Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
National Security and Defence
Issue 4 - Evidence - Meeting of February 13, 2012
OTTAWA, Monday, February 13, 2012
The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence met this day at 4 p.m. to examine and report on Canada's national security and defence policies, practices, circumstances and capabilities.
Senator Pamela Wallin (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: Hello, everyone. I am Pamela Wallin, the chair of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. I want to welcome everyone back. This is our first meeting of 2012. Welcome to all of our committee members and visitors. We have a very busy day, with lots of important people arrayed at the front of the room. As usual, I will ask senators if they can keep their comments pointed and preambles short. We are trying to get as many questions in as we possibly can. We will go to a second round if we have to, but I would like to keep this moving.
We have two parts to our meeting. We will begin by looking at NATO's seven-month air campaign in Libya, which has been hailed widely as a huge success, blunting the worst of the brutal crackdown by dictator Moammar Gadhafi on his own people. The UN-sanctioned NATO military operation was called Operation Unified Protector and had three elements: an arms embargo, a no-fly zone, and protection of civilians from attack or threat of attack. Unified Protector, the entire NATO operation, was commanded by a Canadian, Lieutenant-General Bouchard, who has been called a true hero for mounting and managing such an operation in record time. Canada was involved as one of more than a dozen nations contributing to Unified Protector. Here at home we called our effort Operation MOBILE.
With us today to discuss both the multinational and Canadian operations is Lieutenant-General Charles Bouchard, Former Commander of NATO Operation Unified Protector. He joined the forces back in 1974, flew tactical helicopters throughout most of his career, has an impressive record leading up to his dual role as Deputy Commander of Joint Forces Command Naples and Commander of the operation in Libya.
Also with us is Major-General Jonathan Vance, Director of Staff, Strategic Joint Staff. General Vance is well known to this committee, has twice led Canada's mission in Afghanistan and is now the key strategic adviser to the Chief of the Defence Staff. If you will permit me, this year he was awarded the Vimy award that recognizes one Canadian who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the defence and security of our nation, and the preservation of our democratic values. Congratulations and thank you for your service.
Also joining our panel today is Marius Grinius, Director General, International Security Policy. He is responsible for managing DND's bilateral and multilateral defence in international security relations, including the representation of Canada at the UN, NATO and other forums, and providing advice and support to the minister and management on these international defence relations.
We also have with us Lieutenant-Colonel Robin Holman, Assistant Deputy Judge Advocate General, Operational Law. He offers legal advice on matters affecting the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence when it comes to all international agreements, including things like the Geneva Convention.
Welcome to you gentlemen as well.
General Bouchard, I believe you have an opening statement for us.
[Translation]
Lieutenant-General Charles Bouchard, Former Commander of NATO Operation Unified Protector: Thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to appear in front of this committee to provide you a brief overview of the salient aspects of NATO's Operation Unified Protector and to answer as many questions as I can this afternoon. As the Chair indicated, you have already met my colleagues who are with me here today.
This discussion is timely considering that on February 17, 2012, Libyans will be celebrating the first anniversary of the uprising against their former dictator, Muammar Gaddafi.
[English]
My comments this afternoon will focus on three areas, mainly Libya then and now, NATO today and tomorrow, and what lessons we should seriously consider as we look ahead. I wish to emphasize that our mission, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973,was the protection of civilians and population centres under attack and/or the threat of attack, the enforcement of an arms embargo, and the establishment of a no-fly zone. As late as the first week of October, the regime continued to order the population to behead any person suspected of supporting the transitory national council which had been recognized internationally as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people. Thus the fall of the regime was not our objective, but the violence and the threat of violence continued until the death of capture of Gadhafi and his son. Let there be no doubt that the intervention in Libya was just and warranted.
As Unified Protector stood up on March 31, 2011, regime forces moving toward Benghazi were under orders to kill every male between 17 and 40 years of age. Misrata was under the constant shelling. With their back to the Mediterranean, the people of Jebel Nafusa in the western area suffered similar pressures. Finally, the population of Tripoli was under the thumb of Libyan security forces headed by Abdullah Senussi.
The situation on the ground in Libya evolved in four stages during the transnational council campaign. The first was stabilization of the situation. This was the first stage which prevented the fall of the major urban centres most threatened by the regime forces.
The second was building the transitional national council forces. These were doctors, journeymen and students fighting for their freedom. They were poorly led, organized and equipped and as such required some weeks to build up. During his 42 years as leader, Gadhafi had made sure there was no single leader who could depose him.
The third was the offensive, the tight turn as the three main regions expanded their advance, culminating in the fall of Tripoli.
Finally, we saw the mop-up and the fall of Sirte and Bani Walid, securing the ammunition and chemical storage areas in the south, and the collapse of the regime.
[Translation]
Today there remains some uncertainty in Libya. In my opinion as a military commander, I do not assess the situation to be a religious issue but rather a regional disaccord that will not be resolved until a duly elected, representative government is installed in Libya. Some acts of violence remain; however, I believe this is the normal progression of a nation learning to make the transition from a brutal dictatorship to a Libyan democracy. I believe the key to success in the months and years ahead will be to assist Libyans with the conduct of elections, the establishment of the rule of law, the return of trade and commerce to provide national income and the return to work of the population. I truly believe that Libyans want peace and prosperity.
This was a victory for Libya and for Libyans. For NATO, I suggest it was a resounding success. In only three weeks, plans were developed and unanimously approved by the North Atlantic Council. In the space of one week, a commander was appointed, three headquarters stood up and operations commenced, with a seamless transition from the Odyssey Dawn coalition headed by the United States. Previous NATO operations took nearly a full year to achieve similar results. The Alliance and its partners grew strong and united in a very short period of time, with all countries committed to the success of the mission. We have learned significant lessons, which are being carefully reviewed in order to possibly include them in future operations.
[English]
I use the caveat of "possible" because NATO's success in Libya is not a blueprint, nor should it be one, for the conduct of future missions. We adapted to the environment and conditions on the ground. Future commanders will have similar challenges in future conflicts. It would be unwise to believe that the strategy used in Libya will work equally well in other parts of the world. We sincerely hope that we will learn from our lessons and apply them as needed in the months and years ahead.
NATO today is not the NATO of 10 years ago. Operation Unified Protector validated the strategic concept and the need for rapid military reaction when and where required. The key to success in the future is to retain mental and physical agility, both politically and militarily. As I speak to you today, members of NATO are working to implement the new NATO command structure and a Canadian lieutenant-general will validate the next NATO response force under this new structure this very year. I believe NATO is stronger today than it was a year ago and remains a critical alliance for Canada, the U.S. and Europe.
[Translation]
Finally, I wish to report to this committee that the performance of Canadian Forces members who took part in this operation was simply outstanding.
You can be justifiably proud of the men and women in uniform who responded in record time to a complex situation and executed their mission with gallantry and professionalism.
[English]
I would like to end my opening comments today by offering personal thoughts on what I see as important issues as the Canadian Forces continue to define the way ahead. The experiences of the Balkans, Afghanistan and Libya lead us to the conclusion that Canada needs a balanced Canadian Forces that can act at sea, in the air and on the ground with equipment that can keep pace with the demands of future battle spaces. We must develop stronger capabilities in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, including the need to link all systems together at the national and international levels.
We need lower yield weapons with smaller collateral effects. We must be able to operate in built-up areas where the difference between rivals, combatants and non-combatants is becoming more and more difficult to ascertain. Be they operated on land, at sea or in the air, the assets should have the capability to gather information, pass it on in a real- time manner, and engage valid and bona fide targets when needed.
Finally, we must continue investing in the development of our future leaders, leaders who will be able to operate equally at ease in Ottawa and overseas during times of peace and in combat. Agility of the mind is the key to success enabled by a balanced, flexible and adaptive Canadian Forces.
Thank you very much. I am ready for your questions.
The Chair: I thank you very much. I appreciate your directness and frankness on that.
You ended your comments on the idea of leadership. I know this is not a template and you seem very optimistic that NATO, not known for its agility and speed, is really taking this on. There are others — and this is not flattery; it is a fair question — who believe that you were just the right guy at the right place at the right time. How much is that a part of it?
Lt.-Gen. Bouchard: Thank you very much for your comment. There is not a three star or two star general in the Canadian Forces today who could not have handled the mission with the same level of success. As it were, Canada placed someone that would suit the demands of the requirements. The U.S. did not wish to take a formal lead, nor did France or the U.K.
When we look at other countries, I think Canada was in a good place for it. As it were, with seven years working with the U.S., I was also a known entity to many of the leaders around; but let me restate, ma'am, that there is not one general in the Canadian Forces who could not have handled this mission.
The Chair: Thank you for your comments.
We will begin our formal questioning now with Deputy Chair Senator Dallaire.
[Translation]
Senator Dallaire: There are three parts to my question. You indicated that weapons should be more surgical, meaning under 500 pounds. At the same time, considering the responsibility to protect — although that term was not used — shouldn't troops have been deployed on the ground to minimize combat between rebel and government forces?
The coalition is responsible for the operational level. Would it have been possible to continue the coalition under paragraph 8 by strengthening regional capacity? Should the African Union or the Arab League have been used, or should they be used in the future even in sub-Saharan locations? Will NATO go there?
The Security Council complained that it did not get any information about what was going on, such that it could not influence the situation that some believed to be beyond the mandate.
Do you think that the Security Council should perhaps have a military strategic capacity so that it can have a say in how troops are deployed in strategic operations?
Lt.-Gen. Bouchard: Those are all good questions, Senator. First, with respect to the munitions available to us, we still need 2,000-pound bombs and 500-pound bombs, but we also need much lighter weapons.
The issue is not whether to use one weapon or another; rather, it is the type of weapon that should be used. I was very impressed with the Predator and how it handled the Hellfire missile and the British Brimstone missile. What I am talking about here is having a range of weapons to choose from.
The decision to have troops on the ground was made at the beginning. Resolution 1973 talked about occupying ground forces, but before long, there were no NATO forces on the ground. There were troops on the ground, Libyan troops — doctors, students — all of whom were on the ground and engaged in combat during this campaign.
Should NATO military forces be there too? That is a political decision. We were able to carry out the campaign without troops on the ground by finding other ways to share information, understand the situation on the ground and adapt in such a way that we did not need ground troops for this mission.
It is important to understand that we were not dealing with Libyan air or sea forces. Our specific mandate was to protect civilians. We were able to make the decisions that needed to be made.
In that scenario, that enabled us to deal with the situation relatively easily in the end. When the clock struck midnight, deployment of NATO forces in Libya took three seconds. The plane banked and was off. It was a very rapid, smooth deployment.
If I am not mistaken, you asked whether the forces should have or could have continued. Once again, on the military side, we wondered what we should do if we were told to stay after the order to cease fire on civilians was issued. In late September, early October, we had established four criteria for determining whether we had achieved our objectives: first, an end to violence against civilians; second, the absence of conventional forces that could return and cause the same problem again, forcing us to return as well; third, the lack of a command and control system that could continue to perpetrate violence against civilians; and fourth, complete control of the entire Libyan coast by the National Transitional Council.
Once those objectives were achieved, we were asked what the next step should be. Obviously, without ground troops, it is difficult to do any more than that. It is very difficult to inspect munitions and ensure that borders are closed because that cannot be done from the air or the sea. To me, it was clear that NATO had no interest in putting troops on the ground, so for us, the next logical step was to end the mission.
If I understand your last question correctly, concerning the discussions between NATO and the United Nations, this remains primarily a role of headquarters in Brussels and the United Nations.
I believe that communications between my headquarters — Joint Force Command Naples, SACEUR and SHAPE — and the North Atlantic Council were good and that we were in constant communication.
I think it would be hard to ask an operational commander to enter into direction communications with the United Nations because that could create problems. I would recommend letting the operational commander take care of his operational point and letting the North Atlantic Council and the secretary general and his team talk to the United Nations. I hope that answers your questions.
Senator Dallaire: I was not asking you to talk to the Security Council. On the contrary, information between NATO and the Security Council is what seems to be lacking. The Brazilians are the process of introducing a new change to that. I do not know whether Mr. Grinius is involved in this?
[English]
Marius Grinius, Director General, International Security Policy, National Defence: I am not directly involved in this, because obviously there are a lot of lessons learned, not only from the NATO point of view but also from the United Nations' point of view.
As you know, the United Nations only functions as much as its membership allows, particularly when we are talking about the Security Council. I would suspect and expect that particularly members of the permanent five may have shared a certain amount of information with the United Nations. I do not know, but they certainly had the capacity, particularly when three of the permanent five were actually members of the operation.
The other important element of course is that, unlike in other circumstances, there were no vetoes against the nature of the operation and the Security Council resolutions. That, to me, would imply a fair amount of information actually being provided, if unofficially and informally.
Senator Lang: I would like to welcome our guests here today.
Lieutenant-General Bouchard, it was important that you mentioned not only Afghanistan and Libya, but also the Balkans, which certainly set the stage for what we have been involved in for the past number of decades with respect to our Armed Forces. For some of us in Canada it seems much removed, and it is important that we remind those who are listening of the involvement and commitment we have as a country.
I would like to delve into an area you mentioned in the closing of your presentation. You talked about the command structure and the review of same. Perhaps you could expand a little bit on that in respect to the fact that you were asked to take on this responsibility and obviously acquitted yourself exceedingly well. At the same time you have NATO, which is an organization of a multitude of countries, and obviously there are various rules in different countries with different objectives.
Perhaps you could tell us exactly how it worked with taking the responsibility on. Did you have the independence to make the decisions in conjunction with your colleagues to go into theatre and do the things that you obviously did, or did you find there was interference? If there was interference, what would you change in the future?
Lt.-Gen. Bouchard: First, in preparing the force for this mission, I remained, in fact for most of the campaign, deputy commander of Joint Force Command Naples, which essentially enabled me to not only command the mission but also to reach back into the NATO command structure and get what I needed when I needed it.
I had a close relationship with the commander of Joint Force Command Naples, Admiral Locklear. I had some discussion with Admiral Stavridis, SACEUR, Supreme Allied Commander Europe. In fact, I had several discussions with chiefs of defence ministers, and also ambassadors from The North Atlantic Council and the secretary general. My point is that I had access to many people, and never once did I feel that.
In the same way, I have gone on the record before in other places to say that once the orders and the strategy were approved, never once did I receive guidance or directions that went contrary to any of the points. In fact, I was given quite a bit of liberty to operate within the mandate that I was given. To me, the mandate was clear and what we had to do was clear. I explained to my superiors what my strategy was to get there and, after that, I was given a lot of leeway to do as was appropriate to meet the intent of the mission.
Obviously, it is also a requirement that, while I was given freedom of action, I also had responsibility to keep my chain of command updated as to what was going on.
Really, the transition from being a deputy commander of a joint force command to being assigned as commander of a combined joint force was a natural progression. In fact, we did that so that we would be able to really focus the attention of the team toward our mission of protection of civilians and population centres, enforcement of the embargo and the no-fly zone. I could reach back and move back and forth.
I never once felt there was interference from the higher point. In fact, I felt supported by all levels, both political and military, toward the mission.
Senator Lang: You spoke about the command structure and that it was under review. Just exactly what is being changed, then, if it has worked as well as you said it has?
Lt.-Gen. Bouchard: First, the NATO command structure will be reviewed. By and large, rather than having three major subcommands of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, which was mainly in Lisbon, Naples and Brunssum, we will go down to two major commands — Brunssum and Naples. That is the first part.
The second part is we are shifting, whereas in the past a commander would be appointed and a staff would be formed not only from Naples, but members would come from 500 to 1,000 kilometres away and bring the headquarters. However, the new headquarters structure will actually have all staff members in one place. In fact, the mission of the headquarters will be to stand up a deployable headquarters of up to 500 people.
We put it together relatively quickly. A new headquarters structure will be in place that will enable a commander to actually take over a mission with an integrated staff together, which is a major part.
The second point, in my opinion, is the movement into new structures which will go from a campus approach to a headquarters that is tailored, organized and structured to run in operation. Essentially, you will have standing war- fighter organizations that will be able to take over a mission quickly and operate it as quickly as possible.
[Translation]
Senator Nolin: Hello everyone and congratulations Lieutenant-General Bouchard on your excellent work.
I would like to keep talking about this NATO reform. You talked about predators, among other things. Drones are increasingly being used in theatres of operation. I would like you to say a few words about your experience with this. There is no doubt that a drone can be a very effective tool that does not get tired, is at the right place at the right time and can fulfill the role asked of it. I would like you to comment on that.
As far as the command is concerned, is it just as effective not to have a pilot and to instead deal with the stakeholders remotely? Do you see any problem with that? Or was it just as effective or better to have the equipment manned?
Lt.-Gen. Bouchard: To me it was not one or the other.
Senator Nolin: It was a combination of both.
Lt.-Gen. Bouchard: It was a combination of the entire group. If I may, I would like to elaborate on that.
To us, given that we did not have any troops on the ground, information gathering came primarily from the nations that share information and from resources inside the mission, whether Predator Global Hawk or the piloted planes. Also, what we learned through information gathering and the capacity to develop a comprehensive idea of the situation on the ground, we brought further. I am talking about the Predator, information, surveillance and reconnaissance, but another thing we learned during this campaign is the role of social media such as YouTube, Facebook and the like. We realize that these days, anyone can take pictures or record images with their telephone and share them. Skype is another mode of communication.
In terms of whether one these things is more of a determinant than another, I would say that all these resources need to be taken into account, not just traditional military ones, but also new public trends involving the Internet and social media.
Senator Nolin: That answers my next question. I was going to ask: how did you manage to control military forces? You are an expert, the chain of command is supposed to be able to do that. But when there are non-military stakeholders — you just referred to social media — and when we are talking about information gathering from member countries, knowing that countries do not always share all their information, how did you amalgamate all that and get the result you obtained so successfully? How do you juggle all this so effectively?
Lt.-Gen. Bouchard: Trust and respect between countries to start with. It was obvious that, at first, as you said, not all the information was being shared uniformly. Not all the information was being shared. The team spent a lot of time in the beginning establishing trust and respect between each of our countries. We spent a great deal of time talking with the respective national headquarters. You are familiar with the national information networks that keep information at a national level, whether it is the EU's, Secret/No Foreign, "Canadian eyes," or "confidential French," regardless. That was our starting point.
We had the Five Eyes system, but it might not have been big enough. In addition to these five member countries, Canada, the United States, England, New Zealand and Australia, many other countries took part in this operation. We therefore needed to go further, talk with each of the countries and ask permission to go further.
To me, it was one of the most important lessons, namely that it was out of the question to jeopardize the lives of our pilots or our naval or air crew, if one country had information it was not giving to the other countries. We made that clear to everyone from the outset. We talked about the need for sharing. We talked about it with the chiefs of staff of each country and we worked very hard in the beginning to establish that.
The first thing was to determine how we could share under conventional methods. Then, I have to tell you that we created a fusion centre at our headquarters.
Senator Nolin: When you say "at your headquarters," do you mean the one you built specifically for the mission?
Lt.-Gen. Bouchard: Yes.
Senator Nolin: We are not talking about Naples. We are not talking about Brunssum. We are talking about you specifically, right?
Lt.-Gen. Bouchard: That is right. We built a fusion group to take in all the information. The group expanded to include social media such as YouTube.
Senator Nolin: That is the part I am interested in. You have access to Five Eyes — and there might be answers you cannot give me — but how can you recover information that is circulating on the web? Does technology allow you to do so and fuse it with the strategic information you obtain from Five Eyes? Is that done elsewhere or do you do it directly?
Lt.-Gen. Bouchard: That is the importance of having support from the Arab allies working with us, the Arab nations that could in fact, on their own national line or within my headquarters, do this research on the web and also capture highlights that they could then communicate to us.
Senator Nolin: It is a cultural and linguistic issue.
Lt.-Gen. Bouchard: Indeed, it is a matter of understanding the culture, the language, the religion, the people, and being able to put it all together. To me it was very important to understand that, but also to understand the social problems, including, for instance, sending the satellite over the country at night to see which areas had electricity and which did not; to ensure that the infrastructure for water, natural gas, fuel and the roads remain in place as well. This cultural aspect, which came from our allies, also helped us and was included at this fusion centre.
Finally, the media: Al Jazeera, BBC, CNN, CBC, also provide us with information, but that information is not reliable. If we were receiving information from one source, it was important for us to be able to confirm it through another source and to be able to establish a true information system.
Senator Nolin: From there you made a decision and were convinced that the information you had was valid.
LGen Bouchard: Yes.
Senator Nolin: Congratulations yet again.
[English]
The Chair: Before we continue, I would like to hear from Major-General Vance briefly on this from the Canadian perspective. We are hearing about how it worked there. Can you give us your vantage point briefly?
Major-General Jonathan Vance, Director of Staff, Strategic Joint Staff, National Defence: It is an incredibly important question in today's way of warfare. The only thing I can add to what Lieutenant-General Bouchard said is that the capacity to fuse information demands that professional staffs exist and are extant before the crises start. As you heard Lieutenant-General Bouchard describe, he had to build the place from which he would command and then bring augmentation from around the globe to put it together.
Whether you call it "networkcentric" operations or information dominance, We found that ultimately the objective is to have your force on the ground as smart or intelligent or able to reach back as any layer in that force. We can no longer reserve the knowledge of the battle space at high levels and send people out for one-off missions. We have to be able to share all the time. That demands a great deal of effort in all manner of being able to share information, such as wide bandwidth and being able to download things — www.mywar.com. You must be able to do that. All nations are gravitating this way. It is the only quantum leap and capability left open to us. I would reinforce what Lieutenant- General Bouchard said. It is very important.
We gained great situation awareness because of where Lieutenant-General Bouchard was. We also had to maintain our own situational awareness here, not only through things like Al-Jazeera, like everyone else did, but also through military reports. It is a combination of things that we do.
Senator Plett: Congratulations, gentlemen, for the excellent job you did.
My first question was just answered by Major-General Vance. I was going to ask you that very same question. However, I do have another question for Lieutenant-General Bouchard.
You said in your opening comments that the main objective there was the protection of civilians in population centres under attack or threat of attack and the fall of the regime. The regime was not our objective, but the violence and the threat of violence continued until the death or capture of Gadhafi and his sons.
My question is around the rules of engagement. Clearly, you must have been under tremendous pressure by the Libyan National Transitional Council. I do not think everyone had the same motives as NATO and our Canadian Forces did. I am sure the main objective of many out there was to get rid of Gadhafi and bring down that regime.
How much pressure were you put under by the rebels? How much pressure did they put on you for you to do certain things? Clearly you must have had to deal with them on a regular basis. Could you touch a little bit on that, please?
Lt.-Gen. Bouchard: NATO officers were not allowed direct conversation or communications with members of the TNC.
Senator Plett: They did or did not?
Lt.-Gen. Bouchard: They did not. We were not allowed direct discussion. NATO members did not directly discuss any of these items.
Obviously, there are many ways to get information today, through social media to interlocutors to second or third parties involved in the matters at hand. There was a way to receive information, directly or indirectly.
The biggest point that you are mentioning is whether or not I was under pressure. No, I was not. Someone obviously wanted some actions to take place in some nation's capital, or individuals wanted certain activities to take place. My mandate was extremely clear, and I have stated that already. We stayed with that mandate. I had a strong legal, political and public affairs team, and I had a strong group of cultural advisers. We constantly assessed what we were doing against the protection of civilians, strategy to task. Every task must be related to the strategy. In fact, that was part of a targeting campaign. Is what I am going to do tomorrow or the next three days or whenever I decide I will do it connected with the protection of civilians? Is this connected to the embargo and the no-fly zone? If we could not make the linkage, we would not engage.
With regard to protection of civilians versus support of the rebel forces — the TNC or whatever you wish to call the forces that were against the regime — we did not influence them. At one point, even if we tried, the danger was that we would be held responsible for those activities, and yet you cannot be held responsible when you have no control over their actions, as was evident in the way they behaved at certain times during this conflict. We stuck to our mandate and ensured that what we were doing was related to it, but at the same time, we monitored what was going on. Then you match as best you can. I hope I have answered your question.
Senator Plett: You did, but for someone out here and not that knowledgeable, I still find that it must have been extremely difficult. You have thousands of rebels down on the ground running their own campaign, and yet you needed to somehow work with that. Maybe you did answer it, but I am perhaps not understanding how you could operate outside of having some communication with them. Clearly you also did not want to interfere with what they were doing. They also had their mission. It was not that you were opposing their mission. You were there trying to protect civilians. I understand that.
Lt.-Gen. Bouchard: Very much so. There are ways to talk to people. The Qataris have already said there were some people on the ground. NATO gets its information from many channels. An operational commander gets his information in many ways, through many channels. Certain ways are within the guidelines that you are given. Others are extrapolations of what you can do, how you can do it and with what second and third parties you work with on that. We were able to create sufficient networks to receive what we needed to know to do the mission.
Also, it is important to understand that throughout this campaign messages went to both sides about killing civilians. We made it very clear to the TNC forces, especially in the latter part of this campaign, toward the fall of Bani Walid, that if they were endangering the lives of civilians, they too would be subject to NATO's action. Our mission was to make it clear to them that we would not settle for anything less than that. We worked on both sides, and some of this messaging was passed through social media, in fact through some of our public affairs messages, our websites and the like. Similarly, we got a lot of information by monitoring many discussions.
Senator Plett: Thank you, and again congratulations to both of you.
Senator Eggleton: Thank you for being here, and congratulations on your extraordinary efforts.
Lieutenant-General Bouchard, you said in your opening statement that Gadhafi had made sure there was no single leader who could depose him. I am wondering about the leadership in Libya. It does not have, to my knowledge, a history of democracy. It could easily lead — as many of these other Arab countries could — into a power struggle that could result in slipping back into dictatorship, which is certainly something we would not want and you would not want from the standpoint of the efforts put into this. We hope they can move forward with democracy.
The question I have is similar to what Senator Plett asked. How could you sort out the good guys from the bad guys on the ground in terms of the rebels and the civilians so that hopefully the people who would end up coming into some sort of temporary power, before their elections, would be people who would lead towards the result that we would all want?
Lt.-Gen. Bouchard: Over time, we built the ability to figure out who was up to what, and how it worked. The regime forces, though they had changed their tactics by then and were using civilian equipment and civilian patterned vehicles — pickup trucks and the like — also had a major weapon system, artillery pieces, rocket launchers and the like. We were able to follow through, with appropriate monitoring and surveillance, the logistics chain that led to the logistics centres, ammunition depots and the like. We were able to develop, through a lot of hard work, an analysis of this chain, plus the command and control nodes associated with the regime forces, which were causing harm to the civilians. Based on that, we were able to engage.
In fact, part of the strategy was never to get into that close combat where it became impossible to figure out. That part was not for NATO to deal with, not with the forces assigned to this mission. We focused, rather, on large- concentration areas — lines of communication, depots, weapons caches and the like — and also on command-and- control nodes. This is where we focused our activities, leaving the close battle to the folks on the ground to decide for themselves. That is how we were able to come up with a lot of defining. In the early days, it was difficult. In fact, we had some very difficult challenges because we did not have the surveillance capability. We only had two Predator orbits to begin with. To put that into perspective, this was a country about the size of Afghanistan, yet Afghanistan stands at well over 50 orbits. We were limited with that. It is sufficient to say that at this stage we were able to prioritize and say that Benghazi is the first place we will protect. Misrata is our next place; we will protect that, then do the western area and, eventually, Tripoli. We were able to build the intelligence and the network to work at that. It was an interesting development. We spent a lot of nights, and I had a lot of smart people coming up with ways to do this. We were able to successfully come up with that, and we obviously passed the right messaging to those who needed to know.
Senator Eggleton: Are you concerned about them slipping back and the wrong people taking control?
Lt.-Gen. Bouchard: This is an interesting point. I believe that Gadhafi made sure he did not have a single individual who could get back at him. We saw Dr. Jibril in the early days provide some of the leadership to bring the world together and he did that from outside the country. Mr. Jalil is now in charge of the transitional national government and there is some national representation taking place. However, I think the way ahead toward making sure it does not go back is to ensure there is a duly elected representative from all regions, a government elected by the people. For them to do this is certainly one part.
I truly believe that the people of Libya do not want to go back to a dictatorship and in fact that election will be the long way ahead. I also believe that Libya, unlike many other places that are in a difficult financial situation, has natural resources that it can export. As well, infrastructure is left behind. One of the lessons that we learned from the previous campaign in Serbia and Kosovo is that if you destroy the structure you will need to rebuild it to bring the nation forward. Our strategy was not to touch the infrastructure, but rather to focus on those troops and those bringing harm to the population. This will enable the country to get back on its feet, and bring trade and prosperity back again. I believe once we get there, mixed with a government that is transparent and representative, we will find our way toward a Libyan democracy.
Senator Eggleton: There are some bad actors still on the ground there, apparently. Médecins sans frontières apparently left Libya because they were treating torture victims who, once treated, were then returned to prison to be further tortured. There is apparently also a refugee camp outside of Tripoli that is full of mostly African people from a town that was wiped out by rebel forces and the camp has apparently come under attack. What should be done here further to protect these people? Should we be continuing to work with people in this transformative period?
Lt.-Gen. Bouchard: You will appreciate that these are comments from a military officer who commanded the mission.
Senator Eggleton: You have been there; you know.
Lt.-Gen. Bouchard: I would offer that this is an emerging democracy by people who may not know all the things that need to be done and who may not understand all the human rights issues. They need to continue to be supported by the international community, be it the United Nations under Mr. Martin, who is now appointed as the mission support in Libya, or many other organizations. We need to continue to work with them to establish rule of law, election, understanding human rights and all of that. It is assistance from there but it has to be tempered. Our Western standards must be tempered by their cultural and social experience and expertise.
I am well aware of the issues of continued torture and in fact the fate of the individuals of Tawergha continues. Many of these individuals are still remnants of mercenaries who need to move out of the country and need to go home at one point because there is no value in keeping them. They need to be sent back home and look forward and not backward, and through all of this will a truth and reconciliation commission be required? There are still some regional and tribal issues, whether in Benghazi or Misrata or the west, they are not homogeneous as an organization, nor is our beautiful country. It is a matter of recognizing how we bring these different regions together and focus on one Libya.
Senator Mitchell: I am interested in that question as well. You were optimistic, Lt.-Gen. Bouchard, in your comments about the potential for Libya to come through this and establish itself. Would you say it has a greater potential than some of the other Arab states? Generally we are hearing there is a real problem. You are suggesting in the Libyan case there is not. Can you give us some sense of the differences?
Lt.-Gen. Bouchard: I do not wish to lighten the situation because it is still a difficult situation and there is still work that needs to be done. If I compare with my limited experience of Afghanistan, Libya has oil, natural gas and the ability to produce income to take care of its people. Libya is very much a modernized nation with Internet, a telecommunications network, televisions, education system and universities. To me, it is all of those that a nation requires to bring an enlightened middle class to command and to control. Its organization is in place. It is a matter of whether it is being used. Is it being used by the right people?
Things are changing also in terms of the role of not only men but women in the society and how they are taking an increasingly important role in management of the future of this nation. We are seeing that today. When I add all of these functions together, such as financial, cultural, social, infrastructure, and information, I see a nation that has all the pillars that it requires. Can it put them together and really bring the synergy of bringing all those together to bring in a Libyan democracy? I believe all the factors are in place and it is a matter of putting them together and perhaps assisting the people of Libya in reaching that.
Senator Mitchell: Maybe it is beyond the scope of the military and your role specifically, but what kind of assistance could Canada provide in that regard? Maybe some of it is military. For example, is there some sense of putting military police or trainers in place?
Lt.-Gen. Bouchard: It is difficult for me at this stage to assess the requirement. I would prefer perhaps to pass it on to my colleague. From my perspective, much of the military mission has been accomplished and we have to look beyond that to either security or education, and also commerce and rule of law.
Mr. Grinius: Lt.-Gen. Bouchard outlined all of the areas that need support. This is more of a question to the Department of Foreign Affairs than to the Department of National Defence. Minister Baird, during his second trip to Libya back in October, for instance, announced a humanitarian assistance program that was valued at about $10 million. Part of that had actually been targeted for weapons of mass destruction, finding unexploded ordnance, also looking at surface-to-air shoulder-fired missiles, that kind of military side. Also, he certainly announced support for civil society, including working with women and women's organizations just to strengthen that fundamental social fabric.
As Lt.-Gen. Bouchard said, there are a lot of good, solid pieces in place, or potentially, that we can work on. Again, this is an ongoing effort that I think Canada and other countries will continue to work through.
Senator Mitchell: I am going to make a point about how important the role of women is post-conflict. Is that explicitly consistent with work on UN Resolution 1325, or is it just something you have identified independent of that?
Mr. Grinius: I think it is consistent with it. There is a major and ongoing effort that will be required. Also bear in mind, of course, the neighbourhood; Tunisia, and seeing what is happening in Egypt and elsewhere.
The Chair: Could we have a comment from Major-General Vance on this issue about what is next? Lieutenant- General Bouchard has sort of said call Foreign Affairs. However, if we are going to do missions like this in terms of what we do and what the military's response is in these situations, then what is part B?
Maj.-Gen. Vance: We are very much a resource used strictly when it is demanded. I suspect that the international community will listen attentively to any requests from the NTC as they settle into government. If they run into challenges that would require international support, military or otherwise, the international community would listen favourably, particularly those nations who were in this conflict. Everyone wants this to continue to go the right way. It will take a request from them before support is given, particularly a nation like Canada, the United States or our major allies. With a request, we look at a broad range of the potential for capacity building or otherwise.
The Chair: We know that nation building requires security; that is all I am saying.
Maj.-Gen. Vance: Yes, absolutely.
Lt.-Gen. Bouchard: We are looking at what Canada can do. Towards the end of the mission, an organization called the Friends of Libya was created as well. We know it is headed by Qatar, and that other nations are taking a role in it. It is important to realize the role of other Arab neighbours to be accepted in their own culture and society. While it could be that the West has a role in this as well, it is important to look at what can be brought in by Arabs and North Africans.
The Chair: I would like to ask the indulgence of our witnesses, if you would, to stay another 5 to 6 minutes, maybe even 10 minutes. Four senators have additional follow-up questions. Thank you.
[Translation]
Senator Dallaire: As far as the Canadian strategic component of this operation and future operations is concerned — and without putting too much emphasis on Syria — what key operational shortcomings have been discovered to date with regard to Canada's participation?
Out of the 18, the number that was cited, were there any problems with regard to capacity, monitoring or even decision-making type problems at the political or military levels for troop deployment?
Did you detect any operational weaknesses of that kind?
[English]
We also looked at lessons learned in the positive as well as those things that were in the negative. Everything had a yin and yang to it. In terms of the greatest deficiency, to answer your question directly, this operation was conducted in an environment where the U.S. did not take the preponderant lead. We all learned some great lessons about what that means. When I say "deficiency," that is a pejorative term. I would not use a pejorative term in this case. As Lieutenent- General Bouchard mentioned, the alliance — the British, the French, Canadians, Danes and others — rallied to put together the capacity to execute this operation in fairly short order. The start point, I suspect, was shakier than we would have preferred. We got to a point where NATO and all of its contributing nations have learned that a NATO command structure that is staffed to conduct the operations, perhaps a little smaller but able to conduct the operations that it needs to conduct, is very important; that was a major lesson learned for us.
There are not so many other areas where I would talk about deficiencies. Certainly, there were areas we could improve on; we knew where they were. Absolutely, Canada is interested in having more of its own integral ISR capacity — its ability to see and perceive where it has forces deployed. That is a known, and we have a program in place to address that. We are very interested in maintaining senior Canadian leadership abroad for the obvious reasons: It gives Canada an element of not only influence at the outset but also expertise in management and in the way we would see things to be managed; and Lieutenant-General Bouchard proved it.
We learned that the forward deploying of our assets and maintaining a relevant global posture is very helpful — having a ship already in the Mediterranean with a well-trained captain and crew ready to respond to evacuation of Canadians in peril, all the way through to being able to manage, turn on a dime and join a combat operation and an embargo. It is very useful to the Government of Canada and Canadians to be able to do that.
We have a cumulative list of quite solid things we have learned and taken away from this mission, some of which would indicate areas for improvement. Some are in the continue-to-do column, and we will continue the work to drive those into the end zone.
The Chair: That was very helpful.
Senator Lang: I would like to move back to the question of the blueprint. Lieutenant-General Bouchard said this is not necessarily a blueprint, but two objectives were met. There was the protection of civilians, in most part, as they sorted out their domestic problems with the government and, at the same time, the loss of life by those that were participating, whether Canadians, Americans or others, in the Armed Forces. The objectives were very successful. You mentioned Afghanistan and the Balkans. In that case, we went in on the ground and stayed for years and years. Yet, we went to Libya for a relatively short period of time, established some objectives, accomplished them and, as you said, we were out within days when the decision was made to leave.
Do you see this type of operation being utilized more in the future in view of its successes and in view of the technology we have as opposed to what has happened in the past, from Vietnam forward to the Balkans and to Afghanistan?
Lt.-Gen. Bouchard: The danger is always one of trying to adapt the last success to the next one. We only find ourselves stepping into areas that we will regret. In this case, we were able to do what we did with the projection of power from air and sea. To turn this into the way of the future would be dangerous because each commander, when assigned a mission when the military plans a mission, no matter what it is, will go through its own estimate process. Each commander will define what is needed to do the work, and what can be done within the limitations of what we have. From there, we will be able to build a force required to do the work that is required, be it land, sea or air, and boots on the ground or not.
I would neither want nor wish to compare Libya with the Balkans or Afghanistan because they are different situations with much different problems at the time. My point is to let us take the lessons we have learned in terms of principles and adapt them to the next conflict if and when required. Let us not try to fit the Libya model to another scenario as it could prove difficult. I will admit to you that we tried to adapt Libya to the Afghanistan model in the early days and it did not work. We quickly learned that you should not take the last conflict and try to fit it to the current one, and other lessons. At the end of the day, the lesson learned is what can be applied to the future. We must be mindful that there remains a need, when we look at the future, for balanced organization where actions in the air and on land and sea can be taken to deal with the situation at hand. I would suggest that this is where we should be going.
[Translation]
Senator Nolin: Let us talk about the lessons learned from the operations in the Balkans. NATO discovered a major problem of interoperability, planning and shortcomings in the state of the troops.
When you assumed command, you were already in Naples, so you had a good idea of the state of the premises. I would like to hear your comments on the state of the troops. The state of the Canadian troops does not concern me. I believe they are doing their job. I would like to know about the troops from the 27 other allied countries. The Americans were not there. Since the crisis in the Balkans, we have implemented Operation Norfolk and the transformation. Everyone has invested a lot of money in order to be able to deal with conflicts quickly and swiftly. The current conflict arises and things are under control thanks to you. I would like to know about the preparedness of our allies. I understand that not all 28 allied countries were present, that there were only 14 there.
Lt.-Gen. Bouchard: Of course, the 28 allied countries are not all equal in terms of quantity and quality of troops. Nonetheless it is hard to say that one country is better than another because we talk more in terms of each individual concerned.
Senator Nolin: You understand that I am not asking for names.
Lt.-Gen. Bouchard: Skills are not the most important thing. People sometimes confuse skills with the culture of the individuals. The differences between the cultures make us act one way or another. The commander and his operating staff have to understand the limits of each one of the groups and the cultures to know why certain individuals act or behave in a certain way. Once we discover the strengths and weaknesses, we can be sure to capitalize on the strengths and assign the personnel accordingly. The important thing is to ensure that everyone is part of the team and has a role to play. Whether the contingent from the country has three people or 300, each plays an important role based on his or her skills and culture.
To me it did not matter that a group of individuals or a country had a certain skill in particular. If every individual, who is part of the operation, is ready to train and demonstrate their strength, we can unify everything and ensure success. That is what I focused on and that is what I learned after a year and a half of observation as a deputy commandant at NATO headquarters. I had a good sense of the contribution of each of the nations.
The NATO senior staff's experience is important for creating this level of knowledge, which allows for judgement and acting accordingly.
[English]
Senator Nolin: Now we know why he was such a good commander.
Senator Plett: I will take very little time because my question has been answered in part in response to Senator Nolin.
I want to follow up a little on that. Canada has done a lot of heavy lifting in Afghanistan and Libya, even to the extent of supplying our best general to go there on behalf of NATO. Canada has done a lot, but some of our allies just did not show up. I grant that not every country can do the same as others, but some did not show up.
What does that do to the morale of the troops who are there, who know who our allies are and who know that our men and women in uniform are putting their lives on the line while some countries, for whatever reason, decide they will not take part in the mission? Is that a factor in the morale of our troops there?
Lt.-Gen. Bouchard: I will speak of my observations in Libya and then defer to General Vance, who has extensive experience in Afghanistan as well.
One has to look over a long period of time rather than at a snapshot in time, because there are times when our own country has decided not to take action. I have no problem with that; such is life. If a nation decides to sit one out, I do not mind, if we look over a 20-year period or longer.
While some nations opted not to take part directly, some of them were able to take an increased load in Afghanistan or other theatres, thus relieving the pressure on nations that were in Libra. There was much cooperation. Just because a nation made a sovereign decision not to act in one particular event, when I look at it over time and at how we managed to balance the force structure, I had no problems with that. In fact, from a military perspective there were never any negative feelings. We supported each other in this vein.
Maj.-Gen. Vance: I can only reinforce that. I do not think that morale speaks to the visceral attachment of troops to what they are doing. I do not think that morale is affected by the grand strategy of who comes and who does not. Morale is affected if someone who is there does not do a good job. If your actions jeopardize the safety or lives of our forces, that will have a huge impact on morale.
Although it is sometimes sport to throw rocks at allies that do not show up or that do things differently, when we get together on the ground under a commander and start to work, it generally works out pretty well overall. I know that there are desires on the part of some throughout NATO that there be a little more even response, and so there should be. However, from our perspective, those who show up generally do a pretty darn good job, and we are grateful for them being there.
Senator Plett: I thank you for that and, again, congratulations to both of you as well as to all of our men and women in uniform who went there.
The Chair: Thank you very much. This has given us great insight into what lessons learned in Libya means in the larger picture.
We hope to be as optimistic as you in terms of whether NATO has learned its lessons too in terms of its structure.
Thank you very much, gentlemen.
We continue now to take a look at our operations in Afghanistan. As everyone knows, we were there in a combat role for nearly 10 years. We then had a mission to transit out of Kandahar and move into Kabul and more fully into the training mission, although we all know that that is something our men and women did every single day alongside their Afghan compatriots, and also look then now at the training role that is established in Kabul separately and see how all of these three things fit and what lessons we have learned there.
The operation in Kabul is called Operation ATTENTION, and it is part of our ongoing NATO training commitments. It will raise some of the questions we discussed in the earlier panel as well, which is really lessons learned on our behalf, but also what we think about operating inside the NATO frame in these situations.
Key players from Canadian Forces join us now. Lieutenant-General Stuart Beare is Commander of CEFCOM, the Canadian Expeditionary Force Command. Brigadier-General Charles Lamarre is the former commander of the mission transition task force, and we have brought him home now after he has packed everything up there. We are also pleased that General Vance could stay with us for this discussion as well because, as we mentioned and all know, he led and commanded our forces there twice and is now strategic adviser to the Chief of the Defence Staff, thinking about all of these questions.
We will begin with you, General Beare.
Lieutenant-General Stuart Beare, Commander Canadian Expeditionary Force Command, National Defence: Thank you for this opportunity to present to you an update on Canadian Forces' efforts in Afghanistan. Today I have been asked to speak with you about that engagement, including the mission transition task force, which completed operations in Kandahar in December 2011, and our current contributions to NATO's institutional capacity-building mission in Afghanistan known as Operation ATTENTION.
[Translation]
The Canadian Forces' presence in Afghanistan began in 2002 with Operation APOLLO, our contribution to the international campaign against terrorism, and continued through Operation ATHENA, Canada's contribution of combat forces to ISAF, which began in July 2003.
In 2005, the Canadian Forces deployed to Kandahar to take ownership of security efforts, conducting full spectrum operations to counter the Taliban.
[English]
In 2006, when we found ourselves fighting in the Panjwa'i district in Kandahar, our Canadian battle group there could only muster 128 Afghan national army soldier to fight with us. They were untrained, poorly equipped and poorly led. Countrywide, the Afghan National security forces in 2006, army and police, totalled only 95,000.
In 2011, five years later, as we withdraw from the Panjwa'i and combat operations in Kandahar, those 128 had grown to more than 2,500 Afghan National Army and police, fighting shoulder to shoulder with our task force. These Afghans were well-trained, well-equipped and well-led. Countrywide, the Afghan National Army and police forces had grown to 290,000.
[Translation]
In our six years of full spectrum operations in Kandahar, we went from fighting for Afghans, to operating with them. Now, in many cases, security is being delivered by Afghan security forces themselves.
[English]
Following the conclusion of CF operations in southern Afghanistan, the 1500-strong mission transition task force was tasked to close out the mission in Kandahar. This was one of the largest and most complex logistical and more than logistical operations conducted by Canadian Forces in modern times.
In Kandahar, we owned some 260 pieces of permanent infrastructure that had to be divested, over 1,000 vehicles and 1,400 sea containers of equipment that had to be brought home. Some have already arrived and the remainder are en route.
[Translation]
The mission ended on schedule and within budget. Unlike the days when we arrived in Kandahar, we did not need help from our Allies. We were able to recover our materiel using our own means or by using Canadian contractors. This mission has proven that the Canadian Forces are capable of conducting logistics operations on a global scale.
The Canadian Forces remain engaged in Afghanistan through Operation ATTENTION.
Today, we are focusing on the NATO Training Mission to expand the Afghan National Security Forces in terms of quantity, quality, and capacity at a national level.
[English]
When NATO training mission Afghanistan was established in November 2009, the Afghan national security forces totalled only 190,000. Today, the combined Afghan National Army and police total over 310,000, on track to meet the objective of 352,000 security forces by autumn 2012.
NTM-A is the vehicle that assures the growth in quality, quantity and capacity of the Afghan army and police across that country's 34 provinces. Therefore, by the end of transition at 2014 the protection and security of Afghan people can be led, delivered and sustained by Afghans for Afghans countrywide.
Through NTMA, our over 900 troops and over 40 Canadian civilian police are delivering a critical strategic effect. Their mission success is essential to preserving the international community's investment in Afghanistan. Operation ATTENTION builds on our legacy in Kandahar, contributes to the efforts of our allies and sets the conditions for transition to an Afghan lead for security in 2014.
In conclusion, our engagement has been and continues to be a defining experience for the Canadian Forces. More than 30,000 Canadian Forces men and women have deployed to Afghanistan since 2001 and some multiple times. Many more will gain their Afghan experience under Operation ATTENTION as we complete this phase of the Afghan national security force development. Across the board, their service remains heroic and the support Canadians provides to our troops remains invaluable and incredibly appreciated.
[Translation]
This mission has shaped the next generation of military leaders by making the Canadian Forces flexible, versatile and able to respond to government direction to deploy personnel and resources to emerging conflicts or crises.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you. I could not agree more. I think on top of all of that the military has reconnected with Canadians again, which is also something that is important about this mission.
I had the benefit of being there recently, watching both the transition mission in operation, which was truly impressive, and also seeing our training mission. I want to get into that today but if I could just get from all of you, before we start the formal questioning, the timing. We are seeing a lot of our allies, and particularly the U.S., moving up the timetable and withdrawing troops in the case of France. Do we have time to complete this mission?
Lt.-Gen. Beare: If I could use a clock of 2009 as a point of departure for the current approach to the mission and allow myself to the end of 2014 as a window within which to answer that question, I will juxtapose what remains to be done post what has already been done in the last two and a bit years since the approach of the NATO training mission and a surge of forces to Afghanistan has taken place.
In 2009 there was a significant shift in the strategy and the resources to operationalize that strategy in Afghanistan. The United States conducted a strategic review, which resulted in the Stanley McChrystal strategic assessment. That stimulated a change in strategy to bring into play a deliberate approach to protecting the population of Afghans and a delivery approach to building security forces. That brought 30-thousand-plus troops and 10,000 more NATO troops to the mission. It also brought billions of U.S. dollars and other dollars to help build the Afghan security forces so they could actually do this work as opposed to our continuing to do it for them forever.
In the period of 2009, when the surge in the strategy and the resources were changed, to today, you have seen a growth of Afghan security force quantity of 120,000, 130,000, which means they could be in more places than when they did not exist. The quality of that force is going up in leaps and bounds, and I can describe that later for those who are interested to understand how quality has been affected. Also, Afghan leadership has taken hold.
When General Habibi, commanding in 1st Brigade, 205 Corps, said goodbye to the Canadian Forces in the Panjwa'i in July, he was fully commanding an Afghan brigade conducting operations, so qualitatively there has been growth as well. All of that happened in 24-plus months. There are still three more years.
The timetable that is being advertised in a public domain is actually the timetable that was already derived by NATO ISAF and approved by the NAC as a framework for framing the change of approach over the next three years, which is allowing Afghans, with that increasing quantity and capacity, to exercise more independence, supported by the coalition through to 2014.
We would not want to be doing it for them until December 2014 and then salute goodbye. We would want to bring their capacity on line and allow them to exercise that capacity with the oversight and partnering of professional military forces and then ultimately allow them to fully lead with support from the rear and at the end of the journey with the 250,000-plus troops. Having done it for a while by themselves, they will be ready to go it alone.
In a two-year window we have seen an incredible increase in quantity, quality and capacity. With three more years to go with the same level of investment, which is not just internationals but Afghans themselves now, the chances of success go from a possibility towards a probability.
Maj.-Gen. Vance: I certainly cannot disagree with Lieutenant-General Beare. It would be unhealthy if I did.
The Chair: True enough.
Maj.-Gen. Vance: It is an interesting question of whether we have enough time. There is certainly enough time to achieve the goals that have been set before us, and those goals will change somewhat and the funding will change somewhat in the months to come as we approach the Chicago summit. We do not know what the results of that will be, but we know there will be some shifting of the sands here.
What is not yet stated in the answer taking us up to 2014 is what about after 2014? All nations that contributed to Afghanistan, including Canada, have an interest in that region, have an interest in continued success in that region, and it is the shape and form of that interaction and what we will do that has yet to be nailed down.
The government has signalled on a number of occasions that it will stay engaged. What exactly are they going to do we are not certain. We are working through that. That will have to be in consultation with Afghans themselves as far as what is the need as of 2014 and try to get a sense of that.
Can we get done what we think we need to get done by 2014? I think the answer is yes, but there is risk involved. Post- 2014 I think we all need to remember and therefore think about the fact that this is still a place in the world where we have strategic interests.
[Translation]
Senator Dallaire: NATO has been working on the training plan for a few years now. There was a very detailed plan for both the soldiers and the police. Things on the police side were apparently weaker and lagging behind the military side. We focussed our study on the military side. Can you give us an update on the police side of things in that country? The police are nonetheless well integrated, in terms of security needs.
What is more, it was decided that 950 people would be sent for three years. What did the needs assessment reveal? Was this something that was studied at length? Did 1,500 people need to be sent? Was it 300 people? What impact does the end of combat operations have on the regular and reserve forces?
Lt.-Gen. Beare: As far as training the Afghan national police is concerned, from 2003 until roughly 2009, we have seen uneven investment in the various police forces around the country.
[English]
The stereotypical police developmental effort was driven by a bilateral nation-to-Afghanistan relationship, which meant that the formation of the police forces was a bilateral accord between a donor nation and the Afghan national government.
In other words, there were dozens of approaches to training and forming an Afghan national police force and then you have dozens of forms of investment in that force. You may train them but maybe not equip them. You may equip them but not pay them. You may be paying them but not supervising them in the field. There was an incredible imbalance in the approach to police development. While nations were doing a lot of work, when you rolled it up in a country of 30 million people, 34 provinces, 365 districts, it was an incredibly imbalanced mosaic.
When the NATO training mission was established, it was the first time NATO had declared it would take on development of security forces inclusive of the police and that it would resource them top-down.
As you know, I served for as the deputy command for the mission for a year. I now have blue blood, at least in part. I served alongside incredible police professionals — multinationals, gendarmes, carabinieri, Canadian, British and others — who saw the necessity to do the top-down police build. It is three to four years behind the army effort because of the timing it took to unify it and then to resource it adequately.
In quantity, the Afghan National Police forces — border, civil order, uniform and special — have grown in huge numbers. In quality, you now have a nationalized quality control measure for the Afghan National Police. Simple things like literacy programs are now delivered on a national scale and are not voluntary but are "voluntold." You do not have to convince an illiterate Afghan that they want to learn how to read and write. They take to it big time.
The inputs have changed since 2009. There is a national top-down approach versus bottom-up: a national set of standards created by Afghans supported by internationals and a resourcing approach that provides funding from the recruiting centre through to retirement of the entire Afghan National Police system. We all know that if you put an individual into harm's way and you put in doubt their confidence in your ability to take care of them, they will probably not serve you well. If you do not equip them well, you probably will not maintain their loyalty. If you do not lead them well, they probably will not serve and take risk. If you do not pay them so they can afford to feed a family, they will not serve the country first. These are all the conditions that preceded the nationalization of the effort in 2009. The trends are in the right direction. The challenges are many; and I can speak to those from personal experience. However, the progress is all in the right direction.
If I may leave you with one last thought on the police agenda, leadership in this is not only about international leadership but also about Afghan leadership. The current Minister of the Interior, Bismillah Khan Mohammadi, former Chief of Staff of the Afghan National Army, is a lead-from-the-front kind of guy. Two days after he became the Minister of the Interior, he laid out his six priorities for his police forces. That was the first time we had seen it. First is training and education; second is leadership; third is transparency and accountability; fourth is structural reform; fifth is take care of your police officer; sixth is a system of rewards and punishment so you could reward positive behavior and deal with negative behavior. He animated that through the entire Afghan National Police system is a way that only an Afghan could do for Afghans. The trends are in the right direction but the challenges are many.
Every report you read will highlight the challenges. Unfortunately, it is difficult for you to see the result of the good deed you did today. Normally, it takes six months to a year to see it play out. We are still playing catch-up in that regard. Canadian civilian police and multinational police are fully engaged with the Afghan Police agenda from the minister's office through to what goes on at the recruiting centre and at a training centre. That is a full spectrum national level commitment by over 34 countries today, which is now unified. I will pass to Major-General Vance on what got us there. I would like to say that when I was there last year, about this time, and I heard the number 950, I said, amen. It was 950 and the 4,000 that we had this last time year and it is 950 and the 6,000 of NTMA today. The Canadian contribution is the most significant, other than the U.S. contribution, to that small mission of 6,000 inside 130,000 NATO, but it has a truly national effect. This is going to create the means for the Afghans to sustain the gains in the years to come.
[Translation]
Maj.-Gen. Vance: I would like to add something. At the beginning of the project, in 2002-2003, the United States were supporting the military forces, and NATO and EUPOL were supporting the police forces. The starting points were very different. In my opinion, they underestimated the problem with the police.
[English]
I think we put the U.S. solidly behind the army. The police got short shrift in an environment where we were not sure; but it was no one's fault. We found out the degree of the problem as we went forward. You have to make sure you do not bring a knife to a gunfight; lesson learned.
In terms of the 950 for three years, we arrived at that number because that was the ask as a result of doing the analysis of what is called the CJSOR, Combined Joint Statement of Requirements. NATO was looking at what next year's fill would be as we grew the NTMA mission from 4,000 to 6,000. There was going to be growth. Ils ont été chanceux.
We were on the transition line between us departing with great credibility in our junior leaders and the mission standing up. NATO went through a cycle to stand up the larger mission, and Canada sought out positions that, when added up, came to 950; and the government direction had said, up to 950. We are not at that number and are somewhat short of it. I believe that we are at 925 today. There is room to grow it a bit more.
As one last point, we are all very interested in working ourselves out of a job. As the training mission evolves, all nations are looking to be able to transition from training these folks and achieve some success in the training mission. That may very well cause a drawdown effect because we are successful. Of course, those forces that are drawing down or coming out of their combat roles are offering up their forces for training as well. There may be more people involved in this training mission as the mission matures through to 2014.
Senator Lang: It was an enlightening presentation you gave in your opening remarks, general. It certainly gave some comfort to all of us around the table in respect of the successes that are obviously being felt and seen every day there.
The one area that I would like to pursue a little bit is the question of the training when you referred to quality. My understanding is that we are recruiting, in most cases, young Afghans to become part of the policing establishment. They are illiterate and their training is maybe for three months in duration. At the same time, in the Western world, it takes at least six months of rudimentary training and years after that to finally feel that we have a policeman who is capable of doing all the things that we ask of him or her.
Perhaps you could expand on that in respect of the fact that the training session at least is that short at the beginning. Are there further programs within the police stations across the country as they move out into the field to ensure that they get the quality that they require — that is the general population — and at the same time being able to pay these individuals?
The Chair: Maybe you could just highlight the difference between the ANA and the police.
Lt.-Gen. Beare: The inputs to the Afghan National Police recruiting system are what they are. They recruit from a population of 30 million with the recruiting cohort that age 18 to about age 38 is represented by about a 15 per cent literacy rate or 85 per cent illiteracy rate. However, that number does not describe the aptitude and capacity to learn or to serve. It just tells you what shows up at the door.
Two and a half years ago, there was no mandatory program for literacy for either the army or the police forces. There were programs but they were not nationally executed. From the last statistics I saw before Christmas, I believe that fully 130,000 Afghan army and police members, through the recruiting system, have taken on full-time literacy programs. Going from zero to one in reading and writing — just recognizing a number or a letter — is a human capital investment beyond description. One to two is times two, and two to three is times point six. This initial investment in literacy alone is having an incredible uplift. Those who are serving in the force have fulltime literacy programs available. That is basic cognitive capacity, development and learning.
The basic training programs produce a soldier or police officer who is ready to go on to their next training event or their first period of service. That is a uniformly understood and accepted standard between international security forces and their Afghan partners.
The Afghan police officer will be performing, under supervision, those duties that he or she has been trained to perform. If they show a capacity to learn and for literacy, they will quickly be eligible for leader development.
There was no national program in either the army or the police for junior leader development three years ago. There were regional programs, but not national. Today there are national programs. At any one time you can find between 2,000 and 3,000 police officers and 8,000 to 10,000 army NCOs in leadership training. Those numbers would have been only hundreds three years ago.
Those in officer programs are literate, educated, sophisticated people who come in with a high school or university-level learning ability. They are being trained to be police professionals and/or military leaders at entry. A whole range of specialist training is being provided to them through partners like the FBI, CIA and other specialist police forces. The whole range is now available. The challenge, of course, is to get the audience through that experience. The recruiting has to catch up with the population at large.
Again, the trends are in the right direction and the capacity to learn is high. When they are in the field conducting operations, the real limitation is partners to be there with them. The most partnered forces today in Afghanistan are army forces and the least partnered are police. The police partnering challenge is very real because they do not exist in garrisons, brigades and core garrisons. They live in 5,000 to 10,000 villages and districts around Afghanistan. For international security forces and police forces to be that widely distributed makes things pretty difficult.
They are partnering where they can and as best they can in the districts and the provinces where the gains need to be made and where they can be sustained. It is a full meal deal. You want to recruit them, get them through training, and then apply that through operational experience with partners in the field, but you cannot satisfy that whole demand.
Senator Lang: Are they accepting women into the military or into the police force?
Lt.-Gen. Beare: They are. The police, in particular, are driving to get more women in because their duties require the gender sensitivity of a female officer for many police functions, including border crossings, security checks and searching. The number of female police officers is over 2,000 today, which is inadequate, but is going in the right direction.
The army is making efforts. It is very challenging to recruit Afghan women into the army. Culturally, organizationally and geographically it is more difficult to recruit women into a military force which is culturally and ethnically male and which is living in garrisons as opposed to in hometowns.
Senator Plett: You spoke about closing out the mission in Kandahar. I have heard from our chair and others about the great closing-out operation that we had there, yet we read of various problems. You shared with us that some containers have not arrived at home, yet you say the mission was concluded on time and on budget.
I read in our briefing notes that 10 sea containers had been broken into, all of which contained nothing sensitive. I also read that Pakistan's ongoing closure of its Afghanistan border to NATO supply convoys continues and the backlog is getting worse. I am sure that the Taliban is sitting not far from the border and may be helping with some of the border closures.
You say that the mission was concluded on time and on budget. Are there not costs related to losing 100 containers? Could you elaborate on the problems of the border shutdown and on how we will ensure that we get most of our containers of value back home?
Lt.-Gen. Beare: I will ask Brigadier-General Lamarre to give you some details. I am sure he is dying to tell a Mission Transition Task Force story.
His mission was successfully concluded. It was the successful recovery, preparation and transmission of the materiel by air to Kuwait, formerly Camp Mirage. Through landlines of communication it was passed to support command, which contracted services for that materiel that is of lesser risk in terms of loss or pilferage. The cost difference between a road move and an air move is orders of magnitude in difference. He concluded on time and on budget.
We have yet to conclude the entire repatriation of all the materiel, for the reasons you mentioned. However, the plan is still playing out. Our task force in Kuwait, which is facilitating the preparation of vehicle and ammunition onto ships, is coming to a conclusion as well.
Fighting vehicles and ammo are coming home. For some materiel of lesser value we accepted the risk of pilferage or delay through land lines of communication. It is still in responsible hands through our contractors. We know where it is. Ideally, when the borders do reopen, which is in the interests of all players in that region, they will start to flow again.
That said, without providing too many details, the folks who performed this incredible logistics exercise, which the chair saw with her own eyes, have served us well.
Brigadier-General Charles Lamarre, Former Commander, JTFA HQ 5-11, Mission Transition Task Force, National Defence: Thank you for that question. It is not too often we get to talk about logistics, for a host of reasons. It tends to cause people to fall asleep where they are sitting. I will take this opportunity.
We had forewarning to get prepared for this mission, and we did the planning in detail. That gave us the opportunity to go through it step by step logically and counting, and I think we ended up with the results we needed. We are confident that the contractor contracted by our operational support commanders has control of these sea containers. They are still waiting to come through and eventually will when that border reopens with the pressures of commerce that you see anywhere else.
The same thing happened when highways were closed along the shore in Croatia. As soon as the shelling ceased, trucks moved in from Germany within 48 hours. Many people make a living trucking there, and that is what they will do when the border reopens.
The same care was put toward the type of equipment we are talking about to ensure that we did not have anything that could compromise us or that we had concerns about. We did an ammunition out-load of over 70 sea containers, 450 tonnes, that we had to bring back to Canada, because we wanted that protected and we need it here for the next mission. We did that by air into the intermediate staging terminal in Kuwait, put it back into ships, and that is back in Canada.
We did the same for all of our armoured fighting vehicles. The vast majority of our vehicles came back by air and transited either through the intermediate staging terminal in Cyprus or the one in Kuwait to ensure that we could get them onto ships and safely home. The four ships that were chartered to take all that equipment have already made it safely home.
By contrast, the equipment that we have in sea containers, some of which have already been received in Canada or will eventually be received here, is, as Lieutenant-General Beare said, of limited value in terms of dollars and sensitivity.
As you can well imagine, it requires a lot of spare parts to maintain a large fleet of armoured vehicles. Those are very heavy items but are of limited value. That is the type of material that is coming back by ground.
We always assume that there will be some pilfering, as there is anywhere in the world on commercial routes. Therefore, we sent by ground only things that would not cause concern if they were lost.
Senator Plett: As a layperson, I have limited knowledge, but it makes sense to me that, as we are training Afghans there to do some fighting, we would have left some of this equipment for them. Did we leave some? Can you speak about that?
Brig.-Gen. Lamarre: I certainly can. Some of the equipment, truthfully, was just of little value to us to bring back because the cost to ship it back to Canada was prohibitive, and really you have to do a cost analysis on this thing. Is it worth bringing it back? We made sure that we had matrices that gave us all the trigger marks to say: Is it worth it? Do we need it? Can we buy it back in Canada, where the case may be?
Based on that, we did have an amount of materiel that we were able to divest ourselves of in theatre. When we were doing that, we kept in mind what Canada was trying to do in terms of equipping and preparing the Afghan national security forces to look after their people. There, where it made sense, and if it was materiel that was of limited value back in Canada or was too prohibitively expensive to ship back to Canada, oftentimes we went through a process of either transferring it to another government department, so one of our own departments, or attempting to do sales, or to doing a gratuitous transfer to the Afghan national security forces.
General Beare referred to one brigade specifically that we were partnered with and that General Vance was partnered with when he was there as commander and after that his successor, and in many instances we transferred materiel to these organizations to make sure that they could equip their soldiers. Oftentimes it is very low-level stuff, but everyone needs to have stoves so when you are camping out or whatever the case may be if you are conducting camping, you can cook your food. Sometimes it got more sophisticated where we had vehicles that we had been using, such as SUVs, which we were not going to bring back to Canada due to how much wear and tear we had already put on them. We simply transferred them over to authorities right there, and they were able to use them.
The Chair: You actually had to invent a template to do this. I saw the computer programs and all of that. Is this useful in the future? Did you learn something there? It has been a long time since we packed up.
Brig.-Gen. Lamarre: It has been particularly useful, actually. One of the things we maintain with my task force is an influence activity cell specifically to look as to how we can continue to achieve our aims while helping our partners on the ground, and that is what that cell did. With a specialist team that came out of our materiel world, with the right authorities delegated from Treasury Board to our minister to ADM (Materiel) Dan Ross, this team came into theatre. We established a template by which, whenever we had materiel that we identified was not going to be shipped back to Canada, we had a process with a checklist to make sure we put it to the right locations. It was based on the dollar amount worth and the use where it would best be used and really who would benefit the most. In some instances, though we gave a lot of materiel to the Afghan National Army, we also sometimes gave it through our American partners to Afghan organizations that were looking after Afghan people.
If you allow me to elaborate on that for a couple of seconds, we had "tentage" overseas that we used to establish semi-permanent structures. The frames for those tents were being brought back to Canada where they are going to be refurbished so we can use them on our next deployment and transition to out next operations, but the canvass was of sufficient concern to us because of all the dust it had been exposed to that we were not going to bring it back. If we destroyed it in theatre, it would cost us approximately $150,000 in destruction costs. Instead of doing that, in partnership with the Americans' sustainment brigade, which operated what they called a humanitarian assistance yard, we actually arranged to transfer this through this yard to a local Afghan charity that was using it to construct shelters for the Afghans. It was helpful to do it right there for the Afghan people but also helpful in terms of saving us costs. Those types of initiatives were undertaken by the mission divestment unit that was part of my task force.
The Chair: I wanted people to understand that you did this so smartly and so that things did go where they were best needed. Thank you for that.
Senator Eggleton: It has been a decade since our first deployment into Afghanistan, which I remember well. I was Minister of Defence when we sent the troops over for Operation Apollo. I want to, however, ask about Operation ATTENTION. Part of the question I was going to ask was asked Senator Lang, asked about the problem of low literacy and what is being done to overcome that. Let me ask about another challenge, though, and that is high attrition rates. A U.S. naval officer apparently referred to building the Afghan army as being like pouring water into a sieve. Tell me about the attrition rates. You painted a fairly positive picture about the numbers here. Is there a better handle on the attrition rate? Do you have some numbers to indicate that and what are they doing differently? Earlier, you talked about the things that you felt needed to be done to try to keep people loyal and keep them involved. Are they actually doing that? Are the numbers actually showing that?
Lt.-Gen. Beare: The reports of attrition in the police force, annualized as of last month, totals somewhere between 16 and 17 per cent annualized, which in a country like Afghanistan is not a major challenge. As a matter of fact, it is just 2 per cent above target. They are shooting for a 14 per cent sustainable rate. Police forces typically recruited in their regions or employed in their regions, trained in their regions, so they are typically close to home. The attrition rates were much worse than that years ago because they were not equipped, not trained, not led and not paid, but now all of those are being filled in.
The Afghan National Army attrition rates are still well above Afghan ambition and NATO's ambition for what will allow them to be sustainable, and they are rolling in anywhere between, depending where you are in the country, 15 per cent in one location up to 35 in another. The factors that are driving attrition in those relate to typically geography — where am I working versus where is my home — the different tempo you will have in the different regions of Afghanistan, higher demand in one region versus another and fundamentally leadership.
The Afghan military authorities own and need to own the Afghan National Army attrition challenge, in the first instance, to provide the vehicles through which they do not just put their soldiers in operations and leave them there, but they manage them so they are in the line for eight weeks, out of line for four weeks, in for eight, so a rhythm of operational tempo that could allow them to plan when they will have their breaks and plan when they can go home.
The second is they put into place an inside Afghanistan system of flights that allow soldiers and police officers to go home. As you can imagine, they are family oriented, and they do need to reconnect at least once in a year with family. If you do not allow them to reconnect, they will find a way, which typically equals attrition. Those measures are put into place and are having a moderating effect as well, but it is nowhere near the targets you want to get to.
Third but not least is commanders need to be held to account for the behaviour or the performance of the forces under their command, and you know how difficult it is to create a climate and a culture of command accountability for a lot of things: operations, attrition, transparency. We are trying to get all of those accountabilities running at the same time, and it will take time.
It is a challenge, and no one is satisfied with the numbers, including the Afghans themselves today, so it is being taken on. In the meantime, the growth is still being realized, and the qualitative development is still being delivered, especially in the training base, but it would be nice that you could dial that attrition back so that you could invest more time in the training base as opposed to continuously replenishing what has left.
One last thought on that, if I may, is that the returnees are high as well. I cannot give you a number off the top of my head for that, but the amount of folks coming back having abandoned is significant as well. It is significant in a lot of ways because, number one, they want a pay check, and number two, they actually may still want to serve, but number three, it also indicates a trend. The Afghan national security forces are actually — I will use the small "w" on this — winning. They are actually achieving operational successes that a year or two years ago they could never imagine. They are holding ground and operating in communities that were the heart of the Taliban a year or two years ago, and they own them today. There is a sense of progress and being on a winning side that also has a mitigating effect on that attrition and/or inviting those who have left before to come back. There is an amnesty, if you will, to invite people to come back and a pardon and welcome back to the force and tally ho, off they go.
Senator Eggleton: What about the effort to get regional representation? The southern Pashtuns have been generally underrepresented in the Afghan army and overrepresented in the Taliban. What is happening there? Is that getting better?
Lt.-Gen. Beare: It is getting better, but it is still not near their goals. Nationally, Pashtun representation in the arm and police is at about national norms, but the southern Pashtun component of that Pashtun population is under- representative of the population in the south, and the population in the south remains the most challenged as it relates to the security in the hometown and the toing and froing that had been going on over the years, as we have seen. We cleared and we left and cleared and then left, and now we have cleared and stayed, and what is staying now are Afghans. Now the opportunity for the southern Pashtuns to opt in with some assurance that the security forces will still be there next year is higher. The trend is in the right direction, but I do not have the details at this time.
Senator Eggleton: General Dallaire asked you about the 950 and where that came from. I would like to ask you, in that connection, what percentage of those are reservists?
Lt.-Gen. Beare: I should have that at the tip of my tongue and I do not, senator, but I will get it to you. It is substantial, and the number is to follow.
General Vance tells me around 25 per cent and that sounds exactly right, but we will get you an exact number.
Maj.-Gen. Vance: It has been at about 25 per cent.
Senator Plett: My question was related to what Senator Eggleton was talking about on the attrition rate. I will follow up and ask this question: The Taliban, as I said, is still alive and well. We have beaten them back but I am sure they are out there over the Pakistan borders if nowhere else. What do you think will happen to the attrition rate once we are all gone and they start coming back in; will that have an impact and how serious an impact?
Lt.-Gen. Beare: I will agree with you that they are alive.
Senator Plett: Okay, not well then.
Lt.-Gen. Beare: I can certainly say with some confidence they are not as well as they would like to be, or as they have been the past. The territories they do not occupy and own today versus two, three years ago is transformative. You can now drive down the horn of the Panjwa'i and the Afghan security forces own that, which was typically Afghan owned, so they do not enjoy a freedom of movement or a liberty that they used to have.
The Taliban has no less aspiration than they always did. Now their capacity to deliver on that is not necessarily the same as it was, in part because of a growing Afghan security force capacity, persistence on the part of the international community to partner, not just in numbers but in quality and capacity, and build Afghan capacity so they can do it themselves, and ultimately to make sure that there is a shared appreciation for the fact that this does not end in 2014 but it transitions in 2014.
The language of transition is not well understood. Transition does not equal abandonment; transition equals change. It is from our lead to their lead, at our point of the bayonet to their point of the bayonet, and we are still seeing the negotiation, or the deliberation as General Vance has described, about the enduring partnership with the country of Afghanistan by international actors well beyond 2014, to include security force partnering, administrative development, coaching and mentoring, professional education, rule of law and justice. All these other things are messages to the Taliban.
In the here and now, the Taliban do not enjoy freedom to manoeuvre in the 350 districts of Afghanistan. The Afghan security forces are hunting them down. The Taliban will continue to prosecute spectacular attack for effect naturally, because they have a message they want to send.
While they are doing to that, the capacity of the Afghan security forces continues to grow and develop, and the transition of geographic security to Afghan control goes on. Today 50 per cent of the population of Afghanistan lives under a security framework led by Afghans, supported by ISAF and tranche 2 of the transitions. Tranche 3 will result in 75 per cent for the population of Afghanistan under Afghan leadership and enabled by international security forces.
Senator Plett: Are the Afghan forces proactive in hunting them down?
Lt.-Gen. Beare: They certainly are. The last piece that is eroding this, if you will, the refuge they are seeking to 2014 — that is the Taliban — is peace and reconciliation. When you talk about reconciliation, you are actually providing another avenue for those who would rather not continue to fight.
The reintegration numbers are really quite staggering. This time last year, formal insurgent reintegrating into the Afghanistan peace and reconciliation process — these are people reintegrating with civil society — was less than 300 people. Today it is over 3,000. Every time an Afghan insurgent reintegrates it is not an individual reintegration but a family act because family and tribe are everything. This is an act of a population, not just an individual. These are all trends that are moving us in a certain direction.
Madam Chair, you asked me at the beginning whether we have enough time. My answer is this: If we continue to persist — again, we are going from a possibility of success, which is a good enough Afghan security force and an Afghanistan in 2014 that still needs help — it goes to a probability.
The Chair: Thank you. That is an excellent point.
Senator Manning: I thank our witnesses for their presence here today. I certainly congratulate each and every one of the men and women in our forces for the work they do, and thank you for the work you do on behalf of us all. It is very interesting listening. Even the logistics part is very interesting, to be honest with you. Listening to how you all work with the cultural and societal differences that you have to deal with, and for the different forces to be able to work together, is a compliment to you all.
Many of my colleagues have asked the questions that I had put forward earlier. I just want to ask about the Kabul military training centre to get an understanding of the training that is going on. That is the centre of operations but, as you touched on, there are so many different provinces and districts. Is the training going on throughout the country or are there centres? How do you field that out to different parts of the country, knowing that some parts are less explosive than others? How do you deal with that? How do you take it from the centre out to the districts and the provinces?
Lt.-Gen. Beare: Senator, there are over 30 military training centres in Afghanistan. The largest ones are in Kabul. There are regional military training centres which are becoming the framework for the sustainable training base for the army of the future. They are actually still being built in some cases but, at the end of the day, if you were to count them all up in the country of Afghanistan in any one day you have about 25,000 army personnel in training, and anywhere from 10,000 to 15,000 police in training in one of those training centres on any day.
The baseline training is dispersed as you can, because you do not need to bring the basics to the centre. That can be delivered in many different locations. Our Kabul military training centre is home to a number of training centres, so it is training from the basics, to the literacy, to the cultural advisers and religion, to the NCO, to the officers, and it is also the home to branch schools, including signals, artillery and other branch schools. It is a home of schools, if I could call it that. It is a logical place to have it because you are able to do the national programs in a national location while you do the basics in the regional military training centres.
The training of the Afghan Army is not completed there. The training goes on from your basics to your specialist or leader training. I graduate as a soldier, I have literacy and I could be a communicator. Apparently you have to be literate to be a communicator.
The Chair: The jury is out on that.
Lt.-Gen. Beare: You take a literacy program and then you take a basic signals course. When you graduate from that you will move down the road to the combined fielding centre, where you will meet the soldiers, the leaders who are deploying into your new unit, pick a unit type, an artillery, battery, an engineer squadron, with all your equipment, and you go through a 6- to 16-week program, depending on the skills you are learning, of collective training with the folks you will be deploying to the field with.
When that is completed, you deploy leaders, officers, NCOs, soldiers, with the equipment, communications, weapons and vehicles — a fully fielded, shiny new kit to the field. In any one day the Canadians working at the combined fielding centre or the consolidated fielding centre will put out the door the equivalent of the Canadian army every year, with all its new equipment, its leaders, soldiers, weapons and communications.
That is the sum of the training experiences. We are sitting at the centre of this and the Canadians providing the senior mentorship to the KMTC — Colonel Mike Minor and the Canadian colonel providing mentorship to the Afghan leader of the Consolidated Fielding Centre, Colonel Rory Radford — are exercising a national influence in developing not just the Afghan outputs but the Afghan leaders who are running those institutions.
Senator Manning: You talked earlier about the challenges that you face. Could you tell us what you think is the greatest challenge in regard to the mission transition? Tell us how you see it from where you sit; or any one of you, for that matter.
Lt.-Gen. Beare: I think all of us could have a perspective on that, given we have had individual experiences there. I would say that the most significant challenge pre-2009 was under resourcing and a vision or strategy that did not match the magnitude of the task. We overcame that in 2009 and 2010. If I were to look at it introspectively, the challenge for us is to persist in the face of the challenges while we see the progress that we can deliver on the reasonable level of results that are good enough for Afghanistan in its future, providing merit to the investment we have made. The challenge is to preserve our interests in that region and make sure that what goes beyond that is good for them and good for us. Persistence is a challenge for all of us, admittedly, in the international community. For Afghans, the challenge is to believe in that persistence. They buy in when we buy in. The General Habibis of the world are a demonstration of "you commit; I commit." We are in it; and they lead. Their confidence in us needs to be preserved. It does not need to be the same number or the same amount of money; it just has to be the right number with the right level of effort, making sure that this endures beyond the current phase.
The Chair: Let us hear from Lieutenant-General Vance and Brigadier-General Lamarre as well.
Maj.-Gen. Vance: It is a great question. I would agree with what Brigadier-General Beare said. When we take a realistic look at Afghanistan, and we always need to do that, we see that everything we are doing is intended for an effect. We think we are doing the right thing; most of the feedback is positive; and the trends are in the right direction. Ultimately, this is entirely an Afghan decision. Over the last ten years, we have given them deciding time and space free from existential threat. We held off and got rid of some of the wolves, but there are still some wolves. They still have a country; and that is the way it is. There are many things that their country needs to reckon with that are as challenging as reckoning with the Taliban, such as internal divisions and reckoning that need to happen within the country and an agreement that the rule of law will prevail. Such an agreement will not only provide people with an education but also they will have a chance to use it and make the right decisions and that corruption will not be the norm, and so on. Ultimately, these will be Afghan decisions. Realistically, the trends are going in the right direction. There is a much stated proposition by the international community to Afghanistan that asks Afghanistan to take up the challenge.
Failure to take up that challenge in a way that we know would prevent Afghanistan from falling back into peril is an Afghan challenge that they need to do. There is lots of potential for that to happen; and there are plenty of threats as well. The region is still the region. There are safe havens that guard and protect the existential threat to the country living just out of reach on the other side of the border with Pakistan.
The international community, as I have said many times, has given Afghanistan, through blood, treasure and expertise, a tremendous gift. Afghanistan has to grab that brass ring and do something with. We will stay engaged to a point, but it has to be a partnership with Afghanistan. Lots of strategic changes will happen, with presidential election in 2014, and so on. It is not a sure thing; and I do not think it would be reasonable to expect that it is a sure thing. It is an incredibly complex challenge. I can assure you, I think we are doing the right thing; we have been trying to do the right thing. There is a partnership with Afghans that needs to mature and come to fruition; and they seize the initiative on what will happen in their own country.
The Chair: Brigadier-General Lamarre, what are your views, but not about logistics?
Brig.-Gen. Lamarre: For me it is a continuation of the points made by these two gentlemen, to be encouraged by the many things we witnessed there. When I first went to Afghanistan in 2005, I happened to be on a convoy the day that they first allowed girls to go to school. That force continues to multiply. Also at that time, a cellphone was cause for concern when you saw one in someone's hand. Today, everyone has cellphones and there are a number of radio and television stations. When you think about all of the advantages that are out there, you are encouraged by them. The sheer strength of the communications going on internally is a Genie that is hard to put back in the bottle. It is encouraging to see.
Another important thing, which I was perhaps more exposed to because of the nature of my task force's mission, is the issue of corruption that Lieutenant-General Vance raised. It is definitely a concern and a big challenge. The rule of law is important, and corruption has been endemic. Certainly, I am encouraged by Afghan officers and Afghan NCOs when you make donations because if you show up with X number of signatures they will advise you. I had a discussion with senior officers. One said, "When you go anywhere, make sure that you get signatures on these three forms; it is the only way." We then take the forms and send them up our chain of command to army headquarters in Kabul. Unfortunately, we are creating paperwork trails, but on the other side it comes down to probity and the responsibility to report on transactions and activities going on. Those things are indications of positive results and they certainly give rise to hope for that future.
Senator Manning: We are encouraged by what we have heard here today. I spoke to a soldier returning from Afghanistan last year. Being a layperson, I asked him what the most important job in Afghanistan was. I was waiting for him to say, a pilot or a gunman, or whatever the case may be; but he told me, a teacher. That was his answer. It is interesting that you mention about little girls going to school. He thought that teaching was very important. You are talking about everyone.
Senator Mitchell: That segues to my first question. The concept of the transition is to train Afghan soldiers and police for combat and for policing so that we can get out of those functions. The next phase would be to get out of training. Are we training trainers to do their training as well?
Lt.-Gen. Beare: Absolutely, senator. The transitions are operational in the field and in the institutions. A number of training centres today are run entirely by Afghans in leadership, staff, supply, security, everything. As Lieutenant- General Vance described it, we bought the opportunity for that to come on board and to take hold. Also, there is the development of the systems that manage the entire life cycle of the human experience in an institution. Can you imagine not having a pay system or a logistics system? Actually, I can imagine that. These were the constraints under which these forces were being left to try to fend for themselves for too many years. Again, top to bottom, from the minister's office to their executives, to their institutions that connect the ministry to the soldier or the policeman, things such as finance, pay, communication, public affairs, policy — you name it — are overlaid completely by civilian and military. Multinationals are still involved with about 34 countries participating in the NTMA. That is the kind of thing it takes to create that capacity. The training centres and the trainers are predominantly Afghans. If you were to be in an Afghan training centre, you would see an Afghan instructing an Afghan. For every two Afghan instructors, there is a coalition mentor and adviser for coaching and mentoring. It is the same with the camp commandant, who has a coalition coach-mentor working with him or her. That is capacity building as well.
Senator Mitchell: When this transition began, there was some concern or suggestion or discussion around this question about how to be a trainer training people for combat and then not go into combat with them to observe and support. How is that being done? I assume that we are not going into direct combat with them.
Lt.-Gen. Beare: That is correct. Our duty is passed off at the gate. When the trainees leave the training centre, they join their operational force, if it already exists, or they go to the combined fielding centre, join a new unit and go down range with an observer-mentor and liaison team provided by another nation who lives in the geographic space where they will operate. We are not there so that is not an issue for us. The Observer Mentor Liaison Teams come to the consolidated fielding centre to marry up with their Afghan partners before they leave so that when they do deploy, they are deploying with folks that they know they will operate with. That was a challenge when there was not enough in the field, but due to the coalition density in the field now many of these are being well partnered still, but by someone else.
Senator Mitchell: You made the point that in Panjwa'i in 2005 there were 128 Afghan police and that number has now gone to 2,500; is that correct?
Lt.-Gen. Beare: Yes, in Panjwa'i.
Senator Mitchell: To clarify this for people, the Taliban undoubtedly had the same problem with their soldiers as we are having with our Afghan soldiers. They have to deal with illiteracy, command and control issues, leadership issues and all of that, but in the past at least they seemed to be very effective. Is it because they do not need to do so much to have an impact that it is less complex for them to mount the kinds of attacks they do?
As a corollary, what is the IED incidence now? Are the Afghan soldiers and police less intense targets than we were?
Lt-Gen. Beare: To massively oversimplify a complex issue, illiteracy suits the Taliban. A lack of education is an arsenal for them to inform, coerce or sway to their advantage. They are definitely not interested in a literate, educated population.
To security in general, the majority of the security force density in the field today is Afghan. There is a coalition of 130,000 and 300,000 Afghans while there were less than 150,000 years ago. Therefore, the majority of the security incidents are with Afghan security forces rather than the coalition.
To give one snapshot of the trend, the security force density today is nearly half a million, including the Afghans, while it was less than a quarter of a million two years ago. Yet, the 12-month trend of incidents is decreasing. Statisticians can wow you with data. Being in more places and having more density, you would think there would be more incidents, yet the numbers are coming down. That is because the Afghan security forces are pre-empting and our special forces on the ground are staying long enough that the attackers are not able to return to the places they used to come to.
I cannot say when the last significant event in the city of Kabul was. Afghans are providing the security in that city today.
[Translation]
Senator Nolin: Lieutenant-General Beare, my question also has to do with security staff retention. Did I understand correctly that half the territory is under Afghan control?
Lt.-Gen. Beare: To be precise, the command and control of the security forces are under the control of the Afghan authorities and not under the control of the coalition forces.
Senator Nolin: What does the 50 per cent refer to?
Lt.-Gen. Beare: When you count the Afghan provinces and districts, 50 per cent of the Afghan population is within those districts and provinces.
Senator Nolin: And who is the other 50 per cent secured by?
Lt.-Gen. Beare: Also by the Afghans and the coalition, but the coalition provides the leadership.
Senator Nolin: I misunderstood. I thought that we could guarantee the 34 million inhabitants security on half the territory.
Lt.-Gen. Beare: Yes, it is the Afghan authorities who provide daily leadership and security.
Senator Nolin: General Vance used the terms "existential threat". Are police officers leaving out of fear for their personal safety? I presume that must be one reason they are leaving. They are afraid for their lives and for the lives of their families, so they leave the army — or the police force.
Here or in Afghanistan, I remember talking to Canadian soldiers about this existential security problem. Is that a statistic you are looking at? I presume it is declining, but at what rate?
I would also like to know what measures have been implemented by the Afghan authorities to try to prevent this type of situation.
Lt.-Gen. Beare: I do not have the precise measures on hand with regard to the factors that are prompting people to leave the police force.
[English]
Senator Nolin: It is actually to quit. Is this a reason to quit?
Lt.-Gen. Beare: There is no question it would be one of many factors that would motivate an Afghan to leave their security force. However, at the same time more are joining. You do not necessarily join if you know you are joining a risk.
I would like to use two quick illustrations. The town of Marja in Helmand province in southwest Afghanistan was the Taliban capital of southwest Afghanistan for years. It was effectively cleared about this time last year and within a matter of months they recruited their first eight Marja police officers. These were people who were used to the coalition coming and going and the Taliban coming back and exerting their taxes of both money and punishment. These eight Marjans joined and there are now over 80 Marjans in a police force of 300 in the little town of Marja. Again, it is not a personal decision but a family decision to join a security force. That requires a vote.
Another example of Afghans recognizing a risk but choosing an Afghan institutional approach to their security, that is, the government of Afghan police or army, is a program called the Afghan local police. Because the army and police cannot be everywhere in enough density, communities petition government to be allowed to form their own Afghan local police force, which can only be formed under three conditions. First, they petition and convince government that they want it and really need it. Second, it lives under the command of an Afghan district chief of police. It lives in the police system and is not a militia. Third, it is partnered with ISAF forces so it has a partnership in place.
Every time a village petitions for an ALP, as they call it, it is a vote of a community against the Taliban. The Taliban hate the ALP because the community is voting against them.
After these many years, a certain resilience is starting to manifest itself in Afghans who have an option now, and they are seeing the trends themselves. The challenges are many. These, again, are all trends in a direction that is opting for a different future than what the Taliban would offer. They are not only talking; they are actually walking by choice. Those are the kinds of indicators we see.
There are many reasons why they leave. Danger and risk to family would be one of them, but it is not a dominant factor in terms of affecting the overall security force performance.
[Translation]
Senator Dallaire: David Bercuson produced a report by the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute entitled, Lessons Learned? What Canada Should Learn from Afghanistan.
Are you part of a group that is looking at the lessons to be learned at the strategic and operational levels so that in future, we can apply a government-wide concept? Who is conducting this exercise?
Maj.-Gen. Vance: Yes, I am currently running a project to conduct an exercise of the lessons learned.
Among all the government officers, we have concluded the first step and tabled a report to the clerk of the Privy Council. We are also continuing, at the operational and strategic levels, to take the necessary measures to ensure the success of our future projects.
[English]
Senator Lang: I want to pursue a different tack here entirely.
The Chair: Not a new area?
Senator Lang: No, not a new area.
I have a question to you, general. As a committee, we have heard testimony over the years on Afghanistan and the progress in Afghanistan and the challenges and the difficulties that our men and women face there. We have discussed amongst ourselves the possibility of maybe going and doing a tour there to see for ourselves just exactly what is happening over there. From your perspective, do you it as beneficial for a committee such as ours to go over and meet with the troops and see what is going on over there and to gauge for ourselves the successes you talk about?
Lt-Gen. Beare: Every visit is a transformative experience. There is merit in seeing things with our own eyes. However, there is more we need to do to help provide the facsimile of a visit to people who are interested in the mission at large, because not everyone can go. Clearly we can do a better job of describing not just what our men and women are doing, which is heroic on an individual and team effort, but what it is doing with our partners, coalition, civil and military, and ultimately, the result it is having with and amongst Afghans, who are ultimately the reason we are there. Visits are welcome and transformative and high value. I encourage leaders who need to inform their views, to inform policy strategy and other significant, tough choices, to at least see with their own eyes.
When people visit, I always insist on a few things. First, visiting our troops is one of the reasons to go, but one of the reasons to go is to understand the campaign, where it was, where it is and where it is going. We need to see it in the context of the campaign at large, because it is the endgame or the results we are pursuing that still speak to the motivation of why our men and women are there, and then where are we in terms of our partnerships, our coalition and civil and military partners. Ultimately, where are we with our most important partners, the Afghans themselves, and where are they trending and what do they perceive?
By the way, make sure you do not miss getting into every training centre you can and shake the hand of a Canadian man or woman in uniform and find out how they are doing and how they are part of that. Ultimately, the story they will tell when they come home will be a combination of "here is what I did" and "while I was there, here is what they did want what they got done." That is the trajectory it is on. I certainly welcome it, and I am a fan of good visits.
Maj.-Gen. Vance: To place it in context for you, there are all sorts of these visits that go on now, particularly from the United States. Canada was one of the very first nations to put in a powerful what the Americans would call delegation under the commission of inquiry that the chair was on. The result of that commission of inquiry had a massive effect, because everyone on it knew what was going on because they were there. We cannot underestimate the impact for Canada, the CF and, in fact, the trajectory that Kandahar took because of that, because a group of people came over who would not otherwise have seen the mission, studied it, got enough, took it away and made recommendations. It was the single most important governmental engagement to make right decisions that happened in Afghanistan, period.
The Chair: I have to say that it was a transformative experience. Every time I have been subsequent, it has been as well, because you only feel that when we first went. We saw that if we did not get our troops up off the ground, we were going to continue to lose them and those kinds of things. To Senator Manning's point, looking at the training mission, you can see that when those young men, not too many women, go back out, not only are they literate and trained and better soldiers or police officers, but they are heroes in their own community. They are leaders in their own community. They are supplanting the drug lords and the Taliban, and that can never be underestimated in what we are doing.
Gentlemen, thank you. This has been another interesting and important discussion. We appreciate your time.
(The committee adjourned.)