Customs Act—Preclearance Act, 2016
Bill to Amend--Second Reading
May 11, 2022
Honourable senators, as said by Senators Boniface, Simons and Wells, the constitutional question that Bill S-7 attempts to answer is the balancing of two competing values.
On one hand, it is widely acknowledged that officers at the border, in dealing with travellers coming into Canada, are entitled to ask questions, to inspect goods, including personal belongings, and to detain and search persons in order to ensure compliance with the Customs Act and related laws, all in order to protect our country. In fact, officers at the border are often entitled to act in ways that would not be acceptable for police officers dealing with citizens within the country.
On the other hand, there is the ever-increasing recognition by the courts of the informational privacy inherent in a personal digital device. The Supreme Court has stated that cellphones, like computers, implicate important privacy interests that are different in both nature and extent from the search of other places. The high courts added that it is unrealistic to equate a cellphone or a computer with a brief case, even if they all store material.
As stated in the recent Ontario Superior Court judgment, the core biographical information to be gleaned from a personal digital device can be used to construct an extraordinary, intricately detailed profile of the owner of the device. Judge Harris wrote:
A personal digital device mirrors who we are. It is the manifestation of both our external and internal life.
The intrusion of the state into informational privacy through investigation of digital media has the potential to extend well beyond anything George Orwell could possibly have imagined.
Within Canada, to perform a legal search, police officers have to meet one of two thresholds depending on the context: reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed or is in progress, or a reasonable suspicion that such is the case. Both thresholds are reviewable by courts pursuant to an objective analysis, and not according to the subjective state of the mind of the police officer. Case law has established that the highest threshold is reasonable grounds to believe. I am not suggesting that it shall apply to customs operations, except maybe for an intrusive body search.
As for reasonable suspicion, it is defined by the Supreme Court as meaning the following:
The “reasonable suspicion” standard is not a new juridical standard called into existence for the purposes of this case. “Suspicion” is an expectation that the targeted individual is possibly engaged in some criminal activity. A “reasonable” suspicion means something more than a mere suspicion and something less than a belief based upon reasonable and probable grounds.
The fundamental distinction between mere suspicion and reasonable suspicion lies in the fact that in the latter case, a sincerely held subjective belief is insufficient. Instead, to justify a search, the suspicion must be supported by the factual elements, which can be adduced in evidence and permit an independent judicial assessment.
As said by the Supreme Court in 1996, in the context of section 99(1)(f) of the Customs Act, a hunch based on intuition gained by experience cannot suffice as reasonable suspicion.
Before the courts of Alberta and Ontario, representatives of the border agency have testified that to apply the lowest threshold, reasonable suspicion, would seriously impede their operations, and I suspect this is the reason why the bill proposes a new threshold called “reasonable general concern,” intended to be defined by courts as being lower than reasonable suspicion.
In the Ontario judgment, the judge seems to be unconvinced by the border agency’s resistance to a threshold. He wrote:
In my view, skepticism is the appropriate reaction to an assertion by law enforcement that a search threshold will stymie investigations. Naturally, law enforcement officials would prefer not to have legislative obstacles regulating their ability to search. They would be more effective and productive without them. But there would be a cost to individual rights and to liberty.
Colleagues, I believe we need a threshold. However, if Parliament decides to enact the proposed new threshold, we have to realize that it is an unknown concept to the law, and that the court will have to flesh out its contents considering the content of the binding regulations — which we don’t know yet, but have been promised after the bill is adopted.
On the whole, in order to meet the constitutional requirements under section 8 of the Charter, nobody can predict the end result of this process, but it is fair to say it’s going to take years, including judgments from Courts of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada. In the meantime, there will likely be criminal charges arising from the search of digital devices dropped or dismissed.
Of course, the use, instead, of the reasonable suspicion test will not bring such uncertainty. This is another area that should be studied by the committee, including the pros and the cons of having new tests in connection with documents found on digital devices rather than applying an existing test — reasonable suspicion — which is used for documents in the mail.
The studying committee should look at the existence — or not — of equivalent thresholds in other democratic societies. In the U.S., the use of an applicable threshold is a complete mess, controversial and subject to conflicting case law.
Moreover, considering this bill is a response to the Court’s decisions concluding in the unconstitutionality of the current regime if applied to a device, the committee shall hear evidence from legal experts about the ability of the proposed threshold to survive legal challenges that are promised to come.
Finally, this bill proposes that the new concept be applicable to the U.S. pre-clearance areas located in eight Canadian airports. However, in the United States, this concept does not exist. Moreover, as I said, the issue of access to personal devices is currently quite controversial and unsettled in the U.S. This means that if you go to the U.S. by car instead of flying from an airport, where there is a U.S. pre-clearance, you will most likely be subject to a different threshold. However, I am content to see that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms will be fully applicable across Canada, including in U.S. pre-clearance areas.
In conclusion, like Senators Simons and Wells, I believe that this bill raises some fundamental issues of constitutional law that will need to be thoroughly studied in committee.
I also believe that it would be preferable to have a committee study it soon, in order to put to an end, in the months to come, to the two different regimes that currently exist in Canada for the inspection and seizure of documents found on digital devices, that is, the regime that applies in Ontario and Alberta and the one that applies in the rest of Canada.
Thank you very much. Meegwetch.
I have a question for Senator Dalphond, if there is enough time.
With pleasure.
I had a question because you, of course, bring to the chamber your experience as a judge. If you were on the Court of Appeal and a case came to you that had this threshold test of reasonable general concern, what is the process for a court to look at such a novel test that has no precedent in Canadian law? How do you adjudicate it?
Yes, I will be careful not to try to give an answer to colleagues that are still doing the work.
The first and most critical element will be the content of the regulations to be adopted by the minister or the government because they will provide some indicators — like taking notes and having a record of what was done in what type of circumstances — because what the courts will not accept is a process which is not reviewable by the court.
The word “reasonable,” within the rest of the sentence, normally refers to something that is an objective criterion. The court, in order to find if this objective criterion has been met, will have to get a record that shows, for example, how it was applied, what the questions were, whether the device was disconnected from the cloud — because you are entitled to search only the device, not outside the device — and whether there are notes taken because the officer may not remember because perhaps he has done hundreds since then. All factors that are critical will be found, unfortunately, not in the law, but in the regulations because the concept is undefined in the law. As I said, it will have to be fleshed out by the courts, and the courts will be careful to balance all the interests at stake.
You may end up with criteria that are a bit lower than reasonable suspicion but maybe not far from it.
Is it your pleasure, honourable senators, to adopt the motion?
Some Hon. Senators: Agreed.
An Hon. Senator: On division.
(Motion agreed to and bill read second time, on division.)