THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS
EVIDENCE
OTTAWA, Monday, April 29, 2024
The Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs met with videoconference this day at 4 p.m. [ET] to examine and report on issues relating to national security and defence generally.
Senator Tony Dean (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: Colleagues, welcome. Before we begin, I would like to remind all senators and other meeting participants of important preventative measures. To prevent disruptive and potentially harmful audio feedback incidents during our meeting that could cause injuries, we remind all in-person participants to keep their earpieces away from all microphones at all times.
As indicated in the communiqué from the Speaker to all senators on Monday, April 29, the following measures have been taken to help prevent audio feedback incidents. All earpieces have been replaced by a model which greatly reduces the probability of audio feedback. The new earpieces are black in colour, whereas the former earpieces were grey. Please only use a black, approved earpiece.
By default, all unused earpieces will be unplugged at the start of the meeting.
When you are not using your earpiece, please place it face down in the middle of the round sticker that you see in front of you on the table, where indicated.
Please consult the card on the table for guidelines to prevent audio feedback incidents. This is the card.
Please ensure you’re seated in a manner that increases the distance between microphones. Participants must only plug in their earpieces to the microphone console located directly in front of them, at the base of the microphone.
These measures are in place so that we can conduct our business without interruption and to protect the health and safety of all participants, including the interpreters.
I thank you all for your cooperation.
Welcome to this meeting of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs. I’m Tony Dean. I chair the committee.
I see that we have all of our members in the room today, and I ask them now to introduce themselves, beginning with our deputy chair.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: Jean-Guy Dagenais from Quebec.
[English]
Senator Oh: Victor Oh, Ontario.
Senator Patterson: Rebecca Patterson, Ontario.
Senator M. Deacon: Marty Deacon, Ontario.
Senator Dasko: Donna Dasko, Ontario.
Senator Cardozo: Andrew Cardozo, Ontario.
Senator McNair: John McNair, New Brunswick.
Senator Boehm: Peter Boehm, Ontario.
[Translation]
Senator Loffreda: Tony Loffreda from Quebec.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you, colleagues.
Today, we welcome three panels of experts who have been invited to provide a briefing to the committee on the strategic implications of the ongoing conflict in the Middle East. We’ll begin by introducing our first panel of witnesses, and in that respect, I would like to welcome, from the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, Major-General Greg Smith, Director General, International Security Policy; and from Global Affairs Canada, Neil Brennan, Director, Gulf State Relations; Karim Morcos, Director, Israel, West Bank and Gaza; and Eric Laporte, Executive Director, Security and Defence Relations.
Thank you all for joining us today. We will now invite you to provide your opening remarks. I understand that Major-General Smith will be delivering the opening remarks for this committee.
Major-General, please begin whenever you’re ready. Welcome to the committee.
Major-General Greg Smith, Director General, International Security Policy, Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces: Mr. Chair, members of the committee, I am honoured to appear before you today. I am Major-General Greg Smith, Director General, International Security Policy for the Department of National Defence.
As you know, the Minister of National Defence recently announced Canada’s updated defence policy, Our North, Strong and Free. As outlined in the document, the Canadian Armed Forces are making and will continue to make meaningful contributions around the world as part of coalition-based or multilateral initiatives, including in the Middle East, to help address growing global instability and advance Canada’s foreign policy.
Since October 7, the situation on the ground in the region has remained unpredictable. As Israel continues its operation in the Gaza Strip, or Gaza, and Iran works to destabilize the region from its own territory and through its proxies and aligned militia groups, the risks of both escalation and regionalization of the conflict continue. From a defence perspective, it is imperative that we avoid a widening of the conflict to ensure protection of Canadian citizens and Canadian Armed Forces personnel in the region.
[Translation]
The Canadian Armed Forces, or CAF, played an important role in supporting Global Affairs Canada during the evacuation of Canadians and certain foreign nationals from Israel. As part of Operation ION, the Canadian Armed Forces carried out 19 flights and transported more than 1,600 passengers from Tel Aviv to Cyprus, a safe third location. Operation ION was made possible thanks to the work of my colleagues from the Government of Canada.
[English]
The Canadian Armed Forces, through Operation LUMEN, were also involved in the planning for the potential assisted departure of Canadian citizens and permanent residents from Lebanon. The Canadian Armed Forces were ready and committed to support our partners at Global Affairs Canada to help Canadians in the region.
The Middle East remains a dynamic operating arena. To advance Canadian objectives, the Canadian Armed Forces has six main military operations in the Middle East.
[Translation]
First, we have Operation IMPACT, which is the contribution of the Canadian Armed Forces to the fight against Daesh. This includes support for the United States-led coalition, which is working with Iraqi security partners to defeat Daesh in Iraq and Syria. Now that Daesh’s so-called caliphate has been militarily defeated, Canada, alongside its allies, has shifted its efforts toward capacity building and institutional development.
[English]
Second, Operation ARTEMIS is the Canadian Armed Forces’ mission to help stop terrorism and to make Middle Eastern waters more secure. This mission includes Canada’s contribution to the Combined Maritime Forces, the world’s largest multinational naval partnership. Canada maintains an enduring presence at Combined Maritime Forces headquarters, and in January 2024, assumed command of Combined Task Force 150, whose mission is to disrupt criminal and terrorist activity in the Gulf of Oman, North Arabian Sea, and Western Indian Ocean. Further, in December 2023, Canada contributed three personnel in support of Operation Prosperity Guardian, a U.S.-led operation to protect the free flow of commerce and safety of navigation into the Red Sea and Western Gulf of Aden.
In addition, up to 20 personnel are deployed to Operation FOUNDATION, who work as embeds in U.S. or multinational operation headquarters, both within the U.S. and forward deployed in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa.
The Canadian Armed Forces are also involved in peace support efforts through the region. For example, through Operation PROTEUS, the Canadian Armed Forces are working alongside the Office of United States Security Coordinator to enhance security cooperation between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority, thereby contributing to establishing the security conditions put forward in the Oslo Accords.
[Translation]
In addition, through Operation CALUMET, Canada provides approximately 40 Canadian Armed Forces personnel to the Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai. This independent peacekeeping operation established in 1981 aims to support lasting peace between Israel and Egypt in the Sinai Peninsula. Lastly, Operation JADE, currently comprised of four officers of the Canadian Armed Forces, is Canada’s longest-running overseas commitment. It provides military observers to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, which monitors the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Syria and with Lebanon.
[English]
Mr. Chair, members of the committee, these operations work to help uphold the international order while building the capacity of our partners in the Middle East. We remain committed to leveraging existing operations and initiatives to strengthen these relationships.
Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Major-General Smith.
We’ll proceed to questions. We have one hour with our guests today, and to maximize participation, we’ll limit each question, including the answer, to four minutes. Please keep your questions succinct and identify the person you’re addressing your question to.
Our first question today comes from our deputy chair, Senator Dagenais.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: Thank you for your presentation, Major-General Smith. I’d like to take this opportunity to thank you for your service and for the operations you have led. I have a question for Mr. Brennan regarding Global Affairs Canada. How do you see the future for Israel and Palestine? There is a lot going on right now. There are protests both in the United States and in Canada, as well as on university campuses. How should we view this situation, when we’re trying to maintain a certain distance right now? The events are becoming more widespread, particularly on university campuses.
[English]
Neil Brennan, Director, Gulf States Relations, Global Affairs Canada: Thank you for the question. I believe the question would be better directed to my colleague, Karim Morcos, responsible for Israel.
[Translation]
Karim Morcos, Director, Israel, West Bank and Gaza, Global Affairs Canada: Thank you for the question. I think that, ultimately, the solution is regional and would establish two states. That seems simple to say, but it’s difficult to achieve. Canada is involved with its regional partners, including the G7.
A few weeks ago, Minister Joly was with her colleagues, and this topic was at the heart of the discussions. How do we get back to diplomatic discussions toward a two-state solution that includes a regional aspect?
In addition, what is currently most important for us is to work toward a ceasefire, ensure an increase in humanitarian assistance and secure the unconditional release of the hostages.
Every effort is being made in the short term toward these three objectives bearing in mind that, as soon as these objectives can be achieved, we will have fertile ground to relaunch a diplomatic framework to facilitate a two-state solution.
Senator Dagenais: There is talk of a ceasefire. Pressure is currently being put on Israel to start negotiations for a ceasefire, but are there any negotiations with Hamas to bring about a ceasefire? This is all the more important as we know that a ceasefire depends on the release of the hostages. Right now, the whereabouts of more than half of the hostages are unknown; according to some reports, some of them have been killed.
So a ceasefire depends on two states, Hamas and Israel. Are any negotiations taking place on the Hamas side?
Mr. Morcos: Talks are actually under way in Cairo between Qatar and Egypt, so that includes all the parties involved.
Senator Dagenais: Thank you; I’ll have questions in the second round.
[English]
Senator Oh: Thank you, witnesses, for being here. My question to the panel will be: What are the key diplomatic efforts Canada is doing to address the conflicts in the Middle East and mitigate its repercussions?
Mr. Morcos: Thank you, senator, Mr. Chair. Canada, first and foremost, I said previously, has been a very active voice in terms of calling for a ceasefire, for increased access to humanitarian assistance and the release of hostages unconditionally. In terms of humanitarian response, we were also the first G7 country to announce a $100 million package since October 7. We’ve been a leader, top five in leading the way in terms of increasing access points to humanitarian assistance, calling for the protection of civilians and upholding international humanitarian law. Major‑General Smith also mentioned the work we’re doing with Operation PROTEUS with the security forces, and earlier I mentioned our efforts at the G7 table to bring the conversations to the diplomatic solutions — once we meet the three elements that I mentioned — toward a regional solution to a two-state solution. So Canada will play its part in that when the time is right.
Senator Oh: I would like to turn to the problem regarding the human rights of women and children. We are now seeing the eruption on university campuses across the U.S. and Europe. Are we doing something to help civilians in the Gaza Strip? Now there are over 20,000 casualties.
Mr. Morcos: Absolutely, yes. Let me answer that, senator, Mr. Chair.
As I mentioned, the plight of civilians and vulnerable people is at the centre of our response. We are one of the top contributors to assistance, and for calling for increased access points to increase the flow. We’ve seen limited progress; more needs to be done there.
In terms of the importance of journalists and humanitarian workers, our ministers have been quite vocal. At all levels, we have been quite vocal on this issue with our allies, and I mentioned the G7 as well and our efforts there to take that forward.
Senator Boehm: Thank you to our witnesses for being here.
My question is for Major-General Smith. The Economist recently noticed in one of its articles, the Israel Defence Forces, or IDF, are accused of military and moral failures in Gaza. I think this is taking into account the unfortunate attack on the World Central Kitchen convoy. There has been an internal investigation on that, which some have rejected.
In your comments you detailed the Canadian Forces’ involvement, and I know that over the years involvement in the region and in particular operations. Over the years, the relationship between the IDF and the Canadian Armed Forces has been pretty close. Some of it has also been triangulated with the armed forces of other countries, and I’m thinking in particular of the United States.
Do you have a sense of how or whether the Canadian Forces’ engagement relationship with the IDF has changed since the conflict started? Second, looking at this more strategically, do you believe there is a requirement for a recalibration of Canada’s strategy in terms of its allied nature with the IDF?
MGen. Smith: Thank you, chair. Obviously, a very difficult situation in that region. We are partners with the Israel Defence Forces, who, outside of anything else, have a very challenging mission to do, to actually clear, assault, take care of Hamas within an urban area of 2.1 million people.
We have a very modest relationship with the IDF, but nevertheless it has remained where it is: Individual training-based things, but nothing beyond that. That is not particularly unusual for the West, if I can say it that way. The U.S. has a much bigger relationship with the IDF, but across the West, it tends to be relatively modest.
As far as a recalibration goes, it is important for militaries to be able to speak to each other. I’m apolitical, we are apolitical, and it’s not a political act for militaries to talk to each other. Indeed, it’s a useful place to message. We need to maintain that, if nothing else, so we can continue to pass discreet messages and maintain that relationship for a broader time.
Senator Boehm: Do you feel, Major-General, that that discreet messaging at this moment is going fairly well?
MGen. Smith: Chair, I’ve been to Israel twice now, including in November a bit after the attack. It’s a country that has been traumatized by what it’s been through and there’s a much broader humanitarian situation. I would go back to the fact that it’s a very challenging environment and militaries being able to continue to speak is tremendously important so that we can message, including with my Global Affairs colleagues, to discreetly pass on what the Canadian perspective is on these operations.
Senator Boehm: Thank you very much.
Senator Patterson: I have to reshape my question because you’ve answered some. I’d like to talk about Operation PROTEUS. Major-General Smith and Mr. Morcos, this is a question for each of you.
The original mission was to help facilitate conversations with a great focus on the West Bank. How has that changed given the current conflict, the fact that there are more settler attacks in the West Bank and that there is a huge distrust of the West within the people of the West Bank? How is that impacting on the security threat to Canadian Armed Forces members who are part of Operation PROTEUS? Thank you.
MGen. Smith: Chair, I’ll start and then throw it over to my Global Affairs colleague. For Operation PROTEUS there are just under 30 military personnel, fairly senior military folks. They’re doing excellent work with the Palestinian Authority Security Force to professionalize them. That remains an important mission. I spoke to the commander who returned to Canada a few weeks ago and they’re carrying on with operations. It’s an important operation under the larger perspective of the United States Security Coordinator which is continuing to build that collaboration and cooperation between the IDF and the Palestinian Authority Security Force but professionalize them. Notwithstanding some of the challenges, including some of the violence that is happening, they’re carrying on with that difficult mission.
Mr. Morcos: Thank you, senator, for raising the West Bank. We’re following the situation very closely. The rise of extremist violence is of deep concern. We’ve been vocal at all levels. This violence really undermines the security of the West Bank and the prospects for what I was speaking about earlier on the two-state solution.
Reports indicate that about a dozen Palestinians have been killed since October 7 related to this violence, and 400 have been injured in extremist settler-related incidents. We’ve been vocal and have condemned this and have engaged Israeli authorities on it.
To your question on Operation PROTEUS and building on what the Major-General was saying, it’s challenging on the ground. There is a civilian component, and an RCMP and police training component too. Global Affairs Canada look after that. We’ve been trying, particularly in the refugee camps, to bring in community policing, which Canada does quite well. We’ve been engaging and getting more of a community relationship to get at the trust issue that you raised. There’s been some impact — not necessarily uniquely on October 7, but it’s been amplified. The importance of the work on community policing has grown in that regard.
Senator Patterson: Are we seeing any different threats to Canadians who are doing this work?
MGen. Smith: From the military perspective, they’re carrying on with their mission. Security and doing a threat analysis is always important, but they’re carrying on with the mission.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Senator Loffreda: My question is for Major-General Greg Smith. Thank you for your service to Canada and thank you for being here, along with our other panellists.
This is an important issue, so could you further elaborate on what efforts Canada is making to promote peace and dialogue between Hamas and Israel, including a release of hostages and a ceasefire? How is Canada supporting humanitarian efforts in the affected areas?
Finally — if we have time; if not on a second round — what impact does the conflict have on Canada’s diplomatic relationships with countries in the Middle East such as Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and others?
MGen. Smith: I’d like to start and then have my Global Affairs colleagues talk more about the diplomatic and humanitarian aspect.
The six different operations I discussed, overall, help contribute to the rules-based and international order in the region. It is a relatively modest contribution in different locations — 30 people here; less than that in other locations — but it’s all about continuing to build or to allow dialogue, making sure that incidents don’t blow out of proportion, et cetera. In the bigger perspective, right now, this is a much bigger problem than that relatively modest number of people, but they’re doing what they can to contribute in each one of those places, including Operation PROTEUS which I continue to illustrate as an important example of doing excellent, low-key work that is part of a bigger perspective.
I’d love to throw this question over to some Global Affairs colleagues here now.
Mr. Morcos: As I mentioned earlier, the efforts and the negotiations around hostages are handled by other regional partners, in particular, Egypt and Qatar. Of course, the U.S. has a great role in that, and we thank them for that.
Canada has a long-standing no contact policy with Hamas. We do not speak to them. Hamas doesn’t represent the Palestinian people or their legitimate aspirations. It’s a terrorist organization, as you know, listed under Canadian law.
In terms of your question, I apologize, senator, you asked a question on humanitarian assistance in generic terms?
Senator Loffreda: Yes. How is Canada supporting humanitarian efforts in the affected areas?
Mr. Morcos: Yes. We’re top five. Primarily, our support is focused on Gaza, but it also goes to the West Bank. We’re a big supporter of the United Nations agencies and the Red Cross movement, as well as the UN agency, UNRWA, which represents a large majority of the delivery there. We provide support to the World Food Programme, and we provide support to UNICEF and the Red Cross. There’s a great effort by Canadian civil society as well. We did a matching fund with Canadian civil society and were able to match about $13.8 million. It’s a significant number. Canadians are also involved and the government has supported that.
There’s a monetary and a donor aspect, but there’s also an advocacy aspect in requesting more avenues through land, air and the sea. We’re involved in all three. On March 10, Minister Joly announced our contribution to the maritime corridor, which the U.S. and other partners, the United Arab Emirates in particular, are standing up, but that’s not a replacement for the land crossings, particularly in the north end of Gaza where the needs are greatest, including a looming famine there which we’re all concerned about.
Then there are airdrops which are vitally important. They are a lifeline. Canada contributed through our Jordanian colleagues. We donated parachutes for that. Across the board we’re very active, both on the financial and the advocacy front for the humanitarian response and we’ll continue to do so.
Senator Loffreda: Thank you.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you very much, everybody, for being here. It’s greatly appreciated.
My question is for anyone who would like to respond to it, and the reply could be supplied later in writing if necessary. It concerns the arms embargo on Israel that was announced by the government last month. There was a bit of confusion around this. At the time, it was to apply to contracts made prior to the announcement. Have we supplied any arms to Israel through predetermined contracts since the announcements? If so, what might the product or products be, and what might be the deemed dollar amount?
Mr. Morcos: Thank you, senator. Canada has one of the strongest export control systems in the world, and respect for human rights is enshrined in our export control legislation.
All permit applications for controlled items are reviewed on a case-by-case basis under Canada’s robust Risk Assessment Framework, including the Arms Trade Treaty criteria which are enshrined in Canada’s Export and Import Permits Act. Currently, there are no valid permits for exports of lethal goods to Israel. The export permits approved between October 7 to January 8 have been shared with the parliamentary committee studying this matter. Since January 8, the government has not approved new arms export permits to Israel and this remains the government’s approach. Export permits that were approved up to January 8 remain in effect. Given the nature of supply chains, suspending all permits would have important implications for both Canada and its allies.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you for that. Following up with that, and looking at the other side of things, our arms trade with Israel goes both ways. I’m wondering, following the Israeli missile strike which killed seven World Central Kitchen workers in Gaza, including a Canadian citizen, the BBC reported that the IDF used a SPIKE missile manufactured by Israeli state-owned arms dealer Rafael. Canada has a contract to purchase $43‑million worth of these missiles. I’m wondering if there has been any review of that purchase or doing business with any other Israeli-owned weapons manufacturers in general light of the use and the potential war crimes in Gaza.
Mr. Morcos: Thank you, Mr. Chair. I’ll have to get back to you on this specific question.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
[Translation]
Senator Carignan: My question is about Canada’s advisories — from the Department of Foreign Affairs — for Canadian travellers to Israel. There are currently advisories against all non-essential travel. I’d like you to talk to us about the safety of Canadians in Israel right now and, more importantly, to give us your opinion on whether it’s necessary or risky for Quebec to send its delegate to Tel Aviv.
What is your position on the development of a trade relationship or the current risks for Canadians travelling to Israel on business?
Mr. Morcos: Thank you for the question. I will reiterate the position that is on our website, which states that any non‑essential travel is not recommended. Of course, in Gaza, it’s completely different: You can’t go there. There are other forces at play there. So I think that would apply to all cases, including people who want to do business and other things, such as tourism. People must follow the issued advisory, according to which any non-essential travel is not recommended. The situation is very volatile, as you know; it changes enormously from one week to the next. We’re monitoring the situation very closely and providing all the updates we can.
Senator Carignan: I understand you are saying that it is not a good idea for the Quebec delegate to go to Tel Aviv right now to do business. Is that right?
Mr. Morcos: No, no, I was just saying —
Senator Carignan: I was asking you about the specific duties of the Quebec delegate, who is planning to go and develop business ties from Tel Aviv.
Mr. Morcos: No, I wouldn’t say that about the Quebec delegate. I can get back to you on that, but as far as I know, he’s at our embassy, isn’t he?
Senator Carignan: That’s right.
Mr. Morcos: No, I think for that, I —
Senator Carignan: So the embassy is secure, but the outside of the embassy is not?
Mr. Morcos: No; any non-essential travel is not recommended.
Senator Carignan: But being at the embassy is okay, right?
Mr. Morcos: Yes, I could say that, but I can get back to you later on the measures for the delegate in particular. As far as the embassy is concerned, we’re continuing to work during our normal hours.
Senator Carignan: Are you operating with a reduced staff?
Mr. Morcos: No, we are fully staffed.
Senator Carignan: Thank you.
[English]
Senator Cardozo: Thank you to the witnesses for being here. I have two questions and I’ll pose them together. As a result of the negotiations that have been taking place in recent days, do you have a sense that there is a chance of a ceasefire coming up in the next short while?
Second, with the growing anti-Israel demonstrations that were referred to earlier — both demonstrations on and off campus — what do you think the long-term implications are for Israel, for the Middle East, for peace in the region?
Mr. Morcos: Thank you, senator. I don’t care to speculate in terms of hopes. We’re definitely calling for a ceasefire. We’re encouraged, I can say, by reports. But I’m sure you’ve been following, like all of us, ups and downs. There have been positive reports and then only to be shown that it has been delayed or not happening. More than speculation, at this stage, I don’t have more for you.
Eric Laporte, Executive Director, Security and Defence Relations, Global Affairs Canada: Thank you, Mr. Chair. I’m not going to speak to the impacts of protests on our campuses, et cetera, but if I understood your question, senator, it was the prospects for Israel and the region. For that, I would say that I think what we’re seeing is the region, obviously, has been dealing with the impacts of the October 7 attacks, but it is a region now that is a little more fragile than it was before with increased risks of escalation and tensions.
We saw that, obviously, earlier this month with the exchange of fire — Iranian fire over Israel. We see there is an Iranian entity that is willing to take a bit more risks in terms of willingness to strike Israel directly without the use of proxies, and it has proxies throughout the region. That is something to carry on and to worry about what we can probably expect. I think what we’ve seen is that the Iranians, though, don’t want a full‑scale conflict with Israel, and I think Israel doesn’t want a full‑scale conflict with Iran either. So you’re probably going back to the kind of shadow war, asymmetric warfare that we’ve seen between the two since 1979 where it might be cyberattacks, strikes against proxies, et cetera.
What does that mean for Israel? It means, obviously, a much more heightened level of risk for them as a country in a region that is perhaps a bit more volatile. Thank you.
Senator Cardozo: Thanks.
Senator Dasko: Thank you for being here today. My question is very similar to Senator Cardozo’s question, but I will ask it in a slightly different way. I am not asking for speculation. I take your point about you don’t like to speculate. I’m asking for your analysis of the situation, perhaps along the lines that you were answering just a few moments ago.
What are the scenarios that you would see in terms of the conflict and the way it has evolved? What are the most likely scenarios that you’ve been studying? What is most likely to happen? Looking ahead, I wonder if you can flesh that out a bit. I think your answer started along those lines. I’d like to get a sense of what you feel is most likely to happen and maybe some other scenarios either from a military point of view in terms of military activity or in terms of diplomatic developments. I’m not asking anything about the protests that are going on here. I see that as completely separate. It’s a different topic. I’m asking about your scenarios for the Middle East, big picture, whatever analysis you’ve done.
Mr. Morcos: One scenario that I think we haven’t touched on is the potential escalation. Mr. Laporte was mentioning proxies with Hezbollah. That’s definitely something that concerns us. We’ve seen an increase in frequency across the blue line and a heightened risk of miscalculations there. That could lead to something, a full-scale world war, even though parties are not looking for it, particularly Iran and Israel. That is a scenario.
The other one, of course, is if we don’t have a ceasefire in this current round, would be a full-scale operation in Rafah, where there are roughly 1.5 million civilians. The Government of Canada has been quite vocal in its opposition to that prospect because of the severe impact it could have on civilians.
I’m sure there are many more scenarios, but definitely an escalation would be one and particularly with the north.
Senator Dasko: Would you say that’s the main scenario?
Mr. Morcos: No. I would say it’s definitely a concern and one that daily we’re seeing back and forth and escalation. Another one, as I mentioned, is if this fails — and even what’s on the table reportedly is a six-week truce — it wouldn’t be the end. But if the negotiations fail, then the Israelis have been vocal about proceeding with a Rafah offensive.
Then there is also chances of spillover there, where, if civilians go north, there is an impact on the region in the south, into Egypt. Those are all things we are, of course, watching closely.
Do you want to add anything to that?
Mr. Laporte: Yes, very briefly, the risk of proxies playing a greater role, as Mr. Morcos was saying, either Hezbollah or in Syria. There is also the possibility of bringing — or Houthis taking on a greater role in terms of missile attacks. As we understand, they don’t take their marching orders from Iran. They do their own thing. We have seen that recently. Those are all vectors of potentially greater instability.
A silver lining, if I can put it there again, is that it seems as if none of the major players want to have that regional war, and we have seen some pretty significant cooperation among some of the regional countries. That is also quite interesting to see.
Senator Dasko: Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you. Colleagues — did you —
Mr. Brennan: Only to echo — I also have responsibility for Iran, but I agree completely with Mr. Laporte. The main takeaway and silver lining, as it was expressed, is that, indeed, the worst-case contours have been — it’s been determined that those two main protagonists don’t want to go there. So it is somewhere inside here. That’s a very important piece for us to keep in mind. There is some relative peace in that for us, but that gives us a space to work on de-escalation, whether by messaging to Iran, through our regional partners or together with our allies, or taking actions against Iran through sanctions. We have space to message and to shape, somewhat.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: My question is for Mr. Morcos. When I listen to the parties talk about their demands for peace, and especially when I hear the vocabulary used, I have serious doubts about a lasting peace in that region.
Do you believe there is a real desire for peace on both sides? Can you tell us more about this possibility of having two states that would be able to live without wanting to avenge the atrocities that have led to this situation?
There’s no hiding it: Atrocities were committed, and that’s what inflamed the situation.
Mr. Morcos: Absolutely. Right now, it’s true that we’re a long way…. You’re absolutely right to quote what we are hearing and not to believe that they’re ready for peace right away and, above all, for a return to the table to negotiate a two-state solution.
That said, what is positive — and I should have mentioned this when I answered the question a little earlier — is a scenario where certain countries in the region have a very active role. I’m talking about Egypt and Jordan. There is also a very positive and active role for the Gulf states — Mr. Brennan, who is responsible for those states, could talk more about this — especially Saudi Arabia. Today and yesterday, there were very important discussions, where they said publicly that they would be prepared to recognize Israel, something that they do not do as a country. Ultimately, I believe that what the Government of Canada is envisioning is Israel and an integrated Palestinian state in this region where everyone recognizes each other and respects each other’s security.
I should have added this in my answer to the senator’s question. I only mentioned some fairly negative scenarios, but it’s true that there is a glimmer of hope. I’d like to say that the countries in the region, particularly those I mentioned, and especially Saudi Arabia…. That is a country to which the Israeli government, and even the current government, is paying a great deal of attention and interest. I think that is the key; it will be regional and not just bilateral. Israel’s security will have to be ensured, and a country is needed for the Palestinians’ aspirations.
[English]
Senator Patterson: I would like to focus on the people, and we know that war disproportionately affects women, children and the elderly, and we also know it has impacted both sides, but what I really want to talk about is the people of Gaza. From everything we hear in the news, there are great efforts to get relief supplies in — airdrops, going from the sea, trying to open border crossings — and we hear about things that fail, and we certainly hear about the IDF and their involvement in this. But there seems to be something missing. What is stopping, from your perspective, supplies getting into the hands of women, children and those that need it the most, which is the whole spectrum, not just one-sided.
The follow-on question is, as well, we hear about opening more border crossings. We have people penned up in a space. Even if they wanted to get out, to get away from shelling, what is stopping them? There are Canadian citizens trying to get out. We know the challenges there. Mr. Brennan, this may even come from your perspective. How can the people of Gaza, just to get away, especially the most vulnerable in that population, get out of the line of fire? It appears to be everywhere in Gaza. Those are my questions for you.
Mr. Morcos: Excellent question, and this is something that is at the centre of our concern, the most vulnerable, and I think you put your finger on it. They are definitely in harm’s way, and we have been concerned also in terms of the impact on humanitarian workers themselves. I think it was Senator Deacon who mentioned the World Central Kitchen. The problems are manifold. There are definitely some bottlenecks to the entry of the aid. It’ll take more than four minutes to go through all the steps and the checkpoints that need to be gone through for the aid to actually enter. I believe it was President Biden — about three weeks, or a month ago — where after the World Central Kitchen, made a plea for more openings, including the north areas, and we have seen progress. So that’s in terms of the flow of aid.
The UN estimates we need about 500 to 600 trucks. They used to be at 200 and now we are at, like, 400. So it is progressing. But huge problems inside of Gaza. Silly things, not enough trucks. So I mentioned 400 or 500 trucks, but they have only 230 trucks inside Gaza to deliver all this. We are trying to address this.
There is a breakdown of social order. Right now, there is no social order, so survival of the fittest, and when people are starving there are security issues around the convoys and also with the airdrops. Who gets to that is an issue. So the last mile delivery is an issue.
There is good news. There have been improvements on several fronts. The maritime corridor — and as I said, it is not a replacement — will be able to, we hope, allow a hundred trucks in. That will be another lifeline. The strategy of the UN agencies is to flood the place with aid so that it becomes devalued. So people who are — you know, the black market. So the value of flour just becomes worthless, so people don’t kill or push around others and then that makes the most vulnerable suffer. That’s what we’re trying to get to. We’re not there yet. But that is certainly an issue with the access points.
Airdrops, not so much because it is so little. But the maritime Port of Ashdod on the Israeli side, the Kerem Shalom crossing point and Rafah, if these are continued we will get to a better place, which would allow the most vulnerable to receive assistance. I’ll finish with this: What they are looking for is to basically take a soccer stadium and just fill it with aid and have people serve themselves. That’s the only way they can do it in the short term when there is no civil order to protect those deliveries.
The Chair: Thank you. Colleagues, we have four more senators wanting to ask questions. We will have to limit each of those, including the answer, to two and a half minutes because we have to finish at 5 o’clock.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you. My question is regarding some of the sanctions we’ve had. The government announced three sets of sanctions way back, at least since October — sanctions against the members of Hamas, sanctions against Iran’s Minister of Defence and his general staff and sanctions against Israeli settlers involved in violent attacks on Palestinian civilians in the West Bank.
Sanctions against the first two were certainly discussed and acted on, but sanctions against Israeli settlers have not happened yet. Why is there a delay in implementing sanctions on this third group of individuals?
Mr. Morcos: My understanding is that is in the works. There’s no specific delay, but it’s coming. As the Prime Minister and Minister Joly announced, we’re working on this file, so there’s no specific delay to speak of.
Senator M. Deacon: So it is still a work in progress with a sense of urgency?
Mr. Morcos: Correct. Yes.
Senator M. Deacon: I’ll stop there. Thank you.
Senator Loffreda: What role do you see for international actors, such as neighbouring countries, the United States, or even the United Nations in de-escalating the conflict and promoting sustainable peace? Can they do more? Are we part of those discussions?
Mr. Brennan: I’ll make a few comments and then add to Karim because, as you can see, it’s been a bit of a tag-team effort across the region among us over the past several months.
First, with respect to our regional partners — and I believe you had an earlier question that I didn’t get to about some of the regional partners, so I’m glad you came back to that. Since this crisis was set off on October 7, we’ve had a flurry of very valuable cooperation and discussion with a whole range of our regional partners, especially Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and several other countries. There has been a great deal of exchange with those countries.
What have we done specifically? We had the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the Palestinian Authority here in Ottawa in December. Minister Joly has made several trips to the region to discuss with those partners. Minister Hussen has travelled. The Prime Minister has made a number of calls to their leadership in the region. All of those calls are very important in terms of soliciting from them what we can do to help you, what do you need from us, and for us to be able to project to that region what we think would be helpful.
Maybe just a few specifics on what they can do and what they have signalled to us they don’t want to do, and these are very broad statements. Maybe you can come to some of the specifics, Mr. Morcos.
What they have told us, let’s say broadly speaking, especially the Gulf states, they’re not interested in simply paying to rebuild, again, immediately in Gaza. This is not their interest. In order for them to engage, they need to see a longer-term prospect that begins with a credible, legitimate pathway to a two-state solution. They’ve sort of set out that, once these conditions are established, we will come in and help, but not until these conditions are set.
I think there was also a question just a moment ago about the outward flow of people and shouldn’t they just leave. That’s also not a solution for neighbouring states. If you look at states like Jordan, which already had a 40% resident Palestinian population, the solution to the crisis isn’t more from Gaza to those countries, from their perspective. It has to be a credible solution in situ.
There is a great deal of obvious self-interest with these states in finding a solution, but it’s one, again, built on credible conditions for a sustainable, long-term peace such as a two-state solution. Maybe I’ll just stop there.
Mr. Morcos: No, I think you covered it well. There has been a flurry of calls and trips, as was mentioned, G7 discussions and NATO side meetings. You mentioned the Americans. I think that they’ve been very active. I mentioned there are important meetings now in Riyadh and discussions with the neighbours. There is a full-court press on this.
In terms of where the UN comes in, they are doing, frankly, heroic work, not only the UN but the Red Cross, in terms of their response to the humanitarian situation. Sigrid Kaag was nominated by the Security Council to coordinate the reconstruction efforts. I think they’re also looking ahead and will play a key role.
The World Bank is also playing a role. They’ve put out an assessment of what needs to be done, but as Mr. Brennan was saying, we’ll need this political framework to go around it.
[Translation]
I feel like telling you that everyone is on board.
[English]
Senator Cardozo: If I can take Senator Loffreda’s question a little further and ask you to provide more insight into how the diplomatic world is working these days, and how you gather insight and transmit messages.
Are you talking to the range of ambassadors who are in Ottawa from, say, Israel and the Palestinian Authority and other countries in the region? Are ambassadors in those regions doing a lot of talking coming back to you?
Mr. Brennan: It’s all of the above. It’s ambassadors who are resident here. It’s our ambassadors in the region. It’s our envoys that are going out, whether it be the foreign minister or the minister of development through phone calls, the Prime Minister through phone calls and at the level of officials. The term “full‑court press” is very apt to this scenario. It’s been a very active period since October 7.
[Translation]
Senator Carignan: Canada was a leader in the creation of the International Criminal Court. Rumours are growing, especially in the Israeli media, about fears of an arrest warrant for Prime Minister Netanyahu, his chief of staff and his defence minister. This could set the world on fire. What is the Government of Canada doing about its representations to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, in particular? Is Canada intervening with the court or the court’s prosecutors to avoid arrest warrants or charges? Why has Canada not made a plea to the International Criminal Court in relation to the current charges laid by South Africa, in particular?
Mr. Morcos: Unfortunately, I’m not a lawyer, but I can get back to you on the last question, which is more technical. From memory, I don’t think there was ever a time when this was a possibility, but I don’t want to get ahead of myself. I’ll get back to you in writing on this. Of course, we’re aware of what’s being said in the media. As you say, those are rumours, and we cannot comment.
Senator Carignan: It appears that the decision is imminent, according to sources.
Mr. Morcos: That’s right, according to the media. We can’t speculate on that. What’s more, we respect the independence of the prosecutor. I think we’re following the matter closely. I can get back to you on the technical question.
Senator Carignan: With all the power and influence that you have in relation to the International Criminal Court, can you confirm to me that no specific steps are being taken with the court or the Office of the Prosecutor to prevent prosecutions or arrest warrants against Mr. Netanyahu?
Mr. Morcos: I will get back to you on that, as it’s outside my purview. As I was saying, we respect the independence of the prosecutor, and those are rumours for the time being.
Senator Carignan: Thank you.
[English]
The Chair: Colleagues, this brings us to the end of our first panel. I want to thank, on your behalf, Major-General Smith, Mr. Brennan, Mr. Morcos and Mr. Laporte. You have answered a lot of probing questions with a great degree of candour, openness and transparency — more than we might have expected. This is a volatile area with myriad complexities, and Canada’s presence on the ground might be light, but its presence is felt in a positive way by many people. That impact is probably broader and deeper than many Canadians would expect.
On behalf of the committee, we thank you for your leadership, and we thank you and your colleagues for the very hard work that you do in the most difficult and complex circumstances. We wish you well, and thank you for the important work that you do.
[Translation]
Senator Carignan: Do we have a deadline for commitments? It’s a topical issue, so I’d like it to be quick.
Mr. Morcos: Yes, we can talk, absolutely. There’s also Senator Deacon’s question about exports.
Senator Carignan: Is there a deadline for responding?
[English]
The Chair: Given what we’ve seen today, Senator Carignan, in terms of the helpfulness of our colleagues, I don’t have any doubt that they will supply the supplementary information we’ve requested as soon as possible.
Senator Dagenais: As soon as possible.
The Chair: Yes. Thank you very much.
Senators, we move next to our second panel.
For those of you joining us live, we’re meeting to receive a briefing on the strategic implications of the ongoing conflict in the Middle East.
I’m now delighted to welcome, by video conference, Janice Stein, professor at the Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy at the University of Toronto, and also General Dominique Trinquand, Former Head, French Military Mission to the UN.
Thank you for being with us today. I invite you to provide your opening remarks, which will be followed by questions from our members.
We start today with Dr. Janice Stein. Please proceed with you’re ready, Dr. Stein.
Janice Stein, Professor, Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy, University of Toronto, as an individual: Thank you very much, Senator Dean. It is a pleasure to be with you.
In my introductory comments, I would like to make two points. First of all, the war between Hamas and Israel has made the status quo that existed before the war unsustainable. It is not possible to turn the page back.
Secondly, we are, right now, at a hinge moment in this war, which is itself at an unsustainable status quo. In these days, we are before one of two outcomes: Either the parties agree to a ceasefire, or the war will escalate. Quite frankly, we’re running out of time.
Neither Israel nor Hamas has been able to achieve the strategic objectives of this war. Israel has not been able to inflict a strategic defeat on Hamas, nor has it been able to rescue the hostages, with the exception of three who were kidnapped on October 7.
Hamas has failed to provoke the more general uprising by Palestinians it hoped for in the West Bank and in Jordan, nor have its allies, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iran, been willing to join the war in a serious and sustained way.
Of course, the innocent victims are the civilian population in Gaza who are caught in the crossfire between the two at an absolutely horrific cost to them.
The reason I say that the current situation is no longer sustainable is, for the government of Israel, they are under enormous pressure because time is working against the survival of the hostages.
In Gaza, for the first time, we are seeing open and serious expressions of anger by Palestinians against Hamas, first of all, for exposing them to the war without thought of consequences for the civilian population and, secondly, for the way Hamas has siphoned off assistance that has come into Gaza and diverted it, first of all, for their own use and, secondly, to the black market, as you heard earlier.
What could break the stalemate? One of you asked that question. Because I am not a government official, I will answer it.
The first and most obvious condition is a change in the leadership. This leadership in Hamas, the military wing, is the most radicalized leadership that Hamas has ever had. There is a split between the military and political leadership. As long as the military leadership is making the decisions, very little progress is possible.
In Israel, this is the most right-wing government that it has ever had. Only if this government changes — and, in fact, both governments change — can a political path, which you talked about, to a political solution for Palestine open.
Frankly, I’m pessimistic that we’re going to see a change in either leadership in the coming days. Therefore, we are before two outcomes, neither of which, quite frankly, is very good. But in my view, one is far less bad than the other.
What is the first one? It is an escalation of the war by Israel, as it launches an attack against the military leadership which are, it is assumed — we have no hard evidence — in Rafah. They would do this to break the stalemate. I’m very doubtful that it would succeed in meeting their objectives. It has a high risk of escalation to a wider regional war that could engulf Jordan, which is in an extremely fragile state, and Lebanon which, as you know, has functionally been without a government for the last several years.
It would also have catastrophic consequences for the civilian population. There are about one million people now living in Rafah. It would be extraordinarily difficult, even if the attack occurred in stages, to move people out of harm’s way.
Nevertheless, if the diplomats who are currently working frantically to achieve a ceasefire fail — and that is always possible — I think escalation is very likely.
What is the second alternative? It is far from perfect, and I will explain why in a minute, but it is far less bad, in my view, than the first. It is a limited agreement, six weeks or so, to an immediate and shorter ceasefire in exchange for the release of about 30 hostages. Now, why is this not what we would all hope for? Because it leaves Hamas in power in Gaza. To the extent that Hamas stays in power, a political path for Palestinians remains almost impossible to achieve.
What it would achieve is an immediate surge of humanitarian assistance to reach desperate Palestinians, especially those in northern Gaza who, in some ways, have suffered the most. If there is a ceasefire, the distribution of aid — which officials told you is so difficult — would be made much easier and humanitarian aid could surge.
Right now, it is Hamas that is considering that proposal. It has been accepted by the government of Israel. As much pressure as possible is being put on Hamas to accept a six-week ceasefire. During those six weeks, outside governments would then work furiously to extend the ceasefire for longer and to release the remaining hostages.
In closing, I would like to add — because we haven’t paid much attention to it — that the frontline states to this conflict, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon, are paying an enormous price for this conflict. The economic price for Egypt — to only talk of Egypt, but this is true for Jordan as well — is huge. All three are facing a serious risk of political destabilization should the war continue at a higher level than it has currently reached. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you, Dr. Stein. Next we will hear from General Dominique Trinquand. Welcome back.
[Translation]
General (Ret’d) Dominique Trinquand, Former Head, French Military Mission to the UN, as an individual: Thank you very much for inviting me. I am extremely honoured to be able to share my thoughts with you.
I believe that the war waged in Gaza since the attack on October 7 cannot be understood without a more global perspective on the relationship between Israel and Palestine.
For a number of years, the Israeli government has allowed Hamas to grow in Gaza and has marginalized the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank.
To that end, it has encouraged the channelling of financial support to Gaza, provided in particular by Qatar, but transiting through Israel. Instead of benefiting the population of Gaza, that money has been used to develop military resources for Hamas. That has also encouraged the colonization of Jewish extremist movements in the West Bank, which has diminished the influence of the Palestinian Authority.
The attack on October 7 was an appalling massacre of Jews, a veritable pogrom without parallel since the Second World War. It also revealed Israel’s vulnerability.
Since then, Mr. Netanyahu’s government has constantly tried to punish Hamas without really providing any political objectives that would help see a way out of the crisis. In a way, we have ended up with two extremist movements, Hamas — extremist in its creation and its actions — and Mr. Netanyahu’s government, which doesn’t want to hear about the creation of a Palestinian state, either.
The means deployed by Tsahal since it entered Gaza have led to considerable destruction and civilian casualties. After six months, it can be said that Israel has lost the communication war, around the world, and has only freed three hostages by arms; the others have only been freed through truces.
A truce is currently being discussed, and we hope it can materialize.
However, another confrontation has arisen in this war. For the first time, a direct confrontation with Iran has taken place. The result was a clear advantage for Israel, first and foremost in terms of protection. Aided by its allies, Israel succeeded in neutralizing the direct and massive threats that Iran directed at it. Israel was also able to show that it was capable of striking at the heart of Iran, but without causing any major damage for the time being. Iran clearly wanted to de-escalate the situation after this exchange and did not want to go to extremes.
However, it remains to be seen whether Israel will leave it at that or want to take the opportunity to destabilize or even overthrow the regime. I’ll remind you that the mullahs’ regime is currently very destabilized internally, with an internal war between the mullahs and the Pasdaran. So we may wonder whether Israel will want to use this objective situation of Iran’s weakness before that country acquires nuclear weapons, before it’s too late — remember that Iran has always said it wanted Israel’s destruction.
Mr. Netanyahu’s government subsists only on war and is offering no political perspective.
Earlier, I spoke with Alain Finkielkraut, a French writer and philosopher, who had just returned from Israel where he wanted to feel out the situation and see what was happening there. Essentially, based on all the interactions he had, he came back saying that Hamas is not a subject, it’s the enemy. The problem is that Netanyahu is a prisoner of Jewish religious extremist movements — it should be remembered that one of his ministers was convicted in Israel and yet is part of the Israeli government.
So here is the question we can ask ourselves today: Will the proposed truce open up a new perspective? I would remind you that, as far as we know, there would be a 40-day ceasefire, with the release of hostages, but also of many Palestinian prisoners.
Mr. Blinken was commenting on the situation by saying that this was an extraordinary proposal Israel was making to Hamas. So far, to my knowledge, Hamas has not responded.
Or does the Israeli government, which has been playing the race to war since October 7, want to take this opportunity to neutralize its main enemy, which is still Iran? To do that, it needs to build a coalition around itself, but a new provocation by the Iranians could create that coalition as it was created — I was going to say in a case of self-defence, at the time when Iran was attacking Israel with its 350 missiles.
That’s where we are today. For the moment, Israel is stopped at Rafah and is not acting in southern Lebanon, either, where it has to be said that Hezbollah has been very cautious in its responses. The latter knows that its legitimacy in Lebanon is hotly contested and that Lebanon is in a terrible situation.
So, in my opinion, beyond the issue of Palestine, which everyone is bringing to the table — the Americans, the westerners, everyone; only Mr. Netanyahu doesn’t want to hear about it — the future lies in coming back to this issue, in coming back to a political solution for Israel’s own security, with the creation of two states, even if it is difficult. The key question is also this: Has the confrontation with Iran been neutralized by the latest actions, or will Israel push for a new escalation to try to settle the Iran problem once and for all?
Thank you for your attention.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you, General Trinquand.
We’ll now proceed to questions. Our guests are with us for an hour. We will have four minutes for each question, including the answer. Please keep those questions short and identify the witness to whom you are asking the question. Our first question goes to Senator Dagenais.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: Thank you, General Trinquand. My question is for you. I would like to discuss the Palestinians’ extraterritorial demonstrations.
We’ve just seen encampments spring up on university campuses, first in the United States and now in Canada. In my opinion, the current protest leaves little room for countries and individuals to take a nuanced stance in this conflict. You must be on one side or the other, period.
How do you interpret these protests against Israelis in the academic community? What are the potential risks of these encampments?
Gen. Trinquand: Thank you for this question. The situation that you described in the United States and Canada is happening in the United Kingdom and most recently in France, in the past two or three days. I was saying that, up until now, France has done well and there haven’t been any confrontations. However, in the past two or three days, the situation has come up. I’ll quickly address the topic of France. I think that this movement is being exploited by a very political extreme left in France, which you may know about. Mr. Mélenchon and La France insoumise are playing this card to get the Muslim voters on their side.
On the other side of the Atlantic, Israel has lost the war of communication. People may have been on Israel’s side after October 7. However, the damage done in Gaza and to the population over the past six months has led to a worldwide outcry. Once again, this movement is being exploited, particularly in the universities.
It should be noted that this is happening in universities, with a long-forgotten support movement for Palestine. Sadly, I must say that this is a Hamas success story. People were no longer talking about Palestine.
Do you remember the Abraham Accords? Palestine was no longer on the agenda. There was talk of agreements between Israel and a number of Arab countries, and Palestine was forgotten. Since the horrific attack on October 7, 2023, the subject of Palestine has come up again. These forgotten movements have resurfaced.
Senator Dagenais: With your experience at the United Nations, how do you feel about the use of the word “genocide” by Palestinians calling for a ceasefire? Do you believe that the United Nations has the necessary credibility to bring an end to the wars between these two countries, which have been going on for 75 years, since David Ben-Gurion declared the independence of the state of Israel in 1948?
Gen. Trinquand: As you know, we’re the United Nations. As a representative of a country that holds a permanent seat on the Security Council, I can say that the issue really lies with the Security Council. Clearly, the countries get caught up in the alliance game every time.
During the vote on the latest resolution, the United States gradually shifted its position in order to abstain. It couldn’t use its veto.
This means that Israel had a narrow escape, and Israel knows it. The Security Council won’t solve the problem. The United States will continue to support Israel and won’t allow the adoption of a resolution condemning Israel. I don’t see how the United Nations can solve this problem until Israel decides to solve it.
Right now, in the streets of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, Israelis are demanding a change of government. They’re calling for elections so that Prime Minister Netanyahu can leave and they can develop peaceful solutions that he can’t propose today.
Senator Dagenais: Thank you.
[English]
Senator Boehm: Thank you, witnesses, for being with us. My question is for Professor Stein.
During the many years I’ve known you, I’ve considered you one of the great prognosticators of world events and movements. I wanted to ask you about a comment you made to the CBC about two weeks after the October 7 attack. You said that it would be hard to dislodge Hamas because it is as much a movement as it is a political party, with community roots, and it’s difficult to wipe out social movements.
We’ve seen that in the past: In its day with the Palestine Liberation Organization, or PLO, the next generation moved forward. With Hezbollah, it’s the same thing.
Are those still your views? Do you see that there is resilience?
In your statement, you mentioned there is growing dissatisfaction with Hamas on food and aid distribution, et cetera, and the fact that violence directed toward the people of Gaza was not really one of their big concerns.
Do you think the leadership structure of Hamas and its community roots make it particularly challenging in terms of dislodging it from its position of influence?
Ms. Stein: Thank you, Senator Boehm.
When it comes to any claim to prognostications, I step way back, but I do think that a strategic objective of destroying Hamas is misguided. It is impossible to do, because it is a social movement. It ran schools and provided health care. From that perspective, the goal, if it were of that order of magnitude, should have been the destruction of the military capabilities of Hamas, which is a far more limited goal. That was a major error from the beginning.
We are now six months into this, and what is becoming clear is that the population of Gaza is itself now turning against Hamas in very important ways. It can no longer rely upon Hamas for any kind of social assistance. In fact, what has happened with aid distribution is exactly the reverse of what one would expect: Hamas has gone underground. Yahya Sinwar, the head of the military wing has said that governance of Gaza is not his responsibility; it is the responsibility of the United Nations.
As the suffering of innocent Palestinians has grown almost beyond bearing in Gaza, it is now reflected in the anger we are hearing.
I take that seriously because it is coming from reporters inside Gaza. Palestinians who speak to reporters about their anger against Hamas do so at great political risk. It is for that reason that I said the ceasefire time is now working against Gaza as well.
I think we are at a moment of change. The real question is this: Which way does the change go?
I would add that there are grounds for mild optimism from one perspective: Egypt has now replaced Qatar as the principal mediator. Qatar was asked to mediate by the United States as well as by Egypt and the Palestinians, and they were an effective mediator, but Egypt is directly invested. It is overwhelmingly important to Egypt to get a ceasefire as soon as possible. It is now stepping forward as Qatar has stepped back will, I hope, provide the added leverage. But it all comes down now to whether Sinwar will accept this proposal.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you to our witnesses for being here today.
I’m going to build — not repeat but build — upon what my colleague just asked about. My question goes to Professor Stein. Thank you tremendously for your weekly updates on Mondays on global events. Your understanding of world conflict is second to none, and we appreciate you joining Mr. Mansbridge on his podcast. It was outstanding. I’ll actually elaborate upon one of the things you had talked about, which is around how we end this present and repeated cycle of violence and if there is any hope for a two-state solution.
You just mentioned in response to the previous question that Hamas can be weakened but not destroyed. They are an unfortunate reality. We’ve seen entities, such Sinn Féin in Ireland going from a military to a political group, or one like Likud, which draws a direct line to Irgun, which carried out terrorist attacks in British Palestine, including the bombing of the King David Hotel.
Will we have to accept something similar as a potential path forward for Hamas if we want a peaceful settlement of a two-state solution, or has the decree of their atrocities shut the door on them ever being given a chance to moderate and govern?
Ms. Stein: I think we look first at what’s happened to Israeli public opinion since the war. It is hard to exaggerate the shock and the trauma of what happened that day. Unfortunately, violence almost always radicalizes. It has radicalized Israeli public opinion.
Yes, there are demonstrations in the streets, and yes, the overwhelming majority want Prime Minister Netanyahu gone, but they are deeply skeptical of any solution that would include Hamas as part of a political process.
I think we’re going to have to lengthen the timelines, and that’s what’s happening now. That is what Secretary of State Blinken is doing in the region, working with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. They are working on a phased process.
Clearly, Hamas will not be part of any political solution in the early phases. Again, there are elements of the political wing of Hamas, not the military wing, that suggested that now they would be willing to join the Palestine Liberation Organization and lay down their arms. But that is coming from the political wing rather than the military wing, and it is the military wing that was responsible for the atrocities that were committed.
What is also happening is pressure in the Arab world is now growing on Hamas. That explains partly why Qatar stepped back. Egypt is increasing its pressure. There is a recognition that time is running out.
Of course, Sinwar is funding equipment that he needed through Iran, and pressure is not coming on Sinwar from that direction. That’s why we have to wait and see what he decides.
Senator Cardozo: Thank you to our witnesses for being with us today. I really appreciate the analysis that you provide to us and to the public on a regular basis.
My question, perhaps for Professor Stein, is on the implications of this war worldwide. I thought when Russia invaded Ukraine, that this was having enormous worldwide implications, but this seems even greater in that you have divisions playing out in different countries. The issue is playing out in the Democratic Party in the U.S., and in Canada, the Liberal government is trying to be neutral, and it’s clear that neither side thinks neutral is a thing to do.
How do you see this playing out in the short term, perhaps even in the longer term, for a growing anti-Israel movement, but not unrelated to anti-Semitism, that has grown around the world and that is playing out in various ways that Israel would not have anticipated?
Ms. Stein: Thank you very much for that question, Senator Cardozo. There are so many strands at play in creating the situation that we’re in.
I agree with General Trinquand that Israel has lost the war, not only against Hamas — both have lost, frankly — but it has lost the war for global public opinion. There’s no question about that.
There is also fierce anger against Israel in the streets of many Arab capitals. That is not true with Arab governments. There have always been many years of Arab governments allowing demonstrations in the streets until they threaten their own stability, but, in fact, very pragmatically looking for solutions, because they understand how incendiary it can become.
There is a day after this, and there are ongoing discussions and relationships between Israel and governments in the Middle East, and Secretary of State Blinken is the principal broker of these relationships.
That is part of the second phase that I’ve talked about. That is the carrot that he is using to entice the Government of Israel beyond Prime Minister Netanyahu to consider adopting a political timeline for a Palestinian political solution.
We see something quite different on the campuses, an area you asked earlier about that I know well. There are, rightly so, many young people who express deep sympathy for Palestinians who are caught in this crossfire and who are suffering, as I said in my opening remarks. But we also see outsiders with other political agendas — this is not the first time that we’ve seen this on campuses — who join the demonstrations and hijack them. Actually, I’ve seen and I’ve gotten in touch with Palestinian leaders who are worried that those from outside who are joining these demonstrations actually put attention to Palestinians and put Palestine at risk because of the unfortunate but real anti‑Semitism of some of the comments. I hope those are by outsiders, not by university students, but it is very real, very present, and clearly very frightening to the Jewish community in this country as well as in other countries.
That is not the position of many students I know very well and whom I teach, who express genuine sympathy and engagement on behalf of the innocent Palestinians who are suffering.
Senator Cardozo: Thank you.
Senator Loffreda: Thank you to our panellists for being here.
My question is for Professor Stein.
[Translation]
If we have time, I would like to hear General Trinquand’s opinion on the matter, if not in the first round, perhaps in the second. Thank you.
[English]
There is an urgent need to release hostages and for a ceasefire. You did mention, Professor Stein, that the population of Gaza is turning against Hamas. The anger is growing because of the fact of innocent civilians increasing.
You briefly discussed ceasefire possibilities and strategies. What are some of the lessons that can be learned from previous attempts to resolve the Hamas-Israel conflict? How can they inform future peace-building efforts? What have we learned from the past, and is there a role Canada can play in these efforts?
Ms. Stein: I’ve actually written on the history of mediation between these parties. What I can say — and I would ask you not to be discouraged — is that everything has been tried. There have been mediators from outside. There have been indirect talks. There have been direct talks. There have been multilateral conferences. There’s no formula that has not been tried.
This ultimately comes down to the region and to the two parties, the Palestinians and the Israelis. For both of them, this has been the worst war that they have ever experienced. I would say for the Israelis, this is worse than the 1948-49 war, for a whole variety of reasons. For the Palestinians, the suffering of Palestinians in Gaza is greater than Nakba, which is the Palestinian war — the Arab word for “catastrophe” — that happened in 1948-49.
There is a point when people approach the abyss and understand how close they are to going over that abyss, that new leadership comes to the fore and says, “We have no choice. This is the critical change that has to happen. We cannot eliminate you.” Israelis have to understand that they will live next door to Palestinians forever, and they cannot eliminate Palestinians, and Palestinians have to give up. That is why Hamas is such a problem, because it has not given up on the idea of eliminating a Jewish state from among them. Yossi Lapid, a leader of one of the opposition parties in Israel, is exactly there. He made an effort to express his views in Washington, understanding fully that he was undermining his own government.
There are Palestinians who are deeply critical of what Hamas has done. To give you just one example, President Abbas said — there are political incentives to do this, but, nevertheless, he said that what Hamas has done to the Palestinians is worse than the Nakba. So there are Palestinians who understand very clearly there must be a solution where both peoples live side by side and have full political rights. Those people have to be empowered, and the rest of us have to have the strategic patience to support those voices in both communities, who understand that their future is that they must live alongside each other, and that neither one can eliminate the other.
Senator Loffreda: Thank you.
Senator Oh: Thank you, witnesses, for joining us today. My question for both of you is this: What role can Canada play in promoting peace, especially in human rights for children and women? Also, the region was heavily bombed, affecting stability in the Middle East. The question is for any one of you, please.
Ms. Stein: Would you like to go first, General Trinquand? I will follow you.
[Translation]
Gen. Trinquand: To follow up on the previous question, the solution lies neither with Hamas nor with Mr. Netanyahu’s government. Both the Palestinian and Israeli sides must put in place leaders who clearly understand that the only way to ensure a peaceful future for the region is for the two states to coexist.
The role of Canada and the entire international community would be to encourage discussion, not with Hamas, of course, but with an Israeli government that will come after Mr. Netanyahu’s government. After the events of October 7 in Israel, it’s difficult to make both Israelis and Palestinians understand this. This can happen only in stages and with the help of the Arab governments in the region. These governments want only one thing. They want to return to their agreements with Israel so that they can stabilize the region and do business. Canada can stand with the entire international community. Today, quite honestly, the entire international community agrees on this solution. Thank you, professor.
[English]
Ms. Stein: I would only add that if a ceasefire is reached, there will be an opportunity for a dramatic increase in humanitarian assistance, particularly to women and children. Canada has assets, resources, training and skilled people, and we should be thinking very hard right now about how we surge our capacity when a ceasefire happens. Yes, more aid is coming in, but there is still a great danger of famine. It is possible that we may avert that, and I think we need to think about how we can surge our capacity with partners so that we take advantage of the ceasefire to reverse that risk, especially in northern Gaza, and especially to women and children.
[Translation]
Senator Carignan: I don’t know whether you heard my question earlier about the possibility of an arrest warrant for Mr. Netanyahu and the defence minister. How would this type of measure by the International Criminal Court affect the domestic situation in Israel? It seems that Netanyahu’s leadership has been weakened. What about the international situation, in terms of the world order? The question is for both witnesses. I want to hear what you have to say.
Gen. Trinquand: I’ve heard the same rumours as you. I’ve also heard that Hamas would be prosecuted in the same manner. This strikes me as important. If measures are taken and the goal is to respect the independence of the justice system, then both sides should be involved. That’s the first point.
Second, on the Israeli side, I hear talk of three leaders. These leaders are the prime minister, the defence minister and the chief of the general staff. For the Israelis, dealing with the chief of the general staff will be quite a problem. Many Israelis will accept what Mr. Netanyahu has done. However, in general, measures must be taken on both sides. Above all, it’s important to explain that freedom of justice doesn’t mean a conviction. There must be a trial.
Remember that the International Criminal Court has prosecuted other heads of state. I closely followed one case involving President Gbagbo of the Ivory Coast. He was released and found innocent. Given the current turbulent atmosphere, I think that Israel will be quite shocked to see this. Will this calm down the other highly agitated movements on the Palestinian side? I don’t know.
[English]
Ms. Stein: I would only add that timing matters. I hope the court is judicious. I’ve often said that, at times, the search for justice, which is itself entirely legitimate, competes with the search for peace, which is also very important. We are at such a fragile moment now, and a ceasefire is so important for averting a much worse outcome. We are still dealing with rumours. There’s no confirmed evidence. But I would hope the court considers the context and the timing before it moves ahead.
[Translation]
Senator Carignan: Why? Because of the risks?
Ms. Stein: Yes, because of the risks, exactly, senator.
Senator Carignan: Thank you.
[English]
Senator Patterson: Thank you very much for your testimony. General Trinquand, I’ll probably start with you, but, Professor Stein, I would also be very interested in what you have to say. We’ve talked a lot about what needs to happen with Hamas in order for them to change, and what the people think of Hamas. How does the Israeli people view their government? We know that everybody is on a spectrum of political beliefs. What is the general consensus within Israel in terms of keeping the Netanyahu government in place? With that comes the actions of the settlers in the West Bank, the violence they’re directing and their threats to expand this conflict even wider.
[Translation]
Gen. Trinquand: According to my information from Israel — and I repeat, I was with someone who just came back from there — most Israelis don’t want anything more to do with Mr. Netanyahu. They know perfectly well that he’s mainly a hostage to his own policies, but also to the extremist religious parties; that he encouraged settlement in the West Bank; and that he allowed Hamas to receive financial support from Qatar. He still hasn’t accepted or claimed any responsibility for what happened on October 7. The head of Israeli intelligence resigned and acknowledged that the Israeli intelligence assessment had been flawed — not Mr. Netanyahu.
That’s why I brought up the current demonstrations in Israel calling for elections to change the government. Mr. Netanyahu won’t bring about a political solution. Mr. Netanyahu is Israel from the river to the sea, and Hamas is Palestine from the river to the sea. The two can’t come to an agreement. As I said earlier, there needs to be a new government in Israel and a discussion with a Palestinian authority, not with Hamas. This is all quite complicated. A 40-day truce would calm things down a bit and get the talks going again. That’s what I think.
[English]
Ms. Stein: I would only add that there is good public opinion polling. The numbers are at 70% of those who wish to see the Netanyahu government gone. As an aside, when Iran launched 350 missiles and 100 ballistic missiles at Israel, support for the government went up. This is true, generically, in societies. When societies are attacked from the outside, there’s what we call a rally round the flag. And even if you intensely dislike your own government, the level of fear engenders support, and I think that’s also important to understand.
There’s one other point I would like to add to General Trinquand’s commentary that in the right wing of the government are two very different groups. One is religious parties, and the second is nationalist parties, and there is growing friction between those two. For example, the religious parties pressed the government very hard to launch only a very limited response against Iran whereas the nationalist parties pressed the government very hard to do exactly the opposite. So it is not only the public that wants this government gone. We see growing signs of fissures and cracks within the government itself.
The Chair: Thank you.
Senator Dasko: Thank you to both of our witnesses today. I’m learning a great deal. I have two questions, and I’m just going to dive right in. We heard a couple of months ago, and it was claimed that Israeli intelligence was apprised of the coming attacks by Hamas. I’m asking both witnesses, Professor Stein and General Trinquand, do you find this claim credible? Do you think this happened? And what happened? If Israeli intelligence did learn this, passed this information up, why was it not acted on? That’s my first question. Thank you.
Ms. Stein: Maybe I could start. This is a classic example of an intelligence failure. Not the first, not the last, and we know a lot about what happened. Yes, they did have a war plan from Hamas, but the analysis was, well, there’s no capability to execute on this war plan; it’s not serious; the threat is not serious. There was a systematic discounting not only of the intentions of Hamas to do this — because, of course, Netanyahu had enabled Qatar to flow funds to Hamas, so he was motivated to discount the tensions — but the military itself and intelligence itself discounted the capabilities.
That is very common. President Zelenskyy did not believe until five days before — he did not accept U.S. intelligence, despite urgings, that Russia was intending to launch a full-scale invasion.
A group of us are working hard now, how do we build in better incentives in institutions, because there’s a complicated set of psychological factors which explains this. A group of us have worked on this for years, Senator Dasko, but that’s not good enough. The real question is why do we see this pattern of error over and over again? Somehow we have to realign incentives.
I’ll only share with you one interesting piece [Technical difficulties] I’ve already uncovered. One of the things that people have recommended for years is to build in a challenge function. Build in a group of people whose job it is, when estimates are dismissed like that, to say why? Where is your evidence?
In Israel’s military intelligence, that group was reduced to one and a half people. That’s all. That has to tell us something about the way we structure challenge functions inside government.
Senator Dasko: Do you have any comment on this question?
[Translation]
Gen. Trinquand: The intelligence on the plan was indeed passed on. The message simply wasn’t conveyed. According to the assessment, they didn’t have the required capabilities. In addition, it didn’t fit into Mr. Netanyahu’s political plan. He cared about the West Bank and protecting the settlers there. He thought that Gaza had been lulled to sleep by the millions of dollars already poured into it. The intelligence services received the information, but a proper assessment wasn’t conducted. It wasn’t done because it didn’t fit into the Netanyahu government’s political plan.
[English]
Senator Dasko: Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you. We are going to the second round now. We have about five minutes left. Let’s try to take two minutes each for the question and the answer.
Senator M. Deacon: This question is back to Professor Stein. You mentioned just briefly a moment ago, Iran, and I am wondering from you, and it wasn’t that long ago, your sense of how bad the most recent tit-for-tat was for Iran’s military readiness. You mentioned that Israel and other nations’ success intercepting and destroying essentially all of Iran’s rockets really exposed their position of weakness. But how badly at this moment do you think Iran was exposed from a military perspective, and what does this mean for them moving forward?
Ms. Stein: Thank you for that, Senator Deacon. A colleague that I have tremendous regard for, Tom Juneau, will be with you shortly, and this is the area he works on, so please make sure to ask him.
But I do agree with General Trinquand in his introduction when he talked about the fact that this has to be — and I agree with this, and I have said this in public — a moment of some trepidation for Iran’s military leadership. First of all, there is evidence we still have to dig and confirm that a significant number of rockets blew up on the launch pad or in mid-air. In other words, they were not shot down. They simply malfunctioned.
Secondly, nothing got through. Eight or nine ballistic missiles got through, which did limited damage. That has to be disturbing, because Iran only has about 300 launchers that can operate at any given moment. And yes, Israel’s response was very limited.
And by the way, for the record, President Biden has now intervened twice and personally through his intervention prevented escalation of this war beyond the borders of Israel and Gaza, which is no small accomplishment.
The limited response managed, again — the missiles were launched from outside Iran’s air space, and the missile flew beneath the radar, was not detected in a timely way, and an installation that was put in place to guard Natanz, which is one of the important nuclear sites inside Iran, the radar was damaged.
How do we know? We live in a different world now. We have private satellite companies, so people like me can see the satellite pictures 24 hours later and see the damage. And that has to be disturbing to the Iranians too.
So I do not agree with our officials who said earlier we’re going back to the shadow war. I don’t think we can turn the page back at all, but I don’t think that the next round that Iran is likely to escalate until it tries to understand and learn from what went wrong in this one case.
The Chair: Thank you.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: General Trinquand, while Hamas is in the picture, can Israel see any real possibility of a future Palestinian state? Can Hamas really withdraw from the scene? If Netanyahu were replaced as head of Israel, would most Israelis really change their attitude towards the Palestinian people and especially Hamas?
Gen. Trinquand: You asked a good question. Once this level of escalation has been reached, how is it possible to get back down?
I spoke to some people whom I know well in Jerusalem. They told me that they supported the creation of a Palestinian state. However, at this point, even the Palestinians can no longer come to work in Israel because the Israelis are afraid of the Palestinian presence on their side.
The problem lies in coming back. That’s why it will take time and money. It’s important to rebuild and figure things out. However, this can’t be discussed with Hamas. It isn’t possible.
The issue in Gaza, if the rumours that the people of Gaza have had enough of Hamas are true…. This whole thing happened because of Hamas’s escalation, so that would be good news. Hamas made a good move in the West Bank, where it had less of a presence. All the Palestinian hostages released during the first truce came from the West Bank. As a result, Hamas became very popular in the West Bank. It’s important not only to avoid talking to Hamas, but also to have the opportunity to talk to the Palestinian Authority. We know that Mahmoud Abbas is currently in serious disrepute. For one thing, he’s an old man, and he’s in serious disrepute. We’re talking about one or two men in prison right now. Would the Israelis make the effort to get them out of prison in order to start talks with them? That seems difficult.
The purpose of all this is simply to de-escalate the situation and get back to talks, so that once Mr. Netanyahu is no longer in power, all the players can agree on a peaceful solution. Right now, people are clinging to the two-state solution, because that’s the only thing that exists, meaning the Oslo Accords.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Colleagues, we would have many more questions, but I’m afraid to say that we’ve run out of time. This brings us to the end of this hugely impressive panel. Thank you, Dr. Stein and General Trinquand, for joining us today and your wonderfully rich analysis and observations on what is a terrible conflict. If anyone can make sense out of this and offer thoughts on it, you are two foremost commentators. We’ve seen your ability to look through the lens and the motivations of all the key actors in this war and to reflect on future possibilities, and we very much appreciate your time, thoughts and advice. We know that you’re both in high demand, so we thank you for giving your time and your expertise to the Senate of Canada. Thank you and we wish you both well.
We now move to the final panel of the meeting today. For those joining across Canada, our meeting examines the strategic implications of the ongoing conflict in the Middle East. For this next hour, we welcome Thomas Juneau, Associate Professor, Public and International Affairs, Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Ottawa; Sami Aoun, Director, Observatory on the Middle East and North Africa; Raul-Dandurand, Chair, Strategic and Diplomatic Studies, University of Quebec in Montréal; and, by video conference, Nathan Sachs, Director, Centre for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution.
Thank you all for being with us today. I invite you to provide your opening remarks, to be followed by questions from our members. We’re starting this evening with Thomas Juneau. Welcome. Please commence when you’re ready.
Thomas Juneau, Associate Professor, Public and International Affairs, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ottawa, as an individual: Thank you for this invitation. Debates in Canada on the Middle East in recent months have mostly focused on the war in Gaza and more broadly the Cold War that turned hot between Israel and Iran. I wish to focus my brief remarks on the war in Yemen, the emergence of Houthis as a regional power, the threats that they pose to maritime shipping in the Red Sea and beyond and what this means for Canada.
It is true that Canada has had a marginal presence in Yemen historically, but recent events will have long-term consequences that affect our interests.
The Chair: Please slow it down a bit for our translators. Thank you.
Mr. Juneau: To put the situation in context, the Houthis have de facto won the civil war in Yemen. They control the capital and the northwest, with more than 60% of the population under their authority. In part thanks to Iranian support, they have resisted the military intervention by the Saudi-led coalition since 2015 and have, in fact, come out stronger.
The point is that the Houthis are not going away. They will remain the de facto governing authority in Yemen for the foreseeable future. This has important consequences and they affect Canada. We need to think about them more thoroughly.
First, Houthi rule is increasingly repressive, brutal and corrupt. From a human rights perspective, this marks a significant setback. The Houthis, moreover, have no intention of engaging in a peace process in good faith. The internationally recognized government is weak and fragmented. The Houthis will not make any concessions and share power because they perceive, correctly, that they are in a strong enough position to be intransigent. More importantly for Canada, the Houthis have emerged as a regional power. As we have seen in recent weeks, they have both the capability and the intent to obstruct maritime shipping in the Red Sea. They have acquired, in large part thanks to Iranian support, missiles, aerial drones, drone boats, drone submarines, naval amphibious assault teams and naval mines. This allows them to pose a significant threat in the Red Sea, where approximately 12% of global maritime shipping transit daily.
A key point to keep in mind here is that the Houthi threat to maritime shipping in the Red Sea will not stop once the war in Gaza stops, despite what the Houthis say. Even if the Houthis might temporarily stop their attacks in the Red Sea when the war in Gaza stops, the threat will not disappear. There should be no doubt that when, not if, the Houthis want to pressure adversaries — the U.S., Israel and Saudi Arabia, in the context of post-Gaza war negotiations — they will threaten attacks again. The threats that the Houthis pose to one of the most crucial choke points for global maritime shipping is a long-term one.
Beyond the issue of maritime shipping, it is worth situating the Red Sea into broader debates. The Red Sea connects to the southern entrance of the Suez Canal and therefore links Europe to Asia. Simply put, its tragic importance is growing. It’s a major preoccupation not only for Canada’s most important ally, the United States; for other allies, especially in Europe, the U.K. and France; but also for regional partners, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and others.
In addition to Yemen, the Red Sea also borders Sudan, where one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises is unfolding. The bottom line is that the Houthis and the Red Sea matter to Canada. There are two broad reasons for Canada to keep this in mind. First, our most important foreign policy priority is to be, and to be perceived as, a reliable and capable ally, primarily to the United States, but secondarily to other allies and partners in Europe, in NATO and in the Middle East. Second, as a trading nation, direct attacks on the security of the global commons also threaten us. In this context, it has been the right decision for Canada to openly support U.S.-led efforts to counter the Houthis. Our support, to be clear, has been minimal — a handful of staff officers — but that is better than nothing. At this point, the U.S. primarily wants its efforts to be perceived as multilateral.
Canada should commit to continuing this, and should — that is, if the U.S. asks — consider expanding this contribution, whether more human resources, more information or intelligence sharing, or capacity building. Ideally, Canada should contribute or should consider contributing a frigate to multinational efforts to counter the Houthis, although, to be fair, our spare capacity at this point is very much overstretched.
Saudi Arabia, in addition, is a fast-growing regional power whose foreign policy has moderated in recent years and is now more often aligned with ours — not always, but more often than a few years ago. It would welcome more Canadian involvement in contributing to Red Sea security; so would the UAE and Israel. With this, I will stop. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Juneau.
We now welcome Mr. Aoun. Please proceed when you’re ready.
[Translation]
Sami Aoun, Director, Observatory on the Middle East and North Africa; Raoul-Dandurand Chair, Strategic and Diplomatic Studies, Université du Québec à Montréal, as an individual: Thank you for the invitation. It’s a privilege for me. I have four points to cover in detail. I’ll start by talking about the asymmetrical triggers. I’ll then discuss the impact on the pro‑Iranian camp in the region and the impact on the pro‑peace camp, or normalization in the Arab and Muslim world.
Lastly, I’ll focus on possible ways out of the crisis, especially for the Palestinian cause or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
First, the asymmetrical triggers are the horrific events of October 7, 2023. This terrorist act was perpetrated by an Iranian genius and an alliance among radical Islamists, particularly Hamas and others. It’s certainly the strategy of the Iranian regime. In this respect, the asymmetrical component of the war is quite clear.
Why? Because it was a shadow war, a war between wars, as it’s called in the region, especially in the strategic vocabulary. The reason for the break was the strategic patience of Iran, which manipulated this shadow war with Israel. The strike on April 13 countered the attack on the Iranian consulate or the adjacent building in Damascus that almost wiped out the entire team formed by General Ghassem Soleimani, who had been killed by an American strike a few years earlier.
This had repercussions. On the Israeli side, it brought up many traumas and phobias within Israeli society. This mainly shows the existential limits and fragility of this entity. It was quite dramatic for the people. On the Palestinian side, October 7 was more an expression of frustration at the stalled peace process. As a result, attempts were made to play down the terrorist attack by trying to frame it in the context of the war of liberation.
Arguably, the Iranian strategy’s major gain came from directly confronting Israeli power for the first time. It was simply a break. However, it showed the fragility of Israeli power and the limits of Israel’s power to assert itself in the Arab world. Another technically brilliant aspect of this strike was that it set in motion a whole strategy of normalization, not just between Israelis and Arabs, but also with India. India was in the process of creating a corridor to downplay the significance of the silk road and the Chinese belt. In this respect, clearly the Iranians won at that point. We aren’t sure that they’ll keep on winning.
In this sense, a total war has been waged. It was a strike, but it means more than before. We’re back to asymmetrical or shadow warfare. The Iranian strategy certainly scored many points. Perhaps one objective was to show that they aren’t necessarily the first to be able to rekindle the Palestinian issue. This was quite successful. Furthermore, the Arab world, which has so far sided with the peace camp, remains fairly firm in its resolve.
The Abraham Accords involving the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and other countries are still stable. They have been subdued, but they do exist. Something new is the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. These relations have been somewhat rekindled, especially in the past few hours. We see the Saudis starting to prepare for normalization and to strengthen their historic alliance with the Americans. However, they still seem to be moving towards normalizing relations with Israel.
The conflict on Palestinian soil remains deadlocked. We don’t really know whether Hamas’s losses in this war will result in a political solution that benefits the Palestine Liberation Organization and especially the Palestinian Authority. The conditions are certainly right for reform, but this is still a murky area.
Second, what will the Israelis want after this war? Will they really be more keen on exploring a partnership with the Palestinians in Palestine? Progress toward peace in the region cannot happen without the Palestinians. That’s an unknown, in my opinion, and a change of government in Israel could certainly help, but that doesn’t look likely at the moment.
Islamic radicalism in general, and Hamas in particular, have their own agenda. If the Iranians lose Hamas, things will swing toward Lebanon in northern Israel or in southern Lebanon, with Hezbollah. If that happens, and Hamas is lost, the Iranians will do everything they can to keep Hezbollah intact, manœuvre it into war or keep it in the so-called ring of fire around Israel.
For the time being, we still don’t know how the war in Gaza might end or what the turning point might be. We can’t be sure yet. We don’t know if there’ll be an invasion of Rafah or just a political solution, an arrangement of some kind. It’s kind of tough to predict. The Middle East has always been subject to hybrid wars of all kinds. We can’t be sure there will ever be peace or normalcy. The Middle East is now divided into two regions: the Middle East that is at war, the Near East, where states have failed or almost failed; and the other Middle East, which is in the Gulf region, where there is great prosperity with plans for development and modernization. We don’t know which way the Middle East as a whole will go.
On the strategic front, the United States is now back on the scene in a big way after saying it would pivot toward Asia and leave the Middle East. It’s being assertive. Secretary of State Blinken has made seven visits so far, and he’s very active. In contrast, China seems to be more of a trading power, and Russia has not succeeded in its attempt to provoke conflict in the region in an effort to divert attention from the war in Ukraine. Russia is losing that one. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Aoun. We now welcome our final witness of the day, Mr. Nathan Sachs. Mr. Sachs, please proceed when you’re ready. Welcome.
Nathan Sachs, Director, Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution, as an individual: Thank you very much, senators, for the honour of appearing before you again today and for hearing me remotely. I’d like to point briefly to five strategic issues that I think are directly affected by the current crisis to varying degrees, and I’m happy to expand upon them in the Q & A.
The first, as was already mentioned by Professor Juneau, the Iran-Israel war is now out in the open. What was a long-standing war, not a cold war but a hot war, one always kept behind closed doors, is now an open one with direct attacks from Iran onto Israel and from Israel onto Iran. This is complicated dramatically by the fact that Iran is essentially today a nuclear threshold state. What was true before, the assumptions that underlined especially the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, has to be put in question today. What was true then is no longer true now, both in terms of Iran’s military capacity in the region and in terms of the potential for nuclear weapons or nuclear capacity.
The second point that emerged from that same incident was the efficacy of missile defences, especially the Israeli missile defences, but not only them. They are very important and have implications for the global arenas as well. What emerges as well is my second point, and that is that regional security architecture, an idea promoted in particular by the Americans, as well as others in recent years, that regional security coalition is now in some ways a reality.
During the attack on April 13, the U.S. with allies, including regional allies, Jordan, but also Gulf countries, participated in the active defence of Israel, which from a historical perspective is quite remarkable. From the United States’ perspective, this is part of a long-term integration of the area of operations of central command — CENTCOM — based in Tampa, Florida in the United States, but it is also a long-term by-product of the attempt to create normalization between Israel and Arab states that my predecessor also spoke about.
This could be a prelude to a very important development, which is the potential for normalization, especially between Saudi Arabia and Israel as part of a regional architecture. This is a long shot. It is not easy but is certainly one that the United States and others have been very actively attempting to promote in recent years and could be quite important for the day after in Gaza. Given the dramatic damage and the huge humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip, an enormous amount of both political will and financial capacity will be essential, and Saudi-Israeli normalization could offer that alongside a horizon for Israeli-Palestinian peace.
Third, a new alliance has emerged — a Russia-China-Iran alliance. On this, unlike the other developments, I would offer that it should be taken with a grain of salt. This alliance has more to do with the war in Europe and Ukraine than it does about the current crisis between Israel and Hamas. It has a lot to do, of course, with opposition to the United States and with China and Russia taking advantage of this crisis to try to diminish the standing of the United States alongside Israel.
Nonetheless, the degree to which Russia has sided not only with the Palestinians but with Hamas explicitly is quite remarkable, as is the degree to which Russia continues to be aligned with Iran, the backdrop of which, of course, is the provision of a substantial number of munitions, including unmanned aerial vehicles by Iran to Russia for its war in Ukraine.
Fourth, on Israeli-Palestinian peace, as I said the last time I appeared before your honourable committee, this crisis provides, unfortunately, generational traumas, one to each side. Israelis suffered on October 7 what they regard as the worst day in their history as a state, one which they will not get over anytime soon. Illusions to the contrary should be set aside. The sense of personal insecurity and vulnerability was dramatically enhanced by that day.
The months since then have produced for Palestinians what was the worst nightmare for them as well, a repetition of scenes of mass death, mass destruction and displacement. In other words, for both sides, their worst fears of the other were confirmed. This will have strategic implications. We must continue to have ambitious visions about Israeli-Palestinian peace, but we must be realistic about what is possible in terms of when that can be achieved and what will be necessary in the interim. Israel is not about to take new security risks for Palestinian sovereignty, and the Palestinians are not about to embark on generational historic reconciliation with Israel. The parties are further apart than they ever have been. However, that should not weaken our resolve — all of us in the West — to pursue Israeli-Palestinian peace as a vision and to try to push all tactical, interim measures in that direction.
Fifth and finally, the global discourse about Israeli and Palestinian affairs has become unmoored from the actual conflict in many respects and has entered a symbolic realm, which is tethered more to domestic politics in the West, including the United States — where I am — than it is to the actualities and the specifics of the conflict itself. This will not contribute to a solution, I’m afraid. Although some of the people engaged with us have good intentions, I fear the kind of discourse that arises well beyond the actualities of the conflict itself will make it harder to find resolution rather than easier.
I look forward to your questions, and I will pause there.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Sachs. We will now proceed to questions. As with our last panel, four minutes for the question and answer in each case, and please identify the person you are addressing the question to.
As in the normal course, I offer the first question to our deputy chair, Senator Dagenais.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: Thank you to our witnesses. My question is for Professor Aoun. I talked about this earlier this afternoon, and I think we need to discuss it some more. Encampments have sprung up on university campuses in the United States and now here in Canada, in places like Montreal and Vancouver. The number of people camping out at McGill has tripled in two days.
I’d like to talk about the tone of the camp occupants’ demands. It leaves no room for those who want to offer a nuanced interpretation of this conflict. You’re on one side or you’re on the other, period. How do you interpret these new anti-Israel demonstrations in university communities, and what risks could arise if the movement spreads?
Mr. Aoun: Thank you very much, Senator. Several different crises are at the fore in these demonstrations, whether it’s the woke movement or cancel culture. Changes are happening in American society right now. People are frustrated, and one of the reasons for that is that young people in both parties and independents aren’t happy with either presidential candidate. There’s also an economic crisis in the middle class.
To your question, yes, there’s frustration. It’s a shame for the Palestinian cause that people can fly the Hamas flag. Hamas is considered a terrorist group in North America, particularly in the U.S. and Canada. Some are flying the Hezbollah flag, which is also a terrorist group. People are doing this. There’s frustration, but the demonstrations have no real political structure, which can have a boomerang effect on the demonstrators’ own cause. That’s why there are doubts about these people’s intentions. Are they radical Islamist networks and groups, or is this movement financed by a particular country, such as Qatar? These are rumours; I have no proof. The idea is that there’s a connection between the radical left and radical Islamism. That keeps the Palestinian cause as such at a standstill. That’s the takeaway here.
There’s also frustration because Hamas and Iran have really won the image war with Gaza. That makes this activism understandable. It’s justified because of the carnage and massacres we’re seeing, but does it help promote the Palestinian cause? I have my doubts about that just because our media don’t show the debate between the Palestinians themselves, between Fatah and Hamas, for example. We don’t see that criticism of radical Islamism, the standard-bearer for the Palestinian cause in the interest of a powerful entity. Promoting this cause is not its primary objective. For example, Iran has become a state that is trying to protect the regime or its nuclear plans by creating this ring of fire. I may have my doubts, but unfortunately, we’re not seeing any reasoned public debate on this issue at the moment.
Senator Carignan: Mr. Juneau?
Mr. Juneau: Just to expand on what Professor Aoun said, it’s important to distinguish between the pro-Palestinian demonstrations, between the peaceful elements that have legitimate demands, whether you personally agree with those demands or not, and the demonstrators who are openly anti‑Semitic, who glorify terrorism and call for the end of Israel. The peaceful element, a significant proportion of these demonstrators, support peace and want a two-state solution. It’s not always a clear line between the two, but both camps are out there. There’s a full spectrum from the acceptable to the unacceptable, from the legitimate to the illegitimate. To add to what Professor Aoun said, in public debates, people on one side claim that there are only legitimate demands; people on the other claim that there are only illegitimate demands. The fact is, it’s much more complicated than that. It’s both.
Senator Carignan: Thank you, gentlemen.
[English]
Senator Loffreda: My question is for Mr. Sachs. Thank you to our panellists for being here.
Mr. Sachs, you discussed the potential normalization of Saudi Arabia and Israel and the alliance between Russia, China and Iran. I’d like you to elaborate and give us your view on other possible implications of this conflict on regional alliances and geopolitical dynamics in the Middle East. How much will it change? How much will Canada be affected through our strong allies, the United States and the United Nations, et cetera?
Mr. Sachs: Thank you for your question. I think it’s a very good one. Of course, some of it we do not know at present.
There’s an interesting tension. On the one hand, this is an inflection point of historic proportions in many respects. Everything is different in one way. In another, a lot of the fundamentals remain the same. The fundamental structure and the desire for regional architecture that was mainly conceived to counter Iran and that aligned many of the Sunni Arab states alongside Israel and the United States. Those fundamentals still remain. The Palestinian issue, which was much neglected in the Abraham Accords, will probably be much less neglected, I think, if normalization comes to fruition, which is a long shot. But the same fundamentals still remain. This could be important. The demonstration on April 13 of the security aspects of this, the ability to coordinate actual physical defence of Israel by Arab states or with the participation of Arab states is historic and could be important.
As the professor mentioned before, this also notes a pivot back by the United States again. Since 2008, the United States has been egging to rebalance its efforts toward Asia. The Biden administration was the first since then — not the Obama or Trump administrations. The Biden administration was the one that managed, until recently, to pivot mostly to other regions of the world. It viewed East Asia and, of course, Europe as much more important from a strategic perspective. That still remains the case, but the administration has put an enormous amount of effort into the Middle East, especially since October 7.
In the context of the wider global arena with China and Russia, I think the connection there is tenuous. China remains, by and large, interested in having other people deal with the Middle East, be that the United States in particular, or perhaps Canada and other allies of the United States. It has its interests in the Middle East, it is pursuing them more forcefully than it was in the past, but it remains a tertiary region from the Chinese perspective.
Russia is deeply involved in the Middle East, of course. It has troops in Syria and is active there, but it remains relatively constrained in what is trying to achieve. It has so far not attempted to recreate the old Soviet hegemony in the region. In that respect, there is a major question before policy-makers here in the United States, in Canada and in other allies: How much involvement would there be in the Middle East, and what form would it take? Here I would simply offer two points of advice, if I may.
The first is that the Middle East is indeed not the primary area of geopolitics today. Nonetheless, as we’ve seen in the past year, it cannot be neglected. If it is neglected, it will suck us all back in there, and the consequences, first and foremost for the people there, could be horrendous.
The second point I would make is that if we want to do it, we have to think carefully about how we do it. We should not simply go back to old assumptions, for example that is America is a hegemony, or America working together with its allies is a hegemony. Rather, America and its Western allies working together in consort by, with and through these regional partners are the most effective way to promote interests, and I think what we saw on April 13 is a demonstration of that.
Senator Boehm: My question is also for Dr. Sachs. We have seen over the decades the ebb and flow of U.S. diplomacy with respect to the Middle East. I think it was Henry Kissinger where the term shuttle diplomacy was used, and that was about shuttling through the Middle East. There were the Camp David Accords and other moments and attempts, but I think that at no time has there been such a convergence between the sort of diplomacy that the U.S. administration is engaged in — particularly Secretary Blinken — and diasporic interests in the United States, as we are seeing. The previous question by Senator Dagenais was regarding university campuses. We’re seeing that in Canada now as well. This is an election year in the U.S. There is a lot of information in the media, but particularly in social media, which was not a factor before.
How do you see this developing in your country in terms of policy focus and getting the message out against the backdrop of an upcoming election?
Mr. Sachs: Thank you, senator. I think there’s an irony here. On the one hand, people, especially younger people in the United States and elsewhere in the West, have turned away from ideas of a two-state solution. It is now fashionable — certainly in academy, but also elsewhere, to regard the two-state solution as obsolete, as impossible to achieve. Therefore, many, especially in the academic world, but also in the activist world, are turning to ideas of a one-state solution — which I do not believe is a solution at all — or alternatives. As Professor Juneau mentioned, there are those — not all, certainly — who are talking about abolishing Israel, turning back the clock 76 years, et cetera. That has become much more of a highlight of this discourse. The irony is that at the same time, we see governments, including those of the United States, Canada and close allies in Europe, turning more forcefully than ever to the idea of a two-state solution.
Here I return to something I said in my opening remarks. I think it is extremely important that we reaffirm our commitment to peaceful resolution of this conflict, which I believe will entail Israel living side by side in peace with a sovereign Palestinian state of some form. This may not look exactly like the two-state solution of old, but it will eventually entail two people, independent, able to govern themselves, even if there are complex security considerations involved and perhaps limitations. But we should have no illusion that is around the corner. Setting ourselves on a path that would lead us there would already be a gargantuan task, and it would be very worthy of our efforts. That would not be the same as returning to the status quo of October 6. That would be very different. It would entail different policies and a very different strategic commitment.
Senator Boehm: How would the Biden administration cope with this? Students are being forcibly removed from campus. They are being arrested. That hasn’t been seen since the days of the Vietnam War. What is the way ahead in terms of getting the message out to the American people?
Mr. Sachs: I think the first step is actually on the ground. There is now a new proposal for a ceasefire placed before Hamas, urged not only by the United States but also by the Egyptians and other countries that Hamas accept it. We do not know if Hamas will accept this one — it has rejected previous ones — but a ceasefire would allow for some calm, at least.
I’m not naive. It would not end any of the demonstrations, I think, but it would allow for, I hope, an enormous amount of aid to enter and also be distributed in the Gaza Strip. That would be extremely important from a humanitarian perspective. It would allow for a considerable number of Israeli hostages to return home, at lease those who are still alive. This would allow, I hope, for some sort of calm. This is also the hope of the administration as well. They hope for a ceasefire to allow them to return to a diplomatic track — perhaps one that includes Saudi Arabia, as I mentioned before — and therefore would also allow, from a political perspective, the American administration to deal with other things. Of course, the United States, just like Canada, has many domestic and international issues to deal with besides this.
This was not a panacea. This would not mean the issue goes away. It would not lower all the tension, but it would perhaps allow the Gaza Strip to start healing — a very long process — allow Israel to start healing and allow the United States to write its policy and also its politics in a very contentious and difficult year, as you mentioned.
Senator Boehm: Thank you.
Senator Patterson: This question is for Dr. Juneau. I want to go back to your comments about Houthis, and the role they’re playing. I kind of thought they were a proxy for Iran, but it sounds a bit, from what you’re saying, like this is a way of exerting their position and legitimizing their role as a power broker in the region. Yes, Canada does want to support the trade and all the areas there, but what can we do from a diplomatic perspective? Can you negotiate with the Houthis? You said no. What can we do to help address the challenge that they’re facing? Because this is for a very long time in the future.
Mr. Juneau: Thank you. I’ve been studying and following the situation in Yemen for years now, since I studied there more than 15 years ago, and usually, very few people care about Yemen. As tragic as the situation there is, I am happy in a way that there is more attention on it.
The first point I’d make — and this is not just a point about semantics, it actually is an important point — some groups that Iran supports in the region are proxies by any reasonable definition in the sense that Iran exerts significant influence over their day-to-day activities. I don’t think that’s an accurate label for the Houthis. The Houthis do receive a lot of Iranian support — military, intelligence and financial support. They work together, they share objectives in the region in opposing Saudi Arabia, for example, and Israel, but the Houthis largely remain autonomous. There is little daylight between them and Iran, but that is not because Iran controls them. It is because, ideologically and politically, they’re on the same team.
The Houthis — to answer your question directly — like I said very quickly in my remarks, won the war in Yemen. They won the war in Yemen in part because of Iranian support but also — and this is important to answer your question — in part because their local adversaries are so weak. The internationally recognized government of Yemen, which still holds a seat at the UN and receives American support, is fragmented. It is weak. It is corrupt. It is incompetent. It is viewed as illegitimate by a majority of Yemenis. That is a major problem moving forward. It does mean that, for the U.S., there is no viable partner on the ground to build an opposition to the Houthis.
In January, the United States, with a bit of U.K. assistance, started bombing the Houthis to try to dissuade them from continuing their strikes in the Red Sea. In many ways, that’s a bad option for the U.S., because the damage they have done to the Houthis has been limited. They have allowed the Houthis to score major propaganda points.
The problem, though, is that it’s not clear that there’s a better alternative. For the U.S. to do nothing would be a bad option, a worse option, because you are creating a vacuum that you know the Houthis will exploit more and more because they are a rising regional power.
For the U.S. to attack the Houthis even more than they have done would also have been a bad option, because that would have led to escalation, significant civilian casualties and so on.
We’re in a difficult situation where the U.S. probably took the least of a bad menu of options in which it does not have a reliable partner on the ground which, ultimately, would have, in theory, been the alternative.
Can the U.S. build a reliable partner on the ground in Yemen? Again, in theory, yes. In practice, the Saudis have been doing that for nine years and have abysmally failed.
Moving forward, I don’t see a good option to deal with the long-term threat that the Houthis pose. It’s a threat that the U.S. will have to contain but will not be able to defeat.
Senator Patterson: Is there a role for Canada in this?
Mr. Juneau: I think there is a limited role for Canada. To be clear, it is a very limited role. First of all, looking at the bigger picture, the Middle East is not our foreign policy priority; it ranks far behind Europe and Asia right now.
Among the limited bandwidth that we have left for the Middle East, there’s a lot going on — not just with Yemen and the Houthis — as I said in my presentation, there is a bit more that we can do.
The U.S. wants its efforts to counter the Houthis, its maritime efforts in the Red Sea, to interdict Iranian shipping of weapons toward the Houthis in Yemen; the U.S. wants these efforts to be perceived as multilateral.
There’s a bit more that we could do. You would have to ask officials from National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, is there a possibility in the mid-to-longer term that we could free up a frigate for a six-month deployment in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean? I know it’s hard because of limited resources, but I think there is a good case we could make.
The Chair: Thank you.
[Translation]
Senator Carignan: My question is for Mr. Aoun. Not much has been said about the role of the Quds Force. What is its role in the conflict within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard? How significant is it? We know that Israel attacked the generals during the attacks in Syria. How do you see their role? How important are they? What does targeting this particular group accomplish for Israel?
Mr. Aoun: They’re the major command that came up with the stratagem for what I called the ring of fire around Israel, along with Qasem Soleimani. They were the team that succeeded him and originated the call for “unity of fronts”, that is, uniting all fields against Israel and certainly the United States. They’re the ones behind the whole hybrid warfare strategy that I called asymmetrical. They’re the brains behind militia strategy in Iraq, like the Hashd al-Shaabi, so pro-Iranians and others who back the Iraqi Hezbollah, and especially the Lebanese Hezbollah, which is the pride of Iran’s strategy in the region.
It’s the strategic team that has virtually dominated the four capitals: Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut and Sana’a with the Houthis, as Mr. Juneau mentioned. Virtually every militia plays a role, and their participation in the war is dictated by Iranian strategic priorities. These are the people who did it. Taking them out was a major coup, not just because a building next to the Iranian consulate in Damascus or the embassy was attacked. At least, it was next to the Canadian embassy. They neutralized the brains of the operation with that strike.
I believe there are two facets to their relationship with the Iranian regime, as Mr. Juneau explained. With the Houthis, it’s an alliance, a convergence of interests with a certain ideological affinity, although the Houthis are not duodecimal Shiites, but with Hezbollah, there’s an organic unity on an ideological and structural level and because of loyalty to the Iranian guide, Khamenei. That’s why they’re important.
For the Iraqis, maybe Iraq is richer than Lebanon. The Iraqi Shiites have more Arab affinities; they’re a bit aloof and don’t want to be unconditionally loyal to Iran, but for the Hezbollah in Lebanon, it’s almost absolute loyalty. Lebanon is smaller and poorer, and Hezbollah has been financed, armed and trained to become a nuisance power against Israel.
At the moment, it’s clear that the two are afraid of each other. The Israelis know that Hezbollah’s nuisance power could strike hard at the heart of Israel, somewhere like the port of Haifa, where there’s ammonium storage. They could also hit the Dimona nuclear reactor in Israel. They have ballistic missiles that are capable, and some of them can fly under the radar. On the other hand, the Israelis are certainly capable of destroying the whole of Lebanon, especially the capital, Beirut, in an application of the well-known Dahiya doctrine formulated by the current Minister Eizenkot, who says that Dahiya, on the outskirts of Beirut, must be destroyed, so that Hezbollah will give up.
Hezbollah may harm Israel, but the war will continue to be a border war, despite all these ideological pretensions. The idea of liberating Al-Quds, of liberating Jerusalem, comes from the media, propaganda and ideological mobilization. What Hezbollah is really doing at the moment, thanks to French diplomacy in particular, is negotiating with the Israelis for an eight to 10-kilometre withdrawal, but we don’t know if they’ll accept it. It also depends on Iranian interests and Iranian command. If Israel does negotiate, we don’t know what the outcome will be for Lebanon. If Hezbollah withdraws to Lebanon, it will have a hold on the Lebanese regime and perhaps dominate a little more, which will antagonize the other communities, such as the Sunni Muslims and especially the Christians. We’re not there yet.
Are we going to solve the problem of northern Israel and southern Lebanon through diplomacy or war? What the Israelis have seen in Gaza is that Hezbollah is definitely 100 times more powerful than Hamas. People are calculating gains and losses on both sides.
[English]
Senator Cardozo: My question is for Professor Sachs and Professor Aoun. Both of you spoke about the parties being far apart, coming back to Israel and Hamas. What do you see as the long-term way out of this?
Mr. Aoun: For Hamas, you mean?
Senator Cardozo: For both sides, to get to a situation of peace, if we can dare dream about that.
[Translation]
Mr. Aoun: There is no bilateral solution; it would have to be a regional solution. From a security perspective, if the parties could move forward with what people are calling an “Arab NATO” or “Middle Eastern NATO”, it could work.
That would mean integrating Israel into a regional security agreement with Saudi Arabia or other countries by slightly expanding the Abraham Accords to pacify the region.
The Palestinians could be invited to join in. That would enhance security for them and for Israel. There is no direct bilateral Palestinian-Israeli solution. There is one possibility, which is to look at how the territory is managed. That’s why Professor Sachs said that a two-state solution was impossible, because there are 700,000 to 800,000 settlers in the West Bank. In Palestine, in general, the British Mandate for Palestine territory…. Today, demographically, the Palestinians outnumber the Israelis by 500,000. That’s a bit of a sticking point.
One option is federative administration, decentralizing and opening up markets with a security plan. This is all possible. It’s true that the Palestinians are in the grip of a kind of Islamic radicalism or frustration. They don’t believe in peace, but, practically speaking, they do know what’s in their interest.
There’s a Palestinian elite that speaks Hebrew very well. Let me give you another example. About 20% of the people in Israel are so-called Israeli Arabs. Throughout this war, they’ve kept their distance. Mansour Abbas, a well-known Islamist and member of the Israeli parliament, has been highly critical of Hezbollah and Hamas. They do realize they have a common future. They know it’s impossible to annihilate Israel. So they agree to manage a conflict where they can share the territory and its wealth.
For the Israelis, their long-term interests are inextricably linked to the Arab world, to the Gulf states that have resources and plenty of wealth. There’s no doubt that Israeli technology is very advanced. If there has to be a partnership, it will have to be an Arab-Palestinian-Israeli partnership, which would wrest control over Palestinian mobilization and justice for the Palestinian cause out of the hands of Iran, Turkey or some other state. It could go in that direction.
Senator Cardozo: Thank you, that’s very interesting.
[English]
The Chair: Sorry, Senator Cardozo, but we just have time to get to Senator Dasko.
Senator Dasko: My question is mainly to Mr. Sachs.
You were speaking about the alliance between Russia, China and Iran. You said it was mainly around the Ukraine situation. Here is my question: At least before the October events of last year, Israel appeared to show no sympathy toward Ukraine after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Of course, Israel’s allies, including the West — the U.S., Europe and so on — were very supportive and remain very supportive of Ukraine.
I’m looking for some insights into why the Israeli leadership would have had any sympathy or show any support for Russia and so little or no sympathy whatsoever to Ukraine. What is going on there? Was that just transitory? Have they changed? Of course, they’re in the middle of their own war now. I’m looking for insights into the Israeli leadership and why they would even bow in that direction.
Mr. Sachs: Thank you, senator.
When the latest Russian invasion of Ukraine happened, the Israeli leadership had a very difficult dilemma. On the one hand, their global alliances were very clear. The United States, Israel’s closest ally, was very clear in its support of Ukraine. In the United Nations and elsewhere this time around, Israel supported all the resolutions, alongside the United States and the rest of the West. It also supplied considerable non-military support to Ukraine, but it did refrain from some of the most advanced military support the Ukrainians were asking for. The reason for that was a geostrategic one very much in the neighbourhood of Israel. Israelis referred to Russia as their neighbour to the north, not because Russia actually borders Israel but because Russia has deployed very effectively in Syria, with the Russian air force commanding Syrian airspace. Iran, in many recent years, has been on a long-standing campaign to arm Hezbollah. As we heard from Professor Aoun, Hezbollah is very powerful. In particular, its most powerful weapon is precise missiles that can hit within a very small radius and cover all of Israel in terms of range. For many years, Israel has been trying to prevent the armament of Hezbollah with that, in particular through the transfer of advance instruments from Iran via Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Therefore, Israel has operated many times in Syria. In the past decade, Israel has found a modus vivendi with Russia to deconflict its flights over Syrian airspace to avoid Russian-Israeli confrontation in the air space, something which was of paramount importance for the Israelis.
So the consideration of what seemed in the West to be a relatively muted Israeli response — it was not supportive of Russia but was muted — was completely about the ability to deconflict war in Syria and avoid what would be catastrophic: an Israeli-Russian confrontation in the air.
Since October 7, that has changed, in particular because Russia has sided so clearly not just with the Palestinians but with Hamas. We should differentiate very clearly there.
In terms of the de-conflicting in Syrian airspace, that actually continues between Israel and Russia, even though the Israeli rhetoric on the Ukrainian war has changed.
Senator Dasko: Would anybody like to add anything to that? I might have to take some time to digest that.
The Chair: Be very brief, professor. We have about a minute left.
[Translation]
Mr. Aoun: There’s a huge Russian-speaking community in Israel — over a million people, and 800,000 of them are Ukrainian; that’s why there’s this polarization.
Diplomatically, the Israelis, like many Arab countries, such as Egypt, have chosen a policy of multi-alignment. They have tried to get out from under the American umbrella to some extent, but without breaking away or moving closer to China and Russia.
In Russia’s case, when there was the alignment with Syria, as others have said, Putin was Netanyahu’s favourite at one point. Then the relationship cooled, but didn’t fall apart entirely, because Netanyahu tried to court Putin when he had problems with Obama and Trump.
[English]
The Chair: Our time is almost at an end. It’s been a long meeting, and I know we could keep going, but we do have to bring the meeting to a close.
I want to thank Mr. Juneau, Mr. Aoun and Mr. Sachs for your critical analyses on a complex and fraught situation that is taking a massive toll in human lives. It’s hard to decipher, but you and other witnesses have helped us decipher this situation this afternoon. I believe this has been one of our best and most informative meetings. I say that, given the degree of complexity, depth of conflict and history involved here. I thank you, colleagues, for your insightful questions, which brought the best from our witnesses, as usual.
The last word from me is that these meetings take organizing, as you might imagine. I want to thank, as I occasionally do, our terrific clerk, Ericka Dupont, for managing the overall operations of everything we do here. I thank our Library of Parliament analysts, Ariel Shapiro and Anne-Marie Therrien-Tremblay, who play a large role in supporting us and particularly in identifying and helping us identify witnesses.
Given the difficulty and the trauma and the messy situation that we have been talking about today, our witnesses brought an even-handed — every witness brought an even-handed look at — looking-at-all-sides perspective to a conflict that many find it easy to choose sides on. I commend you for that, and I commend the skills and judgment of our analysts in the choice of witnesses.
I thank our colleagues around the table, again, for your terrific questions and for hanging in during this three-hour meeting. With that, I’m going to bring the meeting to a close, by noting that our next meeting will take place on Monday, May 27 — so we’ll have a little bit of a break — at 4 p.m. EST.
Thank you again for your active participation, and I wish everyone a good and safe evening.
(The committee adjourned.)