THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
EVIDENCE
OTTAWA, Wednesday, November 19, 2025
The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met with videoconference this day at 4:16 p.m. [ET] to examine and report on such issues as may arise from time to time relating to foreign relations and international trade generally.
Senator Peter M. Boehm (Chair) in the chair.
[Translation]
The Chair: Good afternoon, honourable senators. My name is Peter Boehm. I am a senator from Ontario and the chair of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. I wish to invite committee members participating in today’s meeting to introduce themselves.
[English]
Senator Adler: Charles Adler, Manitoba.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: Hello. Amina Gerba from Quebec.
[English]
Senator Ravalia: Welcome. Mohamed Ravalia, Newfoundland and Labrador.
Senator Woo: Senator Woo, British Columbia.
Senator Harder: Peter Harder, Ontario.
Senator Wilson: Duncan Wilson, British Columbia.
Senator M. Deacon: Welcome. Marty Deacon, Ontario.
[Translation]
Senator Hébert: Martine Hébert, Victoria division, Quebec.
[English]
The Chair: I would like to welcome all who may be watching us across the country on SenVU.
Before we begin today, we are anticipating a possible vote that could occur during our deliberations in committee. If it happens, we will see the lights flashing, and we’ll know how much time there is, but I’m convinced there will be enough time allotted for us to run away into the chamber, vote and then resume. I just wanted to put that out there for you.
We are meeting today under our general order of reference to discuss Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, and today for our first panel from Global Affairs Canada, we are pleased to welcome Weldon Epp, Assistant Deputy Minister, Indo-Pacific Branch, who is well known to all of us; Valérie Samaan, Director General, Indo-Pacific Strategy Planning, Policy and Operations Bureau; and Aly-Khan Rajani, Director, Indo-Pacific Regional Coordination, Policy and Planning Division.
Welcome to the committee. Thank you for being with us today. I’d like to acknowledge that Senator MacDonald of Nova Scotia has joined the proceedings.
Before we hear your opening statement, Mr. Epp, and proceed to questions and answers, as we always do, I would ask everyone present please to mute the notifications on their devices. This can be a distraction. By the same token, I’d like you to observe the rules with respect to earpieces and microphones so we can avoid any feedback, which would be a problem, particularly for our interpreters and technical staff.
We’re ready to hear your opening remarks. Mr. Epp, you have the floor.
[Translation]
Weldon Epp, Assistant Deputy Minister, Indo-Pacific Branch, Global Affairs Canada: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Good afternoon, honourable senators. Thank you for inviting me here this afternoon. As Assistant Deputy Minister, Indo-Pacific Branch at Global Affairs Canada, I am pleased to address you today to provide an update on Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy.
We are coming to the end of the third year of the strategy’s implementation. Over the past 36 months, we have achieved several important milestones that have strengthened Canada’s prosperity and security while consolidating our regional partnerships.
This period has also been marked by unexpected developments and diplomatic tensions that have required adaptability in the face of economic and geopolitical change.
The very successful visit by the Prime Minister to the region last month demonstrates the importance of continuing to forge closer ties with this region, which remains the fastest growing in the world.
[English]
Since the launch of the Indo-Pacific Strategy, we have made tangible progress in advancing five core objectives: promoting peace and security, expanding trade and investment, strengthening people-to-people ties, supporting sustainable development and positioning Canada as an engaged and reliable partner in the region.
Mr. Chair, I would like to take a brief moment to highlight some of the main activities we have been conducting under the strategy.
With respect to the first objective of the strategy — promoting peace, security and resilience — we have significantly deepened our defence partnerships in the region at a time of rising tensions. It is also fair to say that the importance of the Indo-Pacific region for Canada’s security has been elevated since the adoption of the strategy.
Canada deploys three Royal Canadian Navy warships annually in the region, reinforcing maritime security and demonstrating commitment to the rule of law. We have recently signed new defence and security arrangements with Japan, South Korea and the Philippines.
We are actively supporting the peace efforts in Myanmar led by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, and contributing to sanctions monitoring against North Korea through Operation NEON.
Cybersecurity and digital resilience are also central to Canada’s engagement. One notable development is BlackBerry’s expansion in Malaysia; it now serves as a regional hub for cybersecurity excellence. I would note that at the recent ASEAN summit, at which the Prime Minister was a guest, the security infrastructure for all IT that the host Malaysia used was provided by Blackberry.
Economic engagement and trade diversification has been at the centre of our activities and will continue to be central to our work in the region.
To give you an idea of the importance for Canada, in 2024 our two-way trade with the Indo-Pacific totalled $261 billion dollars. If you count the ASEAN region as a single economic unit, five of Canada’s top ten trading partners are now located in the Indo-Pacific region.
Since 2022, we have deployed Team Canada Trade Missions to nine countries and opened representative offices through Export Development Canada, or EDC, FinDev Canada and Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada to support Canadian business diversification.
We have made significant strides in expanding access to regional markets. As you know, Prime Minister Carney recently signed the Canada-Indonesia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, or CEPA. We have also signed a Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Arrangement with Taiwan.
That said, we know more must be done for Canada to continue to diversify its exports. In line with the Prime Minister’s objective of doubling Canada’s non-U.S. exports over the next decade, you can imagine we will be intensifying our economic focus in this region. This will include positioning Canada as a trusted partner in critical minerals, energy, resetting trade and investment relations with India, and recalibrating our engagement with China to advance mutual interests while safeguarding national security.
We will also expedite trade negotiations with ASEAN, Thailand and the Philippines, and continue to champion open, inclusive and rules-based trade through platforms like APEC and the CPTPP.
The strategy i mentioned also involves reinforcing people-to-people ties. We have supported dozens of new initiatives through the Indo-Pacific Engagement Initiative, which my colleagues helped program, engaging many Canadians, NGOs and researchers, to strengthen the connective tissue between them and partners in the region.
We will soon announce new agreements with several Canadian universities to provide a new tranche of Indo-Pacific scholarships; this is for young Canadians wishing to study in the region.
On the other hand, we are expanding our flagship SEED scholarships for young students from the region to come to Canada to study. That’s an existing program that the Indo-Pacific Strategy recapitalized and expanded the scope of.
In terms of climate action and sustainable development, that remains central. Canada has provided $750 million to FinDev Canada for loans for green infrastructure projects, including in Southeast Asia. For example, a $59-million project supporting Thailand’s renewable energy transition through the construction of solar technology and battery storage, and $40 million in another project to support climate finance initiatives in Vietnam. Those are just a couple of examples.
We are also working closely with regional partners such as the Asian Development Bank to support energy transition to renewable sources, including support for a 600-megawatt wind farm in Lao PDR.
In the medium to long term in this area of work, Canada’s expertise also includes meeting needs and demands from the region for civilian nuclear energy. It is a big opportunity, and it’s in line with many of the ASEAN member states’ goals for their own transitional energy security and climate resilience.
[Translation]
Mr. Chair, over the past three years, we have moved from vision to action. We are achieving results that benefit both our economy and the region as a whole, but we also recognize that the world of 2025 is not the same as the world of 2022.
The international trading order is now disrupted by new U.S. tariffs and the war in Ukraine has brought transatlantic and Indo-Pacific democracies significantly closer together. Against this backdrop, our partners in the region are increasingly looking to Canada as a stable and reliable supplier of energy and natural resources.
In the coming weeks and months, we will update the strategy to reflect these developments and align it with the priorities set out in Prime Minister Carney’s mandate letter, including the need to safeguard our sovereignty and to work closely with our allies and reliable trading partners.
This will not be a fundamental review of the strategy, but rather a recalibration of our means and tools to achieve them.
Thank you for your attention. I’m now ready to take your questions.
The Chair: Thank you for your remarks, Mr. Epp. I’d like to acknowledge that Senator Al Zaibak from Ontario has joined the proceedings. I wish to remind senators that you will each have a maximum of three minutes for the first round. That includes questions and answers.
[English]
Therefore, to members of the committee and our witnesses, please be as concise as you possibly can in your questions. I would encourage the witnesses to do the same in their answers. We will always go to a second round if we have enough time.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you for being here today. I want to start with a response. Yesterday, we had an opportunity to meet with a number of representatives of the Indo-Pacific and connected folks, like The Asia Foundation or think tanks in Canada. A few senators were there.
As the morning progressed, some concerns came from these represented countries: the need for a common security partnership, a need for a more repeatedly conveyed narrative on a global Pacific strategy. The comment was made a few times that Canada seemed a little bit fair-weather right now or a little bit vanilla.
There was another comment around the fact that there might be a good strategic vision right now; if there is one, great, and if there is, is it something that can be clearly communicated in a purposeful way? I listened. That was the feedback from a round table. Could you comment on any of those sources of feedback?
Mr. Epp: First, to validate, we hear similar feedback. It’s important for us to listen to the feedback. The strategy under any government is dynamic. We have goals. It is comprised of 17 departments. It has funding. Some of it moves faster than others. The reality is that we have to adjust not only to external changes to the environment but also to the feedback we’re receiving.
To some of the specific pieces, what matters most is our activity, actions, commitments and how we get things done — our outcomes.
Over the last two to three years, the feedback I received, among others’ roles as ASEAN senior officials — I plugged in often with that community — and that would be the community where we have traditionally heard the most concerns about being fair-weather.
It’s like any multilateral. There are many meetings. Is Canada showing up at the meetings? Are we coming at the right level? Those have been valid concerns.
The feedback the Prime Minister and Minister Anand heard — I was with her colleagues in the summer — was that that used to be our experience, but we’ve really seen a shift; please keep it up.
As I had the opportunity to say to the Prime Minister, the answer is you going. You are showing up. Let’s not worry about the narrative and criticism. Let’s get things done.
I would say fair-weather. The Government of Canada — the previous government and the current government — is committed to delivering on a very significant $2.3-billion strategy. It’s not just funding. It’s travel time. It’s executive time. It’s the Prime Minister showing up at ASEAN in his first trip to Asia.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Senator Woo: Thank you for your testimony. Is China part of the Indo-Pacific Strategy, or IPS?
Mr. Epp: When the Indo-Pacific Strategy was launched in 2022, it included China, absolutely, and as folks who haven’t looked at it recently might recall, it has several drill-down chapters. One was on China at the time. China is clearly part of the region, and the strategy has always been inclusive of the entirety of the region.
One of the objectives of the strategy is to engender not only a conversation, competencies and capacity but also diplomatic, programmatic and commercial engagement with the whole region, not just with one part of it.
Senator Woo: I’m asking about China, though. What specific programs and activities for China have been undertaken under the rubric of the Indo-Pacific Strategy in the previous three years?
Mr. Epp: In the previous three years, a number have had direct application to our important and complex relationship with China. One would be the work in a sector that most Canadian politicians think of first, as we do in Global Affairs, and that’s working with colleagues from Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, or AAFC, to resolve long-standing trade barriers in that sector. The AAFC was funded and launched a new office that puts specialists and technical expertise in the time zone and the region to address emerging issues or meet with officials to deal with existing trade irritants in agriculture.
As I mentioned in my opening comments on connective-tissue scholarships, the largest part of the funding that Global Affairs spends on competency building for Indo-Pacific competencies relates to China competencies. We will continue to do that. We think that for either upside or downside it’s important to have officials, academics and all levels — federal and provincial — more familiar with China.
Senator Woo: The office is in Manila, correct? The China competency work is in Canada, principally. It’s for Canadians; it doesn’t involve Chinese nationals. Is that correct?
Mr. Epp: That’s correct because the objective is to help raise the competency of Canadians.
Senator Woo: You are saying there are no programs that involve China or that work with Chinese nationals, Chinese institutions, Chinese think tanks or Chinese scholars? What can you tell us about that in the last few years? If China is part of the IPS, one would expect that these would have taken place. I know there are scholarships and fellowships for folks from all of ASEAN — probably Korea and Japan and other parts of the Indo-Pacific. What about China? Have there been any?
Mr. Epp: Yes. I’ll give you one concrete example. I was just speaking to one of the organizers, somebody whom we both know mutually, who worked with the University of Toronto with support from Global Affairs Canada to hold a next-generation China scholars conference. The whole point of that is to address what we are concerned about, as are a number of folks in academia: We have seen a drop over the years recently in scholars who want to have careers in China. That’s not in the interest of anyone in Canada. We want to have the reverse.
We can’t change that. People make individual decisions, but we use the tools we have to incentivize, encourage and send a signal to both the federal bureaucracy and universities that this is a career option. We want more people to study and do research in China, so we will continue to support programs like Next Generation Scholars. The scholarship program I just mentioned will go to universities, many of whom encourage scholarship with China.
The Chair: Thank you very much. We are over time on that segment. I have the impression that Senator Woo might like to go on the second round. I would like to acknowledge that Senator Pupatello of Ontario has joined the committee.
Senator Harder: My question involves the extent to which, and how, you were involving our private sector stakeholders — business essentially — and our provinces, who have, I would argue, a unique responsibility in a successful Indo-Pacific Strategy not only by their competence in certain areas but by their focus on some of the economic ties that we need to strengthen.
Can you tell us a little bit about, not what you’re doing, but what they are doing, perhaps together with you or in a coordinated fashion? It’s important for us to understand that Canada in Asia-Pacific must mean more private sector and provincial engagement.
Mr. Epp: First, I fully agree with the premise. I’ll turn to Valérie in a moment to talk about one activity that just in the last few days gets straight to the heart of that with provinces and territories. I had a meeting earlier today with the First Nations, or FN, on the same issue, which is to engage them and see how we can work with them more closely in the region.
I have a couple of responses. We see an incredibly significant shift in the level of sophistication, capacity and resourcing in Canadian provinces and territories to deal with the Indo-Pacific as a whole traditionally, and still first and foremost usually with China or India. That’s where the capacity is focused, and that also gets to the kinds of resources that provinces and territories have deployed to the field where their ministers travel.
We work together closely, but we are often finding out quite late in the process that there are very impressive delegations or missions being led at the provincial level. In some cases, we are able to help; in other cases, they already know what their focused objectives are.
Valérie Samaan, Director General, Indo-Pacific Strategy Planning, Policy and Operations Bureau, Global Affairs Canada: Ultimately, yes, we did have a meeting in Ottawa with all provinces and territories this week, in which we gave them an update on the Indo-Pacific. We talked about phase 2 and asked for their comments and feedback as we want to have them involved in the elaboration of the update that Weldon referenced in his opening remarks.
We are doing many outreach activities in the team, so we go meet the provinces and territories directly, and we meet with businesses and chambers of commerce, as well as academics, throughout the country. Aly-Khan just went to Alberta in October, so we’re hoping to do more of those in the coming months as well.
Senator Wilson: My question is about the scale of the opportunity in terms of what we can more immediately do versus what’s more focused on the longer-term future.
In terms of where we can divert our attention, products and services — Blackberry is a good example — things that Canada is doing or producing now, how much opportunity is there in that barrel versus how much is in the coming critical minerals projects and other things that, obviously, could be quite significant but haven’t been built yet? Transportation of these products hasn’t been established. All the infrastructure needs to be in place. What is more real and immediate, and what is our more hopeful opportunity?
Mr. Epp: That’s a complex question. I’ll try to answer it as quickly as I can.
A couple of concrete examples in the first category are things that we don’t need trade agreements to move on quickly. In the last few years, we have seen nine Team Canada Trade Missions, or TCTMs. The return on investment in certain markets has been quite significant. Where we are able to, we have markets in the region who are now already, and will continue to be, looking to Canada to supply nutritional security — I think that’s a term of art these days — and needs Canada as a key player, both in terms of raw commodities and also high-protein products, et cetera.
It’s not just in agriculture, but that’s one area that’s moving fast. There is also a strong interest in Canadian clean tech and nutraceuticals. It’s not just raw products; it’s value add. Canada has a very strong brand. We’re seen as trusted — not just at a country level, but also in terms of the safety and quality of products.
If you look at the growth of the middle class in the Indo-Pacific region, that is a demand today, and that demand will continue. Where we’re focused on more strategic pieces, that will take time, but the future is positive in terms of demand and what we can supply. That’s in areas like energy and critical minerals, and we see that particularly in ASEAN and also India.
Our exports to India grew by 10% last year, year on year, in a year that all present will recognize was not the smoothest in terms of bilateral relations. Nevertheless, that market is growing massively and will be the third-largest market in the world by 2030.
On the base of what we’re doing now, we’re already quickly growing opportunities, but they are longer-term plays. The off-take from Trans Mountain and the off-take from LNG phase 1 are good examples, and the region is perking up. I mentioned nuclear: They’re looking to Canada for those strategic infrastructure and off-take opportunities 10 to 15 years out.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: Welcome to our guests. The Indo-Pacific diaspora makes up a large share of our population. The figures I have show that it represents approximately 19% of Canada’s population. I’d like to know how you interact with this diaspora, which is an important part of this Indo-Pacific Strategy. Do you have lines of communication that allow you to consult them? Do they take part in Team Canada missions to the region?
Mr. Epp: Thank you for the excellent question. That’s a core part of our strategy since this segment is considered an asset for Canada in relation to this region, which is different from other competitors, if you will. It is important to recognize this, but without necessarily using these communities as such because they have their own interests, either because they are in a country of immigrants or in another region. We have a knowledge base, connections, business partnerships and academic partnerships and we are using them as best as we can.
We do have lines of communication and we have consultations from time to time regarding the realities of these communities and some of the challenges they have to overcome here in Canada, such as the impacts of interference. I would like to better manage risks and opportunities as best as I can, if possible. We are seeing a greater participation through chambers of commerce or community organizations from the region. This week, there was a delegation of Hindu businesswomen from Ontario. We would like to have more of these voices.
[English]
Senator Ravalia: Thank you very much for being here.
I wonder if you can outline for us to what extent coordination between Canada and the U.S. regarding each country’s Indo-Pacific Strategy has evolved over recent years in light of some of the tariff tensions, et cetera?
Mr. Epp: That’s a terrific question. I will start with over the last few years and move to more recent times.
It shouldn’t surprise most of you that, in many respects, our assessment of the region, both in terms of opportunity and risk, has a strong degree of overlap with that of many like-minded nations, including our American neighbours. Like us, they are very aware of the rise of regional powers — India and China — the opportunities in ASEAN, the opportunity to be partners in regional growth that is historic and to take advantage of it for our own opportunities for Canadian companies and others. Where we work to the same objectives, we have been able to have very good conversations.
Over the years, we have been in Washington and vice versa. This year, I would give an example in the context of the G7 that we are hosting. The focus has been a bit more on certain sub-areas of work, such as maritime security, which has been a Canadian priority. There, we have seen very active participation from U.S. diplomats and experts in all of the sessions we have held.
The same has been true on issues of transnational repression, which Canada has featured in some of the work we have done within the G7-China working group. Depending on the item, we have seen active participation.
Where perhaps there’s a clear difference between approach, if not objective, is that Canada will always be unapologetic that we reject false questions of choosing one or another superpower. In our dialogue with countries in the region, it is meaningful for them to hear us repeat that that’s a false question. The question is whether we choose international law that applies equally to all or not? There, Canada has a consistent brand, and it’s a reliable brand, speaking of fair-weather. What we are not seen as fair-weather on is our commitment to reinforcing international law, and that goes not only to tariffs and disputing what we would see as illegitimate trade policies from, for example, China, in some cases, or other economies, but also from the United States, because it is about international law.
[Translation]
Senator Hébert: I have so many questions, Mr. Deputy Minister, but I’ll have to pick one from my list. First, I don’t know if you have this information, but I’d like you to give us a reference from the internet that can give us a brief insight into our Trans-Pacific Partnership as it currently stands. What does that look like? I tried to do a search, but I didn’t find an updated status of the actual results of this partnership. It is an important agreement for our businesses.
You mentioned that you’re updating Canada’s strategy. I’d like you to expand in more concrete terms on the broad areas that will be updated.
Mr. Epp: Thank you for the question. I’ll start, and perhaps my colleagues can chime in. In answer to the first question, if I understand correctly, the Trans-Pacific Partnership is very important. For instance, the results we have show that there has been an increase in trade with these economies. I don’t have the numbers off the top of my head, but I’ll look them up.
We have seen very rapid growth in Vietnam in favour of that country, but that is to be expected for the economy of a developing country. This is a very positive basis for pursuing agreements with Indonesia and now with ASEAN. This is drawing the interest of many Canadian businesses that would like to take advantage of these agreements. It’s more important to use the agreements than to negotiate them. We can find the numbers, but these markets are extremely important to meeting our diversification targets.
That said, it is very important for us to continue to explore more opportunities, including in the very big markets where we don’t have policy and trade tools, such as with India and China. We should not wait until we get a free-trade agreement.
The Chair: I’m sorry, but your time is up. I took note that Senator Hébert would prefer to ask questions during the second round.
Senator Hébert: I’d like to get a scorecard.
[English]
Senator Al Zaibak: Mr. Epp, my honourable colleagues Harder and Gerba addressed two important segments that could be of great help in implementing the Canada strategy: the business community, private sector participation, as well as the Indo-Pacific diaspora community in Canada.
I am wondering if you have given some consideration as well to another segment, which is parliamentary diplomacy. Have you considered deploying, activating and imploring parliamentary diplomacy in your efforts to achieve the stated objectives of our strategy?
Mr. Epp: That’s a terrific question because there has been some evolution in terms of how parliamentary travel and engagement are funded, and for Global Affairs Canada, or GAC, in my experience over the years, we have partnered well with parliamentarians in the region. My career has been in the region. In my first assignment, among other duties, I was asked to be the officer at the embassy in Beijing to help manage the Canada-China Legislative Association, or CCLA. I’m delighted to see that, for the first time in a while, a delegation of the CCLA is about to come to Canada. That has been an important channel for policy and governance discussions.
Expanding that is important across the region. Some of these exist and have existed for a long time. China is a great example. In some relationships, like Bangladesh, where there is a terrific amount of opportunity for us to build on years of partnership as a development partner into something much more complex, we haven’t seen as much bandwidth or as much institutional commitment. I would very much welcome that, recognizing very clearly budgetary limitations for any institution including the Parliament of Canada.
The Chair: That’s all, I’m afraid, but if you do have any extra funds, we’d always be happy to take them if you want to take note of that. Thank you.
Senator MacDonald: I was going to ask you about the evolution of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, or CPTPP, but Senator Hébert mentioned it. I will go on a different tack here. In terms of our Indo-Pacific Strategy, what are the big wins so far? What has evolved in the sense that we can point to something that is working in a way that perhaps we didn’t expect it to work? Where are we falling down? Where are we still behind the eight ball a bit and have more work to do? There are so many groups out there, like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, group. There are so many things on the table, and I’m wondering how they all integrate together.
Mr. Epp: I will try to be brief. Where we have seen some early wins has been — referring to earlier comments — being more present and being seen as more serious. There is a row to hoe there. I’m not saying we are going to claim that the mission is accomplished, but I feel it from past experience from before and after that there is a recognition that Canada has not just committed in rhetoric but that there is also an availability of principles, tools and funding. That’s particularly noticeable with ASEAN. I don’t think we would have achieved strategic partnership with ASEAN, and although we don’t get as hung up on the taxonomy as partners in the region do, this matters. It matters in terms of prioritizing Canada and being available to meet with Canada — the kind of invitation we just had for Prime Minister Carney.
Yes, concretely, the part of the strategy that was about strengthening Canada’s reputation and our reliability as a partner in the region has come a long way. For our Canadian stakeholders, for Canadian citizens, where is the meat? It will take time, but the Team Canada Trade Mission so far has had an incredible return on investment. I will risk a number, but for the Japan one, my colleague Sara Wilshaw, who is our Chief Trade Commissioner, has talked about the outward investment to get that many companies to go and do meetings versus what we have returned — it is 20 plus times return on investment.
Some of these tools are showing real results in terms of deals made. We will start to see, slowly but surely, the overall country account level of that part of our non-U.S. trade growing, and growing in the region.
Finally, in the security sector, we can’t be free riders, and that part of how we were seen didn’t ever apply to the Korean peninsula where Canada has never been a free rider. We have always been a strong, committed and reliable partner. But the broader region has challenges to our interests, and we need to be seen as present. The CAF has stepped up very quickly with incredible, near-constant presence of frigates in the region. Programs like our Dark Vessel Detection program have been extremely well received by partners like the Philippines to help their capacity. So in the security sector there are tangible outcomes that we see and, over time, Canadians will see too.
The Chair: Thank you very much. I have a question before we go to round two, and, in fact, it picks up on the dark vessels issue. A few years ago, in our vainglorious attempt to join the Security Council, I was in the South Pacific and met with representatives of the Pacific Islands states, and that was a really big concern for them, and it was a big ask: How can Canada help as a maritime nation with its expertise in fisheries? You mentioned the Dark Vessel Detection program and how it was appreciated. Is it increasing? Is there a trend line to be concerned about here?
Mr. Epp: Indeed. It is very well received. Kudos to our colleagues from Department of Fisheries and Oceans, or DFO. It is the technology, the training and the relevance of it for multi-objective use. In the region, in countries like the Philippines, among the poorest communities are coastal fisher communities whose fishing livelihoods are being challenged by others with industrial fishing fleets. It is very much not just a domain awareness kind of security piece; it is a development assistance partnership in many ways.
There is a lot of appetite. There is more appetite than Canada can meet the demand for. The initial five-year-funded part of the Indo-Pacific Strategy included funding for DFO to be able to be more present, divert some of their resources and increase their capacity to do that. Two years from now, that funding runs out. There is an active conversation about how to ensure continuity, if not expansion, of what I would argue would be — we didn’t maybe present it as a flagship, but it has turned out to be diplomatically, and in terms of the Canadian contribution to the region — one of the most significant wins.
The Chair: Thank you very much. We’ll move on to round two, recognizing that we’re also under a bell. Now, it is not the bell that is ringing, but the lights are flashing, and we will have to go to vote. We’ll have an assessment in a moment, but we will go to round two.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you. My colleague Senator Gerba talked about the Pacific strategy and the communication piece. I will add to that question. When we look at this strategy that was put in place in 2022, the world has changed. We look at the international order, rule of law, stability and percentage of countries that have new leaders. My question is this: In your work, are you still able to use the overarching goals? Are you still able to work through what the original strategy was, or are you finding yourself having to make adjustments?
Mr. Epp: Minister Anand recently publicly conveyed that she had asked Global Affairs Canada, or GAC, to produce an update to the Indo-Pacific Strategy. That is very much anticipated. I won’t pre-empt advice to her, but as the senators outlined, there are a number of key differences in the international environment since the strategy was launched, and then bilaterally, Canada, the U.S., et cetera. It clearly is good timing to have a review, and that’s under way. I don’t think it will take very long. What I could say is that, until there are changes or a change in mandate or tool kit, the reality is that two of the core pillars of the five and others supporting the fifth pillar are very much aligned with Prime Minister Carney’s seven missions for his government. That gets to diversification, toward reliable trade partners, and doing that as fast as possible takes you to — among other regions of the world — the Indo-Pacific.
Secondly, strengthening our security and sovereignty of Canadians through deepening partnerships with those who share our interests, and that — as we’ve seen even most recently in the Prime Minister’s visit to the region and the defence minister’s visit the subsequent week to the Philippines — includes strengthening agreements like Status of Visiting Forces Agreements.
Those two core priorities of the current government are very much anticipated by the strategy, but the environment has changed, and we will be reviewing it.
Senator Woo: Do I take it from your comments that the two pillars which will remain intact, having to do with reliable partners and allies and so on, would mean that China will not feature as prominently in the review of the IPS, or has GAC changed its view of how China is perceived in terms of its suitability as a partner in that region?
I ask because Mr. Carney, of course, has made a statement with Xi Jinping about solving irritants and expanding bilateral trade investment.
Mr. Epp: I’m not sure I can entirely agree with the premise of the question, but it’s a reasonable question insofar as we will see what the decisions of the minister and the Prime Minister are with respect to an update to the Indo-Pacific Strategy. I won’t pre-empt their decision. We will give advice.
My comment just now was to describe the existing guidance we have from the Prime Minister, which is clear-throated with respect to diversification and strengthening security partnerships. Those were already key pillars, but I don’t preclude other key pillars of the Indo-Pacific Strategy continuing. I’m just speaking to parts that were obviously part of his agenda, and those were clear in his recent and current travels into other regions as well.
That also included having what all will recognize as being a very significant meeting between the Prime Minister and the President of China. The good news is that we see indications that China is changing its Canada policy.
If it’s possible now to have ministers travel to China and be met by their counterparts, that’s good news. Canada has always wanted to discuss trade and agricultural challenges. We haven’t always had a willing partner when our ministers have disembarked from the plane in Beijing.
That’s progress, and any government would want to develop that. I don’t see a contradiction between my previous answer and seeing a lot of that activity also take us to partnership with China.
Senator Woo: Is your department inviting input from stakeholders on the review of the IPS? Is there a formal mechanism to do so?
Mr. Epp: We don’t yet have formal guidance on a process for the review. I have a minister who has made that intention clear both internally but also externally. The work is under way to anticipate that, but I have no direct answer to your question because I don’t yet know what the process will be, senator.
Senator Harder: Some 20 years ago or so, Canada and China established the Strategic Working Group, which was at a very senior level with a broad scope of issues. That was in a dormant state for a while. I read recently that it has been revived.
Can you give me an update on the level and kind of agenda the Strategic Working Group is dealing with?
Mr. Epp: To date, the architecture for managing our evolving relationship with China does not yet have any commitments to level or calendar for a Strategic Working Group. We have talked about — if I might make the precision — how we interpret a now 20-year-old strategic partnership. Canada has a lot of strategic partnerships, and as I mentioned earlier, the taxonomy or the terminology sometimes trips us up in Canada, but it’s meaningful in Asia; it’s meaningful to China. That strategic partnership from a different era included expectations that neither country would see as our priority today.
There are areas of priority — and Minister Anand communicated these after her meeting with Wang Yi, her counterpart in Beijing, recently — that working together on a fit for 2025 or for the present partnership with China, that strategic would include areas that are strategic, like energy cooperation. We already cooperate in energy.
The actual administration, and the mechanisms to do that, will depend on landing on exactly what areas we prioritize, but, again, I would assume that energy will be a key piece.
Senators here and others watching will know that PetroChina was an investor in LNG Canada 1, and a lot of the offtake is going there. Canada also has companies that participate in China’s energy sector, and that’s an area that we can expect to grow.
Senator Ravalia: Mr. Epp, I have a bit of a philosophical question, particularly in respect to our relationships with China and India. Do you feel that we’re at a point where economic imperatives outweigh ideological frictions?
Mr. Epp: With respect, I’m not sure my views on a very great philosophical question are particularly useful to the Senate.
We understand Canada to be navigating a period of incredible dynamic change, and that’s true for many of our like-minded partners who share our values and interests. The relative risk of how we manage those interests may look different today than it did, for example, 20 years ago when we established partnerships with certain countries.
Canadians understand that the importance of maintaining a strong, stable and modern economy, including one that’s very reliant on international trade, in 2025 is a different challenge for governments to manage, and managing that will take us to creative and urgent engagement, including an urgent calendar of free trade agreements with growing markets in regions that, in the past, perhaps, Canadian companies were less invested in.
[Translation]
Senator Hébert: Mr. Deputy Minister, my question is a follow-up on what my colleague Senator Deacon said earlier about the changing environment, particularly recently.
The U.S. has drawn closer to and signed agreements with some countries. I’m thinking, for one, of Japan. How much has this had an impact on Canada’s appeal in relation to countries with which it is trying to restore or boost relationships and to sign bilateral agreements? I’m wondering if that does not undermine Canada’s efforts to maintain its appeal.
Mr. Epp: Thank you for the question. It goes without saying that the context is very dynamic and there is a lot of competition. However, there are also a lot of changes when it comes to brand Canada. What Canada is doing is to consult to reinforce Canada’s brand as a stable and reliable country. We are strengthening the opportunities we are offering the region in energy and other sectors. As diplomats, we normally try to refrain from making comments about third countries.
When it comes to the North American economy, it’s better to maintain growth south of the border. That depends on the close relations that are built through partnerships between the U.S. and major economic sectors in the region.
We hope to see more stability between China and the U.S., for example, or to see a better use of trade, perhaps through free trade agreements with the U.S., but we would hope these countries would at least follow the rules. That helps us and it certainly helps our trading partners in the region.
The Chair: Thank you.
[English]
I’m going to reduce the time for questions and answers to two minutes just to get the last three senators in, because then we’ll have to take a break and be informed about the vote.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: You can send the answers to my question in writing.
The first question is that when the Canada-Indo-Pacific Strategy was launched, I think there was a $2.5-million envelope. Has all of that money been used? Did the budget affect that envelope? Actually, how was the money utilized? It would be nice to have a document that provides the details of how the $2.5 million allocated to the strategy was used.
My second question is on the diaspora. We know the diaspora serves as an economic and cultural bridge between countries. You alluded to challenges pertaining to the diaspora, but also spoke about an increase in exports. Can you tell us whether the diaspora and diaspora-led businesses have had an impact on this increase in volume of trade? If we can have disaggregated data that shows the countries where we have sold goods and the goods we sold . . . That’s it.
The Chair: I suggest you answer that question in writing because we only have 30 seconds left and that’s not enough.
Mr. Epp: Absolutely.
The Chair: Perfect, thank you.
[English]
Senator Al Zaibak: With high commissioners reinstated in 2025, how does GAC assess the prospects for rebuilding a functional and forward-looking partnership with India, given India’s centre role in the Indo-Pacific Strategy?
Mr. Epp: Briefly, I would answer positively. We have seen a fairly considerable turnaround in interests in Delhi. Also, with the new government here, we have had the opportunity to do two things at once in order to move with more positive relations at the top, and that’s just a reality that is important. India had every reason to want to take advantage of a change through our electoral process, and we’ve moved quickly to use that to stabilize the relationship.
I will provide a couple of examples. There is a concrete and productive law-enforcement dialogue, and it’s important. It will continue to address long-standing structural issues in the security concerns of both India and Canada and address issues that have emerged. There is an ongoing judicial case in the case of Mr. Nijjar that’s very important. None of this should stop Canada and India from developing more stable relations across the board, be it economic, education, et cetera.
So we’ve seen two documents that I would refer senators to if you haven’t had the chance: a road map that came out of the recent meeting between Minister Anand and her counterpart; and secondly, last week, a joint statement coming out of Minister Sidhu’s meeting with Minister Goyal in India for the 2025 Ministerial Dialogue on Trade and Investment. Both of these give you a sense of where the momentum is going, senator.
Senator MacDonald: I just want to go back to the CPTPP for a second. The Trump administration turned its back on the organization, but administrations come and go. If a new administration wants to get involved in the organization, how will that affect the evolution of the organization if the Americans jump in, and how will it affect us in particular if the Americans became part of the organization?
Mr. Epp: Those are terrific hypotheticals, and I’m not your best witness on this, but whatever the likelihood of the prospect of current or future U.S. administrations joining the CPTPP, it has always been a high standard agreement meant to open markets for those who have common interests in high standard labour, environmental, but also evolving issues, digital, et cetera. To the extent that a large economy would want to join, there would be a lot of interest. Currently, that is not the case, but there are aspirant economies that would be significant. Many of them are economies that Canada already has free trade agreements with.
There is also broader discussion about how to use the brand and momentum of CPTPP in a period where rules-based trade is under some degree of challenge to work, for example, together with the EU, and the Prime Minister has been very forward-leaning on how we bring together communities like the EU and the CPTPP to reinforce rules-based trade, something that currently doesn’t seem to be the priority of all our trading partners.
The Chair: Thank you very much. This committee never disappoints. We can go from philosophical questions to hypothetical ones as well. The three witnesses, particularly the assistant deputy minister, did very well.
On behalf of the committee, I would like to thank Assistant Deputy Minister Epp, Director General Samaan and Director Rajani for being with us today. We appreciate your comments and the information you provided. There were a few items that, if we could get something in writing, just send it to the clerk. We would be very grateful for that.
I am delighted to welcome by video conference Paul Evans, Professor Emeritus, University of British Columbia and Hugh Stephens, Distinguished Fellow, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada and former colleague of mine. Welcome. Thank you for being with us today. We’re ready to hear your opening remarks, and these will be followed by questions from the senators. Professor Evans, you have the floor.
Paul Evans, Professor Emeritus, University of British Columbia, as an individual: Thank you, Senator Boehm, for the chance to be with you even if not quite at the moment we expected. Democracy has its exciting turns.
I’m appearing today as an individual recently retired from the University of British Columbia and now in part-time residence at the National University of Singapore where I spend several months each year.
Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy was conceived and implemented more than three years ago as a successor to three decades of intermittent effort to pursue an Asia Pacific strategy that was deemed no longer right for the strategic moment. Very recent changes in the geopolitical and geo-economic context make significant changes in our Indo-Pacific Strategy essential.
The geopolitical competition between the United States and China is intensifying. China presents a complex set of challenges and threats. What has changed most radically is the American approach to the norms and institutions of world order. As Canadians are painfully aware, this new approach includes unilaterally imposed tariffs, coerced negotiations and withdrawal from multilateral processes, including the World Trade Organization. The idea of an American-anchored, rules-based international order lies in ruins. The idea of “like-minded” now sounds equally shallow.
In Asia as in Canada, there is recognition that the existing trading system, featuring free, open and rules-based trade and multilateralism is shattering, and it is widely believed that this shift is not temporary. Most voices in Canada and Asia believe that “America First” — including industrial policy, restriction on supply chains and calculations of narrow national advantage — is here to stay. The implications for Canada in the Indo-Pacific region are far-reaching. Several adjustments are needed.
The Indo-Pacific is much, much larger than China, but because of China’s size, economic weight and regional and global presence, our China policy must be a central part of “Indo-Pacific 2.0.”
First, China can no longer be framed as the chief disruptor. That distinction is now shared with the United States. There are significant worries across the region about the build-up of Chinese military capabilities and its rising dominance, foreign interference, et cetera. But this is now matched by distrust of the United States, its reliability, tariffs and demands for side payments from its allies. Many ask the question: Which is the bigger revisionist power? China or the United States?
Second, the reset or recalibration recently signalled by Prime Minister Carney and President Xi in Korea, which we heard about a few minutes ago, is a promising step. It signals a reopening of high-level contacts and negotiation on some outstanding issues, including canola exports and tariffs on electric vehicles. But in this new moment, what needs to at least be explored is something more ambitious, including matters related to long-term supply agreements in energy and agriculture.
Further, it could include potential cooperation in underwriting multilateral mechanisms for rules-based trade minus the United States, and this leads to a reconsideration of the membership and purpose of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership.
Third, various track 2 and academic channels need to be restored for discussions with Beijing and Chinese counterparts about difficult topics and possibilities not yet ripe for official discussion. One immediate topic is the idea of economic security, something that is bedevilling some of the things we wish to do in conversations with China and other countries. Our research collaborations in areas including agri-tech are hung up on national security concerns that need careful examination by all parties.
Finally, Canada’s Indo-Pacific policies are dependent on our relationship with the United States. The fundamental strategic choice is whether Canada prefers wide and aggressive diversification beyond the United States or whether we opt for deeper economic integration with the United States, possibly in a “Fortress North America” arrangement.
With capital “D” diversification comes the need for much wider and deeper connections across the Pacific, including with China. With capital “I” integration with the U.S., would come even closer alignment with American policies on areas like friendshoring, working with like-minded partners and disengaging or decoupling from China, which seems to be the long-term trend in U.S. thinking. For the moment, as our relationship with the U.S. is fluid and indeterminate, we have an opportunity to think creatively and independently about the shape of our “Indo-Pacific Strategy 2.0.” Thank you.
Hugh Stephens, Distinguished Fellow, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, as an individual: Thank you. I’m speaking today in my capacity as an individual.
My comments today will encompass three main points: the Indo-Pacific Strategy and its renewal, Canada and the CPTPP, and the importance of people-to-people relationships and informal networks.
As we’ve heard, the Indo-Pacific Strategy was unveiled in November 2022, almost exactly three years ago, although we are now in year 4 of implementation. It brought welcome new resources and energy to a relationship that had been allowed to drift. You are fully familiar with its five component parts, so I won’t repeat them. The implementation report, released this June, laid out an impressive range of activities undertaken or in progress, although the strategy was slow to get started owing to various bureaucratic requirements, resulting in the first five-year phase, which is coming to an end, being reduced to more like three to three and a half years. Next year will mark the end of phase 1 of the strategy, and, in theory, it is to be renewed for a second phase covering the years 2027-32.
Recall that it was developed back in 2020-21, finally announced a year later and, as the point has been made, we are in a very different world today. Clearly, some recalibration and reorientation will be required for phase 2. Funding may also be an issue, given the government’s announced expenditure reductions over the next three years.
However — and this is the point I really want to make — it is critical that Canada commit to renewing the program. To seriously reduce or terminate the strategy at this stage would be both a waste of resources spent to date and would send the worst possible signal about Canada’s long-term commitment to the region.
We have been here before in the 1980s and 1990s when Canada’s ASEAN centre, which had put us on the map regionally, was closed. That left many in the region to conclude that Canada was a fair-weather friend. We cannot allow it to happen again.
Programs should be reviewed and recalibrated for phase 2, for example, by focusing less on hard, and more on soft, infrastructure and emphasizing areas like energy and food security. At the same time, we must avoid sending any signals that the region has ceased to be a priority. We are just starting to restore our credibility; let’s not squander it.
On the CPTPP, Professor Evans made the point very eloquently that the established rules-based order on which we have depended for so long is now under enormous stress. Furthermore, we have a diversification strategy under way to diversify our trading relationships away from heavy dependence on the U.S., and the Indo-Pacific and its major economies are clearly important elements in that, including China.
Equally important are the rules that govern these relationships: the WTO, of course, but more specifically, the most advanced of the regional trade agreements, the CPTPP. Despite the attack on the rules-based system by the U.S., CPTPP members have continued to conduct themselves in accordance with the agreement. Canada has an important role to play in strengthening respect for international trade rules by working to update the CPTPP, which is now a 2015 agreement, by expanding the reach of the agreement to bring in new members — that will mean some creative solutions to the Taiwan-China impasse — and by establishing a permanent secretariat. Membership in the CPTPP is an ace card that Canada needs to play well.
Finally, on people-to-people relationships and networks, they are the bedrock of engagement with the region through business associations, Track II contacts, student and academic exchange. I’m a bit worried that recent pushbacks on student visas, for understandable reasons, could end up “throwing out the baby with the bathwater.” This must be carefully handled. We need to protect high-quality institution-to-institution student exchange while continuing to attract talent to Canada from Asia. Track II organizations like the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council and the Canadian committee, of which I am vice-chair, should be used to their maximum, especially with China chairing and hosting the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, or APEC, next year.
Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Stephens. We will open things up to questions and answers.
Senator Woo: Thank you, Professor Evans and Mr. Stephens, for your testimony. My question is principally for Dr. Evans.
You spent a lot of time in the region. You have an appointment at the National University of Singapore. I know you talk to very senior folks in government, think tanks, academia and the business community across Southeast Asia and other parts of Asia.
Can you give us your sense of what Asian leaders, elites and decision makers are thinking when they think about Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy as we currently have it?
Mr. Evans: Asia is a big place, and opinions vary. However, the general perception is that it has been a valuable initiative by Canada and that several aspects of it have been important to individual countries.
Where the questions arise is in the strategic frame of our existing Indo-Pacific Strategy, particularly the framing of China. Leaders and intellectuals have all kinds of reservations about what China is doing and its increasing presence and dominance in the region, but they feel that the region cannot effectively manage those without engaging China as an integral part of processes.
So, push back against China, but also integrate with it. They have seen Canadian opportunities from an earlier era sort of disappear. So far as we have geopolitical and geostrategic investments, our military, economic and trade issues are significant, and they seem to be increasing, but our role as a diplomatic power in working with the China question is in question; it is not necessarily going to work.
However, one thing that is clear is that Canadian influence is now being identified and respected in new ways. A recent survey listed Canada as number 12 in the region in influence. Now, we were a distant 12, but things are happening around the edges. There is a hope and an expectation, with Mr. Carney’s government in particular, that Canada can play a role in leading into some new discussions and partnerships without the United States that might include China and some other big players.
There is a slight hope and expectation that we may be able to jump into a bigger role.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Senator Harder: Thank you to you both for being here and for your very informed and, in some cases, provocative comments.
I want to follow up with Professor Evans. I don’t quite buy the binary choice that you are posing to us, but it is a great effort. I don’t think that it is possible for Canada, certainly in the present circumstances, and probably in the longer term, to commit itself to a “Fortress North America.” That is neither politically possible nor is it economically wise. But your other proposition overstates what we might be able to pursue.
I would like you to explore this a little bit: To what extent can Canada seek greater engagement in the Indo-Pacific, including China, while maintaining at least a level of economic relationship with the United States that does not bring harm to the residual relationship? I would think part of that is also this: To what extent can we engage other like-minded nations or regions, such as the European Union, in our efforts to engage with China?
Mr. Evans: Professors have the advantage of being able to overstate the options, and I think we all see that we’re likely to be sailing in waters somewhere in between. Exactly what those waters are is now just starting to become clear.
Should we wish to engage in a diversification strategy in various kinds of new agreements with China, does the United States have a veto over them? On a free trade agreement or something like that, we already have that poison pill through our current — maybe vacant — arrangement with the United States. I suspect that there are going to be any number of poison pills that we’re going to face at almost every step, if we decided to take a little bit of a broader-gauged approach to China.
This is going to test Mr. Carney to the utmost degree — how far he really feels diversification is possible and what costs he’s willing to pay into that vis-à-vis the United States even before we get into big integration or big diversification choices.
Senator Harder: Could you just reference the EU a bit?
Mr. Evans: Yes. The idea that Hugh Stephens introduced about trying to bring the EU into a CPTPP-like arrangement is excellent. But it is going to be important for us to do something other than deal with the so-called like-minded, who often appear to be European Anglo countries, with Japan and Korea added. To appeal to ASEAN and others, we’re going to have to do something a little bit broader than just bring the EU in, though very desirable. If I may be blunt, “it ain’t gonna be enough,” without dealing with China and India in a big way.
Senator M. Deacon: Hello to our witnesses. Thank you for being with us virtually this evening. This question is for Mr. Stephens.
In your piece from the Policy Magazine from the beginning of April that I read, you suggested that, yes, the Indo-Pacific Strategy requires a shift, and we should focus on transnational challenges such as climate change resilience, food and water security, energy security, public health and digital security when engaging with the region.
Following this past October’s diplomatic tour by the Prime Minister and members of government, I’m wondering if you think they’re striking the right tone and balance at this moment on these suggestions you made in your written piece.
Mr. Stephens: Thank you for the question. One of the points in that piece was to talk about asymmetric geometry with respect to China. While I don’t think the Prime Minister picked it up from that article, I’m delighted to see that he has endorsed it, so that we can do things with China in areas where it is of mutual benefit, and we may not be able to do as many things in some other areas.
I haven’t seen the shift yet because, of course, phase 2 of the IPS, if it is to be renewed, has not come out. We heard earlier about how there will be a review and possibly some public input.
One area in which it has done some good work — obviously, it was fairly capital intensive — has been in funding frigates, opening an office of the Asia-Pacific Foundation, opening new offices of Agriculture Canada, new consulates and so forth. That funding has to continue, but there were a lot of hard costs. I would hope there would be a greater emphasis now on soft costs, such as programming that would make those investments really pay off, and a shift in emphasis to some extent. We’ve already talked about how the language is changing as the geostrategic backdrop of the region changes, having some greater focus on energy security, food security and more contemporary issues, areas where Canada can make a real difference. The “dark ship” issue was mentioned.
I don’t downplay the importance of defence minister meetings and having some additional military presence, but I really think we need to focus on areas where we have a strategic advantage and really something to offer, and maybe there will be a reorientation of the strategy in phase 2. It’s a bit early at this stage to say whether that is happening.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: Thank you to the witnesses for being with us today. It’s been three years since the strategy was released and it’s important for us to focus on the outcomes. Monitoring indicators and mechanisms are essential to understanding the actual impact of Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and to guide future adjustments.
Professor Evans, what indicators or monitoring mechanisms would you recommend to objectively measure the effectiveness of Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy?
[English]
Mr. Evans: Mr. Epp gave several examples of the indicators of ministerial visits, some trade statistics and return on investment for a Team Canada trade mission. That’s all very useful. We have surveys from the region, as I mentioned, and one of them indicates Canada is having some influence, not great, but something bigger than we had before.
The real challenge is to come up with some metrics that are more imaginative. Beyond trade, beyond some of the diplomatic interactions, the big factor in the region is technology and innovation. If I were putting a scorecard together for measuring in the next phase, it would be this: How have we advanced value-added production in Canada and stimulated our industry?
The idea that the Indo-Pacific is over there — that we trade with them and we do things over there — is part of the story. But the other part of the story is what it does to us and for us. There, in areas like scientific collaborations, the number of advanced students who are moving back and forth in areas of our economy where they make a difference, is the kind of scorecard that measures what it has contributed and what we need to do to advance that contribution in the world of high technology and artificial intelligence, et cetera. We need to try to find ways to capture that as well beyond the indicators that we already have in hand.
Senator Al Zaibak: Thank you both for being with us today.
I have noted that the strategy’s ambitions may exceed Canada’s diplomatic and defence resources. In your view, what are the most urgent capacity gaps Canada must address to remain credible in the Indo-Pacific? If Canada cannot fully resource the strategy as designed, where should it prioritize security engagement, trade diversification, development programming or diplomatic presence? Thank you.
Mr. Evans: One of the most important resources that Canada has is our new Prime Minister and the way that he is being listened to and observed. I had opportunities to speak in eight different countries and settings, and there were many questions about Mr. Carney and his possible role in the reinvention of a trading system that we can put in place that the region could rally around. This is a non-partisan statement, but it’s just that he has a gravitas and a reputation in the region that maybe can make him work a miracle or two.
Mr. Stephens: With regard to the question you asked about whether we could disaggregate and prioritize trade over security and so forth, the strategy has been very carefully developed to integrate all of those. In fact, I don’t think you can disaggregate. Trade is clearly a driver. You can put some hard numbers behind it, but you can’t do trade without taking into account the whole range of geostrategic issues.
The third part that I mentioned was the building blocks of the people-to-people relationships, developing and taking advantage of the diaspora and investing in our future. I don’t believe I can actually say one is more important than the other. They all need to fit together.
Senator Ravalia: Thank you, professors, for being here. My question is this: Has Canada’s exclusion from key regional forums, such as Quad, AUKUS and IPEF, impacted our standing in the region? Is there a negatory effect of this?
Mr. Evans: My sense is that the Quad, AUKUS and some of the defence-related organizations have not been harmed by not having Canada as a member. I would make a case that they are not in our interest as representative of what we would like to see emerge in the region. There are ways to push back against China and others without committing to many lateral processes on the security front that can maybe impinge upon some of the things we would like to do on the diplomatic front, working across ideological divides.
Mr. Stephens: There are some elements of AUKUS, which I believe we could benefit from, but I would agree with Professor Evans that, in fact, it’s not a disadvantage from the perspective of many in the region. We have been able to develop bilateral defence relations with many of the players. The IPEF is not going anywhere. The Quad is what it is, but the fact is that Canada has many other opportunities to pursue its interests, and I don’t believe our absence is a significant disadvantage.
Senator Adler: Professor, you referred to value-added production, which is something we desperately need in Canada to get the productivity that the Prime Minister and others keep talking about that needs to be enhanced. Are you optimistic that we will get investment capital from Asia to create the opportunities in this country with the “mother’s milk of opportunity” which is capital? Will we be getting money from Asia?
Mr. Evans: Mr. Stephens can probably speak to that better with his business background, but on the one dimension of the China factor on this, I think it’s an essential question. At this moment, that kind of investment is not flowing. There are several obstacles to it, some of them political, as we’ve discussed. But some of the other practical obstacles to things coming in are the way our national security laws are being enforced.
Research collaborations are extremely difficult in any of the advanced technology areas. Some restrictions are absolutely necessary, but the list of sensitive sectors where we can’t entertain collaborative research or investment from China is getting bigger by the hour, even in agri-tech. There are now 16 different fields of agri-tech that are on new sensitive sector lists, and that’s one of the things we have to address before we can — at least on the China side — be able to deepen those investment possibilities.
Mr. Stephens: I don’t think it’s just about China. Of course, we’re not getting much Chinese investment, and there are those obstacles that Professor Evans mentioned, but there are many opportunities for Japan, Korea and Malaysia, particularly, the LNG field, as we have seen. All of those countries have invested in the first phase.
I was looking at some foreign investment figures the other day. It is very interesting that Taiwan at the moment is the second-largest investor from Asia from the region. Many people overlook Taiwan. The extent of investment is quite remarkable. Much of it is in small- and medium-sized enterprises and so forth, but I do believe that, as we take our message to Asia, as we open up to investment, as we invest in building our brands through the Indo-Pacific Strategy, more investment will come. We have lots to offer in the energy critical minerals field and so forth, and these growing Asian economies need our resources, and investment will follow to take advantage of that.
[Translation]
Senator Hébert: Professor Evans, we talked about Canada’s difficult position with the U.S. as opposed to China and India, as well as other countries. I have a feeling that we are walking a tightrope over a crocodile-infested swamp. We need to be careful.
What should Canada’s strategy look like? Should we go ahead of the U.S. and enter into or sign agreements with some countries or should we wait for the U.S. to engage in some rapprochement in order to safeguard our relationship with the U.S.?
I’m wondering about the best strategic sequence.
[English]
Mr. Evans: Thank you, senator. Based on that question and your earlier questions, I’d like to invite you to the University of British Columbia to give us a class, because you’re asking all the fundamental questions. Thank you.
If I were asked that question a year ago, I would have said, be extraordinarily cautious. Under the current circumstances, we should push some areas of Canadian national interest even at the expense of displeasure from the United States. We don’t need to repeat our Huawei adventure. One of those areas is going to relate to electric vehicles and a reassessment, partly because we don’t know where the Americans are landing on the future of the auto industry, but it might be a signal that we’re willing to take some chances with China if we calculate it’s in our national interest.
Mr. Stephens: On the EV issue, it’s actually a litmus test. We went all in during the Biden administration with 100% tariffs. We threw $52 billion at the EV industry on the assumption that we would be having an integrated North American market, based on a contractual agreement that was subsequently torn up.
We have to start looking out for our own interests. We have to do so in such a way that we don’t invite catastrophic damage upon ourselves, but let’s remember that, while we’re being cautious and looking over our shoulder at the United States with respect to our steps toward China, the U.S. is also doing its own deals with China. One day we may wake up and find we’ve been so cautious that the U.S. has moved around us. So we have to go in with clear eyes and sharp elbows, recognizing our vulnerability, while, at the same time, working to reduce that vulnerability, which the Indo-Pacific region offers us an opportunity to do. Be very careful, but keep Canadian interests first.
The Chair: Thank you very much. That’s a good note to end on. On behalf of the committee, I’d like to thank Professor Paul Evans and Mr. Hugh Stephens for their commentary. Apologies, it was a case of force majeure that we had to truncate the session a little bit, but no doubt we’ll be coming back to you again in the future. On behalf of the committee, thank you again for appearing.
Colleagues, we’re going to reconvene tomorrow morning at 10:30 in this room to discuss the situation in Sudan.
(The committee adjourned.)