Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Issue 12 - Evidence - Meeting of May 10, 2012
OTTAWA, Thursday, May 10, 2012
The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met this day at 10:30 a.m. to examine and report on Canadian foreign policy regarding Iran, its implications, and other related matters.
Senator Raynell Andreychuk (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade is convened. We are continuing our examination on Canadian foreign policy regarding Iran, its implications and other related matters.
This morning via videoconference we are joined by Dr. Gary Sick, Adjunct Professor of International and Public Affairs, Senior Research Scholar, School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University. A more detailed biography has been circulated and is available.
Before we turn to the doctor's remarks, we have received a reply from the Bank of Montreal, which was asked to come forward and testify. They declined, but they indicated they would send a written submission, which they have, but it is not translated yet. We hope by next week it will be circulated to all members.
Dr. Sick, can you hear me from New York?
Gary Sick, Adjunct Professor of International and Public Affairs, Senior Research Scholar, School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University: I can hear you very well, thank you.
The Chair: Welcome to Ottawa via videoconference. We are examining all aspects of Canadian foreign policy, though we put Canadian foreign policy in context of the global issues that other countries are dealing with, some which are similar to ours and others which perhaps have different takes on it. Whatever experience and information you can share with us would be very much appreciated.
The floor is yours.
Mr. Sick: Thank you. I was in the White House during the Iranian revolution and the hostage crisis, and I have been studying Iran and U.S.-Iranian relations for the last 33 years. Hopefully I have learned something in that process. I will share with you a few thoughts at the beginning and then I really look forward to hearing your questions on any aspect of anything I talk about or any other aspect you would like to raise.
First, I think it is worth putting this in the context of the geopolitical situation in which we find ourselves in relation to Iran. It is not often considered this way but, in fact, Iran and Israel are polar rivals in the Middle East. This is a peculiar situation because Iran and Israel are not Arab; Iran is Persian and Israel is not. Neither one of them speak Arabic. Neither of them are Sunni Muslim, which is the dominant religion we think of when we think about the Middle East.
Therefore, you have these two outliers who sit on opposite ends of the Middle East and who are rivals for power. You have to start with the realization that a great deal of what is said about Israel and Iran by each of them is actually a reflection of their rivalry.
The other fact about this is that Iran is a rival for the Sunni Muslim countries like Saudi Arabia and Jordan in the Middle East. We often forget that this sudden rise of Iran to great prominence in the Middle East, and its role as a major power in the Persian Gulf, was not really of its own doing. To be honest, it was the United States who did that. You will recall in 2001, after the 9/11 disaster, the United States invaded Afghanistan and got rid of the Taliban who was Iran's worst enemy to the east. Then we turned around shortly thereafter and invaded Iraq and got rid of Saddam Hussein, who was Iran's worst enemy to the west.
As a result, at the end of that period of time, Iran was left with no significant enemies in its own region. That accounts, to a considerable degree, for the reason that Iran has become the dominant or influential power it has. It is important for us to remember that it was not something that they did; it was something we did.
People talk a great deal about the Iranian threat and I think it is worth spending a few seconds discussing what the Iranian threat actually looks like. Iran is a mid-level power with a largely unpopular and dysfunctional government headed by a firebrand, populous president with extremely limited powers. Iran's gross domestic product is about the same as the State of Florida in the United States. Eighty-five per cent of its hard currency revenues comes from oil, which is not, as many of you know, always a blessing. Currently, inflation in Iran is running above 20 per cent, maybe up to 30 per cent.
Job creation is so low that many of its young well-educated citizens — and there are many of them — are actually looking to emigrate. Some come to the United States, and we have benefited from that. I know many of them also go to Canada. I think that has been a net gain for both countries.
Iran's annual defence expenditures total about $19 billion. That is 2.5 per cent of GDP and less than half of the expenditures of Saudi Arabia. Iran's entire defence budget is equivalent to about three months of U.S. expenditures in Iraq. Most of Iran's expenditures for their defence have been on defensive systems, such as air defence. For some reason, they seem to think they might be attacked by air, and they have taken steps to try to do something about that. They have not purchased any heavy lift, no heavy armour, no long-range strike aircraft, and no naval/amphibious units.
As you will recall, Iran fought Iraq for eight years in the Iran-Iraq War and. At the end, they were losing that war. Of course, then the United States came in with its allies and eliminated the whole Iraqi defence force in a period of weeks. Iran has not invaded another country for 200 years.
I put all this on the table just to make clear that you have to keep the threat in some kind of perspective. That does not mean there is no threat. Obviously, even weak and penurious states can be dangerous. Afghanistan and Pakistan are clear examples of that. Iran has asymmetric warfare capabilities, such as terrorism and proxies, which must be taken very seriously indeed.
I do want to stress that, in my view, if there is a war with Iran, as a number of people have been talking about, everyone will lose. Very few people, perhaps no one, would dispute the fact that an Iran without nuclear weapons is preferable to an Iran with nuclear weapons; in fact, even Iran agrees. Iran has a remained a member of the nuclear non- proliferation treaty. It accepts inspections of its principal nuclear sites by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and its leaders routinely proclaim, and have for many years, that the possession, manufacture or use of nuclear weapons is contrary to Islam.
Since the days of the Shah, Iran has been a proponent of the nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East. The U.S. Director of National Intelligence testifies that Iran has not taken a decision to build a bomb, and there is reason to believe that such a decision would be detected rather quickly if they did.
Interestingly, that view has now been repeated by Israel's Chief of Staff and by the president and past three directors of the Mossad, Israel's intelligence service, who all say that Iran is not necessarily an existential threat to Israel and that a war would be, in the words of the most recent head of Mossad, "the stupidest idea I've ever heard." It is interesting that this pushback is coming at a time when many people in Israel have been talking about a war.
The question, of course, is what to do about the nuclear situation. I will touch briefly on sanctions, which I think is something of interest to your committee. The sanctions presently in place and that are coming down the road have increased to the point that it could potentially cut off half or all of Iran's petroleum exports in the course of the next few months, thereby depriving it of 50 per cent of its revenues. That is the equivalent of a military blockade of Iran's oil ports, which is an act of war. Therefore, sanctions that were supposed to be the alternative to war have gradually increased to a point where they have actually morphed into economic warfare.
To this should be added the assassinations of Iranian scientists, cyber-warfare attacks on Iran's nuclear infrastructure, and supported dissident movements on the peripheries of the country. In fact, as a senior Iranian official said the other day, Iran is under siege.
These sanctions and the threat of war have driven Iran back to the negotiating table. As we know, we have had one round of negotiations in Turkey and a new round is coming up on May 23, later this month.
We should have no illusions that Iran will reverse or abandon nearly two decades of experience with its domestic nuclear program. Even if we would like such a thing to happen, it is very unlikely. Even if there were a change of government in Iran, whatever should follow the present government, they would not agree to abandon their nuclear program either, and we should have no illusions about that.
What kind of an agreement is possible? The broad outlines of an agreement can actually be described. That would be Iran capping its nuclear enrichment program at a low level, hopefully, accompanied by intrusive monitoring and inspections by the IAEA of its nuclear program. In return, Iran would expect the sanctions to be lifted and that its role in the region as a significant player would in fact be acknowledged.
Both sides have an incentive to seek a negotiated solution. From the perspective of the Western nations, the P5-plus- 1, as well as many other countries, the incentive is the prospect of very high oil prices if this threat continues as it has in the past. We are now paying a premium of something like 15 per cent for every barrel of oil that is purchased, just because of the uncertainty of the situation in the Persian Gulf. That affects every economy in the world.
The fact that both sides potentially stand to gain does not necessarily ensure success. There have been many missed opportunities in the past, by both sides, and this could still be another in that long list. I am slightly optimistic about the current negotiations that are going on, but I have no illusions that it will be easy or short.
With that, I will stop and hopefully have some questions from the committee.
The Chair: Thank you, Dr. Sick. I do have a list of senators who want to question you. Thank you for your comments.
[Translation]
Senator Fortin-Duplessis: Thank you, professor Sick, for agreeing to give us an overview of the situation in Iran. At the beginning of your presentation, you said you were also available to answer any questions regarding aspects you did not cover in your statement.
I have three quick questions for you. I have already asked questions about Russia when we began our study on Iran. Russia is supposedly implementing an action plan in case of a western attack on Iran. If a conflict with Iran were to erupt, could the Russian military get involved?
[English]
Mr. Sick: I do not think that Russia is at all interested in getting itself engaged in a military operation. I very much hope that there will not be a military operation taking place in Iran, but I find it hard to believe that Russia, which has limited capability in the Persian Gulf region, would in fact intervene in any significant way.
The most I can imagine is that Russia would sell equipment to Iran that would give it a better opportunity to defend itself. For instance, Russia was requested by Iran to provide the S-300 anti-aircraft missile system, which, in fact, Russia has refused to do. Therefore, I do not see Russia participating actively in any kind of military operation.
[Translation]
Senator Fortin-Duplessis: We have heard statements made by important figures in Moscow to the effect that, if western countries were to attack Iran, Russia would get involved. That is why I asked you the question. I am still wondering whether Moscow can block any U.S. or Israeli action.
[English]
Mr. Sick: As I said in my opening statement, there is a significant pushback within Israel itself against any kind of a military operation, so I think that certainly is a hypothetical. However, again, I do think Russia would make an effort, say, in the United Nations or in the court of public opinion to try to counteract any such activity. It would have a considerable amount of support in that, I suspect, in the UN and elsewhere. In terms of military intervention, I do not think so, but if it is a matter of Russia intervening through the UN or in other diplomatic ways to try to prevent such an activity or to react to such an attack if it happens, yes, I think that is entirely possible.
Senator D. Smith: Welcome, professor. It is nice to see someone from Columbia. I have to confess: My son did his PhD at Columbia and I have spent a lot of time there.
Mr. Sick: Very good.
Senator D. Smith: With regard to the Iranian community, not just in Iran but the diaspora, to the extent there are people who would like to see a change of government in Iran, they cannot say anything or they will be locked up and bad things will happen to them.
However, there is this huge diaspora; I think there are over half a million in Los Angeles alone, and there is quite a diaspora in Canada. By and large, they came after the Shah days. They are a well-educated and cultural group that moans about the current government there.
Let me preface my question about opposition to the regime. It would have to be more outside the country than inside the country for reasons I do not need to explain to you, although I am sure there is underground stuff there. For instance, there is the big Paris rally they have every year. The leader of the umbrella group is the wife of the former opposition leader, but he has been in hiding for years because he is convinced he will be assassinated by Iranian agents if he says or does anything. I do not know whether you think that is true or not.
Maybe we are influenced in our thinking by some of the events of the Arab Spring. I know Iran is not Arabic, but they are part of the Muslim world. To the extent of what happened in Egypt and things like that, do you see that sort of thing having some chance of happening in Iran? Are the opposition groups sort of structured and viable, or credible? What sort of analysis would you have of that aspect of this overall situation?
Mr. Sick: Thank you, senator. I got my PhD at Columbia also, so I do have something in common with your son.
I am glad that you raised the question of the diaspora, because it is the forgotten part of the equation when we talk about Iranian politics. You are right: There is a very large diaspora in Los Angeles, which is probably the largest outside Iran, though I am sure the diaspora in Canada is quite large, as well. There is a very large community in New York, Boston and Washington. They are everywhere.
Again you are correct that this is a very well-educated group of people who have financial resources that are significant. These are professionals, in many cases, such as doctors and lawyers. If you go, for instance, to Silicon Valley and look at the names, you will find a lot of Iranians in Silicon Valley and in other parts of the technical industries.
In passing, Iran is actually very successful at training people for computer engineering and sciences. This is something their education system has really worked on. Iranians like to become engineers, so cyber-engineering is an area they are particularly good at. In many cases we have benefited from the young people who cannot find jobs in Iran after they graduate, and some of them come here. That is not a bad thing from our point of view.
To get to your question, the diaspora actually cuts a variety of different directions. First, they do not all agree with each other. There are many people in the diaspora who take very different views. There are people that range all the way from hard-line monarchists who want to see the monarchy restored, to people very much in favour of reform inside the government.
I would say there are very few people outside the country who actively support the present government. In fact, I would argue that the number of people even inside Iran who actively support the present government is dwindling; their base of support has been declining over the years. Over time, as their legitimacy has been lost, as they have declined in terms of their own legitimacy with their own people because of their mismanagement of the economy and various other things, they have replaced that with repression. That is a way to stay in power, but it is not a way to win friends and influence people.
I think Iran has in fact worked its way to a point where you can see the writing on the wall: This present government will probably not survive indefinitely. The question is: How long does it take for that to happen?
I must say they are very firmly in command right now. They really do own the means of repression and they are quite prepared to use them. They have been extraordinarily clever in the way they have used the Internet, for instance, to their own benefit, finding out what people are doing, learning where the next demonstration will be planned or held, and at turning the off the Internet in certain areas where it will interfere with the plans of the opposition.
At the moment, they have the opposition well under control inside the country, but it is there. A friend of mine said that if you had a demonstration in Iran and people thought they could do it without getting arrested or getting killed, you would have 3 million people in Tehran out marching on the streets today.
They are not doing that for the moment. The Arab Spring, in some respects, looks very much like what was going on in Iran in 2009 after the election that people contested. Despite that, they have gotten it under control and it is not very apparent today.
I do not see any immediate chance that this government will just collapse. I do think it is doomed in the long run. I wish I could put a time on that. A number of other countries have lost their legitimacy, such as Soviet Russia under Stalin. It lost its legitimacy in the 1930s when people realized it was a sham, but they lasted for 50 more years after that. Repressive regimes, even ones that are terribly unpopular, can in fact survive. Therefore, I cannot put a date on it.
Senator Johnson: Thank you, chair. Welcome, professor. Thank you for your very excellent presentation.
You stated that it is important to keep the Iranian threat in perspective. That is very good advice. If there is a war, everyone will lose.
We found in our studies that the Economist Intelligence Unit, for example, described Iran's relationship with its neighbours as fractious, with mutual distrust, rivalry and fears of the nuclear weapons programs. Then the U.S. State Department in February made a statement that Iran still has not recognized Israel's right to exist and has hindered the Middle East peace process by arming militants, including Hamas, Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
Could you elaborate on the role and the influence that Iran has on the region?
The Chair: He is gone.
Senator Johnson: Where did he go? I looked up and there he was.
Senator Nolin: Should we suspend?
The Chair: Is he there by sound as opposed to vision? We shall suspend for a few minutes.
Professor Sick, just as you were talking about technologies and capabilities you disappeared from the screen. I will ask Senator Johnson to quickly get to a question before we lose you again.
Senator Johnson: Professor, at which point did you depart?
Mr. Sick: I departed just as your name was mentioned.
Senator Johnson: I sure have an impact on this technology.
The United States Department of State said in February 2012 that Iran still has not recognized Israel's right to exist and has hindered the Middle East peace process by arming militants, including Hamas, Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Can you elaborate on the role and influence that Iran has in the region and the alliance that exists between them and their neighbours? Does Iran have a non-state militant group in the region? I want to then go on to Syria.
Mr. Sick: The short answer to that question is that Iran has relations with a number of countries in the region. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, some of that influence is actually a result of our activities in the region; the reason that Iran has influence today in Iraq is because we got rid of Saddam Hussein and installed a Shia government there, many of whom had sheltered in Iran during the time of Saddam Hussein.
There is no question that Iran's influence and relationship with Iraq today is far, far greater than it was before the U.S. invasion in 2003.
That does not mean that Iraq will ever take orders from Iran. That is the key point here. Does Iran use its influence with these other countries and groups in the region to try to influence policy? Absolutely; there is no question about it. They provide funding for some of these organizations, such as Hamas in the past, though today that relationship is very problematic because basically Hamas has now broken with Syria and Iran has not broken with Syria. The Hamas relationship, which many people saw as Iran using Hamas as an outlier, as a proxy, in fact, may be completely gone now from where it was before. However, the relationship with Hezbollah in Lebanon certainly remains and the relationship with President Assad of Syria remains.
That relationship you can argue is not necessarily a good thing for Iran. It has undercut Iran's standing in the Arab world tremendously because just as Iran accuses us of having double standards and applying different rules in different cases, the Arabs now say you have double standards as well. You support revolution and change when it suits you, but when it does not, you do not. You oppose freedom, liberty and opening up another country.
It has undercut Iran's position in the Middle East rather substantially, and I think that is the key point. I would say Iran has influence in a number of places with a number of countries and a number of movements, but it does not give the orders for those countries either in Iraq or Syria, or even with Hezbollah, for that matter, in Lebanon, and in some cases its support for those organizations cuts both ways and undercuts Iran's capability to affect events in Egypt, for example.
It is a complicated question and one that we have to be realistic about, that Iran's influence is there but it is not dominant. It does not determine what everyone does in the rest of the region.
Senator Nolin: I have two questions. The first one deals with the diaspora and, more specifically, with Iranians temporarily being in the U.S. or in Canada to study. We discovered yesterday — it was not a secret, but for me it was a discovery — that in the last 10 years the number of Iranian students coming here to Canada, and it is probably the same thing in the U.S. and you can correct me if I am wrong, temporarily to study has increased very much.
Considering the obstacles and the cost of coming to North America to study, can we trust the intentions of those young Iranians coming to Canada or the United States?
Mr. Sick: I have a number of Iranian students. I routinely at Columbia have them in my class. Some of them have become good friends and many have gone on to work on PhDs and other things.
As I mentioned previously, the Iranians who have come to this country in many cases have really good language skills. They come able to speak the language or languages, as the case may be. They have good educational backgrounds and are contributing in many ways.
Can you say that is true 100 per cent across the board, that there are no other people in that group? You can say the same thing about any American or Canadian students going abroad. They are a mixed bag. I cannot guarantee that every young Iranian student who comes to Canada or the United States will be someone that we absolutely want, but that is what visas are for. That is why we have the process.
My view is that, on the whole, having a place for these young people, who cannot get jobs in Iran, who do not want to leave the country but in many cases find that they must for economic reasons, to go is really a very important thing. I think this is a contribution that we can make, which actually works to our benefit as well as theirs.
Senator Nolin: Thank you. My next question deals with a piece you did for CNN, at the end of March titled, What if Israel Bombs Iran? For the benefit of my colleagues, I will read the first paragraph: "Imagine that you wake up tomorrow morning and discover that, during the night, Israeli planes had conducted a bombing raid on Iran. How would your world have changed?"
Is that a possibility? I will let you elaborate on your answer to that question.
Mr. Sick: Thank you very much for raising that. To be quite honest, it has never been my view that this was a very likely thing. Basically, if anybody — the United States, Israel — attacks Iran, there is going to be a morning after. The morning after, everything is going to be worse than it was before the attack took place. If there is an attack on Iran's nuclear capability, for instance, you will drive them underground. They will leave the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, kick out the IAEA inspectors and renounce their present situation where they say that going for a bomb is contrary to Islam. They are very likely to say, "Islam permits us to defend ourselves." All of those bets are off, and we could expect them to go underground and probably go for a bomb. People would rally around this present government and actually strengthen it. Plus, the price of oil would probably go up to three or $400 a barrel simply because of the conflict in the region, which would have an impact on virtually all of the economies in the region. If people are talking about an attack, they have to think about the consequences. I think the consequences are really very severe, which is why I think an attack probably will not take place.
Senator Nolin: Answering a question asked by my colleague Senator Fortin-Duplessis, you alluded to the Russian UN forum as an area where Russia would rally against any attack against Iran, so is it in that context that you are giving me that answer?
Mr. Sick: That would be one additional thing. Iran today, by most standards, has not decided to build a nuclear weapon. Probably if they get attacked, they will. At least, that is my judgment. Those are very important, serious and dangerous possible outcomes of an attack. I would put the Russian involvement very much lower than that. I do not see that is as being the same kind of threat as the other aspects of the problem.
Senator Frum: You have now said twice that the Iranian regime states that going for a bomb is contrary to Islam. It seems to me that you are putting some stock in that statement. Can you explain why you think that is a meaningful statement?
Mr. Sick: Let me give a very brief answer to that. First, maybe we in the West, particularly more secular people, say that whatever the mullahs say is just done for effect. It is just something they say, and we do not have to take them seriously. However, you have to remember that this is a theocratic regime. When you have the most senior authority in a government that is a religious government saying openly and repeatedly that it is a sin and absolutely contrary to Islam to build, store or use nuclear weapons, you have to at least ask yourself why they would be doing that. Even assuming that it is a trick, it has not tricked you, and it is not likely to trick anybody else. What it will have is an impact on the people in Iran itself, people who are actually responsible for nuclear development. They are being told by the most senior religious authority in Iran that they are committing a sin if they do that. Does that mean that Iran, under no circumstances, would ever build a nuclear weapon? No, it does not, but it means that, at the moment, we have something to build on here. Why not take advantage of that? Iran says it does not want to, does not need to and actually is prohibited by Islam from building a nuclear weapon. Why do we not start with that as a way of negotiating with Iran and say, "Okay, we with agree with you completely. Now let us figure out how we can get assurances that what you are telling us is true. It seems to me that that is exactly where the negotiations are at this point.
Senator Frum: You also said in your presentation that you felt that there was nothing that was really going to dissuade Iran from proceeding with its nuclear program. You also said — and I thought this was interesting; this is not my question, though I would love to hear more — that you felt the opposition parties would not abandon the nuclear program. Putting that aside, you also said you felt that there had been missed opportunities by both sides of the non- proliferation negotiations.
Perhaps you already answered this question, but what do you consider to be the missed opportunities on the part of the West, let us say, in those negotiations?
Mr. Sick: As I say, I have been watching this situation for over 30 years, and I once did a survey of what I thought were missed opportunities on both sides. I got to 10 and quit counting.
Let me give you a clear example on the Western side: At the time that the United States invaded Iraq and overthrew Saddam Hussein, Iran presented, in 2003 and 2004, an agenda for negotiations between itself and the West, which we would love to see today. The agenda that they provided, which is actually available on the Internet, is quite broad and comprehensive. At that point, we were busy taking care of Iraq and of the aftermath of the invasion, and the Bush administration, for whatever reason, just dropped the agenda in the wastebasket and never pursued it. That was a missed opportunity.
We had another case with the elder Bush, back in 1990, where he made the statement that goodwill begets goodwill. We said to Iran that, if they would free our hostages in Lebanon, we would respond to them in a positive way. Iran freed the hostages in Lebanon. It was a complicated process, going through the UN and elsewhere, and, by the time they got the hostages freed, we walked away from the deal because President Bush was in a difficult election process and did not follow up. Iran feels that they were betrayed. There are a number of such things.
There are other cases where we have every reason to feel that Iran betrayed us. My point is that, basically, the relationship between the West and Iran is kind of like a seesaw. One side is up, and the other side is a down. Whoever is up says, "I do not need to negotiate," and whoever is down says, "I do not dare negotiate." Then they switch positions, and they reverse. We almost never get to a point where Iran and the West or Iran and, particularly, the United States feel that they are on an equal playing field. I think that, in some respects, that is where we are today. We ought to take advantage of it when we have a chance.
Senator Downe: I am curious if you have had a chance to look at the changes in the government of Israel. You talked in your presentation about some opposition in Israel to any military action from very senior sources. The new coalition government, however, may change the equation dramatically. You are an expert in the region. Have you had any time to look at that new coalition in the last 48 hours?
Mr. Sick: I do not consider myself a great expert on the internal politics of Israel, though I follow it as closely as I can. Let me say that the new coalition government is with the Likud on one hand headed by Prime Minister Netanyahu and on the other by the Kadima party headed by Shaul Mofaz, who just won an internal election. Mofaz is a former Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. He was born in Iran, which is something many people do not realize, and he has been an outspoken critic of Prime Minister Netanyahu's talk about striking Iran.
You can look at it two different ways. One is that he has given up his opposition and is now joining into a party where a strike against Iran is regarded as something to at least be discussed. Second, you can look at it the other way and say that he is a critic of this and the opposition within the Israeli government is now greater than it was before in terms of an internal strike.
In my view, I think of the answer I gave previously about "what does the day after look like?" What happens the day after someone does a strike against Iran? That is the critical issue. I think it is true of any prime minister of Israel any time; for that matter, it is also true for any president of the United States. They have to face the consequences, which are very unpleasant.
When push comes to shove, we have had talk about striking Iran for at least 10 years now. We get these ups and downs, and suddenly it is on the front pages of the papers and then it declines. Then it is back on the front page. Ten years we have been talking about striking Iran. Normally, when Israel has launched strikes against other countries, they have not advertised it for years in advance and give the other side a chance to respond.
We are seeing pressure by Israel to get other countries to put very severe sanctions against Iran, and they have been very successful at that. However, when it actually comes to pushing the button and doing something, it will probably be very bad for Israel as well as very bad for the rest of the world. I think there will be reluctance to do that.
Senator Downe: The question in my mind really is: Can Israel allow such an unstable country to obtain these weapons? That question hinges on a second question: Are they close to attaining them or not? This void of information would seem to explain — and I accept your analysis — that it is a pressure tactic; you do not broadcast ahead of time if you are thinking of attacking someone. If you can get inspectors in and have the current regime change their viewpoint, but I assume it is the unavailability of the status of their program that is the problem.
You talked before about possible negotiations and things that were under consideration before. In the current environment, do you see any signs of optimism that the Iranian officials will actually disclose their program to third- party oversight and disclose what stage they are actually at?
Mr. Sick: I am sure you are familiar with the fact that the IAEA presently has inspectors in place at the centrifuge centre. They have people inspecting that underground site near Qom, which is deep underground. Israel thinks it would be very hard to hit that site and it probably would be. However, the IAEA people are there with cameras watching what goes in and what comes out.
To that extent, that is better than any intelligence organization could ever do. I think we have to realize that is a real boon for us and also realize that is one of the things that would be lost by an attack. Those people there reporting on those sites, as well as other sites around Iran, would simply be gone.
Does that mean that we know absolutely everything about Iran's nuclear program? I will simply repeat what the Director of National Intelligence of the United States said not too long ago and which is formally the U.S. government position. Iran has not taken a decision to build a nuclear weapon.
I think that is a positive thing. A strike against Iran would immediately remove that judgment. Does that mean that we should just sit back and not worry about it? Not at all, but I do think that the makings of a bargain are really there if we want to use them.
I would like more inspection rather than less, and the only way we will get that is with some kind of negotiation.
Senator Downe: This is my last question. It is the quality of the information. There is a high degree of suspicion that we are not finding out the true state of the program. I assume that is a concern for a host of countries. We keep hearing about Iranian scientists who are alleged to be working on this program suddenly dying in a host of different methods, which would seem to indicate that someone knows that something is happening that is not being reported.
You seem to have a high comfort level that inspections are showing most of what is going on; is that correct?
Mr. Sick: There are inspectors present with cameras, and they do surprise inspections on all of the major parts of Iran's nuclear system. Does that mean that Iran has nothing in the rest of the country that is not under control? I think that is true. Basically, Iran at one point tentatively accepted what are called the additional protocols, which permit surprise inspections to go much wider than just a few sites.
We passed up the opportunity I think of keeping that there. I think we should go back to the point where Iran again accepts the additional protocols. Those are very important and are very useful.
Inevitably, there will always be doubts about what any country is doing or what it can do. The question is: Are you better off by having the inspectors on site, hopefully with a broader mandate to extend their coverage, or doing away with them and trying to eliminate their whole system with a strike, which virtually every expert I have ever talked to — and I have military background myself — believes that you cannot do it? You will hit some of their sites. It will drive them underground and actually will increase their willingness to go for a nuclear weapon.
It is counterproductive. That is my point. More inspection is better. If we have to pay a price in terms of lifting some of the sanctions in order to get more inspections, that is not a bad bargain.
The Chair: We are fast running outline of time, and I still have Senator Raine on my list. Senator Mahovlich has indicated he has a supplementary. If the questions and answers can both be made shorter, I can accommodate all of the senators.
Senator Mahovlich: Thank you, professor. I would like to know something about Iraq. The morning after Iraq, was the United States pleased with the way Iraq has turned out? How does the world look at Iraq? Are they quite satisfied?
Mr. Sick: My short answer to that is no, the United States is not happy the way it has turned out the day after, and I think the rest of the world is probably not happy either. I think pretty much everyone is happy that Saddam Hussein is gone; however, if you look at the structure of the government there, what is currently going on, which has the makings of a potential new dictatorship, I do not think anyone is happy with that. I am certainly not.
Senator Raine: I find this very interesting. I would like to give us your view on what is happening with the demographics in Iran. You say many of the young people are seeking to emigrate, and yet they are well educated. Are things improving at all for the general population?
We also hear about the lack of human rights. It is hard to sit back and watch that happen. Do you see any way that the outside world can apply pressure to alleviate some of the human rights abuses going on there?
Mr. Sick: My good friend Ramin Jahanbegloo testified before your committee yesterday. He is one of the great experts on Iranian human rights circumstances. I am not sure what exactly he told you, but I am sure what he told you is better than anything I could in terms of dealing with the human rights situation.
With regard to the population, I believe the numbers are somewhere in the neighbourhood of 70 per cent of Iran's population is under the age of 35. This is a very young population. The reality is that they are facing a situation in which job creation is far too slow for the people entering the job market. Inflation is high. A lot of people are facing difficult circumstances in Iran.
Also, this is not an inspiring government. The young people are exposed to the world. They are on the Internet. They are not cut off from the rest of the world. They know what is going on. They are disappointed in their government, I think rightly so, for a whole variety of reasons, whether it is economic or human rights or the governance structures. This is a government that is difficult to love, and I think the young people in Iran do not love it very much.
That does not mean, however, that there will be an outbreak immediately or that the government will be overthrown. It does mean there is a tremendous amount of dissatisfaction. The degree to which we can provide real alternatives to them, ideologically or from the point of view of an alternative model, I think that is wonderful and I think we should. I think we can focus on the human rights.
I am a member of the board of Human Rights Watch and have been for many years. I take the human rights aspect extremely seriously. However, that is only part of the equation. We have to deal with the security situation and the power structure in the Middle East and the region. There is no silver bullet, no nice, easy way out of this whole problem.
The Chair: Professor, we have run out of time, so perhaps my questions will have to be in one of your seminars. We have covered a lot of territory. Your personal experience on the ground and your reflections from your position in the university have been extremely helpful in framing some of the issues we will be facing as we draw to the end of our report and have to make some recommendations.
We regret that we had the technical delay, but I do not think it detracted from your testimony. Thank you for being with us.
Honourable senators, in the second part of the hearings, we have, again by video conference but this time from Paris, France, from the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique, Mr. Bruno Tertrais, Senior Research Fellow. His area of expertise is conflicts, U.S. strategy, trans-Atlantic relations, security in Asia and, more important for our study here, nuclear proliferation, nuclear deterrence, and military strategy and terrorism.
Mr. Tertrais, you certainly cover a lot of ground. We are studying Iran, so may I turn to you for your opening statement. We have a lot of senators who would like to ask questions. I know your NATO background, so if you could just give us a short opening statement and then we will proceed to questions.
Bruno Tertrais, Senior Research Fellow, Fondation pour la recherche stratégique: Thank you. It is an honour and a pleasure to appear before this committee. If it is okay with you, I will give my opening statement in French and then answer any questions in the language in which it is posed. Is that fine with you?
The Chair: That is fine.
[Translation]
Thank you, Madam Chair. I want to begin by giving you four good pieces of news for 2012 regarding the Iranian nuclear crisis.
The first piece of good news: Iran is much more isolated than it was as recently as one or two years ago. One of the reasons for that is the Arab Spring. Another reason is what happened in Syria because, as you know, Syria is Iran's only true ally in the region. In addition, the assassination campaigns — which failed for the most part — that Iran has carried out over the past few months have resulted in blame being laid not only by the countries involved, but also by the United Nations General Assembly.
The second piece of good news: we can now talk about truly effective sanctions against Iran. The sanctions have been effective in considerably slowing down Iran's centrifugation program. However, they have also been effective politically. That is especially true of the economic sanctions, since the Istanbul meeting — and especially the Baghdad meeting — would not have taken place if Iran had not yielded, in my opinion, owing to the sanctions.
The third piece of good news: I think that the U. S. has re-established the credibility of the military option. President Obama has made it clear that he would not accept a containment policy if Iran were to develop a nuclear weapon.
The fourth and last piece of good news: I do not think Israel will take military action in 2012. I feel that the cumulative effect of sanctions, President Obama's new openness to the military option and the ongoing negotiations helps create a backdrop that is rather unfavourable to Israeli military action.
I want to add that I think we are considerably overestimating Israel's availability to take on this venture. The cost- effectiveness of an Israeli military action is, as you probably know, highly debatable and discussed within the government.
It is too early to say that 2012 will be a turning point in the Iranian crisis. I have been following this matter for some ten years now, and so many turning points have been predicted that I think we have to be careful. It seems to me that, as much as the P5+1 and Iran want to buy time, a comprehensive agreement remains improbable at this stage. I think that, in Baghdad, the stakeholders will be able to reach a solid agreement on the first steps to be taken — a synchronization of gestures on both sides that will help reduce the tension.
I think the western countries that recall — as far as Europe goes — the negotiation with Iran from 2003 to 2005 will be extremely careful when it comes to the specific details of those steps. I think the true test of a comprehensive agreement could only be one of the following two. On the one hand, the 20 per cent enrichment and the transfer of uranium enriched at 20 per cent outside of Iran would have to come to a complete stop. On the other hand — and this maybe even more important — the International Atomic Energy Agency's additional audit protocol of would have to be applied fully and unconditionally.
We will see even before the Baghdad meeting — as early as next week, when the IAEA meeting will take place — whether Iranians are willing to take action to clarify their past and perhaps present military actions.
I have a few points in conclusion, Madam Chair. We must be very careful not to come to a rushed conclusion regarding our assessment of Iranian strategic projects. No one knows what exactly the supreme leader's expectations are in terms of the nuclear program.
I hear many of my colleagues state with certainty that Iran wants nuclear capability but not a nuclear weapon. I remind them of nuclear proliferation history — the history of nuclear programs — which shows us that, with very few exceptions, all the countries that reached the nuclear threshold also crossed it.
That is why my conclusion is fairly pessimistic. I think that we have not yet reached a stage where Iran has definitely abandoned its military projects. In any case, there is nothing to support the statement that we are today at a point where the crisis could be resolved. If that were the case, Iran would have definitely abandoned its nuclear military project.
That is why I am not sure this crisis will be resolved in 2012 or 2013, and I fear that only the maintenance of especially strict and sustained sanctions — perhaps even for several more years — could lead Iran to believe that its regime might not survive. Only this fear, this Iranian belief, may lead the country to abandon its military intentions.
Thank you. I am ready to answer any of your questions.
The Chair: Thank you.
Senator Nolin: Thank you, Mr. Tertrais. As the chair mentioned, we recognize your accomplishments in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.
Mr. Tertrais: Thank you very much.
Senator Nolin: My understanding is that, when you were there, that was not the organization's name; it was called the North Atlantic Assembly. Today, its name has been changed a bit, but everyone knows what is going on anyway.
I want to discuss your conclusion. I want to understand. Do you feel that the sanctions are too strict and that they may lead us to unpredictable results, or have I misunderstood? Are you asking us to maintain and even increase the pressure through those sanctions?
Mr. Tertrais: Let us be clear. I think that strict sanctions have helped bring Iran back to the negotiation table. I urge all governments of the alliance countries, but also all members of the international community, to continue supporting those sanctions and applying them fully. That is because only those sanctions — in my opinion — can lead Iran to believe that perhaps its regime will not survive.
Sanctions are not the best solution; they are the least bad one. Between the military option, which no one wants, and negotiations without the backing of sanctions — we know what that approach produced in the early 2000s — I think that negotiating on a strong footing, which we have today, is the least bad alternative.
Ladies and gentlemen senators, you are politicians. You know that politics often involve choosing the least bad option. I think that the current approach is indeed the least bad of the alternatives.
I want to quickly add that the past 30 years of history have taught us that Iran sometimes makes difficult decisions under pressure. One of those decisions came in 1988, when Tehran was worried that the United States would attack Iran following incidents that took place at sea and in the air in 1987-88. I am one of the people who are practically convinced that is why Ayatollah Khomeini decided to drink the cup of poison — to use his expression — even though he had previously said he would never end the Iran-Iraq war short of a victory. I think it is important to keep this historical precedent in mind.
Senator Nolin: In a book published in 2011, titled L'apocalypse n'est pas pour demain — the apocalypse will not happen overnight — you argue against catastrophism. I have not read the book thoroughly, but according to the summary I was given, you have certainly calmed or tried to calm the political pressure that often seems to prevail in certain capitals. That being said, we cannot ignore the population — the Iranian population's discontent — especially since 2009. How can we juggle human rights objectives without lapsing into catastrophism?
Mr. Tertrais: Thank you, senator. It is very nice of you to refer to this anti- catastrophic book. A few months ago, I was invited to Ottawa to discuss the book with Canadian services. That was a rich learning experience for me. When it comes to proliferation and other issues, I am something of a repentant catastrophist.
Let us be clear. The Iranian crisis is serious — very serious — and I do say that in the book. What I speak out against is the idea of a mechanical idea of proliferation that suggests that, after Iran, there will inevitably be three or four other nuclear powers in the Middle East over the next ten years. I do not think it will be that simple or that quick.
For those of your colleagues who may not be familiar with my book, I want to point out you that I address catastrophism in the general sense, but I am fairly careful when it comes to proliferation. If Iran were to cross the nuclear threshold, we would still be faced with a very substantial risk of the non-proliferation regime "unravelling". That would be the second time a country withdrew from the treaty, following North Korea, so there would be a concern that the non-proliferation regime could not recover.
I am much more careful when it comes to immediate proliferation risks in the region, even though I think Saudi Arabia could not react to an Iranian bomb, and even though I think Saudi Arabia would not be appeased by the U. S. reassurances.
When it comes to the Iranian population, you have put your finger on a true dilemma. Can we have very strict sanctions against Iran, without at the same time penalizing the Iranian population? We know or assume that this same population is for the most part opposed to the current regime. I think that dilemma always goes hand in hand with sanctions. The international community had in a way resolved the dilemma in South Africa in the 1970s and the 1980s.
I actually think that, at the time, some opponents of the regime were saying that they understood the sanctions, even though they had to suffer because of them. I do not know what the prevailing attitude of the Iranian opposition is on those issues. I think there are even debates within the population as far as whether sanctions are good or bad.
On the other hand, what I do know is that, in every scenario, even if there were no economic sanctions, the Iranian population would still be suffering greatly from poor economic management — which could even be referred to as disastrous — provided by the successive administrations since 2005. The international community has nothing to do with that.
To resolve this dilemma, I would say that the least we could do — even though we cannot completely resolve the dilemma — is to let the Iranian population know in no uncertain terms that we are not just thinking about the nuclear aspect. We are also thinking about human rights and democracy in Iran.
This is a difficult balancing act because, if we insist too much on making Iran a democratic country, we may make the supreme leader think that westerners actually want a regime change. And if the supreme leader gets that idea, the potential for reaching an agreement on the nuclear program may be reduced. The dilemma is really very difficult.
I think the least governments can do — especially those of western countries that are based on human rights and democracy — is state that we are not only interested in the nuclear aspect. We are also extremely interested in the future of this country. Iranians need to know that we support, at least in terms of our intentions, the relinquishing of the control this regime is exerting on its population. I want to add that the situation has not improved, as it is even worse than it was in 2009.
Senator Nolin: Thank you very much.
[English]
Senator Frum: Thank you, Mr. Tertrais. I am wondering if you could share some insights with us, if there are any to be had, about the situation in France. I do not know if you would agree that is it fair to say that President Sarkozy was one of the most vigorous, outspoken champions of the sanctions on behalf of the EU. He really led that, I think it is fair to say. Do you see any possible change of direction with President Hollande?
Mr. Tertrais: In the interests of full disclosure, it would be fair to tell you that I was part of the Hollande campaign, and Iran was one of the issues on which I advised the candidate.
Nothing that the candidate has said publicly about Iran in the past six months is indicative of a forthcoming change in the French policy vis-à-vis Iran. I think Hollande understands the stakes of the issue very well. If you have noticed what he has been saying or writing about Iran, you may have noticed that, on at least two occasions, he made a direct reference to what I was saying earlier, a reference to the fact that we should not forget the human rights situation and democracy in Iran and that the nuclear issue should not completely overshadow the fact that we have certain values and that we share the values and interests of those in Iran who would like to see more democracy.
I cannot speak for him. I have neither the knowledge nor the authority to speak for him at this point and certainly not after Tuesday. However, in the coming months, I see no sign and no reason to believe that there will be a change in policy, even though his style in this matter, as in other matters, may be slightly different. The style and the public expression might be a little different. With the policy itself, I do not anticipate any change.
Senator Johnson: Welcome. We had a witness before you who said that Iran has not taken a decision to build a bomb, but I know that you did an article, The 10 Reasons Why We Know Iran Wants the Bomb. You said that their nuclear program is inconsistent with its alleged civilian purpose but consistent with a military purpose.
Could you enlighten us on your comments, please, and on the difference in these two presentations to our committee today?
Mr. Tertrais: Absolutely. Words matter a lot, and sometimes people do not always refer to the same thing when they talk about a nuclear program, a nuclear capability or a nuclear weapon. Let me be as precise as possible.
First, once again, we do not know what Iran has decided. I would challenge any expert or government official to give me the proof, so to speak, that he or she knows what Iran has decided. I think we do not know. I would be very surprised if our intelligence services knew with precision what Iran may have decided or not decided.
I would just say, at this point, that it is fair to assume that Iran wants, at least, to be able to build a bomb in a very short period of time. "Very short" can be days to months. I do not know. I cannot give you a more precise answer than that.
However, your question allows me to go back to the question of the lessons of history. Again, one reason that I am skeptical about Iran stopping at the threshold is that I have seen what other countries have done over the years. Once you have invested so much in a military nuclear option, it just becomes too tempting not to go all the way across the threshold. Indeed, the only countries that have refrained from doing so — having invested so much, as Iran has, in a military nuclear option — are countries that were stopped by external events. The two examples that are relevant to the Iran crisis are Brazil and Iraq. Brazil was prevented from crossing the threshold by a domestic regime change. Iraq was prevented from pursuing its nuclear weapons program by the international intervention of 1991, not 2003 but 1991. Absent these two examples, all other countries ended up crossing the threshold sooner or later, including South Africa, Pakistan, India, and my own country, France.
For a long time, in the 1950s, the French nuclear program continued without real political guidance, until 1958. This is an interesting comparison because it means that, by default, the program continues up until the nuclear threshold, and then at this point there needs to be a political decision. I do not want to compare France and Iran, but once again, the history of nuclear proliferation gives us some interesting insights.
I would finish by saying that we should refrain from any comparison with Japan. That comparison is sometimes made even by Iranians themselves, and it is inappropriate and erroneous. There is no evidence whatsoever of any weapons activity in Japan.
Japan is the most inspected country in the world by the IAEA. The IAEA has never found, to my knowledge, any evidence of weapons activity in Japan. Japan does have a uranium enrichment program and a fuel reprocessing capacity; however, from an economic and technical standpoint, it has perfectly legitimate uses for these capacities. Iran does not.
Finally, even though Japan does have space capabilities that could be, from a technical standpoint, converted to military usage, there is no evidence at this point that Japan has made the kinds of test trials that would allow it to do so quickly. For these three reasons, I challenge the comparison between Iran and Japan.
[Translation]
Senator Fortin-Duplessis: First of all, Mr. Tertrais, I want to thank you for sharing your opinion with us.
The Iranian ballistics program is currently not a threat to Europe or the United States, according to a statement made last Thursday by Michel Miraillet — director of strategic affairs at France's department of defence — at the conference on missile defence in Moscow. What do you think about that statement? Do you not find that he is being overly confident?
Mr. Tertrais: Thank you for the question. As I did not attend the conference, I cannot confirm that statement, which should be verified. I am very familiar with Mr. Miraillet, and I know about his very minute assessments on the issue. It is accurate to say that Iran does not yet have the capability to pose a ballistic threat to either the North American continent or most of Europe.
Senator Fortin-Duplessis: You talked about four pieces of good news, and I was very happy to hear about them. But what would be the consequences of an Israeli military attack on Iran?
Mr. Tertrais: We can consider the possibilities and present scenarios. The truth, in my opinion, is that no one knows exactly what would happen. Iran would clearly respond. It is difficult to know in what way and to what extent it would respond. We cannot start from the principle that Iran could mobilize its allies, including the Hezbollah, for immediate retaliation. I think that the current relationship between the Hezbollah and Iran is more complex than that. But Iran would respond.
The question we should really be asking is what will happen after Iran retaliates. That is where the slope gets very slippery and uncertain. I would imagine that a country like the United States would make clear to Iran that it must not cross certain lines in its retaliatory attack, because then Iran would really jeopardize its own regime, risking an American response to its attack.
I think this is akin to building castles in the air. In my view, it is incredibly difficult to predict the exact repercussions of an Israeli strike. But I can say two things very quickly, in my opinion at least. The first is that, on the whole, a U.S. military action would be better than an Israeli military action, from both an effectiveness standpoint and a political one.
In no way, do I advocate one or the other. What I am saying, though, is that if one day, a country did have to assume that heavy responsibility, it should fall on the United States as opposed to Israel. At least, that would guarantee the Iranian program suffered a major blow; the outcome of an Israeli action would be less certain.
While I do not support military action against Iran, I am not convinced that, in the very long term, the consequences of an Iran with nuclear capability would not be worse than those of a strike against Iran. Once again, I cannot say anything for certain, and the onerous responsibility of making decisions without any certainty, without knowing the long-term consequences of their actions, falls on politicians. If we look well into the future, a nuclear Iran would be worse than the consequences of an attack against Iran.
Senator Robichaud: Good afternoon, Mr. Tertrais. You talked about sanctions and their effectiveness; you said you were not in a position to say how they affect the population. If, at some point, we had to impose stricter sanctions, could that cause the Iranian people to turn against the international community and generate more support for the current regime, not to mention, of course, the effect on their nuclear program and its development?
Mr. Tertrais: Thank you, senator. I think I will start with the last part of your question. I would say that, unfortunately, one of the pernicious effects of the Libyan operation, which I personally supported, was no doubt to bolster the position of those in Iran who want to see the country with its own nuclear weapons. A friend of mine made a very well-documented film on the Libyan operation and he interviewed the last person to speak to Colonel Gadhafi before he left Tripoli at the end of the August. That individual was a Russian friend of Gadhafi's, and he heard Gadhafi recount that he did not have to abandon his nuclear program because if he had had a nuclear weapon, the West would not have attacked him. There is a fear that the Libyan operation had the damaging effect of bolstering the thinking of those in Tehran who want to pursue a bomb. I would say, however, that, over the past 20 years, the logic behind Iran's program has been more political in nature than military; it was a prestigious and influential project to serve as a power projection tool rather than a deterrent. Today, Iran may be more keen on pursuing a deterrent than it was in the past.
As for sanctions, I would suggest, if I may, that, before considering or proposing new sanctions, it would be more effective to apply the existing sanctions fully. UN sanctions should be applied by all UN members and voluntary informal sanctions should be applied to the full extent possible. To my mind, that would be more significant than imposing new sanctions.
In response to the first part of your question, the risk of seeing Iran's population support or rally around the current regime existed in the early 2000s.
I do not think that risk exists anymore. Iranian society has evolved, and from what I gather, there is considerable discontent with the regime, even though political activism is not very strong. In my view, sanctions are much more likely to turn the people against the regime than towards it. I may not have said that in 2003 or 2004, however. But Iran has changed a lot since then, economically, socially and politically. Although the regime is the same, it has become much more radicalized since 2005, and especially, after 2009.
Senator Robichaud: Thank you.
[English]
The Chair: I just have one question I hope you can answer quickly.
Do you believe that Israel has the capability to go it alone if it became necessary in their eyes to commit to a strike against Iran, or is the American support necessary to accomplish it positively in their eyes?
Mr. Tertrais: Unfortunately, Madam Chair, it is very difficult to answer in one single word, yes or no. It basically depends what the prime minister would expect its armed forces to do, exactly. It is not a question of annihilating the Iranian nuclear program. It is a question that can be summarized as follows: Let us imagine I am the Israeli prime minister. I would ask my military chiefs and intelligence chiefs, "What can you give me? How much can you guarantee me?" My understanding is that when this conversation takes place, the answer is "two or three years, Mr. Prime Minister." That is one of the reasons why the risk is not worth it at this point.
The Americans would have the ability to do much more damage to the Iranian nuclear program than the Israelis have. There is not much more I can say, because there are some data that I do not have; namely, what the Israelis can do in terms of non-kinetic action, as they say in the jargon. Non-kinetic action has been fairly successful so far. I am talking about the viruses, in particular, and various other acts of sabotage. The assassinations are a different question and a different problem where other parties in Israel have been involved.
In any case, I do not know exactly what the Israelis can do but I do know for sure they will be able to accomplish much less than what the Americans, from a strictly military standpoint, would be able to accomplish.
The Chair: Thank you. I think this committee also shares that such a step not be taken, if at all possible. We are monitoring Iran's actions but we are also monitoring European actions and reactions, Israeli actions and reactions, and those of the whole region. It is a complex field; it is a complex issue with consequences that are very serious on a world basis.
We thank you for your knowledge and for your answers today, which will be very helpful in our continuing study.
Thank you, Mr. Tertrais.
Mr. Tertrais: Thank you, Madam Chair.
(The committee adjourned.)