian response, the R4V regional platform that Mr. Eduardo Stein already presented is one of the best examples of coordinated humanitarian response, involving 250 partners in 17 countries.
On Canada’s leadership in the Americas, it’s not surprising that, in the last years, Canada has demonstrated great solidarity with Latin America and the Caribbean and has led many initiatives contributing to the implementation of this hemispheric approach. Some concrete examples:
Visibility and resource mobilization: Global Affairs Canada played an important role in the mobilization of resources through the organization of solidarity and pledging conferences for the Venezuelan situation, as well as the support provided through financial facilities managed by development banks.
Canada was also very much engaged in regional processes, such as the L.A. Declaration, the Comprehensive Regional Protection and Solutions Framework (MIRPS) and the group of friends of the Quito Process.
On asylum capacity, Canada’s support was essential to strengthening the asylum system in the region, building efficient and fair processes for seeking safety. Some examples of that are the support provided by IRCC to Mexico, Panama, Brazil, Colombia, Peru and Ecuador.
Finally, on third-country solutions, Canada has been committed to expanding resettlement and complementary pathways, including the new family-based humanitarian options and support of the Safe Mobility Initiative and other legal pathways in the Americas. In 2024, Canada plans to resettle close to 50,000 refugees globally. Eight hundred refugees will come from the Americas, including UNHCR referrals and private sponsorships.
In conclusion, while others have turned their attention elsewhere, the role of Canada in the Americas is crucial, not only as a donor to address urgent humanitarian needs but also the champion of human rights protection and responsibility sharing, as well as a convenor to mobilize additional support to address the root causes of displacement and promote solutions and stability for refugees and migrants.
Diego Beltrand, Special Envoy of the Director General for the Regional Response to the Migrant and Refugee Flows from Venezuela, International Organization for Migration: On behalf of IOM, I would like to extend my greetings and gratitude to you, the honourable members of the Human Rights Committee of the Senate of Canada. Thank you for the invitation and for providing us the opportunity to share a brief overview of the situation of migrants and refugees from Venezuela.
First of all, I would like to express that I join all the concepts mentioned by the special representative of IOM and UNHCR, Dr. Stein and my colleague the Regional Director for the Americas for UNHCR, Jose Samaniego.
Regarding the situation of the flows of migrants and refugees from Venezuela that persist with alarming urgency crossing the borders of Latin America, many going in the South American direction and others to the U.S. and Canada, the escalating wave of irregular flows compounded by the perilous crossings through the Darien Gap underscores the desperation in the quest for stability. There has been an increase in departures from Venezuela, with numerous individuals undertaking secondary movements through Andean countries before braving the journey across the Darien. We are also witnessing some returns to Venezuela. For the moment, they are low in number in relation to the persons leaving the country, but all of them illustrate the complex scenario we have.
In this regard, I want to emphasize another part that complements this story, and this is the part of many countries in Latin America and the Caribbean who offer residence, asylum and migration permits to Venezuelans.
As was mentioned, more than four million permits that were provided to Venezuelans and also to migrants and refugees of other nationalities. Most notable, in Colombia, the Temporary Protection Statute for Venezuelan migrants has provided legal status to almost two million persons, allowing them to work and access basic services. In Peru — but in lower numbers — there will be a granting of temporary permits consistently, as well as in the Dominican Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica and Ecuador. All these countries implemented regularization schemes. I would like to mention Brazil, with the possibility for the migrants and refugees from Venezuela to access a program which allowed us not just to receive a legal document and migration permit, but also to fully integrate in Brazilian society. Argentina and Uruguay also offer pathways through the Mercosur Agreement.
These are all initiatives that really speaks very well of the reaction of many countries in the region, the majority of them, in a dynamic context, more normally in a contradictory context. These initiatives reflect the human and pragmatic approach while trying to provide security and dignity to those most in need, highlighting the valuable contribution of migration to the development and social fabric in host countries.
One of the central sectors of the Refugee and Migrant Response Plan is integration in all its dimensions: the creation of sustainable job opportunities for migrants and refugees, the fight against xenophobia and the appreciation of the cultural heritage that migrant populations bring to the societies that host them.
Recently, IOM has conducted six economic impact studies of Venezuelan migration in countries across Latin America. The studies show that Venezuelan migration has contributed to the stimulation of national economies through various channels such as fiscal revenue through consumption, income tax and job creation. Here are some examples we would like to provide.
In Colombia, in 2022, the direct and indirect fiscal contributions of the Venezuelan population amounted to more than $592 million annually, 2% of total tax revenue. The research shows that if irregular migrants were to regularize their status 100%, the amount would reach $800 million.
In Panama, the tax contribution of Venezuelan migrants amounts to 4% and their annual consumption to 3% of the total consumption.
In Chile, Venezuelan migrants contribute to 0.5% of the GDP and could increase to 1% if more migrants are regularized.
In Aruba, Chile and the Dominican Republic, figures also demonstrate a similar positive impact and their potential increase linked to regularization.
Drawing on this evidence, I would like to emphasize the critical importance of establishing regular pathways for migration regularization and expanding opportunities for labour mobility.
To harness the talents and skills of migrants to drive economic development, among other actions, we have supported training programs for Venezuelan civil society organizations for the establishment of a network of diaspora women leaders, and we have also contributed to the formation of the Chamber of Businessmen, Executives and Entrepreneurs of Venezuelans Abroad (CAVEX).
Another key aspect is raising awareness and engaging the private sector. We should do more, but we should recognize the current engagement of the private sector. We should look for even more dialogue between the public and the private sectors.
Finally, as R4V co-leader, IOM is committed to continue working with UNHCR and the 248 partners of the regional platform to support the protection, documentation and integration of migrants and refugees from Venezuela as well as from other nationalities.
We also support the work of the Quito Process, currently under the presidency of Costa Rica, as well as its Group of Friends, through the joint Technical Secretariat. I want to add to this list the support of the L.A. declaration and the other regionally consultative processes in Latin America and the Caribbean.
I would like to conclude my remarks by thanking Canada for its invaluable support over these years, the support provided by the government, particularly by Global Affairs and IRCC, and emphasize the message that these situations will continue requiring the greatest effort from international communities.
Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you, gentlemen, for your presentations.
Before we proceed to questions from the senators, I would like to acknowledge the presence of Senator Cardozo. Senator Cardozo, thank you for joining us.
We will now proceed to questions from senators. Colleagues, as we know, we have five minutes for your questions, and that includes the answer.
Senator Omidvar: Thank you to all of you for being with us.
I must say that in this committee over the course of the study, we have heard a lot of bad news. It is a little uplifting, first, to know that Canada has played a constructive role in building capacity and providing funding and, second, to know that the regional arrangements seem to be working relatively well as compared to other regions.
I wonder, Mr. Stein, if you could reflect on some of the foundational elements of this regional model between Colombia, Peru, Brazil, Argentina and other host countries of Venezuelan refugees. What are some of these elements that could possibly be transported to other troubled regions in the world where such cooperation is absent?
Mr. Stein: Of course, there are some very basic elements.
First, language is one of them, which makes it a lot easier to develop operational structures that operate in transborder fashions.
Second, the cultural history in some of the countries has facilitated the understanding of social agendas through church-oriented organizations. In particular, Catholic Church organizations have worked extensively throughout several decades in Latin America, and their agendas intensified notably after Second Vatican Council in the late 1960s.
Third, I would like to refer to some of the countries in which, for many decades, the original populations were, in a way, not carefully attended and worked with. That has also dramatically changed in the last couple of decades. Original Indigenous peoples have begun to play a very important role as receiving communities. In this regard, they have also provided trustworthy networks of leadership that have facilitated the way in which incoming populations, not only from Venezuela but from other nationalities on the move, as Diego Beltrand underscored, began to merge economically productive activities within those communities.
I would not want to get into strictly political issues because this all of this continent is undergoing a very complex situation throughout, and this implies that mostly younger generations — as we know them in our end of the world, the TikTok generations — are demanding from public authorities results in terms of the traditional democratic frameworks that are almost impossible to provide in such a short lapse of time. In this regard, the influx of foreign nationals that speak in the same language, that have similar traditional and cultural structures has proven to be ways in which development at the local level is facilitated.
One last element, which is also extremely important in some of the countries, is the value of the diversity of agricultural production. Some of the Latin American countries are world providers of grains and of other types of food. In this regard, the opportunities for local development, with the implementation of new technologies, have been explored substantially and with a lot of success in several countries.
Thank you.
Senator Omidvar: That is a fulsome answer.
Mr. Beltrand, do you have anything to add?
Mr. Beltrand: Let me add to what our joint special representative mentioned, senator.
There was a requirement of the decision of vision from some of the governments and presidents of the region, particularly at the moment Colombia, to develop these massive regularization programs. There is a requirement for a lot of decisions and vision on the positive contribution of migrants and refugees to our societies. This also happened in other countries, but probably through more than presidential decisions, through of the intermediate ranks of the governments, of issues related with migrants and refugees. This is because there are certain traditions in the region to provide and grant asylum to allow migrants to come to the countries and to integrate into the countries. There are many countries in the region that created their national identity through and with the support of the migration of different nationalities. In this sense, there is a mixture of decisions in the region, mostly positive, because it allows particularly the Quito Process, to exchange good practices, to let the other countries know that it’s possible and that it’s a good thing for the countries to regularize and to provide this status.
Of course, humanitarian situations persist, but now we are in a phase in many cases where we have to emphasize the integration efforts. This will require other types of talent, which is related to the notion of development of host countries.
Senator Omidvar: Thank you.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: Thank you to our witnesses for being here today. My question is for Mr. Samaniego. In your opening remarks, you talked about initiatives states developed to implement help for Venezuelan refugees, specifically to ensure better access to health care. As you also said, several countries, including Columbia, also acted in other areas, like immigration and the regularization of millions of refugees.
First of all, what is your point of view on these initiatives, considering what Mr. Beltrand said? He insisted on the contribution migrants make in the countries where they work illegally.
We have the evidence that they contribute significantly to those countries’ gross domestic product. What do you think Canada could take from Columbia’s initiative, which regularized the status of more than two million Venezuelan refugees?
Mr. Samaniego: Thank you very much.
When the Venezuelan crisis hit, what was crucial was that most of the countries had a favourable legal framework for universal access to education at least, but a little less so for the issue of health care. Also, what certainly helped was a cultural affinity with Venezuela and deep solidarity. We mustn’t forget that, in the past, Venezuela welcomed many people from Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and other countries.
After a favourable legal framework, the second aspect is the public’s solidarity and political will. As Mr. Beltrand pointed out, governments made very brave decisions while experiencing a social crisis in the region. We mustn’t forget that Latin American countries were hard hit by COVID-19. Nonetheless, they supported regularization measures and reinforcement of the asylum system to offer opportunities to Venezuelans already living in the country. It was a generous political vision, but also very pragmatic, because the people were there and conditions had not changed in Venezuela. To get them contributing to the economy and society in general, the best thing to do was give them the documentation they needed to integrate.
What I could say on the matter is that Canada has always been a champion when it comes to taking in refugees, including very elaborate programs for migrant populations. What’s important is that Canada continue its ongoing efforts to mobilize more support for the region, not only through humanitarian funds, but also by further engaging development stakeholders. In the current phase, it’s decisive. We have to promote integration. Otherwise, as I was saying, at some point most people achieve partial integration into their countries, but states need to reinforce their capacity in terms of markets and services. For that, we need much more solid investment from Canada and other countries involved in international cooperation.
I might venture a single comment, Senator Omidvar. You asked how we can replicate this model in other regions. The model implemented to deal with the Venezuelan situation rests on three pillars. First of all, it must be a state-led process. They must be willing to hold a dialogue with each other and share best practices, but also share the challenges they experience. At several points during the Quito process, negotiations were very difficult. What we managed to do, however, was think about what could help these people on the move, beyond political or other considerations, and how that could impact their integration. So, we saw leadership from governments and opportunities for coordination. That’s the first pillar.
The second is a very inclusive partnership not only with international organizations and international NGOs, but also with regional NGOs. We must keep in mind that in the regional R4V platform, more than 70% is made up of local partners, NGOs and refugee-led organizations. Of course, the wider the range of stakeholders, the better we can support the response.
The third pillar is international cooperation that is not only robust, but coordinated as well. During solidarity conferences led by the Group of Friends of the Quito Process, what was important was to bring together the main humanitarian aid providers who were part of the solution, of the strategy, not only as donors, but also as aid providers and development stakeholders. I would say that engagement from international banks like the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank was essential, even for governments, because they were able to show that they weren’t acting alone and had the support of the international community. You have to have those three pillars and, lastly, significant ability to adapt.
Crises, by definition, are not stable. From 2018 to 2021, our priority was South America and the southern Caribbean. Those currents have now changed. That’s why we’re talking with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and other partners to see how we can provide greater coverage during a response, now that people are leaving from Central America and North America, and not just in the case of Venezuelan populations. It’s becoming harder and harder to distinguish a Venezuelan from a Colombian, an Ecuadorian or a Haitian, because they all have problems and, in many cases, they can’t go back home. We’ll see what the ability to adapt really is, whether we can develop a stronger, broader geographic response, and whether we can benefit from humanitarian aid; not only Venezuelans, but also other populations on the move in the region.
Senator Gerba: Thank you very much.
[English]
Senator Arnot: I have one question for each witness here.
Mr. Samaniego, how has the UNHCR adapted its strategies to address the growing forced displacement in the Americas? In particular, the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the vulnerabilities of older refugees in Latin America. What steps did the UNHCR take in addressing their unique needs to ensure their inclusion in national responses?
Ms. Jamous Imseis, Canada has been recognized for its leadership in refugee settlement. What lessons can other countries learn from Canada’s approach, in your opinion, and how does UNHCR Canada support those efforts? Similarly, I’d like you to comment on the success of the Economic Mobility Pathways Pilot in Canada.
Mr. Beltrand, your work involves collecting and analyzing data on Venezuelan refugees and migrants. How does that data inform policy and humanitarian responses in the regions, and importantly, what trends have you identified or observed in the Venezuelan situation?
Similarly, Mr. Stein, given the scale of the displacement in the region, how can the international community best support the needs of Venezuelan refugees? In particular, specifically, what role do you see Canada playing in those efforts? Thank you.
Mr. Beltrand: Thank you very much, senator, for your question regarding the data.
One essential thing should be known about our official figures. First of all, the figures come from official statistics. The sources of the figures are the migration institutes or the ministry of foreign affairs or other ministries that are in charge of collecting data on migrants and refugees in each country, so they are official sources. There is not a slight difference because it provides real information and is an asset to inform policies and to take decisions to take political decisions. We are talking about more than 7 million Venezuelans settled worldwide and more than 6 million in Latin America and the Caribbean. We are talking about the official statistics from each of the countries. The countries in the region have a reasonable and solid tradition of having good statistics systems for migration and for other purposes in the region. Therefore, they are totally valid and credible and reflect the realities.
We complement these official sources with our own sources of information — with polls and other types of information gathering. In the case of the International Organization for Migration, or IOM, we use displacement-tracking metrics, known as DTM, which help form a picture or a photo of the situation of migrants and refugees in border areas and other places in the countries. We complement the official sources with other data that allows us to have a real picture, because, as you know very well, senator, migration statistics are probably some of the most imprecise aspects that we can know. By definition, people are moving, sometimes alone or with their families or friends, and therefore it’s not easy to have accurate data. In this regard, we are really very proud to support the work of the countries in the region to provide and collect.
Our work is mostly to analyze these figures and see the trends. I think that is the second part of your question, related to the trends. Unfortunately, we are not seeing improvements on the stabilization of communities in terms of countries of origin. In this case, Venezuela was mentioned in other presentations, but equally in other countries. Haiti, of course, is one of the most acute situations. They continue leaving their countries. There are many migrants and refugees at this moment who are moving to different countries. They’re trying Peru, Chile and other countries, and then they return to Venezuela, but then they leave again to go north to Mexico and the U.S. on a very dangerous journey.
It’s a difficult moment. There’s an increase at the moment, but at the same time, there’s hope of measures of regularization and the integration efforts of many of the countries in the region. This is the reason we call on the international community to support these efforts. The support given to efforts of integration will bring stability to our region and development for host countries.
I hope this can be useful, senator.
Senator Arnot: Thank you very much.
Senator Pate: I’d like to ask each of you to elaborate a bit on what steps you think high-income countries like Canada should be taking to better allocate their resources to ensure an equitable distribution of wealth and aid to those countries at the forefront of responding to forced displacement. Also, how do you see us addressing internationally the economic, climate, racial and other global inequalities that are at the root of so much of the migration patterns?
Mr. Samaniego: Thank you, senator. Maybe I will take the opportunity to make reference to the last two interventions.
I believe the best way to really support the region is by fostering and building capacity in the different countries. Yes, the humanitarian support is very important. However, the big problem in many countries in Latin America and elsewhere is that we have weak institutions and weak protection systems. Their advice, in addition to the traditional resettlement programs, legal pathways and others, is really to reinforce and strengthen local capacity and enhance the different protection systems, not only asylum systems. There are other protection systems that are specific for children and women experiencing gender-based violence. These are an essential part because, in the long rung, these would be much more sustainable.
On the integration part, we are now hearing that there is a meeting on the Los Angeles Declaration. Many governments are underscoring that what is needed in this report is international cooperation to complement the efforts of the state. Again, it’s not only funding. This has to go together with the development of public policy and inclusive policies to ensure that, through these policies, we can include refugees and migrants in different sectors of the economy and in education. Currently, maybe one of the main gaps is social protection, because this will also be key for the sustainability of solutions in the region.
Senator, you mentioned previously the role of the United Nations Refugee Agency, or UNHCR. Starting the regional platform was a decision by the Secretary-General because he observed that it is very difficult to respond to current humanitarian crises with a traditional approach. Yes, of course, there are economic migrants and typical refugee situations. However, there are many situations like the Venezuelan one where you have a mix of different causes that are forcing people to move, starting with violence and persecution but also the lack of opportunities and the huge economic crisis in Venezuela. He asked the UN and UNHCR to work together in this platform, of which the main goal is to not work alone. The UN is only one of the main components — the main element — of the response. Really, it’s about taking advantage of local capacity and local organizations and to adapt the response. For example, again, the role of development banks has been extremely important.
I would say the main added value, in addition to collating this platform from UNHCR’s perspective, has been to mainstream protection considerations in the response, and in all phases of the response, starting with the humanitarian assistance. Then, in terms of inclusion, there are different profiles and different needs. Also, in the promotion of public policies, I would say that COVID, in a sense, had a positive impact because governments realized that people are there anyway. We are talking about a public health issue, so the best way to address it is to include this population in vaccination programs and others. I would say the main added value we have had is to bring mainstream protection to the response and also to try to play a convening role in engaging different actors in different aspects of the response, from the humanitarian response to the local integration of people.
Senator Pate: Would anybody else like to comment?
Mr. Stein: One of the most delicate dimensions of our work and the way in which these more than 250 members of the platform in the subcontinent have been successful in addressing these problems is this integration process, or the regularization process, in which you guarantee the legal existence of the people who have migrated and are trying to make a living in each of the communities, have access to social security services and have education for the children.
I would like to underscore the larger enemy that has been found in several subregions of the subcontinent, which is organized crime. Unfortunately, Latin America suffers from the onslaught of criminal organizations that have infected public institutions in several countries. It is not within our responsibility as joint agencies of the United Nations to directly address these issues, but we can talk positively, in the Quito Process and in this coordinating platform, of the transfer of capabilities that come from sophisticated societies and governments that have been successful in addressing organized crime activities within their own territories. They have managed to transfer some of those capabilities to our own institutional scaffolding. In several countries, it implies the reform of the justice system. Again, I must insist that it is not within our mandate to get involved in those issues but, within the Quito Process, I would say that governments were able to tell apart political issues that were dealt with in other fora and deal strictly and with as much precision as they could with the challenges at hand, which had very strong cultural roots in several countries.
The way in which these positive experiences have been able to be shared among different institutions of different countries, without making any big noise about it, has been indeed a source of recurring successes in different territories. In this regard, I would say that we have had a lot to learn from countries such as Canada. Thank you.
Senator Pate: Thank you.
Senator Cardozo: I’d just like to pick up from that last comment and ask Ms. Rema Jamous Imseis to could provide us with her thoughts on what are the aspects in terms of settlement of refugees that Canada is doing well. We know we have some gaps. What areas do you think we’re doing well? What are some of the examples in other similar countries, say OECD countries, that are doing better and from where we can learn?
Rema Jamous Imseis, Representative to Canada, United Nations Refugee Agency: Thank you for the question, senator.
I think if I were to highlight the success or the core of Canada’s success with refugee resettlement, I would immediately point to integration and the supports that resettled refugees receive on arrival to Canada — things like access to social assistance, education and health care, language training, financial literacy training. The things that local settlement organizations provide on arrival accelerate the integration of resettled refugees to Canada and significantly improve their chances for successfully residing in the country, then moving from just arriving and settling into thriving and contributing financially and in other ways to the country.
We have actually studied this extensively and looked at Statistics Canada data which effectively supports the assertion that if you provide those strong supports on arrival, people do very well. Refugees end up paying more in income taxes than they ever receive in social assistance on arrival. They own homes at similar rates to native-born Canadians. A very interesting statistic is that if a refugee child comes to Canada before the age of 12, they will graduate from post-secondary institutions in Canada at higher rates than native-born Canadian children.
All of this essentially points to the importance of maintaining strong integration supports for resettled refugees on arrival. I have to say that, in fact, other countries are looking to Canada for the example. Canada frequently receives delegations from places like Germany, the U.K., Australia and other countries that are coming to study what Canada does and try to import similar practices.
If I point to one area that I think has been slightly more challenging — and this is challenging for settlement service providers in Canada — as of late, Canada has been very quick to provide responses to different crises around the world. We saw new humanitarian pathways rolled out for the Americas. We saw the same thing for Sudan, Gaza and other locations. I think what’s challenging to providers in Canada is that each of those different pathways comes with different supports or lack certain supports. Each formula is quite distinct and has been formulated to respond to a particular crisis. I think that is something I would watch carefully in Canada because, in diaspora communities as well as newcomer communities, we’re seeing some tensions arise between different groups. Social cohesion is becoming an issue between groups who say, why did community X get certain supports whereas, when we arrived, we didn’t get something similar? I understand the inclination to respond quickly to different crises and provide these life-saving pathways in Canada, but I think there is some value in standardizing the approach so that people have a sense of equity and access to the same types of supports on their arrival.
Senator Cardozo: Do you have one or two examples of other countries that have a program here or there that is really working and that we could be emulating?
Ms. Jamous Imseis: To be frank with you, again, I go back to the point that I think Canada is doing really well in this space. Perhaps one area where we may be able to take some lessons from other countries and perhaps scale up what Canada is doing is in the area of labour mobility, which one of your colleagues asked about earlier, the EMPP program which seeks to match skilled refugees to employers in Canada. They’re refugees but essentially treated as economic migrants, and they come to address certain specific labour shortages in the country. Countries like the U.K. and Australia have been able to scale those programs much more quickly, but there’s a reason that they have been able to do that. It’s because they don’t provide the same permanent residence pathway to those refugees on arrival. Arguably, it’s more advisable to go slow and steady but provide people with that long-term horizon coming to Canada. In order to do that, the process is slightly more arduous and requires more time, whereas in the U.K. and Australia, they will provide the offers and have people in country more swiftly, but that’s because people will remain on a temporary status when they come.
Senator Cardozo: Thank you very much. I found your opening comments to my answer really interesting because, even among people who are supportive of refugees coming, there is a feeling that we recognize they’re never going to make it well but we’re doing something good for them and hopefully the next generation will work out okay. You’re saying that, in fact, the first generation who are coming themselves are doing relatively well after a few years and that their children are doing well. That’s quite encouraging. Thank you for that answer.
Ms. Jamous Imseis: You’re welcome.
The Chair: Gentlemen, my question is to maybe all three of you, and this is a question I asked of the previous witnesses. I was recently in Costa Rica, and we visited a shelter that was housing migrants. Just listening to their stories, I think some of them themselves were shocked by the amount of gender-based violence they faced along the way and how difficult it was. There were a lot of young children there. The situation seemed very hopeless. Some had chosen to go back because they did not want to continue with this journey. They’d rather go back to face whatever issues or problems they had in their home countries. On the other hand, while being out and about, I heard of resentment that was building amongst the host countries. Is that something that you’re also hearing? We heard from you what positive contributions they make. I do acknowledge that most migrants, when they come, do make a positive contribution, but I think I was surprised by the amount of sexual violence. The women didn’t say it directly, but they were hinting that it existed in the journey they had to make.
Mr. Beltrand: Thank you for the question, senator, and particularly for raising some of the most sensitive issues that migrants and refugees face on their journey.
You’re right. Your sense of what you heard from women in shelters is completely right. Unfortunately, there’s a prevalence of sexual violence, gender-based violence and rapes, and it’s a matter of concern for all of us.
We develop services in the journey, in the road, not just UN services but those of civil society, housing for migrants, et cetera, where, basically, the migrants and refugees can go and receive orientation and assistance. There is knowledge that it’s impossible to prevent many cases that are happening on the regular routes and as the routes are changing permanently due to the work of the criminal groups that Mr. Stein mentioned, the smugglers, that oblige the migrants and refugees to transit to these dangerous places. We develop services, and we particularly help the host countries to develop more services to address this violence that affects women and children, but it’s a factor that still persists. You are very right in raising it, as I mentioned.
Secondly, on the resettlement of communities, let me tell you that both sentiments or feelings coexist. It sounds strange, but some of them prevail depending on the situation in the country and the political speech, political discourse, depending on the economic situation and depending, of course, on the influence of criminality, although we firmly believe, and statistics prove, that the numbers for the involvement of migrants and refugees in criminality are very low. For the population, the host community, this has expanded, and this generates strong reactions that we can understand sometimes from host countries.
Also, there is some rise in xenophobic sentiments. Of course, this is something that, at the same time, we manage or succeed in showing the successful cases. When we manage to show the common benefits of the process of the migrants, these sentiments decrease and there is less xenophobia. Let me tell you that, fortunately, although there were, in these past five or six years, very strong demonstrations of xenophobia, this is not the prevailing factor. In some countries, we have to acknowledge that the situation is more difficult, as there are countries that have not received many migrants in the past so now they react very strongly to this.
All these sentiments coexist, as I said, and it’s our work, and we try to do our best to reduce the level of xenophobia and level of violence against migrants.
Mr. Samaniego: Maybe just to complement that answer, you are right, senator, when you mentioned that sexual and gender-based violence has increased, particularly, I would say, for people on the move in isolated and remote areas such as the Darién Gap but also in very insecure regions in northern Central America and also in Mexico.
On the strategies we are promoting, first I would say is to provide for people to stay where they are. For that, again, we come back to the need of improving documentation processes, expanding the documentation processes and reactivating or providing livelihood opportunities for people.
The second — two hours ago, I was just at the shelter here. If people have options for legal pathways and different schemes — more schemes for refugees, more schemes for labour migration — certainly people would prefer that. It would be cheaper, because you know how expensive these irregular movements can be, and safer. In the region, we not only have an increase of protection risk, but also very traumatic incidents in the Darién Gap, even in Costa Rica, in Mexico, kidnappings, fires and other kinds of things.
The third point I would say that is very important is that it is very difficult in these remote areas to really fight against all kinds of violence that you can find in these regions. However, we can mitigate risks. On that, I believe that the experience in Northern Central America — let’s say from Panama to Mexico, but also two or three years ago, when the exodus of Venezuelans started in the Andean region — is to maximize state presence and the support from civil society organizations.
We are very proud to say that, in the regional platform, we have 250 partners, but if you take the example of only the Catholic church, they have a network of over 800 services on the route, providing not only some humanitarian support but also counselling and other types of information, and what is very important about the different shelters is that they are also able to identify and refer cases with high vulnerability or with protection risks to the different available protection systems in the region.
On xenophobia, well, the situation is difficult in the whole region, as Eduardo Stein already said, not only the economic downturn and somehow the impact of COVID still, but also with the increase of criminality, very present in both areas. There is also the toxic narrative from some sectors. Again, the main impact has been the increase of xenophobia, and the result of that was an attempt, in some of the governments, to close borders and to increase pushback. As Diego was saying, there are many examples that we could put forward of successful integration of people, and we are not talking about individual cases. We are talking about 5 million or 6 million Venezuelans who are contributing to their society. The best way, really, to fight against xenophobia is through the inclusion of these people in the different communities.
On that, I believe the main focus that we are having now — we are not providing support to refugees and migrants only. Our aim is really to expand the support to local communities so they can enhance their reception capacity, but also to support existing services in the communities and engage the local population as well as refugees and migrants in joint initiatives.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: I just wanted to come back to the global rise of xenophobia. The chair asked a question and got an answer, but I still want to come back to it.
Mr. Samaniego, you proposed recommendations and insisted on international cooperation, on partnership and leadership among states. In the current context, with the rise of the right throughout the world, we see migrants being deported and undocumented persons being returned to their countries. For example, very recently, people were sent back to Rwanda. Obviously, it’s not their country, but with international agreements, Rwanda is accepting British migrants and undocumented persons. I could make a list: An immigration law just passed in France, and in the United States, we heard that as soon as the presidency changes, all migrants will be put on boats and sent back home.
In this context, what do you think productive international cooperation looks like? How can Canada play a role in bringing its major partners back to reality, like our neighbours to the south, regarding the need for cooperation and collaboration for accepting, managing and integrating refugees?
Mr. Samaniego: You’re absolutely right. I think the general tendency among states when they see xenophobia, problems with insecurity and other issues is to blame foreign populations arriving in the country. Unfortunately, we see that in many countries. Furthermore, as you said, many states opted instead for stronger border controls. They’ve also chosen more radical measures, such as externalization and massive deportations.
Nonetheless — I want to reference Latin America or the situation in the Americas more than what’s happening on other continents — I think that history will prove that, no matter what barrier you create, in the end, all that does is increase irregular migration. You can put up 10 walls and every time, people will keep trying more complicated and riskier routes. What’s more, you risk worsening the insecurity issues other countries are experiencing.
In that sense, we think — and we come back to the same theme — that the only solution is to stabilize the population. I think very few people want to walk 2,000 or 3,000 kilometres through the jungle or the desert to reach the country of their dreams. Many of these people, even culturally, would rather stay in their country of origin or neighbouring countries.
For example, we were talking about opportunities different countries could offer. Currently, we emphasize mixed migratory movements and the theme of xenophobia, but I think a significant part of the population successfully achieved a high degree of integration.
Even considering that, throughout most Latin American countries, we apply the principles of jus soli after four, five or six years, many children and families have very strong connections within those countries.
We think…. It’s the work we’ve done with Canada’s support. You know, Canada’s voice really gets heard. It’s not the first time various countries have wanted more border controls and wanted to start massive deportations. I think the role of cooperation, especially for Canada, was not only…. Canada set up solidarity conferences for the situation in Venezuela, and it also played a very important role in the Quito process and the Comprehensive Regional Protection and Solutions Framework, MIRPS, in Central America. Canada has always insisted on the message that we have to give populations socio-economic and legal options, and to do so as much as possible in the country of origin. Sometimes, it’s a little complicated, because countries of origin have serious problems and even governments are probably not promoting viable solutions for their people. The ideal is really to promote protection and development initiatives within the countries of origin or, if not, in the closest neighbouring countries.
Senator, with numbers that keep going up, I think we can see that the approach Canada has promoted is very valuable, and it can be verified in light of this data on the region.
Once again, in spite of all the problems and in spite of COVID-19, 80% to 85% of Venezuelans would rather stay in the countries where they’re currently located. As Mr. Beltrand said, we’re working more closely with the United Nations response within Venezuela and outside of it, because some people would rather go back home. The problem is that they don’t have the means or the stability required to stay there. The cost of living is too high, there are too many risks, they don’t have access to rights and to services. We’re working with the United Nations team to figure out how to help communities in various countries take in and reintegrate those who would rather go back home, in spite of the current context. The numbers are there. I think the solution is never a fast one; we have to invest in protection and integration. That’s the only way. We can have 50 campaigns against xenophobia, but the best way to ensure social cohesion and total inclusion is to foster integration of these migrants into the countries and communities that accepted them.
Senator Gerba: Thank you.
[English]
Senator Arnot: This question is for Ms. Jamous Imseis. Given that global displacement continues to rise, what strategies are UNHCR Canada focusing on to address root causes of displacement and support sustainable solutions for refugees and asylum seekers?
Ms. Jamous Imseis: Thank you for the question, senator.
You heard from all three of the witnesses that there are different pillars actively being worked on right across the Americas region, and indeed the globe, which seek to address root causes of displacement in order to prevent onward movements and dangerous journeys and to essentially try to contend with what are the highest and unprecedented numbers of people on the move that we’ve ever seen since we started capturing these numbers. In fact, if I defer to the gentlemen here, they might provide more detail.
It’s not the role of the humanitarian agencies to address the underlying political causes of some of these movements. Indeed, refugees are fleeing persecution, violence and insecurity in their home countries, which are largely precipitated by political conflict. That’s the role of the international community. It’s the role of the UN Security Council. Unfortunately, we are failing in that. That needs to happen. You need to have meaningful, durable political solutions to address that.
Mr. Samaniego mentioned the importance of development actors and banks in providing support, because these are not short-term or even medium-term solutions that need to be implemented, and dealing with some of these generational issues and problems that you see in governments and countries around the world that continue to drive displacement.
Perhaps I’ll leave it there and allow the other three witnesses to comment. They might have specific examples they wish to share from the Americas region.
Mr. Samaniego: Senator, I believe that the core of initiatives such as the Los Angeles Declaration is exactly what you are talking about, to put all actors together to try to promote protection and solutions in the different phases of displacement.
Again, it is sometimes difficult in countries of origin. People leave due to different reasons. Of course, you will have situations of economic exclusion and social tensions, but you will also have situations of extreme violence — for example, the presence of gangs in many of the communities in northern Central America. We know that addressing the root causes will take a long time. You will not solve the situation of violent countries or governments with, let’s say, governance issues. The transition will probably take a long time.
That’s why we say it is essential not to lose focus. We have to understand the underlying causes in order to try to address them through economic investment but also, importantly, economic investment linked to the promotion of public policy. Otherwise, you will have investments without substantial change in the affected communities. Keep in mind that this is, I would say, the ultimate goal, but in the short term, at least provide options of protection in the same country. There are different programs in Honduras and Colombia, for example, where people can opt for relocation within the country. In terms of the development of legal frameworks, Colombia has an exemplary legal framework for IDPs. If they cannot find sufficient protection in the country of origin, it is important to at least have options either in neighbouring countries or through the legal pathways that we mentioned. People have to be able to find short-term protection solutions that could alleviate their suffering.
I would say the only way to address the current situation is to keep in mind that we need a hemispheric approach to involve countries of origin, transit and destination, and to have spaces for dialogue so that we can identify and promote concrete solutions that could give quick protection solutions for people in need but also promoting that the root causes are addressed in the different countries of the region. Again, it’s not easy to address the root causes of displacement, but at least you can mitigate the situation in affected communities. Communities affected by violence, for example, need more state presence. They need the presence of civil society. They also need job opportunities and livelihoods. With that, we can start working to mitigate the causes. However, in most situations, this will only have a long-term impact.
The Chair: We are coming close to the end of our time, so if the questions and answers can be brief, I would appreciate it.
Senator Pate: My question may require responses in writing. I was curious as to whether any of the witnesses have examples of interventions that have been used. You mentioned organized crime and trafficking of people. Oftentimes, the forces that are involved in that are also involved with governance. The criminal activity is often also part of what is fuelling the governance and some of the instability of governance. Do you have examples of where effective interventions have been undertaken that also address the fact that criminal law approaches often only get the small actors and don’t deal with the systemic issues or where those trafficking and organized crime models are actually embedded in the governance of the countries?
I have a more specific example. During my trip to Syria last summer, the flip became clear that in Canada and many other international — well, international actors are not doing their part in post-conflict zones to address the rebuilding of structures and allowing for everything from repatriation of foreign nationals to assisting governance bodies like the Autonomous Administration to actually build the kinds of structures that are needed to allow for fair and equitable treatment of folks. As they’re dealing with millions of displaced people in their own countries, they’re not able to fully support their citizenry. If you’ve seen examples of where this is being done better, where we haven’t just abandoned folks — as in Syria and Sudan and other places — that would be helpful to hear about. I suspect that would need to be in writing, though. Thank you very much.
The Chair: Just to let the witnesses know, if there is something you feel you didn’t say or you want to give a written answer to, the clerk will follow up with you for your written answers. We do have a few minutes remaining, and anyone can answer the question.
Mr. Stein: You referred to issues that necessarily relate to the way in which, on the one hand, a state is organized to care for its people and, on the other, the way in which they relate to neighbours. This is increasingly complex but also increasingly necessary in today’s world.
I’m going to refer to examples in my own country because I don’t want to offend other people by mentioning issues. A former head of state from Mexico once said, at the beginning of the 20th century, “We are too far away from God but too close to the United States.” In this regard, the small Central American countries have always taken into consideration, within their own institutional scaffolding of public institutions, the relationship to the United States. It is our main economic partner in the region aside from the interaction amongst these smaller countries.
When you begin to deal with the way in which organized criminal groups have infected public institutions and have managed to control their decision-making processes to the extent that they are investing heavily in local electoral processes to elect mayors in their municipalities or governors in the states, it’s because they want to maintain the roots of transshipment as fluent as possible. Unfortunately, in this regard, we have found that some of the local authorities in several countries have become either complacent with these practices or directly involved in their gains. In this regard, it is crucial that local authorities can indeed be identified by the population of the communities there if they are receiving communities. Transparency in the government’s practices is an essential issue. That starts within the family, within schools, and so on, as you well know.
Second, if, and only if, you begin to move away from the elements that just a few years ago were part of the conflict generation dynamics within several territories, then you will begin to aspire to produce the kinds of conditions for foreign investment to come. Along with foreign investment, there is a considerable number of new technologies coming in.
In the case of Guatemala, my country of origin, when we were trying to finish the negotiations for the peace accords at the end of the 1990s, we necessarily had to rely on groups of people who were not residing in Guatemala but in the neighbouring countries and yet were directly involved in many of the dynamics of the economic evolution of many of the communities here. We very much thank you for the opportunity not only to answer the question but also to put in writing some of the experiences that we have found.
We have an example in Brazil with an operation in which they take care of identifying, in this enormous territory, the need for certain capacities. Once they have explored these job markets in fine script, then they move the lump of incoming migrants to those places. In most cases, they must learn a new language which, fortunately, is somewhat similar to Spanish. These kinds of institutional dynamics and practices are becoming a model for neighbouring countries to try to do the same as quickly as possible.
In this regard, they have to affect all of their educational structures, not only at the primary and secondary levels but also at the college levels — not necessarily for a traditional college degree but for technical capacities, as my colleagues mentioned at the beginning of our exchange. With a few adaptive efforts, some of the training facilities that have been successful elsewhere can be reproduced within these new environmental options where you can indeed absorb people on the move and begin to link investment capabilities from abroad to create new job opportunities. Thank you.
The Chair: We are out of time. I want to thank all the witnesses for appearing before the committee. Your testimony will be very helpful as we move forward with our deliberations and the study.
(The committee adjourned.)