THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS
EVIDENCE
OTTAWA, Monday, March 18, 2024
The Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs met with videoconference this day at 4 p.m. [ET] to examine and report on issues relating to national security and defence generally.
Senator Tony Dean (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: Honourable senators, welcome to this meeting of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs. I’m Tony Dean, representing Ontario, the chair of the committee. I’m joined today by my colleagues — committee members — around the room, whom I welcome to introduce ourselves, beginning with the deputy chair.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: Jean-Guy Dagenais, senatorial division of Victoria, Quebec.
[English]
Senator Oh: Senator Oh, Ontario.
Senator M. Deacon: Senator Marty Deacon, Ontario. Welcome.
Senator Anderson: Senator Anderson, Northwest Territories.
Senator Boehm: Peter Boehm, Ontario.
Senator Kutcher: Stan Kutcher, Nova Scotia.
Senator Cardozo: Andrew Cardozo, Ontario.
[Translation]
Senator Gignac: Clément Gignac from Quebec.
[English]
The Chair: We are also joined by Senator Donna Dasko today, representing Ontario. To my left is the committee clerk, Ericka Dupont, and to my right are Anne-Marie Therrien-Tremblay and Ariel Shapiro, the Library of Parliament analysts assigned to this committee, who support us so well.
Today, we welcome three panels of experts who have been invited to provide a briefing to the committee on the current security and defence situation in Ukraine, Canada’s military support to Ukraine and the implications for Canada’s defence operations.
We will begin by introducing our first panel of witnesses. In that respect, I would like to welcome Dominique Arel, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa, and Yann Breault, Assistant Professor at the Royal Military College of Saint-Jean. Many thanks to you both for joining us today. We invite you to provide your opening remarks.
We begin with Mr. Dominique Arel. Please proceed whenever you’re ready.
Dominique Arel, Chairholder, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa, as an individual: Welcome. Thanks for the invitation.
In early 2024, three major events have altered the geopolitics of the war in Ukraine. First, Russia captured the city of Avdiivka with an artillery ratio advantage exceeding 10 to 1 — between 5 to 1 and 10 to 1 — raising the prospects of a significant setback for Ukraine in 2024.
Second, Donald Trump recaptured the Republican Party, effectively blocking U.S. military aid to Ukraine — at least for the time being — and essentially telling NATO front-line states that the U.S. may no longer defend them.
Third, French President Emmanuel Macron declared that a NATO military presence could no longer be excluded. His message was clear: Russia cannot win in Ukraine because a Russian win would be — in his own words — an existential threat to the security of Europe.
The wild card that could not be anticipated even a year ago is the Trump comeback. He is not saying that Vladimir Putin and Russia “can do whatever the hell they want,” if NATO states don’t pay up — namely, meet the 2% of GDP threshold. He is, in fact, saying that American soldiers will not die for Tallinn, even though Estonia, like all front-line NATO state, have, in fact, met the requirement of 2% and, in some cases, largely exceeded it — such as Poland.
Trump has been anti-NATO all his life, but what is new is that he is uttering this stance after Putin launched the first full-scale war of aggression in Europe since World War II. Putin crossed a red line with the invasion. Trump is crossing one by announcing that he will not respect Article 5. The message, loud and clear, is that Europe is on its own. Even if Trump were to lose his re‑election bid, the nearly decade-long instability in American politics, as well as an isolationist current reminiscent of the interwar period — the 1920s and 1930s — is not about to subside.
This has become a moment of truth for Europe, who can no longer count on the United States in the short term, or perhaps, the long term. This means drastically increasing industrial military production and sending weapons and funds to Ukraine. But also for Macron, no longer self-declaring red lines of defence.
Here in Canada, there are signs that this new reality is beginning to forge public opinion with greater support for increased military spending in recent polls. However, the lack of political will to — at the very least — initiate a public debate persists in government and in the opposition. The modest progress regarding the 2% threshold appears to reflect a sense that no matter what, the Americans will always protect Canada. As Europeans realize that the U.S. could abandon them, we remain comforted by our geographical proximity to the military superpower. Should that really be the foundation of our national security? The fall of Ukraine would be an existential threat to Europe — but not to us? This is a hard question, but it must be asked, especially since, with climate change, Canada will wind up with a common border with Russia.
Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Arel.
Next, we will hear from Mr. Yann Breault. Please proceed when you’re ready.
[Translation]
Yann Breault, Assistant Professor, Royal Military College of Saint-Jean, as an individual: Thank you for having me. I am very pleased to share some thoughts with you, even though they may be rather grim. We are talking about Canada’s military support for Ukraine in light of what is happening on the ground.
I have three observations to share with you today. The first has to do with Russia’s engagement in what it is referring to as a “special military operation”. Two years ago, I appeared before a committee of the Canadian Parliament, where my esteemed colleague, Timothy Snyder, said that we should continue to help Ukraine, that Putin’s regime was weakening and that we had to support Ukraine for another month because Russia was on the verge of collapsing on its own. He is one of the region’s greatest experts and historians.
As we saw from the results of Russia’s election yesterday, two years later, there is no sign of Vladimir Putin’s regime collapsing and no loss of momentum in Russia’s military efforts, but there has been a 70% increase in the country’s defence budget, which now represents 6% of its GDP. The International Monetary Fund, or IMF, is forecasting economic growth of 2.6% for Russia next year. Shell production is now up to 250,000 shells per month, which is nearly three times greater than what the Americans promised to help Ukraine.
Mr. Putin believes that time is on his side in this war, and he is showing no signs of slowing down. That is my first observation.
My second has to do with Ukraine’s capacity. Ukraine is having difficulty recruiting. The average age of soldiers on the front is 43. Ukraine’s GDP has dropped nearly 30% since the beginning of the war, and the budget deficit for this year alone represents 20% of Ukraine’s GDP.
With all of this financial uncertainty, one has to wonder how the Ukrainian government will even be able to offer its people essential services in the coming years. The budget situation is that serious.
In order for there to be any hope of turning the situation around, Ukraine needs more international support. That is my third observation. As my colleague, Dominique Arel, mentioned earlier, what is happening with the political situation in the United States raises major concerns about the sustainability of the financial and military aid provided in the conflict to date. We also need to consider the way things are going not only in the Western world, but also within the entire international system.
What we are seeing is that the NATO countries have been unable to impose an economic sanctions regime that is effective enough to deprive Russia of the financial means it needs to continue this war. The UN is almost unanimous in condemning Russia’s aggression. In March 2022, 141 countries voted to condemn this aggression, but there are still only 23 countries around the world, including Canada, that are imposing economic sanctions. What is more, of the members of our military alliance, Turkey in particular does not support the economic sanctions regime, which has made it much easier for Russia to reconfigure value chains and restart industrial production at almost pre-war levels.
There are economic costs associated with the fact that Russia has to go through certain intermediaries to sell its oil on international markets, but given the high cost of energy, Russia’s current energy revenue is basically the same as it was before the war.
The major states that are helping Russia to circumvent the economic sanctions regime include China, India and the new BRICS countries — the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt and Ethiopia — which are now members of an alliance of states that is helping to improve the movement of capital and interbank communication systems outside networks that may be directly affected by U.S. sanctions.
This is accelerating the fracturing of the international financial system, making it easier for states like Iran and Russia to continue to obtain the revenue they need to maintain this effort. We need to sound the alarm not just with regard to the existential threat posed by the potential destruction of Ukraine but also with regard to the risk of the NATO countries becoming involved in a conflict that, as we know, is unfolding against a backdrop of nuclear weapons distribution and hypersonic delivery systems that have been being developed in Russia at great expense for over 20 years. There is still a risk of the conflict escalating into a nuclear war, and unfortunately, that is something that Canada has to consider when providing military support for Ukraine.
Thank you for listening.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Breault.
Those were two very sobering presentations that will evoke many questions, which we’ll now go to.
Our witnesses are with us for one hour today. In order to ensure each member is able to participate, we will limit each question, including the answer, to four minutes. Please keep your questions succinct and identify the person to whom you’re addressing the question.
Our first question today comes from our deputy chair.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: Thank you Mr. Breault and Mr. Arel.
My first questions are for Mr. Arel.
I agree that it is never easy to hold an election in wartime, but given that Russia just re-elected Vladimir Putin for six more years, do you think that the Ukrainian president will be able to hold on much longer without calling an election in his country? He was elected in 2019 in the second round of voting. If he were to call an election, do you think that he would get as much support as he did in 2019 after two years of war?
Mr. Arel: That is an excellent question.
I think that we can all agree that what happened yesterday in Russia was not an election. Ninety-four per cent of the people in the occupied territory of Zaporizhzhia did not vote for Putin. This was a ceremonial exercise in an authoritarian country to give the impression of almost unanimous support for Putin and the regime.
What people need to understand when it comes to Ukraine is that Ukrainians are not in favour of holding an election right now given of the extreme conditions, not only in terms of safety because of the bombings, but also because of the mass displacement of the population. There are millions of refugees living outside Ukraine, but there are also millions of people who have been displaced within the country, particularly from the eastern part of the country toward the centre and the west. The feeling that seems to prevail is that holding an election in these conditions would unfairly favour Zelenskyy. There’s no such pressure.
What is remarkable in a time of war is that the debate is very open in Ukraine, but after two years, how long can Ukraine actually go on like this without holding an election? During the Second World War, there were coalition governments that lasted for four or five years. I am not saying that this government will last for four or five years, but unfortunately, we are talking long term.
Senator Dagenais: In order for peace talks to begin between Russia and Ukraine, someone is going to have to make some compromises one day, and I am not seeing that from either side right now. Since Putin was re-elected for six more years, do you think that President Zelenskyy’s refusal to make territorial concessions to Russia is a major obstacle to potential peace talks?
Mr. Arel: It is difficult to give credence to President Putin’s statements on most subjects, starting with the war on Ukraine. Recently, the dominant narrative has suddenly become that the negotiations are pointless because Ukraine is losing ground, even though that narrative has been the opposite in previous months. That is the message that we are getting from Russia.
That being said, when it comes to territorial concessions, there is an assumption of sorts that such concessions could lead to the end of the war, to peace, to an end to the bombings, and that if Ukraine would give up some territory, then we could finally turn the page. However, there is no guarantee that the cessation of hostilities would actually lead to the end of the war because Ukrainians have been through this before with the war in Donbass in 2014. The negotiations lasted eight years and led to the first war of aggression on European soil since the Second World War. Russia is no longer credible when it comes to keeping its promises, starting with respect for borders. It violated two treaties with Ukraine, the 1994 and 1997 treaties, so any type of “negotiations” are unrealistic right now.
[English]
Senator Patterson: Thanks for your presentation. Mr. Breault, my question will be directed to you.
We have heard many people talk about the existential threats. Obviously, there are countries out there that do not see it that way, but Canada does — we look at the state of our current military and what we are actually able to raise as forces in Latvia, which is right on the front lines, whether we like it or not. If we say it’s an existential crisis, and if Russia is not going to change in its production of armaments or conscription of troops and throwing its people to their deaths, how is Ukraine going to continue without thinking about what President Macron has said or the fact that there could be bilateral agreements, even if it’s outside of NATO, for other nations to go in there?
From your perspective, Canada — boots on the ground — I do not mean they have to do that — I would like to know what the thinking is in academic circles in general and specifically for Canada with the current state of our military. Good luck.
Mr. Breault: This will come with a disclaimer: I’ve been examining and analyzing the situation in the post-Soviet world, but I do not claim to have any expertise in terms of Canadian defence policy. So, what I have been trying to do since I’ve been asked to comment on the situation — and I have done a great deal of interviews for the past 10 years — is to help us to understand how things are being seen from the other side of the wall.
In terms of how we should possibly react to the threat that Russia is right now, I never pretend I had any sound answer. Ten years ago, I was invited to the Defence Engagement Program, and I was asked that question. It’s very difficult and our predictions are absolutely worthless. I was among the numerous specialists who couldn’t really conceive the possibility of a full-scale invasion on February 24th. But there is one thing that I know. I did my PhD dissertation about national identity construction, how Russia, Ukraine and Belarus reimagine themselves as a nation in a post-Soviet world and how these identity construction processes are interrelated one to another, meaning that the way Ukraine defines themselves would affect the way Russia perceives itself and vice versa. In Russia, there is one, single thing that made real consensus among Russian society, which is this imaginary idea that Russian state history started in Kyiv more than 1,000 years ago.
Of course, Ukrainians are right. This is something that was stolen from there, from the Muscovy principality back in the sixteenth century. It is not true that the Moscow is the legitimate heir of the Kievan Rus civilization, but everyone in Russia believes it is so. There is no possibility that Russia will ever allow what they perceive as the heart of their civilization to fall into the orbit of a rival geopolitical enemy. For them — and they are wrong — it is an existential threat, and they will fight a bloody war before this will happen.
I was saying that 10 years ago, and it was the reason I was so uncomfortable with Prime Minister Harper shaking Putin’s hand in Brisbane at the G20 summit and saying, “Hey Vlad, I guess I will shake your hand, but you have to get the hell out of Ukraine.” I say, who do you think we are in order to use that sort of language toward what remains today a nuclear and very powerful state?
When I say that this is a nuclear power state, I mean that from the moment that President Bush tore apart the ABM Treaty in 2002, telling Putin that we are going to install these vertical launchers in Poland — an anti-missile defence system — right at your border, Russia has been investing. We were not thinking about nuclear weapons anymore back then. Remember, in 2002, we were with Russia in solidarity fighting international terrorism together, we had the NATO-Russia Council again, and we thought that Putin was helping us with our intervention in Afghanistan. Relations seemed pretty good between Putin and Bush back then.
This is the precise moment when Putin started increasing the military budget, and they were investing into developing means to deliver nuclear warheads into our territory by the development of hypersonic technology because they felt threatened by our attempt to deprive them of their retaliation capabilities. This is what they have been involved in for 20 years. We have seen the use of missiles. The Kinzhal was used a few times in theatre in Ukraine. Russia has these military capabilities.
This is where I disagree with my great friend Mr. Arel: We don’t have the same methodological point upon which we are building our reasoning. For me, the distribution of military capabilities that does exist cannot be evacuated from the equation.
When we are thinking in terms of what place Ukraine will have in the future, I thought the proposal that Putin put on the table back on November 21 saying, “You guys keep these new member NATO states in the alliance, but you move back your military capabilities,” was a way to reinvent a sort of delimitation between spheres of influences, which is what we used to deal with during the Cold War.
The Chair: I’m sorry, we’ll have to move on. Thank you.
Mr. Breault: We are back in this era. Thank you.
Senator Oh: Thank you, witnesses, for being here. My question is for both of you. What steps is Canada taking to protect against any dispute over effects of the conflicts, such as increased refugee entries, disruption to global supply chains or possible terrorist threats?
Mr. Arel: In terms of the refugees, Canada had already stepped up in a major way in 2022. My understanding is that almost a million — about 800,000 — visas were issued, even though most of them didn’t come. At least they had the visa.
Terrorism could be an effect, but I think that terrorism is — sorry, do I need to speak louder?
Senator Oh: No.
Mr. Arel: Okay. I think the destabilization campaign led by Russia abroad takes place a lot in cyberspace. You can call it cyber terrorism. I don’t think there have been major attacks on Canada yet, but since I’ve been talking a lot about France’s President Macron in the last few weeks. France has actually been in theatre for a long time, but it has been particularly intense in the past few months with those kinds of attacks and interference.
The larger question that I tried to raise in my short presentation is less about the spillover than the foundational threat. Is it indeed an existential threat? Macron is now saying it outright. Actually, the Europeans have been saying it for two years, except that Macron, because again the geopolitics have changed in a major way, is bringing the point to its logical conclusion, that if indeed it’s existential and things begin to go really south in Ukraine, in part of the asymmetry of capabilities, then what? Then what? We let Ukraine disappear from the map and create the precedent that Poland or Estonia is next, or what? That’s the big question that he asks. Of course, there has been an outcry — we are not ready to put boots on the ground. That’s not what he said. He is not saying that we are not about to put boots on the ground. Although he mostly chose to indirectly say, actually, we’ll not really have boots but shoes on the ground, in terms of technicians and, obviously, intelligence people. That question has suddenly become very urgent. What does it mean for us? What it means for Europe and for us, I think, merits, at the very least, a public discussion.
Mr. Breault: The larger spillover is the energy crisis that Europe has to face now that it doesn’t have any access to cheap natural gas as it used to. When I look at the figures, I think that is quite an opportunity for the U.S. and possibly for us. U.S.-held natural liquefied gas has increased tremendously since the beginning of the war. It’s a great economic opportunity.
You see the German industry struggling very much right now with some companies considering moving to this side of the Atlantic where they have cheaper energy, which makes a lot of Russian think this war is very much an American way to make sure it keeps its upper hand on European politics, preventing Germany from ever again becoming another autonomous centre of geopolitical power in the world.
The spillover effect in Europe, our partners, are having a great deal of problems keeping their level of productivity and competitiveness. To what extent would Canada be ready to find a way to export energy to Europe? That might be a way to deal with it.
The Chair: I’m afraid we have to move on.
Senator Kutcher: Thank you very much to both. I have a question for Mr. Arel, but also for Mr. Breault. The post-World War II world order really was good guys versus bad guys to a degree — liberal democracies against totalitarian states. But we are now seeing liberal democracy sliding into autocratic rule. Turkey, India, Hungary and Poland went that way and then came back a bit, and we’ve seen the United States wavering on that precipice. The question is: What does this increase in the autocratic rule or autocratic rise within liberal democracies mean for Canada and its role, not only with regard to Ukraine, but with NATO? And what does this rise of autocratic realities in once-liberal democracies actually mean for the multilateral world order, which was supposedly going to buffer the impact of the great states?
Mr. Arel: Four minutes? I’ll have a two-minute first crack. First of all, it is an international challenge — the rise of autocracy. We had these so-called elections yesterday in a state that hasn’t been that repressive since the 1940s. It’s even more repressive than in the late years of the Soviet Union right now in Russia. But it’s also a domestic challenge with the rise of the far right in the United States, Europe and less so in Canada, but who knows what could happen in Canada. So it’s both domestic and international. The way I see it after two years of war in Ukraine is that it’s really — I would say — the sanctity of human life that distinguishes between an autocratic and open democratic system; let’s leave liberal aside and just say, open system. Even the way the Ukrainian army is treating its own soldiers is light years away from the way the Russian army is treating its own soldiers. It’s a relationship in which individuals mean nothing: It’s all about the power of the state. If you’re an open society, things are messy, but ultimately you hear the voice of individuals. That’s what we call human rights and so forth.
I’ll leave you with one example that really struck me. There was a great deal of tension between President Zelenskyy and chief of the military, Zaluzhny, who was eventually forced out and is now an ambassador. One of the reasons — because it’s complicated to know what was really going on — was a dispute over tactics that involve the question of, to what extent the Ukrainian army or state would be ready to sacrifice its soldiers to achieve tactical objectives. The military and the politicians didn’t see it the same way. What’s remarkable is that you had that discussion — that tension — whereas there’s nothing like that in Russia, currently one of the prime authoritarian states. On top of it, we had Zelenskyy telling us — he didn’t grow up in the Soviet Union — but he misunderstood or underestimated the capacity of the Russian state basically to sacrifice its own soldiers. We’re talking about the meat grinders, these waves of soldiers being sent to Bakhmut and so forth, without incurring any social or political cost. They just keep doing it. That’s kind of an intangible advantage. Not only do they have all this military or technical advantage like artillery, but there’s that. I think that, to me, symbolizes a great deal of the current world challenge that we’re facing: the state and the individual.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you both very much for being here today. This question is certainly for either one of you to comment on.
This war has definitely driven home the fact that those who can manufacture and deploy artillery fastest, have a distinct advantage in a conflict. I’d like to shift this to what it means for Canada. Our procurement is certainly a big challenge right now. It takes quite a long time from a proposal to completion. We don’t necessarily get the best product, or the product we’re looking for in the first place. I’m wondering if what we’ve seen in Ukraine should lead to Canada taking a sober and much closer look at what our defence industry is and how we can better produce not just the big-ticket items, but the smaller-ticket items like ammunition and artillery.
Mr. Breault: Again, I’m not a specialist in Canadian defence policy. You’ll have a chance to talk with my colleague Justin Massie, who knows a great deal about this. I was in Latvia a few times and was asking our Canadian military there, “Are we training our guys in using drones?” And that was in the early stages of the war. That was before 2022. I was told, “Yeah, the Spanish had one and we tried it.” I said, “You guys are supposed to be there protecting the NATO border, and you guys have no training or drones to use.” I was struck by his answer. If I recall, that was 2021. All the echoes I got from people I talked to who were involved either in the UNIFIER mission in Ukraine, or Operation REASSURANCE in Latvia, told me that we’re helping Ukrainians. We play a significant role by providing them with the capacity not to wait for the chain-of-command orders from the higher rank of the military, but making autonomous decisions so that a lower rank officer on the ground could evaluate the situation. We’re helping them to get rid of their old Soviet military culture. I think that was a useful role. In terms of military equipment, “deplorable” would be a euphemism, I think. We don’t have the proper equipment to fight.
Mr. Arel: I think at the current rate of production in Canada, if we were to send everything to Ukraine, it would last about three days. But then if the French would do the same thing, it would last four days. The French are also not producing artillery. They’re producing high-end Caesar cannons, Mirage Fighters, and so forth. The Germans are picking up the Norwegians. But basically even the Americans would not be able to supply Ukraine for a month. They did with stockpiles, but not in terms of new production.
No one in NATO expected that kind of war. We expected it throughout the Cold War. It never happened. But that kind of high-intensity warfare was supposed to be off the books forever. The question now is whether what’s happening in Ukraine is a one-off, or if it’s going to be a very long war, and if it’s pivotal — the epicentre of the NATO international order. It would seem now that the thinking is that it’s not a one-off. We need to prepare, to basically face the current war, but also plan accordingly. Here Canada has to make very hard decisions. It’s not something that you can turn around and start the production line next week. It takes years, actually. But I’m not sure we’re moving very fast. There seems to be a lack of political will again. It’s not that urgent. Whereas in Europe, it’s really picking up, but there’s going to be a time delay, of course.
Senator Boehm: I thank our two witnesses. You are both professors who are frequently quoted in the media, including today. Professor Breault in The Hill Times, and Professor Arel more recently in Le Devoir. I wanted to follow up where my colleague Senator Deacon left off. In terms of defence production and procurement, everything Canada can and does provide Ukraine does not count at all against our commitment to attaining 2% of GDP in terms of our own national defence.
That might explain a bit of the political reticence that exists in a minority government situation. But if you look at total output, it is actually relatively good compared to some countries.
I wanted to ask you more specifically — both of you — whether you think the current arrangements through the Ramstein Group in terms of focusing and coordinating. That is, assuming that the Americans will be back on board. I think we need a bit of faith that it is sufficient. I was at the Munich Security Conference a month ago. The talk there, in Germany, was about whether the Germans will provide Taurus missile systems, the designated type of missile that could take out the Kerch Strait Bridge, for example, and could disrupt supply lines, but that’s a tough point in the German three-party governing coalition.
Do you see any developments there? We haven’t talked about Ukrainian military intelligence, the machinations and whether the work of General Budanov to get massive yields with relatively small investments in drones behind the lines is a factor. It’s really the strategic elements looking ahead that I would like you to comment on.
Mr. Arel: You touched upon domestic politics. I’m sure not around this table —
Senator Boehm: We don’t do politics here.
Mr. Arel: In public opinion, or in Russian, or in Ukrainian, or in international studies, we sometimes forget that foreign policy is also domestic politics. One is not disconnected from the other.
You have this peculiar situation in Germany, as you put it, where it’s not exactly clear why there’s such resistance by the chancellor except in his complicated domestic politics. All the arguments are, “We don’t want to send soldiers,” but it turns out you don’t need to send soldiers to man the Taurus. Another argument is, “We need to send technicians.” However, you don’t really have to send technicians. There are other ways. It all goes back to the politics and the peculiar coalition. Macron is kind of free hands right now. He has three years left in his final mandate. Although all the opposition parties were not crying, and so on, he has the political upper hand in the United States. We know the dynamics, but I would respectfully disagree with you. Maybe they’ll come back next month; maybe they’ll vote, but it’s unstable. This issue of Trump with Ukraine has to do with loyalty to the leader. It’s not even an ideological commitment, although it breeds this isolationism. I don’t see that going away. That’s the main message. Europeans are beginning to confront the reality that in the long term, they cannot rely on the Americans to bail them out as they have for 70 years.
Mr. Breault: The issue is all about escalation and to what extent we are keen to increase the lethality of the weapons we’re sending to Ukraine; that is unless we become an existential threat to Russia itself, which, according to its nuclear doctrine, will allow them the first use of probably a small nuclear warhead to make us realize what we are really engaging in with this.
This debate about whether or not to send a Taurus is the same debate: “We’re helping Ukraine, but not sending lethal weapons.” Then Mr. Trump says, “Yes, we will send lethal weapons but they will be lethal defence weapons.” So we go with the MANPADS and the Stinger missiles. We’re moving a step closer and using some small missiles with limited range because we don’t want to allow the Ukrainians to hit deep into Russian territory. We’re training pilots for fighter jets and having discussions about long-term missiles. We’re testing that bullet. To what extent can we possibly invest in weakening Russia militarily? Some politicians in Europe say, “That’s a good deal. Look at how little we’ve spent and how much damage we did. Let’s keep fighting this war through our Ukrainian allies because this is a cheap way to weaken Russia.” But how far can we go before we trigger something that will spin out of control? It’s the same thing that I’ve been repeating for the past two years, but it hasn’t changed.
The situation on the ground has changed. At some point, we thought the Russians would win in three days. No. They didn’t. The Ukrainians defended. Then we thought the Ukrainians were in their counter-offensive phase. It worked for a while, but now Russia seems to have the upper hand because it has become a long-term, industrial fight. I doubt that sending long-range missiles to Ukraine to possibly hit the Russian territory will help the Ukrainians regain territorial integrity.
[Translation]
Senator Gignac: Welcome to the witnesses.
Professor Arel, you mentioned that Mr. Trump had crossed a red line with his statements because he said that he will not respect article 5. I was in Brussels with some of my colleagues in early February, a few days after Mr. Trump made that statement. His shocking statement did not necessarily cause a panic, but it was seen as an attempt to put pressure on his colleagues by making himself out to be a great negotiator.
Do you think that we have been naive and that the United States may not get involved if a Baltic country were invaded? What would be the implications of that? That would be a losing situation, not just for Europe but also for the United States. I am trying to understand how serious this threat is.
Mr. Arel: President Biden gave a speech in mid-October when he returned from Israel. I remember because it was broadcast live. I was asked to join some colleagues who are experts on Israel and the United States on the show 24/60 because they were talking about Ukraine. That is when Biden said that they were going to put everything together and have $61 billion for Ukraine, Taiwan and Israel. It was the much-talked-about border issue. We know what happened. It has been six months.
Trump has been making sweeping statements for the past 10 years and now it is worse than ever, but factually speaking, American military aid has been blocked for six months. There is only one reason for that: Donald Trump. He has reasserted his control and it is stronger than ever. It even extends to U.S. senators. Even though they voted in favour in the end, for the first time half of them broke ranks. That is the reality. This is not conjecture about what might happen if Donald Trump takes office. The United States actually blocked military aid and Ukraine is literally losing ground as a result of insufficient military aid because, obviously, Europe and Canada are unable to address the shortfall in the very short term. We do not have the military production required.
That is why there is a sudden sense of urgency in Europe. Take, for example, Macron’s statement, but also the much-talked-about artillery coalition. That comes from the Czech Prime Minister. Macron made his statement during a conference on the subject.
This American instability seems very serious. It is all about Donald Trump’s return. Whether he wins or loses, there are no more guarantees that the bipartisan consensus that has been around in the United States since 1945 will return, no guarantees at all. I think that this is the new geopolitical reality and that, as neighbours of the U.S., we need to take that into account.
[English]
Senator Dasko: Thank you to both of you for being here today. I have a lot of questions, but I want to start with Professor Breault.
I want to go back to your comments about the construction of identity that you spoke about for the Eastern Europe countries. Ukraine has constructed itself as a democratic, independent and Western-leaning country. That identity evolved with Maidan. That was part of what Maidan was about. Are you suggesting that Ukraine has to go back to some sort of a neutralized kleptocracy which we saw in its uneven development toward its current identity? Are you suggesting that is what would bring peace, namely, if Ukraine looked like that as opposed to the way it looks now?
Mr. Breault: The reason I have been so reluctant to share my view in the public space is because when I hear myself starting from that methodological standpoint of power distribution among the unit and the international system, and I’m thinking about the conclusion, it leads me to say a thing that makes me feel like omitting myself. I have been a keen supporter of Ukrainian identity and independence since the beginning. I was myself a Quebec independence supporter, and when I saw these people standing against Soviet imperialism and hoping to build their own independent nation, I was very supportive of that idea.
The problem started with Ukraine, not with Maidan in 2014. It started with the Orange Revolution in 2004. When you had American interference in an independent state’s internal affairs, supporting a candidate called Viktor Yushchenko, that rehabilitated some of the extremely controversial figures of Ukrainian independence who sought the war against the Soviet Union while collaborating with Hitler for a short time during the Second World War.
You see a state rehabilitation of Stepan Bandera, who became a portrait in some school, giving medals to those great Ukrainian cultural figures, associating them with someone who was perceived — rightfully, to my humble understanding — in most of the former Soviet Union as a bad person for what he did during the Second World War. I started to worry about the incompatibility of the new national identity discourse that was put forward in Ukraine after the Orange Revolution that we very much supported back then, saying, “This will trigger a reaction in Russia.”
Russia can tolerate an independent Ukraine. Mr. Putin was there in 2001. He celebrated the tenth anniversary of the Ukrainian independence next to President Kuchma. Ukraine was meant to be an economical and geostrategic partner with Russia, or at least a kind of bridge between Russia and Europe. This is what Ukraine was meant to be. Ukraine is torn between its affiliation and historical memories with Russia, and its aspirations with Europe. The only bright future Ukraine could have hoped for is to be a bridge between these two worlds.
The moment we start to think that Russia is this barbaric, Asian, totalitarian, autocratic, dirty regime that we don’t want to have anything to do with and we don’t bring in our alliance in the form of a periphery and allow Ukrainian to have a bright Western liberal democratic future with us, and we will build a border with Russia, I was among those who said, “Wait a second. It’s not going to be. Russia will never stand being excluded from its European cradle.” All the cultural references — even the young people in Russia know nothing about China. They don’t go to watch Chinese films and they don’t know Chinese literature, but they can talk a great deal about Balzac, Proust and Zola. They know all the French films. They can sing. They know a lot about British rock and their cultural references in Europe.
If you’re trying to put Russia on the other side of the border and say, “you big bear, stand out of our way,” you’re not thinking as a way to build a secure European security architecture. That was my point.
When I look at the consequences of what we have right now, the best I hope for Ukraine is for Ukraine to remain an independent state. For that to happen, I think Ukraine will have to quit the idea of being a member of a U.S.-led military alliance, especially an alliance is not a security collective alliance anymore. We broke that in 1999 when we circumvented the UN Security Council and decided to bomb an independent country called Yugoslavia, because we had the responsibility to prevent genocide in Kosovo. We tore apart a country that had legitimate and recognized territorial borders. We created something that Russia became extremely fearful of, and we started a process of the degradation of the relations that we’ve been witnessing for two decades. I’m just afraid this will lead us into a full-fledged military confrontation with a nuclear power. That is not something I cannot condone.
Senator Dasko: So Ukraine cannot be an independent, Western-facing democracy?
Mr. Breault: It can to the extent that we in Canada can remain an independent and sovereign country next to the U.S. border. We are sovereign. We have our own institutions. But the day we have a government here that would invite the Chinese to rent a naval base in Halifax or Vancouver, let’s see how long our U.S. neighbour will support our independence and our right to be a sovereign country.
When Russia invited the U.S. into Ukraine —
The Chair: Thank you. We have to move on.
Senator Cardozo: Thank you, professors. This is awfully interesting. It has been an interesting afternoon.
My question is quite simple, and, Professor Breault, you partly answered it: How do you see this ending? You laid out one possibility.
My other question is this: How do you see the politics going in other European countries? One looks at Hungary and Belarus playing closer to Russia. What are your concerns about the other countries? Are others going to break away and figure that it’s going to be worth their while to play closer to Russia?
Mr. Breault: The debate and views I presented here, which I know are controversial — and I dropped them here to allow for an enriched dialogue and reflection — are all about the unity of our transatlantic alliance, which is extremely important. The editorial line I take on this is something you hear a lot in many places in Europe. In France, you have this very strong commitment of Macron not to close the door to sending troops on the ground in Ukraine, but when you look at the recent poll, you saw Marine Le Pen from the far right who is poised to get — the latest poll was about her gaining a legislative majority.
This is the challenge. My advice for a small and weak country like Canada is to keep our allies, work to get harmony within our alliance and tamper those extreme views that would allow us to move too far in one or the other direction is very important.
Mr. Arel: I disagree that this is an existential threat to Russia. Since I have two minutes, I’ll explain why, very quickly. An authoritarian regime is unaccountable to its own people. The regime declared that it’s existential. It’s not existential. It might be existential to the regime but not to the state.
Russia doesn’t need to destroy Ukraine or to buy half of its country to survive. Hungary, which is currently the black sheep in the European Union, 1 of 27 — although little Slovakia is on its coattails — is also an unaccountable state. Sure, they have elections, but they have devised the system so they can never lose an election again.
When we talk about the geopolitics and the security threats, those are the threats: having those kinds of regimes that are launching wars of aggression and destabilizing the international order. Now, we see that threat — and it’s pretty frightening — in the United States. There are constant claims that the elections are stolen, et cetera. It’s not clear if Donald Trump will return and it’s going to be the last election. It might sound like science fiction, but it’s not.
What has impressed me in these two years — since your question is about the alliance — is how strongly the alliance has held together. The 27 in Europe and 32 in NATO now, with Finland actually declaring what Macron said as not being a bad idea. They’ve been neutral for 75 years. They should know what they’re talking about. It’s remarkable.
The weakness, of course, is the lack of industrial production and so forth; we understand the politics. But the front has held politically, except that we didn’t see what’s happening now, which are the internal dynamics in the United States. We didn’t see that coming, and that’s most distressing.
Senator Cardozo: How do you see this ending?
Mr. Arel: Ukraine cannot lose. Russia cannot win the war. Russia has lost wars before. It’s not predestined to win the war. Sure, it won World War II, but so did Great Britain and the United States.
It cannot lose the war, because then, essentially, the credibility of NATO is finished. That is the end of the international order as we have known it. Of course, it could happen.
The Chair: Thank you. I’m afraid that at this point, we have to finish, which is important.
Thank you, Mr. Arel and Mr. Breault. This is very much appreciated. Your presentations first and certainly the responses to our questions have been rich. They have been sobering, and they have been worrisome.
Colleagues, I note that we commenced our study of security and defence in the Arctic two months before the invasion of Ukraine, and we were reminded today that events south of the border might have deep implications for Ukraine but might also have deep implications for Canada as well. I think that’s hugely important.
We will now move to our second panel for this afternoon. For those of you joining us live, we’re meeting today to receive a briefing on the current security and defence situation in Ukraine, Canada’s military support to Ukraine, and the implications for Canada’s defence operations.
We welcome next Andrew Rasiulis, Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute; and by video conference, Magdalena Dembinska, Full Professor, Department of Political Science, Université de Montréal. Thank you both for being with us today. I invite you to provide your opening remarks, which will be followed by questions from our members.
[Translation]
Magdalena Dembinska, Full Professor, Université de Montréal, as an individual: Hello. Thank you very much for inviting me to appear before this committee.
The war in Ukraine is dragging on. Two years after the Russian invasion, there is no sign of the war ending any time soon and no sign of a ceasefire or even negotiations. After two years, two things are certain.
First, international alliances are being redefined. Again today, we have seen indications of this with China, Iran and India congratulating Putin on his landslide electoral victory, while Europe is expressing outrage over the illegitimate and even illegal process.
Second, we can no longer ignore the risk that the war could spread beyond Ukraine’s borders. There is a very real possibility that Russia could attack Moldova, Georgia or even NATO countries, such as the Baltic states or Poland. This is no longer just about helping Ukrainians. It is about Canada’s allies’ ability to defend themselves.
Why should Canada be concerned when, geographically speaking, it is so far removed from the turmoil?
Obviously, if there is an attack on a NATO country, then Canada would be directly involved under article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. While we cannot rule out an attack on Latvia, for example, where Canadian NATO troops happen to be stationed, that is less likely in the short and medium term than the war spreading to Moldova or Georgia, two countries that Russia considers its “near abroad” countries and that have pro‑Western geopolitical leanings but are not part of NATO.
Canada should be concerned about the war spreading and escalating in this way, since an attack on these countries would signal a clear desire to weaken European security and the international order, and thus Canada’s national interest. Such a development would be a victory for Russia, which would have no reason to stop there. This would not be a regional issue, but a global one, as an informal alliance is taking shape between China and Russia. Incidentally, allowing an attack on sovereignty without any resistance or consequences sends a signal to and may serve as a motivator for every country in the world that wants to invade its weaker neighbour.
As a member of NATO that has been involved in providing military, humanitarian and economic aid to Ukraine from the start and that also shares a border with Russia in the Arctic, Canada should be concerned.
Canada should be concerned about the Kremlin’s determination and resilience, the support it has in the global south and its economy, which continues to survive despite Western sanctions, mainly because of the natural resources it is exporting to China. Russia’s economy has been rebuilt around war, military spending, which accounted for 6% of the Russian GDP this year, and spending on information and disinformation efforts, propaganda, which totalled 1 billion euros in 2023.
Canada should also be concerned about the fact that the U.S. is blocking aid for Ukraine, when, until now, the U.S. has been the largest source of Western support. We should also be concerned about Donald Trump’s looming potential victory.
Ukraine cannot wait. It is sorely lacking in weapons and munitions when, according to many experts, a major Russian offensive is imminent this summer, with the Kremlin taking advantage of hesitations and delays in military supplies being sent to Ukraine. The risk of Russia advancing on the Ukrainian front automatically increases the risk of the war spreading beyond Ukraine.
In this context, if Canada wants to contain the war in Ukraine and thwart Russia’s plans, then we need to be guided by three objectives. First, we must strengthen military aid to Ukraine and continue to weaken the Russian economy. Second, we must provide more aid to eastern European countries, particularly when it comes to cybersecurity, in their war against disinformation and destabilization. Third, we must deter Russia by presenting a united front and showing that the allies are able to defend themselves.
European countries are working hard to achieve this, as evidenced by the recent joint statements from France, Germany and Poland and the security co-operation agreements that France signed with Ukraine and Moldova on March 13. In light of the perhaps temporary disengagement of the U.S., Canada must consider strengthening its co-operation with Europe, sharing the burden of providing aid to Ukraine and strengthening the capacity to deter and defend in central and eastern Europe.
NATO’s eastern flank is taking action. Their military spending is skyrocketing, especially Poland’s. It has become a leader among the NATO countries by allocating 3.5% of its GDP to defence in 2023 and committing to increase that to up to 4% in 2024. In comparison, Canada allocates 1.4% of its GDP to defence. It is about deterrence. Whether Russia wins or loses, the international order as we know it will be altered and fragmented, so Canada has an interest in looking ahead at what its place and its capabilities will be.
Thank you very much.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you very much, Ms. Dembinska.
Andrew Rasiulis, Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, as an individual: The war between Ukraine and Russia has now passed the two-year mark in terms of Russia’s attack on February 24, 2022, but the actual date of the conflict has its origins in the events of 2014 with the Maidan revolt, Russia’s consequent annexation of Crimea, and the partial control over the oblasts of Luhansk and Donetsk.
Fast forward to the current security situation and its implications for the Canadian Armed Forces, or CAF. In light of the continuing dynamic nature of the war, I will present a very short update on the politico-military situation and then be pleased to elaborate further in response to questions from the committee.
At present, the Russian forces have the offensive momentum in the war. The Russians are making tactical-level gains in several sectors along the 1,000-kilometre front line and are advancing westward. The most visible Russian victory of late was the capture of the long-contested town of Avdiivka in the Donbas oblast. The Russians are reinforcing their success with attacks on Ukrainian positions further west. The Ukrainians are establishing new defence lines to hold back further Russian advances.
Both sides are using missile and drone strikes to hit targets behind the front line in eastern Ukraine. Russian strikes have occurred throughout Ukraine, including areas in western Ukraine, such as the city of Lviv, close to the Polish border, which is a NATO country. While the Russians have greater numbers of missiles and drones and have therefore inflicted relatively more damage on targets in Ukraine, the Ukrainian forces have managed some spectacular long-range missile and drone attacks on targets in Russia proper, as well as in Crimea. The Ukrainian strikes in Crimea have sunk or damaged several Russian ships of the Black Sea Fleet based in Sevastopol. In response, the Russians have been forced to pull back some of their ships to coastal locations further east along the shores of Russia proper. The net gain of Ukraine from these actions has been to secure a limited naval corridor for their grain shipments using the Danube basin. However, the critical mass of this war is the land battle in eastern Ukraine. Ukraine’s objectives remain to strategically defeat Russia by forcing all Russian forces out of occupied Ukraine, including Crimea. Militarily this is not impossible, but not very likely given the current balance of forces and the strength of Russia’s defensive fortifications. Ukraine’s offensive of last summer failed to meaningfully penetrate the Russian defences in Eastern Ukraine. Ukraine is now on the strategic defence and for the foreseeable future, although Zelenskyy has stated that Ukraine has a plan of attack for later in 2024.
It is expected that the Russians will continue to press their attacks on multiple axes westward along the front line. The immediate objective of the Russians is to militarily secure the four oblasts that they are fighting over and have incorporated into the Russian Federation according to legislation passed by the Russian Duma. Beyond that, the Russians might aim to push their attacks in the northern part of the front and try to capture Kharkiv, which they managed to do in their initial attack of 2022. Attacks along the Black Sea coast to seize Odesa may be a long-term objective, but militarily very difficult.
Essentially, Russia will try to exhaust Ukraine’s ability to conduct the war. Currently, Ukraine is struggling with shortages of equipment, ammunition and combat soldiers. The soldier part of the equation is most acute for Ukraine. Assuming that the West will, over time, continue to provide equipment and ammunition, the Ukrainians must find their soldiers among their population. Mobilization of sufficient soldiers in Ukraine continues to be a major political problem for the Zelenskyy government. The Russians, on the other hand, are managing to balance their requirements for equipment, ammunition and soldiers and appear strong enough to continue the war.
Ukraine is relying on technology of Western arms and innovative tactics to offset the Russian advantages over the longer term. They may also be hoping for a repeat of 1917 which saw the Russian army collapse and a regime change in Russia leading to the humiliating peace with Germany at Brest-Litovsk. The probability of such a scenario today is not high as far as it may be ascertained.
Canada’s military support for Ukraine in this war is conducted under Operation UNIFIER. The mission consists of CAF providing training support for various military skills to Ukrainian forces at training facilities in the UK and Poland. By so doing, the CAF act as a combat multiplier effect, freeing up Ukrainian instructors for combat duty while the CAF provide some of the trainers.
Equally important is Operation REASSURANCE, Canada’s Military contribution to strengthening NATO’s Eastern Flank. The focus of this mission is Canada’s lead role in the brigade group in Latvia. This mission will very likely continue after the war in Ukraine as there is likely to be a protracted stand off between NATO and Russia in which might be termed a “Cold War Redux” or “Cold War II.”
Thank you very much. I’m open to your questions.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Rasiulis. We will now proceed to questions. I remind you that these witnesses are with us for about 40 minutes. In order to ensure that each member is able to participate, I will again try to limit each question, including the answer, to four minutes. Please keep your questions succinct and identify the person to whom you are addressing your question. The first question goes to Senator Dagenais.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: My first question is for Ms. Dembinska. The Trudeau government announced that it is preparing for the potential return of Donald Trump as the leader of the United States. Since Canada’s foreign policy is not very clear or easy to follow, will Canada not be trapped by its promises to Ukraine and NATO with Trump as the American president?
Ms. Dembinska: Thank you for the question. That has to do with bilateral relations between Canada and the U.S., but I think that Canada, which is an independent country with its own policies, can still look more toward working with Europe. Whether or not Mr. Trump becomes president of the United States, perhaps Canada should play a bigger role in Europe by working with partners, such as France, Germany and Poland. In recent days, we have seen talks between these three countries, which have made joint statements that prove that, despite everything that is being said about the Western countries hesitating in providing aid to Ukraine, where there is a will — and when one feels threatened — there is a way. I think that Canada has a role to play independent of what is happening in the U.S.
Senator Dagenais: My next question is for Mr. Rasiulis. Let’s come back to the words of the French President, who said that a Russian victory would be a threat to Europe. With or without Putin, Russia will remain a superpower and a country that is unlikely to embrace our style of democracy.
That being said, is there any possibility, in the near future, of a political trend in Europe that would create a new dynamic that includes the Russians, or are we doomed to engaging in never-ending confrontation with them and never trusting Russia?
[English]
Mr. Rasiulis: Thank you. You can sort of see where I’m going with my answers in my preface. There will be a Cold War, I think, at the end of this. I don’t think the Russians will be defeated. I think there will be a long stand-off. I went through the Cold War I. I was 10 years in the defence department when we still had the Cold War. I was doing conventional arms control stuff.
There comes a point where you can eventually have détente and what we were calling back then a peaceful coexistence. You can come around from the point where, yes, there is a great antagonism, but then it becomes in the mutual interests of both sides to ratchet down the level of confrontation for mutual benefit. It’s a mutual benefit thing.
In the long, long term, I think Russia and the West will have a rapprochement but it will take a long time.
Senator Patterson: I’m going to take the focus a bit more on the home front. We know that Canada’s will to fight comes from the people as a democracy, especially when we’re looking at what Ukraine needs to continue in the fight right now, whether it’s artillery shells or conventional weapons, et cetera. It’s up to the Canadian taxpayer to decide whether or not they wish to pay for that.
Unfortunately, we know the history of the former Soviet Union and Russia. Whether I talk about Georgia, or Chechnya, or Moldova, or Ukraine I, or Ukraine II — you pick it — we know that this relentless pursuit of territory will remain. However, the will of the Canadian people is very much about our understanding of our history and why this is a threat to Canada.
My question probably goes to both of you: How we can better educate Canadians to understand that it is part of the history of our democracy to confront aggressors such as this; that this is truly an existential threat that can, in the long term, threaten their desire for affordable housing, et cetera; and that we need to invest in a military industrial complex that will make shells and the arms that are needed.
I have just returned from a tour in the U.S. to large defence suppliers. They are not charities. They need money for starting up. They need government will, but that means Canadians are willing to pay. Are you seeing apathy in Canadians toward our history? If so, is there anything that we can do, or what key messages should we be trying to put forward? Thank you.
Mr. Rasiulis: I would make a real distinction, as I do whenever I speak or write, between Canada’s existential interests, which are NATO and therefore our commitment in Latvia; as opposed to our commitment to Ukraine, which is a training thing. I do not regard the outcome of the situation in Ukraine to be existential to Canada’s security, but I do regard the defence, security and deterrence of the NATO borders to be existential.
That’s the way it was back in the Cold War days. If we make that clear distinction, because I think you can go down a rabbit hole saying that we have to supply Ukraine almost indefinitely, to a situation where victory is not at all assured, and you’re getting this blowback in the U.S. Congress right now, where people are saying that we’re pouring billions into Ukraine but we don’t see a pathway to victory because there is none, in my opinion. If we went that way, the Canadian taxpayer would be asking the question, “Why are we blowing our money?” And I would say, I can’t explain why because the more you pump into Ukraine it’s not going to result in a strategic outcome that we think we would like. But if we support our brigade in Latvia, which is desperate for funding, and it’s also meaningful because it’s a very distinct and visible Canadian commitment, to be the lead nation in the brigade group in Latvia: People can see it and identify it; it’s 2,000-plus people; you can actually do something with it and come out and say, “We have a brigade, and Canada is doing its bit in the NATO deterrence.”
Ms. Dembinska: Thank you very much. I very much agree with my predecessor about the deterrence and the role of Canada in NATO and deterrence, and this is something that the public should certainly be aware of and be informed about. Yes, education and defeating disinformation, which is something I mentioned in my opening statement — that disinformation is something we should certainly work on — cybersecurity and so on, but maybe also such things as international news in our media, which are topics not so much exposed and read about, et cetera. I also think there is something to be done, which is probably not the role of your committee, but it is still very connected to how to get public opinion to stick — if I may say— with the policies and politics.
There’s one thing that I would try to nuance from what was said: What does victory mean? This is something that obviously depends, for the moment, on Russia saying that it is occupying this and that and annexing and overthrowing the Ukrainian government, and NATO being the existential threat to Russia, as it is framed in Russia. On the other side, we have Ukraine, for whom, obviously, victory means total recuperation of all occupied territories by Russia. In the end, what victory is and will be, is another thing we can also frame and have a discussion about, probably not in Russia, but in Ukraine, yes, and here in Canada too. I think the danger of saying that we don’t need to have weapons in Ukraine is the danger of giving up on an independent country. If we give up on an independent country, that means other countries may say, “What the hell? The Western world is only interested in their Western democracies and NATO members, and if we want to transgress borders of other countries, why not? Who will defend them?” I think this is very important.
The Chair: Thank you. So do we.
Senator Boehm: I’d like to thank Professor Dembinska and Dr. Rasiulis for being with us. I’ll try to keep it short because I really want to hear both your comments on this. I want to ask about Russian capability. Taking Avdiivka and the siege of Bakhmut, previously panels referred to this as a “meat grinder operation.” Russian soldiers are not necessarily coming from Moscow, St. Petersburg and that area, but from other parts of the country; in addition, there might be other parts of that vast country where there could be some issues, whether it’s in the Caucuses or wherever. Sweden and Finland have joined NATO, which leaves only Kaliningrad in the Baltic Sea as the sole Russian outpost. There are, of course, reports, which you mentioned, Dr. Rasiulis, about how the naval capacity of the Black Sea fleet has been severely decimated. Also some cheap drones have destroyed multimillion dollar aircraft that were there for reconnaissance purposes as well.
I’d be curious to know what you think the capability is over the long term in the war.
Mr. Rasiulis: Right now, the estimates are that the Russians can sustain an offensive momentum in 2024. Questions begin in 2025, as Western armament production starts to ramp up, and potentially Ukraine gets more and more supplies. Then there’s the tipping balance in terms of personnel, soldiers. And for the Ukrainians, in my opinion, that is the weakest spot because you can assume all that stuff will come in, but if you don’t have a soldier behind a weapon, it’s useless. At the end of the day, if you’re looking at Ukrainian objectives, that is to defeat the entire Russian army in Ukraine, push them out of Crimea and so on. That takes a lot of soldiers. My estimate is that they don’t have it. General Zaluzhny was saying that. He says they need half a million soldiers at a minimum to do what they want to do, and they can’t do that. So I think the Russians can, therefore, balance that out. The question is how many soldiers can the Russians keep meat grinding away and so forth? Surprisingly enough, the Russians are getting a lot of their troops from volunteers; they’re being paid and they’re being paid well. People are coming from poverty-stricken parts of Russia, who are joining the fight. How long can that be sustained? Again, beyond 2024 into 2025, we’re getting really nebulous out there, so I don’t know. I think that if I saw the Russian war plans, I would think they will do their strongest to defeat the Ukrainians in 2024 and force them into a level of exhaustion where they might accept the ceasefire. The way I see it, essentially Ukraine will be partitioned. The question is where the partition would be, and that’s where I think the Russians are driving the Ukrainians.
Ms. Dembinska: I’m not an expert on military strategies and defence. I’m working in the region doing ethnographic work. So I will not speak about arms and military capabilities. However, I think it is important to mention and to bear in mind that Russia has soldiers and Russia does not need to be accountable to public opinion, meaning that the use of Russian citizens is a different mobilization, et cetera. It’s a different issue in Russia than in Ukraine or here. I think this is important to bear in mind. So Russia’s better capability in military terms is its authoritarian regime and repression for mobilization, et cetera.
Yes, soldiers are paid and the public opinion is — as we could see during the so-called elections — a [Technical difficulties] one, one might say; oppression is doing its work. I think this is something that is in Russia’s benefit in terms of military capacity — the regime.
You mentioned that Kaliningrad is the sole outpost in Russia now in Europe. Yes, but at the same time, I think we need to pay more attention to those territories that are continually destabilized by Russia within larger Europe, like Transnistria in Moldova, or Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and mentioning the Black Sea fleet. This year, there will be the opening of a naval base in Ochamchire in Abkhazia, which is legally in Georgian territory but in a separatist region controlled by Russia.
That all makes possible hybrid wars and cybersecurity issues. Those are things we should not dismiss in terms of Russia’s capabilities in using those territories.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you to both of you for being here virtually and in person.
I will ask this question of Ms. Dembinska first. It is a bit of a carry-on from some of the conversation. This is actually coming back to NATO and membership in NATO.
As we’ve talked about at different tables, you’ve heard that influential experts, such as the former NATO chief and the U.S. ambassador to NATO, have called for Ukrainian membership into the alliance and for it to be sped up.
I’d like your thoughts on a few items. Do you think that, given slipping public support among NATO allies, it is even a realistic possibility? Accession would have to be ratified in each member state, for instance, and even in the U.S., it’s not clear that would happen.
Second, would it mean NATO troops on the ground in Ukraine if it happens? What would happen with that, or would it lead to some sort of NATO “light” arrangement that might even undermine the alliance? So those are some strategy and tactics I’m wondering about today.
Ms. Dembinska: Thank you for the question, which is quite difficult to answer.
I’m not sure I would say there is decreasing public support in European public opinion, for example, for helping Ukraine. Yes, there are political adjustments, et cetera, but even here in Canada, I’m not sure that we can talk about decreasing support. There is the way and form of support, and pessimism linked to that, but I’m not sure it’s decreasing. It’s certainly not decreasing in the countries that are bordering the war. In Central and Eastern Europe, they still have a need for NATO and NATO troops on the ground.
There’s the question of Ukraine speeding up joining. What is important for Ukraine right now is to hear that it is a real possibility to join NATO. But they are not naive; they don’t really count on being members of NATO as long as the war and the conflict are there. We are realists. It is not something we can really hope for.
But the symbolic saying that it is considered and real, and that it should speed up, et cetera, is important for the morale of the troops, for Zelenskyy and for maintaining this possibility that the Western world, NATO included, is not giving up on Ukraine. That is the important message that should be said, whatever the reality of it in a short and medium term is.
Mr. Rasiulis: I think the whole thing about Ukraine and NATO — there’s a point of diminishing return, politically speaking. Ukrainians are realizing it’s not going to happen. Because the outcome of the war is not going to be a 100% Ukrainian victory, I think the prospects of Ukraine in NATO are minimal. Rather, what you could tell the Ukrainians is that there’s a chance of a neutral Ukraine that might actually do well — as the other professor, who was sitting here before me, said — as a bridge between East and West.
I’ve also argued that Ukraine, before this war, stood the chance of being a bridge between East and West. I was working in this area in the 1990s. I was deeply disappointed by the way things went in the ultra pro-NATO side of the equation, which I think threw Ukraine off. Getting it back to the neutral side of the equation could bring benefits to the people of Ukraine.
Senator Kutcher: Thank you very much to both the panellists.
I’d like your thoughts on the sword of Damocles that hangs over this war, and that is Russia’s use of nuclear weapons will be triggered by some unspecified Western involvement in the war. That was supposed to happen with tanks; it didn’t happen with tanks. It was supposed to happen with fighter jets; it didn’t happen with fighter jets. Now, it’s deemed the Taurus missiles.
What is the reality of Russia’s use of nuclear weapons in this conflict?
Mr. Rasiulis: I’ll be precise on this.
The Russians didn’t address the weapons that they would go nuclear with — tanks and so on. Russian comments have always been very straightforward, saying that Russia is a nuclear superpower, and Russia would use all of its nuclear capabilities if it felt existentially threatened. It didn’t specify what that meant. That’s as far as it goes.
We can start to interpret. The interpretation — and this really got strong in the fall of 2022 when it looked like it was a possibility that Ukrainian forces might actually reach Crimea. Most analysts, including me, thought that if the Ukrainians ever got to threaten Crimea, that’s when the Russians would pick up the phone to Biden and say, “This is 1962 in reverse. If Ukrainians get to Crimea, we consider it the same way Kennedy thought of Russian missiles in Cuba to be an existential threat. So please call off the Ukrainians, or we’ll go nuclear.” It won’t be “onesies” and “twosies” — there are a lot of theories on that. I think they will go all out and go DEFCON 2 and basically threaten Armageddon. When you do that, no one can go higher than that. You’ve reached the maximum of the escalation ladder. Anything below that is one bomb here and one bomb there. Americans can counter, and you go up like that. So you go to the top and stop.
That’s where I think the threat is.
Right now, that’s really off the table. Putin has mentioned it again when Macron started talking about putting boots on the ground, saying that if we escalate to war with NATO, we’re back to the nuclear scenario again. That’s what he was saying.
But we’re nowhere near that, and Putin himself has said that we’re not.
Ms. Dembinska: I essentially agree. This is part of a deterrence war. If you do this, I will do that. The same thing goes for President Macron’s saying that they might go to Ukraine with their NATO boots, et cetera.
I want to return to this question of Ukraine as being a bridge between Russia and the Western world — yes, if this is the decision made by the population that they want to be a bridge. The problem is when it is imposed from above. History tells us that when imposed from above, problems begin.
Senator Cardozo: Professor Dembinska, could I ask you how you see all this ending? I’m not asking how you’d like to see it ending but, realistically, what do you think will happen?
Mr. Rasiulis, I wonder if you could share your thoughts on what the Trump playbook is in all this.
Ms. Dembinska: In terms of how it is ending, I’m a political scientist, so I’m not good at predictions; in social science, we are not. I think the victory of Ukraine is still possible given our commitment to Ukraine; however, the form of the victory may not be the maximalist claims that Ukraine would like to see. Yes, Crimea, Donbas. Now the question is that [Technical difficulty] had sung, I would say, depending on the power relations at the negotiation table if and when it will be there.
I think it is still possible with a victory that is acceptable to both sides, given the framing that they will do about the victory on one side and on the other. But, as said by others here, I don’t think that after this war we will have a happy peace forever. I think we will be in a conflict and, as mentioned here, a sort of second Cold War with a fragmented system of alliances that is already reshaping the world.
Mr. Rasiulis: Trump. On the one hand, you have unpredictability. There are pros and cons about that. But two, there is a bit of a continual strain in Trump. He’s an isolationist. Basically, he appeals to certain strains of the Republican Party that is now coming back and which was prevalent before World War II, which is isolationism. That is to say, do not get involved in foreign wars. I think he’s averse to that. He’s very proud of the fact that during his presidency he did not start a war, as you said, even though he had people like Bolton, who never met a war he didn’t like. Trump has been war avoidant.
Within the Republican Party, in which Trump has some partiality with, is the China lobby, people who are very afraid of China. Therefore, if anything, Trump will be putting his emphasis on trying to strengthen the American position vis-à-vis China and to protect Taiwan. I think that’s where the Trump administration might be going. It’s highly unpredictable, and I’m stepping out on a limb by saying this knowing it’s going into Hansard. I think the China thing is where Trump is going.
Senator Cardozo: He is capitulating on TikTok, surprisingly, but that goes to your point about unpredictability.
Senator Dasko: Thank you to both witnesses for being here. Mr. Rasiulis, I’d like to explore something you said earlier about your vision for what you think might be an end scenario — another Cold War followed by détente. That’s what you said. What does Ukraine look like in this scenario? Is Ukraine still an independent Western-facing democracy or not?
Mr. Rasiulis: We’re talking about a partition of Ukraine, in my opinion. There’s a part of eastern Ukraine that will be formally incorporated, as it is already by their law, into the Russian federation. The 1991 borders of Ukraine — I think that’s over. What we’re seeing is a Ukraine that is less than that.
There will be a Western-oriented Ukraine. You have areas like Galicia in the west, which the Russians have zero interest in. They regard those lands as essentially Polish and the antecedence of the grand duchy of Lithuania, and Austria. It’s up to Kyiv as to where the Russian interests go and what they see as traditional Russian lands. In that part on the other side of Kyiv, I think you have a potential Western-oriented but not Western-integrated area. That’s the difference. I keep saying it’s up for neutrality. You can think of Austria, for example. Neutrality is imposed on Austria in some ways, but you can see what happened in 1955. Basically, Austria did well under neutrality and managed. I think there’s hope for neutrality.
Senator Dasko: So that is a Ukraine that is divided?
Mr. Rasiulis: I think Ukraine is divided. Right now it is, and it’s not going to be reunified.
Senator Dasko: It looks nothing like what it did.
Mr. Rasiulis: Not to the 1991 borders, no.
Senator Dasko: I want to ask both of you how far you think Europe will go to support Ukraine. I’ll leave that as a general question: How far will Europe go? Will European countries, NATO countries — not necessarily as NATO but as individual European countries — what do you think they will do? How far do you think they will go to support Ukraine? Will they go into Ukraine, send troops into Ukraine?
Mr. Rasiulis: I’ll be brief. I don’t want to take up all the time.
As individual countries, you have Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and France being at the forefront — the Polish are being more hesitant — saying that they reserve the right as bilateral sovereign states to go and put boots on the ground in Ukraine to prevent what I’ve talked about. That is their right. France does have nuclear weapons. That kind of raises an interesting situation here.
Will they actually do it? I can’t predict what they’ll do, but I think the Russians will do everything to discourage that. If they do send troops — and it’s not impossible, but I think the Americans will be signalling. The moment Macron said what he said, the same day, the United States issued a statement saying there would be no U.S. troops in Ukraine. That was a clear signal coming out of the White House. Behind the scenes, I suspect the Americans will put pressure on those countries saying you can talk like this, but don’t get serious about it because there will be no U.S. backup.
Ms. Dembinska: Lithuania, the Baltic states, France, and I’m certain Poland, are not hesitating in their support for Ukraine independently of which political party is in power. This is public opinion; it is clear. However, they will probably not send troops individually. They will pressure NATO so that it is a collective decision and not individual states, because Lithuania or Poland going alone is like a suicide mission.
Another thing France is doing, and now maybe with Germany and Poland heading it, is the European Defence Agency. We might do without the United States. We should build up our security politics, et cetera, something that the European Union has always had problems doing. Maybe they will strengthen these institutions. Support clearly, but not alone.
Senator Yussuff: This war has been going on for two years at incredible cost to Western democracies in terms of supporting the war with military equipment, and it will be greater as we continue on to the next part of the battle. Public opinion is not inevitable in support of the war. It will shift over time.
Recognizing that reality, how do we maintain support for Ukraine to regain sovereignty over lands that it has already lost and maintain some degree of support for Ukraine? So they could say, maybe we don’t regain our territory, but at least we have the support of the West to maintain defence against the Russians army. In time, whether it’s in Europe or here in North America, as we’re seeing in the United States and Canada, public opinion eventually will shift in a different direction because the public will say we can’t keep supporting the war. Our politicians will be the ones who will have to convince the nation that the greater sacrifices need to be made. As you know, public opinion is not inevitable with our politicians with regard to supporting any war.
Mr. Rasiulis: Thank you for that. I would agree with you; therefore, my response is that the pathway for success has to be realistic. Right now, the 1991 border pathway, which is the official Western view, because it supports the Ukrainian view — that’s all unrealistic, as far as I’m concerned.
The public is starting to see that. The Republicans are focusing on that.
If we developed a more realistic negotiating-based one — I know you don’t trust the Russians, but you have to still negotiate with them — at the end of the day, it’s the common interest. In order to sustain any amount of support for Ukraine over any period beyond 2024 to 2025, there will have to be a realistic pathway, and that’s going to be coming backward from where they are today. That’s for the negotiators and the people in the various countries to figure that one out, not for me, but I think it will be a compromise of some sort that will see a partitioned Ukraine, and we will have to live with that.
Ms. Dembinska: I will say this: At the negotiation table, you will see a compromise. So yes, I would say I agree that it’s unrealistic to see the borders of 1991 not being affected. However, we have to understand that compromises on territory means that there is no guarantee that Russia or another country would not, at some point, want more if we agree that the principle of territorial integrity does not stand anymore.
Second, there is public opinion in the Western world, and you’re absolutely right: With time, it probably will be lessening. So what do we do? For the moment, I would argue that it is still sufficiently high for us to act on that. Surprisingly, maybe, in Ukraine it is still high, although the last public opinion on the potential war resolution, et cetera, shows a slight decrease of this option of total recovery of all territories in Ukraine, but it is very slight. There is still a huge majority of people who stand by the eventual maximalist victory.
As long as there is a perception that we can do that, it’s very difficult to go to the negotiation table with a minimalist proposal. For the moment, maximalist claims or the ones at the negotiation table, yes, realistically, it is a compromise between not symmetrical power relations between Russia and Ukraine, accompanied by the West or not.
[Translation]
Senator Gignac: Welcome to the witnesses.
In the previous group, we talked a lot about NATO and what Mr. Trump said. I would like to talk about another member of NATO, and that is Turkey.
Two hours ago, the Turkish President congratulated Mr. Putin on his re-election, as did China, Iran and India. We also know that there has been tension between the Turkish and American delegations because of what is happening in Israel with Hamas and the Muslim population in Turkey. My colleague, Senator Patterson, and I felt it when we were in Brussels in early February.
What is the likelihood of Turkey imposing a veto, as it has done for other reasons, or delaying the process? Finally, how strong is Turkey’s membership in NATO, given the changing geopolitical situation? We could start with Ms. Dembinska so that she can talk about Turkey’s membership in NATO.
Ms. Dembinska: You are quite right. Turkey has a rather ambivalent position when it comes to NATO, as does Hungary. Turkey is looking out for its own interests, which tie in with European security and regional security, especially in the Black Sea and South Caucasus. In that region, Turkey is in direct competition with Russia. Turkey is playing both sides and positioning itself as a possible mediator in the war in Ukraine because it has an ambiguous relationship with Russia. Turkey is in competition with Russia but also co-operates with it to a certain extent. When it comes time to make urgent and important decisions, I have no idea what Turkey’s position will be.
One thing is certain. Turkey could create obstacles, as it did with regard to the NATO membership of some Scandinavian countries, and as Hungary did. Does that call into question Turkey’s membership in NATO? I’m not sure, because I think it is more about blackmail, like Hungary did with the European Union. Turkey’s veto gives it a lever for its internal policies and national interests, as opposed to its position in the emerging reconfigured world order.
[English]
Mr. Rasiulis: I agree with everything Ms. Dembinska said, so I will simply say that the NATO alliance is composed of sovereign nation states. Even regarding Article 5, every state has the right to decide on its own, how it will implement Article 5. So Turkey is doing its thing. It’s a bit more of an outlier, but it adapts to its interests. It does not contravene NATO interests. Therefore, it is maneuvering in that large space.
The Turks might serve a great interest by brokering a peace settlement eventually.
The Chair: Thank you. We have a couple of minutes left.
Senator Patterson: Thank you. This is actually a Black Sea question in Turkey. I had the privilege of being briefed by the Turkish ambassador to the permanent mission at the United Nations. It was very interesting to hear their perspective, how they position themselves and the challenges they have, not just on the European front but also as they look to the Middle East. Your comments about their role as the peace negotiators were quite striking.
Very specifically, about the Black Sea, we know that the Montreux Convention — was it 1936? — about controlling what goes into the Black Sea. He actually made a point of talking about how they have articulated Article 19 about not allowing warships to pass into the area. As recently as this January, they have created an alliance with Romania and Bulgaria concerning littoral waters.
We know that if Russia does end up going into Odessa and starts to choke Ukraine off from the Black Sea, it is very hard for any nation to survive without access to littoral waters. What are your thoughts on the future of Russia’s desire to move forward and cut Ukraine off from the Black Sea? How do you see this arrangement of the anti-mining side of the agreement with Turkey playing out?
Mr. Rasiulis: I think the Russian priorities are keeping the North. The Odessa option is extremely difficult. Given the fact that the Ukrainians have pushed the Russians back toward the east side of the Black Sea, for the Russians to conduct an amphibious operation in Odessa without those ships is extremely difficult. They would have to do a land attack without covering the Black Sea. I think that is really remote — not impossible, but very remote.
I think it’s a long-term Russian objective, but I think they will be grinding away on the central front and threatening that in the longer term.
The Chair: Colleagues, this brings us to the end of our second panel and the end of some rich discussions on the critical issues in front of us. For that, we have to thank Ms. Dembinska and Mr. Rasiulis for your thoughtful and inciteful presentations which have provoked lots of questions around the room from my colleagues. Thank you both on behalf of my colleagues and the Senate of Canada. This is greatly appreciated.
For those joining us across Canada, our meeting is examining the current security and defence situation in Ukraine, Canada’s military support to Ukraine and the implications for Canada’s defence operations. We have had a compelling discussion over the last couple of hours, and I know that will continue over the next hour.
We now welcome by video conference today Justin Massie, Full Professor, Department of Political Science, Université du Québec à Montréal. We were to hear from Professor Anessa Kimball, Co-director, Canadian Defence and Security Network and Full Professor, Department of Political Science, Laval University, but unfortunately she is experiencing some technical difficulties. We apologize for that. We hope that at some future date, Professor Kimball will be able to join us. For the time being, she is monitoring today’s hearing and we welcome her to do that.
I invite you then, Professor Massie, to provide us with your opening remarks today, which will be followed by questions from our members. Please begin when you’re ready.
[Translation]
Justin Massie, Full Professor, Department of Political Science, Université du Québec à Montréal, as an individual: Thank you very much, senators. I am pleased to be here with you today.
Unfortunately, this is rather grim topic. Ukrainians are in a terrible situation. The lack of munitions and missiles is limiting their ability to withstand Russian attacks. The most recent example is the loss of Avdiivka, which Russia managed to seize, despite the loss of tens of thousands of Russian soldiers and hundreds of heavy weapons.
Ukraine also needs more soldiers. The mobilization of 500,000 additional Ukrainians to support those who have been deployed, for two years now in some cases, has stalled because of domestic policy concerns in Kiev.
Ukraine is accelerating the fortification of its defensive lines and using drones to compensate for the lack of shells and missiles. The 800 drones provided by Canada pale in comparison to the million that Ukraine intends to produce this year at a much lower cost.
Western military aid is vital to Ukraine’s survival. It has helped to prevent Russia from capturing a lot of territory. Russia controlled 7% of Ukrainian territory before February 22, 2022, and had taken over a maximum of 26% by March 2022. Ukraine’s counter-offensive in the spring of 2022 liberated 5.5% of the territory, and, after receiving Western donations of heavy weapons, its counter-offensive in the summer of 2023 liberated approximately 2% more. Today, Russia controls about 17.5% of Ukraine.
However, Western aid is in decline. The bilateral military aid planned for 2024 is less than what has already been granted to date, even though that aid has only made it possible to resist the Russian offensive rather than liberate much of Ukraine. I have a few figures for you. In 2022-23, the United States gave $46 billion U.S. and it has $61 billion on the table that is currently blocked. In 2022-23, Germany gave $19.4 billion and this year it is offering $7 billion. In 2022-23, the United Kingdom gave $10 billion and this year is it offering $3 billion. In 2022-23, France gave $4 billion and this year it is offering $3 billion. Over the past two years, Canada gave $2.28 billion in military aid and this year it is offering $238 million.
Russia has put its economy on a war footing. It is mobilizing more than 300,000 new recruits per year to the Ukrainian front. It is producing approximately three million artillery shells per year, not counting the aid it is receiving from North Korea and Iran. Together, Europe and the United States are currently only able to produce half that number. Investments are planned in Europe to produce two million shells a year, but that won’t happen until 2025. The increase in U.S. production is currently being blocked in Congress by MAGA politicians.
Ukraine can therefore not compete with Russia on the battlefield or when it comes to industrial production. Europe is becoming increasingly concerned about a military defeat in Ukraine, hence the surprising statement from President Macron, who said that he would not rule out sending troops to Ukraine. The idea is now also being supported by Poland, the Baltic states, Czechia and Finland.
This proposal is not enough to deter Russia, but it could muddy its strategic calculations. In my opinion, the best way to ensure Europe’s security is to increase the quantity and quality of weapons supplied to Ukraine. All conventional weapons should be on the table. Neither Russia nor Ukraine wants neutrality, so that is not a possible solution to the war. Canada’s military support is seriously out of step with its ambitions. Although we are saying that we are going to support Ukraine at any cost for as long as it takes, Canada is ranked only the 19th largest arms donor by percentage of GDP. It has not invested in its defence industry or made emergency acquisitions to support Ukraine in the long term.
The Canadian Armed Forces are therefore not ready to fight the protracted high-intensity war of attrition that we are seeing in Ukraine, despite the fact that the CAF is mandated to defend Latvia in the event of a Russian attack. That is clear from the operational unavailability of most of the troops earmarked for NATO in case of emergency. Canada’s commitment to NATO is rather limited. It consists of one mechanized brigade, three frigates and 12 fighter jets. The emergency procurement of air defence systems, drones and anti-armour weapons for the troops in Latvia illustrates the problems that Canada has in planning for military needs. Regardless of how the war in Ukraine ends, an increased military presence will be required in eastern Europe or Ukraine specifically. In the event of a Russian victory, we will have to strengthen protection for the neighbouring countries and support the Ukrainian resistance, or in the event of an armistice establishing the partition of Ukraine, we will have to deploy troops to the liberated part of Ukraine to protect it from future Russian aggression.
Unfortunately, I don’t believe that the Canadian government has fully grasped the geopolitical situation that we are in right now. Even the threat made by an aspiring potential U.S. president not to protect the allies, including Canada, that do not spend 2% of their GDP on defence in the event of a Russian attack does not seem to have struck a chord in Ottawa. I’m concerned that we will have to wait for the Canadian Armed Forces to be deployed to the battlefield, once again under-equipped, before Canada has a military awakening.
Thank you for your attention.
[English]
Anessa Kimball, Co-director, Canadian Defence and Security Network and Full Professor, Department of Political Science, Laval University, as an individual: Thank you for the opportunity to share these remarks with the standing committee members. First, I will offer a brief context of the current defence and security situation in Ukraine and summarize the 2024 intel forecast. Then I turn to Canada’s defence contributions there collectively and to international efforts and how it’s affected its capacity to self-defend and maintain existing defence operations.
In Ukraine, I would characterize the situation as what bargaining scholars call a mutually hurting stalemate where both sides are suffering. If it were a wounded patient, we might consider them bleeding at different rates over different things. Those are the things we can talk about in the questions and answers.
Despite substantial support to Ukraine, what we can say is that states dithered in donating expensive assets or investing in the advanced type of training that was required to professionalize the Ukrainian armed forces.
The Chair: Excuse me. I’m very sorry to interrupt, but our technical advisers are telling us that this is not working sufficiently well. I apologize on behalf of the committee and the Senate of Canada for this issue. We will look forward to hopefully talking to you again at some point in the future. Thank you for the investment of your time and your patience, Professor Kimball.
That being said, colleagues, we’ll go to questions. The first question will go to the deputy chair, Senator Dagenais.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: Obviously, my questions are for Mr. Massie. Mr. Massie, I have a question about the strategy of the countries that support Ukraine in this war.
Knowing what we know now, two years after the war began, do you think that many countries, including Canada, played poker in this war by promising equipment that they could not deliver within a reasonable time frame, hoping that their position would scare Vladimir Putin and Russia?
By so doing, did we not mislead Ukraine as to our ability to provide aid?
Mr. Massie: Thank you very much for the question. It is very relevant in that most of the Canadian aid that was promised has not yet been delivered. Yes, there is some truth to that statement in that, if we promise military equipment that the Canadian Armed Forces does not even have itself, then it will be very difficult and take a very long time to provide it to someone else. That is why chronic under-investment in Canada’s national defence is such a problem.
When faced with a crisis, we are systematically unprepared. Other countries were more prepared and were able to deliver a lot of military equipment to Ukraine from the start. They were able to use the past two years to recapitalize their armed forces and procure military equipment so that they can eventually face Russia, something that Canada has not yet done, since it is still thinking about updating its defence spending two years later.
I think that it is a sliding scale and depends on the countries’ past investments. Those that had the ability to provide certain equipment did so and those that have a more structural or more mature planning capacity are also able to support Ukraine in the long term.
Unfortunately, aid from the main country with the ability to do this, the United States, is currently blocked for domestic political reasons. Otherwise, the U.S. would be quite capable of supporting Ukraine in the long term, since the aid that the U.S. would provide is a lot less than the money it has spent on other wars in which it has participated in the past 30 years.
Senator Dagenais: The fact that some countries are withdrawing their financial support for Ukraine raises a question for me about support for this war.
Do you think that this is about the financial capacity of these countries or is it more about the fact that governments are more concerned about backlash from their own populations if they inject more money into this conflict?
Also, what does the aid for the future reconstruction of the parts of Ukraine that have been bombed look like to you?
Mr. Massie: Reconstruction depends a lot on how this conflict ends and how we get out of this crisis. If the territory is partitioned, and that is the most likely outcome, then part of the country will be under Russian occupation and another part will be under Ukraine’s control. Only the liberated parts will be rebuilt.
I think that the $300 billion in Russian reserves will be used for this reconstruction. There are a lot of negotiations happening right now to figure out how to use that money for reconstruction.
As for the reduction in aid, it is important to understand that a lot of military support was provided in the first year. It takes time to renew that equipment, and it is only recently that the Western countries have come to understand that this war will not be over quickly. I think that the Western countries have been learning day by day.
In the beginning, many people, including the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States, believed that Russia would win the war in three days, so not as much aid was provided. Ukraine was given equipment like grenade launchers and some shorter-range equipment. After it became clear that Russia had greater ambitions and that it was facing resistance from Ukraine, then people realized that the situation was more serious, but it took time.
I think that, as of 2025, the Western world will be much better able to support Ukraine, as long as Europe is making investments. The problem, of course, will be in Washington because we don’t know whether, in 2025, there will be a president who wants to put an end to support for Ukraine or whether there will be a president who wants to help Ukraine but who will be prevented from doing so by Congress. I therefore think that the key to European security is based largely on the U.S. election that will take place in a few months.
Senator Dagenais: Ultimately, is this war worth the cost from an economic and humanitarian perspective?
Mr. Massie: It depends on how much you value the lives of Ukrainians. Obviously, it depends on if you are Ukrainian. If you are in one of the neighbouring countries, the cost will be higher than for those countries that are farther away, like Canada.
The problem is that the cost of defeat has to be calculated. Even for a country like Canada, a military defeat for Ukraine will mean that we will be called upon to further fortify the neighbouring countries and increase our NATO commitments. We are already having a hard time keeping our current commitments, let alone increasing them. Canada could even be drawn into another conflict in Europe and still not be ready.
I think that we always need to take into account, not only the cost of human lives, on which we cannot put a price, but also the financial cost of our current inaction. A victorious Russia would be emboldened and continue to threaten Moldova, Georgia and the Baltic states. The fact that Russia has issued arrest warrants against ministers in the Baltic states says a lot about its intentions, as does the demand that Russia made in December 2021 to have all Western and American troops removed from any countries that joined NATO after 1997. Those are Russia’s ambitions right now, and I think that they have to be taken seriously.
Senator Dagenais: Thank you, Mr. Massie.
[English]
Senator Patterson: Dr. Massie, thank you very much for your comments. You talked about Canada’s military awakening. I actually believe it’s the Canadian people’s awakening to the fact that we have a military and that there is a role for the military even in a peace-loving nation like Canada. I do thank you for your comments. As you’re probably aware, we have had an idea about what that defence policy update should look like for well over a year. It’s the cost, especially in such a particularly difficult economic time. One of the challenges is that history will repeat itself. It always has and it always will. We know that ignoring defence and security — both nationally and internationally — will have long-term repercussions.
We have no message out there. How do we help Canadians understand that, yes, we absolutely need to solve inflation, housing, global warming, et cetera, but if we ignore defence spending in order to create geopolitical stability, those prices will only continue to increase? Do we need to help Canadians learn more? If so, how?
[Translation]
Mr. Massie: That is an excellent question that we have all been grappling with since the Cold War. We have to convince Canadians. In my opinion, that will always be difficult, even if there is a threat looming over Canada, because Canadians feel very safe and comfortable as a result of the fact that there is an ocean separating us from Europe and Asia-Pacific, which is the next potential theatre of conflict. It is difficult for Canadians to understand.
The advantage that we do have is that we do not need to convince a majority of Canadians, if our political elite and decision makers agree. Regardless of what the public thinks, if there is a consensus among the main opposition parties and the government party, if there is a transpartisan view of the national interest, then there will be no electoral consequences or political costs to defending the national interest. The problem is that the parties have made Canada’s foreign defence policy into a partisan issue, not just recently, but over the last number of years, and that causes mistrust or a lack of awareness among Canadians regarding the country’s military needs.
I think that if our elected officials could agree on those needs and have a multi-year plan like many other countries do, rather than always including defence in political platforms, then we would be able to make Canadians better understand that it is in their interest to have the insurance policy that national defence provides.
[English]
Senator Patterson: Thank you. A follow-up question to that: We actually know the cost if Canada doesn’t invest in defence capability for our soldiers, sailors and aviators. It’s the tenth anniversary of the ending of our time in Afghanistan, and Canadian soldiers paid the consequences for equipment that was not quite right and having to get equipment in at that time.
If you were to have a look at how we can better establish our military industrial base so that we have some longevity in cost and procurement rather than peaks and valleys, as we are going through now, whether it be from equipment right up to the big-ticket items because ramping up such huge-ticket items in a democracy is very challenging.
[Translation]
Mr. Massie: In my opinion, the solution involves long-term planning because the military industry does not want short-term contracts. It wants contracts that last for a number of years or even decades so that it can make investments in infrastructure to produce this equipment. We are seeing that right now with the 155-millimetre shells that are produced in part in Quebec and Ontario and whose production has recently increased by only about 40%, from 3,000 to 5,000 shells a month.
We are far from increasing production the way Europe intends to do by doubling it or like the United States, which is producing two million munitions a year in Europe. In order to do that, we would need multi-year investments. The same goes for all military equipment. The problem is that Canada has under-invested for 30 years, and we are only now realizing that we need to buy everything at the same time. It is not normal for our country to have to buy all of our warships and fighter jets at the same time. This sort of thing takes planning, because we know the equipment’s lifespan. We decided to buy F-35s. Why not decide right away what to do after the F-35s? If we keep waiting 50 years, then we will always be dealing with chronic delays.
We need a multi-year plan that sets out our needs, which are fairly clear since our geography isn’t going to change. Canada is a nation that needs a lot of aircraft, given the size of our air space, as well as a lot of ships, given our oceans. We are not a country that will have to deal with a major land threat, but we will be called upon to help other countries from time to time. We need to focus our efforts in the following order. First, we must protect our waters and our air space. Second, we must have the capacity to support civil authorities and third, we must provide international aid when necessary.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Massie.
[English]
Senator Kutcher: Thank you for being with us. My question will follow a little bit from Senator Patterson. I have three observations from what we’ve heard today and previous days, but I would like to start with the understanding that great powers often fight over values and not just over territory. I think this is a key thing for us to keep in mind. Three things I’d like to run by you and then ask a question.
This is not the first time in history that democracies have failed to understand the designs of a totalitarian aggressor. It’s happened before. History has also taught us that territorial appeasement does not usually end well. We’re also seeing a switch, a change, in that our traditional reliance on Pax Americana may turn out to be more a chimera rather than a solid reality, given what’s happening in the United States now. Taking these things into account, are you seeing an awakening at the political level in Canada to the fact that these things are actually happening? If so, what are you seeing? Do we have some glimmer of hope that our leadership is actually understanding these important things?
[Translation]
Mr. Massie: I’m sorry, but I’m not very optimistic this evening. When I look at the political situation in Canada, no, I don’t believe that a military awakening is happening. That is obvious when, for example, we want to update the defence policy and the minister gets shuffled because the Prime Minister’s Office feels that what they are proposing is too costly, or when the government does not listen to the Chief of the Defence Staff when he says that we need more money to defend our sovereignty. I am not happy about the fact that our country has no plan to one day honour our commitment to spend 2% of our GDP on defence and that the leader of the main opposition party will also not make any formal commitment to make that investment. Once again, I do not think that Ottawa has fully grasped this the way it should have.
Unfortunately, historically, Canadians had to be operating in a theatre of war and dying on the battlefield for Ottawa to realize that it was not ready and that it needed to invest quickly and urgently. Unfortunately, I think that history is repeating itself right now.
[English]
Senator Kutcher: We had these same challenges in World War I and World War II, and it was a coming together around specific values which actually drove Canadians to action. Are you hearing any discussion about specific values that we hold dear and cherish that will drive us to action now, or are we losing some of that discussion about what the values are that we hold dear and cherish?
[Translation]
Mr. Massie: I think that Canada does have a desire to support international democracies, but Canadians, like other Western societies, are also the target of Russian propaganda, which is saying that Ukraine is not really a democratic country. We are seeing it in the current parliamentary debates, especially in Kiev, and in the discussions between the former chief of the defence staff and President Zelenskyy. We are seeing that the support is being undermined to some extent by the assessment of Ukraine and its fight against corruption, which admittedly was endemic a few years ago.
I think that the aid that we provide can be humanitarian aid, because, when Canadians see in the media the atrocities being committed in Bucha and Irpin, it really resonates with them. They do not feel that we can allow a people to live under occupation and to be subject to summary executions for refusing to obtain Russian citizenship, as Russia is now forcing people who live in the territories it occupies to do.
Even though the national interest may not be as well understood by Canadians, it is understood by those who have military intelligence and those with a knowledge of foreign policy and who understand the lessons of history. Those people exist, here in the Senate, in the House of Commons and in our government departments. It is our responsibility to make the right decisions and not to simply rely on the shared sentiment of Canadians when it comes to international conflicts.
[English]
Senator Yussuff: Thank you, Professor Massie, for being here. My comment will start based on the data you’ve provided to the committee regarding NATO countries that are diminishing their financial support for the Ukrainian effort, especially for this year. If those numbers were to hold true, and given the U.S. reluctance to deliver the support this year, it would be a very decisive moment in terms of what happens with the war. Fundamentally, all of this debate and sacrifice would have been quite devastating to the Ukrainian people, given that they’re relying on Western countries to support them in this effort. The data you provided gives me cold comfort in understanding how we’re going to change the battlefield equation if these countries don’t step up their support.
In the same context, maybe political leadership, both in Europe and other places, are reading public opinion in a way that we don’t appreciate, given we’re not in that realm. Public opinion is shifting accordingly in regard to their support for this war.
Tell me that maybe my pessimism is unwarranted and that you see a silver lining here with regard to the efforts of the war this year.
[Translation]
Mr. Massie: Unfortunately, I do not see things in a better light than you do, senator. Public support always wanes for long wars. We saw it with the war in Iraq and the war in Afghanistan. When wars drag on, public support for them weakens. That is what always happens. The reason why democracies are able to maintain long wars is that the political parties come to an agreement. We saw it with Afghanistan. The mission to Kandahar was unpopular in Canada and 70% of Quebecers were opposed to it, but the operation in Kandahar continued for a number of years because elected officials recognized that it was worth maintaining the war effort, regardless of what the opinion polls said.
The electoral reality is always there. The advantage that we have in Canada is that we do not have any elected radical right or far left parties like they may have in Europe. We have centrist parties that could support a war effort, but we did not make a decision and we lost two years where we did not invest in the industry so that we could be there for Ukrainians in the long term. Europeans took such action recently.
We can hope that, in 2025, they will be better able to increase their support than they are in 2024, with the figures that I gave you. We can hope that the U.S. presidential election goes to a president who recognizes the national security interests of the United States, but that is uncertain.
Unfortunately, I do not see a lot of options for Ukraine aside from what is already being done. Ukraine is investing in its fortifications so that it can hold off Russian attacks as much as possible, and it is investing in the domestic production of drones, mainly to compensate for its lack of shells on the battlefield. It is going to produce a million shells this year, along with munitions, to take out Russian troops. Ukraine is hoping that the Western nations will eventually be able to help, if it can hold off the Russian troops in 2024, so that it has a chance to retake or liberate territory in 2025. In order for that to happen, we need to make those decisions today to be prepared to provide that equipment to Ukrainians.
From what I am seeing in Canada, we have not yet bought any military equipment to replace what we provided to Ukraine, so we will not have any more to offer next year.
[English]
Senator Yussuff: Very briefly, following up on that, recognizing that the two years of this war have hardened both sides — the Russians have suffered a lot of casualties. I think, most recently, President Zelenskyy revealed that 30,000 Ukrainians have died on the battlefield. Given the decisiveness of where this war might be in 2024 — and we’re approaching summer, which is an advantage to both sides with regard to the war — if we don’t get Ukraine the necessary military support and they are not able to meet their recruitment needs for the military, aren’t we likely to see a turning point in this war in a very dramatic way that it could be a huge setback to all of the arguments that have been made as to why we should support this war in the first place?
[Translation]
Mr. Massie: That’s a possibility. Ukraine’s military defeat cannot be ruled out as a possible scenario, especially if the 500,000 additional troops that Ukraine wants to mobilize do not step up. Ukraine will need them, because some troops have been deployed for two years now, with only a few brief leaves in that time. This isn’t sustainable in the long run. Ukrainians need to do their part in terms of committing to military action.
As far as weapons are concerned, if the United States doesn’t offer that kind of support, if assistance of that nature doesn’t increase, it’s possible that the Russians will maintain or continue their offensive and advances. So far, the Ukrainians have managed to limit the amount of territory Russia has captured over the past year. Avdiivka was captured, for example, but that doesn’t seem to have led to any major advances or the capture of many other villages or territories, and it hasn’t forced the Ukrainians to retreat far back into their own territory. They managed to reinforce and hold other positions.
That being said, the Russians are mobilizing another 300,000 to 400,000 soldiers this year to join the troops in Ukrainian territory, and they’ve put their economy on a war footing, so they’ll have more capacity.
As I see it, there’s only one comparative advantage that Ukraine could have, if it had western support. It wouldn’t be the quantity of weapons that could be offered in the short term, because we don’t have the military industry that Russia has chosen to establish and we’re not prepared to suffer the budgetary consequences that Russia has had to endure. However, one thing the west does have that Russia does not is the technological superiority of its equipment. Instead of taking a gradual, step-by-step approach, from one piece of equipment to another, if we adopted a policy whereby every possible weapon available to us would also be on the table for Ukraine, we could then consider supplying Taurus missiles, for example, along with the Germans, and we could consider not F-16s, but perhaps F-18s, or even F-35s for the Ukrainian army. Why are we always setting limits on the type of equipment we want to supply rather than giving them superior technological capabilities?
It’s important to understand that if the west were to go to war with Russia, it wouldn’t do it the way Ukraine is doing it. The reason we’re seeing a First-World-War-style conflict is that neither country is in a position to bring air superiority to the battlefield. For example, if the United States were part of this conflict, the first thing it would do would be to destroy Russian anti-aircraft defences and use its superior air force to eliminate all Russian air defence capability, and then support the advance of ground troops.
If Ukraine had aerial devices, such as offensive drones, Reapers, Tomahawk missiles or fifth- or fourth-generation aircraft, it might be able to inflict significant damage on Russia, and damage is not necessarily about the number of soldiers. What we learned from 2023 is that 300,000 Russian deaths make very little difference to Vladimir Putin. That doesn’t seem to be the focus of the war. That sacrifice, the sacrifice of human life, does not appear to be especially important to Russia. However, if Russia’s adversaries could hit where it really hurts the most, as the Ukrainians are currently doing with oil refineries in particular, that could change President Putin’s strategic calculations.
Senator Gignac: Welcome, Mr. Massie. It’s always a pleasure to hear you speak. We’re fortunate to hear you speak quite often in francophone media.
Belgium passed legislation two years ago. Belgium was spending 1.4% of its GDP on national defence, but they passed a bill to increase that figure to 2% by 2035. After a lot of negotiations between the parties, a consensus finally emerged.
As you said, the current political climate in Canada does not appear to support this, and even if we listen to the Leader of the Conservative Party, it’s not clear what he wants.
I’d like to hear your thoughts on what the Senate should do. The Senate is a chamber of sober second thought, so 90% of bills are passed in the House of Commons first, with the Senate taking a second look at them. However, we can launch our own initiatives and pass legislation.
What would you say to the Senate proposing a consensus bill, debated and passed by the Senate, that would have the effect of forcing Canada to reach 2% of GDP, and do so before the next election, to force all political parties to take a stand? Once the Senate passes a bill, it goes to the top of the pile in the House of Commons, which has no choice but to debate it, but no one is talking about it at this time.
Could this be worth trying?
Mr. Massie: I think that would be worth a try. I don’t know if people’s reactions would live up to expectations, but why not give it a try? Pressure from the military is very strong within the department and within the expert community. I have the opportunity to speak regularly with people from the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of National Defence. This awareness is widespread and based on a consensus. This is stuck at the political level, not because of anyone’s understanding of the geopolitical situation.
What might such a bill look like? We could model something after the French “Loi sur la programmation militaire”, in other words, France’s military planning law. It covers a five-year period and outlines the financial and fiscal needs and capabilities associated with this budget. The budget is passed in the National Assembly for a period that extends beyond the mandate of the president and the legislature that passed it, thereby forcing any future government to follow the plan. This military planning law is always preceded by things we no longer do, specifically national security reviews and a national defence strategy.
That’s why we need to define the threats, establish our defence policy for the coming years and then make the financial, budgetary and capability appropriations, that is, choose the equipment we want to have as a result. This is being done consistently, on a regular basis. Members of Parliament have security clearances that allow them to have informed debates on defence matters, so they can pass this kind of legislation over time and they can have greater awareness of the national interest.
If we were to adopt this model, as the Australians recently did by updating their defence policy, it would be in Canada’s best interest to make our country more serious about defence.
Senator Gignac: Thank you very much for that answer.
If I may make an observation, in the current political context, with a government that’s practically a coalition, since we need the NDP’s support, social programs appear to be the government’s priority, rather than defence and national security. I’m going to do some homework and look at what France and Australia have done, so that, as senators, we can contribute to creating this kind of favourable conditions for public opinion, but especially to force political parties to take a position.
Thank you, Mr. Chair, for allowing me to express my observation.
Senator Cardozo: My question is along the same lines as that of my colleague, Senator Gignac. As I see it, the federal government and other governments receive many requests for support in many areas. How would you argue that defence spending on our Armed Forces is more important than, say, infrastructure, cancer or support for seniors? That’s the question all politicians get asked.
Mr. Massie: Thank you for the question.
Absolutely, compromises always have to be made when it comes to spending. We can’t always have our cake and eat it too.
If I can use an analogy, the defence policy is essentially an insurance policy. Let me use my personal life as an example. I have three children whom I need to feed every week, but I still manage to put money into my insurance policy, in case my house is broken into or in the event of a fire. Perhaps all that insurance money will be for nothing. Maybe I’ll never get robbed or have a house fire. I hope not, for my family’s sake, but if it ever does happen, I will have invested in an insurance policy.
The same goes for National Defence. We hope we never need to use our Armed Forces. That’s our greatest wish. We don’t invest in the Canadian Armed Forces to wage war, but rather to defend our territory and our interests. If we don’t, and if there were a fire and we were sucked into a war, we would have deaths on our conscience, whether Canadian or foreign. That’s unfortunately what has happened in the past and where we’re headed in the future.
Yes, compromises have to be made. There are always opportunity costs when you invest, but it’s important to realize how crucial it is that we protect ourselves in the event of a conflict or crisis. We’ve heard the warning from the potential and hopeful president of the United States who has explicitly stated that he won’t defend us Canadians because we aren’t investing enough. Imagine if Mr. Trump fully understood what NORAD is, because I don’t think he really does. If he did, what impact would that have on U.S. defence policy vis-à-vis us Canadians?
I don’t think we want to get to that point. I don’t think it’s in Canada’s political interest to have no plan to reach 2% of GDP by January 2025 and be left to face the harsh criticisms, sharp comments and extremely tough diplomacy that Canada would be subjected to by a future president Trump or the Trump conservatives elected to Congress who will continue to block the Democratic President if he is re-elected.
Senator Cardozo: What do you think Mr. Trump’s strategy is? Is he a friend of Mr. Putin, in a sense?
Mr. Massie: There are two aspects: cognitive and electoral.
At the cognitive end, in his first term, President Trump always seemed to appreciate strong authoritarian leaders. He’s always singing the praises of Mr. Orbán in Hungary, Mr. Erdoğan in Turkey, Xi Jinping in China and Vladimir Putin. He is not a fan of Olaf Scholz, Angela Merkel or other leaders who are subject to electoral politics, including Justin Trudeau, for example.
There’s that aspect, which is personal, and then there’s the electoral issue. He will do his best to block President Biden’s foreign and defence policy to show that it’s not working and that he himself is in a position to restore U.S. National Defense. He wants the U.S. to stop intervening on the international stage, and this sentiment is shared by tens of millions of Americans, because they’ve been dragged into wars that have lasted far too long or were completely misguided, like the invasion of Iraq. We’re dealing with the consequences of all that, with the Islamic State and with Russia, which seems to think that if it could be done in Iraq, why can’t it be done in Ukraine? We’re left to deal with these bad American decisions, and Americans are tired of these long-lasting wars. Unfortunately, this is the political context in the U.S. Even some Republicans understand that it’s in the country’s national interest to maintain support for NATO, and we can only hope that these people will continue to have some influence in Washington.
[English]
Senator Dasko: Thank you, Professor Massie. I want to mention a few things. Public opinion support today for spending on defence is much higher than it was a decade or two ago. I can tell you that as a matter of fact. Support for Ukraine in Canada is very high. That is partly why support for spending on defence is up. Actual spending on defence is also up. It has increased. We have had the minister here to tell us that, and we can see that from the expenditures. We are buying ships and aircraft, we have NORAD modernization — we have many expenditures that have increased.
I would also say that there is reasonable political consensus on this, unlike other issues like carbon taxes and so on where there are huge splits. I would say that the political consensus is quite significant here in this country.
Putting all those things together, is it really as bad as you’re suggesting? Don’t we have some of the conditions that you were calling for, like consensus and public support that is higher now than it’s ever been? Couldn’t you look at it this way?
[Translation]
Mr. Massie: Absolutely, the political environment is—
[English]
Senator Dasko: Perfection is never in our reach, right? It’s never possible to have a perfect scenario whereby we have all the spending that the military people might like. That will never happen. It doesn’t happen in any other area of spending either, like pensions or benefits. People always want more. Sorry, I interrupted you. You were about to comment.
[Translation]
Mr. Massie: You’re absolutely right to say that the political environment is a little more conducive to increasing military spending. Absolutely. Now the environment is even better. In February or March and April 2022, at the beginning of the war, there was an opportunity to set out a more substantial budget plan.
Unfortunately, the spending increases we’re seeing today are for equipment that is far too old and that every country needs to have, such as ships and aircraft. This is the minimum we can hope to have, and ships will arrive last, in 2050. Yes, we’re spending a lot, but it’s over a very long period of time.
Modernizing NORAD is a 20-year project. However, when we send four howitzers to Ukraine, we no longer have them for ourselves. When we send eight tanks, we have none left.
We produce enough shells in a month in Canada for one day’s worth of war. It’s true that spending is necessary to maintain a high-intensity war. If we don’t want to be involved, if we don’t want to help Ukraine, then that decision will have to be made. However, when the Prime Minister goes to the Ukrainian capital and says very publicly that we’ll stand by them for as long as it takes, no matter what the cost, it’s not true. We’ve put a price on helping Ukraine by not investing enough to provide the much-needed military equipment.
I don’t agree that we should cut certain capabilities and not have submarines, for example, because we want to pay for warships.
Perhaps we need to think about meeting that 2% target that successive governments have publicly committed to since 2014 and which we’re not meeting.
Yes, times are fiscally tough for Canadians, but the same is true for the British, French, Germans, Norwegians and the other countries that are nevertheless meeting the 2% target.
In the current political environment, no one is asking for the moon and no one is suggesting that Canada should have the biggest army in the world, merely that it participate in a way that’s equivalent and proportional to the size of its economy, in a way that’s comparable to our allies.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you.
Colleagues, I’m looking at the clock. We have time for Senator Dagenais and Senator Patterson to ask follow-up questions. I’m going to suggest, in view of the time, that Senator Patterson and Senator Dagenais each ask their questions and we’ll give the witness the ability to answer the two of them in concert. Then we’ll wrap up.
Senator Patterson: Thank you, Dr. Massie, I would like to follow up on that last comment. I don’t think it’s very well known by most Canadians that the Canadian Armed Forces is given a mandate that talks about the mission that is meant to be able to support simultaneously and be interoperable with other nations. In our case, that includes domestic operations as well. That is then costed out from there and decisions that are made, of course, are about how much the country can deal with.
I know you were probably pretty aware of what the most recent defence policy had stated and the requirement for concurrent operations, levels of redness, including how many holdings we need to have. That costs astronomical sums of money that get caught up in inflation.
Knowing where we’re going with the constraints domestically as well as the very unstable geopolitical environment, what should we be focusing on with our Armed Forces?
[Translation]
Mr. Massie: I think we need to invest where there are comparative economic and industrial advantages.
[English]
The Chair: I’m sorry, Mr. Massie. Senator Dagenais will ask his question as well, and then you can answer them both.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: Mr. Massie, I want to come back to the use of drones, which are now becoming prevalent in military operations. Have you looked at the data to evaluate or assess Canada’s effectiveness in using drones for our own security, particularly in the Arctic — since our neighbours and Russia could soon close in — as well as in our military operations including in Latvia?
That’s my question, on the use of drones.
Mr. Massie: Thank you. These questions are entirely complementary, because what I was going to say to your colleague is that one area where we need to invest is in drones. We need to develop an industrial strategy associated with our defence policy, which is essentially what we’ve done with ships, by choosing to build 15 ships by 2050 in Halifax, but also at Esquimalt and in Lévis. However, we haven’t done this to the same extent in the aerospace industry. Drones are the future.
When I said that we need to plan for the post-F-35 era... It’s not human-piloted aircraft that will be flying over our air space in 2050. All western countries and Canada’s adversaries are investing in this technology, as well as artificial intelligence, a sector in which Montreal and Canada are pioneers and are very avant-garde. Canada has the expertise. We produce them here, and we’ll be offering 800 of them to Ukraine in the next few months.
We have the capacity to make them, but when we decided to buy armed drones for Canada, we chose to buy 10-year-old American equipment. We didn’t invest in this technology in Canada, and now we can’t buy armed drones produced in Canada with Canadian expertise.
This industry must absolutely be promoted and prioritized in any industrial strategy for scientific development and innovation around drones. When I talk about drones, I’m not just referring to aerial drones, but also underwater and maritime drones. All of these technologies will ensure — and we’re already seeing this on the battlefield in Ukraine — the use of autonomous systems to lay mines on the battlefield. That is the future of this conflict, because we don’t want to jeopardize the safety of Canadians. If we can lower the human cost of war, using automated robots, it will be to the benefit of countries that have invested in this technology. The same is true in terms of monitoring the vast spaces of Canada’s territory and its waters. We need to invest in sensors and drones, and this data integration is the future of Canada’s national security.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Massie.
Colleagues, this brings us to the end of today’s meeting. On behalf of the committee, I extend our sincere thanks to you, Mr. Massie, and all our witnesses today, and I include in that Professor Kimball for her efforts to join us this evening.
I would remind you, colleagues, that several weeks ago we thought it would be useful to have an update on the situation in Ukraine. It seems that since then, the situation in Ukraine has changed almost daily and is moving in directions that we would rather not see. In that sense, we appreciated today and this evening the presentations, the advice and the cautions that we have received from all of our witnesses, particularly in highlighting the important role that Canada is playing in supporting Ukraine as well as identifying some of Canada’s challenges in supporting Ukraine and where we have room to grow some capacity for that, and it’s fair to say, beyond that, the importance of addressing Canada’s own deficiency in our defensive capacity more broadly. These are all very important, critical considerations for us as a committee for the Senate and for Canada.
Thank you so much, as I have said in the past colleagues, for bringing out the best in our witnesses today. It’s appreciated. With that, I note that our next meeting will be on Monday, March 25, at 4 p.m. Eastern Time. Thank you for your active participation. I wish each and every one of you a good evening. Thank you.
(The committee adjourned.)