Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
National Security and Defence
Issue 6 - Evidence - Meeting of April 28, 2014
OTTAWA, Monday, April 28, 2014
The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence met this day at 1 p.m. to study the status of Canada's international security and defence relations, including but not limited to, relations with the United States, NATO, and NORAD; and the policies, practices, and collaborative efforts of Canada Border Services Agency in determining admissibility to Canada and removal of inadmissible individuals.
Senator Daniel Lang (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: Welcome to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence for Monday, April 28, 2014. Before we welcome our witness, I would like to begin by introducing the people around the table. My name is Dan Lang, senator for Yukon. On my immediate left is the clerk of the committee, Josée Thérien. On my right are our Library of Parliament analysts assigned to the committee, Holly Porteous and Wolfgang Koerner. I would like to go around the table and invite the senators to introduce themselves and state the region they represent, starting with our deputy chair, Senator Dallaire, now that you've found where you want to sit.
[Translation]
Senator Dallaire: Roméo Dallaire. I represent the Gulf of St. Lawrence, Quebec.
[English]
Senator Mitchell: Grant Mitchell, Alberta.
Senator Segal: Hugh Segal, Kinston-Frontenac-Leeds, Ontario.
Senator White: Vern White, Ontario.
Senator Beyak: Senator Beyak, Ontario.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: Jean-Guy Dagenais, Quebec.
[English]
Senator Wells: David Wells, Newfoundland and Labrador.
The Chair: Thank you, colleagues. This afternoon we have a number of panels. The first three will be dealing with our study on ballistic missile defence, and the fourth with our current study on the Canada Border Services Agency.
Before beginning with our witness, we have two matters of housekeeping to address.
Senators, as you know, the pre-study of certain parts of Bill C-31, An Act to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in the Parliament February 11, 2014 and other measures, introduced in the House of Commons on March 28, 2014, was referred to our committee on April 9, 2014. After discussions, it was agreed by the steering committee that Division 1 of Part 6 of the bill will be studied by the Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs and that the remaining portion, Division 7 of Part 6, will be examined by this committee.
I'd like to read into the record a motion as follows:
That Division 1 of Part 6, benefits and allowances of the order of reference on the pre-study of Bill C-31, adopted in the Senate on April 9, 2014, be delegated to the Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs and that the subcommittee report to this committee no later an June 2, 2014, and that Division 7 of Part 6 remain to be examined by the full committee.
Could I have a mover for that motion?
Senator Dallaire: I so move.
The Chair: All in favour?
Hon. Senators: Agreed.
The Chair: Carried.
Please also note that a new order of reference was adopted by the Senate on April 9 regarding the mental health study. This is a new study that will be undertaken by the Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs. Will a senator propose the following motion to delegate this order of reference to the subcommittee?
That the order of reference on mental health issues affecting serving and retired members of the Canadian Armed Forces, adopted in the Senate on Wednesday, April 9, 2014, be delegated to the Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs.
Senator Dallaire: I so move.
The Chair: Senator Dallaire, you are seconding everything. Congratulations.
Senator Dallaire: On the ball.
The Chair: All in favour?
Hon. Senators: Agreed.
The Chair: Carried.
Thank you. Now, to our first panel. On December 12, 2013, the Senate adopted the following reference:
That the Senate Standing Committee on National Defence be authorized to examine and report on the status of Canada's international security and defence relations, including but not limited to, relations with the United States, NATO, and NORAD; and
That the Committee report to the Senate no later than December 31, 2014, and that it retain all powers necessary to publicize its findings until 90 days after the tabling of the final report.
Colleagues, as we continue our look at Canada's national security and defence relations and ballistic missiles defence, we are pleased to have with us, on our first panel, Major-General Michael Day, Chief of Force Development. Major-General Day was awarded a Meritorious Service Decoration, on October 12, 2013, by His Excellency the Governor General. His citation noted:
From April 2011 to May 2012, Brigadier-General Day excelled as commander of the Canadian contribution to the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan, while simultaneously occupying key leadership positions within the NATO command structure. In addition to overseeing the successful stand-up of the Canadian contingent, he was critical in shaping the mission's overall approach during a time of major strategic transformation. Brigadier-General Day's leadership and vision had a profound impact on the Afghan National Security Forces' transition to self-sufficiency.
Welcome, major-general. We are proud of your service to our country and of your commitment to excellence within the Canadian Forces. I understand you have an opening statement. I invite you to begin. We have one hour for the panel.
Major-General Michael Day, Chief of Force Development, National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, ladies and gentleman. Thanks very much for the opportunity to come and brief you, as well as to answer any questions you may have on the space program within the Canadian Forces.
[Translation]
Consistent with what you have heard and what you will hear from the others, including the President of the Canadian Space Agency, the Canadian Armed Forces participation must be seen in the context of a whole of government effort. We benefit from a close collaboration with other government departments.
[English]
Back in November of 2012, my previous director general of the space program, Brigadier-General Rick Pitre, now retired, sat in front of this committee. My comments today should be seen as building on those, but, recognizing that the membership of this committee is slightly different, I do think it's important to recap briefly some of those elements as they do remain unchanged.
As such, it's important for us to recognize — and we certainly do within National Defence — how deeply space capabilities are now integrated into our daily life. Civil society's reliance on the Internet GPS phone service — and, of course, the list goes on and on — is now taken for granted. It is, therefore, a surprise to nobody that the military's reliance has not just mirrored this growing dependency but perhaps taken on an even greater life. Much of what we now do is enabled by the dramatic advances in technology that are achieved through the acquisition of space systems.
Almost inarguably, we could not operate in the fashion we do today without the tremendous benefits that our space capabilities now afford us.
[Translation]
Our focus is on the provision of communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems, as well as timing and navigation. These capabilities would be difficult if not impossible to recreate by other means and most certainly prohibitively expensive.
[English]
We do not do this alone. As I mentioned, we are closely aligned with CSA's efforts and work collaboratively with allies to ensure that we are not only more effective but also gain a level of efficiency that can be realized only by sharing the costs to create these capabilities and the associated costs.
This is equally important given the need to provide an assurance of access to space, which can only now be done collaboratively. You will have heard, and it is our position, that space remains and is becoming more congested, contested and competitive. We address this by working with others to ensure that we gain the maximum output for our efforts.
[Translation]
The five core principles articulated into the Government of Canada Space Policy and as detailed (or as will be detailed by President of CSA) remain central to our approach as well.
Whilst recognizing that their focus is on civil and commercial, they do find resonance not just in the approach we take, but are also completely consistent with the Defence Procurement Strategy.
[English]
With Canada's Space Policy Framework in place, we have now commenced work on how we in Defence can best express our strategy. Currently, I can best describe this as being focused on the following areas: first, global communications; second, maritime and global domain awareness; third, space-based search and rescue; fourth, navigation warfare; fifth, space situational awareness; and, sixth, space operations.
Within this construct, we are making tremendous progress. Back in November 2012, the last time I was before this committee, we were poised to launch Sapphire, a Canadian satellite responsible for providing space situational awareness. Focused on that awareness and integrated into the international network surveillance system, it has now been successfully declared fully operational. Not only does it provide a functional awareness to the international community, positioning Canada as a true partner in space, but equally it allows us to continue to leverage our membership in this network to harvest tremendous amounts of information, data and participation in future endeavours.
[Translation]
Although I will not go into detail for each individual initiative, I do believe it to be helpful to give you a sense of the scope within the CAF space program and consequentially further underline our intended use as well as our increasing reliance and the benefit we received from such efforts.
[English]
In sum, space-enabled effects are vital to National Defence's ability to exercise strategic decision making, conduct mission planning and execute operations. Our commanders depend on the precision provided by the global navigation satellite systems, such as GPS, to enhance the maneuverability of forces into synchronized, precise targeting in complex operating environments. Satellite communications enable us to exercise command on a global scale through secure, protected, dedicated and survivable links.
Space-based search and rescue capabilities contribute to force protection, and satellite-derived intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance of areas otherwise inaccessible support commanders' information and situational awareness requirements, thereby directly supporting both force application and protection.
From a defence and security perspective, space-enabled effects have evolved from a force-multiplier status after the First Gulf War to being critical enabling in modern military operations. I look forward to your questions, sir.
The Chair: Thank you, Major-General Day. We appreciate your overview in respect to your office and the satellite and space responsibilities the military has.
Colleagues, I would like to lead off with one question. It refers to the ballistic missile defence program, which is the particular area of study we have undertaken over the last couple of months. I would like to have you clarify for the record that the current ballistic missile defence system as we and the military know it today does not interfere with space from the point of view of how some individuals critical of ballistic missile defence have said, which is that it does affect the question of space and the weaponization of space. Could you comment on that?
Maj.-Gen. Day: I would refer back to make sure I am on the record for understanding our position with regard to BMD and as it relates not just to space but to the whole Canadian Armed Forces. Based on the February 2005 policy decision, Canadian Armed Forces actually have no involvement in BMD in North America whatsoever. As a consequence, we do not enjoy full visibility in terms of many of the aspects of BMD. However, I can tell you with high assurance, because I do run the space program, that I have not encountered during my time any aspect of anything associated with BMD that has interfered with today's space program or that threatens to interfere with any of the initiatives we are currently considering.
The Chair: Thank you.
Senator Dallaire: General, you are to be congratulated for being one of the more progressive officers in this complex and ambiguous era of conflict resolution. Your performance in the field is more than commendable, and your reputation is well deserved. Being in the job you are makes sense, because you are looking into the future and handling the future.
That brings me to the specifics of space. I am reading some of the stuff that was in the 1987 white paper on space and a number of the requirements that were identified at the time. I notice that we still have, as far as space — although capabilities that will become operational if they are all funded, of significance, let alone the interfacing of BMD and North American defence — we still have a staff officer running the thing.
What is the logic of having so many significant operational requirements being handled by, essentially, a staff function versus being articulated by an operational command or commander that could then probably influence significantly the prioritization of these essential requirements?
Maj.-Gen. Day: Given your background, obviously you understand the not-insignificant difference between its being a staff-led initiative versus a command-led initiative. I would, however, reassure you we are moving in a very specific direction.
I am responsible for the space development program, in that I look after what we are about to do, the capabilities that we need. Therefore, the project management of that initiative lies in my domain. However, we do recognize that the operational use of space is commander's business. In this last year, we have put in the Canadian Space Operations Centre within CJOC under General Beare, so that our operational commander for the Canadian Armed Forces has direct control; it follows his priorities and allocates the resources and assets based on what he believes to be the most important piece.
Obviously, there is a hand-off between operational requirements and Horizon 1 — one to five years — and the future of space — five years and out — which belongs to me. You can see that as an integrated piece. That Canadian Space Operations Centre, CSpOC, on paper belongs to me, but I have given operational control of it to our commander of our operations centre.
We have taken the initial step. My view — only because I have already initiated the study — is that, much like cyber, we will have to look at how we provide joint effects to our operational commanders outside of the staff line. You will see that we will walk through in the next year a development of courses of action that would allow the Chief of the Defence Staff and the rest of the leadership of the Canadian Armed Forces to determine what is the next best mix.
I would encourage you to think about this as a spiral development, where I would see us take a series of steps as opposed to one big step. That is based on two functions. First, the space cadre, if you can define it as that, is relatively small; therefore, dividing up that technical expertise too thinly across a number of different fronts would incur a number of disadvantages, albeit giving us some advantages. So as we build the cadre up — and we have a deliberate plan to build up these people who are career experts in space, not just guys who get posted in for a couple of years — we will develop those men and women so that we can populate further command and control systems down the road.
Second, there is the issue of how many systems and how much we want. Space, in terms of enabling things and owning two different things — for us to draw on that capability, we've not really had a full understanding as of yet just how much that will take in the fullness of time. I think you will see a spiral development, and I can say with high confidence that we will continue to empower the operational commander to have his priorities met, and we will play a supporting and enabling role as the staff is designed to do.
Senator Dallaire: It remains a concern that such a significant future operational capability has such a division in its command and control, and also in its prioritization within the DND level-one decision making for resources.
In the whole realm of understanding missiles, I am talking about spiral missiles off of frigates, ballistic, that whole radar milieu, the satellite milieu, global, and so on. RMC has been running a Bachelor of Science program for space since the early 1990s. Has that become an occupational classification for the officer corps, and maybe some NCOs, to be able to build a group that has the depth to be able to move such significant requirements, which are hugely expensive, through the system? You are a solid soldier on the ground, but that is another area.
Maj.-Gen. Day: Regarding the ownership piece, I am not sure I could find a better way in the Canadian Armed Forces to enable the future of the space or cyber program than giving it to the guy who owns the future of the Canadian Armed Forces. That is my primary role. By positioning it in the Chief of Force Development, it is integrated as a priority before we start to think about the conventional pieces because I do own five years out already. It is being championed at the institutional level.
With regard to the space program, we are moving toward — and I am very cognizant of the fact that you ran the HR program in the department. You will know the difficulties of creating an occupational specialty for the officer and NCM course. We now have a formal qualification. You will, in relatively short term, start to see a space badge much like I wear my special operations badge. That is the interim step where we are formally codifying the qualification required to operate in the space cadre.
The difficulty, again, is one of a critical mass. You cannot create an MOS without a career progression for those officers. You cannot start it from scratch and say we now have a career field. We need to think about how many people we take, how to do the leadership piece, and what are the future bits.
What we have done as an interim step is the two pieces; the one I have described is the formal qualification. The second is that we now have a career focus, regardless of your original MOS, of people who have worked in the space field for a number of postings and years, and we have career managed them very specifically. It is a step short of an MOS. I believe we will get there at some point, but it allows us to harvest not only the outputs of RMC but outputs that we have in the exchange with the Americans, for example.
Senator Dallaire: That is very good.
Senator Segal: Welcome, general, and thank you for your work for Canada.
I want to take a look at the specific aspects of your responsibility for space that relate to intelligence, and the linkage of that intelligence with our other combat and national defence requirements.
If one thinks about, for example, when we were in a fully mature state in Kandahar and the real-time intelligence centre that was established by our forces with our allies using a whole array of different sources, human intelligence, electronic intelligence, digital sources and putting it all together in a way that maximized the efficiency, effectiveness and safety of our forces in the field, a genuine force multiplier, what I heard you saying — and please correct me if I misunderstood — is that a lot of our space activity contributes to that force multiplier concept because it gives us better contextual awareness and capacity to have our troops, our naval, air and other assets, well informed in any deployment they might have to engage in, notwithstanding the important role of search and rescue.
We do know, and this committee has visited Cheyenne Mountain, that because of the decision taken in 2005 with respect to anti-ballistic missiles, Canada is not linked up with that part of American activity that relates to anti-ballistic missile defence. It is a policy framework, and I understand that you can't do anything about that being in the uniform services.
That being said, surely it is fair to suggest that our great success as part of NATO in standing down the old, more militaristic — I say that with some irony these says — Soviet Union was because we had a superior linkage between intelligence, combat capacity and force multipliers, such as the location of theatre nuclear missiles in Europe so that the Russians understood precisely the risk to them of any adventurist activity. That may be one of the great historical successes of our allies and us in keeping a launch from happening because the implications of that for the Russians were very clear.
Do you worry at all, in your role with respect to space, that because as a present matter of policy we are not engaged with missile defence, the Americans have no responsibility or requirement to share any of the data or information that they have and no legal responsibility to defend a Canadian city, which may end up being under attack by North Korea or any other rogue proposition, your capacity to maximize the space area in the interest of Canada is diminished? I am not asking for you to comment on the appropriateness of a federal government policy; I understand you are constrained. But do you worry that because you don't have access to that information, for reasons relating to that policy, some of what you might like to do as the senior officer responsible for mining space in our national interest is in some modest way diminished?
Maj.-Gen. Day: Thank you, senator.
Senator Mitchell: Yes or on no?
Senator Segal: Maybe.
Maj.-Gen. Day: "Yes, on Thursdays" would be the normal answer. That is an excellent question. I am tremendously grateful that you do not expect me to comment on policy. I would start off with that point.
I would say absolutely the leveraging in Afghanistan by the All-Source Intelligence Centre, ASIC, relied on the space domain. "Space domain" constitutes two parts: the space segment, the stuff that is floating up in the atmosphere, and the ground segment. You can have both or just the ground segment and still be able to leverage the benefits. How we contribute to the overall space network does allow for us to gain some of those advantages. I think this speaks to what we were trying to do in the ASIC, et cetera. Obviously the separation in the BMD continentally between the NORAD mission and USNORTHCOM, as you heard in Cheyenne Mountain, is that USNORTHCOM is responsible for BMD and NORAD isn't, although it finds itself vested in the same person, at this moment in time, General Jacoby.
With regard to going back to the Cold War — and I am now stretching myself, although I was in uniform at the time — I do recognize that the arms race, initiated under President Reagan, resulted in part, based on intelligence, knowing what they had, what they could do and everything else.
But I come back to your question of do I worry about that. Although there is physicality to BMD, from which we are separated by policy, my general sense is that without being read into the BMD program, our access to intelligence sources writ large, generally speaking, operates on a need-to-know basis depending on what we are doing.
In my experience, in terms of my force development responsibilities, I have not felt inhibited in making any decision on that basis. I cannot tell you whether they would be further improved, because you don't know; I hate to quote Donald Rumsfeld pretty much at any time in my life, but I would say, "I don't know what I don't know." Could it be enhanced? I don't know. Do I feel inhibited? I don't at the moment.
Senator Segal: Can I read from that, general, that in terms of DND's relationship with the U.S. National Reconnaissance Office and Joint Space Operations Center, you're comfortable that the information you need and we need is shared on a need-to-know basis and that flow is sufficient for you to discharge your responsibilities, both in terms of the space function and your advice to the Chief of the Defence Staff?
Maj.-Gen. Day: Senator, I can absolutely affirm that. The support we receive from both those organizations — and in fact other space-associated organizations in the American government, and particularly in the American military — is excellent.
I can't claim it is a full share, because you don't know what you don't know, but it absolutely has been central to our understanding and prosecution of our plan, and I do feel I'm well-armed to provide that advice to the Chief of the Defence Staff.
Senator Mitchell: I'm dying to ask the general if he's a rocket scientist, but I don't want to waste my first question on that.
I would like to follow up on Senator Segal's question, and that is to take it one step further. Do you have space assets now that could be applied in a productive way to Canadian participation in the NORAD ballistic missile defence capability?
Maj.-Gen. Day: I am unaware. I'm not a rocket scientist, but I believe I have at least a reasonable understanding of the technical elements of the space domain and how it applies to what we do. I'll be perfectly frank; I am completely uneducated as to the connection between BMD and space. Our space assets are leveraging space assets. We have Sapphire up there. We use RADARSAT-2 at the moment. We're planning on RADARSAT Constellation. Whether or not they could be used, it would be a poorly informed opinion. I would not want to mislead you.
Senator Mitchell: We do have the North Warning System. Is there a relationship, technical or otherwise, between that and the assets that you control in space, and how do you coordinate that?
Maj.-Gen. Day: The North Warning System was initiated as part of our ongoing contribution to NORAD in terms of aerospace defence, et cetera, and remains central to that capability writ large. We intend on continuing that. Obviously, since it is a Canadian-initiated piece, it is not part of the BMD system. We do not contribute in any fashion whatsoever to that piece. Again, much like the satellite pieces, although I may have opinions, they are uninformed as to what the BMD system might leverage from current, extant systems, either on a ground- or space-based position. I apologize; I am not well positioned to answer that.
Senator Mitchell: We are hoping to find an answer to that. I appreciate the predicament you're in.
Senator Wells: Welcome. Thank you for your presentation and your answers thus far.
In your presentation, you talked about the areas of responsibility. I think you mentioned six, including global communications and space operations. Can you tell me the key assets we have that support those activities?
Maj.-Gen. Day: Absolutely. Thank you very much. I did go through a couple. Again, my previous comments about space and ground segments are important in this regard. At the moment, as I've mentioned, Sapphire, which is a space domain awareness piece, essentially helps us understand what else is moving around in space. Although that does not at first glance appear to be tremendously important, back to that congested area, there are thousands of undocumented space objects floating either geosynchronously or in orbit, and you need to understand what those are in order to safely launch a satellite, maintain its position and use it effectively.
On the global communication side, Sapphire is critical to the positioning of communication satellites and their future launches. We are part of that overall domain.
We do have RADARSAT-2, which we use. As you know, it was a joint government-commercial enterprise. That's being leveraged at the moment. We harvest a series of other satellite systems and networks on ground stations. The next significant piece that you will see launched by us will be RADARSAT Constellation, which will be a minimum of three satellites going up.
We also leveraged the worldwide SARSAT system. It is a low-earth orbit piece which we use to help identify based on beacon awareness where we have search and rescue areas to respond to. That is transitioning to a MEO system, so we will continue to leverage that as well.
As much as leveraging current systems and signals, whether they are European, American or whatever, we are moving forward on our own system.
Senator Wells: You are satisfying your program's objectives. In looking at what other things are floating up there that might literally impact on our satellites that we put up, are there any gaps? If you had a reasonable budget ask, or not so much a budget but a reasonable operational ask, what would you say is needed to fill the gaps?
Maj.-Gen. Day: Like everybody, I'm always interested in a reasonable budget ask within the town here.
Senator Wells: That's why I qualified it with "reasonable."
Maj.-Gen. Day: Absolutely. Without monetizing that specifically, I think we are all aware that the main challenge not just for Canada but, quite frankly, for all Arctic nations is in fact an ability to communicate effectively in the North. We are working very hard on a satellite capability called Polar Communications and Weather, and that would be the top of the list of gaps that we have.
The term "gaps" is a good way of describing it in some fashion, but it is not nuanced enough to give you a sense. It's not a binary piece. There are ways to get around that. But certainly from our perspective, we are really looking at three broad areas: the communications up North; the continuing evolution and improvement of our SAR response capability; and maritime domain awareness in terms of automatic identification systems, AIS, to allow us to know what is approaching, if you will, the coastline, et cetera. Those are three areas.
There does exist some capability to differing degrees in all of those. They are not, strictly speaking, a complete gap, but certainly there are areas we look to make fundamental improvements on.
The Chair: Colleagues, I will follow up on Sapphire, if I could, in respect to our satellite and what we've provided.
Are other countries charged financially for the information that we provide? If so, does it pay for the cost of Sapphire?
Maj.-Gen. Day: We do not exact a cost on Sapphire. It is all part of the space awareness piece. I would hasten to add that, therefore, it does not defray those costs. We harvest exponentially much more data than we provide.
If we went to a user-based system in space, we could absolutely recoup the cost to Sapphire and pay multiple times more in order to get the information that we currently are extracting from the network to which we contribute. So it would be a losing proposition.
Senator Day: Maj.-Gen. Day, thank you. That name has a nice ring to it.
I'd like to follow up with respect to the Sapphire issue again. Just so that our viewers and I can understand, it's a space awareness asset. Does that mean, through information that one gathers from Sapphire, that you wouldn't be looking at aircraft? This is above our atmosphere, up in space?
Maj.-Gen. Day: Absolutely, senator. It does not look down. It neither surveys the oxygenic atmosphere of flying craft, nor the surface of Earth. It looks outwards. Upwards and downwards a bit, but essentially it's designed to identify and add to the database of all of, frankly, the space junk that is flying up there. It's a critical piece of information for space operations.
When I think and talk about space operations, it is as much about accessing data and information, intelligence and surveillance reconnaissance, as Senator Segal said, but it's also about manoeuvring the satellites themselves. It's about positioning the satellites initially, and you can't do that with a blindfold on.
Sapphire allows us to understand — excuse the pun — that space in which we operate. Because it is becoming increasingly saturated, not only with satellites but also with space junk — the cast-off of previous launches, satellites that break up that don't go into re-entry, et cetera — Sapphire provides a tremendous capability to allow us to understand who is on our left and right, who is in front and behind us physically.
Senator Day: You indicated that it provides functional awareness to the international community, so this is the sharing that the chairman was talking about. In that sharing are there MOUs as to what that information can be used for?
Maj.-Gen. Day: Yes.
Senator Day: What I'm wondering, then, is with respect to missile defence, which is our overall focus here, an intercontinental ballistic missile will go out into space and then back into the atmosphere. Would Sapphire pick that up, and is that information that you're passing on then to our American friends?
Maj.-Gen. Day: There is absolutely an MOU about the sharing of all information that we get from space, whether we access it directly from space or share it through our ground segments. They're all very detailed and specific. Nothing in our agreement includes BMD in any fashion.
I am aware of the physics in broad terms of BMD, of moving in and out of atmosphere. I am aware of the technical aspects of Sapphire. I cannot tell you whether there is a match between the two. I'll take that under notice and try to provide a more complete and detailed answer, but I would hazard a guess that we will not be able to answer that. Because we're not part of the BMD program, the specifics of the flight profile of whatever those missiles might be are likely not available to us, and therefore to do a cross match of whether or not Sapphire has the capability to match that is probably a conclusion we could not reach.
I would say, however, based on understanding how Sapphire works — and I would caveat this to a tremendous degree — I would doubt, under its current configuration, if suitable, that it would provide very much at all. I will take that under notice, if I may, and come back.
Senator Day: That would be helpful.
Maj.-Gen. Day: Please manage expectations knowing that our access to BMD-type technical information is constrained because of course we're not involved in the program. But we will have a look and I'll come back to you, sir.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: Major-General Day, thank you for being here.
[English]
Can you confirm for the record that the Chinese are the only nation actively seeking to weaponize space? Can you elaborate on how this is contributing to space debris?
Maj.-Gen. Day: I am tremendously aware and apologetic about the classification in this room and what I can say about the weaponization or militarization of space. At the front end, I would say that the language of militarization and weaponization in space does not have a common definition around the world, even within NATO, frankly.
[Translation]
In French, the words are almost the same.
[English]
For the militarization, obviously the first time a young infantry officer like me got lost and pulled out a GPS, we had militarized space. We were using it for military purposes. The weaponization of space, we and all NATO agree it's only the peaceful use of space. Although it can be used for military purposes, it can't be weaponized, as I think you and I are using the term. I can't, in this forum, I think, have an unclassified opinion or statement on which nations may be or may not be involved in that. I apologize.
Senator Beyak: Would you be able to tell Canadians at home, from your perspective, what you think is the biggest threat to Canada and her allies today?
Maj.-Gen. Day: I'm not quite yet sure. It would depend on whether or not I was an economist, a military man or a politician. I apologize; I'm not quite sure you want a military person to define what the greatest threat is: whether it's an asymmetrical terrorist threat, I think we all appreciate that the last 10 years, certainly since the post-9/11 environment, those threats have grown exponentially; whether we looked at Iran and North Korea and the rogue states and potential nuclear programs and ballistic missile programs — perhaps where you're coming from — that absolutely represents it; and whether you look at the trade and security piece. It would depend on what you value. I recognize all of those have tremendous potential. I'm not sure I'm well positioned to give you a relative weighting between any one of those pillars, however.
Senator Beyak: Senator Wells said if you have an ask, what would you focus on for the safety of Canadians militarily?
Maj.-Gen. Day: If I were to speak on behalf of the chief, I think he would continue to say we're tremendously well trained. The experiential base of the Canadian Armed Forces has never been better. If you go back to the things we've done, whether in the domestic response to the floods in Calgary, where we are positioned to help again this spring; whether or not you look at Libya or Afghanistan, both the combat and training missions, we have no gaps there. If you look at the equipment we've been afforded and where we're at, I think we're in reasonable shape there. We have an aspiration, obviously, on a number of programs like the national shipbuilding program. That must continue apace. I think the chief would identify that one of his priorities is to make sure that that didn't slip. Certainly the recapitalization of a series of other fleets has to move forward. That's what he would be saying, institutionally.
Senator Dallaire: I was going to ask you, regarding the six major projects, of which I suspect some are major Crowns, to what extent they have been moved to the right or maybe even reduced in scope because of the budget cuts. I'm wondering whether or not you were able to prevent that from happening.
The real question I'm asking now, with ballistic missile defence, is if North Korea or possibly Iran targets North America, what do you have, from your responsibilities, available to defend a Canadian city from a ballistic missile attack?
Maj.-Gen. Day: I know you didn't ask the question, but if I might seize the opportunity to talk about the space program and slippage, et cetera, I have reduced none of the scope or ambition of any of the space programs that I currently have.
Some of the re-scoping and phasing that I've had to go through has been about technical wherewithal and lining up with allies as opposed to funding itself. The space program, as I think you will see in the ensuing years, will become an even more significant thrust line, along with cyber, within the Canadian Armed Forces. We see that emerging. It is the critical enabler.
To date, although it is crowded to try to find space on the investment plan, at the moment, quite frankly, I have high assurance we will continue to prosecute that. I come back to your previous question about being successful in championing this. It is a direct reflection of what the chain of command believes the priority and importance of the space program is and holds within the department.
With regard to protecting that, I run through a capability-based planning model for the Canadian Armed Forces. Essentially, it looks out 20 to 25 years, runs through a series of scenarios and identifies the capabilities that the Canadian Armed Forces might aspire to in order to best meet those scenarios. One of them is close to the one that you describe.
I would hasten to add that the full spectrum of capabilities that would be identified through this planning construct could not be met by any other nation but the United States. This is conceptual to inform and allow prioritized choices to be made about what capabilities we value the most.
In today's current arsenal, as I do a gap and overlap analysis between what might be needed in the future and what we currently have to inform those decisions, with respect to the scenario you currently describe, there is nothing in the Canadian Armed Forces' arsenal that would protect or preventing a hypothetical launch. However, I would also say to you that neither of those two countries has a serious threat in terms of some of the scenarios going forward. They both certainly don't have identical threats going forward. They have a different level of ballistic missile capability.
Senator Dallaire: I appreciate the candor on that.
Senator Mitchell: I would like to clarify that and use Senator Beyak's observation for the people watching at home.
If a nuclear warhead was sent by a jet from somewhere toward my city of Edmonton, let's say, or a nuclear bomb is being delivered by a jet plane, if a nuclear warhead is being delivered by a cruise missile, in both cases, Canada is directly involved in the decision through NORAD, because we participate in NORAD on those two delivery systems. So we would have a say, even if it was coming to Edmonton, which is not a great threat to the U.S., or Montreal or any city not too close to the U.S.; it is not unlikely that NORAD would take it out or attempt to do that. But if a ballistic missile is shot at, say, my city of Edmonton, because we are not involved in ballistic missile defence, it's just another delivery system. If it could be exactly the same warhead, for all practical intents and purposes, Canada would not be involved in that decision, because we are not involved in the ballistic missile defence aspect under NORAD, period, simple as that.
Maj.-Gen. Day: The response to Senator Dallaire was about the specificity of a missile attack. As you have articulated, should it be air launched from a plane, that clearly falls into the NORAD responsibilities.
I can't tell you the specifics, and I know that you've seen Lieutenant-General Parent and you've had Major-General St-Amand talk about the Canadian Air Division's responsibilities. They are in a better position to talk about how effectively they would intercept and deal with those threats. But you're right in saying that if it was a ballistic missile launched toward Canada, we would not be involved. That decision is not made within NORAD, which is a binational command. It is made with NORTHCOM.
Senator Mitchell: The U.S. command itself.
Maj.-Gen. Day: Right. NORTHCOM is an American command and control construct.
The Chair: It is not necessarily a good position for Canada to be in.
Senator Dallaire: In some of the readings, I'm left with the impression we are seconding people, however, into space command in the United States. Are those secondments staff functions and not line functions? Is that for exchange of information? Do they have a specific role?
Maj.-Gen. Day: They have a variety of different functions. We're actually aggressively pursuing that because the size of their space enterprise and the lessons we can learn, we believe we can take some generational leaps forward by leaning on their lessons learned, embedding our people in their staff and importing them back here and subsequently employing those people. That's that space cadre I talked to you about that we are managing specifically by name, by individual. We have a variety of different appointments in staff and liaison function. I would have to check in detail line position if they are involved in any chain-of-command space operations. If I can come back to you, I will do that. But even if they were, they would be omitted from any conversation or involvement in space operations involving BMD. But I will confirm what those specific positions are for you.
Senator Day: General, I need you to help me with the organizational chart for your part of the Armed Forces, and how Brigadier-General Pitre, who appeared here previously, or his replacement now, fits into the organization.
Maj.-Gen. Day: I have two responsibilities. I am the institutional future planner for the Canadian Armed Forces. I am responsible for the future capabilities and force structure of the Canadian Armed Forces, which means five years and out. My responsibility is, if you will, to create a strategic road map of choice for the chief, the DM, and others. Subsequently, within five years, I am the internal challenge function to make sure that all the other parts adhere to that road map. I check their math to make sure that what they are executing is in line with the plan laid out previously. Those are my institutional responsibilities.
Much like in the army, navy and air force, where they are responsible for the execution of that road map, I'm also responsible for the execution of the joint parts of the road map. I'm the joint force enabler. As a consequence, I own space; cyber; MBC; C4ISR, so command and control, communications, coordination, intelligence, surveillance, recognizance, the development of all of those capabilities and operational support. My job is to produce the capability, after which it becomes environment responsibility to force generate it and then subsequently employed.
Specifically, you asked about Brigadier-General Pitre. Brigadier-General Pitre is one the general officers. He's retired now. His replacement works for me as the individual on the ground level, if you will, of the space program. His responsibilities are purely about space. He's focused solely on space. I focus on the joint domain writ large and the strategic capabilities set of the Canadian Armed Forces for the future.
Senator Day: We are going to be hearing from General Natynczyk shortly. Where does your organizational chart fit in with the Canadian Space Agency? What is the relationship?
Maj.-Gen. Day: As you would hope, we do it at a variety of different levels. I actually speak to General Natynczyk regularly. I go over and see him. We talk on the phone. We sit on the same deputy minister's committee. I sit in a supporting role with my deputy minister. Then we have, actually, a seconded liaison officer in the Space Agency full time who interfaces with that.
The minute-to-minute interface happens at Brigadier-General Pitre, soon to be Brigadier-General Lalumière, just promoted last Friday. He will be coming to the job in the next week. That's why you have me and not your space expert. He will be the direct interface, with his team, on an ongoing basis. It would not be wrong to say we deal with the Space Agency every single day.
Senator Segal: I want to go back to my colleague Senator Beyak's question, and I appreciated that you were straightforward about the constraints that you face, because — and I want to be clear I understand that — none of us is sworn under the Security of Information Act relative to classification. Even if we were in an in camera session, you would be, just by virtue of your classification, prohibited from sharing information of certain kinds with us simply because of the constraints that you face. I just wanted to make sure I understood your context there appropriately.
Maj.-Gen. Day: Absolutely. To the point where even if I took open-source intelligence and communicated that to you, it would imply my either supporting or deferring it. So regardless if it was in camera or not, it's a classification issue, and again my apologies, senator.
Senator Segal: No, I understand that. Thank you for your frankness on that, general.
The Chair: It is one minute to two o'clock. I will thank the witness for appearing here today. I want to say you were very informative. I appreciate how forthright you were. We appreciate the work you do on our behalf and on behalf of all Canadians.
I would like to continue looking at the subject of ballistic missile defence. We are pleased to welcome Ms. Michaela Dodge, Policy Analyst, Defence and Strategic Policy at the Heritage Foundation in Washington, who has extensive experience in researching U.S. ballistic missile defence policy and has worked to move the agenda forward on ballistic missile defence in Europe, specifically the Czech Republic.
Sitting next to Ms. Dodge is Dr. Richard Weitz, Director, Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute. He has worked as an academic at Harvard and as a member of the Department of Defense. He is a graduate of Harvard College with the highest honours, the London School of Economics, Oxford and Harvard University, where he was elected Phi Beta Kappa. He is proficient in Russian, French and German.
Sitting beside him, assisting Dr. Weitz, is Ms. Lauren van den Berg, Foreign Policy Consultant.
I would like to welcome you all to the committee. We are pleased that you could be here in person to share your perspective on this important subject. I understand you each have an opening statement. I would invite Dr. Weitz to begin, followed by Ms. Dodge. We have approximately one hour for the panel.
Richard Weitz, Director, Center for Political-Military Analysis, Hudson Institute, as an individual: Ms. Dodge has a broader presentation, so I thought she should go first and then I will come in.
The Chair: Okay. Ms. Dodge, please proceed.
Michaela Dodge, Policy Analyst, Defence and Strategic Policy, Heritage Foundation, as an individual: Thank you. I am a policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation. However, the views I express in this testimony are my own and should not be construed as the official position of the Heritage Foundation.
Thank you so much for the opportunity to testify on the vitally important subject of ballistic missile defence and the potential benefits of cooperation between Canada and the United States on this issue.
Ballistic missiles have become weapons of choice for rogue nations. North Korea and Iran have been working on long-range ballistic missiles that could reach Canadian and U.S. territory. North Korea might already have such a capability. In 2012, they displayed what appeared to be a long-range ballistic missile.
In March 2014, General Jacoby, NORTHCOM commander, warned that tangible evidence of North Korea and Iranian ambitions confirms that a limited ballistic missile threat to Homeland has matured from theoretical to practical possibility. Fortunately, we do not have to stand passively by as the threat advances.
NATO adapted ballistic missile defence as its core competency in 2010. Canada wisely endorses and supports NATO's position; however, it does not participate in the U.S. missile defence program that protects North America. As a result, there is no legal framework that would allow American soldiers to intercept a ballistic missile en route to Canadian cities such as Ottawa, Toronto or Quebec.
The U.S. missile defence program has advanced in the past 13 years. This advancement has not initiated an arms race, nor has it promoted weaponization of space. The U.S. long range missile defence program has a 50 per cent successful test record, and the system is getting better because with each test and failure, we push the envelope of the system and learn new things.
Allies are embracing missile defence through NATO. Poland and Romania have agreed to host Aegis Ashore sites; Turkey hosts AN/TPY forward-deployed radar; Spain is hosting U.S. BMD-capable ships; and Germany and Denmark are considering upgrading their ships for a missile defence role. The Dutch navy is modifying ship radars to track ballistic missile targets. Spain, Norway and the U.K. have expressed interests in upgrading their ships, and Denmark and the U.K. already host upgraded early warning radar. I firmly believe that it is in the best interests of Canada to initiate discussions among the other nations participating in the U.S. long-range missile defence program.
First, Canada would gain the advantage of defending its citizens and territory from a ballistic missile attack. What is more important for sovereignty of the government than the ability to protect its own citizens?
Second, Canada would gain the advantage of demonstrating its commitment to NATO's missile defence efforts. At a very critical time, Canada could set an example to allies seeking to make decisions on their own missile defence capabilities. It would send a message to adversaries that the Canadian government is serious about protecting its citizens from a ballistic missile threat.
Third, Canada would gain the advantage in gaining a voice in missile defence systems. You have heard General Day elaborating on some of the problems he might have by not having a voice in those decisions or insights into the process.
Canada could ensure that Canadian cities are on top of the critically projected cities for missile defence intercepts.
Fourth, Canada would gain the advantage of increased security while lowering the costs of doing so. In an era of declining defence budgets, it is only logical to integrate defences. Missile defence is an excellent example of NATO's pulling and sharing concepts. Even a relatively small contribution could make a large difference for the security of all the NATO allies.
Fifth, Canada would gain the advantage of reducing its vulnerability to a ballistic missile attack. Ballistic missile threats are advancing and becoming more sophisticated. U.S. adversaries already see Canada as a critical ally. This vulnerability could be exploited by adversaries who possess ballistic missiles that can reach Canadian territory. Iran and North Korea want long-range missiles and are willing to sacrifice significant amounts of resources, manpower and reputation to obtain them. It is unlikely that they will stop pursuing these programs any time soon.
The governments of Canada and the United States will have to work out many technical, political and financial issues. Initiating the discussion on these important issues would serve Canada's national interest.
I appreciate the committee's critical work on this important issue. I would urge the committee to include in its end-of-the-year report a positive endorsement of Canadian involvement in U.S. missile defence efforts.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify on the potential for Canadian participation in the U.S. missile defence efforts and the benefits to Canada of doing so. I look forward to your questions.
The Chair: Thank you, Ms. Dodge. Dr. Weitz.
Mr. Weitz: Ms. van den Berg will make a couple of comments about the Canadian perspective, and I will present after.
Lauren van den Berg, Foreign Policy Consultant, as an individual: First, I would like to thank you for the invitation to speak here today and to address the committee on such an important and critical issue.
The spirit of Canada's foreign and defence policy has long been focused on development and cooperation as a first line of defence for collective security. This prevailing preference for a separate but cooperative defence has greatly defined our relations with the closest ally to the south of our borders. Along this line, Canada's policy regarding missile defence has historically been based on three key diplomatic-centred policies: first, engaging diplomatically with potential ballistic missile proliferators; second, promoting multilateral arms control mechanisms; and third, examining the deployment of defence capabilities.
The ballistic missile defence in Canada has largely been shaped by several popular myths. The first, which was briefly touched on by Major-General Day earlier, is that missile defence is simply an extension of the Strategic Defence Initiative, a.k.a. "Star Wars," and will lead to the weaponization of space. The second is that it will initiate a new arms race between China, Russia and the United States. The third is that Canada will be required to contribute financially to the deployment of the system and that Canadian territory will be used. The fourth is that Canadian sovereignty will be jeopardized as a result. We will get into this later on.
Proponents of Canadian participation in missile defence have emphasized how it failed to result in either space weaponization or strategic instability. Such proponents also argue that participating in ballistic missile defence will gain Canada a seat at the table where the defence of our territory is ultimately decided. But Canada cannot simply assume that having NORAD involved in interceptions would be tantamount to having a say in what locations are actually protected, which brings us to three main options. I will discuss them in increasing magnitude.
The first is the status quo. Canada can remain relatively disengaged from ballistic missile defence in Europe and North America, but given the rapidly shifting international environment in which we find ourselves looking toward Russia and the Ukraine, it might not necessarily be the most attractive option in the medium to long term.
Second, we could look at developing or installing radar systems in Canada alongside the Canada First Defence Strategy, or CFDS, and the strategic value of the Arctic region, which is highlighted therein. We would look at limited investments in radar serving other defence and security functions, which is not necessarily inconsistent with our existing policy per se.
Our third option is sort of a gradient approach which involves equipping ships to NATO missions with radar or launch systems, which could require funds to invest in the refitting of our Royal Canadian Navy. Along these lines is the option to contribute to Europe- and/or American-based ballistic missile defence systems, although it might not be the most cost-effective for Canada and our limited resources to develop our own ballistic missile defence system from scratch.
For these reasons, NATO offers a unique opportunity for participation, as the alliance, as discussed by Ms. Dodge, has recently agreed to expand the scope of its ballistic missile defence program. In fact, by ratifying NATO's strategic concept in 2010 with the Treaty of Lisbon, Canada has already endorsed the strategic utility underpinning missile defence and taken the first steps to agreeing, if only intellectually, to pursue participation in ballistic missile defence systems through NATO.
On that note of multilateral cooperation, I will turn it over to my American colleague, Mr. Weitz.
Mr. Weitz: To put this in perspective for the committee, you have a description of the kind of interest Canada has at stake, the reason it wants to participate, and then we've had an affirmation of Canada's long-standing commitment to international security, shown recently in Afghanistan and now in the case of Ukraine.
What you would want to think about, I would think, is the kind of options in some detail that you might want to play around with and the costs and benefits of those. I understand you will not make concrete recommendations, but you have a lot of smart people there, so you probably want to think about this.
The status quo is to do nothing. There are some advantages to that. It doesn't really cost much in terms of finances. There is not a clear threat. There is no country out there that would, at least at present, deliberately target Canada with a nuclear-armed ballistic missile, but this could change. We have a changing security environment. There could be a misfiring of a launch. It could either go off course or be hit in a failed interception attempt and head towards Canadian territory. There is a possibility that, as some of the European countries fear, Canada could be held hostage. To deter the U.S. from taking some action, an adversary might want to threaten or target a less well defended target. Canada has always strived not to be seen as a free rider within the alliance and has always succeeded to that end, so the status quo might hurt that.
With respect to the two options that I think you could consider, the first being the radar system contributing to the networks, how the missile defence systems work is that they are much more effective in terms of the censors. You have overlapping censors. You have sensors from different platforms. You can pool the information. You can integrate the information. That is what I am sure Major-General Day would tell you if he could. You can get a lot of benefits from just a small increment in censors and so on. It was logical for Canada to put an X-band radar or some other advanced radar in its northeast to complement the kind of systems the U.S. is doing. As long as there are sufficient guarantees of sharing and pooling information, it could extend some of the early warning time we might have to deal with a threat to North American territory.
Within the NATO option, you have the option of the censors, but you also have a shooters option. You can think of this as censors and shooters.
What NATO is doing now, as you know, is it has been evolving to develop missile defences in response to the growing threat. It starts off with putting some short-range systems on ships near Iran. It will then start putting longer-range systems, some land-based, in Romania and Poland, as well as longer-range radars and so on. Countries are participating in various ways. Canada could easily fit within that multilateral framework. You could put some censors in some of your ships. You could put interceptors in some of your ships. These could also defend Canadian interests in the Arctic and wherever since they would be based on ships. It could also not cost as much because NATO has been working within this framework of pooling and sharing within the smart defence initiative. So, for very expensive assets, such as transportation and ground-looking UAVs, they have several countries pooling together to buy some of these assets and then sharing them and allocating them.
Those are some of the options that Canada might want to consider — the radar for North America and then radar and interceptors within NATO itself. Then, it's a question of the funding and so on.
Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions.
The Chair: Colleagues, if I could just start out with one question, I want to refer back to the previous witness. I believe you were both in attendance then. A question was put with respect to the fact that there is no legal framework in place for the ballistic missile defence program between Canada and the United States. Senator Mitchell keeps raising Edmonton as a location where, perhaps, that errant missile might be directed or, let us put it this way, might go off course and go to that part of the world. I think we all share that concern, but I think this is an area that we really haven't, as a committee, discussed at any length — that is, the question of the lack of legal framework being in place that puts both Canadian industries and the United States in a position where they do not know exactly what the position is for the purposes of that errant missile, if it were to occur.
Perhaps I could ask Ms. Dodge if she has some comments on that. Perhaps Mr. Weitz also.
Ms. Dodge: Absolutely. It is true that there is no legal framework that would allow the U.S. to intercept a missile headed for Canada. If you ask your American colleagues whether they would intercept such a missile, they would probably say yes. I don't know if they would do it despite not having a legal framework, but here is one more critical thing to keep in mind when thinking about missile defence intercepts. You have precious little time to decide what you want to do. That time is taking away from your option to shoot a second time if you miss the first. Having that legal framework, those command and control issues worked out and pre-delegated authorities gives you a much better chance to make an intercept and, if you miss, try a second time. It is called look-shoot-look capability in the U.S. missile defence parlance, but it is very important to keep that in mind. It takes about half an hour for a long-range missile to reach U.S. territory, and you literally have minutes to decide what you want to do about that missile.
Mr. Weitz: Building on those very good insights, what you would probably see happen is that the U.S. would implement its already decided contingency plans. If the missile was heading toward North America and they were not sure whether it would hit Canada or the United States, they would try to intercept it based on the plans that they had worked out in advance because they would not have time to do that spontaneously. Without the legal framework, that means Canada will benefit or suffer from whatever the U.S. has decided, on its own, to do. You've had no say in this. You may or may not agree with what the U.S. was planning to do. You might have preferred another outcome, but, at the moment, you will have no say in that. So that is the cost.
Senator Dallaire: I want to take it from the angle of NATO and Europe. During the Cold War, although we did not have nuclear weapons, we had the capability of delivering them, particularly tactical nuclear weapons in the forward areas. On the one hand, we say that we won't make nuclear weapons or own them, but, if the crunch comes, we might use them. By the by, we are in an alliance that we agree can use them. There is a bit of a hypocritical scenario there.
Let me push it to the next level with the smart defence concept of NATO. Is it possible that there are Canadian dollars now being moved into NATO that are funding ballistic missile defence in Europe?
Ms. Dodge: I can take that. Actually, the missile defence assets are being paid for by the United States. There will be U.S. interceptors. There will be U.S. personnel on the ground in Poland and in Romania. Just like in the case of nuclear weapons, the European nations are contributing their territory. They might contribute toward security of those assets. As you know, within NATO, there are no real kinds of NATO capabilities. They remain within the command of nations that provide it for them, and that is the case with missile defence.
Senator Dallaire: I did not have a problem about who owned it; it was whether, under the new smart defence concept, the funding side of the house was being aligned in any way, shape or form. What I am trying to get at is that it would seem to me to be absolutely fundamentally stupid that we would be participating in NATO and putting money into helping missile defence in Europe but refusing to do it for ourselves. Are you telling me that there is no link at all, that the Americans are covering the full cost and not offsetting those costs with anything else from the NATO infrastructure?
I am looking at both of you.
Mr. Weitz: NATO has certain multilateral structures. They have agreed, in the case of missile defence, to spend $200 million initially to integrate the missile defence program that the European members of NATO were building with the United States. It is basically a command and control framework that allows European and U.S. assets to interchange, and it is responding to help protect NATO populations, territory and forces deployed.
There are some other of these kinds of pooling arrangements. Canada may be contributing some funding to these. It would not be a large amount because, in the case of missile defence, the U.S. is paying a lot of the cost, almost all of it now. Probably that will change a bit over time. I would think that some dollars that Canada gives for various NATO collective projects have application in missile defence, be they studies or whatever. As you know, Canada has a history of supporting a lot of multilateral NATO efforts that don't really benefit Canada. I think you had a pier once funded by the NATO pool. That is something that the committee would want to look after as good stewards of the Canadian dollar.
I don't think it is an urgent issue at present, but it is something that you probably want to keep an eye on going forward.
Senator Dallaire: It is a philosophical framework of a political nature, of logic.
Senator Segal: I wanted to ask a micro and then a macro question.
My micro question is for Ms. van den Berg. You made reference in your very constructive presentation to some of the options that Canada might have with respect to constructive engagement. I think you made reference to having some radar facilities established. There has been talk about Argentia or other places in the northeast. You also made reference to the fact that allied navies are utilizing the Aegis combat system in what I think are probably in the U.S Arleigh Burke-class destroyers for the purpose of positioning shoot assets around the world in a way that is constructive.
Are you suggesting those as options, or do you have a preference between those two? We are going through a period of prolonged naval procurement and unending decision making, so there is an opportunity here to give some thought. I wondered whether you'd want to give some clarity in that respect.
Ms. van den Berg: Sure. I would hesitate to come out in favour too strongly of one option or another, but I would point strategically to our CFDS and the emphasis on protecting the North and the Arctic and our interests there, specifically with regard to some of our other NATO allies and Russia that are looking increasingly at solidifying their own footprints in the region. We have natural resources in the area and a strong claim in the area. It is something this current government has definitely taken seriously.
In terms of perhaps using that particular region as a launching point for radar, not necessarily the interceptor missiles, I would recommend starting from a nice middle ground rather than going all out, because I do not think we can necessarily afford to build a BMD system from scratch. If we are looking just at radars rather than the missiles themselves, the Arctic and the CFDS present a useful platform to launch other studies for this committee. The 2005 proposal that was muted or killed to set up a radar system in Goose Bay, Newfoundland, has a lot of validity that could be a platform to protect the northeast.
The Chair: Can you make your preamble short?
Senator Segal: I will. My macro question is for either one of the other two guests on the panel, whose presence we appreciate very much. Can you locate the rogue nation ballistic missile threat within what we have seen to be greater military cooperation between the Chinese and the Russians — cooperation at the Security Council with respect to standing in the way of the responsibility to protect; various other notions; military cooperation; and the rate at which the Chinese are cutting steel for their navy, which far outstrips other countries? I am curious how you would connect those with the issue you were so straightforward on earlier.
Ms. Dodge: Both Russia and China are critical enablers of North Korea and Ukrainian ballistic missile programs, and that cooperation goes back for decades, in some cases.
One of the notions I have encountered is that ballistic missile defence is going to cause an arms race. North Korea and Iran are examples of the fact that missile defence does not cause an arm's race, because they started their programs way before the U.S. became serious about its missile defence efforts.
On the Russian side, it is a very serious threat, especially for European allies. We see violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and a willingness to change boundaries of a sovereign state for the first time since the Second World War. Having options, having capabilities, allowing you more decision time to de-escalate crises — those could be critical roles to missile defence in addition to protecting people and institutions.
Mr. Weitz: I want to put forward two caveats. The current U.S. missile defence program is not designed for or capable of defending against a Russian or Chinese missile attack against North America or probably any other country. To the Russians, the Chinese have been providing much assistance that has enabled North Korea and Iran to develop their missile-launching capabilities. As far as we're aware, they have not recently assisted them to develop nuclear weapons. If it were a conventionally armed missile that hit, it would be a tragedy, and maybe 1,000 people would die, but that's not why we're spending all the billions of dollars. We fear countries will put on top of these missiles a nuclear warhead — or a biological or chemical weapon, but I think nuclear is the main fear. That's why we're afraid, because that could be an Earth-changing event if they were able to do that.
Senator Mitchell: Thank you to each of you. The key question for me at least and I think probably for Canada is this: How much participation do we need to have in the ballistic missile defence system to get it treated in the same way as cruise missiles and airplane-launched nuclear warheads that might affect and be directed at Canada to be included under the NORAD system so we have a little more certainty that the U.S. would be inclined to do something about ballistic missiles?
To this point, each of you has talked about the various levels of involvement from Canada's point of view, but that begs the question: How badly does the U.S. want us to be involved in ballistic missile defence, and what would they require of us? It could range from nothing — they'd be quite happy for us to say, "We want to be involved in BMD" — or it might require us paying for a rocket on our soil. I don't think that is the case, but that would be the outside. Somewhere in between, do you have any idea what the U.S. ask is or might be?
Mr. Weitz: The U.S. has accepted Canada's position that missile defence does not fall within NORAD and that it does not want to deal with missile defence supporting the U.S. program. It has accepted that; it does not like that. What they would like to have is a radar in the northeast. If you wait a couple of years, the U.S. will put a radar in the northeastern United States — probably. It's not as far north as they would like, but they will do that.
So, thinking strategically, if you were going to make a contribution, your leverage will be maximized if you do it soon with respect to the radar. If you wait too long, the U.S. will have done this on its own, and Canada's leverage and influence will lag.
The NATO context is not clear. I think they would welcome it. There is a problem in that the U.S. is paying for pretty much all of NATO's missile defence program. Some of the Europeans are contributing to the sensors, but not to the upper-tier shooters; there have been the lower ones, and you have seen this with the Patriots in Turkey.
I'm sure they would welcome a Canadian contribution, and it would also help Canada's influence in Europe. But from the U.S. point of view, they would like to see a radar in the northeast. So there is urgency.
Senator Mitchell: My second question really addresses this idea that when the decision was made in the early 2000s for Canada not to get — the whole context of it was torqued quite intensely in the sense that it was space warfare and there would be rockets in space. What is interesting in your presentations is really how close we are to that in any event. Maybe you can comment on this. Ms. Dodge mentioned that there are ships — the Dutch have Aegis on their ships and other countries are considering it. I would like to get an update on how much they're considering it. And I think the U.K. and one other country has ground-based.
Ms. van den Berg, you mentioned the Treaty of Lisbon. I know a bit about that, but I was interested in how you said that we have already made an intellectual commitment. Can you show how close we are in any event or how, in the case of the ships, it's already been done by our allies? In the case of the Treaty of Lisbon, what exactly is the intellectual commitment?
Ms. Dodge: If I could go back to your previous question, the fact that we're not even having discussions about these issues between our governments is very unfortunate. That would be the venue to get the best and most detailed answer to all the questions.
With respect to European commitment to missile defence, it varies nation by nation. Some of the nations are considering upgrading their radar, like the Netherlands and the Norwegians. Some are considering buying SM-3 missiles, perhaps even creating a pool of missiles the Europeans could draw on as they provide ships to ballistic missile defence missions. That would be good for the United States because the ships are multi-purpose; missile defence is not their only role. You get into rotation schedules and problems, and you have to sail them back for maintenance, et cetera.
We are looking at these efforts with optimistic eyes, with pessimistic eyes on the other side with the Europeans declining their defence budgets and not investing enough to provide for some of their core defence needs in the long term.
Ms. van den Berg: On the 2010 Lisbon summit, it is the idea that we agree, in theory, to the strategic underpinning of ballistic missile defence. The idea is that NATO agreed to expand the scope of its own Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence program. We are technically saying we agree that Europe should protect itself, be able to engage in this system and develop the mechanisms and tools required. If you take a step back from a more macro level and look at the philosophy behind what we are saying yes to, we are really agreeing to the rationale of a ballistic missile defence system. It's how we how decide to go about that going forward. We can still uphold our multilateral heritage in our foreign policy to look at non-proliferation of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons, but we can do that in tandem with our NATO allies, American allies.
Ms. Dodge is correct when she says a forum would be better suited in close dialogue with our American counterparts in this. Going back to the question posed by Senator Segal, we have our own deficit reduction action plan issues going on right now. Our navy isn't perhaps what we would like it to be in some circles, and it may not be equipped now to send ships on NATO missions that they are looking for. We cannot necessarily get to Russia at the drop of a hat. We do not necessarily have the capacity to protect the Pacific as much as we could or like. Take from that what you will, but based on our budget constraints and on the costs of engaging in this type of missile defence system, we have a gradient of choice available to us as long as we get our foot in the door, which we have done with the Lisbon summit.
Senator Wells: I believe Dr. Weitz had a follow-up to that last question.
Mr. Weitz: I have a couple of statements. On the NATO decision, Canada attended the NATO summit in 2010 and this was reconfirmed in the Chicago summit in 2012. They agreed that missile defence is a key component of NATO doctrine and policy; along with conventional capabilities — nuclear weapons and other elements — it's a key element of what NATO is going to do, so Canada participates that way. I believe there are Canadian experts who engage in some of the joint committees we're looking at on how you would mate the Canadian and U.S. system.
I did not mention this at the beginning, but there is another model to think about. In terms of the U.S. cooperating with another country to develop missile defences, the best example is actually Japan. The Japanese and the United States are co-developing some of the systems, and we have extensive exchange; the Japanese are bending a lot of the rules about arms exports and arms sharing to allow this to take place. They have a natural problem with North Korea right next door. That's a model of bilateral corporation that if you wanted to supplement or not pursue a multilateral framework with NATO, you could do it with the U.S. The Pacific is of great concern to Canada and is an area a lot of us are worried about. Despite recent events in Europe, we see a lot of potential threats coming out of the Pacific region, which would naturally affect Canada.
Senator Wells: I just wanted to clarify: Ms. van den Berg mentioned Goose Bay and Gander Bay, but I represent Newfoundland and Labrador and there is a small village called Gander Bay, but I know they are not being considered. And they would be pleased to hear that.
Ms. Dodge, thank you for your presentation. It's a fascinating subject.
You mentioned that through NATO, the allies embrace ballistic missile defence. And it appears all our European NATO allies have fully embraced it and are happy to have the protection of the United States. For North American NATO partners, Canada and the U.S., it seems as though people who have sat in the chairs you are in and the folks we spoke to at NORAD have all said there is no legal framework, we are not involved. The comments we've received are very specific. I assume that Canada seems to be, through its actions, opting out other than in a very general way as a contributor to NATO. If that's the case, is Canada more vulnerable because we appear to be opting out?
Ms. Dodge: Do you mean in a sense that it's more likely a target?
Senator Wells: Yes, in a ballistic missile target.
Ms. Dodge: One of the important reasons why the U.S. is pursuing missile defence in Europe — and Dr. Weitz alluded to it — is so that so our European allies cannot be coerced, or the U.S. cannot be coerced through our European allies, to take action it does not want to take or refrain from actions it does want to take. A similar dynamic applies to Canada and probably more so because in a way Canada is a much closer security cooperation partner. It's a close neighbour; our grids are interconnected and in many cases our vulnerabilities are shared, so in that sense it's potentially less beneficial for the U.S. to have a vulnerable neighbour to its north than in Europe.
Senator Wells: I would agree with that. If you look at the 50 miles on the northern and southern side of our shared border, are you going to hit Detroit or Windsor? Everyone is saying, and I think Dr. Weitz said earlier, if there is a ballistic missile attack on the northern border of our shared border, the U.S. would act. But at the same time, we have heard people say there is no legal framework, we're not involved, we are not part of it. Are we missing something, outside of the legal framework and outside of what appears to be a wink-wink, nudge-nudge agreement? Is there something we are missing? Are we de facto part of this ballistic missile defence without the legal framework?
Ms. Dodge: You are missing the time. You are missing the time to potentially have two attempts to intercept incoming missiles. You are missing perhaps the discussion that will be very strained and difficult at a time when you have 10 minutes to decide whether you want to shoot it down or not.
I would argue that that's even more critical than legal framework or whatever because it's not going to be a good time to have that discussion. You can be the best allies in the world, but as long as you don't have clear rules of engagement, clear rules of authority, you are losing time and potentially creating serious complications in alliance relationships.
Mr. Weitz: Realistically, Canada is not as threatened as many other countries are by ballistic missile defence. What you are doing, which may be an acceptable policy, is you are saying the United States will protect Canada and you will have no impact. The United States will protect us so you don't need to worry about it. If you're comfortable with that — and you might be, a lot of countries are — then that's fine. But if you want to have some say in how the United States does that and get a more binding commitment — You're also potentially missing industrial benefits.
You mentioned all the NATO countries have signed on and are really enthusiastic about missile defence. Eastern Europeans really like it because that gets the United States heavily involved in their defence, almost independent of NATO, so it's a supplement to the NATO guarantees, and historically they have not been served well by some of their European allies in earlier conflicts so it's nice to have the U.S.
For Western Europeans it's harder, the French and the Germans. What's going on in some of these countries is that they benefit from industrial cooperation with the United States, developing their sensors and aviation components. Canada may not be benefiting from that. There is some economic question, but primarily I think it's a sovereignty question: Are you comfortable relying on the United States to defend you?
The Chair: Senator Day, could you answer that question?
Senator Day: I'm actually sitting here wondering about Article 5 of the NATO agreement and if we felt there was an attack on Edmonton coming —
Senator Segal: Not to mention the Monroe Doctrine.
Senator Day: An attack on one is deemed an attack on all. So aren't we already into this game? Speaking about being comfortable — wouldn't we expect the Americans to come to our defence, as well the Europeans?
Mr. Weitz: Article 5 obliges the members to defend one another. It doesn't necessarily require a military obligation. It has not been frequently invoked. The one time recently that I recall was after the 2001 attack, with all the NATO countries, but it was more declaratory. This was considered an attack on all of us, and there was no commitment necessarily. The Bush administration, for various reasons, didn't want to have NATO heavily involved in what it was doing in Afghanistan and then Iraq that came later.
The United States, as I said, will defend Canada. You will not have a say in how they're going to do it, and that's the risk.
Senator Day: The chair prompted me to ask that question. I was thinking about it.
Ms. Dodge, I appreciate your written comments, and I've had a chance to review them. You didn't follow them precisely, which is fine, but one of the points that jumped out at me was that in 2004 Canada agreed to allow NORAD to share global missile surveillance and warning information with other commands responsible for missile defence in North America. Is that something in writing that is available to us to read and have access to?
Ms. Dodge: I do not know the form of that agreement, but in effect it allows our missile defence system to utilize early warning data. It would alert us so that we see that a ballistic missile is coming.
Senator Day: We had a discussion on Sapphire earlier on, and that satellite domain, space domain monitoring and information could be very valuable and is shared. I wondered if there was something in writing with which we could determine that. I asked that question of Major-General Day, and I don't believe he felt there was something necessarily in writing about this.
Ms. Dodge: I don't know the form of that agreement. In my research, as I was preparing in the testimony it reappeared and it came up in various writings of Canadian authors and scholars. Their argument was that because Canada agreed to share early warning data, it in effect endorsed missile defence, except about two weeks after that agreement the Canadian government announced it would not participate in U.S. missile defence efforts. It will parallel the NATO homeland security, almost schizophrenic possession.
Senator Day: If you go back to your source and determine that there is something in writing, that could be helpful in learning what the wording is.
Ms. Dodge: I will do that.
Senator Dagenais: Mr. Weitz, can you elaborate on how Canada could reduce its vulnerabilities to ballistic missile attacks by being part of U.S. ballistic missile defence?
Mr. Weitz: It depends on the options. Canada already is helping to reduce the threat from ballistic missiles through other activities: diplomacy and trying to resolve conflicts that generate tensions and can lead to missile defence through its participation in NATO and contributing insights.
In terms of actually helping protect North America from an attack, I think that having radar based in Northern Canada would be useful by helping to extend the radar sensor coverage, make it more robust, accurate and give us more early warning time. Therefore we will be more likely to be able to hit a missile proceeding towards North America.
If you will allow me to consider our citizens as something we need to defend, Canada, like the United States, often sends its forces on international missions: peacekeeping, and sometimes actual conflicts, as we saw in the case of Afghanistan. The NATO framework is designed to protect not only the territory of all NATO countries and their populations but also their forces deployed abroad. Even if you consider a missile strike against Canadian territory unlikely, I think it is more plausible that there would be more countries to target short- and medium-range missiles at Western troops, which would probably be U.S., but there might be Canadians there as well. You want to try to protect those. That's another angle to this.
Senator Beyak: Thank you for very impressive presentations. Your knowledge is remarkable on this subject.
I wanted to know, for Canadian tax dollars and value for money and costs, can you each expand on your comments about the different options for missile defence?
Ms. van den Berg: I think primarily starting with the first option of status quo, it's zero. We do nothing and we continue on the path we're on, which will probably end up being decided for us down the line. At the end of the day it's a trade-off between one of the earlier myths I spoke about: this fear of having to give up Canadian territory to participate in a ballistic missile defence program.
On the other hand, what about Canadian sovereignty? As has been discussed repeatedly, the idea that our protection, our defence, our collective security, is decided by someone not of our country might not sit well with our citizens, taxpayers or otherwise.
I think the installation and development of radar systems is slightly more cost-effective than constructing an entire BMD from scratch, especially when we have the U.S. system all raring to go. Either we can look at reinstating the 2005 proposal to not put it in Gander Bay but in Goose Bay, or the alternative of coverage up North. In this case knowledge is power. The greater information we can gather in a shorter amount of time is all the better for our long-term safety.
The third option is frankly I think more than we can afford. I think having to wait until 2017 for some Arctic offshore patrol ships, having to wait for replacements for our CF-18s, means we maybe have more on our plate than we anticipated. That's definitely an issue we need to consider before making any decisions.
Mr. Weitz: The key to keeping your costs down will be buying something that is already out there. The research and development costs, which are most of the cost of these systems, have been incorporated.
I suspect that buying an X-band radar, which you could put into northeastern Canada, would not be that expensive, because the U.S. spent all its money developing them and now has the technology down well.
With respect to the sensors and shooters on ships, the key there would be to share this as a pooled arrangement. Canada would put in a certain amount of money along with a bunch of countries. They would buy the ships and the capabilities, and Canada would gain protection of its forces on deployment and presumably rights to the ships for Arctic contingencies, along with Norway, and so on.
I don't think the costs are that great overall. The U.S. has found it to be expensive to build and test these systems and get them to work. But to buy something that is already out there, like the Patriot, or some of these systems that, for example, Raytheon has developed with the Dutch that allow our ships to communicate, is different. To take a U.S. system and put it on ships that Canada might have is not that expensive.
The Chair: I want to follow up on one question. I do not know if you can technically answer this. This concerns the possibility of a radar intercept or site being located in Newfoundland, maybe Gander or Goose Bay.
If the decision were to proceed and come to an agreement with the United States government with the ballistic missile defence program, and the interceptor radar installation was put in Newfoundland in this case, will that make the system that much more secure as opposed to locating that same installation down in the lower 48?
Mr. Weitz: What do you mean by "secure," sir?
Senator Dallaire: More effective?
The Chair: By "secure," I mean more effective, putting it into northern Newfoundland.
Mr. Weitz: I think so. I think that because of the positions of where the U.S. systems are now in Alaska and California, the technical parameters are such that we had better get the one in the northeast as high north as possible. That would marry up, of course, with any sensors and chips and other information, as well as the space-based sensors, which we discussed in the previous session.
The Chair: Thank you. Senator Wells, do you want to follow up on that?
Senator Wells: For those who don't know, Goose Bay is located in Labrador, the northern part of Newfoundland and Labrador, and it is a fully equipped air force base that was used by the Dutch, the Germans, the British, and of course the Canadians and French, and other NATO allies, that will come in and do low-level flying and testing, et cetera. It is an available, fully activated site, when necessary.
Senator Beyak: I think Ms. Dodge had a comment on the costs.
Ms. Dodge: I had a comment on the radar. I was going to echo Mr. Weitz's endorsement: The more north you can put the radar, the better, because of the curvature of the earth. It allows you to see more.
Senator White: Thank you very much to each of you for being here as well. My question will be short.
If I were a Canadian sitting out there listening right now, I would think we hope if a missile were coming they would do something. We think they would do something. We want them to do something. But you are saying that if we want to know something will be done, we have to get all in; we need to be a real partner rather than a hanger-on?
Mr. Weitz: Maybe there's a way that the U.S. plans and works you don't want. This has come up in the European context. At some point, there was an idea that maybe the Russians would cover their area — this was a Russia proposal — and NATO would cover our area.
Senator White: It's old news, obviously.
Mr. Weitz: Right. But the problem is that if the intercept takes place and you actually manage to destroy the missile, but the warhead is damaged and starts falling, you might want to have a say if the U.S. plans to intercept it over one part of the world rather than another. Maybe you want the U.S. not to try to intercept it over Canadian territory. Maybe you want it out in the North Atlantic somewhere. You have no say in that. The U.S. technical people will try to intercept it without having input from Canada.
Senator White: In the rest of the security of this nation, we do want a say. It does not matter how good a system the United States provides with our borders; we still have our own border security and every other system. Why is it we don't want to be part of this and actually have a say, when we still expect to have a product at the end?
Mr. Weitz: That is for a Canadian to answer.
Ms. van den Berg: I would argue that perhaps it goes back to the mess we were discussing earlier, the fear about Star Wars, the fear that Russia would be after us, the fear that we would lose our territory and our money would go somewhere where we wouldn't have control over it. It was prevalent with the Canadian electorate; immediately post-9/ 11, those fears were amplified to a large extent, and they remained incredibly prevalent.
Senator White: I will be honest; I have learned a lot in the last couple of presentations. We obviously have not done enough to educate Canadians either on the reality that we are just talking about a system of protecting this country, not one turning us into a —
Ms. van den Berg: War machine?
Senator White: Yes, or giving us missiles to shoot elsewhere. We are talking about protection.
Ms. van den Berg: Yes, and we have not done a good job of controlling the narrative. We have not gotten on top of the story. We haven't crested the wave, or whatever adage you want to choose. We haven't done it, and it is coming back to bite us on our collective butts, because we didn't get ahead of the story, and now we run the risk of letting the story define it for us.
Mr. Weitz: I don't want to answer for Canada. In the European context, you've seen interesting phenomena that some groups in Germany, for example, who are strongly opposed to nuclear weapons and want to abolish them, support missile defence as a means to pull NATO away from its dependence on nuclear deterrence. President Obama has committed to eliminating nuclear weapons in the world. One of the reasons he is comfortable with that kind of policy is that he plans to erect missile defences that would make nuclear deterrence unnecessary. This is obviously a long-term vision.
Senator Dallaire: Remember that the ballistic missile defence program is not aimed at China or Russia; it is still aimed purely at North Korea, Iran and potential rogue outfits there. It doesn't have that grand strategic balance exercise between the big players on the major ballistic systems.
However, I am a patron of Pugwash, which is an anti-nuclear program. I am addressing Ms. Dodge, because you have written that you think the United States would improve its strategic posture by withdrawing from the north the new strategic arms reduction talks, even the intermediate-range nuclear forces.
It's one thing to defend yourself because some wacko has decided to get the toys that we think are absolutely stupid to have in the first place. It is another argument, though, to want to keep a capability that is of another era and that I think is an affront to our human right to security by the mere fact it exists.
How do you balance that out?
Ms. Dodge: I propose that we should withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, because the Russians are cheating on it. The treaty is giving us a false sense of security. We think that we have a treaty, while Russia is pursuing systems that are banned under the treaty. We don't have very good insight into what the systems are and what Russian strategic thinking about it is.
I propose that we withdraw from the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and go back to the drawing board, because the treaty mandates the United States reductions. It allows Russia to build up its nuclear weapons. Since the treaty entered into force, Russia has started the most expansive nuclear modernization program since the end of the Cold War. I do not think that U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons are morally equivalent. I think that based on the fact that the U.S. is not an aggressor — Russia is an aggressor; the U.S. uses its weapons to assure allies, NATO allies like Canada, European allies, the Japanese, South Koreans, and their trust in that assurance prevented some of those states from developing their own nuclear weapons capabilities.
The discussion is broader than just reduce nuclear weapons or increase nuclear weapons. It is about implications on assurances, implications on what Russia thinks, what kind of image we project to Russia at a time when the state is under the increasingly aggressive rule of Vladimir Putin.
Senator Day: You were going to try to find some information for me in regard to 2004. Ms. van den Berg, I am interest in anything in writing where Canada has allowed the U.S. to use the intelligence that we gather and share with them.
I think we are all finding your argument very compelling that we have intellectually gone a major step in the direction of participation but have somehow been able to keep one foot back.
With respect to NATO, are you aware of anything in writing, any caveat from Canada that states, "We do not want to participate in this particular thing, but we will do everything else"? Are you aware of any caveats in that regard?
Ms. van den Berg: I am not aware of any particular caveats. I know there was one Canadian on this 11-person committee that drafted the strategic concept that we then ratified, but I think Dr. Weitz might be in a better position to speak about that.
Mr. Weitz: NATO signed on formally to the missile defence initiatives, at least the U.S. program, only in 2010.
I am not aware of a caveat within the NATO context. I think Canada's decision is a unilateral policy decision made not only by Canada but some other countries not to support missile defence in principle, not to try and impede what NATO is doing.
I have an example. It's not perfect, but it's an example the Turks have been struggling with. They are concerned about Iran, but they have been cautious about saying that what their contribution is doing is actually helping NATO against Iran. So they basically have let NATO do things such as put the radar there, but to take a very detached response to this.
There is nothing within the NATO context that would impede Canada from coming into NATO or to the U.S. or some other missile defence program.
The Chair: Ms. Dodge, Dr. Weitz and Ms. van den Berg, I would like to thank you very much for attending today. It has been very enlightening, and your testimony will obviously be seriously reviewed by the committee. We are looking forward to coming out with a report toward the end of June, if we can meet our deadlines. Once again, thank you for coming.
As we continue our study of ballistic missile defence, we are very pleased to welcome General (Retired) Walter Natynczyk, President, Canadian Space Agency; and Luc Brûlé, Vice President.
General, you are no stranger to the Senate and this committee. We are pleased to have you back in your new capacity as president of the Canadian Space Agency. Although you have only been at the agency for a short time you are already making positive contributions. We look forward to hearing about how things are going, from your perspective.
General (Ret'd) Walter J. Natynczyk, President, Canadian Space Agency: Thank you for your kind remarks and the opportunity to speak today.
It is a totally different role. The mandate of the Canadian Space Agency is to promote the peaceful use and development of space; to advance the knowledge of space through science; and to ensure that space, science and technology provide social and economic benefits for Canadians.
The word "peaceful" in our mandate does not preclude us from supporting security objectives. The Space Agency is, however, focused primarily on industry success and the development of innovative capabilities that have commercial potential.
[Translation]
In my former job as Chief of Defence Staff, I was well aware of the strategic importance of space assets for security and defence. After almost nine months at the Space Agency, I can assure you the same dependency exists on the civilian and commercial side of the world.
[English]
Space is essential to our way of life. Many Canadians take space for granted and do not realize that space touches them numerous times a day. Their quality of life depends upon space, from personal banking services, telecommunications and the Internet. Satellites help in forecasting weather, managing our natural resources, monitoring our coastlines and improving our understanding of the universe. Space delivers all of that and more.
Recognizing the strategic importance of that, the government recently adopted the new space policy framework for Canada. The framework sets the foundation for the next phase of Canada's pursuits in space. It hinges on five overarching principles.
The first principle is Canadian interests first. This means that sovereignty, security and prosperity will be the key drivers of Canada's activities in space.
Number 2 is positioning the private sector at the forefront of space activities. The space sector currently employs 8,000 employees and generates over $3 billion of annual revenues, half of that coming from exports.
I call space a watershed sector. That is technologies that are developed in space then cascade into sectors such as the automotive industry, aerospace and mining.
[Translation]
Number three: progress through partnerships. Domestic and international partnerships have always been central to Canada's Space Program. We will continue to look for partnerships to share the costs and gain the benefits of space investments.
Number four: excellence in key capabilities. Canada's success in space came from developing world-recognized leadership in science and technology areas that are invaluable domestically and to our international partners — notably in telecommunications, robotics and radar imagery. The government will continue to focus on proven Canadian competencies while keeping a close watch on emerging capabilities for tomorrow's space programs.
[English]
Number 5 is inspiring Canadians. Space is highly effective in terms of motivating youth to study sciences and to pursue careers in the high-technology field. I've got to mention the huge contribution that Chris Hadfield has made; but even today we have two extraordinary astronauts in Jeremy Hansen and David Saint-Jacques. It's my view that together they've made space and science cool to tens of thousands of Canadians and people around the world.
[Translation]
Flowing from these principles are four areas for action that will guide the choices that need to be made. First, commercialization. Space is becoming increasingly commercial. We need to ensure Canada's Space Program provides sufficient transparency to aid Canadian industry to make strategic investment decisions.
Second: research and development. Working with the industry and the Canadian research community, we will encourage further opportunities in research and development and innovation through partnerships. These efforts will enable the Canadian space community to gain the knowledge and human capital it needs to build tomorrow's workforce.
[English]
The third area of action is exploration of space. Canada will work in partnership with our international partners to determine the next steps in space exploration. We will collaborate with the Canadian industry and the academic community to ensure that Canada advances its key technological capabilities to maintain a strong position as a partner of choice in future space exploration.
The fourth area of action is stewardship and management accountability that will ensure that the Canadian space stakeholders in government, industry and academia are consulted during the planning, development and implementation of space policies, strategies and initiatives, and it will ensure the stewardship of the public purse.
To achieve this, we have built an interdepartmental governance structure to enhance decision making in Canada's space program.
[Translation]
This is not totally new. We have been working with other departments since the creation of the CSA to advance technologies and applications that can provide effective responses to civilian, commercial and governmental objectives.
[English]
To be more specific to the interests of this committee, that cooperation includes projects such as the M3MSat. This project is the result of a "Team Canada" approach that includes industry, the Space Agency and Defence Research and Development Canada, DRDC. It aims at developing our national capability in the area of the space-based Automatic Identification System, otherwise known as AIS.
This capability enables global coverage for the identification and tracking of ships. This information is of interest to ship owners as it enables more efficient use of their fleet. It also increases maritime domain awareness, and, as a result, it has tremendous commercial potential.
The launch of M3MSat had been scheduled for mid-June of this year, from Russian facilities in Kazakhstan. The launch has been deferred, and the Government of Canada is working with the Canadian company that is the prime contractor for this project to find an appropriate launch solution. This is an example of how the Space Agency fulfills its core mandate to advance industry and technology, while supporting other government departments.
[Translation]
NEOSat is another example of close cooperation between the CSA, DRDC and industry. Launched in February of 2013, NEOSat is a technology demonstration satellite that performs Space Situational Awareness from space — enabling the tracking of space debris, satellites and other objects orbiting the earth.
[English]
We are also working closely with DND's force development branch to ensure alignment of space investments. This alignment is best exemplified by the whole-of-government approach that we've taken toward the RADARSAT Constellation mission, which will be launched in 2018. This is a space-based radar system that will support the mandate of several departments, including Environment Canada, Natural Resources, Fisheries and Oceans and National Defence. The RADARSAT Constellation will help to maintain Canadian industry's leadership in the commercialization of space radar systems and applications. The Space Agency is also active in the area of space diplomacy. Through our active involvement in international forums, such as the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, we promote the non-weaponization of space, as well as the development of transparency and confidence-building measures. We do this under the leadership of the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Mr. Chair, ladies and gentlemen, these are some of the most significant Space Agency activities and priorities related to the interests of this committee. I'm still relatively new in this business, and some of you know much more my past — I am not a rocket scientist. But I have a great, dedicated team. My vice-president, Luc Brûlé, who is sitting beside me, was in charge of the satellite operations, but he typifies the extraordinary dedication and talent that has made the Canadian space program one of the foremost in the world.
I'm pleased to be able to be here today and to continue to serve the needs of Canada.
The Chair: Thank you very much, and I just want to assure you, general, that I don't believe there is any other rocket scientist around this part of the table at any rate. So you have good company.
We want to say that the Canadian Space Agency is a very important arm of the Government of Canada, and the more that we can get people like yourself coming forward and being witnesses to proceedings such as this, the more Canadians can become informed of exactly what you do, how you are spending their money, what results we are getting at the end of day and the importance to their everyday lives.
I would like to start with one question. It has to do with a couple of points you made in your opening remarks about the commercialization and the research and development aspects of the Canadian Space Agency. As you know, we are studying the ballistic missile agreement that is not in place at the present time, and we have had various witnesses before us. I'd like to enquire from the Canadian Space Agency: With our technology and assets in space, can you confirm whether we might have some significant contributions to make should we become part of the U.S. ballistic missile defence program?
Gen. Natynczyk: Senator, my mandate is really on the civil side of space. We look at each one of the programs we have of satellites that are flying, and really you can put them into three pots. One pot is satellite communications and that whole genesis, since the Alouette in 1962, to create satellites that enable communication across Canada and around the world. Another is navigation. Again, we don't do a lot of navigation. It's really a GPS system. Some of our allies do, but that is an area that we track.
The third is called Earth observation, and this is where, kind of like satellite communications, Canada has some of the best radar imagers able to look through cloud and dust day and night and see objects on the ground. It also determines changes if there is a change on the ground. From what I've been briefed, those kind of systems really are not applicable to the kind of interest that you've mentioned.
The other area where we are working in support of National Defence and other government departments is spatial awareness of what is happening in space with regard to the operational satellites out there, of which there are about 1100, but also the space debris. Again, I've been briefed that there are over 200,000 bits and pieces of stuff floating around out there, each one of them moving at a very high speed, like a bullet. We track all of those things so that we can ensure that not only our satellites but also other satellites stay out of harm's way — if any of you watched the movie Gravity, you know what I'm talking about — and also protect life on the International Space Station. The kinds of things that we have helped National Defence with thus far look toward the spatial awareness of tracking that debris. I will ask my vice-president to chime in here if I have some gaps.
Luc Brûlé, Vice President, Canadian Space Agency: In terms of specific assets, I believe you already had discussions with DND on their project mission Sapphire, and you also had a discussion on the purpose of that mission, primarily to look at orbiting objects on the geosynchronous orbit on higher-level orbits.
The other mission that we have flying right now is a microsat called NEOSSat, and it also monitors orbiting debris on lower orbits. It also has a scientific purpose to look at asteroids flying around our solar system and to make sure that we have good mapping of where they are and the tracking of them as they approach the Earth or leave the Earth and move toward the end of the solar system. These are basically the two main systems we have in Canada, and neither of them has any purpose to monitor ballistic missiles.
Senator Dallaire: The Space Agency has one of the best screens to watch the Grey Cup and the Super Bowl in the country. Also, I'd like to just say that we have two ex-cadets from RMC and CMR there, plus two more on this side. I'm not sure we succeeded as much as you did, but it's a sign that that school has an impact on our society. I wanted to make that point.
The question I'm looking at is how you are moving not just technology. I spent a year with the Marines. We had a class called space law, and professors from Duke and so on. Do you engage in the development of space policy, space focus, conceptual frameworks of space into the future that are not purely technical but are in the domain of humanity and the use and so on that go beyond the space station and some neat vehicles that go up and down?
Gen. Natynczyk: Senator, thanks for the question. As I mentioned in my opening address, there is an international body, and Canada has taken a lead role. It is led by Foreign Affairs, but the Space Agency participates on Team Canada, if you will, on the legal side, working, in a United Nations kind of forum, on those protocols on the safe use of space and developing the code of conduct on how to operate in space.
In real terms, I have three lawyers in the Space Agency, all of whom have significant background skills in space law.
Just so you know, McGill University is kind of like the centre; it has the only institute of space law in Canada. We have a great graduate from there who is leading our team but working in support of Foreign Affairs and with international colleagues to develop the confidence-building measure and the protocols that go toward this code of conduct in terms of non-weaponization and so on of space.
Senator Dallaire: I'll come back on the second round with another question, but this one is very much focused on how missile defence, you and national defence link up. To me certainly, missile defence is not space. It's just something that is passing through. You've spoken about the sales pitch of Canada in space. Has there been a solid argument to articulate how missile defence is not part of a space program in any way, shape or form?
Gen. Natynczyk: To be very honest and clear, in preparing for this brief and my nine months in the job, we have not touched missile defence whatsoever. On the Space Agency, I'm kind of asking the questions as we move forward here, saying, okay there is a security aspect, which is not my job. Other folks in security do that job. I do focus on space safety when it comes to, for example, space debris that could affect the efficient use of satellites and the international space station but also look at what Mother Nature does in space, for example, solar storms that could take out all the satellites. I think you heard about "a day without space" a couple of years ago, when the Anik F2 satellite came off-line because of an anomaly, and all of a sudden, tens of thousands of Canadians do not have communication or banking, and thousands of folks are stranded on the ground because airplanes don't fly. That's a safety issue, looking at the radiation that is connected to all of that, and, indeed, as Mr. Brûlé mentioned a few moments ago, trying to track asteroids. You're aware what occurred last year with the asteroid that impacted in Russia where just the sonic boom and the shock wave injured about 1,000 folks. The Space Agency on the peaceful side of the fence is focused on the aspects of what happens in space and leaves it to others in government to address security aspects.
Senator Dallaire: My aim was to make sure that's not at all in your realm and that's what we are trying to prove.
Senator Segal: Welcome, general.
My question relates to the polar communications and satellite mission, which I think falls into one of clusters you were kind enough to make reference to. My understanding is that your agency is in the process of trying to find some international partners for this, whether private investors or other governments that might be part of this. Do we have a financial problem in actually making good on what the government's commitment has been to get this polar array up and running for both communications and analytical purposes? Are we hypothecated on finding other partners to make this thing go, or do we have a commitment from the government to make it go no matter what?
Gen. Natynczyk: The Polar Communication and Weather satellite will be, I think, a very powerful satellite for Canada when it gets to flight again, being able to provide communications in the High Arctic and also more accurate weather forecasting through the area. Coming into the job, I looked at the PCW, Polar Communication and Weather satellite, and how it was being developed comparing it with, say, the RADARSAT Constellation mission and trying to figure out what the Space Agency does, what our what focus is and what we do.
I realized that when a technology becomes kind of normalized, so that it's not high-risk, industry wants to do it, and when the outcome is information or data that is of operational use to a given department or several departments, the question becomes why is the Space Agency doing it. Really, it is a conclusion from the Honourable David Emerson's report in terms of who pays for space equipment and the spacecraft. The model had been that because space was so novel, the Space Agency paid for everything. As the technology has matured, the realization is that this should be spun out to commercial solutions, which are less expensive, and I use the Telesat model as being one. Back in 1962 the Government of Canada developed and flew Alouette, over time created Telesat and then spun off Telesat to be a commercial entity and doing quite well.
The PCW project, as I understand it, is not earth shattering and new technology. It is basically commercial off-the-shelf communications technology and weather technology integrated in an effective means and then flown on a unique orbit, and they are calling it the tundra orbit so that, at any one time, these two satellites have about 12 hours of coverage over the Arctic.
The Space Agency in partnership with Environment Canada and National Defence did the initial studies on it. We put some money against it and figured out how to do it, but then going back to the Honourable David Emerson's recommendations, the operational output is going to National Defence and Environment Canada, and it is for those reasons that they have the lead now with the Space Agency supporting it. That kind of changes the paradigm of how you pay for these space projects because the Space Agency has three key lines of business, if you will. One is supporting all those government departments, as well as the provinces and territories, in providing space solutions to meet their operational needs, PCW being a great example.
A second line of business is looking across the country for extraordinary technology and getting it into space as quickly as we can in order to prove it and maintain a competitive edge.
Then the third is space exploration: the International Space Station and what we've been able to do with that, looking at the James Webb Space Telescope and looking into deep space. That is a third line of operation.
That innovation line and the space exploration line are really our business, and the third line is supporting those other government departments.
Going to the financials of this, we have created the interdepartmental governance that is bringing all of these departments around the table and saying that the Space Agency will be invested in every one of these as we are in PCW. But in whose interests is this space solution and who wants to take the lead, not automatically assuming we are leading everything? When those other departments want us to roll in, we will roll in, but this kind of changes the dynamic from what has transpired in the past.
Senator Segal: What is the implication for that change in lead from time to time financially?
Gen. Natynczyk: You now have the other departments that can lay out their space requirements in their own investment plans. I found that when you get a spacecraft up, normally it produces information that is of use to many departments. So you have many champions supporting it, but we have to determine for every one project who wants to take the lead.
The Chair: Who pays for it?
Gen. Natynczyk: Yes, sir. That's exactly as the Honourable David Emerson put in his report as to how the projects should be paid for.
Senator Mitchell: Thank you, gentlemen. This is very interesting to somebody who shares your background. I'm not a rocket scientist, either, at least to that extent. I live in Edmonton. We are worried about missiles.
You mentioned that we will work with our international partners to determine the next steps in space exploration. Could you give us some insight into what those might be, what Canada's priorities might be and the next steps?
Gen. Natynczyk: The international space agencies kind of come together on the topic of space exploration, and they have created the International Space Exploration Coordination Group, ISECG, that meets together to map out where the consensus is in terms of moving forward into the future.
One of the challenges we have is how frail we are as human beings and our biosciences. That is why the International Space Station is so important — and you heard a lot about this with Chris Hadfield's successful command of the space station — in learning how we as human beings can endure long space flight. ISECG has laid out that the goal for around 2050 as an international body should be Mars. They are plotting the technology you need to get there.
In addition to human space flight going to Mars, you also have astronomy looking to deep space, so you know what's happening well beyond Mars. That is why you've heard about the significant investment in the James Webb Space Telescope that will replace the Hubble Space Telescope. It is extraordinarily powerful, and Canada has an important role. The pointing device that will point that telescope within one millionth of a degree was manufactured in Cambridge, Ontario. It is for looking for deep space, black holes — all of those things that Luc understands.
You have the lead with space exploration being astronomy. Right behind astronomy, you have robotics, and today there is a robot on Mars with a Canadian-built sensor. Basically, it is at the end of a robotic arm that goes on top of a rock and tells us on Earth what that rock is. It was extraordinary. A few weeks ago, at Guelph University, I was in a lab and there was a Canadian postgrad student on a global chat, describing where we will put the arm next, because we are partly controlling that technology.
It is robotics there determining the feasibility and the requirements of space flight, and then you have the human space flight moving up to the International Space Station and beyond.
Senator Mitchell: That is very interesting.
RADARSAT-2 will be replaced by RCM, which stands for RADARSAT Constellation Mission, as you know. There has been some delay in that, so there is a question of bridge funding possibly; there have been some reports. Could you comment on what the budget implications are for that?
Gen. Natynczyk: Right now, we are tracking that project on time. We have a fixed, firm price on the project with the prime contractor, which is MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates. I had the opportunity to go to one of their subcontractors in Winnipeg. I visited Magellan Aerospace and they are fabricating what they call a "bus," but it is the superstructure of the satellite. They are tracking. There are many "sub-subs," I guess, that are building components — many in Canada; some in Europe. They are tracking those right now.
I asked Luc, because they are tracking this, but my estimation is that we are on time and costs.
Mr. Brûlé: In terms of the RADARSAT program, our involvement was in the pre-purchase of data when we built the RADARSAT-2 mission. Since the launch of RADARSAT-2, we are drawing down on our credit. We are monitoring that closely. Right now, our predictions are that we will have enough credit to last until the RCM is launched and becomes operational.
Senator Wells: Thank you, gentlemen, for your presentation and for the answers to our questions so far.
I want to ask for your opinion — or maybe if there is some solid data out there — with respect to ballistic missile defence — and I recognize the relationship, or the non-relationship perhaps, that the Canadian Space Agency has with that.
I want to ask about the financial benefits — the industrial benefits — that would come from a program such as that. In your presentation, you said "positioning the private sector at the forefront of space activities." To a degree, this would be a space activity, certainly in technology and infrastructure.
Has the CSA done any work not so much related to ballistic missile defence but in the industrial benefits there might be around the installation of radars and things like that?
Gen. Natynczyk: One of the huge lessons I have learned over the past while is the exponential benefits of advanced space technology and its impact on the Canadian economy. People gave me the example of the Canadarm that went on the space shuttle. We built six of those. The first one was paid for by Canada. NASA bought the other five.
The technology developed from the Canadarm has morphed into other areas like the NeuroArm; you actually have a robotic arm developed by MacDonald, Dettwiler and a great physician in Calgary. It can do surgery on a person inside an MRI machine. It is extraordinary.
I know my predecessor was using as a benchmark for every dollar you put into space, you had an output of $10. I am trying to figure out if that is accurate. Where is the rigour to that? Every time I visit one of these companies across the country, whether in Montreal or Toronto or out in Winnipeg, I hear anecdotes of extraordinary stories of CSA investing in a technology and then the company selling a lot of the equipment.
I was in Sainte-Anne-de-Bellevue, and they hired a great young postgrad student out of the Université de Montréal who had an idea. The CSA gave this MDA in Sainte-Anne-de-Bellevue $150,000 for a direction antenna, and the company spun that into $75 million of sales of that antenna.
We are trying to put together the value proposition. We have the analytics, and over time we are trying to determine what the net value is of that initial investment. Until we have the analytics, I cannot give you a firm ratio, because it depends on the example. Robotics is one, satellite communications another, and so on.
Senator Wells: It is something like the Canadarm. It is the gift that keeps on giving to our economy, specifically. You mentioned the outreach and the benefits that these industrial projects create. And that is what they are; the mission to Mars is an industrial project. It is research, but it has benefits to the University of Guelph and many other universities and research institutes.
Something like ballistic missile defence, if Canada did embrace that with a supply of a site and service, can you talk a bit about the partnerships, which is another piece of your mandate — the development of partnerships — with universities and research institutes? How important is that to the foundation of building up an industrially beneficial project? I am thinking like BMD, but I will not say it specifically, because I know where the CSA sits.
Gen. Natynczyk: One of the key foundations for success is the partnerships, because the Space Agency does not conduct research and development at the Space Agency. People assume we're a bunch of rocket scientists and we study things. We don't do any research at all inside the Space Agency; we actually look out to those extraordinary technologies being developed in those 30 universities across the country — again, the 1,300 researchers in those institutions who are coming together in clusters where their studies and their focus meet with industry.
I was out at the University of Winnipeg, and we all think of the University of Winnipeg as being an arts university and those kinds of things. They have this extraordinary professor they hired named Ed Cloutis. He's a geography teacher, but he's also a planetary scientist. He has networked with faculty at York University and a few companies in Montreal doing planetary science. When Japan had a sample of an asteroid that they spent a huge amount of money to bring back to Earth, they offered it to the University of Winnipeg to look at it.
The Space Agency has enabled that cluster, and we enabled the clusters on satellite communications, robotics, Earth observation and so on, to bring these groups together and give them a bit of seed money. But also we are saying, "Listen, we need to make sure that they are leveraging all the other pots of money out there, like the Canadian Foundation for Innovation, CFI; the NSERC money; the SADI money." We need to ensure we are leveraging all these pots and bringing all these clusters together because that is where this innovation magic occurs.
Senator Wells: Good. Thank you very much.
Senator Day: Thank you, general and Mr. Brûlé.
You answered my first question. I wanted to get a feeling on where the innovation and inspiration were coming from. Presumably you have a number of people working to say that we would like to see something happening and help to bring a cluster together — as well as a cluster happening — and them knocking on your door for money. I would assume that is the way that would work.
Could you explain the first step in innovation? We talked a bit earlier about commercialization. Are these the people you have working away with you in Saint-Hubert and in other places, and talking about the fact that this could have a number of applications and we need to develop that into a commercial product? Are you doing some thinking on that, or are you just waiting for people to come to you as well?
Gen. Natynczyk: In February we had the first Canadian space stakeholder conference that brought about 120 people together representing most of the departments with space interests, and representatives from as many of those space companies as we could. I personally phoned and had teleconferences with the vice-presidents of research of universities from coast to coast, and then called those who missed out and invited the provinces and territories. We brought them all together to work exactly along this idea of how to stimulate that innovation. My homework assignment to everybody is that I need a family tree that has the Canadian Space Agency and going out to the planetary science, the astronomy, the satellite communications and Earth observation. Tell me about these clusters. The fact is that they are literally linking across the country between university institutions and companies that have like-minded interests and innovation. Really, it is these bright people who are getting together in the right kind of circumstances, learning from one another and having a eureka moment in terms of going ahead.
In terms of the opportunity, we have announcements of opportunity where we go out to people and say, "Listen, we will have a grouping of five microsatellites coming up. These microsatellites might be the size of a milk jug or microwave on your countertop, so they are pretty modest in size. What are the technologies you would like to have fly up there?" Then you have all of the responses come in. Also, NASA and the European Space Agency also have these announcements of opportunity going out, but like hockey scouts, everyone is out there scouting for technology because they know what is out there. They are looking for it and trying to get it into space. Again, it is matching those announcements of opportunity to these clusters in order to get these innovations into space.
Commercialization, going back to our space policy framework, is like one of the foundations here. After we have addressed the national interest of sovereignty, security, safety, we do want to position the commercial interests of this country in order to be successful. We look at ideas like that little Sainte-Anne-de-Bellevue satellite antenna for its commercial potential. If we invest in something, it is almost like being a venture capitalist; you want to make sure it takes off.
Mr. Brûlé: I want to expand on the process of communicating with industry and academia. We have several mechanisms to do this. It is either through the announcement of opportunities or through a request for proposals. Space projects take time. We need new ideas, so we have ways and means to work with industry and academia, fund their activities and studies, and through that process we generate all kinds of ideas — good ones and bad ones. We have processes, ways and means of prioritizing them. To move forward and continue the work from science development to technology development to the day where things will be flying in space is a rigorous process. It takes time and requires a lot of interaction with the people in universities and academia. That is a key function at the CSA.
Gen. Natynczyk: Can I add something? Again, part of the evolution of space is that it has been the practice where the only customer of spacecraft was government. What we are seeing in this evolution and normalization of technology are commercial customers. Commercial interests become the customers. That is where they are going in the United States. Think about the resupply to the International Space Station being commercialized to SpaceX, which is currently resupplying the space station and by the end of the decade might actually be carrying astronauts up there. It is a change of philosophy that you have commercial interests that are becoming the customer.
I have been approached several times about mining in space — That is, about the feasibility of going to an asteroid, going to the moon or to Mars and mining for rare minerals. Again, we know what meteorites or asteroids hit Earth, and perhaps some of those could have come from Mars. It is the idea that commercial interests become the new customer.
Senator Day: You mentioned David Emerson's paper that he generated on this a couple of times. I am assuming that is policy that has been adopted by the government.
I have not seen it, but I will now that you have made mention of it. In that outline or paper that was done, is there any discussion about the ownership of intellectual property with some advice that the government, for the money you are putting in through the Space Agency, should retain some of the patent rights and use those funds to generate new concepts and new ideas?
Gen. Natynczyk: Having read his two-volume, November 2012 report that he came out with, one volume focused on the aerospace sector and a second on the space sector. He listed eight recommendations in the space policy framework, and government responded to most of those recommendations. To my knowledge, intellectual property was not part of the recommendations, but we have a dedicated team inside the Canadian Space Agency who looked into the appropriate approach to the IP. Perhaps Mr. Brûlé wants to add more.
Mr. Brûlé: In the IP, we are governed by rules, by the PWGSC. We have principles that we need to obey. At the same time, we want to encourage industry in this process. Usually the rule is for the IP to be owned by industry with a licence given to us for our own needs. We also want industry to benefit from this, especially the Canadian industry, so that they can develop new products with this IP. That will serve not only the CSA but also other departments and industries within Canada and will help with the export permit. The golden rule is to try to leave the IP with industry because they are best equipped to nurture that IP and make it into better products. But at the same time we can protect our own rights so that we have access to this IP for our own operational needs.
Senator Beyak: Thank you very much, gentlemen. It is nice to see your enthusiasm. Each new generation is fascinated with space because it is cool, and you're very inspiring.
I wanted to ask you about the debris in space. You alluded to it earlier, and Major-General Day told us earlier that it is congested, contested and very competitive. Do we have a contingency plan in Canada should one of our communications satellites be hit by debris or collide unintentionally with our RADARSAT-2?
General Natynczyk: This was Luc's area of expertise for some time. Every satellite that we send up there has the ability to manoeuvre with a finite amount of fuel. It is a question of how long you expect that satellite to operate, how much fuel it has and how much you have to move.
Up to this point in time, we have been successful in redeploying our satellites. That is why you have to know where the debris is and exactly where our satellites are in order to move it. In the same way, the International Space Station, given its size, has to move on a regular basis.
Mr. Brûlé: This is becoming more and more a constant preoccupation by many of us. We do have a small operational centre at the CSA in Saint-Hubert, and we have a team monitoring the situation constantly. We do get regular reports from our colleagues in the U.S. about the situation of our satellites and also the orbiting debris that could come close to our own satellites.
For example, we have had to move RADARSAT-1 once in a while. We went through an orbit manoeuvre to have a collision avoidance approach to it. In the case of RADARSAT-2, it does occur once in a while where we work with our commercial partner, MDA, and we give them advice about whether or not they should move their satellite, depending on the trajectory of incoming debris. It does happen, but it is under control. We know where the debris is and we know when we have to move our satellite assets to avoid it.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: I would like to thank Mr. Brûlé and General Natynczyk. I have had an opportunity to visit the Canadian Space Agency's facilities on the south shore of Montreal and I was very impressed.
Senator Dallaire: You went there to watch football?
Senator Dagenais: No, I went to see the Canadian Space Agency; then I went to watch baseball.
[English]
Will you confirm that China is the principal party seeking to weaponize space? What are the implications of such actions for nations like Canada, with a significant investment and technology in space?
Gen. Natynczyk: From my perspective, the Canadian Space Agency is working to build partnerships with countries around the world.
I have attended various space conferences, and I have heard time and time again that it is not about competition; it is about cooperation. We are working closely with China and with countries around the world because you need to cooperate once you put something into orbit.
I am not a specialist on any country with their own space program. We work with their civil space agencies in sharing lessons learned and finding areas where we have common interest in science and technology.
Senator Dallaire: Marc Garneau brought a little cymbal into space that my dad had during World War II, and it took everything to get it there. Chris Hadfield ends up with a guitar. I am not sure how that was miniaturized. Both Marc and Chris Hadfield are also ex-cadets from RMC, just to throw that in.
I remember some NASA scientists coming to Canada to discuss the spacesuits being put into the dirty environment, that is to say for mining, firemen, military, exoskeletons, micro servos, microclimates and all that kind of stuff, to adapt it to a much more effective weapons platform.
Does that type of stuff exist, and are you into any leap-ahead research endeavours that you are generating or that somebody is generating that you are now pushing? I am not looking for the warp drive, but I would love to see that.
Gen. Natynczyk: I am not sure you actually want to know how the guitar got up there; if you wish, we could take that under advisement.
Senator Dallaire: No, that is okay.
Gen. Natynczyk: Again, we are going back to the commercialization aspect. We are trying to get the lessons learned from the International Space Station and turn that back to Canadian industry so that they can use the technologies in a host of fields.
I was thrilled to hear that we have this body shirt, this Astroskin shirt, which basically maintains awareness of your body systems, being able to be operated on the Antarctica expedition. One of our great astronauts David Saint-Jacques was participating in the monitoring of that. We could probably get back to you with regard to various projects that we are doing under life sciences, which is really the crux of your question.
I want to reinforce that what we do is take the technology and disseminate it to those industries and say, "Okay. What do you want to do with it?" At the same time, any of those industries are involved, whether it be in Houston at the Johnson Space Center or with us, looking for those technologies and how to commercialize them.
This goes back to the value of the space policy framework, saying that this is a key outcome or area of action that we want to achieve and facilitate Canadian companies to get a competitive edge in these areas.
Senator Dallaire: In these endeavours, what about leap-ahead pure research of what might be done? Do you have a pot specifically dedicated just to throw out there and try to see what is coming out?
Gen. Natynczyk: Yes, and that is called the Space Technologies Development Program. Again, part of the Honourable David Emerson report recommended increasing it, and government decided to increase it. It is currently about $10 million and growing to $20 million, specifically for those high-risk technology innovations.
Senator Segal: I will ask the general's advice in his present role to this very simple question: In your prior military role, you had knowledge of our national security issues and challenges, including our relationship with U.S. intelligence, United States Space Command and NORAD, such as they were, and you understood how that was impacted by the existing policy with respect to missile defence. You understood all that, some of which you could share with us, some of which you would not have been able to for reasons that relate to national security, which I respect.
In your civilian role, you have a different perspective. You have partners who have an interest in national security. Can you, yes or no, assure this committee, and through us the country, that the flow of information on a real-time basis between what your people are doing, what did happen in the Department of National Defence, and American colleagues is sufficient to ensure the optimum protection of our national security?
Gen. Natynczyk: I would say yes to that question.
Senator Day: I am trying to understand the relationship between Defence research and development and the Canadian Space Agency. If a government-level policy decision was made that Canada would start participating in the missile defence — and there is a lot of research and development that is going on — would you say, "Well, with our mandate, as we only look at peace in space, we'll have to give that to somebody else?"
Would it go to Defence research and development?
Gen. Natynczyk: I would say, again, that it goes to the departments that are responsible. The Space Agency has a mandate that is focused on civil space and safety. Because your question is really along security lines, my expectation is that it's a mandate that would not be given to the Space Agency.
Senator Day: Thank you. That's it.
The Chair: I would like to take the prerogative of the chair here and ask a question going back to Polarsat since I'm one of the senators from the North. Senator Segal did ask a number of questions, which you responded to, but I would like to ask a question with respect to the call that's been put out by the CSA. When do you expect a decision to be made with respect to the actual decision to go ahead with Polarsat?
Gen. Natynczyk: Mr. Chair, thanks for the question. My understanding is that Defence has the lead on this issue, supported by Environment Canada, supported by the Space Agency. Last fall, Public Works, also a partner in this endeavour, put out a request for information. My understanding is that about 21 companies have responded to that request for information and that it is a team of all those entities doing an evaluation of those requests for information led by Public Works. I'm not sure of the date that they are going to go out with it.
Mr. Brûlé: Without being able to go into the details, we can say that there was a lot of interest out there concerning this request for information, and a lot of novel ideas are being proposed. So the actual analysis is ongoing, and we have an interdepartmental team looking at the details. They are finalizing their report. Very soon, within the government, there will be a process for looking at their recommendations and moving forward with the program.
The Chair: Just to conclude this — and this would be a yes or no now that I've learned from Senator Segal — we can expect a decision sometime in the year?
Gen. Natynczyk: This is a request for information, so I think that what will occur this year is a basically a report on these novel ideas that have come out. There is not yet a request for a proposal.
The Chair: So we're saying next year, maybe.
Colleague, it's 4:30, and we have another panel coming forward. I would like to thank our witnesses for coming here today. It has been very informative. It sounds, general, like you have not retired. You just have the best job in the country based on the way you've described it in the last hour. We appreciate your taking it on and taking it on with the enthusiasm that you had when you were with the Armed Forces. Thank you for coming.
For our fourth panel today, we will continue our examination of the Canada Border Services Agency. Colleagues, on December 12, 2013, the Senate adopted the following study reference:
That the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence be authorized to examine and report on the policies, practices, and collaborative efforts of Canada Border Services Agency in determining admissibility to Canada and removal of inadmissible individuals; and
That the Committee report to the Senate no later than December 31, 2014, and that it retain all powers necessary to publicize its findings until 90 after the tabling of the final report.
We are pleased to have with us, on the final panel of the day, someone who is no stranger to our committee, Ms. Chantal Bernier, the Privacy Commissioner of Canada. Accompanying her is Mr. Christopher Prince, Strategic Policy Analyst.
Welcome back to the committee. Allow me to say that we were very impressed by your recent appearance before us, and we look forward to your comments today. I understand you have an opening statement. We have one hour for the panel. Please begin.
[Translation]
Chantal Bernier, Acting Privacy Commissioner, Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada: Good evening, Mr. Chair and members of the committee and thank you for your invitation. Joining me today is Christopher Prince, our policy lead on the border file.
Let me begin by saying your study is timely. As you have heard from previous witnesses, the changes underway in border security are vast and their privacy implications far-reaching.
In my time today, I will focus specifically on the data protection and sharing challenges — as these aspects implicate privacy rights of Canadians and non-Canadians alike.
[English]
As this committee is well aware, the 2011 Beyond the Border declaration and the 2012 perimeter security work plan have a great many moving parts, each progressing on separate tracks. Bearing this in mind, the governments of both Canada and the U.S. had the foresight to acknowledge and codify privacy as a major concern from the outset. That is why the two governments established 12 joint privacy principles to be observed as each perimeter security initiative is developed. Among other things, these principles seek to require that organizations limit use and disclosure of personal information, ensure the public is fully informed and verify that information collected and shared is up to date and accurate.
We welcome these principles. However, we have expressed some concerns with the shape of substantive protections accorded under these principles. For example, we had hoped greater control would have been exerted to restrict onward transfer of data to third countries. Ideally, a legal right for the originating country to refuse transfer of personal information would have been an important failsafe.
For our part, over the past three years, we have expended considerable effort examining privacy risks connected with border security. In our communications with CBSA and other agencies, we have flagged concerns touching on the widening scope of sensitive personal information being collected, the expanding uses and sharing of this information with authorities, the need for clear complaint and redress mechanisms and retention periods for sensitive personal information that would have to be justified.
[Translation]
Ultimately, choices at the program level of departments only go so far. And this is why in January we also recommended legal reform in our special report to Parliament, Checks and Controls.
To offer adequate protection in a modern information-sharing environment, Canada needs a modernized federal Privacy Act, so that departments clearly demonstrate the necessity for collecting personal information, Privacy Impact Assessments are required prior to implementing new programs, and finally, provisions for exchange of personal information with foreign authorities are tightened.
This last point is particularly significant to your current study; simply put, federal agencies must exercise great care in sharing personal information with foreign counterparts. They also must ensure the veracity of any such information.
Finally, we firmly believe agreements and rules for cooperation between domestic and foreign agencies must be as clear as possible beforehand and where practical put in writing.
In closing now, each issue I have raised reflects the scope and reach of significant changes to Canada's border security policy and they will be important for this committee to consider.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you very much. It was a very brief but very informative position that you've put forward. I will lead off with one question: In your presentation, in your third last paragraph you state this last point is particularly significant to your current study. Simply put, federal agencies must exercise great care in sharing personal information with foreign counterparts. You also say you firmly believe agreements and rules for cooperation between domestic and foreign agencies must be as clear as possible beforehand and, where practical, put in writing.
That is fairly clear, concise and to the point. I would ask you, in respect to your discussions with the various departments involved and specifically the CBSA, how has this particular recommendation been met by them, and are they making any changes in that direction?
Ms. Bernier: At the moment, we have approached the Beyond the Border security initiatives by ourselves coordinating our review. We have, for example, 15 privacy impact assessments before us, 11 on which we have already made recommendations. To answer your question about how we are working with CBSA on that, first of all, we have regular meetings with them in addition to specific meetings on the various initiatives that are the object of a privacy impact assessment, and within each of these initiatives the privacy impact assessment that we review is the framework for us to address, among other things, how information will be shared.
The Chair: Has it been positive?
Ms. Bernier: It has been positive. For example, we have made recommendations on redress mechanisms that have been heard. We have made recommendations on retention periods that have led to a reduction of the retention periods. We are generally satisfied in relation to improvements that CBSA has made in their frequency to contact us and in the advance notice we get. Definitely, we have seen progress in that regard.
[Translation]
Senator Dallaire: You painted different pictures for us in your remarks than you did the last time you appeared before the committee; you were certainly not as optimistic then. I see you as the office responsible for preserving our individual freedoms; that means not just our privacy but also our freedoms within society. These apply when we cross borders and they guarantee our security when others cross our border.
That said, I am still not convinced that, in this complex era of information sharing, rapid changes and concerns about security, your office has the basic power to impose methods; you recommend but you do not impose. How can these things be imposed? It seems to me that the system is evolving every which way and that our individual freedoms are increasingly under threat.
Ms. Bernier: I quite agree with you on a number of points. First, you portray the right to privacy as a fundamental freedom and you are right. That is where fundamental freedoms are preserved. You also rightly express a frustration that I share: it is true that we can only make recommendations. So how can we be as effective as possible? To begin with, it was on our own initiative that we prepared the special report presented on January 28. We wanted to contribute as much as possible to informing the debate on these issues where this genuine transformation is underway.
We can no longer talk about privacy protection in this era of cybersurveillance the way we did before. We are trying to have a greater impact by taking initiatives of this type, by informing Canadians by taking this opportunity to come and inform you and give you the information you need to have oversight where these issues are concerned.
In our January 28 report, as you know, we recommended that Parliament hold a specific debate on the need to protect fundamental freedoms in the era of Internet surveillance and how to go about that. It is true that our power is limited to making recommendations with respect to privacy impact assessments. However, through the involvement of Parliament and Canadians, we are able to exercise influence that often leads to our recommendations being implemented.
Senator Dallaire: The government increasingly delegates certain responsibilities to contractors that used to be carried out by departments. That makes it easier for you to target problems. If contractors do not comply with needs, who is responsible? The contractor or the minister? We are talking here about important personal information such as visas, and this relates to our study. How can you be sure that these contractors will properly apply the rules?
Ms. Bernier: This is one of the concerns that we expressed. The simple fact of calling on a contractor adds complexity to the protection of personal information. According to a Treasury Board of Canada directive, all government contractors are subject to the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act. They are subject to the same level of protection, to the same obligation to protect as the departments that award the contract.
That having been said, when services are decentralized, to the extent that we deal with subcontractors, a level of complexity is added to the governance structure for the protection of personal information, and this complexity must be taken into account in the creation of a governance framework that properly protects personal information in that relationship.
Senator Dallaire: We could be one among many other clients of this subcontractor who could divulge information.
Ms. Bernier: Exactly. That is one of the precautions that must be taken. If there is a subcontractor, the government must ensure that its contractors, its organizations and its private agencies have all the necessary measures to protect personal information at the same level that is imposed on the department.
Senator Dallaire: To the lowest bidder.
[English]
Senator Segal: I'd like to make a very short comment and get your reflection on it. The comment is not necessarily a view with which I agree but it's one that I've heard.
The paranoia around keeping bad people out and the protective guardian mindset of the hard-working people in the CBSA produce on occasion, perhaps more frequently than we would like to see, a notion where the privacy of someone arriving in Canada, the right to be presumed innocent, their right to have their basic information protected, the nature of the officer deciding that he or she has more discretion in the particular secondary interrogation that takes place than might be provided for under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms — these incidents are on the increase, producing a kind jagged edge to what has been, in fact, a country that has a long history of receiving many new arrivals and that has been built through the generosity of that history.
I put this to you and to your colleague: Would you view that as a fair statement of where we are today as an arch? Is it unfair? Is it unreflective? I would be interested in your judgment on that.
Ms. Bernier: I don't have statistics at all as to whether CBSA is applying its laws differently now, but I certainly would agree that the tension between security and privacy has heightened in the past few years.
What I answer to that in relation to how to apply privacy at the border is that the right to privacy is fundamental, whether you are at the border or at home. However, the legitimacy of privacy intrusion being determined by external factors in relation to the need, for example, to intrude upon privacy, in relation to the effectiveness of the intrusion in relation to that need, that public safety objective, the proportionality of the intrusion with the objective and the absence of an alternative, all this will apply differently according to circumstances. So one person who goes to the border has, by law — in Canada it has been stated in case law — a reduced expectation of privacy, but the same right to privacy in the sense that any intrusion upon that privacy must be justified according to the same test of legitimacy that I have just spelled out.
Senator Segal: You say you do not have statistics. If the Privacy Commissioner does not have statistics, to whom can Canadians look who might have statistics, so that the Privacy Commissioner can render a judgment on these issues in defence of the privacy of our citizens?
Ms. Bernier: My answer reflected the fact that there may be privacy intrusions at the border that are never reported, for example, by people who are taken aside for a secondary search that may not be warranted and they wouldn't know to exercise any redress — that I don't know. What we have as statistics at the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada is the number of investigations we have.
There are some that we publish every year. We have our statistics in relation to CBSA. Those are those statistics about the people who have chosen to complain to us.
Senator Segal: What is the trend line of those?
Ms. Bernier: I would not be able to tell you the trend line right now, but I'd be happy to get back to you on that to see how it is playing out.
Senator Mitchell: Thank you for being with us, Ms. Bernier.
I'm quite struck by two statements in your opening comments in the context of the relationship between Canada and the U.S. in the sharing of information, and they were quite startling, and I would assume you meant them to be. I am quoting you: "For example, we had hoped greater control would have been exerted to restrict onward transfer of data to third countries." Then you go on to say, "Ideally, a legal right for the originating country to refuse transfer of personal information would have been an important failsafe."
In the context of a case that may not have been reported properly where the woman who had a 911 call for an alleged suicide and eventually couldn't get into the U.S., can you elaborate on these two statements? This is startling to me.
Ms. Bernier: You are honing in on perhaps my biggest concern.
First, I will address the issue in the investigation in the case that you are talking about. I will say no more than the fact that we are currently investigating. I can't tell you any more, but we will make the findings public. You will have our full results in that regard. It is complex, because being federal jurisdiction, there is a web of agencies involved, so it will take a few months, but we are investigating.
By the way, I should say that I have full respect for our negotiators, who negotiated with the U.S. and obtained the best they could, so I'm not blaming them at all. However, when we saw the list of 12 joint principles, my biggest disappointment was that one. I would have liked Canada to have retained sovereignty on the personal information that it holds. I would have liked Canada to have been enabled to impede the U.S. from sharing personal information with a third country if Canada felt that that third country had, as MP O'Connor said in his commission of inquiry, "dubious human rights records."
Senator Mitchell: So the real implication is that we could refuse to give information to the United States, but we can't then restrict them from giving that information to a third country. It is as easy as that. But what would drive us to give information to the United States that they might be inclined to share?
Ms. Bernier: What is being worked on is an integration of personal information. The two countries will integrate in relation to immigration controls, law enforcement and national security protection. Inherent to that is the sharing of personal information.
I would have liked there to have been a provision whereby Canada could have impeded the U.S. from sharing that information to which they have access, because that is the purpose of the security perimeter — that we could have impeded the U.S. from transferring that to a third country. Unfortunately, that is not part of the joint privacy principles.
Senator Mitchell: Would it be possible for me to ask one quick question?
The Chair: Very quick.
Senator Mitchell: Has any action been taken right now to write legislation that would cover the issues you have specified under your call-for-reform section?
Ms. Bernier: These are reflected more in privacy impact assessments. The 12 privacy principles are non-binding. The other concerns you have heard about we make through our privacy impact assessment; it is through programs.
Senator Mitchell: So this legislation is not being put into place just yet?
Ms. Bernier: No. For example, all the issues that you have — the widening scope of sensitive personal information being collected — those are all concerns that we expressed in the development of the initiatives.
The Chair: I have a little latitude here and I do want to keep things structured, so I will keep everyone to two questions, if I could.
Senator Mitchell: My preamble was so short I thought I had earned another question.
Senator Wells: Thank you, Ms. Bernier. Welcome back.
I want to follow up on Senator Mitchell's line of questioning with respect to the land-based Canada-United States entry-exit initiative, which I think is coming into force in June.
But in a more general tone, in your presentation you said, "The rules for cooperation between domestic and foreign agencies must be as clear as possible beforehand and, where practical, put in writing." It seems we have no issue when we have an agreement to provide information. Once it is out of our hands and in the hands of someone else, in this case the United States, we have less control or perhaps no control even if the rules are agreed to in writing.
Can you give us some comfort that writing something down will give us some comfort?
Ms. Bernier: It depends on what's written. That is how we would have liked the 12 privacy principles to be worded differently. We would have liked them to have stated, in writing, that there would not be a transfer to a third country if the originating country had an objection.
Senator Wells: You mentioned earlier in relation to a more general topic that you have confidence in Canada's negotiators. Would that not be a go-or-no-go position in your principles? If you were negotiating, would that be a go-or-no-go condition? It seems fairly fundamental.
Ms. Bernier: Yes. When we discussed it with the negotiators, they pointed out, rightly so, that the 12 privacy principles were still an improvement to what exists now, and I agree with that; they are absolutely right.
I don't think it would be fair for me to judge how they could have obtained or how I could have obtained a better version of the 12 principles without having been there myself. The fact is that this is a negotiation with the United States. Clearly, what we are going to get will be the product of a compromise, and that is probably what happened under that caption.
The Chair: If I could, I want to follow up on Senator Wells' question. How does our agreement compare to other agreements that the United States has with, say, Australia, New Zealand and the U.K.? Do we have a better agreement, or do we have the same agreement?
Ms. Bernier: This is a perimeter security agreement. They don't have perimeter security agreements with those states.
The Chair: But don't they have agreements with those other states with respect to the sharing of intelligence and information, and, thus, it would be the same principles that are in this particular agreement?
Ms. Bernier: These 12 principles have been developed for this specific perimeter security action plan.
Senator Day: I have a question with respect to change of name. There was some news coverage this morning on that which I thought was quite interesting. I guess the change-of-name legislation is primarily provincial, but if someone changes her or his name and that person, prior to changing his or her name, had been involved in a criminal prosecution and was convicted, do you have a position on whether that information should be under the person's new name, that the criminal conviction should be connected to the person and that people should be advised in the community that there is somebody with a conviction to be aware of, who may put your children in jeopardy?
You understand where I am getting with certain convictions. I will let you go ahead.
Ms. Bernier: The Criminal Code provides for notification of the public in certain cases where it is necessary. Provisions exist in the Criminal Code for disclosure — provisions, for example, on allowing public notification. There are provisions regarding the Corrections and Conditional Release Act on parole or what you can get, what we call a pardon — it is not really a pardon but a sealing of the criminal file or record after a certain number of years as a law-abiding citizen, et cetera. All of this applies in the same fashion if a person changed his or her name. Obviously I would expect that all of the paperwork would make sure that there is a proper continuum of law in between to respect the application of criminal law to that individual, as it should.
Senator Day: The person is changing the name. The article this morning in the media was about people changing their name and coming across the border. They were convicted in some other place under a different name; they get a name change and come into the country with a new name and start a new life.
If you learn about that, can the person say that privacy legislation requires you not to publish this, or are you actively watching out for this kind of thing that is taking place?
Ms. Bernier: Privacy can never be a screen for criminality or for escaping proper application of criminal law.
Senator Day: You are satisfied that there are sufficient laws and regulations to ensure this is not being abused?
Ms. Bernier: That would be more of a law enforcement question than a privacy question; I would really pose that to law enforcement officers to see whether aliases are properly reflected and whether information is properly shared between law enforcement agencies. Certainly we have seen tragic cases in Canada that have resulted from lack of sharing of information between police services. Privacy cannot be held as proper justification for not implementing criminal law as it should be implemented.
Senator White: Thank you very much for your presentation today.
I will be a little unfair, actually, because I will take you back to 2004-05 in your previous role as assistant deputy minister at Public Safety. When you talk about absence of clear complaint and redress mechanisms, we have seen CBSA's mandate expand much more toward a police model than it was in the 2004 time.
Do you have an idea of what that model would look like? Are you thinking about emulating what the RCMP has, or a mix, or even using the same agency?
Ms. Bernier: That is an excellent question. It is one of the questions we actually put to Parliament in our report of January 28. Many suggestions have been made. You will recall that Justice O'Connor made specific recommendations in his report where he wanted to see a special agency overseeing CBSA because he felt that the powers of the CBSA had grown, as you have just mentioned, so much that it warranted a specific oversight for them.
The report we submitted to you on January 28 leaves the door open in that we felt the issue was bigger than privacy. There were also the issues of protection of the life of people, protection against discrimination. However, the question is fair as to whether we have the oversight system we need for the current reality of information sharing and governance framework for national security. The question you raise is exactly the kind of question we would like to see debated more fully in Parliament to get some concrete, definite answers.
Senator White: Leading into that, my second question is this: Do you think we have come to a point in Canada in 2014 where we should migrate to one agency? We talk about joint force operations, but the truth is you can almost not discern between border service agencies — I realize they do other things but so do most police agencies — from each other and our federal police agency. Would one agency satisfy, I guess in your case, your department?
Ms. Bernier: Again, in our January 28 report, what we favour would be rather than constitute a new agency, build better bridges between the existing oversight mechanisms. We would like to be able to cooperate with other regulators. We would like to cooperate with SIRC as well as with the CSEC commissioner. The commissioner of CSEC and SIRC have also made the same recommendations; they would like to have bridges between them to ensure that they exercise oversight in an integrated fashion.
That is where I feel we should first look.
Senator White: Thank you very much.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: Thank you, Ms. Bernier. Listen, I might be a little bit redundant. You have explained very well that one of the jobs of border services is to respect privacy and principles. However, how are you able to verify if the border services agencies of the United States and Canada, which must exchange information, do so while respecting the principle of privacy? We have no authority over the American border services, but we are aware that the two services constantly exchange information.
Ms. Bernier: Absolutely. This is the complexity created by the security perimeter agreement: we transmit personal information to a state that, on the one hand, is outside of our monitoring mechanisms because we have no authority over the United States, and that has, on the other hand, different laws concerning the protection of personal information.
To give you what is maybe the most patent example, the United States do not have a privacy commissioner. They have not established an independent authority to review the protection of personal information within the American government. They have privacy administrators within their departments, but they do not have an independent organization. They created the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, which has some independence, but which still resides within the White House. This organization had the courage recently to criticize American surveillance practices, but its mandate is much narrower in scope than that of our office. This is the first example of the differences that distinguish Canadian and American laws and approaches.
[English]
Senator Beyak: I have one question as well. Thank you, Ms. Bernier, for coming here. Would you able to share with the committee what happens to the information that is collected from someone who comes as a temporary resident and then becomes a Canadian citizen?
Ms. Bernier: If you don't mind, I think that question really should be put to CBSA and Citizenship and Immigration Canada because they are the ones who oversee that process. I think they are better to answer that.
Senator Mitchell: I may have confused the two, but in your presentation you have a section called "a call for reform" where you say we need to modernize the Privacy Act. I think that modernization applies to more than just things that would affect the specific topic. With the approval of the chair, I would like to ask you quickly if there is any legislation right now being drafted to cover the three or four specific bullet points that you are making that should be incorporated into a modernized Privacy Act?
Ms. Bernier: Not to my knowledge.
Senator Mitchell: Thank you.
The Chair: Do you have any follow up questions?
Senator Mitchell: Yes. This whole question of oversight is an issue with the RCMP. Most major police forces across the country have public, independent, arm's-length from political and police force oversight. I mean "oversight" in the sense of actual managerial supervision, hiring, budgeting, policy direction. The RCMP doesn't have it. I think it would be a great thing and that it should have it. Are we at the point that the CBSA, with the kinds of issues that it is facing, which are so critical to civil society, needs to have a public oversight board to review issues within your competence, of course, like privacy?
Ms. Bernier: As I mentioned to Senator White, that is certainly a question that should be carefully considered. There are many options. One option would be to have a specific oversight function for the CBSA. It is a recommendation that has been made in the past and is certainly very valid.
There are other options. Other options are to reinforce the existing oversight mechanisms. We have jurisdiction over the CBSA for the protection of privacy and we certainly exercise it, but when we consider the powers of the CBSA, the question naturally arises as to whether there is the proper level of oversight considering that level of power. That question should be addressed.
Senator Mitchell: I am talking about something different from what you are talking about. I am talking about public, arm's-length outside of government, like a police commission —
Senator White: A board of governance.
Ms. Bernier: Well, that would be one of the options that could be considered. It is far broader than a privacy issue. Obviously it is a machine-of-government issue. It is also an issue where the Canadian Human Rights Commission would want to weigh in, in relation to discrimination. I certainly see a lot of players who would want to express an opinion.
Certainly, I think the question is fair because of the inherent privacy implications of where we are going in relation to border security.
Senator Beyak: This is a supplementary to what I asked before. As the Privacy Commissioner, I assumed you knew the answer to that but that out of respect to the CBSA you would rather I put it to them. I am curious because so many people ask me.
Ms. Bernier: The thing is that the process you are talking about changes frequently. I was at Immigration for two years, many years ago, and I then was special adviser to the chairperson of the Immigration and Refugee Board, and by then the rules changed again. To make sure that you have the most up-to-date information, that is why I think the answer should come from them.
Senator Segal: In the context of your role as an officer of Parliament — and you have a broad purview of trends, not only in the legislation we are discussing today, CBSA, but things like Bill S-4 and lawful access, et cetera — I think Canadians appreciate the diligence in your reports on specific issues. As is often the case with the Auditor General and others, people want to get a general sense of their view about whether the trend, for example, in the financial control of taxpayers' dollars is heading in the right direction.
I would be very interested in your view as to whether the concern about terrorism, lawful access and the transmission of criminal intelligence information is proceeding apace with our cyberworld where you have a view as to where we are on the broad issue of protecting Canadians' privacy.
Ms. Bernier: Absolutely. That was the premise of our report of January 28. If you look at that report, you will see that we speak about the trends, how the national security environment is changing and how these changes are relevant to the protection of privacy. Then we make our recommendations.
You are right. There are clear changes in relation to the types of threats as well as in relation to the surveillance capacity that have a direct impact on how we protect privacy. We must take the measures that are commensurate to that. That means modernizing the current regime.
Senator Segal: So you are not going to give us a specific view as to how well you think things are going on the privacy front? I read the report; it is superb. But it makes a transition that because of all these changes we now have to consider a new series of issues.
If I may say so, with respect, you go from an analysis of various issues to a prescription going forward. I am looking for your opinion as to what is happening to privacy in this country to the extent that government is involved.
Ms. Bernier: I see several trends. One trend I observe is heightened awareness among both Canadians and public officials in relation to privacy. The heightened awareness from Canadians is apparent from the increase in complaints to our office.
The increase in awareness among public officials is observed in the increase in the notification of breaches, the increase in privacy impact assessment reviews, as well as an increase in implementation of our recommendations. That is the positive side.
I detect the same concern in your question: There is a pace of development of surveillance capacity and practices that is rapid and consequential, and it must be met with the same rapid, consequential legislative movement.
[Translation]
Senator Dallaire: All the same, I am still worried. England entrusted part of its immigration branch to subcontractors. The company then lost several files and the information was released.
When Treasury Board established standards for companies under contract, were you consulted, given that you are to some extent the watchdogs in this area? Or, were you called afterwards to verify if these standards contained any deficiencies? The system might already have started and people might be caught up in it.
Ms. Bernier: Yes, we work closely with Treasury Board. We consider this directive to be very timely. Obviously, everything depends on how it is implemented. The directive clearly states what it must communicate; that the department that hires a contractor must ensure that, in the contract, the contractor's obligation to respect personal information protection standards, which are incumbent on the department itself, is clearly stated.
Where we really have to evaluate protection is in the implementation. For example, have risk evaluations been adequately carried out? Have the repercussions on privacy been adequately evaluated? What protective measures have been taken? This is done in the framework of an evaluation of factors relative to privacy, which we review. This is where I come back to your question. We make recommendations and we hope that they will be respected.
Imagine a scenario where a contractor does not respect the obligations and there is an incident, an intrusion or an improper use of information. The department will be blamed because it remains responsible for the protection of the personal information that is has provided to a contractor.
Senator Dallaire: It is one thing to say that the department is blamed. I have yet to see a minister be fired. We are correctly looking at a very important issue. At the borders, we are trying to build fortress North America.
Can you tell us if the department responsible has the necessary tools to carry out the evaluation of subcontractors that you mentioned; that it does the follow up, that an evaluation and a validation are done? Is the department really able to get into the inner workings of the company to ensure that this information does not disappear? Does that exist in this particular department?
Ms. Bernier: Without being complacent, it is important for me to remain very critical at all times to properly protect Canadians. At the same time, I have to say that I am reassured by the intensity of our collaboration with the departments. In other words, I see that these departments are truly preoccupied with ensuring the protection of personal information, with producing evaluation of privacy factors in timely fashion — I mentioned earlier, for example, that there has been an improvement in this area — and detailed evaluation. We have created guides to help them do this. I have to say that, indeed, we have seen a good effort in this area.
To date, as I said, we are staying on guard, we remain critical. However, the signs are encouraging when it comes to the discipline that we have seen in this area.
[English]
The Chair: Ms. Bernier, could you update us on your study on metadata and the consequences of the hearings that we had earlier in the year with the intelligence community?
Ms. Bernier: Certainly. Obviously the events of January, you will recall that we tabled our report, and then a few days later there were revelations that implied the use of metadata. The public officials responsible for that appeared, and we decided to undertake an analysis of the status of metadata in privacy law in Canada. That study is under way.
The first part describes what metadata is to make the proper distinctions, and then having made those proper distinctions in terms of types of metadata, we will do a legal assessment of what the protections are of that data under privacy law, trying to put some framework, some structure around the whole question as to what protection should be afforded to metadata.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Ms. Bernier and Mr. Prince. I really appreciate your coming. We are going to be calling upon you in the very near future in view of your comments on the last question. We look forward to your reports. The meeting is adjourned.
(The committee adjourned.)