Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
National Security and Defence
Issue 11 - Evidence - Meeting of November 17, 2014
OTTAWA, Monday, November 17, 2014
The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence met this day at 1:01 p.m. to study and report on security threats facing Canada.
Senator Daniel Lang (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: On June 19, 2014, the Senate agreed that the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence would be authorized to study and report on security threats to Canada, including but not limited to cyber espionage, threats to critical infrastructure, terrorist operations, and prosecution, and that the committee would report to the Senate no later than December 31, 2015.
To begin with, colleagues, before we welcome the witnesses, we will introduce ourselves. I am Dan Lang, senator for Yukon. On my left is the clerk of the committee, Josée Thérien. I would like to invite the senators to introduce themselves.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: Senator Dagenais from Quebec.
Senator Fortin-Duplessis: Senator Fortin-Duplessis from Quebec.
[English]
Senator Ngo: Thanh Hai Ngo from Ontario.
Senator Beyak: Lynn Beyak, Ontario.
Senator White: Vernon White, Ontario.
Senator Day: Senator Joseph Day from New Brunswick.
The Chair: Colleagues, before we start with our witnesses, I just want to go back and review what we've done in the past number of weeks.
During our earlier hearings, the committee received evidence that we have between 135 and 145 Canadians who are dual nationals fighting in Syria and Iraq with ISIS. In addition, we have approximately 80 who returned to Canada, and we also have presently some 93 people on a high-risk traveller watch list. This, I believe, is quite troubling, especially if one considers the responsibilities that our law enforcement agencies assume to oversee these individuals.
We also heard that there were 50 terrorist organizations recognized in Canada in 2010, and today our government has designated 53 terrorist organizations in one capacity or another.
Also, when it comes to supporting terrorism with money, we learned that terrorist financing from Canada is in the six figures and often disguised as humanitarian aid. The committee heard that we have very few terrorism prosecutions in Canada under section 83 of the Criminal Code. This in itself is disturbing when one considers that our laws under section 83 allow for charges when one provides material support to a terrorist group or organization.
This afternoon, the committee will be meeting for three panels of discussion as we look at the threats to Canada, specifically terrorism. We will be focused specifically on the issue of countering terrorism and what law enforcement and government are doing to meet these growing threats.
Joining us today to discuss counterterrorism and counter-radicalization are three representatives from Public Safety Canada: Mr. Gary Robertson, Assistant Deputy Minister, National and Cyber Security Branch; Mr. John Davies, Director General, National Security Policy, National and Cyber Security Branch; and Ms. Anna Gray-Henschel, Senior Director, National Security Policy Division. From the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, we have Mr. Tom Venner, Assistant Director, Policy and Strategic Partnerships.
I understand Mr. Robertson and Mr. Venner have opening statements, and we will begin with Mr. Robertson.
Gary Robertson, Assistant Deputy Minister, National and Cyber Security Branch, Public Safety Canada: A little more than two years ago, the Government of Canada unveiled its counterterrorism strategy, a multi-faceted response to a threat that is both national and global in nature.
[Translation]
The strategy is comprised of four mutually reinforcing elements: prevent, detect, deny and respond.
[English]
Canadian security and law enforcement agencies have been successful in detecting terrorists and denying them the means and opportunity to carry out their activities. Over the past decade, they've uncovered and disrupted a series of terrorist plots that would have had devastating consequences had they succeeded.
Nevertheless, in the last month the events remind us that the threat of extremist violence remains. It affects us both as a nation and as individual Canadians. Terrorist groups like ISIS and al Qaeda may seem distant to most Canadians, but lone actors inspired by their toxic ideology can represent a direct threat to Canadians.
[Translation]
Canadians who travel to other countries for terrorist purposes represent tremendous challenges.
[English]
They are often trained in terrorist camps, and they take part in terrorist and combat operations. Those who return are equipped to plan and carry out terrorist attacks in Canada. Just as important, they have the credibility to encourage and recruit aspiring violent terrorists at home.
[Translation]
This highlights a key challenge: How do we prevent radicalization to violence from happening in the first place?
[English]
The Government of Canada is committed to the ''prevent'' element of the CT strategy; it is committed to countering violent extremism in all of its aspects. Our preventive approach, which laid out the ''Feature Focus'' of responding to violent extremism in this year's public threat report, is built around three mutually supportive themes.
We're building community capacity and law enforcement capacity, and we're using early intervention to redirect people away from pathways that lead to extremist violence.
[Translation]
We need to remember that countering violent extremism is not really about government, and it is not really about the police and it is not really about intelligence officers, it is about communities.
[English]
Family members, peers, religious community leaders, even teachers, doctors, nurses and social workers are better placed to identify and respond to the changes in attitude and behaviour that are precursors to violent extremist action. And, with support, they are better placed to take meaningful and positive action to address those early warning signs before they become problems.
So community knowledge of radicalization to violence and community awareness of the dynamics and precursors of radicalization to violence are the keys to a preventive approach to countering violent extremism. Outreach and engagement networks built up by local police services, the RCMP and advisory and liaison groups like the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security are absolutely fundamental to building that knowledge and awareness.
[Translation]
Specific programming includes a community awareness package developed by Public Safety Canada in consultation with the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security.
[English]
We are initiating conversations with community groups in which we discuss violent extremism in the context of people's life experiences. This is accomplished with the help of professional facilitators who create a ''safe space'' for communities to talk about radicalization to violence and to identify opportunities for individual and community intervention. With the help of the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security, we've conducted seven facilitated sessions in Quebec, Ontario and Alberta. Response has been overwhelmingly positive. Demand for sessions currently outstrips supply, so we are developing training for community facilitators.
[Translation]
Our work in this regard has been recognized as an innovative and noteworthy practice in various countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom.
[English]
I referenced the police a moment ago and the importance of the trust and community networks built up over the years by the RCMP and by our provincial and municipal police services across Canada. Obviously, outreach and engagement is a big part of our countering violent extremism strategy. Outreach and engagement is something the police do very well because it is rooted in the most basic principles of community policing.
[Translation]
Community policing depends upon knowledgeable police officers who are able to pick up on warning signals and respond appropriately, within a community context.
[English]
So a community-based response to violent extremism and the foreign fighter issues includes police officers, and ideally other first responders, whose knowledge and understanding of violent extremism is as comprehensive as their knowledge and understanding of any other type of criminal behaviour.
We want communities to understand the threat of violent extremism, so it follows that the police officers who will be supporting those communities in their countering violent extremism efforts must be equally knowledgeable.
[Translation]
The Government of Canada will help to promote and enhance existing law enforcement training on violent extremism.
[English]
Particularly, we want to build on the success of our programming like the RCMP Counter Terrorism Information Officer initiative. CTIO provides front-line police officers and other first responders with the critical training around the warnings and indicators of violent extremism. Approximately 2,000 candidates have participated in this program since it was established five years ago.
A community policing response to violent extremism does not replace the necessity for investigation, arrest and prosecution; but it does support the kind of preventive approach that permits law enforcement resources to be focused on the most serious of crimes.
[Translation]
Clearly, investigation, arrest and prosecution must come into play when preventive measures fail.
[English]
But what, potentially, does a prevention-based response to radicalization to violence look like? How do we divert and dissuade people who are radicalizing but who have not yet crossed the threshold of extremist violence, whether here in Canada or abroad?
[Translation]
Development of an early intervention program is a core component of a countering violent extremism strategy.
[English]
A shared initiative between police and communities, early intervention programming should be aimed at people at the periphery of violent extremist activity but who haven't yet progressed to the point where disruptive action — investigation, criminal charges or prosecution — is warranted. Having community-based mentors to provide advice, support and counselling aimed at promoting constructive responses to violent extremist ideology is a best practice.
[Translation]
Early intervention is no guarantee that a person will not radicalize to violence, or travel abroad to take part in terrorist activity.
[English]
But as a tool for diverting potential violent extremists, it is a constructive alternative to investigation and prosecution.
Ultimately, it represents a joint community and law enforcement response to the problem of radicalization to violence and to the challenge of terrorist travel.
Violent extremist ideologies remain powerful. They continue to encourage people to take part in operations on the other side of the globe. They continue to evolve and, as the terrible events of October show, they continue to inspire and influence people here in Canada.
[Translation]
But this is not a problem that we can arrest our way out of.
[English]
As a society, the task facing us is to counter violent extremism at the community level.
As a government, our task is to ensure that communities are equipped with an array of options in support of prevention and intervention. Thank you.
The Chair: I believe Mr. Venner has a presentation.
[Translation]
Tom Venner, Assistant Director, Policy and Strategic Partnerships, Canadian Security Intelligence Service: Good afternoon, honourable senators. Thank you for the invitation to participate in your study of security threats facing Canada. I am pleased to be here today to discuss Canada's response and, in particular, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service's role in supporting the prevention pillar of the counter-terrorism strategy.
[English]
Everything the service does is rooted in its mandate, which is clearly articulated in the CSIS Act. Through our national security mandate, we are authorized to collect and analyze information on threats to the security of Canada, and to provide advice to partners. For the purpose of today's discussion, it is important to underline that CSIS is not authorized to act directly to disrupt threats or to prevent radicalization to violence.
We can and do, however, support the government's efforts to prevent the radicalization to violence in meaningful ways, both by understanding the threat environment and the dynamics of radicalization and by supporting community engagement.
[Translation]
In order for government partners to craft effective strategies to counter violent extremism, they need to understand how and where extremism manifests itself. This is where CSIS has considerable expertise. The service is well placed to provide insight on the scope and nature of the phenomenon, both in Canada and globally. This is possible by virtue of our own investigations and analysis, as well as through our strong relationships with allies.
[English]
Of course, CSIS is most commonly associated with its investigative function, which puts us at the forefront of efforts to detect terrorist activities. But the service does more than detect threats to the security of Canada. We also seek to understand them, which was the subject of my colleague's introductory remarks before honourable senators late last month. We are doing important work to decipher the dynamics of radicalization — trying to understand, in other words, what makes certain people vulnerable to extremist ideologies. The more we understand about the radicalization process, the most effective strategies to counter that process will be.
To that end, the service is an active participant in Public Safety's Kanishka Project and also maintains its own independent research capacity. This analytical work is integrated with our collection and operational activities and, in turn, is shared with partners to inform their own research, policy and programs. We also participate in the Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society, which fosters communication and collaboration between Canadian academics and policy-makers on national security issues.
While the service does not have a legal mandate to engage directly in outreach per se, we have nonetheless been strong proponents of such initiatives, including the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security, the CCRS. The CCRS has given us access to representatives from various communities, creating opportunities to raise awareness and to learn more about some of the communities we serve. In the last four years, CSIS has participated in 12 CCRS events on a wide range of issues. And through our regional presence across the country, CSIS also participates in a range of community outreach initiatives led by our partners, the RCMP.
[Translation]
Clearly, it is important that all Canadians understand who we are and what we do. It is also important that members of the public understand that our mandate is to protect all Canadians.
Canadians have a strong interest in issues of national security, and where possible — thanks to fora like the CCRS — the service has been able to help promote an informed public conversation.
[English]
That concludes my remarks, Mr. Chair.
The Chair: Thank you. We'll begin questions with Senator Beyak.
Senator Beyak: Thank you for your presentations, gentlemen. I wonder if you can tell me, in formulating our policy, how much have you looked at other nations' policies? The problems in France, Belgium and the United Kingdom, specifically, are getting worse there and not better. I wonder what you're doing differently or what you have used from them. Thank you.
Mr. Robertson: We have looked quite a bit internationally at what is going on and recently had a delegation in France dealing with a number of our international colleagues. I would say we have leveraged quite highly and quite heavily the information that's available elsewhere, especially what has been shown to be effective. But the approach that we have taken is unique in that we've developed narratives that really engage, in a much more meaningful way, the communities that we're attempting to work with, and in fact it's been seen to be a bit of a best practice internationally.
Senator Beyak: Why do you think it's getting worse in those countries, specifically France, Belgium and the United Kingdom?
Mr. Robertson: I would say there is an international problem right now that is of great concern. I wouldn't characterize it as getting worse, but I would say any problem that continues to exist continues to fester, and we definitely have an issue on that scale. It's a material issue, as we've been seeing in the last months or so here in Canada. It's one we've been experiencing for years, and it's certainly one we want to get a better handle on.
Senator Beyak: Last question: Do you have a strategy for doing that?
Mr. Robertson: Yes. Not to use propaganda, per se, but we have a strategy that's been in place since 2012, and we're working within that framework.
At Public Safety, we are principally involved in the preventative, but we are involved in the other three pillars to some degree as well, whether it's through coordination or other activities. But we're certainly attempting to execute the strategy we already have in place.
Senator Day: Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for being here. I think it would be helpful for the record if we had some clarification on Mr. Venner's comments in relation to Public Safety's Kanishka Project. Can you tell us a bit about that project that you were saying is a good thing?
Mr. Robertson: It's a Public Safety Canada initiative, and back in 2011 it was launched by the Prime Minister. Basically, $10 million of investment went towards enhancing community capacity. So we have a number of initiatives, largely funded through grants and contributions, with organizations that are doing research in the areas that we're most interested in.
Senator Day: So it's been in existence for a number of years now and it has some public money put into it each year. Which budget does that come out of? If I was to trace that back, where would I find it?
Mr. Robertson: For grants and contributions, $10 million over five years works out to $1.5 million to $2 million in this current fiscal year.
Senator Day: Thank you. The other area I'd like you to tell us about is the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security that we've heard more about, but we've also heard different points of view on this particular round table, so could you tell us first of all how long it has been in existence? How many permanent members are there on the board? Where do they get their funding? Give us a background on that, whatever information you might have, please.
Anna Gray-Henschel, Senior Director, National Security Policy Division, Public Safety Canada: It was created out of the National Security Policy in about 2004. Its first meeting was in about 2005.
Its terms of reference allow for up to 15 members, and these members are selected across Canada from diverse communities, diverse genders and diverse backgrounds. They're all considered leaders within their communities. Members have come and gone over the years. I don't have the answer. I don't know about its funding. It's through our Citizen Engagement Branch, but I can get that information for you. Sorry. I'm a psychologist, not a finance person.
Senator Day: If you could follow up on that for us and let us know the total amount of funding, over what number of years, 10 years, $1.5 million a year, whatever it might be, and it's up to 15 members. You can send that in to us so we have a full understanding. It's up to 15 members?
Ms. Gray-Henschel: Yes.
Senator Day: But how many members are actually there now? Have any of you been involved in recommending any members for this round table, for example?
Mr. Robertson: As Anna said, we'll go back and get the financial numbers you requested.
The meetings are quite frequent. It's interesting to note that oftentimes the members contribute their time on weekends. It's often a Friday night, Saturday and a good portion of Sunday. The next meeting is actually scheduled for this Friday, so I'm heading out to the East Coast to participate in that along with Anna.
Senator Day: The East Coast?
Mr. Robertson: Yes, so closer to home.
Senator Day: This is good. I noticed you didn't have the East Coast, and you have conducted seven facilitated sessions in Quebec, Ontario and Alberta, and I said what about B.C. and the east? So you are filling that gap — half of it, anyhow.
Senator White: Thanks to all of you for being here today. I'm going to refer to the Securing an Open Society document from about a decade ago. I'm trying to figure out whether we've had an update. Where are we in relation to the changes that we've seen in the last 10 years that would cause us to maybe shift or at least come up with a new document in relation to national security threats?
Mr. Robertson: What I would say is that while the nature of the threat evolves and the participants in the threat evolve, the fundamentals remain fairly unchanged. So the foundation piece of it hasn't evolved a lot. What has changed quite a bit is how we focus our resources to address the emerging threats. As I said, back in 2012 we developed a counterterrorism strategy, and that clearly laid out the four pillars we're approaching under it.
Maybe more to your question is that what changed back in 2012 was the government's commitment to actually report on progress. So in the last two years, we actually issued an annual report as to what has been occurring, how it's been evolving, what we're investing and how we're seeing benefits from it. The most recent report is the 2014 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada, and it's quite a useful document. It's publicly available.
The only other thing I would say as it relates to the report is that, as you would expect, it relates to the previous period. You won't find 2014 activities, at least not the ones that were fairly close to the publishing deadline, but you'll get a very good flavour for how things have evolved since then.
Senator White: The second question I have is probably more for Mr. Venner, if I may. We hear a lot about radicalization and indoctrination, and it seems people focus on the Internet, but there is also, as we know, that same type of movement in the more formal locations. Some would argue whether or not it's a school atmosphere or at least in a religious foundation atmosphere.
I'm trying to figure out where we are from CSIS's perspective on combatting or making a shift in those more formal arenas. If I go back to the Toronto 18 as an example, we know that at least some of the evidence told us that in fact some of the indoctrination happened in that type of arena. Today we are trying to combat some of that in Canada, and I think there is more we should do from a legislative perspective to try and combat that as well.
Mr. Venner: I think I'll start with going back to the point I made at the outset about our role in terms of collecting intelligence on threats. Our focus is on threat-related activities, and we target investigated individuals engaged in those activities, so we don't focus on institutions per se.
Senator White: Individuals and institutions possibly?
Mr. Venner: Possibly, but we wouldn't define that as investigating an institution.
Senator White: Understood.
Mr. Venner: The results of those investigations are obviously the type of thing that we may share with our partners so that they may decide to take action, whether it's, for example, in relation to countering violent extremism, which the service doesn't have a front-line role in per se. That's more for the types of mechanisms that are alerted to for the RCMP and, as I think Gary mentioned, the significance of a front-line community policing approach to that problem.
So I think I would try to make sure that there isn't a view that we would stray from that. We obviously gather, on occasion, helpful information that could be shared, but that's not really our focus. We're there to worry about the threat-related activities that could potentially pose a danger to public safety, and then if we can develop through those investigations our analysis trends or aspects of radicalization, we think it would be helpful for our partners to use, and we would certainly be sharing that.
Senator White: Thank you for that. I'll certainly ask a similar question later when the RCMP are in front of us.
I have a question for Public Safety, though, if I may, around the sharing of information and whether or not we're actually sharing. Look, our two largest provinces and our largest cities with their police services are not policed by this country's national police service, right? I guess I'm trying to figure out whether or not we actually have the ability to share at every level we need to with those police agencies when they may or may not meet the security requirements to receive the information — sure, they can feed in, but can they receive it back — and whether or not Public Safety Canada believes we should have a national standard that all police organizations and their officers meet to be able to receive the information that, I would argue, they have to receive, particularly in this day.
Mr. Robertson: You may want to pose this to the RCMP when they appear before you later today.
We have five INSETS, Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams, across the country whose sole purpose is to integrate the activities of the various police forces, whether municipal, provincial or federal, and to pursue investigations where it's required. That's definitely a focus of the law enforcement community.
I think the point we were hoping to make most today is that more people appreciate the enforcement side of the equation, which, unfortunately, often happens once things have escalated too far. On the prevention side, we're hoping to promote to a greater degree the work that's been going on that law enforcement has been co-leading, in terms of helping communities understand that interventions are possible earlier; that there are law enforcement personnel who are well trained and sensitized to these unique issues; that they understand how to work with the community practitioners, as I said to your earlier question, whether they be school counsellors, nurse practitioners or whoever it might be; and that it doesn't necessarily lead to incarceration should the family or friends of a person someone is concerned about approach law enforcement.
The Chair: Colleagues, I'd like to follow up with Mr. Venner on a few of Senator White's questions to get some clarification on the record.
Do I understand that CSIS has no responsibility at all in respect to institutions that are perhaps teaching this radical Islamic doctrine or any other religious political doctrine at a religious institution or at a university campus? The reason I ask this question, if you have been reading the international news, there was a report out recently in respect to England, I believe, where it is being said that a lot of this indoctrination for the radicalization of young people is happening in various institutions. If no one is monitoring it, how do we know if it's happening or not happening? If you're not doing it, who is doing it?
Mr. Venner: I will try to clarify. I didn't mean to suggest that there are sort of areas of refuge where the service would be not looking and not investigating. We have policy that deals with how to approach investigations that may touch upon sensitive institutions such as educational institutions and religious institutions, because of the obvious sensitivities around any sort of investigative or operational activity that could potentially impact them or touch on them.
It's not to say that we ignore them or consider those off limits, but we treat those investigations with a certain degree of sensitivity and care. As I said, we're not going to be targeting those institutions per se; we're going to be worried about individuals who may be engaging in threat-related activities conceivably attached to those institutions. We're not targeting the institution. We're following that threat-related activity wherever it may be. When it comes to sensitive institutions, we are obviously very careful about how we do that. There are policies to make sure that that is authorized at the appropriate levels and within the right framework and parameters.
The Chair: Let's get clarification on the record. What you're saying is that for those types of institutions, you do have the authority, if needed, and if there is a threat that you feel is being posed, you can monitor to see if indoctrination is taking place, and then, of course, obviously maybe appropriate action can be taken.
Secondly, these institutions are provincial institutions in some cases. What relationship do you have with the provinces in respect to that as well, if any?
Mr. Venner: I'm not sure what you mean by an institution. Are you talking about an educational institution?
The Chair: Yes.
Mr. Venner: Our issue there is the nature of the institution, whether it's federal or provincial. The point is it would be deemed a sensitive institution. If that's a university or another place of education, that's how we define it. We don't really say, ''Well, it's provincial, so we're not going to go there.''
The other question was?
The Chair: In respect to your authority to be able to go into these institutions, religious or educational, you do have the authority and you do monitor it, and then you take appropriate action if you find, for example, the definition of advocating hate were to come into play. Then you would report this to the RCMP and the integrated group; is that correct?
Mr. Venner: First of all, in terms of our threshold for investigations, generally we have to have reasonable grounds to suspect that an activity is related to a threat to the security of Canada. That would be our threshold for whether or not we would go there.
As for how we would do that, as I mentioned, we have our internal policy, and if you've got an investigation that's going to touch upon that type of institution, you would have to adhere to that. It obviously means higher levels of approval and things like that to make sure it's being treated appropriately.
I'm not sure what else I could add to that. Certainly, we have the authority to do that, but that's how it's in effect treated.
The Chair: I'm sure Senator White may follow up on that a little later. I think he indicated that.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: My question is for Mr. Davies. RCMP Commissioner Bob Paulson said in committee that he would like to see the threshold lowered in terms of the evidence required for the Attorney General to authorize and order a peace bond against a national security target. He stated that, instead of reasonable suspicion, a reasonable belief that an offence is being committed or that an individual is involved in that offence should be enough.
He added that, although it is sufficient if the peace officer believes on reasonable grounds that a measure such as preventive detention is needed to prevent an individual bound by a recognizance to keep the peace, under section 83.3 of the Criminal Code, he must first convince the Attorney General that there is a reasonable ground to believe that the individual carried out or will carry out a terrorist activity.
On the same day, Brian Saunders, Director of Public Prosecutions at the Public Prosecution Service of Canada, told us that obtaining the consent of the Attorney General does not pose a problem for the police. However, he reminded the committee that the Criminal Code authorizes preventive arrest without the consent of the Attorney General or a warrant. Where circumstances so require, law enforcement can arrest someone and obtain consent afterwards, followed by the laying of an information with a view to obtaining a recognizance with conditions.
What does Public Safety Canada think about the threshold being lowered in terms of the evidence required for the Attorney General to authorize and order a recognizance with conditions?
Mr. Davies: Thank you for your question, senator.
[English]
My apologies. I'm not going to have a great answer for you. I know the commissioner made some comments. There are a lot of things in discussion right now, post events in Ottawa, and just given the extremist travel overall, in terms of looking at thresholds and other policy and program legislative approaches that we could be taking, there are a number of things being worked out with the minister now that are advice to the minister and to cabinet. It's difficult for me to discuss any particular proposal that may be on the table.
Obviously, we're interested in thresholds. We're interested in getting intelligence in the courtroom in a safe way that protects the sensitivity of that information. We're interested in improving information sharing. It's difficult to talk in details right now.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: In terms of the British version of the recognizance with conditions, the terrorism prevention and investigation order is valid for two years whereas the peace bond is valid for one year only. Why has a decision been made to limit the duration of the recognizance with conditions to 12 months?
[English]
Mr. Davies: First of all, I think they've just put some new proposals forward. I think Prime Minister Cameron in Australia announced new changes. We haven't had a chance to have a detailed look at those. In the past, when they've done work in this area, they've had trouble in the courts. A lot of the proposals haven't held up well. A lot of the work going on now is led by the Department of Justice. I'm not sure if you're meeting with colleagues from Justice in this committee on this issue, but they're the lead on this issue in terms of any advice on the way forward on peace bonds or recognizance with conditions and the other provisions in what was Bill S-7.
The Chair: As a committee, this is what we're trying to get to, to see whether or not the thresholds presently are too high, because we've been informed on this committee that we have at least 240 Canadians and dual citizens involved in terrorism or at least identified in one manner or another, and yet no charges are being laid except in one particular case, as I understand it. The question is, is the threshold too high? If the threshold is too high, sir, what do we have to do to lower it so that we can expect you and the law enforcement agencies to do the job we expect?
Mr. Davies: It's not just an issue of thresholds. Thresholds are an important part, but there is also the issue of making sure intelligence is usable in the court of law. It's not necessarily just about thresholds.
Thresholds are an important piece, but making sure information can be used in a court in a way that it's protected is also an important piece — and also ensuring information gets to the intelligence agencies so that they can use it, which then can be used effectively in a court of law. You have to look at this from all angles. There are also administrative tools at our disposal, whether passports, watch listing, immigration actions and so on. It's not just about the issue of criminal thresholds.
Mr. Robertson: One other point, if I might. We also need to look at whether some of the other mechanisms John just referred to are contributing to fewer arrest detentions under the section that you referred to than we would expect.
Another program is the listings program. By shining a bright light on organizations or individuals who are engaged in particular activities that we deem to be quite harmful, rarely is there a subsequent infraction within a Canadian jurisdiction. Oftentimes those folks don't return to Canada. They don't come back or don't incur problems here in Canada because it has been made clear there's an issue with the behaviours that we're focused on.
Just another point on the absence or few charges under the one regime, ideally if we were preventing and causing all the mechanisms that act in concert to be successful, we wouldn't see a large number of charges because we wouldn't have a large number of incidents.
The Chair: I'm sorry, colleagues, but I don't think we should leave this. We've been informed that there's in the neighbourhood of 80 Canadians or dual citizens who will return back to this country from being involved in one manner or another in terrorism activities, at least identified. You just told me if we identify the organization, they don't come back.
Mr. Robertson: In some cases. I wasn't using a generalization. Let me take another approach. Just because an individual went overseas, we focus more on the extreme cases where they're actually taking up armed conflict or involved in other things. Others go over and receive very minor training or leave. Some are peripherally involved in financing, whether it's their intention originally or not. In some cases people come back quite disillusioned, and so it's quite possible and one would expect some segment out of that 80 are folks who would have no intention of pursuing anything further along the lines we're discussing today because they've seen enough that they don't wish to have or they didn't have the extreme experiences some others do and they haven't glorified it. I'm not characterizing the full 80 by any means; I'm suggesting there are subsections of that list that aren't necessarily as high a risk as others.
Senator White: I'm trying to figure out how we walk through gathering and sharing some of the information. I'll try not to talk about institutions, because Mr. Venner doesn't want me to. The reality is that things are happening at some institutions by individuals, and that information is out there. We've seen that a number of the cases we've disrupted in this country successfully and prosecuted successfully have been because that information was shared. I have to say that I'm not hearing that we have either enough resources out in the communities right now engaging and gathering and sharing, and it's okay that we say it could come from a teacher or a nurse practitioner happening to work in an institution that could gather it, but the reality is it still has to move its way through a system to go from information to intelligence and often into evidence.
I know Ms. Gray-Henschel's background. I'm sure she'll walk us through this. I'm not convinced we have the resources in those communities to pick up this information to drive it so we can successfully disrupt, as we have in the past — and we've done extremely well in this country for a decade, but I'm not sure our future is as bright now, to be fair.
My question will be to Ms. Gray-Henschel: Have we actually moved the yardsticks forward, kept them where they were over the past decade, or are we falling behind when it comes to resource levels and our ability to combat this? I will disregard the two incidents in October, to be fair. But overall, as a country, are we in the right place? And I'm not apologizing for putting you on the spot.
Ms. Gray-Henschel: It's okay. Thank you for the question. A lot of effort has gone through law enforcement in earning the trust of communities. That's through your basic law enforcement work, so they can engage and feel comfortable in engaging in this radicalization to violence space. In the future focus, one of the things we talked about was building community capacity.
As we ask communities to come forward, to intervene in the pre-criminal space, but also if they cross the line, to trust law enforcement and its agencies, they need to have the information on what the indicators are. We have to equip them. A lot of parents, teachers, nurses and doctors have a number of threats. We are reaching out to educate them through telling the stories.
We have that foundation, which a lot of countries envy. Law enforcement in Canada enjoys the trust of many communities. Can we do better? Of course, we can always do better. But now that we have that, people are willing to have a focused discussion on radicalization to violence, and that's where our energy will be. Recently at a federal-provincial-territorial meeting, we talked about bringing those other orders of government in. Our way forward is to leverage those good relationships in general and to now do the early intervention and prevention.
Senator White: I accept that we are doing much better when it comes to educating those people who are in positions of gathering that information. But we also know that if they don't understand exactly what they should be looking for, too much information that isn't relevant will be less helpful than no information. I'm trying to figure out how to make this more formal in this information sharing. I'm back to the earlier question: Do we need a standard in this country to ensure people are at the right level to receive the information that we want them to get? ''Here is what you should be looking for: Specifically, we have a concern about this group, and here's how they're radicalizing.'' Because if we can't tell them that, I'm going to argue they can't tell us what we need to hear.
Have we actually got to the point where now in this country we need to have a standard to push out across the country for all police agencies? The members of most police agencies in this country don't meet a level whereby they would receive some of the same information you have on your desk, let alone the other agencies we're trying to deal with. Are we at a point where we should be pushing that forward so that we can have 66,000 police officers in this country sharing information more readily than we have in the past?
Ms. Gray-Henschel: What I can say is that in speaking with communities and listening to communities, they've asked for that information, and we've had really good dialogue around that. They're able to provide us with their perspectives and the points of intervention. It's very much a two-way dialogue. With the threat being so diffuse, we need everybody to recognize changes in behaviour, changes in attitude.
A lot of that discussion is not of a classified nature, to be quite honest. It's in the pre-criminal space. A lot of work is going into that, and communities have received us very positively when we've come and told the stories and talked about those changes in attitudes and behaviours, because they're the ones that are seeing it, then follow-up discussion will be held: What do we do with that information? Who are our resources within the community? That's where our priority is right now with the other orders of government.
Senator White: Did you want to add to that, Mr. Robertson? I notice you're nodding your head.
Mr. Robertson: We're obviously at a point of reflection right now. We're looking at a wide variety of things that we might want to consider, especially back to your point as well. Nothing is off the table. We're going through and looking at what makes sense. Even when I talked about the program that we've been leading, we've had great success with the number of people, but we're not in the quantum you've discussed. One of the responses is to go to more of a train-the-trainers approach, because we know we will never have the resources we need to directly interface with every community member who has an interest or every law enforcement member who is inclined to go through that standards-based process. Nothing is off the table right now.
Senator White: Thanks to both of you for your responses. I appreciate it.
[Translation]
Senator Fortin-Duplessis: This is my first time on the defence committee. I am very pleased to hear your remarks.
Here is my first question: When do you anticipate that the Minister of Public Safety will submit the next annual report on arrests without warrant, under section 83.31 of the Criminal Code? I will have two other quick questions afterwards.
[English]
Mr. Robertson: The report that's tabled annually is typically prepared during the spring and early summer periods and usually published late summer or early fall. That would be the next opportunity, probably August or September of 2015.
[Translation]
Senator Fortin-Duplessis: Has the 2014 report already been released?
[English]
Mr. Robertson: Yes, it's been prepared and published. In fact, we can obtain a copy for you, if you would like.
[Translation]
Senator Fortin-Duplessis: The Minister of Public Safety is required under section 83.31 of the Criminal Code to publish an annual report with his opinion on whether section 83.3 should be extended.
Do you think that the minister will support the extension of this provision as currently formulated?
[English]
Mr. Robertson: I'm not sure I fully understood that. Could I ask you to restate?
[Translation]
Could you rephrase the question?
Senator Fortin-Duplessis: Perhaps I should say it in English?
[English]
Do you anticipate that the minister will support the extension of this provision as currently formulated concerning section 83.3 of the Criminal Code?
Mr. Robertson: I'm not sure that I have that information. I'm sorry that's my response, but I'm not sure. John?
Mr. Davies: I don't recall 83.3. What is that provision?
[Translation]
Senator Fortin-Duplessis: It is section 83.31.
[English]
The Chair: May I can just clarify this? My understanding under section 83.3 of the Criminal Code is that there is a requirement, for the minister, therefore the department, to table a list in respect to what's taken place as far as that section is concerned. Our understanding is a report has not been tabled since 2007. Is that correct? If it is, is there an intention to comply with that particular section of the Criminal Code?
Mr. Davies: We'd have to get back to you on that. I believe this is the list of warrants or applications for warrants by the RCMP. I'm going off memory here, but this is not our group that's responsible for that, but we'll look into that and get back to you.
Mr. Robertson: I'm sorry that I didn't have a response for you.
[Translation]
Senator Fortin-Duplessis: Could you send it to us in writing?
Mr. Robertson: Yes, of course.
[English]
Senator Beyak: Thank you, gentlemen. Further to my first question, and Senator Lang's questions as well, there are countries where it isn't working. Have we looked at countries where it is? Australia seems to have a good policy. I'm hearing in your presentation the words ''violent extremism,'' but I'm not hearing what's internationally known as ''violent Islamic jihadist extremism.'' If we can't acknowledge the problem, how can we find a solution? It's like there's an elephant in the room that nobody wants to talk about.
I believe the FBI in the United States has the tools to go into institutions that they believe are radical, that are teaching radical extremism from their podiums. If we don't have the tools to go into those institutions, what do we need to change? How can we give you the tools for Canadians who want solutions? We're all working hard, I acknowledge that, but we seemed to be talking a lot and not actually doing anything to solve this problem.
Mr. Robertson: The comment I would make is we certainly have seen the repercussions of a particular brand of extremism lately, and it has been severe and certainly noteworthy. It's not, as I believe my colleague from the service would say, the only threat we face. We have other extremists and different ecological extremists. There are a wide variety of folks who pose challenges to our country.
I fully agree with you. We need to make sure we're fully aware of where folks are being indoctrinated, if I can say it that way. But again, I think there are huge benefits to living in Canada. There's a huge desire from many people internationally to find their home here, and it's mostly because we're fairly embracing of each other and respectful of each other's views, to a point where it's reasonable, up to the point it becomes extreme.
Again, our program we've been speaking about in terms of prevention is to basically do a better job both from the law enforcement side but also from the community side, to clearly define where that is, apart from the Criminal Code, apart from the formality of it, and have an agreement that we shouldn't move beyond that point. When we're facing situations where we're approaching them, that we want to intervene earlier. Hopefully, that's at least a partial response to your question.
Ms. Gray-Henschel: Can I please answer as well? We are very fortunate to have close relationships with our Five Eyes and some of the countries that you've mentioned. We share a lot of information about this. One of the things that we learned about is that communities that take ownership of this problem and work together with law enforcement, with social services, with mental health professionals, like the Channel program in the U.K., can develop a tailored program for that individual person's factors, which might be different. They have been forthright in sharing that success, as well as some of the materials around the narratives. The United Kingdom and Australia again have shared that.
The opposite is that Canada has also shared what we have learned. One of our best practices is the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security and the partnership that we have and how they vouch for us within communities and build networks right down to the ground. We are sharing that and really trying to work in the space together — not an easy space, but we have a trusted relationship. Regardless of how the threat is evolving, we need to keep adding to the tools so that communities can take what they need based on the gender and age of the person, who the credible voices are for that person. Is it a peer? Is it an older person? Is it a coach? Is it a teacher? Thank you very much for that question.
Senator Beyak: Do you need an additional tool to be able to go into mosques that you suspect have radical programs? We've heard about them in the press. I'm not telling any secrets here. Do we need one further tool to be able to go to where we may be harbouring radical teachers?
Ms. Gray-Henschel: Radicalization occurs in our neighbourhoods and on our streets and is facilitated through social media. We need those conversations to take place in these safe spaces and to really rely on the leaders as to what they need, and we need to provide them with those tools and that support for whatever they need. But they need to adapt it to their own situation. That is where that dialogue is really productive.
I'm very excited about Canada's approach in this. The RCMP has really built that foundation of trust so now we can have those difficult, emotionally charged discussions and ask what we can do. Here is what we expect. What do you expect? What do you know about this? Here is what we know about this. Here are some response actions. Who is going to do what? And do it in a nice, coordinated way so that we have the best chance of redirecting that young person from that pathway to one where they're a meaningful, productive Canadian citizen.
My parents came to Canada, and as a young person I was taught that in Canada you can be whoever you want as long as you don't hurt someone. That was really comforting to me and held me together with all of my friends. Those are the really productive discussions that we're having with diverse communities right across the country, and those are where the most meaningful, preventive responses take place.
Senator Beyak: I'm just concerned that we're not doing it fast enough with what's going on.
Senator Day: I'm trying to get my arms around all the different programs that are out there from a preventive point of view and a sociological point of view, which I think is an important aspect that we've got to be looking at here.
I made a list of the various programs since the 2004 National Security Policy came into being. There's the Kanishka Project that's about to sunset unless something happens and has an interesting mandate to look into the psychology of just what this radicalization is all about. We have to know a little bit more about the fundamentals before we can start talking about preventive measures. I think it's a good program from the point of view of understanding its fundamental approach.
There's the Canadian Safety and Security Program, which I'd like you to tell me a little bit about. We've talked about the Kanishka Project earlier. There's a National Security Community Outreach initiative by the RCMP. You may say we should talk to them when they come before us, but I think Mr. Venner indicated participation in that outreach initiative. There's the round table, the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security, and you're going to get me the information on that. Then I found the Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society — the TSAS — and there's CSIS. Mr. Venner indicated you're also fostering your own communications and collaborative activities with academics and the public, et cetera.
Have I named all of the programs, and are these all of the initiatives going on? Are they all coming out of the 2004 security policy statement by the government? Are any of you working on something a little bit more up to date? That's 10 years ago now. Who would like to start?
Mr. Davies: For the most part no, it didn't come out of the 2004 national security paper.
A lot of the mechanisms you talked about came out of the government's Air India Inquiry Action Plan, for example the Kanishka research funding of $10 million. We don't know of another example in another Western country doing this amount of research into the issue of violent extremism. Amongst our allies we are definitely looked to as a leader in pure research on violent extremism.
Senator Day: Did Kanishka flow from the recommendations in the Air India inquiry?
Mr. Davies: Yes. Some of the other mechanisms are actually funded from Kanishka. You mentioned the TSAS. I can't remember the acronym.
Senator Day: I tried to use the full name.
Mr. Davies: I believe it is a UBC-led project with nine universities across the country. Really the idea is to create a network of scholars on terrorism and violent extremism.
The CCRS, as Anna mentioned, a bit of the history of that predates the mid-2000s.
Senator Day: The Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security.
Mr. Davies: The RCMP has probably been doing outreach since it was created. A lot of the Public Safety-related engagement is entwined with or certainly aware of the RCMP engagement. We will reinforce and complement each other. A lot of these initiatives are in the prevention, engagement space. There are mechanisms to make sure they're talking to each other and they don't overlap, but I think most of them are probably more recent than the 2004 National Security Policy.
Senator Day: Would anyone like to tackle the question of whether we are working on a new national security policy, white paper, green paper from the government? Are you participating in that?
Mr. Robertson: Not to my knowledge. We are certainly re-examining the various tools we have at our disposal right now, and certainly there are a number of discussions under way, but no, we weren't contemplating a white paper.
Senator Day: I can't find it right now, but the Canadian Armed Forces research branch is also involved in developing security communications equipment. You have the Canadian Armed Forces hierarchy, you have CSIS and you have Public Safety Canada involved and the RCMP all in different programs you're funding partially or with others. I think part of the concern here is that when you try to develop a policy you would like it to be directed into bringing all of these pieces in together.
Ms. Gray-Henschel: We have an interdepartmental countering violent extremism working group, and that is where we share information about the different initiatives and priorities and work together as a whole-of-government approach. On some of this research we sit and evaluate, and we're asked to look at the Canadian Safety and Security Program proposals. This is where we provide feedback and try to coordinate that research, but we also coordinate our activities through that committee. It meets every couple of weeks.
Senator Day: We've created a number of silos, and periodically they get together to talk about what each silo is up to. That's what it sounds like. If we want a whole-of-government approach, then why don't we have one department or one agency looking after this in order to understand where we're going? Did I misinterpret your comment?
Mr. Robertson: If I may, this subject is still early in its evolution. It's not something where we fully understand all the characteristics, permutations and solutions in play and thus can sort of run them out like a sausage maker.
Another area of similar concern is cyber, where you will have 20 different departments all involved from their own perspectives, where DND has a legitimate reason to be involved in cyber even though Public Safety Canada is seen to be the policy coordinator.
In the CT space it's helpful to a large number of folks involved in the issue. They all have their own legitimate mandate to be involved, and what is really important is they're not doing it in isolation. So when we do examine and evaluate the programs that the various leads are pushing forward, as a community we can actually understand which ones are providing us with the best return, the best bang for our buck, the most impact in a positive way and then focus system-wide resources on those.
We're still fairly early in this. The Kanishka initiative was only announced in 2011. As you said, it is a sunsetting five-year program in the absence of a renewal, but four years for pure research is still pretty fresh. We're still moving through to the point where we would have a much better understanding.
Mr. Venner: You asked if you had sort of captured the main vehicles, and from the services perspective you did. CCRS, TSAS and Kanishka are the main ways in which we are participating.
I would also add that there was a reference earlier to the CTIO program, the Counter Terrorism Information Officer service, and we supported the development of that program. We also offer advice and guidance in the development of CVE programs to be implemented by others. Those are a couple of other ways in which were contributing, in addition to the ones you mentioned.
Senator Day: I didn't get that last acronym.
Mr. Venner: Sorry, it's countering violent extremism programs.
Senator Day: To clarify the record, the other departments that I didn't mention when I was naming all the departments, Foreign Affairs and Justice are also involved.
The Chair: And DND.
Senator Day: I mentioned DND.
The Chair: We wouldn't want to forget any one of them.
Senator Day: No, I wouldn't want to do that.
Ms. Gray-Henschel: May I add a clarification? I don't want to leave the impression that these activities aren't coordinated. This is a very busy space, and we leverage all those different departments. We are constantly on the phone and on emails because Foreign Affairs has a mandate, but they rely on us for advice and we'll look to them for advice. It's the same thing with the Department of Justice: national crime prevention programming, the RCMP's mandate, the services mandate.
We are constantly sharing information, and people are conducting those activities according to their mandates. I see them as complementary, to be quite honest.
Senator Day: I guess the point I was trying to make is that 10 years is a long time in the space that's evolving so rapidly. Maybe this coordination, which is very important, would be a bit more precise and better if we had a new national security policy generated.
Senator White: I'm going to change track. I am going to ask a question of Public Safety, but anyone can jump in if they like, in relation specifically to the financing of terrorism and our success or lack thereof in prosecuting such cases. I could only find one, but I could be corrected.
I was trying to go back and see if the Tamil Tigers had any prosecution. I don't think they did either, even though they operated for a number of years.
Does the legislation need to be changed, or are we lacking the tools — whether human resources or other resources — to prepare the cases for prosecution? Is the test too high when it comes to approving charges from Justice? I think I'm looking for a perspective more than anything.
Mr. Robertson: I think you've had appear before you, in the recent past, FINTRAC. They talked about their approach to identifying suspicious transactions.
I think probably what they would have told you is that they flag a large number and they pass them on to law enforcement organizations and then they do a screening, vetting them, and pursue them.
Sometimes the numbers can mean something different than what you expect. Again, it can be helpful to have convictions in particular cases where there has been money laundering or use of funds for terrorist financing. In other cases it's a good sign.
In the not-so-distant past the Government of Canada listed an organization that was known or promoted to be a charitable organization. Again, one wouldn't expect to have a prosecution of someone affiliated with that organization because one would expect that all the activities around that organization would stop the day it was listed.
It goes back into sort of the chicken and egg zone: If we're on top of the listings and identifying the organizations and individuals that are likely to commit these types of crimes, we may not end up having convictions because we'll have blocked them from doing something.
Senator White: So disrupting the practice is disrupting the organization because of listing.
Mr. Robertson: That's just one example. Another one in another domain would be Kanishka, which John talked about coming out of Air India. There are also some boarding issues with some individuals and a specified persons list where folks are flagged and they don't get on planes if they pose an imminent threat. There are a large number of preventive mechanisms in place.
Senator White: Would we have agreement from these investigative agencies that this disruption is happening and it's not a tool perspective when it comes to either preparing a case or the prosecution? Would you suggest the RCMP and every other police agency we'll hear from would say the same thing?
Mr. Robertson: I think what every organization would tell you is they can always do more if they have more, but there's never a never-ending flow of funds, as you would know.
It's about hitting the right balance point where you're getting a good return for the investment you've got. I won't propose to speak for the commissioner, or the director, for that matter.
The Chair: I just want to follow up on that, if I could, with Mr. Robertson.
A number of weeks ago we were informed that there were charitable organizations registered to carry out humanitarian contributions. We were told on the record that some organizations were raising money to aid and abet terrorism, and it was estimated to be in the range of six figures.
Are you saying that we haven't identified those organizations, so therefore they're doing it? I'm not quite clear on what you just told us. You said that as long as we identify them they won't continue what they're doing?
Mr. Robertson: I would say there is a process. One, you identify the potential that someone is doing something, and then there is a process we use in government to vet that allegation or suspicion. If it's found to be proven, yes, we would go forward and list the entity. At that point it would become a criminal act for the entity to continue operations or for anyone to support the activities of that organization. There could be entities that are currently being examined where the suspicion is that they're doing that.
As you know, charities, because of their nature, and not-for-profit organizations, are a favourite target for money launderers or terrorists financers because they deal largely in cash and they often have global operations. There are a number of them that were set up for good reasons that can be misused.
The Chair: I'm not going to belabour that. I guess the question is why there haven't been any charges over the course of the last 10 years if these organizations have been operating directly or indirectly in Canada. Are we not investigating properly? How do we have to change it to prevent this money from being ''laundered,'' as you used that word, in respect to terrorist activity? That is the question I have. That's the question a viewer would have. We have had no charges laid in 10 years.
Mr. Robertson: Again, all I can say is I understand that if we are aware of facts that show that someone has been doing those activities, charges would be laid, but I don't believe we've been able to demonstrate that fact. What I suspect is that some degree of that is related to preventive activities we've taken.
Would I suggest they have addressed all of them? No, but certainly there have been impacts to the programs in place.
The Chair: Colleagues, if you don't mind I would like to follow up. We're getting close to the end of our time. I would like to refer back to Mr. Venner on a number of issues.
There is a question of CSIS's responsibility for the purposes of vetting individuals in respect to the appointment of individuals to various boards. For example, I want to refer back to the RCMP's decision to distance itself from the United Against Terrorism handbook that was made public a number of weeks ago. They were part of the publishing of that document, and at the last minute withdrew their support. It was found that, I believe, there were four co-conspirators identified from the United States as advisers in respect to putting that manual together.
Does CSIS take on the responsibility as advisers to ensure, when we're appointing individuals, that those individuals are who they say they are? I don't understand how the RCMP could be putting themselves in a position to have individuals of this background involved so closely with them, yet at the same time knowing that these individuals are who they are and what they belong to.
Mr. Venner: I'm afraid I can't speak to the specifics of that case. I'm not aware of the service having been asked in any way in relation to that issue.
The Chair: I have a further question. I don't know if you can answer it, but I'd like you to get back to us if you can't.
When we're looking for appointments to various boards, to advisory committees in this very area that Ms. Gray mentioned, it's an area that we do need a public conversation on to ensure the individuals representing the various organizations are who they say they are, that they don't have another message that they're giving somewhere else.
Are we ensuring, through CSIS, that these individuals are coming with the full backing of the general public they are supposed to be representing?
Mr. Venner: Since I've been in this position, I'm not aware of the service having been asked to vet anybody in that regard.
The Chair: I guess you would do it if you were asked.
Mr. Venner: Well, the question I guess is if it's a request because there is something in information at their disposal that would lead us think that this is falling within our mandate. For example, is there some reasonable ground to suspect that there is some sort of threat-related activity going on here where the service should play a role in determining if there's an issue? And if there is, through section 19 of the act we have the ability to disclose information to that effect, but it would depend on the nature of the concern or the request that was made and the information they had that we were being asked to look at.
The Chair: The other area I'd like to follow on if I could, you admitted a little bit earlier talking about the question of the investigation of what you referred to, I believe, as sensitive institutions, where it was sensitive. I can to some degree agree that this is probably a very good description of what we're dealing with when we're dealing with institutions such as schools or perhaps religious organizations, that type of thing. At the same time, there's got to be a concern to all of us if certain things are being said behind closed doors and individuals are being indoctrinated. That is what has to be our concern from the Canadian public's point of view.
You said there was a policy in place, if requested, to look at that type of situation. Could you provide us with those guidelines?
Mr. Venner: Absolutely, yes.
The Chair: Thank you.
Senator Beyak: I have a question, and then I wanted a clarification. We identified glorification as a problem in the process toward radicalization, and I wonder if you have enough policies and laws in place to go to the Internet providers and have them shut down accounts that are glorifying radicalization — the tweets, the twitters — or if you need more tools in that capacity?
Mr. Robertson: I think what I would say is we've got a very good relationship with the telco providers in Canada, and many are willing to look at removing objectionable material when it's identified just based on good governance and good citizen engagement. However, unfortunately much of this material resides in servers that are outside of Canada, thus outside of the jurisdiction. So that's again where our relationship with our international allies comes into play, because if we have a positive relationship, we have shared values, we can reach out and they can, in turn, have those discussions with their telcos. If, however, they're in jurisdictions where we don't have that positive a relationship, it is likely that material will continue to reside on the servers.
Senator Beyak: Is there anything we could do as a committee to help, a new policy?
Mr. Robertson: I think we're looking at glorification as one of the issues. The challenge with it is how do you characterize it in a helpful way, because Canada, as many other progressive countries do, promotes the open Internet, promotes governance outside of government because it's such a helpful tool to promote democracy, amongst other positive initiatives.
Every time we load in a restraint on it, it brings that kind of approach into question. So to the degree that it parallels things like hate crimes or hate speech, I think we can look at examining those. We don't want to go too far into the Internet governance domain beyond that.
The Chair: Perhaps you can enlighten us in view of the fact that you are meeting with our allies. Are you having discussions about the question when it comes down to spreading of hate and those types of teachings? Perhaps you could tell us where you're at.
Mr. Robertson: Every jurisdiction is struggling with this, because it's quite clear what the source is. Different people have had different approaches. The U.K. has a particular approach, as you would be aware. The issue is none of them have come to ground and been proven to be quite effective in balance with all the other things. So, yes, we are looking at them, yes we're aware of what is in play right now, but we're back to Senator Day's response. We're still assessing what is the best approach that has the maximum impact.
The Chair: Colleagues, I would like to thank our witnesses for coming before us. We appreciate what you do, and we're here to assist the government in any way we can in dealing with the issue that's confronting Canadians.
Joining us this afternoon from the RCMP are Superintendent Shirley Cuillierrier, Director General, Partnerships and External Relations; and Sergeant Renuka Dash, Acting Officer in Charge, Federal Policing, Public Engagement.
I understand Superintendent Cuillierrier has an opening statement, so would you please proceed.
[Translation]
Superintendent Shirley Cuillierrier, Director General, Partnerships and External Relations, Royal Canadian Mounted Police: Good afternoon, Mr. Chair and members of the committee.
I would like to thank you for the invitation to speak today on the RCMP's efforts to combat terrorism through prevention.
Prevention is the first pillar of the government's national counter-terrorism strategy. There is an understanding that efforts to prevent radicalization to violence are the best way to mitigate the threat of terrorism, at home and abroad.
In short, we cannot effectively counter the threat through detection and disruption alone, and must focus on prevention. In this regard, the RCMP has focused its prevention efforts on countering violent extremism, or CVE, programming.
[English]
It must be stated clearly that the process of radicalization to violence is an incredibly complex issue and one that is constantly evolving. It is also an issue that law enforcement and our partners in the security and intelligence community cannot address alone. A whole-of-society approach is required. As such, the RCMP is currently focusing on collaborative efforts with the community and developing new and innovative programming.
With me today is Sergeant Renuka Dash, Acting Director of the Public Engagement Team and one of the officers leading the design and the rollout of the RCMP's countering violent extremism, or CVE, program. We are both happy to respond to any of your questions at the conclusion of my comments.
The issue of terrorism and radicalization to violence has been at the forefront of public consciousness since the devastating attacks in late October in both Quebec and Ontario. Earlier this year, a different violent ideology led to the targeting and murder of three RCMP officers and another attack in New Brunswick. In all of these attacks, it was Canadians committing acts of violence against fellow Canadians.
We are also experiencing the phenomenon of individuals either travelling or seeking to travel abroad to engage in terrorist activities in several countries around the world. These are examples of the range of results of radicalization to violence.
When I reference radicalization to violence, I am not speaking of individuals who have radical beliefs or who have passionate views. Every citizen has the right of their own beliefs. What I am specifically referring to is the process by which individuals come to believe that inflicting violence upon others will advance their cause. It is when it is heading towards, or when it reaches this point, that it becomes of particular concern for law enforcement and society at large.
While the decision to engage in violent acts is often sudden and unpredictable, there are often indicators that a change in belief is under way. Often, these behavioural changes are the first indications that radicalization and, more importantly, radicalization to violence are taking hold.
Indicators vary, from withdrawal from positive social interactions and activities to isolation and segregation. They could manifest as expressing increased hatred or espousing the virtues of violence and expressing an ''us versus them'' mentality.
Of course, none of these are criminal or should necessarily be of concern in and of themselves, but they could be signs of change to those closest to an individual. That is why we stress the importance of the community, family and friends to identify their concerns to us at the earliest opportunity.
[Translation]
However, as the Commissioner related to you during his recent appearance, identifying these changes is not easy, even for those closest to an individual, and especially for law enforcement. There is no set pattern or path. Individuals may exhibit few outward and obvious signs. Further, these individuals bear little in common besides their eventual adoption of violence.
If identification poses a challenge, establishing how to best proceed with these individuals is equally as daunting. While law enforcement has access to tools that can help put an individual's behavior in context, individuals who hold violent ideologies rarely see the state as trustworthy. This limits our collective ability to successfully engage and steer the individual toward a more positive path.
[English]
Community members, family and friends are often in a much better position to identify and engage with individuals at risk but often lack the information, the knowledge of indicators and the resources necessary to intervene.
The RCMP is seeking to address these challenges through its new CVE program. The program builds on the RCMP's vast experience engaging with communities through our decades-long approach to community policing. The RCMP is seeking to build capacity and opportunities in two ways, by providing education and awareness and by establishing methods for collaborative engagement at the community level.
Fundamentally, the RCMP's objective is to provide community and law enforcement with the tools they need to identify and engage with individuals at risk. It is also to create avenues of support, which are needed to help steer individuals away from a path of violence.
The program's new training regimen is being developed to ensure that police officers and community stakeholders have the means to understand the issue of radicalization to violence and empower them with effective tools. The training includes context on the wider threat environment and clear indication of early behavioural indicators and vulnerabilities. It also provides information on existing and evolving methods of radicalization to violence, such as the widespread use of social media and other areas of the Internet.
The second component consists of enabling avenues of support, through collaboration between communities and law enforcement that we refer to as ''community hubs.''
Community hubs are multi-agency networks of law enforcement, community organizations and human service professionals. They consist of representatives at the municipal and provincial levels designed to ensure that a collaborative approach is used to engage with individuals at risk. A multi-agency approach helps to ensure that the right people or groups, with the greatest chance for success, are empowered to act.
It is important to note that the focus of the RCMP CVE program is limited to those individuals who have not yet committed violent action.
As I said earlier, our goal is to prevent radicalization to violence before it occurs, in what we refer to as the pre-criminal space. Once it becomes clear that an individual is becoming fully committed to pursuing violence, our national security investigators begin a criminal investigation. In this way, we ensure that all of the tools at the RCMP's disposal are being used to address the threat.
While I am confident that our program will have a positive impact in addressing the threats, our efforts will not be enough on their own. It is important that we continue to educate Canadians to understand the critical role that they play in contributing to our collective security.
To be successful, all of society must be engaged and informed for our collective efforts to work. As I have mentioned, family members, friends and the community are best placed to know when something isn't ''right,'' when someone close to them has changed.
In conclusion, let me reiterate that the RCMP is taking active prevention measures. We want to assure the public that they should feel comfortable in reporting their concerns to the RCMP or their police service of jurisdiction.
We will continue our efforts to build mutual trust and understanding between the RCMP and other law enforcement agencies in Canada and communities affected by criminal activity.
Our goal is a collaborative approach, with law enforcement and communities working together to better protect all Canadians.
[Translation]
I would like to thank the committee for this opportunity to speak with you about the RCMP's prevention efforts. Sgt Dash and I would now welcome your questions.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you very much, superintendent. I just want to reinforce the responsibilities that you have in respect to informing the public of your responsibilities and how the individual Canadian has responsibilities. One of the reasons we're having these hearings is to have this public conversation so that more and more Canadians become aware of the threats but also of how we can prevent them.
Senator White: Thank you very much, superintendent and sergeant. Thanks for being here today.
I appreciate your walking us through the program you have. Without naming names, can you give us an example of how this has worked in one location and we've actually been able to pre-empt, as you call it, at the pre-criminal stage or pre-crime stage? Can you give us one example of how it has worked, possibly with another agency in particular?
Ms. Cuillierrier: Thank you for the question.
We're in the process of rolling out components of our program, and we've started with training. It's still too soon to be able to speak about individual interventions or success. We have a performance measurement framework because we recognize that it will be important to be able to track our progress in terms of doing these interventions. We started with components of rolling out training, where we have approximately 30 qualified trainers across the country now.
Sergeant Renuka Dash, Acting Officer in Charge, Federal Policing, Public Engagement, Royal Canadian Mounted Police: One thing I would add is that when we were looking at researching the different types of diversion programs, we did find there has been a lot of success within Canada. Whether they are programs about drug awareness, organized crime or mentoring children at different stages, those diversion programs have been very successful. Our program is layering a national security component to those. We have every confidence that we're going to actually be successful with this program, because it's early on for vulnerable individuals at risk that we are going to be providing support to.
Senator White: I'm glad to hear that you're engaged with other agencies as well. The RCMP is not the largest police service in the two largest provinces or in any of the major cities in the top 10 cities in the country. How has the engagement been going with those police agencies to ensure they are training their staff at the same time?
Ms. Cuillierrier: In September of this year, we had a police officer from the U.K. Prevent program come here, and, along with Sergeant Dash, we offered training to nine police agencies, inclusive of the RCMP, where we trained a portion of the 30 that I had initially mentioned.
We recognize that there is an absolute need in the country, and we are trying to manage the requests that are coming in right now, but we've been involved in speaking with police services in Toronto, Calgary, Montreal, Peel and Vancouver, and there's no shortage of requests. It's just a question now of being able to manage expectations with the resources that we have.
Senator White: Do the resources you have meet the needs and demands? Obviously, they don't. You just told me that. What would the need or demand look like, if we tried to meet it?
Ms. Cuillierrier: One of the positive aspects of our CVE program is that we want to recognize that there's a lot of competent Canadian police officers in the country that we could do a train-the-trainer with. Our CVE program is essentially built on that model, train-the-trainer. Some of those 30 folks are from different police agencies across the country, and the idea is that they will, in turn, work with their colleagues in their respective police agency, as well as work with community members to talk about radicalization and to recognize the indicators and the vulnerabilities of individuals who are at risk.
Senator White: So you don't have any idea how many resources you need to meet the needs?
Ms. Cuillierrier: We have a small team in headquarters, in Ottawa, and essentially we're trying to do the very best we can and leverage as much as we can through the bigger police services in the country. We're also working with the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, so we're trying to operate on a force multiplier to try to deliver this training as quickly as we can in a professional manner.
Senator White: I appreciate that. Thank you for your response.
[Translation]
Senator Fortin-Duplessis: Superintendent, Sergeant, welcome. Thank you for your brief.
It is reassuring to see in your brief that you have tools to combat terrorism. A former religious studies professor from the University of Calgary, Aaron Hughes, told the media that the leadership of the university completely ignored his warnings about the visible radicalization of certain students.
Could you tell us a little about how the RCMP and local police services encourage educational institutions to cooperate with them to raise awareness of radicalization on university and college campuses?
Ms. Cuillierrier: Our approach is to work with local police forces in the hope that, in turn, they will work with communities and share the information. That could also include CEGEPs or universities. In terms of the university that you mentioned, at the same time as the professor was making his comments to journalists, there was an important conference in Calgary with the municipal police force, the RCMP, community members and members of academic institutions, I believe. All those people gathered to talk about how to identify signs or people's behaviour before they are under investigation for criminal reasons. The purpose of our program is therefore to get the message across and to provide tools to communities and police officers.
Senator Fortin-Duplessis: Thank you very much.
Senator Dagenais: Thank you, ladies. In reference to your brief, you said that your goal is a collaborative approach, with law enforcement and communities working together to better protect Canadians.
Please correct me if I am wrong; let me refer you to a publication entitled United Against Terrorism, which was the result of community action efforts with the RCMP. I think you have backed away or broken ranks from this publication; if so, could you tell me what your experience was?
Ms. Cuillierrier: I think my commissioner talked about it a little when he appeared before the committee. We contributed and are committed to part 3 of the booklet. We contributed to everything that was written in that section, but we did not contribute to the rest of the booklet. The RCMP is making every effort to constantly work with communities and it values the fact that communities are coming together to deliver a message and give back to the young people in their communities. It is important to build that level of trust in communities. That takes work and it does not happen overnight. It sometimes takes months or years. We, in the RCMP across Canada, are very proud of our efforts and our approach to community police.
Senator Dagenais: On another note, people want to go, or have gone, to countries that have different religious doctrines and they have sometimes been involved in terrorist activities. Could you tell me to what extent Canada has looked at the motivations of people who go to or want to go to countries with their own religious doctrine?
Ms. Cuillierrier: Our program has more to do with the period leading up to a criminal investigation. I think our colleagues who conduct investigations would be in a better position to answer that question; Sgt Dash might have something to add.
[English]
Ms. Dash: That's correct. Our program is really about the pre-criminal space. If you look at law enforcement in general, we've got criminal space and pre-criminal space. Our whole program is to identify individuals at the very earliest stages, before they mobilize to commit any type of violence. So anybody returning or who has already been assessed to be a threat to Canada's national security will go directly into the criminal operations side.
Senator Day: Thank you, each of you, for being here. My question is in part Senator Dagenais's question and a follow-up to it.
I'm concerned that an awful lot of the violent extremism that we read and hear about seems to be tied into some religious ideology, and that's not necessarily the case. In many cases, you will see extremism being developed in a community, and they don't have any church affiliation. They might dislike people in uniform; they might have a violent tendency against political figures.
That's pre-criminal. They haven't done anything criminal yet, but they're developing a radicalization that isn't tied into an ideology. Have we skipped that one? Are we just relying on the ideological approach at this stage?
Ms. Cuillierrier: Our CVE program is very broad, and we're not going to focus on religious or political ideology. We're going to look at vulnerability, risk and behaviour. As Sergeant Dash mentioned, because we're working in the pre-criminal space, in policing, it would not be unusual to look at somebody who is vulnerable or exhibiting behaviour where they potentially may be recruited into gangs for organized crime purposes or a young lady being recruited online for sex trafficking or a young man who is being radicalized to violence within a national security threat.
Our program is essentially based on looking at behaviour, the indicators, and in a pre-criminal space around all criminality.
Senator Day: I'm thinking of an individual who grew up in a small community, like Senator Beyak and me, or maybe she grew up somewhere else but has moved into a large community. First is the identification and then trying to do something about it, not letting that person progress to the radical stage.
There was a recent case here in Ottawa, and that individual had lived in a lot of different places. The community wouldn't know that person well enough to be able to detect behavioural changes. Your program is not designed towards that, because you talk about using the community as the main focus for your program to try to prevent this.
The community members may not be able to help because you haven't identified the individual, first of all, or they wouldn't be able to help identify the individual because they haven't known this person that long, and then suddenly he has radicalized himself. He might, at the last moment, look for some religious affiliation to psychologically justify his activity, but he wasn't radicalized as a result of that religious ideology. That was just a handy tool along the way.
Can you fit that kind of situation into your program, or is your program more streamlined than that?
Ms. Dash: Radicalization can occur in many circumstances. What is different is that the pathways are different for every individual, and as law enforcement we recognize that. That's why we recognize first responders as law enforcement police officers. We receive the information on behavioural changes, and that's what the program is going to be focused on. The consistency is behavioural changes, and the best people to recognize those are family, peers, teachers; so it's beyond just community.
What our program is going to do is the force multipliers; front-line police officers have that dialogue and that casual discussion with wherever calls of service that they go to. If it's a school liaison officer, they will be able to have that dialogue with teachers who may be able to see some behavioural changes and there's a concern.
Our program is to educate the front line so that they can have that dialogue just like they have a dialogue about drugs, about organized crime, about truancy. That's really the program. The heart of the program is aimed at front-line policing and the individuals that are going to recognize the inconsistent behavioural changes.
Senator Day: Just as a follow-up, I think the critical point is that the person has to be in a community and thereafter be identified by community leaders. If you don't have that, then your program is not going to work at all. You can't go any further. You don't know who it is.
Ms. Dash: Actually, the communities could be family, friends, teachers. It could be anybody. We're not really focusing our efforts on community leaders. The community can be anybody that this individual is associated with. The program will work, and as long as we're provided that information, we're going to provide the appropriate service and support.
Senator Beyak: At the risk of repeating myself, I said to the previous presenters that I believe we have an elephant in the room that everyone is afraid to acknowledge. We are talking about extreme violence here in Canada, but the world is referring to it as extreme jihadist Islamic terrorism. Are we addressing it adequately? Is there perhaps an anonymous tip line that parents can call if they hear something in an institution, whether it's a school or a mosque, if they hear something from their kids or their friends? Is there an anonymous place where people can phone and report and have it investigated, or are we just talking about in the communities? The problem is severe, and Canadians are concerned. I feel as though we're moving very slowly.
Ms. Cuillierrier: Senator, as I mentioned before, we're not going to focus on religion and we're not going to focus on a type of ideology. I think that's a really important piece to communicate to communities. We will not focus on ethnicity, on particular communities, but we do build relationships with all communities in the RCMP across Canada, as do our policing partners.
Working with young people in school is really important, to be able to message early. I believe our program will work as long as we lay the fertile environment, fertile grounds for having parents, teachers, coaches, taxi drivers be able to call the police service of jurisdiction and know that perhaps there is a different tool that the police will utilize as opposed to strictly going to a criminal investigation.
People need to know that there are different options available to them, particularly parents, and that those options could be exercised at a community level with human service professionals. It might be social services; it might be health; it might be the police — but to have that conversation in all of the communities in the country.
I've been around long enough to know that when community people decide to tackle something, even if it's in a criminal space, because it is a threat to them and they're afraid, they coalesce. They come together and they move forward.
We have used MADD often when we speak to police officers in Canada. We have our naysayers even within policing that say this is going to be a very difficult job, but if you've worked in the community long enough, you recognize that when people are determined to make change, they will come together. We're just providing that fertile environment for them to come together and have the discussions.
The Chair: Earlier, Senator Dagenais referred to the handbook United Against Terrorism. You indicated, superintendent, and the Commissioner of the RCMP also indicated, that you were quite pleased with what you had provided as part of that handbook, yet you withdrew from the handbook. Can you tell us why you withdrew from the handbook if you were pleased with what you presented?
Ms. Cuillierrier: The position of the RCMP on the United Against Terrorism handbook is that the tone of the book was a little off, and that was a decision of the commissioner. As he indicated, we stand behind section 3 that we contributed to.
The Chair: I have a general question but it's specifically in respect to the individuals that were involved and being promoted in that particular publication.
Four individuals were identified in the United States as co-conspirators in respect to the U.S. Justice Department. That is my understanding. What I don't understand is, how would a government publication get to that point, utilizing individuals who obviously are very questionable in respect to what you would want them to be promoting? I asked this of the representative from CSIS today. Why aren't the individuals that we're calling upon to represent the community that is at risk, no matter whether it be the Islamic community or any other community, ensuring that those spokespeople are who they say they are and they're not necessarily bringing forward a membership in some other organization, either indirectly or directly, like the Muslim Brotherhood or otherwise?
Do you think it would be a good idea to put a policy in place to ensure that individuals are scrutinized to ensure that they are going to meet the test of time in respect to what you're expecting to do?
Ms. Cuillierrier: In terms of your first question, senator, I'm not aware of these four co-conspirators. I have no knowledge of them.
In terms of our due diligence when the RCMP does partner with folks on a publication or a partnering, I trust that due diligence is given in terms of who we partner with.
As I indicated perhaps earlier with Senator Dagenais, I think when communities come together to support countering violent extremism, it takes a bit of courage to get to that. My understanding is that in the case where this occurred in Manitoba, an event took place a year ago with the community that was actually quite extensive and we had a lot of police partners. I'll let Sergeant Dash speak to that.
Ms. Dash: The event was really bringing together community members, and they were quite concern not just about extremism but about drugs, about their children and what they are involved in, material online.
Speaking to our program, this is what we want communities to come together to do, to share and have the dialogue and have this discussion about the critical concerns that they have.
That was a really fruitful discussion, and that's where we want communities to get to, to have the open, honest discussion with all of the partners there. That happened about a year ago, and we're very proud that we actually have communities asking us to be part of their discussion. It's been a very difficult road in some communities. We've had to rebuild relationships and re-engage, but for communities to have this difficult discussion with parents I think was a success.
The Chair: Sergeant, no one is arguing that, and I assume everyone around this table would support that, but the question is whether due diligence is being taken with respect to background checks to ensure these people who are representing the community are who they say they are. Do you have a policy in place that you do that due diligence so we don't get into a situation like we did with this particular handbook that we referred to earlier?
Ms. Cuillierrier: I'm not aware of a policy, although there could be one. I have been in the organization long enough that I do know that we do bring due diligence in terms of who we partner with and what we support. I think that's a critical piece because we want the confidence of communities and we want the confidence of Canadians. That is extremely important to us.
The Chair: I look forward to seeing if you do have a policy in place, if you could report back.
Ms. Cuillierrier: Okay.
The Chair: You refer to the pre-criminal space. I have a question and I'm going to voice a concern here. It's a very fine line you walk, I would say, in respect to your job as an enforcement agency versus trying to reach out in the community and trying to prevent getting into that situation where there's criminality.
What concerns me is that there seem to be a number of offences or appearances of offences having been committed in the area of terrorism. We have Canadians with dual nationality coming back from being involved in terrorist activities, being overseas and actually contributing and fighting with ISIS. There seems to be an attitude by some that because they're not necessarily fighting but just involved on the Internet that's a lesser offence, yet we come back here and we have these hearings and very few, if any, court proceedings are going forward at all. I think Canadians are asking themselves exactly what is taking place if these people are that high risk.
That's the question that has to be asked. The question I have is this: Where is that line between pre-criminality versus criminality as you reach out in the community and you know that some individual has already been involved in some terrorist attack that is against the Criminal Code — at least the way I read it — and we're not proceeding?
Ms. Cuillierrier: In terms of returnees, our countering extreme violence program is focused on the pre-criminal space. When an individual does return from perhaps allegedly fighting or being involved in terrorist activities, we leave it to our national security investigators to do whatever they need to do upon the individual's returning to Canada. Again, our program will focus on the front end.
Ms. Dash: I think what maybe needs to be emphasized is that the pre-criminal space is early-on indicators, and that's where our program is focusing. If at any point in that time you want to look at as a continuum that the individual who is at risk is displaying signs of behaviour that they're going towards the criminal space, that information will be shared just like any calls to service and we will get our operations involved. We would not put any operations at risk, and our line is very clear. We are helping individuals at risk at the very early stages.
Senator White: I congratulate you on the restorative method you're using in particular with young people and trying to engage them before they become involved in the criminal activity that we're talking about for the most part here. I appreciate that your focus is on the communities and the people in those communities. In fact we've seen similar success in Canada when it comes to gang outreach in Calgary and, to be fair, here in Ottawa and Toronto as well. I think that is the answer down the road.
The challenge we're having is that we've faced a couple of incidents over the past few weeks that tell us we've missed a few pieces somewhere along the line, and whether or not we're doing enough to engage the people who are going to be violent or are travelling overseas and getting training or are going overseas and helping to fund extremism and terrorist acts. If I may, that's one of the disconnects as a precursor to my question.
So you understand, this isn't about whether what you're doing is working — I think it is and I think it will — but there is a second piece that we're stuck with, and that is what isn't working and whether or not we're engaging the people coming back.
My question now is whether we're seeing enough involvement from the community's leadership when it comes to engaging those communities. Are we actually hearing community leaders saying they are as concerned? You've given them a safe environment. You're telling them you're not looking to arrest their children. From what you may tell us, we're saying we need to engage them at some point in time to find a solution.
Are you seeing leaders believe that now and come forward saying, ''We want you to be a part of our community and speak at some of the events we have''? Are you engaging at a higher level so that you're hitting more, or are you still doing it one by one by one?
Ms. Cuillierrier: I think the tides are shifting in terms of community engagement and community leaders coming forward. I recognized certainly in the last year any time that the RCMP has made arrests around a terrorism charge community leaders have come forth to the media. They have talked about how they've worked with the police of jurisdiction or with the RCMP.
In speaking with other Canadian police officers who were here in September in Ottawa for our train-the-trainer workshop, they are noticing a change at the community level with community leaders and religious leaders. I do think the tides are changing and communities recognize they need to get involved sooner rather than later, as opposed to waiting for arrests to happen or for tragedies to come forward.
I sense that as we move forward and we do have a force multiplier with other police agencies across Canada and that interaction and that deliberation, whether it happens in a university setting or at a town hall, I do believe people will come forward. We've had mothers come forward and say, ''I didn't know what was going on and now that I recognize what I should have seen perhaps I would have acted differently.'' That's a switch in thinking.
Again, I think and I know that by engaging more people in this conversation we'll have that effect of people coming forward to police or community human service professionals.
Senator Day: The program that we've been discussing here today on counter violence, it flowed out of Canada's counterterrorism strategy that was issued by Public Safety Canada in 2012; is that correct?
Ms. Cuillierrier: Yes. We're working under the ''prevent'' pillar, yes.
Senator Day: Did new funding come out as a result of that policy announcement?
Ms. Cuillierrier: That predates my time in this position, so I am really not aware if there was funding in 2012.
Senator Day: If you're able to determine that for us, it would be helpful. What I'm interested in knowing is the total amount that is dedicated to your particular CVE program, countering violent extremism program. You indicated you had 30 trainees across Canada now. Are they being paid specifically to do this job, or are they in uniform and doing that as part of their normal RCMP attachment?
Ms. Cuillierrier: Of the 30 qualified trainers that we have across the country at this point in time, for some of them it is their full-time job. Some of them may be school liaison officers. Some of them may work in different areas but have an interest in working at communities or are very good facilitators and able to train other police officers. That is the reason they would have been selected to come on the training.
Senator Day: Are they paid in addition to their normal salary for this particular training job that they're doing?
Ms. Cuillierrier: No. This would be part of their core function.
Senator Day: Okay. So back to your secretariat here in Ottawa, that's the only place where you have people who are working on this particular initiative. Can you tell me how much money is being dedicated? Is it coming only out of operations, or do you have a separate line item of expenses that we could go to?
Ms. Cuillierrier: I would suggest that perhaps the chief financial officer of the RCMP would be in a better position to respond to questions around funding and budgets. I essentially work with the people I have and recognize that I can work with the INSET teams that are located across Canada, as well as the different municipal police services that are expressing an interest in working with us around CVE.
Senator Day: If you needed more funding, superintendent, would you go to the line of command and say, ''I need more bodies,'' or would you be told to put that in your budget for the next year? Do you work out a budget for your operation?
Ms. Cuillierrier: I do, and my answer would be I do both. I put forward a projected budget, and I also look at speaking to my command around some of the pressures or requests that are coming in on our new program.
Senator Day: I think the sergeant had an answer that she was going to give here as well.
Ms. Dash: I was going to add to the superintendent's comments in regard to Public Safety Canada. We have been working collaboratively under the Kanishka funding, and we have received benefits from some of the research and tools that they have been able to provide to front-line officers, so we have been using Public Safety Canada in that sense.
Senator Day: I'm glad to hear that. We learned that that funding will expire next year, 2015.
Senator Beyak: Thank you for your presentation. I'm still afraid that we're not addressing the big issue hard enough, but I'm very appreciative of your work at the community level.
In March of 2011, the Senate did a report where we identified the four steps to jihad. I will have to read it, because it was quite long. Stage 1, the state of how you were. Stage 2, self-identification. Stage 3, indoctrination. Stage 4, jihadization, when one decides to actually act. Now, it seems we can only influence the radical Islamist during stage 2, self-identification, and stage 3, indoctrination. What specifically are you doing to counter indoctrination, and when do you refer it to the national security investigators that you talk to? You talked in your presentation about the community hubs, but I still don't see how they're going to actually deal with someone who is on the verge of doing what happened in Ottawa.
Ms. Dash: Our program is addressing the early indicators of an individual that is going down the path of criminality and potentially there may be a nexus to national security. I know I've made comments before that early indicators and behavioural changes are really best seen by family, friends and teachers. Early on, the signs could be that language changes, there is an us versus them mentality. There is also language in regard to maybe political ideology or religious ideology. When that type of information is brought to the attention of law enforcement or a community leader or a trusted individual, that is when we could potentially get involved. We would then look at and assess the situation and provide the appropriate resource. It could be a mentor, someone who would come in and maybe have a discussion with the individual to say, ''This is the interpretation of the ideology, and it's not what you're thinking.'' It depends. It's on a case-by-case basis, and we would look at that. That's how we would get involved early on.
The four stages that you've described are pretty much when the individual has radicalized. That could happen over two months or three months, or it can take years, and that is all in the criminal space.
Senator Beyak: When do they call in the national security investigators? At what point in the community hub would someone identify that there is a problem?
Ms. Dash: It would depend on the assessment. If an intervention is taking place and the individual is really not responding to the support, an assessment is done, and that's when a decision will be made as to what the next steps will be.
The Chair: Colleagues, I'd like to go back to the individuals that have been involved in some terrorism activity outside the country and have come back and have been identified.
Superintendent, you identified that there were some who had come back quite disillusioned. It wasn't what they thought it was going to be. They are back in the country because they didn't want to stay where they were and continue doing what perhaps they were doing. In respect to your program and these individuals that have come back, how many have you identified, in rough numbers, that have come back because they're disillusioned? Are you utilizing these individuals, for example, in your program to go to these particular communities to tell these young people just what the real world really is? Do you do that? If you don't, why not?
Ms. Cuillierrier: Senator, as I mentioned earlier, when individuals return, they are handled or managed through our criminal investigations and our national security criminal investigations, so they do the follow-up. They do the interviewing or surveillance or whatever police technique is required based on the information in the criminal file or the investigation.
In terms of our program in the pre-criminal space, we've looked at utilizing returnees or people who have had experience. Our international partners have in some cases done that, and it certainly is effective. In fact, there is one tool that we will be using in one of our training sessions that actually speaks to one of those examples; a young person who has been incarcerated in the United Kingdom agreed to do a video and walk people through his journey. Then it becomes very evident where community and human service professionals could have actually intervened had they been aware or had they had a little bit of awareness about what radicalization to violence looks like and what the indicators are.
Your idea is a good one. We have thought about it. We are not quite in a position in this country to have that kind of tool available to us, but we have been working with Public Safety Canada on an initiative with the consultant to develop Canadian tools that would actually tell the story, as you're suggesting.
The Chair: As I said earlier, the purpose of these hearings is to have a public conversation to let Canadians know exactly what we face or what we don't face. Of the 80 people who have come back, how many have come back disillusioned and have come back just because it didn't work out the way they wanted it to work out? Could you maybe go back and find out the numbers we're talking about here?
Ms. Cuillierrier: If I could make a suggestion, that's a question better posed of our folks who work in criminal operations around the returnees to be able to give you a sense of what that looks like. I'm sure they would be happy to give you a broad idea of what takes place when these individuals return to Canada.
The Chair: Colleagues, we'll wait and see if we can get some information on that.
I'd like to turn to one other area before we come to a conclusion. One program that's been referred to is called countering violent extremism training, as part of some of the programs that are available. You're familiar with that? One of the programs you're working on is countering violent extremism?
Ms. Cuillierrier: Yes.
The Chair: I'd like you to provide us the list, if you could, of the individuals involved in that program, training in the program, and those who are outside the government sphere who are being used as advisers in respect to that, if you could do that for us.
Ms. Cuillierrier: For the police trainers, that would be easy to do. For our community resources, that is certainly not a comprehensive list at this point in time. We're working on it literally on a daily basis.
The Chair: Whatever list you have.
Ms. Cuillierrier: Okay. We're connecting.
The Chair: We know it's a moving list. That's fine.
Ms. Cuillierrier: Fair enough.
The Chair: Thank you, superintendent.
Senator Day: I have a brief question to gain a bit better understanding of your community outreach. In 2004, the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security was created for the specific purpose of helping to develop trust and understanding in the various ethnic communities, and obviously the RCMP and CSIS have been involved in community outreach for a long while, and that's how they recruit informants to gather information. What is it about your community outreach in this particular initiative that is different from the community outreach that you've already been involved with?
Ms. Cuillierrier: In the case of countering violent extremism, as you indicated, senator, we have a long history of doing community work. Community policing is at the core of how we do policing in Canada, and that's writ large across the country.
Regarding what's different, I'd like to say that it's very much about leveraging what we already do very well, and that's essentially building the trust with the communities. I think training police officers, imparting the information, awareness and education is something we do on an ongoing basis. This is a new phenomenon. Police officers in Canada want this kind of information and education, but they also want, ''Okay, so I have this knowledge. I recognize or I get a phone call from a family member. What do I do with it? Where do I go? What do I do to triage or to help this individual or this family?'' That's what's different about this program. It's a combination of training, awareness and education, and then it's leveraging those human service professionals at a community level, whether we're dealing in the past perhaps with sexual assault, gang violence, truancy, and this time it's going to be about layering countering violent extremism and getting people in the community, those professionals, understanding what radicalization to violence is.
We have health professionals out there who are very much in position to help and to provide information. We have teachers out there who are very much in position to recognize when a young person's behaviour or language changes or perhaps how they dress is changing. It's capitalizing on everything that we have been doing but bringing it in together to look at countering violent extremism, radicalization to violence.
Senator Day: Thank you. That was helpful. The CVE program, is that within the RCMP part of the Canadian Safety and Security Program? Do you know that term? We heard about that in the last session.
Ms. Cuillierrier: I don't.
Senator Day: Are you part of that? The Canadian Safety and Security Program works under a different funding mechanism. We learned about it at the same time as the Kanishka Project, which you indicated you do get some funding indirectly for or from.
If you don't know about it, then you're obviously not part of it.
Ms. Dash: No.
Senator Day: That answers that.
The Chair: Thank you, senator.
I'd like to thank our witnesses for coming here today. We certainly appreciate your taking the time to come here and participate in our hearings because it's very important to the general public to hear from members of the RCMP, obviously. We appreciate the work you do.
With us in this final panel of the day is Deputy Commissioner Scott Tod, Ontario Provincial Police, Co-chair of the Counter Terrorism and National Security Committee. Welcome to the committee. We're pleased to have you with us today.
We do have the prepared text of your presentation. Colleagues, it's in English. I'm wondering if I could have a motion to disseminate it as a draft so that we have something to follow. Moved by Senator Day. Agreed.
Deputy Commissioner Scott Tod, the floor is yours.
Deputy Commissioner Scott Tod, Ontario Provincial Police, Co-chair of the Counter Terrorism and National Security Committee, Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police: Distinguished members of the Senate, I am pleased to accept your invitation to be here today representing Chief Clive Weighill, President of the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, and as Co-chair of the Counter Terrorism and National Security Committee.
The mandate of the CACP is safety and security for all Canadians through innovative police leadership. This mandate is accomplished through activities and special projects of a number of committees and through active liaison with various levels of government and departmental ministries having legislative and executive responsibilities in law and policing.
The Counter Terrorism and National Security Committee, CTNS, is one CACP committee with the specific mandate to harmonize the work of the Canadian law enforcement community in identifying, preventing, deterring, investigating and responding to criminal activities related to terrorism and national security.
The strategic priorities of the CTNS committee are, one, to promote collaboration and integration amongst law enforcement agencies with appropriate public-private security and intelligence partners; two, to improve the ability to operate in a cooperative and integrated manner with the view of addressing emerging trends; three, to develop processes and facilitate strong communication at all levels; four, to recommend legislative reforms; and, five, to promote education and training in matters of counterterrorism and national security.
The CTNS committee consists of national representation from police services across Canada at the executive level and government agencies with the operational mandates that include a response to the threats to Canada's national security. I can provide a list of member agencies, if you wish.
The committee gathers partner agencies that assess and address counterterrorism and national security issues, either from an operational or an intelligence perspective. Private industry may also attend our meetings on an advisory basis or when approved and invited by the co-chairs.
During the past year, the CTNS committee has continued to strengthen communication, cooperation and coordination amongst the law enforcement community and key partners dedicated to community safety and well-being.
Activities of the committee include the initiative to create a counterterrorism guide for the implementation of provincial counterterrorism measures and strategies across Canada. The purpose of the guide is to create a tool box for chiefs of police in Canada, which would be in line with Canada's Counter-terrorism Strategy.
The CTNS committee held a national forum this past September 16 and 17 at the RCMP National Headquarters to provide participants with an understanding of the national security threat; the challenges associated with counter-terrorism investigative efforts; and information on the four pillars of prevent, detect, deny and respond. More than 125 law enforcement and government agency representatives attended that conference.
The international law enforcement community is confronted with the challenge of increasing its efforts to detect and prevent acts of terrorism. This challenge has been exacerbated by the global dispersion of terrorist groups and individuals causing police executives to place greater emphasis on the important relationships that extend beyond our cities, our provinces and our nation.
In response to this critical threat, the RCMP co-leads an international group of like-minded countries and agencies designed to integrate our approaches to leadership, terrorism and intelligence, with a focus on strategic thinking, prevention and a global vision.
The CACP CTNS committee assisted the RCMP by assessing and selecting the Canadian law enforcement and security agency candidates for participation and learning opportunities within an international setting.
The Canadian law enforcement representatives are required to complete an action paper as part of their commitment to attending. The committee has assisted in completing a review of those papers and also in approving candidates for the upcoming conference. The approved topics are centred again on the four pillars of prevent, detect, deny and respond.
At a typical CTNS committee meeting, members are provided an overview of the current threat environment within Canada. This is a standing agenda item to generate discussion on issues affecting all of the CTNS member agencies. Bulletins and notices are created by the member agencies and shared nationally through the CTNS committee and the CACP on issues related to threats, trends and law enforcement practices.
Threats, trends, best practices and other timely topics are discussed at meetings. A recent presentation was made to the committee by the Federal Ombudsman for Victims of Crime. Other presentations and discussion include the work being done by the RCMP on radicalization prevention and the development of community engagement programs.
In addition to the work of the CACP CTNS committee, there are other law enforcement activities ongoing to address the threat of terrorism. An example of the provincial activity is the Provincial Anti-Terrorism Section, more commonly known as PATS, in Ontario.
The PATS section is an Ontario Provincial Police-led joint forces operation comprised of intelligence members from eight municipal police services, along with provincial and federal agencies, including the Canada Border Services Agency. The PATS team is mandated to conduct multi-jurisdictional, strategic intelligence operations on matters involving international, domestic and other specific acts related to terrorism in Ontario. The PATS team works hand in hand with the RCMP-led national security teams in Ontario and they meet regularly to share information and support each other on terrorism-related investigations.
Most recently at the municipal level, the Calgary Police Service hosted a conference on countering radicalization. The conference had experts, academics and presenters from other countries, and most notably from across Canada.
Law enforcement officials and other public safety officials attended the two-day conference as an example of the need to inform and share our best practices, observations, research and solutions to the issue of radicalization and extremist activities.
Hopefully I have provided a fair review of the activities and actions that the CACP CTNS committee and its members have undertaken in regard to terrorism and national security at the federal, provincial and municipal levels. Thank you, and I look forward to answering your questions.
Senator White: Thank you to the deputy for being here today.
I appreciate your referring a lot to the RCMP and the support they provide. The RCMP doesn't police our two largest provinces or any of the largest cities in the country. Do the chiefs of police and the agencies — I'll look at Ontario for your sake — get the right amount of intelligence from CSIS, for example, and others? Does it always go through the RCMP? Is there an opportunity as well?
When I was the chief in Durham, one of my biggest complaints was that CSIS would try to give the information to INSET or others to give to me, which could take weeks in some cases before I received it. Should they be going directly to the municipal partners?
Mr. Tod: As you well know, in Ontario the Police Services Act describes the responsibilities of a chief of police and the investigation of criminal conduct or a criminal matter. We're providing public safety for that at the decision and discretion of that chief of police.
In regard to national security, I can tell you that there is an information flow that occurs from the bottom up and from the top down. I'll start with an example of the bottom-up approach.
In Ontario the PATS team that I spoke about is eight police services, and we have a number of other informal partners. We also have a liaison program involving private industry. It all provides information into the PATS unit, which feeds into the INSET teams and is then mixed with the information that's provided from CSIS to the INSET team to develop a clear picture and understanding of a threat.
CSIS does provide information to the RCMP INSET team. They do it in the one-vision concept, in the sharing of that information. They do it within the laws of Canada. I have no concerns in regard to the lack of sharing. Perhaps it's because of the fact that I do sit on the CTNS committee, and CSIS sits on that committee as a representative.
More recently we've been active and robust in the sharing of information in collaboration. I think a lot of it has to do with the trust that's occurred within law enforcement in the last couple of years in Ontario.
Senator White: We've had a lot of discussions with people before us asking about legislation. Do we need more legislation or changes to legislation?
A good example is one police leader questioned the need for AG approval on peace bonds. Do you see any shifts or changes that we need to recommend or that we should be focusing our attention on when it comes to terrorism, and the Criminal Code in particular?
Mr. Tod: The recent legislation I've seen proposed within the federal context in regard to additional powers for CSIS, for example, has been in regard to the protection of informants. I think it's a necessary aspect that the security service needs. I think the other legislation we're looking at in regard to Canadian citizens who travel, Canadian citizens who have an opportunity to travel, is also an important piece of legislation which would support our efforts.
Specifically, in regard to the Criminal Code, I think the Bill S-10 amendments or other laws that have come in have been satisfactory. I can't sit here today and think of any legislation that I could consider being a strong proponent of at this time from the CACP's perspective.
Senator Dagenais: Thank you, Mr. Tod. I have two short questions.
What can we do to ensure better coordination between all law enforcement bodies during all stages of terrorism matters from notification of threats to prosecution?
Mr. Tod: As I opened up with the comments in regard to the legislative permissions that are given to chiefs of police, I will speak for Ontario only. The Ontario Police Services Act provides the legislated obligations, roles and responsibilities of a chief of police. Although it doesn't specifically talk about terrorism, it talks about public safety and about rights and freedoms.
The regulations that we have in Ontario speak specifically to terrorism, counterterrorism, planning and preparedness for a chief of police. It talks about a coordinated role, working with other agencies that provide that service.
The difficult part is in regard to when an event occurs, who carries the responsibility? Legislation will tell you it's the chief of police, but in some instances that may not be the best decision maker for something like that. That, to me, at times is confounding in regard to what other pieces of the puzzle we have in place to ensure that the coordinated effort is occurring.
For example, the chief of police has the option not to call for a national security team, not to call for a provincial security team or not to call a fellow or neighbouring police agency for assistance.
The other part on the coordination piece is the intelligence part. The piece of readiness is, ''How ready are we?'' That is the question we always ask ourselves. I have learned that readiness can only occur through collaboration, coordination and sharing information.
That's why the PATS team, which comprises many police services in Ontario, works hand in hand with the federal police service on the Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams. We've learned the best way to provide and learn information is by being at the table with them and coordinating and sharing.
I hope I've answered your question. Again, it's the individual chief of police who really has the say in how much collaboration and coordination will occur.
Senator Dagenais: How much resources do our local police forces dedicate toward counterterrorism and counter-radicalization matters?
Mr. Tod: For terrorism, we have the Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams. I believe there are six across Canada. Those teams invite municipal and provincial police services to join them. In Ontario, I believe the INSET in Toronto has eight other police services that are partnered, co-located with them. The other team, the INSET in Ottawa, has three police services that are working together.
The collaboration occurs in regard to the larger police services, the police services that carry a substantial amount of population and a substantial amount of a potential threat and that are engaged with the national security environment.
On the radicalization process, that is something relatively new — I would say within the last year or two certainly, two years of policing. How much work occurs, I think you've heard from previous witnesses here today about the efforts of the RCMP. I mentioned one conference that was recently held in Calgary. I know of two others being held in December — one in the Niagara Falls area and one in Ottawa — to counter violent extremism and radicalization.
I think substantial efforts are ongoing now in regards to it. As I said, it has been a recent phenomenon, within the last year, that we've paid a close amount of attention to it.
That's from a policing perspective. In my opinion, our security partners at the federal level have had that on their radar a little longer than we have.
Senator Beyak: Thank you very much for your presentation. We had a representative here from FINTRAC a little while back. I wondered how involved the local police services and the OPP would be in laying charges and pursuing a case for financing terrorism. The RCMP has a national role, but I'm assuming you would have a role to play at the local level.
Mr. Tod: FINTRAC sits as a representative at the national table with the CACP CTNS committee. They provide to the table information about money laundering and financing of terrorism. That information is available to any police service upon request or with notification from FINTRAC.
The money laundering is one aspect we look at, especially right now on the issue of radicalization. It's the high-risk traveller, for example, and the radicalization process to high-risk travellers, but also the facilitation of the travel itself is very important. We do look at how the funding is obtained and where the funding comes from. We can't do that without FINTRAC assisting us.
Senator Kenny: I attended the conference in Calgary this past week. It was a remarkable two days. One of the issues that came up was the question of separating a community outreach program, much like what the last set of witnesses was talking about, from the folks involved in gathering intelligence in an organization.
Do you think, in a practical sense, that actually can work?
Mr. Tod: I do, senator. Speaking on behalf of the Ontario Provincial Police, as a result of undergoing an extensive review of our actions in regard to Camp Ipperwash and as a result of a public inquiry that was held, we had an opportunity to look at the organization and how we manage information and how we do community outreach. We created something called our provincial liaison teams — individuals out there to work with the communities, work with the groups, work with individuals, and to be able to provide a perspective of both sides or a perspective in regard to law, a perspective in regard to someone else's rights, someone else's position on something. I do think that's a very important role, separate and apart from intelligence.
The purpose of our provincial liaison teams is not to collect intelligence and provide information back to the centre or back to an analysis function, but to provide perspective, to provide dialogue, to provide an open door for engagement. I think a similar program in regard to radicalization or community engagement or CVE — countering violent extremism — is very possible.
In Ontario, at a government level, right now we have a community safety plan working group. We're developing community safety plans for communities. I hope that radicalization and CVE — countering violent extremism — will become one aspect within those community safety working group discussions and that, looking to the criminogenic factors of poverty, homelessness, addiction and mental health, we will also use those criminogenic factors and look at extremism and radicalization also in a similar light so that we can identify vulnerable individuals who may cause harm to themselves or society.
Senator Kenny: What would happen within the OPP if somebody in community outreach came across actionable intelligence? What would they do?
Mr. Tod: Within the confines of the provincial police policy, they are required to report information that would prevent a criminal act from occurring, information that would prevent someone from being hurt, information of a breach of some other practice or policy that's important to the policing organization.
Senator Kenny: The outreach programs are dependent on the trust of people they're engaging with. I find myself putting my head in the place of a mother whose son is starting to behave in a problematic way. What do you have to go through as a police officer to persuade that mother to know where the line is when she can come forward and that will be of benefit to her son, or when she decides otherwise? There's bound to be a measure of mistrust initially, at least.
Mr. Tod: Absolutely, senator. I heard a previous witness describe pre-criminal space. On the aspect of mobilization and engagement, it's not a police function; it's a community function. So the police are facilitators of liaison and engagement. We would prefer actually not to do it, the full act, but we would prefer to facilitate how community mobilization engagement occurs.
In the instance of the mother, we would hopefully build trust within a community leader, a community champion or an issue-specific champion within that community that can represent or advocate not just on behalf of the police but on behalf of the citizens in the community to do the right thing.
Having the police fulfill all the responsibilities and obligations on engagement and liaison we know is not the right answer. We have to have community facilitation occur. We have to actively go out and, for the sake of a better word, recruit trusted leaders within communities and issue-specific concerns in our communities to deliver the message or to be the trusted person I think you're speaking about.
Senator Beyak: As a follow-up to my previous question, just for the benefit of those watching, with the money laundering, the terrorism financing and the facilitation of travel that you mentioned, what role would each level of police force play in building a case to lay charges there, the local police, the OPP and the RCMP?
Mr. Tod: Many police services have a relationship with FINTRAC. Where it is ideal is the relationship with the federal INSETs that do financing and money-laundering investigations on terrorism. A police service itself to do that investigation requires expertise in accounting, forensic accounting, understanding the economic management system we have in Canada. Generally, they would seek expertise from a larger organization or another agency that has that specific experience and knowledge on how to do money-laundering investigations.
But it starts with a patrol officer. It really does. It starts with the understanding by the patrol officer that for a person to travel outside of Canada it costs money. In many places it's very expensive, depending on the mode of travel. That officer understands that they have an opportunity to look for plane tickets, Visa bills, receipts, cash, things that occur within the individual or the environment of the person who is travelling, and I'm using high-risk travellers here, or in other types of individuals who maybe entered into terrorist acts in Canada. Everyone plays a role. I'm talking about the patrol officer, but also senior executives at my level to make sure that we're working cooperatively together, especially FINTRAC. They do provide annual reporting to all the police leaders in the country to make sure we're all working together.
The Chair: Colleagues, could I follow up on this? I think this is an important area. We've been informed that we went from 50 to 53 identified terrorist organizations operating in one capacity or another here in Canada. That's the information we received at this committee. Second, we've been told there is a serious problem identified out there of financing of terrorism organizations through charitable organizations that contend they're doing humanitarian work.
What I don't understand is, we have had a number of witnesses come here, say that it's a problem, outline what the problem is and the magnitude of the problem, and yet at the same time, to my knowledge, we have had no charges laid over the course of the last 10 years.
Is the threshold too high from what we, within the judicial system, are asking in respect to laying charges, or is there another way we should be doing this type of investigation so that we can get the necessary evidence to lay those charges? It has to be a concern to you and to the general public if this is obviously going on and there are no ramifications to it at the end of the day. Do you want to comment on that?
Mr. Tod: Yes. Very true. We are concerned about the financing of terrorist activities in Canada or outside of Canada by Canadian citizens. The difficulty in the past has been the ability to prove that the funds were used to facilitate terrorism, and follow the funds — ''follow the money'' is the term we used when I was a fraud investigator — and the end result that the money truly facilitated a terrorist act or terrorism in one way or another. That has always been the difficulty.
In the past, some of it was experience, knowledge of police services. I think we've worked well towards that. But it speaks to the large picture of how much money actually from Canada is used to facilitate terrorist acts in Canada and around the world, and I don't have that number. I can't tell you what the country-specific amount is, what the country-specific percentage is to global terrorism. I don't know. It may be a combination of many things, but we are always looking at that in regard to investigations involving terrorist activities, and we always look at the facilitation and source of funds. Amounts really aren't that large often as we look at it.
The Chair: We were informed here, I believe it was at our last committee meeting, that it's as high as six figures. We're talking about hundreds of thousands of dollars maybe through one organization, according to the testimony that was provided.
I want to go back to my question again. Is the threshold too high in respect of organizations such as your police force or others? Is it being requested so that charges aren't laid, or could I ask this question: In your experience and your knowledge of other police forces, is information being compiled, are investigations being done by the various law enforcement agencies and then being brought forward to the Crown prosecutor's office and then not being taken forward? Is that what is happening?
Mr. Tod: I can't answer that question with a specific answer. My apologies.
Senator Day: This meeting that just took place in Calgary was under the auspices of what organization, the chiefs of police?
Mr. Tod: It was the Chief of the Calgary Police Service.
Senator Day: How does that happen? You mentioned a number of others that will be happening. Is it the initiative of the taxpayers in a particular region to cover the cost of this? Do you have a rotation within the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police saying it's your turn to do something?
Mr. Tod: We don't have a rotation. The forum I spoke about on September 16 and 17 was in fact the very first forum we've ever held as the CACP CTNS committee. We have spoken about extremism before in the CACP environment. This was the very first specific forum we had on terrorism. As I mentioned in my opening comments, each individual chief of police is responsible for public safety within their own jurisdiction.
Senator Day: Yes.
Mr. Tod: Chief Hanson in Calgary took it upon himself, largely as a result I would assume from his discussions with other police services in the province of Alberta and the national police service, and decided that it was to the benefit of the police officers in Alberta to hear from the experts that he had attend. I believe it was at his own initiative, much like the one being held in Niagara Falls in December. It's the initiative of the Chief of the Niagara Regional Police Service and the Provincial Anti-Terrorism Section who have decided to put on a conference in relation to terrorist attacks and radicalization.
Senator Day: That's quite haphazard, though. You're just hoping that the next chief in some other area will decide to call a conference so you can exchange information rather than it being objectively looked at and saying we should be sharing this information on a regular basis, every six months or whatever you decided.
Mr. Tod: It's largely a result of the phenomenon of radicalization that has really become a large specific topic in the last year that many of the chiefs have decided to take action on their own. The CACP CTNS committee has a member of the Calgary Police Service on it. Whether the CTNS committee, as a result of our work on radicalization and terrorism, and that member returned to the service and suggested it or not I can't speak to, but we do have and we do monitor and we provide assistance in the way of speakers and expertise to chiefs of police who wish to put on conferences around terrorism.
Senator Day: Have you participated in the round table on countering extremism?
Mr. Tod: I don't participate in that forum.
Senator Day: Is that something you would get invited to participate in from time to time?
Mr. Tod: My apologies, I can't answer without knowing the specifics.
Senator Day: The Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security.
Mr. Tod: I'm not familiar with that committee at all.
Senator Day: How about the CVE program that we just learned about, the RCMP's countering violent extremism program and the various training sessions that they're having; are you familiar with that?
Mr. Tod: I've received two presentations in regard to that, yes.
Senator Day: Is that a helpful thing that should in your view be continued?
Mr. Tod: Extremely, and timely.
Senator Day: Thank you. That's helpful.
Senator Ngo: I would like to continue the question raised by the chair and some others here. We know that more than 130 Canadians overseas brought some related terrorism activities. We know about 80-something returned to Canada, and this included involvement in training, fundraising, promoting radical views and even planning terrorist violence.
Does the Combating Terrorism Act allow you to arrest those people suspected of terrorism for a period of time?
Mr. Tod: Temporary detentions?
Senator Ngo: Yes, temporary detentions, because in the Combating Terrorism Act they allow you to do that. Have you done it so far? According to the chair so far we have only one charge.
Mr. Tod: I have no knowledge of that, no.
Senator Ngo: Do you know how many times the Combating Terrorism Act has been used to detain these individuals?
Mr. Tod: I can't answer that question either, sir.
The Chair: Colleagues, I think we're all trying to understand what the RCMP does, what your organization does, and other organizations within the law enforcement agencies.
I just want to go back to the 80- to 90-some-odd individuals who have been identified as high risk in security. Is only the RCMP involved in that, or are you involved if it's in the province of Ontario in part of that surveillance and monitoring these individuals who are determined high risk?
Mr. Tod: We provide assistance to the national security enforcement teams — and I'm speaking of the OPP — we provide specific support and investigative assistance to the national security enforcement team in regard to all of its activities, whether it be a high-risk traveller or a planned and deliberate attack. We provide resources to them all the time, of which surveillance would be one, as well as technical assistance and intelligence analysis. We provide the assistance to them continuously. That's true of the partnership we have within Ontario.
The Chair: But just follow this through: You're not the decision maker on whether or not a charge would be laid. You don't bring that before the prosecutor; it's the RCMP. Is that correct?
Mr. Tod: To a large extent, yes, that's correct.
The Chair: Could you?
Mr. Tod: We could, yes, absolutely. Any chief of police in Ontario has the ability to do that.
The Chair: The question I would have for you is, in following through this, with the laws that are on the books and have been passed by Parliament in respect to terrorism — and I think they're very clear; I don't think there's any question of what it says — why aren't we proceeding with charges with some of these individuals with the knowledge we have? Is the threshold too high that you have to meet from the point of view of evidence in order to lay a charge?
Mr. Tod: Are you talking about the high-risk travellers?
The Chair: Yes.
Mr. Tod: I would say the threshold is not too high. The ability to collect, analyze and understand the criminal information so that we can propagate a criminal charge is a challenge for police officers. It's resource-extensive. In order to understand the surveillance aspect of it, if an individual is under surveillance 24/7 we are required to put probably a combination of 30 officers a day on one individual.
The number you spoke about, senator, 130, or the returning 80, if you multiply that by 30 officers per day the amount of police resources is staggering. That's just the human element with the physical surveillance. There's also the technical surveillance, which is extremely challenging for police services. We could actually deplete much of our surveillance resources and our technical resources looking after the high-risk travellers and leave organized crime and other facilitators of crime in our communities alone.
The challenge for us is to first determine the threat level of individuals in the group we're talking about, and I don't have a specific number with me today. The number grows and ebbs.
The Chair: Can you get us that information?
Mr. Tod: I can access that information if I need it, yes.
The Chair: You can get it for us, though?
Mr. Tod: I will.
Senator White: I appreciate your discussion around working together. We had the Commissioner of the RCMP in recently, and we have had other police representatives. We know what cuts the RCMP have also faced over the past number of years. Does the RCMP have the resources available to them today to maintain the things they're doing and to actually focus energy that all of us need them to focus on this threat? Since you don't work for the RCMP, you can say this bluntly, I'm sure.
Mr. Tod: I am familiar with specific aspects of the RCMP in regard to deployment. I can't speak to the national deployment picture, the provincial deployment picture or any other federal responsibilities they share. It may be unfair.
Let me specifically say that the phenomenon of the high-risk traveller has caused an incredible resource pull on the OPP. We are evaluating not only the terrorism and national security projects we're doing but also all the other projects on the organized crime side in regard to gaming and criminal activity involving outlaw motorcycle gangs. We are evaluating all of those projects or targets of investigation and are challenged with the fact that we need resources to deal with the most immediate threat to our communities. The most attention we're having right now is in regard to the high-risk travellers.
Do they have enough? I think the Commissioner of the RCMP can answer that much better than I can. Could we use more? I would suggest the answer is always yes, and I'm saying that with great caution because I understand the challenges faced in the economics of policing. I understand what it's costing our communities. I understand that. We are challenged every day with deploying our resources in the most effective manner, and we attempt to do that all the time.
Senator White: I appreciate that response, deputy. I do. I think it was the Monday afternoon we had Mr. Yaworski from CSIS here speaking to us, the same afternoon the soldier was killed in Quebec, actually I think around the same time. We asked him the question, and I can't remember who asked it, about whether or not we had enough resources in this country to track the 85, not including the medium-risk and the low-risk individuals that may shift back and forth between medium and high, if we understand that. His answer was we have to always kind of risk it out and figure out where our priorities lie. That week, we had two incidents where people, one who was under watch, one who was not, were successful in what they set out to do.
We are saying, though, regardless whether the RCMP has enough resources, we don't in Canada, in your mind, have enough resources to do everything we're doing and take on this challenge. Would that be correct?
Mr. Tod: Again, it's a very difficult question. I think it comes down to the risk management ability, the ability to manage the risk of an organization. The smaller the organization, the less ability you have to manage a risk. The larger the organization, the larger your police budget, the larger human resource capital you have, the better your ability is to manage a risk. I think the very large organizations in law enforcement in Canada can manage the risk within the restrictions they have of people and money. I'm evading giving you a true answer on this one, but, as I said, could we always use more? Absolutely. It comes down to the risk management strategy of an organization and what attention you're applying to that. Through the various governance models we have as police services and who we report to, those are questions that should be asked to the police leaders in Canada. What risks are you taking? What risks are you managing? That's where the discussion deserves to be held in regard to resourcing and deployment.
The Chair: But doesn't it also go back to the threshold in respect to what's being asked for you to do the work you do in order to be able to proceed in the court system? If you have to give 30 police officers a day to do surveillance on an individual, we don't print enough money in Canada to do that, if we keep continuing with these numbers that are continuing to escalate. There have to be other remedies other than just strictly surveillance and things of that nature. It's a multi-faceted question out there. Would you not agree?
Mr. Tod: Absolutely, senator, I agree. The ability to collect that criminal information, as you said, is expensive in regard to surveillance and the human resources capital that's required. Technically, it's very expensive in regard to the technical capabilities. Again, the threshold to determine criminality, if I can use that word, the terrorist activity that requires that a criminal charge be charge laid, that threshold is fine. The ability to collect the information and analyze the information and have access to the information for everyone is what is critically important in regard to determining our threat and the ability to lay a charge.
The Chair: Well, obviously we're not collecting the information, because we're not laying any charges at this date, except for one particular case.
Senator Day: I just wanted you to comment on the community outreach issue we were talking about earlier. Various police forces have been doing that for quite a time, the larger ones in particular, gathering information with respect to organized crime, motorcycle gangs, et cetera. Now we're into the anti-terrorism side of things, which is pre-criminal and takes up a lot more resources. I'm assuming from what you've said that it's only the larger police forces that would be able to get involved in that to any great extent because the smaller ones are pretty busy with their detection and prosecution side of things.
From the point of view of those police forces that are involved in this pre-criminal gathering of information, community outreach, trying to see if there's anything strange happening, is it the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, or do you again leave it up to each chief of police to talk about gender sensitivity and ethnic balance and all those factors that are important, particularly so in a community outreach situation? Where does the initiative come from in that regard?
Mr. Tod: I can't speak to the other committee work that's being done by other committees in the CACP. I'll speak specifically in regard to Ontario.
As I mentioned, since 2009, the policing model of preference in Ontario is the Mobilization and Engagement Model of Community Policing model, and the four specific action areas within that model are mobilization and engagement, liaison and engagement, the risk-driven collaboration piece, which is that community-police piece together, and finally the last one is the law enforcement suppression piece. Any service, regardless of size, has the opportunity to fill all four of those quadrants in the mobilization engagement model.
I will speak for Ontario specifically. That is the model of preference we have taken in regard to moving forward with our safety community working groups and the opportunity for the community to actually lead the aspect of liaison and engagement, in other words, liaison in regard to working with the community and assisting the community in being healthy and vibrant, but the engagement rests within the community. The police facilitate. We step back. We play the backroom portion of that and allow the community itself to engage and the community itself to work towards identifying what we call acutely elevated individuals, largely because of criminological factors — mental health, addictions, truancy, homelessness, poverty, those sorts of things. After that, we have the suppression piece, the policing enforcement. The criminal space is where we operate in.
When you talk about pre-criminal space, I look at the pre-criminal space in Ontario as being the liaison and engagement piece. That's pre-criminal where police have a very small responsibility and role to play in that. The pre-criminal space is actually that community collaboration piece. That is where the police and the community leaders are sitting together identifying acutely elevated individuals, problems or concerns, and working together on collaboration.
The last piece is simply the collaboration is not going to work, the liaison is not going to work, the engagement is not going to work, and we have the suppression piece where we have to go and be the police and investigate, charge and prosecute people.
Senator Day: We were informed by the RCMP that this new initiative with respect to countering violent extremism is in the pre-criminal phase, and there is a community outreach aspect to that that's very important, but that's not something that the chiefs of police or the police forces across Canada, other than the national ones, are getting involved in very much.
Mr. Tod: I think every police service will be involved in that. I know police leaders across Canada now understand the aspect of engagement and liaison and that risk group, and I call it risk-driven collaboration. It's working together with communities.
In 2008, I visited Prince Albert, and Chief McFee, now Deputy Minister McFee, was starting up the whole aspect of community mobilization. Over the years, it has grown into a true collaborative approach in identifying what they call the hub environment, and there are many hubs. You may have heard that.
Senator Day: We did hear that term, yes.
Mr. Tod: That's where the whole aspect of CVE belongs, within that liaison engagement. Collaboration occurs in the community hub where people can identify teachers, social services agencies, community youth groups or sporting groups. They can identify an individual or a concern and work together collaboratively on it without having the police come in to run it and drive it and provide all the resources for it. If that truly works, then we have resources that we can dedicate back out to things like investigations on terrorism, investigations on organized crime and other work that falls within the responsibility of the police.
I may be generalizing here, but the innovative leaders we talk about in our mandate of CACP, leadership through innovation, those police leaders understand the whole aspect of community collaboration and where it belongs. That pre-criminal space is a community responsibility on engagement liaison, and the policing responsibility starts to work in the collaborative approach working with our partners. Then at times there are people out there in the organized crime world who are not addicted, homeless or poor; they've gone to school, and they are still members of a large criminal organization. That's where the police come in, and that's where we work best.
The Chair: I'd like to go into one other area. I'm going to ask you a question. I may be putting you on the spot here, so if I am, bear with me.
It was announced by Prime Minister Cameron that they intend to bring in legislation where if a citizen of Britain leaves the country and is involved in a terrorist organization that has been identified by their country, their citizenship will be revoked for at least two years. This was announced, I believe, down in Australia.
Do you have any comments on that? The reason I ask this question is because when I went home over the past week, a number of people asked, ''Well, if people want to become involved in this, why are we allowing them back into the country?'' Obviously, it puts you in a situation and all the members that you represent of having to monitor and put these individuals under surveillance in view of the fact of what they've been involved with upon leaving the country.
Have you given any thought to that type of legislation perhaps being considered by Canada or other countries?
Mr. Tod: I haven't, senator. I haven't given it much thought, but I would much rather spend our time and resources with the citizens we now have in Canada by preventing them from becoming radicalized and working towards the whole aspect of someone travelling abroad.
I don't think it's as simple an answer as revoking citizenship. I don't think that will stop terrorism and diminish the threat we have in regards to that. I don't think I can answer that. It's just not a simple question for me to sit here and answer.
The Chair: Colleagues, we have come to the end of the time that has been set aside for this committee hearing. I'd like to thank our witness for appearing. We appreciate your forthright responses to our questions.
I would like to go in camera for a few minutes prior to leaving. Thank you.
(The committee continued in camera.)