Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
Foreign Affairs
Issue 26 - Evidence
OTTAWA, Tuesday, November 17, 1998
The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, to which was referred Bill C-52, to implement the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, met this day at 4:00 p.m. to give consideration to the bill.
Senator John B. Stewart (Chairman) in the Chair.
[English]
The Chairman: Honourable senators, this afternoon we are considering Bill C-52.
From the Government of Canada, we have Paul Meyer, who is Director General of the International Security Bureau. I will ask him to introduce his colleagues and then to make an opening statement.
Mr. Meyer, please proceed.
Mr. Paul Meyer, Director General, International Security Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade: Mr. Chairman, with me today are Ross Glasgow, Director of the Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Implementation Agency, and Ranjan Banerjee, who is the CTBT desk officer within that same division. Mr. Paul Connors is the Deputy Director and the national authority for the CTBT within the department. Beverley Chomyn is legal counsel with the Department of Justice and has worked on the CTBT. Dr. David McCormack is a seismologist with the Geological Survey of Canada, Natural Resources Canada.
It is a great honour for me to appear before this committee. This year has been a significant one that has offered a profound challenge to the international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. We are all aware of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, which brought home to many Canadians the important relevance of this regime and the contribution that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty can make to the strengthening of non-proliferation.
Once again, the public reaction against the nuclear tests demonstrated that there is wide support among Canadians for banning all nuclear tests.
[Translation]
The CTBT is the culmination of efforts going back forty years and supported by successive Canadian Governments to effect a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The ultimate non-proliferation value of the Treaty is that it establishes a global norm against nuclear testing by all nations, even for those states that may not immediately join the Treaty.
[English]
The CTBT bans all nuclear explosions for the purposes of developing or qualitatively improving nuclear weapons, and reflects a significant international norm adhered to by the vast majority of states. Some 151 of the 193 United Nations member states have signed the treaty, and 21 have already ratified it. Of these, all declared nuclear weapons states have signed, and two, the United Kingdom and France, have ratified.
The CTBT calls for the establishment of an international monitoring system of 321 stations worldwide that would detect and identify with a high degree of accuracy all explosions greater than 1 kiloton in the atmosphere, underwater or underground, anywhere on earth. While only partially operational at this stage, the IMS easily detected and identified the recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan.
Canada will contribute 15 monitoring stations and the radionuclide laboratory to the international monitoring system. These facilities will be managed by the Geological Survey of Canada and Health Canada, in conjunction with Environment Canada.
The proposed legislation contains needed elements to allow Canada to fulfil her obligations under the treaty. First, it will criminalize any nuclear test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, undertaken for the purpose of developing or improving nuclear weapons. Second, it will mandate the respective functions of Foreign Affairs, Natural Resources, and Health Canada through the CTBT National Authority, which will administer the implementation of the treaty. Third, it will obligate Canadian industry to report chemical explosions of a magnitude of 300 tonnes or greater of TNT equivalent to the National Authority, as these explosions could be confused with nuclear explosions.
[Translation]
Canada is a leader in advancing the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime. In particular, we have been recognised as a major supporter of the CTBT implementation. Early ratification by Canada will reinforce our leadership in the CTBT arena.
[English]
At Canada's initiative, during the negotiation of this treaty, Article XIV was inserted to provide for a conference of participating states three years after it was opened for signature.
That conference is intended to explore ways to facilitate the treaty's early implementation and entry into force. As the treaty was open for signature in September, 1996, this conference is expected to take place in the fall of 1999.
Canada wishes to play a leadership role in organizing and shaping this conference to ensure that we can bring pressure to bear, and incentives, to effect the entry into force of the treatyconvention. We can only do this when we are a state party ourselves.
We need the authority of having ratified the treaty behind our efforts, of being a state party with the right to participate in this conference of which we were the originators. It is a very important vehicle for trying to ensure that this vital treaty is brought into force.
As you know, the proposed CTBT legislation was passed unanimously by the lower House, and early passage in the Senate will allow Canada to ratify the treaty and participate effectively in this conference.
Mr. Chairman, the officials with me have taken an active part in drafting the proposed legislation, and they represent the interdepartmental community in support of this treaty.
The Chairman: Canada has already signed the treaty and participated in ratification.
Would the lawyer from the Department of Justice put on the record whether this is indeed ratification, or is it bringing into Canadian domestic law the terms of a treaty made under the prerogative?
Ms Chomyn: That is essentially what the ratification process is. Through the proposed legislation, we are implementing domestically our obligations under that treaty. To complete this process, ratification will signal that Canada is ready to implement fully the obligations under the convention. That is the meaning of our ratification process, that we are ready to follow our obligations set out in the treaty.
The Chairman: If this were a treaty which did not require a change in Canadian domestic law, would there be a ratification? And if so, how would it be done?
Ms Chomyn: In this particular case, the obligations set out in the treaty do require that we have domestic tools for implementation, but ratification is always necessary. It would still be necessary to ratify this treaty even if legislative measures would not be necessary to implement the treaty. The process of acquiring and depositing the instrument of ratification is the same for both.
I can come back and confirm that, but ratification basically signals internationally that Canada is ready to follow, or commit herself to, those obligations under the treaty.
There are certain treaties where we already have the means, whether legislatively or otherwise, which would allow us to put those obligations into full force and effect. Ratification is the signal internationally that Canada is ready to implement all those obligations and it is required.
Senator Andreychuk: I have a series of questions, and I will state that I am in favour of the bill and its intent.
I was told that the provinces have been consulted. Can you tell me in what way and what was the outcome of those consultations? What is their role in the implementation of this proposed legislation?
Mr. Paul J. Connors, Deputy Director, Nuclear, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Implementation Agency: Just prior to signing the treaty in August 1996, we officially wrote to all the provinces, through the federal-provincial network, to advise them that Canada was about to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. Given that we knew the text of the treaty, we expected that there would be a reporting obligation for Canadian industry arising from our signature. We noted that we would consult with the provinces further to ensure that any reporting requirement would be met through existing mechanisms, and we gave assurances that the method would be the least onerous possible for Canadian industry.
We also explained in the letter the rationale for the CTBT and why Canada supported signing it.
During the preparation of our bill, in March 1998, representatives from the CTBT National Authority visited the provinces affected by the reporting requirement, British Columbia, Alberta, Quebec, and Newfoundland, to advise them that the Canadian government was now preparing a bill to go before the Parliament. We reiterated that there was a reporting requirement that would affect Canadian industry, particularly the mining sector. We wanted to solicit their comments and cooperation with a view towards working with them once the proposed legislation was passed, since we would need to develop regulations for the reporting of industry.
In May 1998, the assistant deputy minister for the mining sector of National Resources Canada gave a presentation to his provincial counterparts and the intergovernmental working group on mining and minerals. He explained the need to collect the data and that we wanted to work with the mining industry and other potentially implicated Canadian industries to develop these regulations to ensure the reporting requirement was met.
In August 1998, as we had our bill prepared and were about to introduce it in the lower House, we again formally wrote to all the provinces, reiterating what I had said before, and informing them that the proposed legislation would be tabled shortly.
In October 1998, the CTBT National Authority gave a presentation to the federal-provincial committee on mining and mineral statistics to further explore with them possible options for developing regulations on data collection next year.
Finally, with the introduction of the bill, we wrote to about 100 Canadian companies, again overwhelmingly in the mining sector, that would be potentially affected by this bill.
Senator Andreychuk: The chemical explosion section talks about reporting a series of explosions, but "series" is not defined. How do you contemplate identifying a series of explosions? Is it by time? I could say I explode once a year, and that could be a series if I do it every year, or is it once a month? Is there another mechanism? That seems unclear and might be difficult for mining companies to understand. Do you contemplate defining that in regulations?
Mr. Connors:I will point out that the series of explosions is given some context, in that it is defined as detonated by a single command, so that is well understood in the parlance of the industry. You are correct that we intend that regulations, with the help of our colleagues who are more technically proficient, will contain whatever further definition is required.
Senator Andreychuk: The Commons committee was concerned that the National Authority be accountable, through the minister, to Parliament, as Parliament would at least have some understanding of the legislation and would be part of the process of supporting it. I understand that the minister agreed, and therefore clause 27.1 (2) was added. It reads:
The Minister of Foreign Affairs shall cause a copy of the report...
And that is a report of the national authority.
...to be laid before the House of Commons on any of the first fifteen days on which that House is sitting after the Minister receives the report.
Normally, a reporting mechanism involves tabling in both Houses of Parliament. Why has neither the minister, nor anyone else, sought to follow this tradition of having both Houses involved and part of the process?
Ms Chomyn: We have proposed an amendment that reads:
The Minister of Foreign Affairs shall cause a copy of the report to be laid before each House of Parliament on any of the first fifteen days on which that House is sitting after the Minister receives the report.
Senator Andreychuk: Are you prepared to have that amendment put into the legislation?
The Chairman: Can I hear the wording again?
Ms Chomyn: The amendment reads:
The Minister of Foreign Affairs shall cause a copy of the report to be laid before each House of Parliament on any of the first fifteen days on which...
The Chairman: "Each" seems to suggest more than two.
Ms Chomyn: Either term, both or each.
Senator Corbin: Mr. Chairman, could we have the amendment circulated to committee members so they can reflect on it while we continue your discussion?
The Chairman: Certainly.
Senator Andreychuk: As the critic on this issue, I felt that the question of the tabling was worthy of an amendment.
Our actions in pursuing this legislation have been laudable. I only fault the government on the grounds that I wish it had been introduced earlier, so that we could continue to signal to other governments that this treaty is necessary and worthy of implementation in all countries. I hope that we do not wait for two years again on these kinds of issues.
My concern is that we should have the same due diligence when we are selling non-military nuclear equipment abroad or using it here in Canada, because our record is less than exemplary and works to our discredit when it comes to the implementation of such a treaty. I urge you to carry those messages to the minister and congratulate you on bringing this bill forward.
Senator Grafstein: I also want to commend the department and the minister for this and I agree with everything that Senator Andreychuk has just said.
However, I do have some questions. Why set up a separate organization instead of using an existing one? Questions are currently being asked about the proliferation of agencies. Also, I am not clear on the mandate of the International Atomic Energy Association, although I know it is an international mandate and regime and that we are a party to it.
Mr. Connors: The establishment of a "National Authority" is an obligation of the treaty for all signatories. If there is a perception that we have created something in addition to existing resources, I wish to dispel that. We have taken the pre-existing, required elements in the Geological Survey of Canada, Health Canada, Environment Canada, and in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and constituted them into the national authority.
Mr. Meyer:The senator asked why a separate organization was established instead of giving the responsibility for verification of the CTBT to the IAEA. I can only offer the suggestion that due to the nature of the required verification process, which is quite distinct from IAEA's current monitoring role, it was felt that there was need for a dedicated organization. There would be serious doubts about IAEA's capacity to take on a dedicated verification role relating to the CTBT. That requires a national monitoring regime of seismic and nuclear atmospheric testing that is different from the accounting and safeguard controls on fissile material performed by the IAEA.
Senator Grafstein: Let me see if I understand the international regime.
We have the international atomic energy regime, with responsibility for regulating and monitoring the actions of member countries, including nuclear explosions.
Article I of the treaty states that:
Each State Party undertakes...to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.
We are haunted by the spectre of another Chernobyl. Who has the international responsibility for an early warning system to detect a nuclear explosion that may be accidental as opposed to intentional?
Mr. Ross Glasgow, Director, Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Implementation Agency, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade: Honourable senators, I have some expertise in the workings of the IAEA. The distinction that Mr. Meyer made earlier was important. The IAEA has the responsibilities and the necessary expertise for safeguarding of and accounting for nuclear materials. It also has responsibilities in the area of nuclear safety. There is an IAEA convention on early notification for nuclear accidents that member states implement.
On the other hand, the particular treaty that we are discussing involves monitoring for explosions. The IAEA does not have expertise or personnel with a background in nuclear explosions, and that partly explains why a separate organization was established.
Senators may be aware that negotiations are underway for a treaty to cut off the production of fissile material. If that comes to fruition, it is possible that the IAEA will be asked to undertake the verification activities of such a treaty, because it would be within their area of expertise. It would involve safeguarding, monitoring, and accounting for fissile nuclear material for weapons purposes. It is a distinction between the kind of talent and expertise you need in the accounting and safeguarding area as opposed to that needed to detect nuclear tests. Yes, the IAEA could perhaps have acquired that expertise, but it would have had to acquire the necessary personnel, so it was six of one and half a dozen of the other.
I am also reminded that during the long negotiations preceding the CTBT, various countries argued that a dedicated organization would highlight the importance of, and provide the necessary support for, such an important treaty. Therefore, there are historical reasons, and there are also the explanations relating to the kind of expertise required for this particular treaty.
Senator Grafstein: I somewhat understand that, but my concern remains the lacuna between an accidental explosion that occurs under the atomic energy regime, and an explosion under this treaty. You have an accidental explosion that is supposed to be safeguarded by the atomic energy international commission, and you have an explosion, perhaps triggered in a different way, under this.
My concern is whether there is a lacuna in which, in effect, we are not taking care of the problem. Are we properly filling the gap in this way? In other words, are we plastering over what I consider to be a deficit in international practice in the past, that is, the lack of an early warning system against a Chernobyl-like situation? We are told that a similar accident is a probability rather than a possibility in the years to come.
There was an earthquake in the Toronto region several months ago that registered quite high on the scale. It was along the Pickering fault line, which is not very far from the atomic energy reactor. It was a one-day story, and since then no one has mentioned it, but it has always been my belief that we might have a serious problem there in the future.
In international terms, let alone domestic ones, who is responsible for the early warning of an explosion?
Mr. Chairman, as I understand this bill, we have allocated on-site inspection to the same authority that deals with domestic atomic energy regulation. In other words, we will use the same bodies. Is that correct, or did I misunderstand what was said?
In other words, we have two international organizations: one regime for international atomic control, and another regime called the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. Underneath that, there are domestic site-monitoring mechanisms, and according to the evidence this afternoon, we are going to provide 15 out of 322. I assume that the 15 are in Canada, and that generally speaking, that comes under the domestic supervision of atomic energy regulation in Canada.
Mr. Chairman, I am trying to sort out accountability and responsibility, and I am not too clear, from the testimony, on where those lie. I gave you the specific example of an early warning responsibility for an atomic or nuclear-based explosion.
Mr. Meyer: Senator, there are important elements in there. Nuclear safety is a primary concern of the Canadian government and we are active at the international level as well.
Perhaps one of my colleagues can distinguish among the various authorities involved in honouring our commitments on international safeguards under the IAEA on the one hand, and our obligations regarding this treaty on the other. There is also the issue of domestic nuclear safety responsibilities.
Mr. Glasgow, can you explain those three? They are all important, but also distinct.
Mr. Glasgow: I hope I can make it clear.
In the first instance, safeguarding declared nuclear activities is a responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Association, which administers safeguard agreements around the world.
In Canada, the responsibility for working with the IAEA on the administration of those safeguards falls to the Atomic Energy Control Board.
The IAEA also administers a number of international agreements and conventions that focus on various aspects of nuclear safety. For example, Canada is a member of a convention on nuclear safety that was negotiated in the mid-1990s and came into force in 1996, with the purpose of enhancing safety at land-based nuclear facilities.
The Atomic Energy Control Board has taken the lead responsibility for ensuring that that treaty is fully implemented in Canada, but it works closely with Natural Resources Canada and the Department of Foreign Affairs.
There are other IAEA conventions that deal with safety. There is a system whereby, in the event of a nuclear accident, the affected country would notify the IAEA, and the agency would alert other member countries to the nature and extent of that accident.
There is a third IAEA convention on assistance in case of a nuclear accident, so that following such a notification, the delivery of assistance to address the immediate after-effects can be coordinated.
These ranges of activities dealing with nuclear safety are all managed through the IAEA, which is responsible for the safeguarding of nuclear material.
What we are addressing through this proposed legislation is a ban on nuclear explosions. That is why we have a separate verification system dedicated to detecting such explosions if they were ever to take place.
Senator, you have raised an interesting point about if there is an explosion, how one would know whether it is the result of an accident or a deliberate activity.
I am sure that the international monitoring system would detect such an explosion, but it might be unable to detect whether that was as a result of an accident, or of a deliberate test. In the immediately following hours and days, that would be sorted out.
If the explosion were the result of an accident, then the IAEA, and all of the international mechanisms that have been developed to address that, would swing into operation and provide the assistance that we would all wish to see.
If it turned out that the activity detected by the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty monitoring system was not an accident, then the provisions of that treaty would come into effect.
In the split second after the explosion, there might be some uncertainty, but that would be quickly sorted out. I will defer to the technical experts, if I have misspoken in any way.
Dr. David McCormack, Seismologist, Geological Survey of Canada: Honourable senators, I will add some clarification. It is important to determine whether an explosion is a result of terrorist activity or any other cause. For example, on one hand, an explosion at a nuclear reactor would result in the release of nuclear or radioactive material, that is, a nuclear explosion as we understand it in terms of this treaty.
Both incidents would have explosive characteristics and the international monitoring system would identify both as explosions. The radionuclide monitoring component of the international monitoring system is specifically designed to assess the particular characteristics of the radioactive materials and isotopes released. It will then be determined if a nuclear explosion, in the sense of an explosion where the energy is generated by nuclear materials, has or has not occurred.
My colleague was correct that we would determine whether an explosion of a particular size has occurred. As soon as the winds were to carry any radioactive debris to one of the 80 radionuclide monitoring systems that form part of this international system, we would be able to tell from the signatures whether a nuclear explosion has occurred, or another kind of explosion.
Senator De Bané: Apart from the five permanent members of the security council, who are all nuclear powers, what is the approximate number of countries that either have a nuclear arsenal, or are working very intensely to acquire one?
Mr. Meyer: There are three so-called "threshold" states, India, Pakistan, and Israel, which are considered to have nuclear weapon capability. India and Pakistan demonstrated that in an unequivocal fashion earlier this year through nuclear tests.
There have been allegations that other countries such as North Korea and Iran have programs underway. South Africa is a positive example of a clandestine program that was acknowledged and then repudiated by a successor government.
The emphasis has been on those that we believe have crossed that nuclear capacity threshold.
Senator De Bané: Are any of the five permanent members of the security council considering ratification of this treaty?
Mr. Meyer: No, sir. The United Kingdom and France have already ratified, while the other three have signed but have not completed the ratification process.
Senator De Bané: France and the United Kingdom have not renounced their nuclear arsenal.
Mr. Meyer: No, but this is a renunciation of further development of nuclear weapons through nuclear testing.
Senator De Bané: Have they perhaps achieved a degree of development where they can simulate experiments but not actually undertake them?
Mr. Meyer: You are correct that there have been developments in computer simulation technology. However, it was felt that any nuclear weapon state, or a state intending to develop nuclear weapons, would be hampered by a prohibition on testing, because that is the only fully reliable way to determine the capacity of a nuclear weapon. It was seen as an effective bar.
Senator De Bané: Nobody could dispute that we should strive to achieve a planet without nuclear arsenals, and since the time of Diefenbaker, Canada has resisted acquiring those weapons of mass destruction.
When President Chirac was elected, he said that France would undertake a limited series of experiments, after which no more would be necessary.
Do you agree that this treaty's major weakness is that it makes us feel good without changing the situation, and is it not a real danger that the five permanent members have huge nuclear arsenals?
When the world was divided into two factions, there was a sense of stability in the fact that the two superpowers acted as counterweights. Today one has the impression that there is no equilibrium and each is on his own. Those who feel threatened will pursue their nuclear armaments, while Canada and other like-minded countries will say that is immoral.
Do you agree that this treaty is more about feeling satisfied with our own principles than about making this planet safer?
Mr. Meyer: With respect, sir, your concerns are only valid if you look at it from one angle. I assure you that this is a very important instrument that must be seen as part of a more comprehensive approach.
We have a dual-track international security policy with important non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament elements. The CTBT is an essential aspect of the non-proliferation element, i.e., it is an effective ban on further development and spread of nuclear weapons.
There is also an important nuclear arms control and disarmament track in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which obliges nuclear weapons states to work towards the ultimate elimination of their nuclear arsenals. We also put great store by that track.
In that sense, the CTBT is only one part of a broader and necessarily wider effort, but it is an important part of the non-proliferation track.
At the same time, we must not lose sight of the equally important arms control and disarmament track, and I agree that that continues to be an important challenge for the international community and one in which Canada is very actively engaged.
Senator De Bané: Canada has only one neighbour, who is also our closest friend, making it relatively easy for us to unilaterally renounce nuclear weaponry. As you know, the defence policy of a country such as Pakistan is based on potential threats and geography, and we have seen what can happen between India and Pakistan when they are feeling threatened by their neighbour.
Senator Bolduc: It could happen in Ukraine.
Senator De Bané: Defence policy is based on your own assessment of potential threats.
To what extent will ratification of the treaty by Canada and other like-minded countries make our planet safer? Will other countries say that their existence is at stake and that they are exposed to threats that Canada is not exposed to? In other words, the weakness of this treaty is that it will not make the world safer, but it will make we Canadians feel good about ourselves. While we do have the knowledge, the capability, and the financial means to develop a nuclear bomb, we have unilaterally renounced that course because there is no threat to our own existence. However, if we lived in another country, it would be different, and that is what makes the situation a little bit ambiguous.
Mr. Meyer: We are not alone in our stance. There are 186 countries that are signatories to the non-proliferation treaty. Except for the five nuclear weapons states, all the rest have voluntarily renounced the option to acquire them. They did not do it out of altruism, but out of a hard-headed assessment that their own security would ultimately be imperilled by the spread of nuclear weapons.
I strongly disagree with the suggestion that Pakistan and India have improved their national security through the use of nuclear weapons. On the contrary, I feel they have raised the risk of utter devastation of their countries to a considerable degree.
Senator Roche: With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I wish to put two questions to Mr. Meyer, in the context that I support the bill before us, and I want to carry on from Senator De Bané's questioning.
When Minister Axworthy gave a speech about CTBT and nuclear tests to the United Nations this fall, he stated that preventing horizontal proliferation was crucial. Mr. Meyer has recognized that the CTBT is aimed at doing that.
Mr. Axworthy went on to say that preventing vertical proliferation is no less vital or urgent, and nuclear disarmament is the other half of the bargain. I thank Mr. Meyer for his comments elaborating on that. However, I want to raise a question directly related to the danger the world faces from the continued presence of nuclear weapons in some countries.
In so doing, I want to quote one sentence from an extremely important letter, Mr. Chairman, that I will file with you, if you wish. This letter was written last week to every Prime Minister of a NATO country, including our own.
It is from Ambassador Tom Graham, the former head of the Arms Control Division of the United States government, in his current capacity as president of the Lawyers' Alliance for World Security. I am sure our witnesses know that Mr. Graham is a very distinguished figure in the field under discussion.
Mr. Graham states:
I believe that the NPT regime will be in grave jeopardy if significant progress is not made toward the Article VI disarmament obligations by the five nuclear weapon states parties by the 2000 Review Conference.
The letter is quite a strong indictment of the nuclear weapons states for resisting the progress toward nuclear disarmament that they pledged to make at the 1995 review and extension conference of the NPT.
Mr. Graham states that one way in which the nuclear weapons states can signal their willingness to implement their promises on NTBT NPT is for NATO to announce that, as a matter of alliance policy, its members will not be the first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict.
That leads me directly to my first question for Mr. Meyer. Since the question of "no first use" has loomed large in international discourse, what is the policy of the Government of Canada on this issue? Secondly, in what manner is the Government of Canada taking part in the current NATO review of that strategic concept?
In other words, in the current strategic review, is the Government of Canada requesting that the NATO council change its policies to adopt a no first use policy?
Mr. Meyer: Thank you, Senator Roche, for forwarding a copy of Tom Graham's letter to our office. I have a lot of respect for him and his views, and I can assure you that they will be given a serious reading in Ottawa.
Our policy development is ongoing, and at this stage I can only tell you that we are actively engaged in the strategic concept review.
If you read carefully the explanation for the vote last week in the UN General Assembly on a resolution that you are all too familiar with, sir, you will see reference to an intention to continue discussing the issues raised with friends and allies. I can assure you that that wording was carefully considered, and we see the strategic concept review as an opportunity for a thorough consideration of a very important document. I think I will have to leave it there, because our policy is still being formulated, and I am not currently in a position to say whether or not it will address that particular concern.
Senator Roche: Mr. Chairman, recognizing the diplomacy with which our witness has chosen his words, I think that what Mr. Meyer has said is quite important, and I thank him for that. He referred to an explanation of the vote last Friday in the UN, and that leads me to my second question.
Mr. Meyer was referring to the vote in the UN Disarmament Committee on Resolution L.48, which was introduced by the New Agenda Coalition of eight states. That resolution seeks to have the nuclear weapon states make an unequivocal commitment to nuclear disarmament, and to demonstrate that by commencing negotiations and practical steps leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons.
Canada abstained on that resolution, Mr. Chairman, as did a total of 12 NATO states, so we were by no means alone. It is further notable that those 12 abstentions occurred in the face of a vigorous campaign by the three western nuclear states, the United States, Britain, and France, to vote no. There was great pressure at high levels on the Government of Canada to vote no.
Thus, the Canadian vote was a signal to the international community that we wish NATO to begin taking seriously what the International Court of Justice has said must be done, and that is that negotiations leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons must be concluded.
I have two questions for Mr. Meyer. First, what was the signal that Canada intended to send by registering an abstention vote? Second, will you, Mr. Meyer, undertake to provide the committee, through the chairman, with a letter that explicitly states what was in the resolution that prevented Canada from voting yes? If Canada's abstention was signalling an affirmation of the resolution's intention, but there were issues preventing us from going all the way, will you, Mr. Meyer, undertake to write a letter to this committee stating precisely what was in the resolution that was contrary to government policy?
Mr. Meyer: Senator, I think that the signal that we wanted to send was that we are very concerned about the challenge that has been raised to the NPT-based non-proliferation regime.
As we discussed earlier, there are two fundamental tracks of non-proliferation, and nuclear arms control and disarmament, and we feel that both aspects of that bargain must be respected. It is not enough to call for restraint on the part of would-be proliferators; it is also vital that the nuclear weapons states demonstrate progress towards implementing their commitments under Article VI of the NPT to divest themselves of their nuclear weapons.
I will add that we have made an unequivocal commitment to do that. Indeed, one aspect of our discussions on that resolution was a desire to be very sure that nothing would detract from the status of the NPT and the obligations therein, because we think they are crucial.
We did issue a public explanation of the vote, and I take it, sir, that you have seen it. I would have to take under advisement your suggestion for a letter outlining detailed reactions to the elements of that resolution.
Senator Roche: I was with Mr. Meyer right up until the last sentence.
Are you saying that you are not currently prepared to commit to writing a letter to the committee, through the chairman, explaining precisely why Canada did not vote in favour of the New Agenda Coalition Resolution L.48, whose central paragraph called for an unequivocal commitment to commence negotiations leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons?
Mr. Meyer: No, senator. I am saying that I will take note of your request, and will have to consult on that. As I noted already, there is a public explanation of the vote. As to further elaboration on that, I would have to consult with my superiors in the department. I have taken note of that request and I will convey it.
Senator Roche: Can you then, Mr. Meyer, respond to my question in some manner by stating what the result of your consultations with the members of the department will be?
Mr. Meyer: I presume we will reply to the committee, if it is the committee's wish to receive a response.
The Chairman: I have a question for Senator Roche. Does the availability of the response affect considerations that might lead this committee to decide to report the bill? Or is this something that could be raised on third reading in the Senate, where, if you are not satisfied at that point, you could say so, in dramatic language, if you wish?
Senator Roche: I want to make it very clear to the committee that under no circumstances would I oppose the bill before us. It is too important. However, in the context of my support for the bill, I would like to receive from the Government of Canada an explanation as to why it did not support the resolution at the United Nations this fall. That resolution called for the commencement of negotiations leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons, and the Government of Canada is supporting the call by the International Court of Justice for the conclusion of such negotiations.
It is this collision of attitudes between the ICJ on one hand and NATO on the other that I am getting at. I simply want to have the record clear, so that the committee, and the public generally, can understand precisely what it is that is preventing Canada from voting in favour of a resolution aimed at merely starting negotiations leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons.
Senator Andreychuk: If Senator Roche has no problem with the bill, we can proceed with it. However, this committee can await a report on this issue, and we can continue to take it up as a consequence of the bill.
The Chairman: That is a possibility. When the bill comes up for third reading, Senator Roche could make his statement on the record at that time. Presumably the sponsor of the bill would then be in a position to say that the government was happy to accede to the request, or to explain why it felt that it would be irresponsible to do so. That would be my suggestion, Senator Andreychuk.
Senator Stollery: We are dealing here with whether or not we wish to report Bill C-52. The issue of the vote, which we all read about in the papers last week, seems to be a separate issue as far as the bill and this committee is concerned.
Senator Roche has a legitimate question, but I am not sure that it addresses this bill. He wants to know why the government did not support the resolution.
Senator Roche: It is directly related to the content of the bill.
The Chairman: We should be appreciative of the fact that Senator Roche brought it up at this stage, so that other members of the Senate are on notice that he is likely to bring it up at third reading. In particular, the government spokesman will be in a position to make some kind of response at that time. If that is acceptable, we will proceed.
Hon. Senators: Agreed.
The Chairman: Very well.
Senator Corbin: The coming into force of the proposed legislation reads that:
This act or any of its provisions comes into force on a day or days to be fixed by order of the Governor in Council.
Can we be informed of how soon the Governor in Council intends to move after Royal Assent?
Mr. Meyer: We intend to move as soon as we have approval in terms of completing the ratification process.
Senator Corbin: Do you mean the legislative process? You used the word "ratification". I am talking about the legislative process.
Mr. Meyer: First, an amendment must be proposed that will have to go back to the House of Commons and then return to the Senate. Certainly, we want to expedite the process.
Senator Corbin: Are you ready to move the minute this bill has received Royal Assent, that is, within a matter of days?
Mr. Meyer: Yes. Once we receive Royal Assent, we will deposit our instruments of ratification, which will allow us to assume the status of state party to the treaty rather than simply state signatory.
Senator Corbin: "Ratification" implies the implementation of the complete bill. However, the coming into force provision reads, in part, "This Act or any of its provisions". It seems to imply that parts could be implemented immediately but not necessarily the total bill.
Why does the bill contain this wording, when you have just stated that you intend to move rapidly on the total package?
Ms Chomyn: That is standard language in legislation where there are certain provisions that cannot be implemented until regulations are made, et cetera.
If we are ready to proceed -- and I see heads nodding -- we should be ready to implement the entire proposed legislation at the earliest possible date.
Senator Corbin: The regulations under the act are already written, edited, and waiting on the shelf?
Ms Chomyn: No, they are not ready.
The Chairman: They are not even translated.
Ms Chomyn: No, but that is not a big problem.
Senator Bolduc: If they were ready, we would want to see them.
Senator Grafstein: Unlike my friend, I am more concerned at the moment about domestic issues. There is a clear statement in the bill that transportation of nuclear substances within Canada will be under the Nuclear Safety and Control Act.
I take it that anything that includes fissionable or nuclear substances transported into Canada, whether for test or otherwise, would be fully supervised under the Nuclear Safety and Control Act. Is that correct? In other words, this is seamless as far as we are concerned domestically.
Ms Chomyn: Transportation currently falls under the Atomic Energy Control Act, which is in full force at this point. The bill provides that once the Nuclear Safety and Control Act comes into full force and effect, the bill provides that he the Nuclear Safety and Control Act will address transportation issues.
Senator Grafstein: Can we receive an undertaking from the ministry that until the regime is in place with respect to transportation of nuclear or fissionable material in Canada, that this legislation will not be proclaimed?
Ms Chomyn: The Atomic Energy Control Act is in place.
Senator Grafstein: The act is in place and operational?
Ms Chomyn: The Nuclear Safety and Control Act is not yet in force, but it will be soon, and when in force it will replace the Atomic Energy Control Act. When one act replaces provisions of another act, you have a seamless transfer and you must cite both pieces of legislation. That is why it is mentioned in that act.
Senator Grafstein: I have not looked at the new legislation, but this legislation has tougher controls vis-à-vis safety.
I now wish to return to the issue of Royal Assent. While we desire to see this bill proclaimed and assented to as quickly as possible, we do not want to find ourselves in a position where higher standards on the transportation of material within Canada are not yet in place.
Ms Chomyn: My understanding is that the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act would also apply. We have the Atomic Energy Control Act, which regulates the transportation of prescribed substances. Once the Nuclear Safety and Control Act comes into force and replaces the Atomic Energy Control Act, then the former will address transportation concerns about nuclear materials.
It seems that we have quite a comprehensive regime set out to cover the transportation of these types of materials, and there should not be any loopholes or grey areas.
The Chairman: Honourable senators, I want to refer back to the letter from Thomas Graham Jr. I understand from what was said earlier that Senator Roche would like to have this letter appended to the record of this committee hearing. Is it agreed?
Hon. Senators: Agreed.
(For text of the letter see Appendix "A" )
The Chairman: That will be done.
I want to ask a question about the draft bill. There is a lot of material after the last clause of the bill. We have a bill in 29 clauses with one schedule; is that correct?
Ms Chomyn: Yes.
The Chairman: We discussed and agreed earlier, that it might be desirable to change the wording with regard to the placing of a copy before both Houses. That is in clause 27.1.
Is any honourable senator proposing an amendment to the bill prior to clause 27.1?
Senator Grafstein: On page 14, it refers to a schedule, so it seems there is one schedule to the entire bill. Page 100 refers to an annex to the protocol. Does that still form part of the schedule?
The Chairman: That is why I asked if there were only one schedule.
Senator Grafstein: It is unfortunate drafting, because annex 2 to the protocol can be confused with annex 2 to 4.
Ms Chomyn: May I just refer you back to the definitions on page 2:
"Treaty" means the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, signed at New York on September 24, 1996, set out in the schedule, as amended from time to time, under Article VII of the Treaty, together with the Protocol to the Treaty also set out in the schedule.
So we have a treaty and a protocol in one schedule.
The Chairman: There is only one schedule that includes various pieces.
Senator Grafstein: It includes annex 2 to the protocol, which is called "annex" on the other.
The Chairman: I will postpone the title, the enacting words and the short title. Does anyone propose to move an amendment to any of the clauses from the beginning of the bill 2 through clause 27? If do not, hear anyone.
I will postpone the title and the enacting words and the short title. I now ask the members of the committee if they are prepared to allow the shall clauses 2 through 27 to stand as part of the bill?
Hon. Senators: Agreed.
The Chairman: Then we go to clause 27.1, to which a draft amendment was circulated.
Senator Andreychuk has called my attention to the fact that the language in the draft is better than that I was proposing, and I have agreed with her.
The language says that the report is to be laid before each House of Parliament on any of the first 15 days on which that House is sitting after the minister receives the report.
If we were to adopt my wording, we would get into drafting problems with regard to which house. Consequently, I will forgo my original hesitation and I have no problem with the proposed amendment to clause 27.1.
Senator Corbin: I wish to formally move this amendment.
The Chairman: We are dealing with clause 27.1(2), the second part of clause 27.1.
Senator Corbin: I move that the current wording in (2) be deleted and replaced by the following:
The Minister of Foreign Affairs shall cause a copy of the report to be laid before each House of Parliament on any of the first fifteen days on which that House is sitting after the Minister receives the report.
You have the French translation in your hands.
The Chairman: Are there any problems with that proposed amendment?
Senator Grafstein: Would it be better to use the word "substituting" rather than "replacing"?
The Chairman: It will be done in the language submitted to us for Bill C-52 in clause 27.1(2). It would be amended by replacing lines 6 to 10 on page 13 with your proposed amendment, Senator Corbin.
Senator Corbin: Yes.
The Chairman: Are there any problems? You have heard the motion. Is it agreed, honourable senators?
Hon. Senators: Agreed.
The Chairman: The motion is carried. We have passed clause 27.1 as amended.
Honourable senators, we have two remaining clauses, 28 and 29. Does anyone wish to propose an amendment to either of those two clauses? If not, shall the clauses stand as part of the bill?
Hon. Senators: Agreed.
The Chairman: Carried.
Shall the Schedule stand as part of the bill?
Hon. Senators: Agreed.
The Chairman: Carried.
Shall the short title in clause 1 stand as part of the bill?
Hon. Senators: Agreed.
The Chairman: Carried.
Shall the enacting words, together with the general title, an Act to implement the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, stand as part of the bill?
Hon. Senators: Agreed.
The Chairman: Carried.
Shall I report the bill with one amendment?
Hon. Senators: Agreed.
The Chairman: Carried.
The witnesses demonstrated great technical competence and were most helpful to the committee.
The committee adjourned.