Honourable senators, I am pleased to introduce you to Bill S-2, An Act to amend the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act.

I’m also honoured to be speaking to you today from Mi’kma’ki, the unceded territory of the Mi’kmaq people.

Colleagues, Bill S-2 is an important bill, a bill with a connection to a long and disquieting domestic and international history, and a bill with enduring relevance in our ever-shifting world order.

Ahmet Üzümcü, past Director General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, said:

We did not reach the heights of our modern civilization by technology alone. We were only able to do so because of our commitment to shared norms and values such as equality, justice and human dignity for all.

The shared international desire to forge new pathways toward a more peaceful, secure and humane future lies at the heart of actions taken by the United Nations and continues to guide Canada’s commitments abroad.

Bill S-2 is a simple yet crucial bill. Bill S-2 essentially amends Canada’s Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act in order to clearly align that act with the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons, otherwise known as the Chemical Weapons Convention, or CWC.

This is accomplished by amending our act to remove the old list of prohibited chemicals appended to our act and making it clear that the correct, up-to-date list of prohibited chemicals is the one maintained by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which is easily accessible on their public website. This work on the prohibition of chemical weapons is part of Canada’s overall disarmament effort. Chemical weapons are often labelled as weapons of mass destruction, along with nuclear and biological weapons.

Now let’s step back for a minute or two to look at what led us to the convention in the first place. Next Wednesday, people will gather with Canadian war veterans in communities across Canada, mostly virtually this year, to observe, with solemnity, Remembrance Day. Remembrance Day was first observed in 1919 throughout the British Commonwealth, including Canada, as Armistice Day, commemorating the armistice agreement that ended the First World War on the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month.

Constitutionally, Canada had been subject to the British declaration of war in 1914, as was the case for other British dominion countries. With the Statute of Westminster in December 1931, Canadian foreign policy became independent.

Colleagues, it was during the First World War that our Canadian soldiers had their first encounter with poison gas at the Battles of Ypres on April 22, 1915. Released from large steel cylinders, a cloud of chlorine six kilometres across and one kilometre deep blew onto Canadian and French lines. Heavier than air, chlorine filled the trenches as it moved. Though our Canadians held the line, over 6,000 were injured and several hundred died. As the war progressed, gas masks were eventually employed but deadlier gases such as phosgene and mustard gas were used. Mustard gas burns any exposed skin and it persisted in the mud, causing grave injuries even days later. It also injured doctors and nurses who came into contact with it on soldiers’ clothing.

It is important to note that Canada and our Allies were not just victims of chemical weapons. We were not innocent, as we too relied heavily on chemical weapons, especially during the final 100 days of that war. All told, chemical weapons injured over 1.2 million people during World War I and 90,000 people died.

The use of chemical weapons in the interwar period and World War II was thankfully much smaller in scope. While not widely deployed, development and testing of increasingly horrific chemical weapons continued on both sides. By the end of the war, toxic stockpiles of these weapons had grown significantly and continued to grow during the Cold War years.

Canada was a major centre for chemical and biological weapons development, and testing for the Allies. Human experimentation was carried out during World War II, and CFB Suffield became the leading research facility.

Following both world wars, Canadian military forces returning home were directed to dump millions of tons of unexploded ordnance, UXOs, into the Atlantic Ocean off ports in Nova Scotia. Some were known to be chemical weapons. The 1972 London Convention prohibited further marine dumping of UXOs. However, the chemical weapons existing off the shores of Nova Scotia continue to bring concern to our local communities and the fishing industry.

Beyond the two world wars, chemical weapons have been used throughout the world at various times.

In 1845, during the French conquest of Algeria, French troops forced more than 1,000 members of a Berber group into a cave and then used smoke to kill them.

In 1935 and 1936, Benito Mussolini dropped mustard gas bombs on Ethiopia to destroy the army of Emperor Haile Selassie.

Between 1961 and 1971, during the Vietnam War, the United States used napalm and the herbicide Agent Orange, sparking national and international protest.

From 1963 to 1967, Egypt used mustard gas and a nerve agent in Yemen to support a coup d’état against the Yemeni monarchy.

In the 1980s, Iraq used chemical weapons, such as tabun, against Iran and its own Kurdish minority.

Kim Jong-nam, half-brother of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, was assassinated with the nerve agent VX at the Kuala Lumpur International Airport in 2017.

Chemical weapons have been used by the Assad regime in Syria, targeting and killing several hundred civilians, and by Daesh in both Syria and Iraq.

Colleagues, last week I hosted a community event launching the new book by Jon Tattrie about the local Antigonish story of our first Syrian refugee family, the Hadhads, and their inspiring Peace by Chocolate business. At that event, Tareq, the elder son and CEO of the company, spoke about how relieved he and his family were to be safe in Canada, a country that values human life and is a leader in promoting and supporting the international rule of law.

Canada played an important role in the creation of the Chemical Weapons Convention we are discussing here today.

Some of the earliest efforts to govern how nations behaved during times of war tried to address chemical warfare. The Hague Convention of 1899 prohibited the use of poisons in war and forbade the use of projectile weapons whose sole purpose was to spread asphyxiating gas. We know that major powers who ratified this convention ended up building massive arsenals of chemical warfare agents and then using them in World War I.

After that war, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 stated:

Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world . . .

It goes on to declare their prohibition as part of international law. Still, chemical weapons continue to be produced and stockpiled.

At the 1980 United Nations Conference on Disarmament, negotiations began that would eventually lead to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their destruction, otherwise known as the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Thirteen years later, on January 13, 1993, the convention opened for signatures. On April 29, 1997, the convention, which is the subject of this Bill S-2, came into force. Canada was one of the first countries to sign on to it in 1993, and we frequently serve on the Executive Council of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the body established to implement the convention.

The convention, which has 193 states parties, seeks to eliminate an entire group of weapons of mass destruction by banning the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer or use of chemical weapons. It also prohibits any state party from using chemical weapons under any circumstances, from engaging in military preparations to use them and from transferring or enabling another country to develop them.

The convention also affirms that states have the right to work with chemicals for peaceful purposes and that the prohibition should not unnecessarily hamper legitimate work in chemistry. The convention was far more comprehensive than its predecessor, the Geneva Protocol, which banned the use but not the possession of chemical weapons.

Today, 98% of the world’s population falls under the protection of the convention. When the convention entered into force, the five states parties entered as possessors of chemical weapons. These were the United States, Russia, India, Albania and one other state that remains anonymous. Three more such countries joined later: Libya in 2004, Iraq in 2009 and Syria, interestingly, in 2013. Finally, Japan, though not a possessor state in the same way as the others, remains responsible for the weapons it abandoned in China at the end of World War II.

Under the supervision of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, these state parties have undertaken to destroy their chemical weapons stockpiles. Of the 72,304 tonnes of chemical weapons declared to the organization, 71,029 have been destroyed. This represents over 98.3% of the world’s declared chemical weapons stockpiles.

The word “declared” is an important one here, and I will return to this point later on.

A list of the most common toxic chemicals and their precursors, or their ingredients used to make them, form an important part of the Chemical Weapons Convention. This has had no previous updates until very recently.

The list is divided into three schedules. Schedule 1 chemicals have only one purpose, and that is to maim and kill. Any chemical on this list is unequivocally considered a chemical weapon. Their use is prohibited in all cases, except for limited activities related to defence against chemical weapons.

Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals have increasingly common uses in industry. Therefore, they are subject to fewer restrictions. Despite the existence of these schedules, any chemical can be considered to be a chemical weapon if it is used in a way that goes against the convention, as was the case in Syria when chlorine was used against its citizens.

Of course, the destruction of chemical weapons is not enough. Constant monitoring in order to ensure that the re-emergence of chemical weapons does not occur is vital.

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons inspects and verifies that facilities meant to produce chemicals for peaceful purposes, such as for commercial and industrial use, are not being misused to manufacture chemical weapons.

Each state party to the Chemical Weapons Convention must create a national authority which serves as that country’s contact point for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Chemical plants in each country declare their activities to their national authority, which then passes that information on to the OPCW. The organization then decides which plant sites to visit and inspect based on those declarations.

The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act, as the same suggests, is the implementing legislation for the Chemical Weapons Convention here in Canada. It criminalizes the possession and use of chemical weapons, and it creates the Canadian National Authority, which is housed in Global Affairs Canada.

The act and its regulations compel Canadian entities involved in the production or handling of chemicals to make declarations to the Canadian National Authority, compels them to accept inspections by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in certain circumstances and requires that facilities handling highly toxic Schedule 1 chemicals obtain a licence to do so from the national authority. About 140 entities report to the Canadian National Authority, of which 31 are inspectable by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. With this act, Canada is fully in line with the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Colleagues, despite the remarkable achievements of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, recent developments internationally have taught us that this critical work is far from done. As I mentioned earlier, incredible progress has been made towards the destruction of all declared stockpiles of chemical weapons, “declared” being the keyword here. Unfortunately, it is the undeclared chemical weapons programs that remain a threat to humankind today.

The four attacks with chlorine and three with sarin gas perpetrated by the Assad regime in Syria have shown the world what can happen when chemical weapons go undeclared.

On March 4, 2018, we witnessed yet another violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. If this incident wasn’t so tragic, one would think it was a spy plot twist straight out of a Hollywood movie. It had everything you would find in a Cold War-era film: a former spy, Russian operatives and a fake Nina Ricci perfume bottle at the centre of it all. Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia had been poisoned in Salisbury, England, with a chemical weapon referred to as a Novichok. Developed by the Soviet Union, Novichoks are a class of extremely toxic nerve agents that persist in the environment and are very difficult to detect. Until recently, they were not listed in the convention and not subject to verification and declaration by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, though their use to inflict harm has always been a violation of the convention.

This horrifying attack left Sergei and Yulia Skripal and police detective Sargent Nick Bailey in the hospital for months.

The weapon itself, which was delivered by a custom-made perfume bottle found in nearby Amesbury, contained enough Novichok to kill thousands of people. Unfortunately, it was found by innocent passerby Mr. Charlie Rowley, who gave it to his girlfriend, Ms. Dawn Sturgess. Both were exposed to this chemical agent, which had been discarded after use on the Skripal family residence. Ms. Sturgess lost her life due to her exposure. She was 44 years old when she passed away, leaving behind an 11-year-old daughter.

Canada and its allies concluded that it was highly likely that the Russian government was responsible for the attack. The Novichok attack in Salisbury highlighted the fact that, despite the completed destruction of Russia’s declared chemical weapons, the Russian Federation had retained some capacity to produce and use Novichok-type chemical weapons.

Canada immediately condemned the act, and then-Minister of Foreign Affairs Chrystia Freeland and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau issued statements. Four diplomats were expelled from the Russian Embassy in Ottawa and the consulate general in Montreal. There was a collective response taken by several allies, including the United Kingdom and the United States. It was decided to take further action and criminalize the possession of Novichoks. This is where the need for Bill S-2 comes in.

Colleagues, Canada was one of the leaders in efforts to add Novichoks to the schedules of the Chemical Weapons Convention, along with our close allies, the United States and the Netherlands. Canada submitted a proposal to add new families of toxic chemicals to Schedule 1 of the convention, including the weapon used in Salisbury.

After working with allies and other signatories to the convention, a total of four new categories of chemicals were officially added to Schedule 1 of the convention in November 2019. The decision to add these chemicals to the schedules came into force on June 7, 2020. Unfortunately, this development was not able to prevent the recent attack on Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny, in which a Novichok agent had again been used.

As part of Bill S-2, the Government of Canada has decided that the best way to make our Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act current and render it future-proof is to remove the now out-of-date schedule from the act itself.

Currently, this schedule to the act contains three sections. The first is a list of definitions found in Article II of the CWC. The second is the current text of Schedules 1, 2 and 3 from the Annex on Chemicals. The third is a list of definitions from Part I of the Chemical Weapons Convention Verification Annex.

Bill S-2, An Act amending the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act, repeals the schedule in its entirety. It also amends the definition of “convention” under subsection 2(1) and deletes subsection 2(3) entirely. These last two amendments remove references to the now-repealed schedule.

Repealing this schedule from the act will not impact how the act applies to Canadians. It in no way changes Canada’s obligations or commitments under the Chemical Weapons Convention. It imposes no new burdens upon Canada, Canadian citizens or Canadian industry. It merely prevents confusion.

Once the schedule is removed, it will be obvious to all Canadians that the correct list of chemicals is the one maintained by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons on its website. Again, colleagues, this is simply an act of good governance in order to ensure that the legislation and compliance requirements are as clear as possible to all Canadians.

In conjunction with the tabling of Bill S-2, a technical change proposal has been tabled in the other place to acquaint that house with the changes to the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Canada has no chemical weapons or chemical weapons production facility, but we do produce and retain chemicals for domestic riot control purposes and for protective research, development and testing. Canada was one of the first countries to sign onto the convention in 1993 and continues to be a leader in disarmament work. We frequently serve on the Executive Council of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and we remain committed to the work of that organization.

Still, we know that there is more work to be done. We know there are states that have not signed or ratified the convention, and we know of others that have not abided by the convention they are a party to. We also know that the newest agent used in the attack against Alexei Navalny was not one of the agents added to the list, highlighting the need for constant vigilance in monitoring chemical activities.

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has experienced cyberoperations against its network, and a coordinated disinformation campaign has attempted to undermine states parties confidence in the OPCW.

Colleagues, the global commitment to prohibit chemical weapons and the organization mandated to uphold that commitment require our unflagging support now more than ever. Canada must maintain its leadership role in the fight against these deadly weapons. Ensuring that Canada’s implementing legislation is clear and current is an important step.

Colleagues, as I move toward the conclusion of my speech this afternoon, I would like to quote excerpts from two often-cited Remembrance Day poems. The first is from Laurence Binyon’s “For the Fallen”:

At the going down of the sun and in the morning

We will remember them.

From John McCrae’s “In Flanders Fields”:

To you from failing hands we throw

The torch; be yours to hold it high.

Colleagues, as Remembrance Day draws near, let us remember them — all veterans, all who have fallen in war — and in remembering them, let’s grasp that torch from those “failing hands” and honour those lying in Flanders Fields and others who have met a similar brutal end by continuing our collective work for peace.

I hope you will join me in sending Bill S-2 to committee for further study as quickly as possible. Chemical weapons use against anyone should never be tolerated anywhere in our modern world.

Thank you. Wela’lioq.