Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
National Security and Defence
Issue 8 - Evidence - Meeting of June 2, 2014
OTTAWA, Monday, June 2, 2014
The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence met this day at 1 p.m. to study the status of Canada's international security and defence relations including, but not limited to, relations with the United States, NATO and NORAD (topic: ballistic missile defence).
Senator Daniel Lang (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: Welcome to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence for Monday, June 2, 2014. Before we welcome our witness, I would like to begin by introducing the people around the table. My name is Dan Lang, senator for Yukon. On my immediate left is the clerk of the committee, Jose Thérien; on my right is our Library of Parliament analyst assigned to the committee, Holly Porteous. I would like to go around the table and invite the senators to introduce themselves and state the region they represent.
Senator Mitchell: Grant Mitchell, senator for Alberta.
Senator Campbell: Larry Campbell, senator for British Columbia.
[Translation]
Senator Ringuette: Pierrette Ringuette from New Brunswick.
[English]
Senator Segal: Hugh Segal, Kingston-Frontenac-Leeds, Ontario.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: Jean-Guy Dagenais from Quebec.
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Senator White: Vern White from Ontario.
Senator Beyak: Lynn Beyak from the Land of Lakes in northwestern Ontario.
Senator Wells: David Wells from Newfoundland and Labrador.
The Chair: We will be meeting for one hour this afternoon on ballistic missile defence. I want to inform the committee about Commissioner Paulson. Due to his extensive travel, he's had to cancel his appearance here today. I have taken the prerogative to extend an invitation to the commissioner to join us later this month, on either June 9 or June 16, as part of our review of the RCMP, and I trust he will be available to attend one of those dates.
Colleagues, on December 12, 2013, the Senate adopted the following reference:
That the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence be authorized to examine and report on the status of Canada's international security and defence relations, including but not limited, to relations with the United States, NATO, and NORAD; and
That the Committee report to the Senate no later than December 31, 2014, and that it retain all powers necessary to publicize its finding until 90 days after the tabling of the final report.
As we continue our look at ballistic missile defence, we are very pleased to welcome Lieutenant-General J.A.J. Parent, Deputy Commander, North American Aerospace Defence Command.
After serving as an air cadet, General Parent enrolled in the Canadian Forces in 1979 to study at the Royal Military College in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu. Commissioned in 1984, he completed pilot training in 1985. Prior to his current assignment, he was commander of 1 Canadian Air Division and Canadian NORAD Region, responsible for the generation and employment of the operational arm of the Royal Canadian Air Force. General Parent has a bachelor's degree in business administration. He earned a master's degree in strategic studies from the U.S. Air Force Air War College Air University. He is also a graduate of the Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College. Upon promotion to lieutenant-general, General Parent assumed the appointment of NORAD Deputy Commander and Commander Canadian NORAD staff on September 4, 2012.
Lieutenant-General Parent, welcome. I want to express formally the committee's thanks to you and to General Charles Jacoby for your kind hospitality during our visit to Colorado Springs and for the informative two days of briefing.
I understand you have an opening statement, so if you would like to begin, we have one hour for this panel. Thank you.
Lieutenant-General Alain Parent, Deputy Commander, North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD): Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today. Before I begin, I would like to extend greetings from your NORAD commander, General Chuck Jacoby. General Jacoby was honoured by your visit to NORAD and USNORTHCOM headquarters and would be pleased to host you again should you have the opportunity to return.
At the outset, I would be remiss if I did not share with you how fortunate and humbled I feel to have been selected to represent our great country as NORAD Deputy Commander. As such, I'd like to begin by reminding the committee that, by agreement, NORAD has three missions: aerospace warning, aerospace control and maritime warning. Since it is the newest, I'd like to begin with maritime warning.
Maritime warning consists of processing, assessing and disseminating intelligence and information related to the respective maritime areas and internal waterways and approaches to the U.S. and Canada. It was added as a mission in 2006, and NORAD issued its first maritime advisory in 2010. Since then, maritime warning has grown to provide 14 advisories in 2013, with four more in 2014 so far. From a defence perspective, a maritime concern can become an aerospace warning and an air defence issue rather quickly. While barriers still exist, especially with regard to information sharing, maritime warning is a tremendous example of how the two nations came to an understanding of the mission gap and agreed that it could be resolved using the proven cooperative mechanisms established under NORAD.
Aerospace warning consists of processing, assessing and disseminating intelligence and information related to manmade objects in space and the detection, validation and warning of attack against North America, whether by aircraft, missiles or space vehicles. From a broad perspective, we are concerned about multiplying and proliferating advanced cruise missiles, various types of ballistic missiles and low, slow-flying threats such as unmanned aerial vehicles. All represent serious challenges that test the limits of our warning systems. Ultimately, providing unambiguous warning of threats and maintaining the reliable means to communicate this warning are the hallmark of NORAD, and we must continue to ensure that our systems remain relevant and capable.
Rounding out our mission set is aerospace control, which consists of providing surveillance and exercising operational control of the air space of the U.S. and Canada. Critical to this mission is our continued effort to sustain the readiness of our forces.
Our current defence capabilities absolutely rely on well-trained crews and equally well-equipped and maintained aircraft. Additionally, as our understanding of the capabilities of potential adversaries comes into focus, we will require aerospace defence systems capable of tracking and engaging long-range aircraft, low observable cruise missiles and even UAVs. We will not be able to outpace emerging threats without evolving and adapting to meet these challenges.
Over the past 18 months, NORAD has been tracking a variety of changes from both state and non-state actors that could challenge the concepts and constructs of defence that were put in place, for the most part, in the last century. I must be absolutely clear on this point. I am not trying to sound the alarm. However, the 9/11 commission chastised NORAD when it reported:
We recognize that a costly change in NORAD's defence posture to deal with the danger of suicide hijackers, before such a threat had ever actually been realized, would have been a tough sell. But NORAD did not canvass available intelligence and try to make the case.
In light of the changes that are occurring, we are now working to make a case for how NORAD should evolve to meet the requirements of the 21st century. Threats to our national security are becoming more diffuse and less attributable, and North America is increasingly vulnerable to an array of evolving threats — state or non-state, traditional or asymmetric, across all the domains of air, land, sea, space and cyberspace.
Furthermore, regional conflicts can rapidly expand to have global implications and expand to impact the homeland. For example, as conditions in Syria worsened, we were concerned about the possibility of cyberattacks on North America.
I will now take a moment to highlight some of the significant changes that are under way. Since the fall of 2011, we have seen a significant transformation in Russian military doctrine, operations, tactics and procedures. They are fielding more precise and capable air- and sea-launched cruise missiles, participating in longer sea deployments and more complex exercises — especially in the Far North — and have undertaken broad modernization programs in all major weapons systems to include submarine-launched ballistic missiles, SLBMs, and intercontinental ballistic missiles, ICBMs. They have increased the frequency of strategic force exercises, and they annexed Crimea. While some of the elements of the old Soviet model apply, it's clear that Russia is working to make a break from the past regarding its military capabilities. We believe Russia is pursuing a new doctrine that draws on the strategic use of precise weapons to achieve strategic effects.
Meanwhile, China continues its broad modernization programs in both tactical and strategic weapons systems, including developments in anti-access and area denial weapons, space and cyberspace. At the same time, China is also asserting itself in the south and east China seas. While this may appear to be a regional concern, one cannot forget China is also building a new icebreaker, has become an observer at the Arctic Council and completed a free trade agreement with Iceland, events that signal an increased desire for both access to and influence in the Arctic.
Both North Korea and Iran continue to invest in ballistic missile, nuclear, cyber and other advanced weapons technologies. The advent of North Korea's successful space launch and previous nuclear tests have led General Jacoby to say that he is concerned that North Korean ballistic missiles have evolved from a theoretical to a practical threat, one that must be defended against.
Additionally, threats from terrorist organizations, while diminished, have by no means evaporated. Of special concern, with the growing likelihood of collusion, witting or not, between transnational crime organizations and terrorists, based on a desire to traffic in weapons, drugs, people, et cetera, there is a growing opportunity for terrorists to use modern weapons, such as cruise or even short-range ballistic missiles launched from shipping containers, or the delivery of weapons of mass destruction from unmanned aerial vehicles or general aviation aircraft.
Adding to the complexity of these threats is the continuing retreat of sea ice in the North, making the Arctic an evolving approach to the continent, one that could be exploited in an opportunistic way.
Despite the challenges, the NORAD agreement, which came into being 56 years ago, is still the big idea for the defence of North America. The best way to defend and evolve the defence of the continent is cooperatively, through the long-established experience of NORAD.
General Jacoby often refers to the exceptional level of collaboration between our two countries and the military competitive advantage it creates, and he often cites the fact that our two countries are so secure in our sovereignty that we routinely command each other's forces.
Ensuring the continued success of these missions and the ability to stay ahead of threats to North America are objectives for which I can assure you that NORAD is not sitting still. Working through the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, General Jacoby has requested and the CDS and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have directed that the command complete a strategic review.
The purpose of this review is to provide the necessary operational analysis to inform and support the need for investment in NORAD capabilities and includes a review of current and potential future roles, missions and command relationships. In addition to the review, NORAD is also running a large number of exercises and tests in search of ways to mitigate and overcome the evolving challenges of the 21st century.
To this point, I have focused on the binational missions of NORAD, but I would also like to take a moment to highlight the ongoing bilateral efforts we have. For the past seven years, NORAD, USNORTHCOM and the Canadian Joint Operations Command, previously Canada Command, have been conducting tri-command staff talks in an effort to improve coordination in the Arctic, information sharing, all-domain situational awareness, exercises, cyber, and theatre security cooperation.
This is just one example of how the spirit of the NORAD agreement has gone beyond its three specified missions.
Finally, I can't tell you how proud I am to serve and have the watch with the soldiers, sailors, airmen and airwomen of Canada and the United States, who selflessly serve our two great countries. Based on their extraordinary drive, professionalism and ingenuity, I am confident that our future is in good hands. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Lieutenant-General Parent. That was a very good overview, and I want to say on behalf of the committee that I think we would echo your comments in your closing statement here with respect to the commitment that both the Canadian and the American men and women make for our countries, especially in Colorado Springs, in view of the visit we had there. Once again, I want to thank you for all the time and effort that you put in for all of us to become better informed on what you do and what you do on behalf of the general public you serve.
If I could, colleagues, I would like to start with a question with respect to ballistic missile defence. As you know, we are reviewing Canada's participation in the ballistic missile defence aspect of NORAD, whether we should become a full partner or not. That was the main reason we went down to Colorado Springs, to actually see what your organization does and just exactly how we participate, if we do participate, in that particular aspect of your requirements.
Going forward, if Canada decided to become a full partner in the ballistic missile defence, how would you see your daily operations changing with respect to your responsibilities now as opposed to what they would be if we were to become full participants?
Lt.-Gen. Parent: Thank you very much for the question, Mr. Chair. If I understand the question right, it is how would daily, practical operations change for NORAD.
The Chair: Yes.
Lt.-Gen. Parent: First of all, it would change the command and control of ballistic missile defence because ballistic missile defence command and control would be moving from U.S. Northern Command to NORAD. There is an organization right now that takes care of BMD operations. They are under the command of the Commander of USNORTHCOM. It would provide seamless command and control from the indicators and warnings of ballistic missile attack, through the engagement and all the way through.
Right now, when an intercontinental ballistic missile flies, the command and control has to change. It starts with NORAD and goes to USNORTHCOM when the inbound missile can be engaged. Then, if it re-enters the atmosphere, the command and control goes back to NORAD. I think my role would change. Just as I am involved in the command and control in the defence against a cruise missile, I would be able to be in the change in ballistic missile defence as well.
The Chair: If I could, colleagues, just to clarify, for the record here, Canada and our American counterparts are fully involved together with respect to the warning systems that would identify such a missile. Yet, once it's identified, Canada steps back and we are no longer involved with respect to the actual decisions that will be taken with the ballistic missile defence if a decision is going to be made. Is that correct?
Lt.-Gen. Parent: The NORAD agreement stipulates that NORAD will support the command responsible for ballistic missile defence, in this case, U.S. Northern Command. So the prosecution of an inbound missile starts with indicators and warning, and then it starts with the detection of an infrared signature. That detection of the infrared signature is characterized by NORAD. So we make an initial assessment of what that missile is pointed at and what it's doing, and we tell the national command authority that we have a missile event happening. Once the missile goes through space and is inside the engagement sequence of U.S. Northern Command, at that time NORAD is not involved. So there is no Canadian personnel in the Canadian ballistic missile defence station that we have in our integrated NORAD and NORTHCOM centre. But right across from there is the missile warning station, where there are American and Canadian personnel; so one feeds the other. While the engagement takes place, it's purely in USNORTHCOM. If the engagement were to fail, then it would become NORAD again because we characterize a re- entry. If there is a nuclear detonation, NORAD is the command in charge of characterizing nuclear detonation worldwide. It is correct that NORAD supports some phases of a missile engagement; but it is stipulated in the agreement.
The Chair: Senator Mitchell?
Senator Mitchell: It's great to see you, general. Thanks for being here and for your excellent presentation. I want to pursue your answer a little further.
The way it stands now, if Canada and/or the U.S. were to be attacked by a nuclear warhead delivered by airplane or by cruise missile, NORAD, start to finish Canada-U.S. cooperation fully engaged, would deal with that.
Lt.-Gen. Parent: That's correct.
Senator Mitchell: If a similar nuclear warhead were delivered by ballistic missile, that no longer would be start to finish fully integrated Canada-U.S. control. It would go to U.S. control and then maybe back to NORAD. Clearly it's not a straight line and clearly that would be not an ideal situation.
Lt.-Gen. Parent: It is correct that NORAD is not involved in the engagement. It creates changes in command and control of an engagement between NORAD and NORTHCOM, while with a cruise missile, it's throughout. General Jacoby likes to say that we should set up our command and control in phase zero, meaning day-to-day operations, in the same way as when a crisis happens. Right now, day-to-day operations are set up for cruise missiles with NORAD. For ballistic missiles, it's USNORTHCOM, with elements of NORAD at each end being involved.
Senator Mitchell: Canada would be less involved in the case of a ballistic missile, by definition. The concern in the early 2000s was that ballistic missiles, because they went above the earth's atmosphere, somehow changed the configuration and it became known as Star Wars, as though weaponization of space would happen and there would be satellites shooting these things down. In fact, that's not the case. They just happen to have a bigger arc than a cruise missile or an airplane and they come back down into the atmosphere. Obviously, they have to if they want to hit something on Earth. That's really the distinction. It's not like we are shooting something at them from above in space. That could not possibly work.
Lt.-Gen. Parent: It's about the domain of travel. When a submarine launches a ballistic missile, it starts in water. It flies into the air, ends up in space and then re-enters. It's convenient for NORAD to have the maritime warning for submarine-launched cruise missiles because the sea problem becomes an air defence problem. Coming back to the arguments of 2000, it is not Star Wars. No weapons are being put in space. Everything is by ground-based interceptor.
The other thing I would like to say is that it is not a shield. It is not something that an incoming missile would bounce against. It's a missile launching against another missile. The interception happens in space. For a cruise missile, we launch a missile from the plane to hit another missile that has its own mode of propulsion; and they have a kinetic effect on each other. It's pretty much the same as the missile interceptor launches an exo-atmospheric kill vehicle, which is basically a piece of metal that will impact the opposing re-entry vehicle. The speed of the impact between the two objects will result in vaporization of the object in space.
You are right when you say that we are dealing with different types of missiles that travel through various domains. Right now when a missile traverses the space domain, NORAD is not involved.
Interestingly, some countries are developing a hypersonic glide vehicle, which is basically a missile that goes into space, re-enters space — high trajectory up, high down, and then glides after that. While they are in space, they are ICBMs, and after they re-enter, they are basically a cruise missile. Technology is changing the world and the situation is changing, so we need to adapt.
Senator Mitchell: NORAD has not changed.
Lt.-Gen. Parent: NORAD needs to adapt as well.
Senator Wells: General Parent, it's nice to see you again. Thank you for your presentation. With regard to threats, we obviously have strong reason to believe that North Korea has moved from a theoretical to a practical threat, more so for Western and Pacific nations and territories, such as Japan and South Korea. Could you explain what this might mean for North America?
Lt.-Gen. Parent: On December 12, I believe the same date as you formed this committee, North Korea launched a multi-stage rocket. When I was at NORAD the first time in 1997 to 1999, I witnessed the first time that North Korea launched a two-stage missile, which overflew Japan. That was the start of North Korea's being able to pose a threat to Japan. Last December, they launched a three-stage, which means that North Korea has a missile capable of reaching pretty much anywhere in North America. If you have the range to put an object in space and the power to do this multi-stage technology, you also have the capacity to reach the extended range all the way to the whole of North America. That was when the threat went from a theory that they were working on developing to a practical threat. We know that they have the reach in terms of distance to cover the continent.
Senator Wells: We know they have the elements to do the full. Do we know whether they have developed it ready to launch?
Lt.-Gen. Parent: We know they are continuing to develop a missile. They are developing a road mobile, KN-08, that will have ICBM range. They also have successfully tested their nuclear weapons, but we have not seen the two put together yet. When you pursue one, you pursue the other. I don't think they will pursue the testing of a nuclear weapon just to put some testing on the ground.
Senator Wells: As a brief follow-up, is it more likely that they would launch from land in North Korea, or do they have a naval capacity or air capacity for launch?
Lt.-Gen. Parent: North Korea is all ground-based capacity.
Senator Segal: General, thank you for coming. We appreciate the work you and your colleagues at Cheyenne Mountain do for Canada. It's important work, and we are lucky to have you there.
Lt.-Gen. Parent: Thank you.
Senator Segal: You may have noticed that two former ministers of defence appeared before the committee, one of whom was in charge at the time of the decision not to become part of U.S. ballistic missile defence and both giving their considered view that it would be a good thing for us to reconsider that decision; and I'm not asking you as a uniformed officer to express a political opinion.
Lt.-Gen. Parent: Thank you for that.
Senator Segal: I understand the constraints, but I want to ask this question, if I may: You have been very clear in describing to us the relationship within NORAD's air defence activities and the ballistic missile defence unit, which does not contain any Canadians. What do you anticipate, should any government in Canada reach the decision for whatever reason that it wanted to become a full partner? Whatever that modality ended up being down the road, what do you anticipate would change in what you understand to be the existing operations based on us not being a partner? What kinds of changes would take place in the day-to-day operation? Assuming that would have to be agreed to in the normal course and maybe beyond the purview of all of us at this table, but just from the technical point of view of the operational linkage of the different commands and the sharing of information, what do you think would change, if anything, should the government in Canada someday decide it wished to be part of that undertaking?
Lt.-Gen. Parent: Right now, NORAD is charged with the mission of aerospace control with a caveat because if you look at aerospace warning, it describes that we look at most man-made objects in space, missiles and then air. We do the warning across the air to space seamlessly.
The control is about inspecting and engaging in the air side, whether asymmetric — civilian airlines with Operation Noble Eagle — or symmetric, which is intercepting long-range bombers that can be equipped with nuclear weapons and they don't file a flight plan, so we go inspect that. We're not really doing aerospace control. We're doing air control because we just do the air-breathing threats. It would practically remove a caveat for the aerospace defence of North America. It's seamless and one change of command with one focus and unity of purpose. What it means in practically is that I would not necessarily be asked to leave the room when there are discussions that lead to a ballistic missile defence engagement. It could mean that General Jacoby could appoint me to be part of the decision making in ballistic missile defence, which I'm not. It would probably mean that I would be put on a shorter leash on the phone than I am right now. It would also allow Canadians across all the domains that we look at with NORAD and NORTHCOM command centre.
It would also probably allow our scientists, in terms of research and development — because we have some science and technology people working at NORAD from Canada — to look at it and see if there are Canadian scientific developments that could help the system.
Lastly, it would make General Jacoby's job easier if a missile comes close to the border; his decisions would be much simpler to decide whether he elects to defend Canada or not.
Senator Segal: I have a supplementary, chair. You were good enough to share your view of where we were relative to Russian military doctrine and how that's changing. Of course, I think the missile defence initiative was very much not about Russia because Russia as a potential risk — along with others who would have a multiple-launch capacity — is very much within the purview of NORAD as we understand it and is now ongoing.
Am I to understand correctly that in the event of a rogue state launch against North America, rogue states being where they are in the technology cycle, their launches may not be as accurate as they would like and something aiming for Chicago could end up landing in Winnipeg? When the meeting took place at NORAD headquarters relative to the deployment of basic missile defence, as I understand, you said to us a moment ago that you would be outside that room because we are not now partners. I don't want to misstate that. Do I understand your position correctly?
Lt.-Gen. Parent: The outside of the room mainly appears in the intelligence-sharing that leads to a BMD. Once the engagement occurs, I'm not going to be asked to leave the room.
Senator Segal: Right.
Lt.-Gen. Parent: But I'm a silent observer on all the decisions being taken during that engagement cycle.
Senator Ringuette: Welcome, general.
Lt.-Gen. Parent: Thank you.
Senator Ringuette: This is the first time I'm at this committee so we are on a level playing field. You indicated this is your first time appearing before a Senate committee.
However, I do have an area of interest with regard to the Arctic. I realize in order to maintain Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic, we need security measures there. You've talked about Russia and China. How does the U.S. feel with regard to Arctic sovereignty?
Lt.-Gen. Parent: Meaning?
Senator Ringuette: It seems to be more and more contested by more and more people. Does your experience point to perhaps a contested Arctic territory by the U.S. also?
Lt.-Gen. Parent: Thank you for the question. Sorry I didn't catch it right away.
The U.S. Arctic policy and the Canadian Arctic policy are very much aligned and in synchronization together. I know we have a difference of opinion of what covers along the Alaska territory, but that's being dealt with diplomatically. Militarily, it's not a source of tension at all.
As military, we all want safety, security and defence. For safety, it is to be able to respond. For security, we need to make sure that we can help if it's required and let them in as well. For defence right now, both Canada and the U.S. don't foresee any conflict in the Arctic. Neither does NORAD, but we see military cooperation among the countries. The NORAD nexus for the Arctic is that we've been operating in the Arctic since our inception, having had to intercept long-range aviation from Russia. The other thing is that in 2006, we got the NORAD maritime warning mission and as the waters open, we have to pay attention to that ocean as much as we do to our internal waterways, as well the other coast.
From the NORAD point of view, there's an element of trust for everyone that goes to the Arctic, but it's always good to verify that everybody is abiding by the international customs and laws in place.
Senator Ringuette: May I have another question?
The Chair: Is it about ballistic missile defence by any chance?
Senator Ringuette: Yes.
The Chair: Can you be specific because we want to take full advantage of the general while he's here.
Senator Ringuette: Yes. With regard to the activity in the Arctic in the last 10 years, what is the percentage of increase of activity with regard to foreign presence?
Lt.-Gen. Parent: I don't have those statistics with me but I can provide them to the committee. We know the traffic that is there.
Senator Beyak: It is good to see you again, general. It was wonderful going to NORAD. Canadians would be so impressed and reassured to see the work you do there.
Lt.-Gen. Parent: Thank you.
Senator Beyak: I had a question from our fact-finding trip, that all of Canada isn't covered under the current NORAD U.S. homeland ballistic missile defence system. Could you elaborate on that for me, how much of Canada falls within the jurisdiction and what it would take to move all of Canada in? For those watching at home, I think it would be very educational.
Lt.-Gen. Parent: I have a short memory. That's why I have to write your question. It's good but it's short.
First of all, the mandate of the system is to cover the United States, Alaska and its territories. Just to make sure that it's clear, this is against a threat from North Korea and Iran right now, so a rudimentary proliferator or builder of ICBMs. It is in no way linked to trying to destabilize our current relationship with China or Russia. I want to put that aside. Not all of Canada is covered. Canada has no say on what is covered or not because it is purely a U.S. system. A portion of Canada is covered because the U.S. decided to put a buffer around its borders as the precision could be doubtful on these weapons and they want to make sure it will not reach U.S. territory. I cannot tell you what the buffer is because this is for other types of meetings.
What would need to be done to cover Canada? Canada would have to enter into negotiations with the United States. From those negotiations, I figure that the United States would then establish with Canada what the delta is and what requirement would be done.
Regarding those requirements, the Canadian geography has not been accounted for in the development of the system, because it was not available. It's through negotiations with the U.S. that such a question could be answered.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: General Parent, thank you for being here today. Of course, I am going to stay on the topic of missiles, but to what extent does your ability to detect the presence of unmanned aerial vehicles compare with your ability to detect ballistic missiles? How can Canada help NORAD counter this threat?
Lt.-Gen. Parent: Are you talking about the first or the second threat?
Senator Dagenais: I would say the first — that of unmanned aerial vehicles.
Lt.-Gen. Parent: Okay. The threat is real when it comes to unmanned aerial vehicles, especially in the area of terrorism or transnational organized crime. It would not be very difficult for a terrorist to fill a cardboard box with biological or toxic agents and throw it somewhere. Instructional videos can easily be found online. The Amazon website offers small devices that can deliver a package.
So, we are cooperating at NORAD/Canada-United States. Research and development is used to examine the rules of engagement that should be applied. It is a matter of determining what type of rules we should apply when it comes to the peaceful use of those vehicles, while trying to defend ourselves against potentially harmful actions. So examining those issues is definitely part of NORAD's mandate.
Senator Dagenais: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Could I ask another question?
Based on your knowledge of current threats and perhaps projected threats, what kind of risks could Canada expose itself to if it decided to participate fully in the ballistic missile defence program? What would be the benefits of such a decision for Canada?
To what extent can you forecast whether Iran or North Korea would launch an attack against Canada or the United States in the next 10 years?
Lt.-Gen. Parent: The main problem with North Korea is that we have to conduct constant analyses of the intentions and the threat. As for Iran, the threat is growing, and the country's intentions are unknown. That is one actor. We do not understand what its objectives are, so they are much more difficult to assess. What we do know for sure is that those countries continue to develop their program. Iran and North Korea are contributing to each other's programs and helping each other. That is clear.
I apologize. I prefer to express myself in English, since that is the language of work at NORAD. I do not know whether I have answered all of your questions. What element is missing?
Senator Dagenais: The assessment of the threat presented by Iran and North Korea.
[English]
Lt.-Gen. Parent: The threat is real. General Jacoby has testified that he's confident the present system could be effective to defeat the threat from Iran and North Korea at this time.
Was another part of what you said regarding the threat to Canada due to BMD?
Senator Dagenais: No.
Lt.-Gen. Parent: Okay, I misunderstood.
Senator White: We've had a few witnesses now, and I think most Canadians, if asked to describe a ballistic missile system — their idea would be much different than what they would have thought a decade ago with the weaponization of space and other things would have been on their minds. Most Canadians now would be sitting there thinking that if a weapon were coming from one of our threats across Canada's air space, we hope and believe that something would be done about it and that it wouldn't land here.
Do you believe our movement to being more involved would move "belief" and "hope" to "we know" that something would happen — that it would be taken out before it had an opportunity to land in our space? I'm talking about more involvement on our part.
You talk about some parts of our land not being covered, for example. So if we became more like partners instead of hangers-on, to be honest, do you think that would allow us to say that more of our land is covered and it's more likely — nothing is 100 per cent — it would be taken out before it landed on any of our land?
Lt.-Gen. Parent: Again, that would be part of discussions with —
Senator White: That's understood, but it would also mean becoming more involved partners.
Lt.-Gen. Parent: If we were part of the system, we would have a say in deciding what should be covered, if not all of it.
Senator White: So the answer is yes.
Lt.-Gen. Parent: The answer is yes.
The Chair: From a practical point of view, in respect to the ballistic missile defence system and looking at expanding interceptors perhaps in the east coast, if I understand you correctly, general, if we as Canadians were full partners in the ballistic missile defence program, we would have full participation in those discussions, and perhaps make the program more effective and more secure if one of those interceptors were placed somewhere in Canada. Is it correct that at least we would be at the table to discuss issues such as that?
Lt.-Gen. Parent: We would be at the table such that the scientists and the rocket scientists who deal with that difficult problem would be able to look at parts of our Canadian geography that would make the system more effective. Through negotiations, again, Canada could say, "Yes, we allow you to take advantage of that geography."
It's geometry in terms of where the interceptors and the radars are — the idea of using the geometry is to have maximum time and space to decide, and to intercept at a place of your choosing.
Senator Mitchell: My question is a follow-up. What would be the kinds of possible levels of involvement — all the way from us saying "we support ballistic missile defence" to actually having a rocket on our soil? That's really not likely, though.
Are there any discussions about what kind of money is involved in this? What's the intensity of the U.S. measurement of what involvement would be?
Lt.-Gen. Parent: Right now, we're not discussing money or having any of these thoughts, because we are not part of it.
To try to help you out, there are various segments of missile engagement that go from the indicators and warnings, to the command and control, to the interceptors, to the radars discriminating, and to research and development. It would be for Canada to discuss with the U.S. which parts Canada would be interested and willing to invest in and which parts they would put off the table.
You gave the example of the interceptor. By the way, the U.S. is not asking for anything right now from where I'm sitting. But it could be as simple as going with assigning command and control to NORAD for the reasons I mentioned before, or it might go all the way to interceptors on Canadian soil, but that's for the Canadian government to decide. Or we paint a Royal Canadian Air Force roundel on one of the interceptors, paying for that missile with our good paint scheme.
Senator Wells: If we do go that route, I would hope it would be more than the paint.
General, thanks again. I want to follow up on a question from Senator Ringuette regarding the Arctic. The committee understands that Canada's air defence identification zone in the Arctic is limited by the current capabilities of the North Warning System. Could you please explain the significance to NORAD of limitations in the existing coverage provided by Canada's North Warning System and other radar systems in the region?
Lt.-Gen. Parent: Every radar has a range, and where the radars were installed they do not cover the complete territory of Canada, so our Canadian air defence identification zone right now does not cover the entirety of the Canadian territory, and also, the presence of our forward operating locations, where they are, so the factors of time and distance are that where our radars are, it's a big challenge to cover all of Canadian territory to make an intercept of an approaching aircraft coming from the north.
Senator Wells: Can you give me a percentage that it currently covers on the radar versus if Canada was a full partner and, therefore, theoretically or maybe practically there would be 100 per cent radar coverage?
Lt.-Gen. Parent: The North Warning System and ballistic missile defence have nothing in common. There is no link between the North Warning System and the ballistic missile defence, so participation in the ballistic missile defence has nothing to do with that air mission of covering the territory. I would say the territory not covered is basically the archipelago; that triangle on top of our territory is what is not covered.
Senator Segal: I wanted to ask about the linkage between the maritime surveillance responsibility and the aerospace responsibility, specifically since you made reference to the fact that the Russians are deploying more sea-based launch capacity than was the case in the past and the Americans have deployed Aegis Class destroyers with an anti-ballistic missile capacity as part of their ramping-up exercise.
Can you help me understand how the pieces connect? I think reference was made that a missile could be launched by a rogue state out of a shipping container on the back of a commercial ship that was under our maritime surveillance. Could you give me a sense of how this would all connect in the event of those circumstances? There appear to be some pieces in the maritime frame that do relate to this kind of security undertaking. I'm keeping in mind your very clear indication of what we're part of and what we're not part of by virtue of where we are on the partnership side.
Lt.-Gen. Parent: That's a great question, senator. Thank you for that.
After 9/11, General Eberhart, the commander at the time, said, "The next thing that concerns me is threats coming from the sea." They've been successful from the air with the attack at 9/11 and from the sea, so there are concerns about sea-launched containers, containers that could launch from the sea. You could have a cruise missile or a short- range ballistic missile coming to our coast. You said we need a maritime NORAD. What we need is NORAD to evolve in the maritime domain to build on the foundation that we used during the previous decades. This is where a maritime issue can quickly become an air defence issue because as soon as something is launched, a cruise missile is clearly a NORAD mission. A short-range ballistic missile, I don't know if NORAD is involved or not, frankly. I know about ICBMs, that we're not involved, but we signed a NATO doctrine to do ballistic missile defence in a smaller theatre.
So if it comes from the sea off our coast and it's a short-range ballistic missile, at this time, if it happened tomorrow morning, it would probably be a USNORTHCOM mission, but you can see the confusion in how seamlessly one domain goes into another and how complicated it gets.
Another interesting thing, you talk about Aegis; Aegis is a very capable air defence platform for a fleet, but its radars are subject, if you point them up, it's also a BMD ship. Again, when a ship is assigned to NORAD or to NORTHCOM and it has both capabilities, I have to have discussion with General Jacoby and say, "If you're using it as a BMD ship it's a NORTHCOM ship; if you're using it as an air defence ship, it's a NATO ship." We're okay that it's the same person, but he's now got two J-3s trying to figure out. What we're working towards is an integrated air and missile defence system wherein we're interested in defeating the object. We're not interested in deciding which vehicle the object comes from.
That's the link between the maritime and air defence that we face.
Senator Segal: You were pretty clear in indicating in your initial statement that all the air assets under the control of the United States Armed Forces and our air assets are deployable essentially in support of the NORAD mission as necessary, as the case may be. Is the same true of naval assets under the control of the Canadian Armed Forces and the American Armed Forces?
Lt.-Gen. Parent: For maritime warning, it's NORAD mission. For maritime control, which is doing the engagement, doing the inspection, it's Canadian Joint Operations Command and NavNorth in the U.S. They are completely interoperable. They share information and talk daily. It's very long-lasting and good cooperation that happens between the U.S. and Canada in a bilateral manner between CJOC and NORTHCOM.
Senator Segal: The same partnership that exists now between NORAD overall between whoever is the commanding officer and whoever is the deputy commander would apply in similar circumstances?
Lt.-Gen. Parent: Not quite, because NORAD is binational, which means we're integrated. Whereas, when you're bilateral it's more through liaison officers and goodwill. As being binational, the analogy I have is, it's like a marriage, with our to-do lists that are non-elective.
Senator Segal: Thank you.
The Chair: I'd like to follow up on a further question of Senator Ringuette and Senator Wells, and that has to do with the Arctic and the North Warning System.
In your opening statement you referred to this strategic review that was under way in NORAD with your colleague, General Jacoby.
Maybe you could comment on the life cycle that our present North Warning System has and maybe make some observations of what we would be looking at for the purposes of replacement when the time comes.
Lt.-Gen. Parent: The North Warning System, if we let it go through its normal course, we estimate a life expectancy of 2025-ish. It could be extended if you invest now or in the future, but at one point every piece of equipment, especially in the harsh conditions of the Arctic, needs to be either refurbished or replaced.
I don't personally have the cost of what it would take. I think with what's happening in the Arctic, we have to look at whether the North Warning System is in the right place. The government has to decide.
Throughout the history of the warning system, there are various radar systems. We always put it at the pine tree line, the DEW Line, the North Warning System, and we've been moving up north constantly. As we replace the North Warning System, the question that needs to be asked is, are we are okay with conceding part of Canadian territory or not as the ocean opens? That is one thing that needs to be looked at.
The other thing is I think we need to look at multipurpose systems to have more bang for the buck; hopefully, something that can look at the air picture can also look at the maritime picture.
The Chair: Colleagues, it's now two o'clock. I want to thank our witness. General Parent, it was a very informative hour you spent with us. I think it has clarified in many ways the ballistic missile defence and how it relates from a practical point of view with respect to your responsibilities.
I also would like to once again ask you to convey our sincere thanks to General Jacoby. As I said earlier, the visit we had the opportunity of taking to Colorado Springs was very informative. I can say, as Senator Beyak said earlier, Canadians can feel very secure in view of the men and women who are spending their time there 24 hours a day, seven days a week with respect to the security of North America.
I'd like to thank you for coming.
(The committee adjourned.)