Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Issue 27 - Evidence - Meeting of May 27, 2015
OTTAWA, Wednesday, May 27, 2015
The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met this day at 4:17 p.m. to examine such issues as may arise from time to time relating to foreign relations and international trade generally (topic: Iran nuclear framework agreement).
Senator A. Raynell Andreychuk (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade is examining such issues as may arise from time to time relating to foreign relations and international trade generally. The topic today is Iran nuclear framework agreement. As members will recall, we have studied the issue of Iran in relation to the nuclear issue but also with respect to the human rights record. As the issue of the framework agreement is topical, current and not yet completed, this is an opportunity for an update from our officials from Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada.
Before us we have Ms. Sabine Nolke, Director General, Non-Proliferation and Security Threat Reduction; and Ms. Carol McQueen, Director, Gulf States Relations Division. We're very pleased that you responded quickly to give us an update on the issue of Iran and the framework agreement. Welcome to the committee. You've been here before and know our process, so I welcome your opening statements, after which we'll turn to questions.
Sabine Nolke, Director General, Non-Proliferation and Security Threat Reduction, Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada: Thank you very much, Madam Chair. With your indulgence, I would suggest that my colleague, Carol McQueen, give you a general overview of the Iran political situation in brief and then I'll go into more detail on the nuclear framework, if that is acceptable.
The Chair: Please.
Carol McQueen, Director, Gulf States Relations Division, Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada: Thank you, Madam Chair and members of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, for the opportunity to address you today. I will provide you with a brief overview of the broader political situation in Iran.
The Iranian regime is a complex authoritarian structure where multiple factions compete for power and influence. However, Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, continues to exercise ultimate political power within Iran. He frequently uses his position to balance the various factions in order to ensure the survival of the regime and retain his control.
Iran's Guardian Council, a group of conservative clerics with close ties to the Supreme Leader, are charged with vetting presidential and parliamentary candidates. As a result, even those running as supposed moderate candidate, like President Rouhani, are regime insiders that have been given the stamp of approval by the Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council. Those who would threaten the regime's control are excluded from positions of authority. A high- profile example of this exclusion is the ongoing imprisonment of the leading political figures behind Iran's Green Movement, which arose in 2009 amidst widespread protests against political corruption in Iran.
Madam Chair, developments in the nuclear negotiations over the past two years demonstrate that President Rouhani has been accorded some latitude by the Supreme Leader to resolve the nuclear impasse. His mandate is to gain relief from the international sanctions that have severely weakened the Iranian economy.
[Translation]
But even in the event of a nuclear deal, Iran's economic distress will likely not end with the roll-back of sanctions. It will take years and tens of billions of dollars in investment for Iran's energy sector to be able to reach former peaks in all exports. Further, Iran is a country wrought with economic mismanagement and corruption. State-run monopolies under the purview of the Supreme Leader and Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps — the IRGC — control significant swaths of domestic industry and production. These monopolies divert revenues away from small and medium-sized Iranian businesses into regime coffers.
[English]
Moreover, the domestic situation remains grave due to the regime's serious and systematic human rights violations carried out by the expansive regime security apparatus, including the police, the judiciary and the Basij, the volunteer arm of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps, all of which are closely linked to the Supreme Leader. The execution rate spiked following the 2013 presidential elections and has continued at a high rate. More than 340 executions have taken place so far this year, with a shocking average of six executions per day between April 6 and 29. As a result, Iran has the second highest number of executions in the world.
[Translation]
Madam Chair, women face serious discrimination in law and in practice, exacerbating issues like child, early and forced marriage, and restricting their full and equal participation in political and economic life. Minority groups fare little better. Iran's ethnic and religious minority communities routinely face systematic harassment, arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, as well as serious restrictions to employment and education.
[English]
The government continues to suppress freedom of expression, association, assembly and the media. Human rights activists and lawyers, journalists and average social media users — anyone who may challenge the regime's narratives — face harassment, arbitrary arrest and detention. Iranians face criminal charges for social media posts, including for example six young people who received lashes for posting a video of them dancing to the pop song, "Happy.''
Madam Chair, despite the charm offensive Foreign Minister Zarif and President Rouhani undertake internationally, Iran's foreign policy is driven by the hardline IRGC, whose commander, Qasem Soleimani, is close to the Supreme Leader. Regional hegemony and destabilization are Iran's foreign policy objectives. Iran's support to Syria in conjunction with its proxy Hezbollah, a listed terrorist entity in Canada, has served to bolster the Assad regime and prolong the conflict, which has claimed more than 200,000 Syrian lives and displaced millions. Iran's meddling in Syria is mirrored by the regime's growing involvement in Iraq, where Iran's arming of Shiite militias stands in the way of a unified nation that is so critical to defeating the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS. Iran is further believed to be providing limited support to the Houthis in Yemen.
One must look only at Iran's human rights track record and its belligerent regional policies, and then compare them with the rosy narrative President Rouhani presents to the world to see the divergence between what the regime says and what it does. Canada's deep distrust of Iran's long-term intentions means that Canada will remain skeptical of any promises Iran makes vis-à-vis its nuclear program in the context of a possible agreement.
[Translation]
Thank you for your time and I look forward to your questions.
Ms. Nolke: Thank you for the invitation to speak to you today on the subject of the ongoing nuclear negotiations between the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, alongside Germany (P5+1), and Iran, in particular on the political understanding announced in Lausanne, Switzerland, on April 2.
I will start however by providing a bit of context and background before discussing the "Lausanne Framework.''
[English]
Canada and like-minded countries have been deeply concerned about Iran's nuclear intentions for more than a decade. The revelations of an undeclared heavy-water nuclear reactor at Arak, as well as uranium enrichment facilities at Natanz in 2002 and again at Fordow in 2009, demonstrated that Iran was not in compliance with its nuclear obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT, and Iran's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA. Iran had an obligation to declare these nuclear facilities. These and other acts of non-compliance have contributed to the skepticism of Iran's claims that their nuclear program is solely for peaceful purposes.
In 2010, Iran began to enrich uranium to 20 per cent. It should be noted that it takes much more work to enrich uranium from its natural level of 0.7 per cent to 20 per cent than it does to enrich it from 20 per cent to 90 per cent, the level needed for nuclear weapons, also called weapons-grade uranium. Iran has no demonstrated need for uranium enriched to 20 per cent. Moreover, the same centrifuges used to enrich from the natural level of enrichment can be used to enrich to weapons-grade uranium.
Iran's record of negative influence in the region is very worrisome. Canada views Iran as one of the most significant threats to international peace and security, stemming in part from the regime's ongoing nuclear non-compliance.
This has been a key non-proliferation issue for a very long time. The P5+1 — China, France, Russia, the U.K., the U.S. and Germany — negotiations with Iran date back to 2006 and are only the latest in a series of efforts. The P5+1 talks stalled during the latter part of former Iranian President Ahmadinejad's term in office from 2005 to 2013; but following President Rouhani's inauguration in August 2013, the P5+1 talks gained renewed momentum. We attribute this solely to the dire economic situation in Iran brought on by international sanctions, including those of Canada, the U.S., the EU and the UN Security Council. We are convinced that every diplomatic measure must be taken to resolve the situation and ensure that Iran never obtains nuclear weapons capability.
In November 2013 a landmark interim deal called the Joint Plan of Action or JPA was finalized between the P5+1 and Iran. It was designed to give the P5+1 and Iran the time and space necessary to negotiate a comprehensive agreement to verifiably ensure that Iran's nuclear program would be exclusively for peaceful purposes. It set temporary limits on Iran's nuclear activities in return for limited and reversible sanctions relief. It included a stringent monitoring and verification regime to ensure that Iran delivered on its commitments.
The JPA came into effect in January 2014, with an initial duration of six months. In July 2014 it was extended for the first time and was subsequently extended again in November 2014. The current time by which a comprehensive agreement is expected by the P5+1 is June 30, 2015. The JPA was considered by many to be a breakthrough, as it was the first major advance on this issue in a decade. The IAEA continues to confirm that Iran is meeting its commitments under the JPA through monthly implementation reports.
We consider demonstrable and verifiable results to be the real test of whether Iran is committed to addressing concerns surrounding its nuclear program. To this end, Canada recently made a contribution of $3 million to the IAEA to support the agency's efforts to monitor Iranian compliance with its commitments under the joint plan of action. This brings Canada's total JPA contributions to date to $4 million. The U.S. has expressed its strong appreciation for this contribution at senior levels.
[Translation]
There are in fact two separate but related tracks trying to address the Iran nuclear issue. In addition to the P5+1 process, there is the framework for cooperation between the IAEA and Iran agreed in November 2013. The IAEA-Iran Framework for Cooperation is a mechanism for the IAEA to fulfil its legal safeguards verification mandate.
Other, similar approaches have failed over the years, due to Iran's unwillingness to cooperate. The IAEA has a substantial amount of information which suggests that Iran's nuclear research activities over at least the last two decades have had possible military dimensions.
This is what the nuclear explosive development indicators officially tell us. These military dimensions are divided into 12 separate areas, each of which can be considered either an essential element or a supporting component of a nuclear weapons development effort. When considered as a whole, a compelling case is made by the IAEA, and several reports by the director general, that Iran has been systematically conducting research and development related to nuclear weapons.
We fully support the IAEA's technical conclusions. Iran continues to drag its feet with the IAEA in the context of the Framework for Cooperation, and does not appear to be genuinely interested in cooperating and resolving concerns regarding the possible military dimensions of its nuclear program.
Canada strongly believes that these questions must not fall by the wayside, even in the event of a broader, diplomatic solution as a result of the P5+1 nuclear talks with Iran. It is crucial for the credibility and integrity of the global non-proliferation regime that Iran provide a satisfactory resolution to the PMD issue and demonstrate that its scientists and engineers are no longer working on nuclear weapons-related research and development.
In order to do this, Iran will need to provide the IAEA with access to the documents, scientists, sites and material that the IAEA has requested. Canada will continue to call for the IAEA to be given this access.
[English]
Now about the Lausanne framework. On April 2 the members of the EU-led P5+1 announced they had reached a political understanding with Iran on key parameters that would form the basis for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the JCPOA. It remains to be seen if a JCPOA can be finalized and agreed prior to June 30. Much work remains to be done. Meetings between the P5+1 and Iran to draft a possible JCPOA and technical annexes resumed in the third week of April and will likely continue right up to the deadline of June 30.
According to the U.S. fact sheet made public on April 2, if the Lausanne framework serves as the basis for a JCPOA and is implemented by Iran in good faith, it will increase Iran's break-out time to at least 1 year, for a period of 10 years. I will elaborate on this a bit later.
Iran's enrichment capacity would be significantly decreased, due to cuts in the numbers of both operational and installed centrifuges, as well as to Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium.
The underground Fordow enrichment facility would be repurposed as a nuclear research facility and not be allowed to be used for enrichment of uranium for at least 15 years.
The Arak heavy-water reactor would be redesigned to make it proliferation-resistant.
Iran would implement the IAEA Safeguards Additional Protocol, and the IAEA would be allowed to inspect the full uranium fuel cycle from mines and mills to disposal of spent nuclear fuel.
Unilateral U.S. and EU economic and nuclear-related sanctions would be lifted, as would UNSC sanctions. The latter would likely be done in a phased manner as Iran meets its commitments.
Finally, U.S. sanctions on Iran due to Iran's support for terrorism or egregious human rights record would remain in place.
A key goal of the P5+1 has been to expand the detection, decision-making and reaction time for the IAEA and the international community in case Iran decides to make a dash towards a nuclear weapon. Break-out time is how long it would take for Iran from the point of taking a decision to pursue nuclear weapons to produce the necessary fissile material for a nuclear weapon, whether enriched uranium or weapons-grade plutonium. The minimum break-out time for Iran of one year is the stated goal of the P5+1. In the view of the P5+1, if a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is finalized and agreed on the basis of the parameters identified in the Lausanne framework, then Iran's break-out time would be increased from as little as two to three months today to at least a year or possibly even longer.
[Translation]
With the prospect of a possible JCPOA before us, we must keep in mind that Iran's track record is not one that encourages trust. Therefore, monitoring and verification will be key to ensuring that Iran only uses its nuclear know- how for peaceful purposes.
The IAEA, as the world's nuclear watchdog, will continue to play the central role in this regard.
I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.
[English]
I apologize if I took a bit long, but these are complex matters.
The Chair: Thank you. I think the length was not an issue. I think the information is very helpful.
Just informational items that you might add, I'll start with Ms. McQueen. In respect to human rights, one of the issues that has preoccupied Canadians is the Baha'i issue. I think we've gone to the seventh year of imprisonment of Baha'i leaders. Do you have any comment? Is there more activity, less activity, with respect to the actions of the Iranians against the Baha'i community?
Ms. McQueen: I think what I would say is we simply don't see any improvement. Since the election of President Rouhani, we see no improvement in relation to the Baha'i. Some of their leaders, as you say, are in prison. They are prevented from going to university. They don't have freedom of practise, et cetera. So, no, the situation is not improving for them and that's why our government has remained very vocal on the issue, issuing that press statement on the seventh anniversary.
The Chair: Ms. Nolke, Canada is not in the negotiating team with respect to Iran. How do we, as a government, receive the information? What is the process that involves Canada?
Ms. Nolke: There is, of course, a very public process that the P5+1 do lead, and I mentioned in my remarks the U.S. fact sheet, which is something, by the way, I can happily make available to the committee, if that is of interest. It sets out essentially the elements of a potential deal that the U.S. is envisioning as part of the negotiations. There is the public track. Of course, individual members of the P5+1 do comment individually as well as publicly and we follow that very closely.
Of course, given the overriding interest that the government has, particularly in the IAEA's role in verifying the implementation of any current and future obligations, we do speak with our allies as well. We have informal channels of communication and some of those, of course, are quite confidential, but we do discuss with our allies what is happening in this part of the negotiations.
[Translation]
Senator Fortin-Duplessis: Welcome to all of you. It is always a pleasure to have you back. Yesterday I read an article on this very topic by Jeremy Kinsman, a long-serving former Canadian ambassador. He writes that under the agreement, Iran will be subject to the most exhaustive and intrusive international inspection regime ever conceived. Do you agree with this statement? As you are very aware of what is happening in the world, can you tell us if there has been in the past the same type of nuclear weapons inspection regime in other countries?
[English]
Ms. Nolke: I think my first comment, senator — and thank you for this question — is that we don't know what will be agreed yet. We have an idea of what our allies hope to be in a final agreement, but a lot of the technical details, particularly when it comes to inspections and reductions of materials, et cetera, are yet to be finalized. We don't know what's in the final deal. That's my first caveat.
The second caveat directly linked to that is nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. Even the points that were discussed in Lausanne, and the points, agreements and commitments made under the original JPA, the joint plan of action of 2013, may take a different shape in a final agreement. There will be a package deal.
I don't have a crystal ball. I cannot tell you exactly the extent to which any kind of agreement will be more onerous or less onerous than anything that is currently in existence. What I can tell you, based on what our allies have indicated might be in the deal, is that yes, it will be stringent. It will be expected, particularly if Iran complies with its obligations to the IAEA under the NPT and under an additional protocol, that those compliance mechanisms are the same for everyone. The difference is that Iran has not previously complied, so it may look more stringent and the IAEA will look more closely, but that is because many of the doors in the past have been closed to it. From what we see, it might not be any more stringent, but certainly there will be great scrutiny and Canada has made a major contribution to enable the IAEA now to verify its agreement.
The IAEA is in there now once a month, or they report once a month, and that is more than they do on other states, but that's because of the ongoing negotiations and the interest that Iran comply with its commitments.
[Translation]
Senator Fortin-Duplessis: Ms. McQueen, you surely have a great deal of experience with the United Nations, particularly when it comes to preventing conflicts. Earlier you mentioned the June 30 deadline, which has been set for some time. There remains but a month to finalize the agreement. Do you believe that it will be signed in time?
Ms. McQueen: I think the question is better suited to Ms. Nolke.
[English]
Ms. Nolke: Again, with all due respect, senator, I am referring to my crystal ball here that I'm afraid I don't have. Certainly the commitment of our allies, and I understand of the government of Iran, is to get it done by the end of June. They have set that deadline, and they're certainly working extremely hard.
In the past, agreement has been postponed twice, so whether or not it will actually happen, I don't know, but we are optimistic. The political will is certainly there on the side of the P5+1. Whether or not that same political commitment to actually getting a useful, effective and verifiable deal done and how far that commitment extends on behalf of Iran, that I cannot tell. Yes, at this point we are optimistic, but we have been before.
[Translation]
Senator Fortin-Duplessis: Madam Chair, put me down for a second round.
[English]
Senator Dawson: Diplomacy is negotiating with our enemies, so we should not be surprised that we're doing diplomacy with someone that has not always been considered a friend. I don't feel that ill at ease about the fact that the P5+1 or the 3+3, or whatever you want to call them, are negotiating with Iran. If we look at the past on these issues of transparency and weapons of mass destruction, the same partners were sitting around the table before Iraq and before the wars, and we were supposed to be finding weapons of mass destruction, which obviously never existed.
I think that continuing to negotiate is better than invading. The Iraq war was a mistake; I don't care how many people want to revisit history. I think diplomacy is negotiating with our enemy.
You talked about the date butoir being the end of June, but there is no drop-dead date in the sense that there is nothing happening on July 1, except Canada Day, that will make the end of June that important. If we don't have an agreement by the end of June, I don't think there is anything dramatic about the fact. I know that our government is not as close to that negotiation as I think it should be, but I think we should encourage the nations that are negotiating. Our allies are six very important allies. We should encourage them to continue this negotiation. Again, I repeat, diplomacy is not negotiating with our nice friends to the south. It's negotiating with people that we have difficulties with.
[Translation]
I would like you to come back to the deadline. What will happen should there be no agreement by June 30? From what I gather, there is no mechanism to remove the parties around the negotiation table.
[English]
Ms. Nolke: I believe I agree with everything that you've just said. I think it was Yitzhak Rabin who said, "You don't make peace with your friends; you make peace with your enemies.'' Absolutely, a diplomatic solution is in everybody's interests. Our government very strongly supports a diplomatic solution.
When it comes to the date of June 30, I think past history on the file has shown these dates are malleable. Even the April 2 agreement was supposed to have been done by March 31. There have been two prior extensions.
Yes, diplomacy has an absolute role to play here. It's in everybody's interests, and we very much welcome and support the efforts our P5+1 colleagues are doing in this regard. As I have indicated, we are supporting their efforts with very concrete contributions of assistance. Yes, I agree with every word.
Senator Dawson: You were very titillating when you said we have backdoor channels that we're negotiating. Any time some of those backdoor channels are open and you can send us the information on progress, we would appreciate it. It was titillating.
Ms. Nolke: It's the business of diplomacy, which I'm sure you're very familiar with, that you do talk behind closed doors and things can get said that aren't ready, aren't ripe for publication, but our allies have been very forthcoming.
We have very public statements from the United States about where they see this deal going, and I think it's headed very much in the right direction.
Senator Dawson: My colleague today made a statement about the fact that some things are supposed to not be said and they seem to be leaking anyway, so if anything does become available, we would appreciate it.
Ms. Nolke: If it becomes public, I'm sure we will let you know.
Senator Dawson: Semi-public.
The Chair: We'll let you carry that negotiation on.
I should think diplomacy is with our friends as well as our enemies. Perhaps that's part of the diplomacy. You don't have to be, but you should when you can. This could go for a new topic: diplomacy.
Senator Ataullahjan: I have a couple of questions. The feeling is that maybe the Iranian-backed militias are best suited to come to Islamic State fighters, since the Iraqi forces haven't had too much luck. Isn't that exactly the opposite of what we and our allies might want because we have just been extending Iran's influence in that area?
Ms. McQueen: Thank you for the question. Luckily, I also cover Iraq, so I know the file fairly well.
Yes, our position is that Iran's support for Shiite militias in Iraq in the long term could be extremely damaging and could certainly fuel ongoing sectarian and other violence. What is complicated about Iraq is there are in fact two types of Shiite militias. There are Shiite militias that pre-existed this current conflict, very much backed by Iran and that exist in a structure of control, arming and so on from Iran. Then there are some popular mobilization forces, which are forces that have come into being since the crisis with ISIS began.
The government is trying to make a distinction between those groups, to call upon the popular mobilization units and bring them more under the control of the Iraqi government, so they could help the Sunnis and other groups fight ISIS in the long run and maybe form a more integrated army or national guard. That's in theory, but obviously in practice it's very difficult to distinguish between those groups.
Certainly we are very worried by the developments in Ramadi a few weeks ago where the town fell because it continues to show the weakness of the Iraqi security forces, the actual Iraqi army, and also the challenges that will come from trying to recruit Sunni fighters into a structure that belongs to the government.
We are very worried that Iranian influence in Iraq will extend deeper and deeper into Sunni areas, which may make a long-term solution to the conflict even more difficult.
Senator Eaton: To complicate things further, the Iraqi government is Shiite, is it not? Was it not part of the problem that it was not inclusive of Sunnis at the beginning? Is it still that way?
Ms. McQueen: It's very important to distinguish between the current Iraqi government and the Iraqi government under Maliki, who was the former prime minister. Unfortunately, Prime Minister Maliki, who is a Shiite, brought into being many policies and things that marginalized Sunni populations and led to underlying discontent and problems.
The new Iraqi government under Prime Minister Al-Abadi is making real efforts to try to create a more inclusive government. Certain aspects of the Iraqi government are clearly delineated. For example, the Prime Minister is Shiite, the President is a Kurd, the speaker of the house is a Sunni. You see that across the ministries and a real effort has been made to make it cross-sectarian.
Today, you could not say it's a purely Shiite government, but obviously the Shiites won a majority of the parliamentarians and so on. To some extent they do control more positions.
Senator Ataullahjan: With the Ayatollah Khomeini firmly in power, you said most of the leaders of the green movement are in prison. Is the green movement effectively dead, or are there still some people fighting on their behalf?
Ms. McQueen: That's a very good question. One of the things I find the most incredible and admirable about Iran is the extent to which there are networks of activists who try to advance human rights and try to make a difference, and certainly those people exist. There are people that are supportive of the leaders that were in prison and there is even a member of Parliament who made a speech calling for their release, so there are some remnants of that. But, no, I'm afraid, with the clampdown by the security forces and so on following the 2009 events, there is no public movement because people are basically too scared to do anything.
Senator Ataullahjan: At the risk of sounding ignorant, you said Iran has the second highest rate of executions. I want to know which country has the highest rate of executions.
Ms. McQueen: China.
Senator Eaton: These questions are as simplistic as that one. Where does Iran get its uranium from?
Ms. Nolke: I wanted to seek confirmation from my experts to make sure that I wasn't giving you wrong information. They have their own sources, their own mines, which is why part of the importance of the deal is to follow the entire nuclear fuel cycle, from uranium mining to fuel disposal at the end.
Years and years ago they also imported some uranium from South Africa and we believe a lot of that is still there, but they do have their own mines.
Senator Eaton: What other purposes can their stockpile of enriched uranium be used for?
Ms. Nolke: That is the $64,000 question. According to the IAEA reports, there is really no reason for them to have uranium enriched to the 20 per cent level. The peaceful use of fuel cycle enrichment usually goes between 3 and 5 per cent enrichment. That's what you would use for peaceful uses, for nuclear reactors and energy purposes. The 20 per cent enrichment serves no purpose that the IAEA could determine, other than getting it ready so that it can be enriched further to weapons-grade quality.
Senator Eaton: But they have a stockpile of it?
Ms. Nolke: Yes, they do.
Senator Eaton: Will it be in the deal to get rid of that, or to seal it?
Ms. Nolke: I apologize, these are extremely technical questions and I'm not a nuclear fuel —
The Chair: Perhaps your colleague could answer the technical question. Just identify yourself, your position and then perhaps the technical questions.
Ms. Nolke: That's a very good idea. Thank you.
Peter Cahill, Senior Policy Officer (Nuclear Compliance), Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Division, Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada: Thank you, Madam Chair. My name is Peter Cahill and I work in the Non- Proliferation and Disarmament Division of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development.
There are different stockpiles of uranium in different forms and at levels of enrichment, starting all the way from having uranium ore to having it concentrated at a mill where they're crushing it. They had some uranium enriched up to 20 per cent in the form of uranium hexafluoride, which is a gaseous form you need to enrich in centrifuges. Under the Joint Plan of Action, they took that and converted it to other forms, like uranium oxide, which has to be converted back to the gaseous form to enrich. So they have a stockpile of this 20 per cent in oxide form, some of which has been turned into reactor fuel and some hasn't. Once it's used as fuel in a reactor, it's irradiated and is essentially almost impossible to safely take out and enrich again.
They also have a stockpile of low-enriched uranium, say, up to 5 per cent. The U.S. fact sheet would have them go from roughly 10,000 to about 300 kilograms; so they would need to reduce that stockpile. That's the key one because there's enough of it that you've already done a lot of enrichment work on so it's much more rapid to get it up to weapons-grade uranium. They would drop almost 97 per cent either by basically doing the opposite of enriching it by down-blending it or selling it to other countries to make into reactor fuel. There are multiple stockpiles.
The 20 per cent stockpile was mostly resolved under the JPA and it's now in forms that have to be reconverted back to be enriched and those are monitored. Then there's the low-enriched stockpile, which, if a deal was agreed on the basis of the U.S. fact sheet, would also be addressed.
Senator Oh: Thank you for giving us all the important information. Do we know if during the negotiation there will be sanctions for economic relief for Iranians? I think that's very important to them.
Ms. Nolke: The sanctions relief will be an integral element of a final deal. That is envisioned in the framework agreement, as well. It's why Iran is at the table — for sanctions relief. That's the driver for them.
The extent to which they will be lifted will depend on the shape of an eventual deal. There are different layers of sanctions. The EU, Canada and the U.S. have unilateral sanctions, but there are also the ones imposed by the UN Security Council, which are global in their reach. Which sanctions will be lifted will depend on the ultimate shape of a deal. Some limited sanctions relief was already granted under the JPA and some assets were unfrozen as a bit of an incentive for Iran to stay at the table and keep going.
Which sanctions will be lifted and when? That depends on the outcome of the final deal.
Senator Oh: According to my sources, the rich in Iran are living a normal life like we live here, with fast, expensive cars — a great life.
Ms. Nolke: The UN Security Council sanctions are specifically directed at Iran's nuclear program — to procurement efforts, technology, components, materials, et cetera. The bulk of the sanctions with global reach are strictly limited to the nuclear program.
The unilateral sanctions that Canada, the U.S. and the EU have imposed target other areas, but they're not worldwide. Yes, certain elements of Iran's society can still get their luxury goods from those who have not imposed that kind of sanction against them.
Senator Cordy: I thought your comments at the end of your speech were very diplomatic when you said that Iran's track record is not one that encourages trust. That was a diplomatic way to phrase it.
You talked about monitoring and verification being key to ensuring that Iran uses its nuclear knowhow for peaceful purposes. The IAEA is doing the monitoring. Do they have the resources for long-term monitoring because it would be fairly expensive. Canada has given $1 million toward the monitoring, but how expensive will it be and do they have such resources for the long term?
Ms. Nolke: That's a very good question. The short answer, and Director General Amano probably would agree with me, would be no, they will require additional funds. It takes a great amount out of the IAEA's regular budget for their global mandate to ensure compliance and to monitor the various safeguards agreements. Of course, right now with the focus on Iran, a lot of that work might suffer. That's one reason that Canada made its contributions to the IAEA; and it was not $1 million but $4 million. We had $1 million in one chunk and then another $3 million.
That is essentially to enable the IAEA to hire additional inspectors. They have people on the ground permanently who report once a month. The Director General reports quarterly on Iranian compliance with its commitments. That requires resources so they had to hire additional staff to do that. That's part of what our money is used for.
Additional costs are for travel, personal protective equipment, analysis of nuclear samples and general operating costs, which have all gone up. So the IAEA has looked to member-states to make additional contributions so that they are able to keep up.
Senator Cordy: What is the relationship between the IAEA and government agencies or the government itself? Are they supportive or secretive? How is that playing out on the ground?
Ms. Nolke: Do you mean the relationship between the IAEA and other governments like Canada?
Senator Cordy: When the IAEA monitors, is there any discussion with government agencies?
Ms. Nolke: They have broad discussions. I indicated earlier the 12 possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program. The analysis of these 12 items was arrived at by the IAEA in discussion with other governments receiving information and data and intelligence analysis to some extent as well. Yes, there is very good cooperation.
Senator Johnson: This is a very interesting discussion, thank you. I was reading that former U.S. Secretaries of State Kissinger and Schultz outlined their concerns with this framework agreement, calling it weak or too weak, in that it only temporarily restricts Iran's nuclear abilities in exchange for permanent relief. Why is the West pursuing this agreement if it's so lopsided?
Ms. Nolke: I don't know if as a Canadian official it's my role to criticize former secretaries of state of the United States. They do see it a little black and white, frankly. The agreement is not that short-lived. Certain aspects of the agreement, and I indicated the break-out period, would be controlled for a minimum of 10 years but possibly more. Again, we have to bear in mind that the agreement is not final. We don't know what is going to come out at the end of the day, but other activities will be controlled for far longer than that, 15 to 25 years. It's not that short-lived a deal. It's not a band-aid. If the agreement ends up looking the way it does now, it should be a fairly solid one.
My expert just handed me the proposed timeline of implementation. This is a visual illustration of years of certain elements of the agreement and how long they would be lived. You can see the 25-year mark and the 10-year mark. It goes from 10 years to 15, 20 and 25 years and beyond. It's not a short-lived agreement; but again, we have to see how the final version looks.
Senator Johnson: It's not helpful when people come out with these kinds of comments?
Ms. Nolke: Essentially, those of us who are not at the negotiating table do not know exactly the full dimensions, and that includes former officials, yes. We are not there; we are not the negotiators. I'm sure some of the elements are very closely held because, as I said, nothing is agreed until everything is agreed, and it's ultimately going to be a delicately balanced agreement, I believe. No, it's not that helpful to come out in advance.
[Translation]
Senator Fortin-Duplessis: I will again refer to Jeremy Kinsman's article, in which he writes that the United States are once more at war with Muslims, only this time they are tacitly working with their main Muslim antagonist, Iran, something that worries Israel. According to the Israeli prime minister, this is a terrible agreement that threatens the very survival of Israel. Do you have any comments about Israel's concerns?
[English]
Ms. Nolke: I can certainly tell you that Israeli officials have publicly stated that Iran must fully disclose to the IAEA all of the possible military dimension related activities of its nuclear program. That means Iran must provide the agency with all the information it is seeking, as well as access to sites, scientists and equipment.
I mentioned the trust deficit. Canada shares that concern with Israel, as do many like-minded states. We have made public statements on verification being an absolutely critical element of the deal. Yes, Israel is concerned and is right to be concerned. We are concerned, others are concerned. Verification is going to be key.
[Translation]
Senator Fortin-Duplessis: Do you believe that the tensions between Israel and Iran will influence the current and future negotiations on the June 30 agreement?
[English]
Ms. Nolke: I'm not sure that we can comment on that because we are not at the negotiating table.
[Translation]
Senator Fortin-Duplessis: Do you have any further information on the negotiations?
[English]
Ms. Nolke: Sorry, I can't look into the minds of the negotiators at the table, where they draw their influences from or on the basis of which they have made certain decisions. The ultimate outcome of the deal is going to be in the interests of the entire international community, all of which has repeatedly expressed its concerns with Iran's nuclear ambitions.
The Chair: Just a few other issues. We seem to be pursuing this file with justification, the nuclear issue. To what extent is it possible now to bring forward the human rights issues in the council, human rights council, and elsewhere in fora about Iran?
It seems to me I hear less and less in the human rights record, and I think that's a disservice to the people who seem to be suffering more and more. What are we doing to ratchet up the pressure on the human rights in the international fora where there would be some allies of ours that aren't involved in the nuclear issue but are concerned about some of the international human rights standards?
Ms. McQueen: That's a very good question. Iran is one of the countries in fact where the international community brings the greatest scrutiny to bear on human rights, and there are a few ways that it does this. One is the UN General Assembly, where Canada, as you know, has led a UN General Assembly resolution on the situation of human rights in Iran for 12 years. We've led this under the former president, under the current president, before the current negotiations and while the current negotiations are under way.
We expect, but we don't yet have ministerial approval, to continue to do that into the future. So if a deal is signed in July, we will mount the resolution. I would say that our allies who are negotiating at the table, certainly our close allies, have been extremely supportive of that process and fully recognize that human rights is a separate issue from the nuclear issue and must continue to be looked at.
Other ways that the UN system has also been very important in terms of looking at human rights in Iran is through a special mandate procedure. So we have the UN special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran, Dr. Shaheed, who was here a few weeks ago; you may have met with him. He writes a report twice a year. He produces a report outlining some of the most serious grievances. The UN Secretary-General produces a report also on the grievances.
This past year Iran happened to go before the Universal Periodic Review at the Human Rights Council in Geneva. I was there when they presented their findings, and certainly there were a countless number of states in the room that voiced their concerns about human rights issues.
I feel that efforts with Canada in a strong leadership role are being made to continue to keep that issue front and central, but what is true and what we have observed and what we worry about — and I think one of the reasons why Canada remains so strong vocally — is we have noticed that some states are being lured by the charm offensive of the current president and also perhaps by the prospect of a deal of saying, oh, Iran is doing better now, let's give them a chance. That's in a way why Iran is fairly effective at pushing forward its narratives and part of the way we see our role is to hold Iran to account and help show what's really happening versus what they say is happening.
Ms. Nolke: The U.S. has made it very clear, including in its publicized fact sheet, that those sanctions that have been imposed as a result of Iran's sponsorship for terrorism, its ballistic missiles program or its human rights abuses will remain in place. They will not be affected by any deal. It is not entirely strictly true to say that the pressure is off on the human rights side. The pressure is still very much on.
The Chair: The rapporteur indicated it is extremely difficult to get in to verify any allegations or complaints, and the UN system in human rights is based often on complaints and NGOs, et cetera.
When a rapporteur doesn't have access, when the Internet and everyone who uses any of the new services is found out, is put under pressure, if not jailed, et cetera, and further, it's the whole verification system that is in question. If you can't get it in the human rights, why would you think you would get it in the nuclear? That, I think, is one of the unanswered dilemmas that the negotiators are facing. To what extent and how do you handle verification?
What I understand is going to happen is that there will be a verification system and it may be some easing of sanctions, but at the moment it's going in the wrong direction. There has to be an up-front, legitimate, substantive verification; it's not going to be gradual because the word has not been good, particularly in the human rights field. That's been from day one.
Ms. Nolke: They are linked and, as I said, there is a trust deficit very much in place, as a result of which certainly the U.S. has indicated that its legal framework, even if it lifts specific sanctions as a result of the deal, the underlying legal framework will remain in place. Any sanctions can be snapped back instantly in the event of non-compliance.
The Chair: Thank you for coming before us. It was extremely helpful, extremely detailed in a way from your perspective and gives us an insight as to your analysis of the situation. It is a very grave situation and a very important foreign policy issue and we are pleased that you took the time to come to our committee to give us this information.
Senators, we will adjourn until tomorrow morning. We will have one panel for information and then I'm requesting that we have an in-camera meeting of 10 minutes so I can update all members on the three studies that we intend to complete before the end of the year. So it is an information item and I would appreciate members knowing, because we're under some time constraints and I want you to know about the issues, the problems and our targets.
We are adjourned.
(The committee adjourned.)