Colleagues, for those of you who think that the debate we are about to begin on this bill is meant for fans of the Constitution more than fans of the Edmonton Oilers, I encourage you to remain in this chamber. This debate touches on the very essence of our responsibility to examine legislation, and the essence of respect for the rights of the minorities we represent.

I thank Senator Harder, who deserves credit for initiating this debate, first by presenting a motion that died on the Order Paper with the dissolution of the Forty-fourth Parliament, and then by tabling this bill.

Colleagues, the issue under debate is central to our democracy and complex, because it requires us to reflect in a measured way on the balance between individual interests and collective interests as they relate to fundamental rights. The balance is most definitely a delicate one.

Bill S-218 deserves serious and robust study considering that it proposes amending our most fundamental legislation, namely the Constitution Act, 1982. The bill’s sponsor, as he acknowledged himself, launched this debate in a deliberately provocative way. This is particularly remarkable considering the characteristic experience, restraint, and cautious wisdom of our esteemed colleague, Senator Harder.

As the senator pointed out, we should indeed be concerned about the use of the notwithstanding clause potentially being normalized for populist, electioneering or even tyrannical purposes, but I doubt that Bill S-218 would suffice to counter the potential risks of the federal government denying rights.

I would now like to put forward a Quebec perspective and suggest some avenues we could explore as we study this bill. I would also like to take this opportunity to correct some inaccuracies that have surfaced during this debate.

Now I will speak to federalism and the division of powers.

Before diving into the content of the motion, I feel I have the obligation to rectify some assertions made about the architecture of our federation, an assertion that, I must say, has stuck with me since Senator Harder’s speech on his motion on September 24, 2024. I quote from his speech, then talking about a surge in the provincial use of the “notwithstanding” clause in recent years:

This brief historical allegory is context for caution about the normalization and abuse of its use at the sub-federal level in recent years. . . .

I note the use of the words “sub-federal level” to describe the provincial level of government.

Colleagues, in my years as a Quebec public servant, I served within the sphere of competence of Quebec, as well as shared jurisdictions with Ottawa in many departments, including immigration, health and social services, agriculture and even international relations. Throughout this time, I never felt that I was operating under sub-powers and sub-responsibilities delegated by the federal government. If I never felt this way, colleagues, it is simply because in Canada the concept of a “sub‑federal level” does not exist, neither is it referred to in the Constitution, in law or in any federal-provincial-territorial agreement.

Within the Canadian federation, a central government shares jurisdictions, powers and responsibilities with provincial as well as territorial governments. We refer to them as different levels of government. This interpretation would be better suited to a unitary state, where delegation of power often occurs, or another system of governance, not our federation.

This point is crucial in the current debate because the sharing of competences was the basis for the creation of Canada in 1867. The sharing of jurisdictions is enshrined in the Constitution Act and contributed to the conditions which made possible the patriation of the Constitution in 1982.

To further illustrate my point, allow me to quote from the Supreme Court of Canada in its Reference re Secession of Quebec. It’s my retirement gift to you:

The scheme of the Constitution Act, 1867 . . . was

not to weld the Provinces into one, nor to subordinate Provincial Governments to a central authority, but to establish a central government in which these Provinces should be represented, entrusted with exclusive authority only in affairs in which they had a common interest. Subject to this each Province was to retain its independence and autonomy and to be directly under the Crown as its head.

In this extract, the Supreme Court was quoting another of its references relating to the Initiative and Referendum Act, dating all the way back to 1919. This demonstrates that the equal standing between central and provincial authorities has been well established in jurisprudence for over 100 years. Not only is it deeply ingrained, but it is also very much contemporary because the principle is cited both in the Supreme Court’s reference related to the secession of Quebec in 1985 and in its judgment in R. v. Comeau in 2018.

Indeed, the court, as recently as 2018, recalled that “the tension between the centre and the regions is regulated by the concept of jurisdictional balance . . . .”

Peter Hogg, an authority on Canadian constitutional law, also quoted by Senator Harder in his second-reading speech, had this to say on the distribution of powers within the Canadian federation:

The Canadian federation is divided between a central government and provincial and territorial governments. In discussions of the relationship between federal and provincial governments . . . the term “levels of government” is often used. This term can be misleading, as it implies that one government is subordinate to the other. Instead, the federal government and the provincial governments are better described as “coordinate,” having equal authority and independence in their distinct spheres.

Even Britain’s Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which prior to 1949 was Canada’s final authority on the interpretation of the constitutional division of legislative powers, was described as “a champion of the provinces,” more often than not siding with the provinces and upholding their powers.

In our system of governance, every level has its powers, authority and its use. I sit every day next to my colleague Senator Clement, who has dedicated part of her career to the municipal level. Many others in this chamber have done the same. Off the top of my head, I can think of Senators Forest, Carignan, Sorensen and Arnold. I know the type of essential and front-line services they have provided. Even considering that municipalities are technically under provincial jurisdiction, I must say that it would never have crossed my mind to qualify them as simply sub-provincial.

Colleagues, we are called to the Senate as representatives of our respective provinces and territories. Our role is not, even if only by the choice of our words, to diminish their constitutional rights and powers by implying their subordination to a central entity.

Now that I have gotten this off my chest, let me take a moment to review the history of the “notwithstanding” clause.

I’ll be brief, because this part of our history is well known. Negotiations to repatriate the Constitution were difficult.

Opposing the federal government was the Gang of Eight, an alliance of provincial premiers with shared demands. The notwithstanding clause, which was agreed to at one minute to midnight on November 4, 1981, was essential to all the provinces but Quebec agreeing to and signing the constitutional agreement.

As Senator Joyal often reminded us, these negotiations, which took place on the fourth floor of the current Senate building, just a few steps from my office, were dubbed the “kitchen accord,” or “la nuit des longs couteaux,” depending on which side of the Ottawa River you were on.

Despite the controversy, the main takeaway from those negotiations and this agreement is the absolute necessity of including the notwithstanding clause in the Constitution in order for certain provinces to agree to sign it. Whatever our position on this clause, it is an irrevocable fact.

Now I will speak to the scope of Bill S-218.

In his interventions, Senator Harder identifies the issue of the trivialization of the use of the “notwithstanding” clause as mainly provincial. Yet we have before us a bill with a purely federal scope of action. Indeed, Bill S-218 would only restrict the application of section 33 to federal legislation.

It also proposes that Parliament limit its ability to legislate as it sees fit on any bill which invokes the “notwithstanding” clause. To defend the adoption of this constitutional amendment, Senator Harder hinted that following public statements earlier this year, a future government would invoke this clause to pass controversial legislation.

While this may be very concerning, the truth of the matter is that section 33 of the Charter has never been used by a federal government since patriation 43 years ago. This merely hypothetical situation would break with tradition and practice. As a result, I don’t believe we should restrict the constitutional and legislative powers of Parliament on speculative grounds.

Bill S-218 could also put us in an awkward situation when dealing with federal bills that reference provincial legislation adopted with the use of the “notwithstanding” clause. As you will recall, we were in this very situation not so long ago when studying Bill C-13, An Act to amend the Official Languages Act, to enact the Use of French in Federally Regulated Private Businesses Act and to make related amendments to other Acts.

While debating the bill, several senators raised the issue of Bill C-13 referencing Quebec’s Charter of the French language, even putting forward an amendment to withdraw its mention, arguing it would cause a dangerous precedent. Yet, after further and thoughtful consideration, the Senate still rejected the amendment and adopted Bill C-13. Will Bill S-218 block us from adopting a bill in a comparable situation or, at least, prevent the government from using time allocation or the Senate as a Committee of the Whole?

Senator Harder voted in favour of Bill C-13 and, at the time, raised no issue with its reference to a bill that invoked the “notwithstanding” clause at the provincial level. I think this is a good example that even in controversial situations, we should let the Senate legislate with its hands untied.

This bill, colleagues, would make the Senate limit its primary purpose, which is to legislate. It would also introduce for the very first time in our Constitution the notion of political parties and partisan politics. By requiring in proposed section 33.1(9)(b) that there must be support of “. . . members of at least two groups composed solely of members who are members of the same recognized party,” Bill S-218 brings partisan politics into Canada’s founding document — the Constitution Act, 1982 — which is meant to be above partisan considerations.

Even in the process to amend the Constitution, simple majority is required at the House and the Senate, without any mention of political affiliation.

I must say that as an independent senator, something about it just does not sit right with me.

Additionally, by requiring prior ruling of the Supreme Court, this bill raises questions on the interrelation between the judiciary and the legislative powers. I am of the view that these important questions deserve more thoughtful scrutiny.

Now I will speak to the “notwithstanding” clause upon the Quebec perspective.

Understandably, the use of section 33 has a bad reputation. At its core, it is an infringement of fundamental rights and freedoms without proper judicial recourse. Its use must be, at best, rare, substantiated and exercised with the utmost discernment.

Having said that, I will now take a few minutes to illustrate another perspective on the “notwithstanding” clause. It’s a perspective that is unique in Canada — one that comes from Quebec, where the clause has been used the most and where the 1982 Constitution, which includes the Charter, has yet to be signed.

In The Notwithstanding Clause and the Canadian Charter: Rights, Reforms, and Controversies, edited by Peter L. Biro — which is truly a superb work that I encourage everyone to read, and it was also quoted by Senator Harder — an entire part is dedicated to Quebec and its peculiar situation.

One section really caught my attention, and I believe it sheds more light on the use of the clause by the Quebec government. In “Bill 21 and Bill 96 in Light of a Distinctive Quebec Theory of the Notwithstanding Clause: A Distinct Approach for a Distinct Society and a Distinct Legal Tradition,” constitutional experts Guillaume Rousseau and François Côté promote the theory that Quebec’s distinct approach to the clause is based on three principles: first, the promotion of human rights, social justice and national identity; second, the province’s civil law legal tradition; and third, the protection against standardized and standardizing common law judicial construction of Charter rights by Canadian tribunals.

According to Rousseau and Côté:

In the overwhelming majority of cases, in Quebec the clause was invoked in the name of collective issues of social justice or national identity — such as when it was invoked to allow for more advantageous pension plans for female workers than their male counterparts to advance women’s condition or in matter of linguistic rights to specifically protect the crucial vitality of French language in Quebec and curtail the free-market English expansionism to its detriment.

The theory also argues that part of the difference in the use of the “notwithstanding” clause is based on the distinct conception of parliamentary sovereignty unique to Quebec in Canada. This is demonstrated by the fact that the National Assembly, contrary to other provincial parliaments, is the following:

 . . . perceived as the legal embodiment of a distinct people and the guardian of its collective rights, in a historical and cultural perspective.

As such, it has a role to play in the national interest of Quebecers, which can sometimes be expressed through the use of section 33.

Rousseau and Côté relevantly relate to Quebec’s civil law tradition — a tradition vastly different in rules and jurisprudence from the common law tradition in place in all other Canadian provinces and territories. Indeed, the civilist legal tradition does not apply and interpret law in the same way as in common law.

The Government of Quebec used the “notwithstanding” clause — to borrow the words of Rousseau and Côté — as a shield to protect it from a standardized and standardizing common law judicial construction of Charter rights by Canadian tribunals. More broadly, it is an affirmation of its recognized status as a distinct society within Canada.

Colleagues, I made this digression to point out that we can be critical of Quebec’s use of section 33, and we can certainly chastise its choice to do so in controversial fashion recently for Bill 21 and Bill 96, but to purely reduce it to populist or majoritarian would be overly simplistic. We must appreciate the context specific to each province and territory in our scrutinizing works.

I will now talk about the use of the notwithstanding clause that may at times, and in rare cases, be justified.

There may be cases where the use of the clause is justified in extraordinary circumstances. Its use may allow a duly elected government to make important decisions that are political in nature and remove them from the judicial authority of unelected persons. Finally, the provincial legislators are responsible for their decisions and, if they’re deemed unacceptable, including because they violate freedoms, they will be tested in the next election cycles.

This relates to the concept of parliamentary supremacy, which has been around for some time and is in use in the United Kingdom, as our former colleague, Brent Cotter, explained in his speech on the motion that preceded this bill. Let us also remember that the override power set out in section 33 of the Charter is not absolute. It applies only to certain provisions and is subject to a five-year limit.

On the subject of that limit, let’s recall that, in Quebec in 1988, Robert Bourassa’s Liberal government used the notwithstanding clause for its Bill 178, which limited the use of English in signage and advertising. Here I would echo Senator Batters’ comments during question period on this debate last week, when she pointed out that Allan Blakeney, the former NDP premier of Saskatchewan and a supporter of the override power, could hardly be described as a populist. I think one would have to be very creative to describe Robert Bourassa as a populist as well.

In Quebec, the signage issue was deemed to be an urgent problem requiring an extraordinary solution. Those measures were replaced five years later by a bill that was Charter-compliant. By using the clause, the Government of Quebec at the time was able to take immediate action to deal with what it considered a serious and urgent threat to the linguistic vitality of the majority.

Premier Bourassa was very aware of the burden of using the clause and did so only after much reflection:

In terms of principles, it was an extremely difficult decision. Party tradition, reason and the heart all dictated that we needed to try to preserve these individual rights as much as possible. We therefore tried to find a formula that would take both into account. In the end, however, when it came time to choose between fundamental freedoms and collective rights, I decided in favour of collective rights by agreeing to apply the notwithstanding clause.

It is important to remember that promoting collective rights doesn’t necessarily mean resorting to majority rule. The collective is not unitary or homogeneous. The majority is defined by a juxtaposition of minorities and very diverse groups. It is not automatically a homogeneous group that imposes its will on a minority. In certain cases, the elected government must have the right, exceptionally and within limits, to defend collective rights to the detriment of individual rights so as to benefit the public interest.

Now, a reflection on the clause and the role of the Senate.

In spite of my reservations on Bill S-218, I do agree with Senator Harder on the importance of this discussion and the need to better safeguard the use of section 33. We need to thoughtfully study such a complex issue.

As such, I believe that Bill S-218 must receive the scrutiny and serious study it deserves at the committee stage. During this study, we could further think about safeguards and alternatives if and when we might have to scrutinize bills using the “notwithstanding” clause.

One of these alternatives would be for us to develop criteria to be applied if and when such bills are introduced in the Senate.

We could be inspired by the work of experts such as Tsvi Kahana, which criteria based on the concept of tyrannical use of the clause has been referred to by Senator Cotter.

He defines tyrannical use as:

. . . when a given use of the mechanism is motivated by a desire to disadvantage minorities or silence opposition, or when it results in exceptionally severe rights violations such that it offends universal liberal values and is unacceptable in a democracy. . . .

His method to understand whether the use is indeed tyrannical is based on a rigorous evaluation with criteria such as motivation, impact on rights, freedom of expression, equality, privacy and legal effect.

Furthermore, we would be wise to look at and take inspiration from the Supreme Court of Canada in its different judgments relating to the constitutionality of bills.

Now — and this may not pertain to the “notwithstanding” clause per se — but we could have a general reflection on the possibility for the Senate to refer to the Supreme Court regarding the constitutionality of federal legislation.

As things are now, this power is the prerogative of the government as per paragraph 53(1)(b) of the Supreme Court Act, the Senate and the House of Commons having the limited power to refer to the court on private bills or petitions.

In a future where the federal government would be more inclined to proceed with the use of the “notwithstanding” clause rather than with the caution of a Supreme Court reference, this power would be an interesting tool for the Senate as an institution of sober second thought.

One last thing we could consider is the reasoning behind the provinces’ and territories’ use of the “notwithstanding” clause. We could look at all previous uses of the clause such as: Yukon in 1982 for an unadopted land development bill, Saskatchewan in 1986 for back-to-work legislation, Alberta in 2000 for a bill against gay marriage and more recent well-known examples in Quebec as well as Ontario.

By closely looking at these examples, we could identify if and when the use was grossly unjust and wrong or when it was more justified. We could base our analysis on debates between provincial legislators, court judgments and public reaction to those bills.

We must also understand that there may come a day when the federal government has good reasons to use the clause and temporarily suspend certain rights. For this day, we need criteria and safeguards, not necessarily limitations and delaying tactics.

In his speech, Senator Harder referred to an anecdote told by former prime minister Jean Chrétien. Mr. Chrétien confided that whenever he met Pierre Elliott Trudeau, after 1982, he rarely missed an opportunity to express his frustration at having been forced to accept section 33, that he was mad precisely at the possibility to overrule the Charter and its protected rights.

Well, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau should be one to recognize the importance of such exceptional measures, having himself suspended the individual rights of Quebecers in October of 1970. It was before 1982, so the possibility to refer to the “notwithstanding” clause did not exist then. Even going, in this instance, way beyond the scope of the “notwithstanding” clause, it’s very important that we keep this in mind.

In conclusion, colleagues, whatever we may think of section 33 of the Constitution Act, 1982, the power to derogate is an integral part of our Constitution. If, however, we consider part of our constitutional agreement to be so abusive and tyrannical that it endangers our democracy and the rule of law, then the right way to proceed is through changes to the Constitution.

For this, I commend Senator Harder because while I felt that his previous motion was not the right way to proceed, he has now identified a better process to tackle this important issue, although I do agree with my colleagues Senator Batters, Senator Housakos and maybe even Senator Harder himself that this bill should ideally have originated from the elected house.

Bill S-218 raises a real and important question for the health of our democracy, and while I do not believe that in this current form the bill is the right solution, I still want it to proceed to committee so it can be studied with the seriousness and application that is required of a constitutional amendment.

Thank you, meegwetch.

Yes.

The short answer is yes, for two reasons: first, because it would restrict our power to initiate some bills; and second, because the threshold for such a bill to be passed by both houses would be a majority of two thirds, which is even more restrictive.

I will not comment on a bill that I have not seen and that is still hypothetical. All I will say on this is that the Senate should not refuse to study any bill that comes from the democratically elected government; then we will have the opportunity to play our role to ensure that the bill is balanced — and to ensure that if some rights are suspended, it is because the public interest would be better served by doing so. This is in relation to your first question; this is another demonstration that the Senate should not be restricted in its ability to receive and scrutinize bills.

Honourable senators, I proudly rise in this chamber today during International Pride Month to join the debate on Bill S-218.

I’d like to thank our colleague, Senator Harder, for bringing forward this very important piece of legislation at such a critical moment in Canada’s history.

Colleagues, those of you who know me will know I’m passionate about the need for Canada to realize its full economic potential. I’m particularly seized with the need to act boldly to meet the moment, a sentiment I share with not only our Prime Minister but also Canadians across the country. As such, I envisioned my first speech in this place to be about the economy. Instead, I am compelled to speak on another issue that is important not only to me but to all of us: our protected rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and our duty as senators to safeguard those rights for minority groups and all Canadians.

Human rights should be table stakes for our country, but in recent times, we have seen such rights eroded around the world as well as here in Canada. We have seen that increased political polarization and the rise of single-issue voting has, in some cases, turned the “notwithstanding” clause into a weapon used for political gain at the provincial level. We have now heard talk of this approach at the federal level as well. While I recognize that Bill S-218 will not dictate any provincial government’s use of this clause, I rise today to support the intent of Senator Harder’s bill: that we in this chamber might serve to guide and inspire future governments in its measured use.

Therefore, colleagues, I congratulate Senator Harder for being bold, being provocative and introducing Bill S-218 to enshrine overdue legislative safeguards that will ensure that any future use of the “notwithstanding” clause happens, as we would all hope, only in the most exceptional circumstances, with robust consultation, written justification and only after a Supreme Court ruling so justifies — never pre-emptively.

These protections will help safeguard minorities and marginalized populations. In fact, by protecting minorities, we protect the vast diversity that’s central to our Canadian identity and that strengthens our ties to the international community.

I’m going to take a slightly different approach from our colleagues who have spoken to this legislation already and maybe share a bit more of a human perspective in terms of what it might mean. Colleagues, today, I’m going to pull on just one thread of this magnificent tapestry of diversity in our country. In doing so, I hope to provide some rationale as to why the “notwithstanding” clause should be used only as a tool of last resort — and even then only with an exceptional level of transparency and oversight.

Today, this one thread of our tapestry that I will give voice to regards the stories of just a few members of the 2SLGBTQIA+ community. In my view, these stories demonstrate how far we have come but also how current challenges continue to bear a striking similarity to those of the past.

Honourable senators, I would like to give forewarning that some of what follows may be difficult to hear and for me to say.

In 1982, the same year that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms came into effect, a young teenaged boy struggled with the realization that he was attracted to men. He felt ashamed as he fought, unsuccessfully, to deny his feelings. Self-hate and thoughts of self-harm were part of his daily life. He lived in fear that this information might get out and lead to ridicule, bullying and, almost certainly, violence. Given the duress this youth lived under, it is sad to think he was safer in some ways back then than some kids are today, over 40 years later. In those days, no province was pushing through legislation that would require his teachers to disclose his identity to his parents or to anyone to whom he did not want it disclosed.

So he kept his secret safely hidden throughout his high school days, until the time came when he felt comfortable sharing this part of his identity with his family and friends. A decade later, that same young man emerged confident. Long free of the terror of being found out, he’d come to embrace his difference and, indeed, had taken on a leadership position in his community, championing queer rights among other things. He believed that the world was changing for the better.

Then one night in December 1996, that confidence was shaken. As he was walking home from the pub with some friends, a car screeched to a halt and three male teenagers leaped out of the vehicle. “You are going to die, faggot” was among the slurs shouted as one of the teenagers fractured the face of the young man with a tire iron. The reconstructive surgery that followed was the easy part. What took much longer to heal was the confidence necessary to walk down the street holding hands with another man. The police refused to characterize this as a hate crime, instead recording it as a traffic incident. Fortunately, I doubt that would be tolerated today.

As some of you may have guessed, that once-young man now stands before you in the Senate of Canada.

As I look back and reflect on those periods of my life, I often ask myself where I would be today had things been different, had I been outed in high school and bullied or even attacked back then, had I not been kept safe or had my rights not been respected. Sadly, we see today that many young people are at risk of losing those rights. We see time and again the intolerance that led to my attack is alive and well and, indeed, growing again in our country, fuelled by politics of division that are putting minority communities at risk.

Colleagues, let’s now move to 20 years after the Charter was proclaimed. In 2002, in a small southern Manitoba town, a young teenager had his head wrapped in tape and pounded against the wall while his tormenters chanted homophobic slurs I will not repeat in this chamber. Meanwhile, teachers stood by and pretended not to see.

When that same boy returned to school for the first day of Grade 9, he was greeted by classmates throwing garbage at him and taunting him with more homophobic slurs. What a terrible environment for a young person to try to learn and thrive in.

We would hope that those are relics and sentiments of the past, and that we have moved on from them as a society. However, only two years ago, some parents in that same Manitoba community tried to have books that referenced 2SLGBTQIA+ themes banned from the public library. I can only imagine how a young person who identifies as queer might feel in such an environment.

Also two years ago, in British Columbia, a non-binary child was sobbing while they watched the news with their father. Saskatchewan was invoking the “notwithstanding” clause to block legal challenges to a law forcing teachers to disclose students’ chosen pronouns.

The clause was used pre-emptively, despite a judge warning that the law could cause “irreparable harm” to vulnerable students. The teenager watching from another province saw the warning signal clearly: It could happen to them next.

Honourable senators, as I was preparing these remarks, I had the opportunity to have a discussion with the mother of a young transgender girl. To protect the family, I will just say they live somewhere in Canada. Here is what she said to me:

We didn’t ask for a transgender child. Nobody hopes for a more difficult life for their child. The lives of transgender children are debated in legislatures around the world . . . governments decide on a whim whether our child is allowed or not allowed to exist. Some party leaders and candidates running to be elected to political office are willing to sacrifice transgender children in a vain attempt to win votes from constituents. Our child is like any other — she wants to play, learn and grow. We didn’t ask for a transgender child, but our lives are brighter, richer and more fulfilled because of it. She is exactly who she is meant to be.

This family, whom I know personally, lives in fear that a future government may well invoke the “notwithstanding” clause to target the trans community for political gain. Can you imagine living in fear of democracy in Canada?

Honourable senators, although those stories are upsetting and distressing to hear, they represent merely a tiny sliver of what is happening in Canada right now and are just those from my own direct experience and those of people close to me.

They are a reminder of the human consequences of discrimination. Sadly, in many of these cases, it is young people who are suffering the consequences.

Although provincial governments of all stripes have used the “notwithstanding” clause since the enactment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, as Senator Harder remarked, more recently, populist governments have championed it for very specific and targeted groups. This is inarguable.

Given the diversity in this chamber, I know as I look around that many of you have similar stories of having faced discrimination in your own lives. Maybe they are based on gender, race or cultural backgrounds, but I know many of you have these stories.

I would encourage all of us to share these experiences, and those of our loved ones, and maybe even to include them in your own comments on this bill. It is from that seed of understanding and empathy that we will collectively grow to do better and to be better.

Although implementing a framework governing the use of the notwithstanding clause in a federal context has no direct impact on decisions by provinces that choose a different path, it offers an opportunity for Canada, and for us, here, to lead by example. In time, one province, then two, and then others might follow.

We only need to look south of the border to be reminded how democracy can be weaponized. Many are being deported from the United States because they have tried to provide a better life and — in many cases — a safer life for themselves and their children.

We must not pretend that Canada is immune. We see early signs of populism threatening minority rights here too.

Honourable senators, the bill before us is of the utmost importance. I encourage each of you to support this bill and ensure its swift passage by this chamber.

In doing so, we will be sending the strongest signal possible that this chamber stands behind the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as well as the values and beliefs with which this country has become synonymous, both domestically and abroad.

Maybe one day, that transgender girl will stand here as a senator, and her first speech will be about the economy.

Thank you.