Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
Social Affairs, Science and Technology
Issue 1 - Evidence - November 21, 2013
OTTAWA, Thursday, November 21, 2013
The Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology met this day, at 10:31 a.m., to study the subject-matter of those elements contained in Divisions 5, 10 and 11 of Part 3 of Bill C-4, A second Act to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on March 21, 2013 and other measures.
Senator Kelvin Kenneth Ogilvie (Chair) in the chair.
[Translation]
The Chair: Welcome to the Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology.
[English]
My name is Kelvin Ogilvie. I'm a senator from Nova Scotia and chair of this committee, and I would like to start by asking my colleagues to introduce themselves, starting on my right.
Senator Seidman: Judith Seidman from Montreal, Quebec.
Senator Wallace: John Wallace from New Brunswick.
Senator Eaton: Nicki Eaton from Toronto.
[Translation]
Senator Bellemare: Diane Bellemare from Montreal, Quebec.
[English]
Senator Enverga: Tobias Enverga, Ontario.
Senator Cordy: I'm Jane Cordy from Nova Scotia.
[Translation]
Senator Chaput: Maria Chaput from Manitoba.
[English]
Senator Dyck: Lillian Dyck, senator from Saskatchewan.
Senator Eggleton: Art Eggleton, Toronto, and deputy chair of the committee.
The Chair: Thank you, colleagues. I would remind everyone, for the record, that we are studying the subject matter of Bill C-4, and today we are dealing with those aspects that fall within Division 5 dealing with the Canada Labour Code.
We have two sets of witnesses today, and I will introduce them as I call them to present. I understand by prior agreement that Mr. Walter Manning, Director of the Health, Safety and Industrial Relations Training Fund for Unifor will present first. Mr. Manning, the floor is yours.
Walter Manning, Director, Health, Safety and Industrial Relations Training Fund, Unifor: Thank you for the opportunity to present to your committee today. However, it is with disappointment that we take this opportunity to respond to the health and safety provisions in the Economic Action Plan, Bill C-4.
Unifor is a fairly new union that came together during the Labour Day weekend this year of the Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada in the CAW, and we have approximately 300,000 members throughout Canada, of which 80,000 of those work in federally regulated jobs.
There's a long history of stakeholders — i.e. employers and labourers — working together to recommend changes to the federal Labour Code. The proposal to water down a worker's right to refuse unsafe work is a serious deviation from this long-standing practice. Certainly Unifor has had no opportunity for consultation in those changes.
On the right to refuse, the government maintains that 80 per cent of all work refusals are not justified and frivolous. Our experience is that workers are reluctant to exercise a work refusal due to fear of retaliation by the employer, despite legislation purporting to protect that worker.
Far from progressing frivolous complaints, we are of the opinion that workers are reluctant to invoke the right to refuse, even in the face of bona fide dangerous work. Therefore, instead of watering down safety rights around unsafe work, we should be enhancing them and ensuring workers feel safe from reprisal by reporting unsafe work.
In addition, we should be enhancing enforcement and inspection, not rolling back the clock on hard-fought health and safety gains.
With respect to work refusal investigation, the additional sections proposed in Bill C-4 to section 128 present an extended formal process to the investigation of work refusals by requiring written reports.
The employer will prepare a written report; that's new in section 128(7.1). The workplace committee will prepare a report; that's new in section 128(10.1). The employer may provide further information and request reconsideration; that's new to section 128(10.2). The employer shall make a decision; that's new. If the employer disagrees, it will notify the worker in writing; also new. If the worker continues refusal, the employer will notify the minister and provide a report; also new. And finally, the minister will decide whether to continue.
The new emphasis on the immediacy of the danger to the worker is lost in the new prolonged procedure for addressing that danger. Formerly, the legislative process leant itself to taking minutes or hours to determine if a safety officer was required. However, the new proposals, with its emphasis on written reports, would appear to take hours, even days, especially in cases of 24/7 operations, such as railways.
Should the employer choose to act in a manner that is frivolous, vexatious or in bad faith, it could prolong the process almost indefinitely. To make matters worse, the deletion of section 127.1(7), the stoppage of activity, would also enable the continuation of the work in question during this entire administrative period, even in cases of real and present danger. It is our considered opinion that this kind of delayed process will further serve to discourage workers from reporting dangers and unsafe work.
With respect to redefining danger, section 122(1) and the definition of danger, the present definition of danger means any existing or potential hazard or condition or any current or future activity that could reasonably be expected to cause injury or illness to a person exposed to it before the hazard or condition can be corrected, or the activity altered, whether or not the injury or illness occurs immediately after exposure to the hazard, condition or activity and includes any exposure to a hazardous substance that is likely to result in a chronic illness, a disease or in damage to the reproductive system.
In the proposed definition, danger means any hazard, condition or activity that could reasonably be expected to be an imminent or serious threat to the life or health of a person exposed to it before the hazard or condition can be corrected or the activity altered.
The present definition of danger enables a worker to determine their destiny using a pragmatic and reasonable expectation of injury or illness immediately or in the future.
In the new definition of danger, the words ``imminent or serious threat'' provide an unending opportunity for debating the quantum of risk of the work at hand, supplanting the real issue, which is whether or not a danger exists to the worker.
The present definition of danger gives reference to whether or not the injury or illness occurs immediately after the exposure to the hazard, condition or activity and includes any exposure to a hazardous substance that is likely to result in a chronic illness, in disease or in damage to the reproductive system, thereby recognizing the historical fact that almost all chemical agents found to be harmful to humans were proven using exposed and affected workers as examples. This fact is recognized in the current language.
The proposed definition ignores what is now accepted science as to the effects of hazardous substances on the body and once again challenges the worker to prove cause and effect in the short term rather than recognize the latency period of many illnesses caused by exposure to hazardous substances in the workplace. This is an unacceptable regression in the protection of workers in Canada today.
The internal responsibility system, which is proposed for repeal, section 127.1(7) states:
(7) If the persons who investigate the complaint conclude that a danger exists as described in subsection 128(1), the employer shall, on receipt of a written notice, ensure that no employee use or operate the machine or thing, work in the place or perform the activity that constituted the danger until the situation is rectified.
As previously mentioned in the right to refuse, the deletion of this section removes the joint committee's ability to ensure that dangerous work will not continue, even when the committee has established a danger exists.
If the employer does not agree, the employer may assign the work to other employees without restrictions until the complaint's progression to the minister under section 129. This period now may be an indeterminate duration in order to comply with the written report provisions of section 128.
It is clear that this amendment to the code will increase the risk of injury and death to workers, while preserving the employer's ability to continue the work unabated. There is little doubt that the proposed changes look to enhance what safety experts refer to as paper or process safety as opposed to proactive health and safety that leads to the development of an improved safety culture.
With respect to repeal of references to ``Health and Safety Officer'' and replacement with ``Minister,'' safety officers are seen as independent experts in administering decisions to ensure compliance with legislation and ensure the safety of federal workers. The replacement of ``Health and Safety Officer'' references with ``Minister'' removes all powers of these experts to act independently, outside of the political sphere. The minister now has complete control over the appointment of any person to administer the code and conduct the investigations.
To instill confidence in the impartiality of the administration of the act, the reference to health and safety officers must be maintained. Why we need strong health and safety regulations and laws, in the case R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc., [1991] 3, Justice Cory J. stated:
The objective of regulatory legislation is to protect the public or broad segments of the public (such as employees, consumers and motorists, to name but a few) from the potentially adverse effects of otherwise lawful activity. Regulatory legislation involves a shift of emphasis from the protection of individual interests and the deterrence and punishment of acts involving moral fault to the protection of public and societal interests. While criminal offences are usually designed to condemn and punish past, inherently wrongful conduct, regulatory measures are generally directed to the prevention of future harm through the enforcement of minimum standards of conduct and care.
Justice Cory also noted that:
. . . regulation is absolutely essential for our protection and well-being as individuals, and for the effective functioning of society. It is properly present throughout our lives. The more complex the activity, the greater the need for and the greater our reliance upon regulation and its enforcement. . . . Of necessity, society relies on government regulation for its safety.
Certainly in the case of worker occupational health and safety in high-risk industries and, indeed, public safety, strong regulation and enforcement is absolutely critical to both the safety of those in such industries and the safety of the general public.
For example, at CP Rail, despite ever-increasing pressures to increase production and perform new work processes, in 2013 to date, our membership of 2,000 workers under federal jurisdiction progressed two work refusals under section 128, both resulting in directions under section 145(2)(a) for the employer to stop the dangerous activity.
Therefore, we would argue that any attempt to water down the language in such important legislation is unacceptable. Laws and regulations are only as strong as the education and enforcement that go with them and how those laws and regulations are practiced in the workplace and enforced by those charged with the protection of our well-being as workers.
We cannot rely totally on the employer to make our workplaces safe because employers have, by their existence, a goal that competes with safety, and that is to make a profit. We should accept that as a given and build from there. This is also why we need vigilant and proactive government involvement. This does not happen by watering down rights and, in essence, the legislative authority of those charged with enforcing our safety.
In conclusion, since the year 2000, while lost time injuries in Canada have been steadily declining, fatalities have remained fairly constant, with over 900 deaths each year. It must be noted that the current legislation, with its superior protections for workers, has failed to reduce these fatalities. This begs the question of why we are not instead looking for ways to enhance worker occupational health and safety rather than eroding their workplace safety rights.
Therefore, we oppose the changes to the health and safety provisions contained in Bill C-4, and I thank you for your time.
The Chair: Thank you very much. I will now turn to FETCO, which is the Federally Regulated Employers — Transportation and Communication. We have two participants from FETCO: John Farrell, Executive Director, who I understand will start the conversation; and John Beckett, Chairman, Occupational Health and Safety Committee. Gentlemen, the floor is yours.
John Farrell, Executive Director, Federally Regulated Employers — Transportation and Communication (FETCO): Thank you, chair and the rest of the committee, for granting us the opportunity to address you today regarding Bill C- 4. My name is John Farrell, and I'm the Executive Director of FETCO.
I'm accompanied today by John Beckett, who is the Vice-President of Safety, Training and Recruitment of the British Columbia Maritime Employers Association, and he is also Chairman of the FETCO Occupational Health and Safety Committee. John Beckett is also the Employer Chairman of the Regulatory Review Committee and a member of the Board of Directors of the Canadian Centre for Occupational Health and Safety.
Federally Regulated Employers — Transportation and Communication, otherwise known as FETCO, consists of most of the major federally regulated employers in the transportation and communications sectors, and FETCO members employ approximately 450,000 people in the federal jurisdiction.
FETCO first became aware of the proposed changes to Part 2 of the Canada Labour Code after Bill C-4 was introduced in the House of Commons. We attended a meeting of Employment and Social Development Canada's Regulatory Review Committee. The Regulatory Review Committee is a tripartite process based on a consultative model that allows both employers and labour representatives to provide expertise, advice and guidance to the labour program, with the objective of continually improving the health and safety of federal workplaces. At that meeting, we had the new legislation explained to us.
FETCO supports the proposed changes to the Labour Code because they strengthen the internal responsibility system, they improve the overall efficiency and management of health and safety officers in the field, and they strengthen the role of health and safety committees.
We would now like to look at each of these issues one by one, and I'll turn to my colleague John Beckett to take you through the rest of our presentation.
John Beckett, Chairman, Occupational Health and Safety Committee, Federally Regulated Employers — Transportation and Communication (FETCO): Good morning. First focusing on strengthening the internal responsibility system, the legal duties and responsibilities of employers, supervisors and workers overlap and complement each other in the pursuit of the highest possible health and safety outcomes. Together they create what's known as the internal responsibility system. This concept is as fundamental in health and safety law as the concept of due diligence. The internal responsibility system is a key component of a well-functioning occupational health and safety system that exists to ensure that workers are safe and their health is protected.
Inherent in the legislative system are mechanisms for workplace parties to resolve issues. Those mechanisms include shared rights and responsibilities. Employers are required to provide a safe workplace, and workers have the right to know, the right to participate and the right to refuse dangerous work. Most importantly, the right to participate requires workers to do their utmost to ensure that the highest possible standards of health and safety are maintained in the context of each unique workplace.
Also inherent are engagement mechanisms for resolving issues as they arise. This is a shared responsibility of employers, employees and the joint health and safety committees or health and safety representatives.
Bill C-4 improves the internal responsibility system. The employer/employee workplace safety representatives and health and safety committees are required to work together to resolve issues at the workplace without the need for intervention by government-appointed health and safety officers.
The primary mechanism to resolve workplace health and safety issues has always been through the health and safety committees. Canadian employers and unions have invested heavily in training and processes to ensure that health and safety committees work effectively. Bill C-4 strengthens this role by requiring employers to engage both employer and employee members in the assessment and resolution of unsafe work and work refusals.
Turning to changes to the definition of danger, the definition of danger is changed in Bill C-4 to ``an imminent or serious threat to the life or health of a person.'' This definition does not diminish the rights of employees to refuse unsafe work, nor will it diminish protection provided by the Canada Labour Code. The current broad definition invites an assessment of speculative risk based on potential hazards for future activities that inevitably contribute to unnecessary work refusals. Speculation about unsafe conditions that do not pose imminent or serious danger should be resolved by the workplace parties to the health and safety committees without the need to exercise the right to refuse and government intervention. Refusing dangerous work is not something either party takes lightly.
The current approach is a three-step process that involves the workplace parties. This process is enhanced in Bill C-4 by requiring written documentation by the employer and enhances the role of the health and safety committee in resolving work refusals.
I have a slide that has been distributed. It is basically black and red, and it explains the revisions to the system. I would like to take you through that briefly.
With the slide you have in front of you, the items in black are the current process, which is a three-step process. Essentially, an employee who believes that they're about to undertake dangerous work talks to the employer, but really what they do is talks to their supervisor and says, ``There's an issue; we need to resolve this.'' The majority of refusals that happen on a daily basis are stopped at this point because the supervisor says, ``You're right. Let's get this fixed and let's get back to work.''
If the supervisor disagrees, in the current process, the employer gets a hold of somebody in the health and safety committee to assist in the investigation with the employee who's refusing and the supervisor. They have a discussion and they decide whether there is a danger. If there is a danger, it gets fixed and everybody goes back to work. If there is not, at that point in the current system, there's a call made to the employer, to the labour program, and a labour affairs officer is dispatched to deal with the refusal.
In the new process, there are a number of steps that have been added to ensure that the investigation by the parties is enhanced and focused. The new pieces are that the employee still refuses, talks to the supervisor, then they report to the employer. The employer investigates with the employee.
The employer now has to give the employee a written report as to what the finding is. Again, if the danger is fixed, everybody goes back to work. If there's disagreement, then the safety committee is brought in.
The enhancement to the safety committee is that it, the employer rep and the employee rep must be involved in the investigation and must do another report to give back to the employer to indicate whether there's a danger or not. That's a second additional step that has been added, and they have to write a report, which is a third additional step.
There's a step there wherein if there's more information the employer knows about that maybe people are not looking at, the employer can add new information. Again, if there is danger found, it gets fixed and people go back to work. If not, the employer then writes a final report to the employee with all of the information saying why the employer believes there is no danger. At that point, if there's still a disagreement, the employer phones the labour affairs officer to intervene.
From our perspective, there have been four additional steps added plus an enhancement of the health and safety committee's role.
The proper role of government is to intervene only when the internal responsibility system fails. This has not been the case in the federal sector. Too often, labour affairs officers have been injected into the process too early, which undermines the responsibilities of employers, employees and the representatives to seek appropriate solutions together.
Statistics provided by the labour program indicate that in the last 10 years, approximately 80 per cent of the work refusals that required government intervention were found to have no danger. This is a sobering statistic indicating that many work refusals are unwarranted.
The workplace parties are better equipped to assess and manage these risks than health and safety officers because the assessment of health and safety risks often requires specific expertise and technical knowledge about sector-specific workplaces. There are many examples of early and inappropriate interventions by health and safety officers that diminish the effectiveness of the federal health and safety regulatory system. Asking government to intervene in speculative risks is asking them to become experts on issues where evidence is often minimal or non-existent. This is the responsibility of the workplace parties.
In provincial jurisdictions, the Ministers of Labour and Workers' Compensation Boards have developed protocols that are similar to those proposed in Bill C-4 to ensure there's minimal interference in the workplace health and safety internal responsibility system. ``Danger'' is not defined in most provincial jurisdictions, and where it is defined, it is merely defined as ``imminent danger to life and health.''
The last thing I want to talk about is improving the performance of the government system. Changes proposed in Bill C-4 remove the responsibilities formerly delegated to health and safety officers and gives those responsibilities to the Minister of Labour. This change is designed to improve the management and delegation of responsibility in the field, including the responsibilities delegated to health and safety officers. This is not intended to diminish their role or the numbers of health and safety officers, which we wholly support.
FETCO supports provisions in the proposed legislation designed to improve the efficiency of the allocation of resources by the Minister of Labour so as to free up resources to focus on the serious health and safety issues and improve clarity and consistency of decisions in workplaces across the country.
Positive measures in the proposed legislation include allowing the combining of identical or substantially similar health and safety matters and allowing the minister to rely on findings of previous investigations of the same employer on substantially the same issue. Such measures will improve the ability of health and safety officers in the field to focus on substantive issues and proactive measures to improve health and safety in the workplace.
Mr. Farrell: Just one final note. When it comes to changing labour legislation and drafting and implementing regulations and guidance documents regarding the proper implementation and operation of such legislation and regulations, the opportunity for the workplace stakeholders to provide advanced guidance and advice will be helpful and appreciated.
FETCO supports pre-legislative consultation, where practical, to the greatest extent possible. We wish to thank members of the committee for listening to our presentation.
The Chair: Well, thank you all. I will now open the floor to my colleagues for questioning, and we will begin with Senator Eggleton.
Senator Eggleton: Thank you very much, gentlemen, for being here and contributing to our deliberation of this provision of the budget.
There was a definition that was worked on for several years and I think was put in place in terms of the word ``danger.'' It was back in 2000, and it involved extensive consultations with both employers and employee representatives, but this one I'm not aware of much consultation having gone on.
Could all three of you tell me just how much consultation went on leading to this change in the definition?
Mr. Farrell: FETCO was not consulted in advance of the drafting of this legislation.
Senator Eggleton: Okay. That's pretty blunt. Mr. Manning?
Mr. Manning: Unifor has had no consultation whatsoever.
Senator Eggleton: Oh, I see. Okay. Thank you for the chart, Mr. Beckett, which you described here. It strikes me, just looking at it and looking at the red components, that this is a lengthier process than what you have now because it involves more written reports. It sort of slows things down, whereas now I get the impression if you get an agreement, you get the matter fixed. If you don't get an agreement, you can bring in a third party, the officers. You can bring in those people as a third party and that gets it settled, but now you have all this written stuff that has to be done, and it really doesn't involve bringing in these officers any longer. It would end up going to the minister. Well, that strikes me as a process that's bad for everybody.
Mr. Beckett: Good comments, but I disagree. The current process as it relates to refusals, first, is when someone refuses work in the workplace; it's a highly stressful event. There's a fair bit of tension because something is not getting done. There's a piece of machinery not being worked on; there's cargo not being moved; there's something not happening because the work stops when there's a refusal.
As I've said before, the majority of refusals, which are not part of the discussion here, occur on a daily basis.
A worker has a danger, talks to the supervisor. The supervisor says, ``Yes, you're right. The lights are out on that,'' or, ``The seat belt is not working on that. Let's get it fixed. Let's get back to work.'' Those are never recorded. Those are not part of the conversation. I would say that's probably 95 per cent of — well, more than that, probably 99 per cent of the refusals that occur.
What happens, though, in those cases where there's high tension and a fair bit of angst in the process, this process that currently exists, the three-step process, quickly goes from, ``I refuse,'' to the supervisor getting frustrated or is frustrated, and at that point the safety committee is called and the labour affairs officer is called to respond immediately. There is little investigation that goes on in the way that is intended in the current legislation.
The other point I want to make is when there's a refusal and there's work not getting done, there is a fair bit of push by all parties to get work happening again. The speculation that was given earlier on is that this would slow down the process. This will not slow down the process. This will put more rigour in the process.
Senator Eggleton: Mr. Manning, what is your view?
Mr. Manning: The last thing any of our members, or any worker, for that matter, wants to do is invoke the right to refuse. It is very stressful. John even said when it happens, the supervisor becomes very frustrated. So they don't want to see it happen.
It's our opinion that the changes that are being proposed are meant to intimidate the worker even further. Why would I want to invoke my right to refuse when it's going to go through all the different levels? We write this to this committee, to that committee, to the other committee, and the last thing the worker needs is that much more stress upon them. So we feel that the changes that are being proposed are meant to be more intimidating to a worker and thereby make the workplace not as safe or friendly as it should be.
Senator Eggleton: I have one more question. The new definition is going to take out the words ``chronic illness'' or ``damage to reproductive organs.'' What is your take on that?
In terms of chronic illness, we have heard down through time a lot of cases where people have accumulated some illness as a result of workplace conditions, and it ends up they get cancer or some other long-term chronic illness. Why would this be taken out? Why would you support it being taken out?
Mr. Beckett: I support it being a focused definition as opposed to the broader definition that was there before, because the broader definition led to, frankly, as the stats show, about 80 per cent of the refusals being found ``no danger'' even after appeal.
The broader definition still provides protection for physical harm and for long-term health harm. It talks about an imminent or serious threat to the life or health of a person. Health of a person, could be immediate, which is exposure to a chemical on your hands, or it could be long term, such as exposure to asbestos, which we know has a 20- to 30-year latency period. Both are still buried in there.
There are other protections in the code as it relates to chemicals in other different sections that deal with the preventive side. It's important to remember that there are 20 sections in the code. This little half a page piece, although it's important, does not go to prevention. This is what happens when, potentially, your prevention fails. The other 20 sections are all about prevention. None of those have changed.
Mr. Manning: I want to make a comment on the stats that John has been using, the 80 per cent have been proven to be frivolous or not right to refusals as we define it.
I don't know where those stats came from. I've looked, and we can't find those stats. What I do know from my research is that in the last 10 years, we've probably had about 1,000 rights to refuse. When you talk about 1 million people in the workforce, that's not a whole lot.
Getting back to your question, senator, around the hazards that could lead to other diseases, we think it should stay there. The fact that it may be in other pieces of the code is not good enough. How many workers who go to work every day know the code from one end to the other? There is a piece right there that highlights that to them if they need to. Things like diesel fuel, for example, have just been declared to be a carcinogen, and we have members in the railway around diesel engines and the like, and it may not be something that occurs immediately, but we need to ensure that some man or woman who retires 25 or 30 years down the road is not dying now because of the diesel fumes they sucked in 25 or 30 years ago, and we didn't do anything about that.
Senator Eaton: I would like to follow up. You will have to educate me, Mr. Manning and Mr. Farrell. I would like to follow up the question of Senator Eggleton on the word ``danger.''
It doesn't stop workers from saying something is dangerous. The new definition will not stop people from saying, ``I feel in danger.'' Workers continue to be paid, as I understand. They are kept on the job and paid no matter how long the process takes.
Mr. Beckett: That's correct.
Senator Eaton: Mr. Manning, you are much more familiar with production lines. Surely when you set up a plant or you are running a railway, things might suddenly become dangerous. I don't think the new definition changes that, but surely in a production plant or in a run-of-the-mill day in a production plant, things don't suddenly become dangerous that can't be fixed, i.e., a seat belt breaks, a guard drops off the production line. I'm having trouble with what you think has been changed so much or how all of a sudden things will pop up and be far more dangerous than they are now.
Mr. Manning: That's a good question. When you use the example of the seat belt, those are not the things that we're really concerned about, because workers, generally and in the workplace, that's an easy fix. We're concerned now that by changing it to ``imminent danger,'' that there is going to be more arguing about whether or not this is an immediate danger.
I agree workers still have the right to refuse, but we're just concerned that it's becoming so — we just don't want employers, workers and frustrated supervisors out there arguing over whether or not this is dangerous, and I think that's where this will lead. It's not, ``Let's get in there and fix the problem.'' It now becomes a big argument about whether or not the problem even exists.
Senator Eaton: Who sits on a safety committee in a plant, and what are their qualifications?
Mr. Manning: In the plants that we represent, the committee is made up of equal amounts of unionized personnel — or the worker — and management people. The qualifications, in the case of workers, they are either elected or selected from within the worker body, and they come off the shop floor. They don't have a whole lot of experience, but that's where the employer and the union go to work and give that individual the training that's required to carry out the role as a safety representative in the workplace.
Mr. Beckett: One slight change to that. The members are actually chosen by the union, and the unions have different processes for selecting individuals, but the code actually requires them to be appointed by the union themselves.
There is usually not equal representation. Usually there are more workers than managers, and that just makes sense. That's just the nature of work. But certainly the requirements are that you can't have more managers than employees, which makes sense.
Most of the committees I have functioned on, usually there are two or three management and, depending on the size of the plant, anywhere from six to ten employees.
Senator Eaton: It doesn't concern anybody here that people who sit on a safety committee don't have to have special qualifications, i.e., mechanical engineering, medical? It is just because they happen to be a popular guy on the floor or been there a long time?
Mr. Manning: No. I disagree with that. The worker, depending on which area of workplace he comes from, is considered to be an expert in the work he is doing and adds a lot of value to that committee. He may not be an engineer, doctor or lawyer but I can tell you he knows that workplace.
Senator Eaton: But he understands the mechanics of the machine?
Mr. Manning: Yes, he certainly does.
In all fairness to them, they do a good job and take a lot of heck sometimes for the decisions that they make.
Mr. Beckett: The most popular person in the plant would not be on the safety committee. Safety committees are — they work hard.
And I agree with Mr. Manning: They may not have expertise when you talk about engineers or mechanical systems, but they are experts in the work they are doing and they are there on the safety committee to deal with health and safety issues that deal with that particular work.
Senator Seidman: I will just go back to that 80 per cent that gets bandied around a bit to try to get some specifics. Do we have any information in a general way — not names or anything like that — from a socio-demographic point of view? Women — are they pregnant women?
Do we have any information at all on these 80 per cent of refusals to work that have been determined to be situations of no danger even after appeal?
Mr. Beckett: We actually don't have that level of detail. The information was provided to us by HRSDC, the labour program. They provided it to us by federal sector, on a statistical basis. They did break it down by public versus private operations within the federal sector, but there are no demographics.
Senator Seidman: But by sector would be interesting.
Mr. Beckett: That is very interesting.
Senator Seidman: If you have it by sector. You don't have that information with you? Okay. While you're checking —
Mr. Beckett: Sorry, I was going to say that we got the information last week, so we've done a little bit of a hurry-up on statistical analysis, but it is hurried.
Senator Seidman: If you can't find that while you're here, would you be able to send us that information?
Mr. Beckett: Absolutely.
Senator Seidman: Mr. Manning, did you have any more particular information on that?
Mr. Manning: I will say I do not. I have something here, but I have not had the chance to review it.
The 80 per cent I said earlier is a number that is bandied around, and we have been looking for it but we don't know where it came from.
The Chair: Mr. Beckett, I understand you got that information from HRSDC.
Mr. Beckett: HRSDC provided the refusals — both where danger was and was not found — by sector in the federal sector, provided both to the employers and to the unions. It breaks it down in some level of detail, but not the demographic information that you're asking for. But it does break it down by federal public service, private companies, et cetera.
Senator Seidman: Well, it would be really helpful to have that so why don't we get it.
Mr. Manning: I do have a copy, by the way, and I can provide it.
Senator Seidman: We'll get it. That would be great.
I just want to go back to the definition issue because, as you are well aware, the greatest amount of negative publicity around this has been focused on the definition change. If I could just use two examples quickly — and perhaps you could help me understand if or if not the definition change would have an impact here. Basically what we are doing in the definition is we are removing ``hazardous substance'' from the definition. We've now defined it that:
``danger'' means any hazard, condition or activity that could reasonably be expected to be an imminent or serious threat . . . .
As opposed to it being a hazardous substance that could have a long-term impact.
If you think about, for example, a person who is exposed to a toxic or hazardous substance, such as asbestos or a pesticide, and who could end up with a neuro-degenerative disease or a cancer or something like that down the line — that's one person. And then if you think about, for example, a female x-ray technician who becomes pregnant and obviously is at risk from daily exposure and has to be removed to a different type of job.
Could you help me with those two examples and tell me how this definition may or may not impact that person's rights?
Mr. Beckett: First, as Mr. Farrell indicated, the changes have been made without any consultation with us. I find myself having to defend changes when I did not participate in writing them. So I will not defend them other than to say that we have been told by the labour program specifically that the long-term health issues that you are indicating are protected as they were before within the current language.
To your specific concerns as relates to pregnant females, there is section 132 of the code, which is pregnant and nursing employers. There are specific — about half a page — protections that enhance this particular section, specifically around pregnant and nursing employees. So a pregnant or nursing employee is as equally protected as she was before any of this changed.
The other example you gave was exposure to a chemical. The two substances you mentioned — asbestos and pesticides — the hazards are well known, and the protection mechanisms and modalities of disease are well known. One of the comments I have heard is that there are no more protections from asbestos. Well, of course there is. We know that it is a long-term disease that causes cancer. The protections are well known, the regulations are very tight, and remember that there are 20 other sections in the code that are not changed on the prevention and protection of workers.
The only thing that has changed is if a worker believes they have been or might be exposed to asbestos, they now have a more rigorous process to go through before a health and safety officer is brought in. All we are doing is requiring the employer to do a more thorough investigation and put it in writing before a government representative gets called in. The worker still has the right to refuse, the employer still has to investigate, and the labour program will still be called if there is no agreement. But the part that has changed is the amount of rigour that has to take place before the officer is called has gone up exponentially.
Mr. Manning: Again, I think the changes are deliberately made to decrease the amounts of the right to refuse. Why take that out of that particular piece of the legislation? Mr. Beckett talks about section 132. I read that section and it talks about if a woman is pregnant. What about before she's pregnant? What about chemicals and hazards in the workplace that could do damage to her reproductive system, for example? So why take it out of there?
I think it is out of there so that people won't, you know, be jumping on it and saying, ``Hang on a second. I'm not pregnant, but I am a woman, and what I'm working with here may interfere with that.''
The Chair: We need to have clarification and then we will move on to our next question.
Mr. Beckett: I think it's important to remember why the change was made. The change was made — as it was described to us by the labour program — to basically get rid of vexatious and frivolous complaints. The 80 per cent of danger was not found. The number that keeps getting thrown around was that there have been 1,000 refusals. Well, 800 of them — which is a lot of work and a lot of energy, and a lot of work stoppages — were found to be no danger upon review by officers or upon appeal.
The changes are not designed to stop people from refusing. They are trying to make the system more efficient.
From my experience of being a health and safety professional for 25 years, doing refusals both at the provincial and federal levels, the amount of refusals that are frivolous at the federal level are higher than at the provincial level. The changes proposed actually go to what already exist at the provincial level, where it puts the internal responsibility of the system in highlight, which forces the employer to deal with issues before the regulator is called.
[Translation]
Senator Bellemare: I listened to what you said. It was very enlightening. Mr. Beckett, you said the following in your presentation:
[English]
In the provincial jurisdiction, the Ministry of Labour and provincial workers compensation boards have developed protocols that are similar to those proposed by Bill C-4 to ensure that there is minimal interference in the workplace health and safety.
[Translation]
I would like Mr. Manning to compare this legislation to existing provincial legislations. To the best of your knowledge, does this legislation go further or is it less stringent? Is it balanced? How would you compare it to provincial legislation in this regard?
[English]
Mr. Manning: The only response I have is that the legislation seems to be similar to provincial, albeit provincial legislation is different in every province. I am not expert enough to be able to elaborate more than that.
[Translation]
Senator Bellemare: My second question is addressed to the three of you. You all said that you were not consulted on the amendments we have here. If greater effectiveness is a concern, would you say that consultation would have made a difference? In other terms, would the bill have been very different or is it close enough in its present form? I would like to have your reaction to this.
[English]
Mr. Manning: I'm trying to think if this as a trick question — no, I'm only joking.
Well, we're good at sitting down and working with our employers on coming up with language, whether it's a collective agreement or otherwise. And I think because we're also experts in the workplace, we have a lot to add. No disrespect to people working in the Department of Labour, but getting the voice from people on the shop floor that have spent time on the shop floor is very, very important. It doesn't matter whether it's the provincial government, federal government or employers and workers, working together, consulting with each other and including all the stakeholders is absolutely important.
Mr. Farrell: Yes, FETCO values pre-legislative consultation. We think that all the parties working together is the best way to advance labour legislation and regulations, so we wholly support pre-legislative consultation. We have a very good working relationship with the Canadian Labour Congress, with whom we consult regularly and we do work together to find solutions to problems. When it comes to safety, we work well together to ensure that employees are safe in the workplace.
[Translation]
Senator Bellemare: This answer is interesting. This is also what is good in theory. Would the process have been too long if consultation and negotiation had taken place? Or are labour relations so good in the federal public service that an agreement can easily be reached on proposals designed to improve the situation?
[English]
Mr. Manning: No, I don't know if they would have been different. From everything I read and hear, the labour relations within the federal workplace are not good.
Mr. Beckett: I'm not sure I heard the question correctly, but I believe it was about whether this change would have taken a long time. My first answer is this: Would it look different? Of course it would. The nature of negotiations is that there is always a trade-off. Would it have taken time? Yes, it would. The tripartite regulatory review committee, for which I am the employer chair, works. It is slow; it is unique in government in that it is a tripartite group that works on consensus to making changes to regulations and to the code, but it takes a fair bit of time.
For example, we have been working on changes to Part 12, which is personal protective equipment, for four years now and it's going to Gazette next year. That is the nature of negotiations as well.
[Translation]
Senator Bellemare: If you follow this process, I guess it is easier to train people and get everyone involved. Moreover, people will get to know the changes much faster.
[English]
Mr. Farrell: The value of pre-legislative consultation and the parties working together is that while you may be required in the process to make compromises, when the parties in the workplace make the decisions themselves and come to an agreement, our experience is that the ability of employers and unions and employees to enforce or engage in those agreements that you've made is enhanced. So if we work on making the rules ourselves and we have a role to play there, we believe that the result is inevitably better.
Senator Cordy: Thank you very much. I think the same themes are coming from everybody and I was like others; I'm very disappointed that FETCO and Unifor were not consulted at all, but just presented with the legislation because I agree with Mr. Farrell: If you are part of the discussions then you take ownership of it and it is an easier sell to union membership or employers. Were any labour groups consulted? I think you're probably the largest labour group in Canada.
Mr. Manning: We're the largest private sector union, but Canadian Labour Congress is the umbrella for all of labour and I don't know if they were consulted or not. I'm pretty sure they weren't.
Senator Cordy: Thank you. This is part of an omnibus budget bill which is over 300 pages, rather than a standalone labour bill. It's sort of unusual for us to be dealing with it as part of a budget bill, I think. Has this happened before where labour bills have been part of omnibus budget bills?
Mr. Manning: Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Farrell: Yes, it has happened before that labour legislation has been included in an omnibus budget bill.
Senator Cordy: I'm going back to others who asked about the question about the 80 per cent. Mr. Manning, CP Rail was the example you gave where there were two refusals to work in 2013, so almost a year. You said that about 80 per cent of the work refusals were really not substantive and so the 80 per cent in 10 years would be 801 work refusals, or about 80 a year. For how many employees would that cover in the workplace?
Mr. Beckett: In the federal workplace there are 1.2 million workers employed.
Senator Cordy: So that would be 1.2 million workers over 10 years and there would be 800 situations where the work refusals were not warranted. It doesn't seem that high to me. Hearing 80 per cent sounds high but in perspective it does not sound high to me. Would you agree with that?
Mr. Manning: That's been the bone of contention with us from the very beginning. First of all, we don't know where the 80 per cent came from, but even if it was 80 per cent over 1.2 million people over 10 years, I don't see urgency in doing what has been done here.
Mr. Beckett: I think I'll add a little context here. I can't speak to 80 per cent, but I can speak to my experience in the federal sector.
I am in an industry now that is enjoying an eight-year collective agreement that was established three years ago. We've probably had two or three refusals a year since the agreement was settled. Before that, we had one a month.
I don't know where the 80 per cent comes from either but when I read the stat and the no danger versus danger, it goes to experience in my sector that in times of tension — and collective bargaining is a time of tension — the way that this legislation is currently worded is used as a tool to disrupt the normal activity of work. I had the same experience when I worked in the provincial sector, and I have worked in airports, municipalities, non-union and union.
I've been on both sides of the fence. I used to be a business agent with the CUPE local long before I went to the dark side in management. I've seen it from both sides. I can only assume what's buried in behind those stats is some of that. We don't know for sure.
Senator Cordy: It would be interesting to see the background because 801, with over one million workers and a 10- year period, does not seem high. But I'd like to see any of the background material, if you have it.
Mr. Beckett: We have the statistics. The labour program was quoted in another presentation on Tuesday and they believed the number is greater than what's being quoted. They are the supplier of the information so we can only go with what they've said.
Senator Enverga: Thank you for the presentations. I'm looking more at the review process. I just noticed that now there's a report that has to be written to the employee. I'm just wondering how they made the report before.
Mr. Beckett: Everything before was verbal. The employer would go to the supervisor and it would be verbal. The supervisor conversation was verbal. The involvement of the safety committee was verbal. The call to the labour affairs officer was verbal. Only then would you begin to get something in writing because the labour affairs officer was required to leave something in writing, whether there was a danger or not.
Senator Enverga: I'm surprised how they get the numbers. If everything is verbal, chances are a lot of information was not reported here.
Mr. Beckett: That's a very good point. As I said at the beginning of my presentation, the majority of work refusals in the workplace do not involve the government; 99 per cent of them don't involve the government. We're only talking about the ones where the government was called in. The 1,000 responses were ones involving the government when the parties could not come to a decision on whether it was a danger or not. That is the role of government.
After the employer and employee representatives have exhausted all avenues, what we have found in the federal sector is that the officers are called in before the parties have even had any discussion. They throw their hands up and say we're not going to do anything. Unfortunately, the labour affairs officers, with all good intentions, try to come in without forcing the employee, the employer, and the employee representatives to do what they are required to do under the code. That's part of why we have so many decisions that are non-danger.
Senator Enverga: The way it looks, a lot of refusals haven't really worked and 81 per cent might be too low. Do you think that might be the case? It says 81 per cent were the result of no danger, so there must be a lot of reports not indicated here. So it could be more or less than 81 per cent.
The Chair: Senator, I think there is a distinction — and the witnesses have made it clear — that issues in the workplace that get resolved quickly do not result in a statistic that comes forward in this case. These are dealing with those issues that couldn't be resolved and came forward.
Senator Enverga: Yes, I'm just looking at the benefit of this new policy, which I believe will be about right because of the written portion of the legislation.
Mr. Beckett: Part of the benefit is to the labour affairs officer. It's still going to be a labour affairs officer that arrives. Even though the decision will be decided by the minister, they're not going anywhere and will still be the first responders when the parties cannot reach an agreement.
What it does for the labour affairs officer is that a lot of their investigation has already been done. It's already been put in writing. The officer can see what has happened, which will speed up the decision on whether or not there's a danger. There's some efficiency built into this piece, but it has been built into the employer doing their job, which quite frankly they haven't been doing.
Senator Enverga: Any comment, Mr. Manning?
Mr. Manning: Listen, there are good employers out there, don't get me wrong, and we work with a lot of them. We have good relationships with them. I don't see this legislation having a whole lot of difference. I still think that those issues will continue to be resolved at the outset. But we also have employers who like to play the game and don't respect health and safety in the workplace. We have to be vigilant with those employers. We see this as giving those employers another tool to exasperate the system and intimidate workers.
[Translation]
Senator Chaput: Thank you, chair. You provided us with a chart describing the process involved when an employee refuses dangerous work. We now have in Bill C-4 a new definition of ``danger'' that will not include ``exposure to a hazardous substance,'' Once the bill is in force, how will this change affect employees who refuse to work because they believe they would be exposed to hazardous substances?
[English]
Mr. Beckett: They are, actually. They're provided in the definition of danger and it's the immediate or serious threat to life or health of a person. Hazardous substances affect health, so it is included in the definition of danger, from our perspective.
Senator Chaput: From your perspective, okay.
[Translation]
Do you have any statistics showing the percentage of work refusals related to exposure to hazardous substances?
[English]
Mr. Beckett: We don't have that statistic. That was not provided to us by the labour program.
Senator Chaput: And you don't have any idea?
Mr. Beckett: No idea.
[Translation]
Senator Chaput: My question is to the three of you. Had you been consulted before these amendments were made, would you have recommended a different definition of ``danger''? Would you have changed Bill C-4 in any way?
[English]
The Chair: Who wants to start? I'll put Mr. Manning on the spot.
Mr. Manning: We probably would have come up with something new. I've sat at lots of bargaining tables and union management meetings. We start out thinking we will never get through this and at the end of the day we do, so we probably would have come up with something new, yes.
Mr. Beckett: I agree with that. We would have come up with something new. What it would look like, who knows. That's the nature of negotiations and trade-offs.
I will say this: The current definition is very cumbersome, so I'm confident that we would come up with something different.
The Chair: On this point of hazardous substance, for clarification, asbestos is something that one or more of you have used as an example. It is clearly identified as a hazardous material. If it is identified by an employee on a work site, what would happen under the new legislation?
Mr. Beckett: Nothing has changed. As I've said, the dangers and controls for asbestos are well known. There are no secrets. It's not an emerging issue. We've known for 30 years. We're now living it. The number of fatalities is relatively the same. Buried within that statistic is the number of asbestos fatalities, which of course had a 20 to 30-year latency period.
The worker would still refuse. I'm potentially going to be exposed to asbestos, there is a danger. All of the process would apply. Nothing has changed from that perspective.
The Chair: Mr. Manning, do you agree with that?
Mr. Manning: Yes, I would agree. I want to add that we found out the devastating effects of asbestos from workers dying and we don't want to wait until people start dying to say, ``You know what? We should have recognized that hazard 10 years ago.''
Mr. Beckett: I'll speak to that particular point and it's in my notes. Part of the problem we have around what's being suggested is that society continues to grow in its knowledge on all kinds of issues, including hazardous substances and chemicals. The reference was already made to diesel exhaust. There's a growing body of science indicating there are long-term health effects to diesel exhaust. We're not there yet. We haven't concluded whether there is or there isn't, but indications are that there are.
We have nanotechnology, which is a new emerging manufacturing process that I still don't understand very well, and we don't understand the risks of that very well at all. Those things will always continue to emerge as society's knowledge grows, and out of that will come regulations, which will be enforced. We don't want it to be done on the backs and the death of people who were exposed to it. We want to rely on science.
The problem we have in the current system, the current broad definition that's in the danger, is that workers can refuse to say, ``I think this nanotechnology will potentially affect my health somewhere in the future.'' No one knows that, yet we are being asked to bring in health and safety officers, who are not experts at everything, to say whether there is a danger or no danger when there is really very little evidence to say whether there is or there isn't. That's part of the problem we currently have in the broad definition.
Senator Seth: Thank you. Just going through this series of things that an employee can refuse and the process eventually goes to the minister, I understand that you represent federally regulated employers. Can you explain to me how safety is inspected in federal workplaces and how it is different from private industries?
Mr. Beckett: Well, it's not any different. The code in the federal sector applies to both private and public employers, and the process is the same. In the federal code, employers are required to have what's called a hazard prevention program. It's part 19 of the code. The hazard prevention program requires employers to do what's called a risk assessment. It's important to remember that all work has hazards and all hazards have risks. The question always is: Are you managing the risks that are going to harm people more than the risks that have a lesser degree and may not harm people?
The internal responsibility system is inherent in any safety management system that requires consultation with the workforce. That's done through the safety community. There are refusal mechanisms which, of course, are what we are here to talk about. There are risk assessments that are done and training that is provided. There are inspections done by the safety committee. There are inspections done daily by supervisors. That's basically how prevention occurs.
It's important to remember that the regulations we do have are the minimum you have to comply with to do business in Canada in the federal sector. I agree with the comments made by Mr. Manning that there are some employers that don't follow the regulations as tightly as they should, but the majority, certainly the ones I deal with, exceed the regulations by far.
Senator Seth: Do you think that people have more risk because of the changes made in this proposed bill?
Mr. Beckett: Do I think people are more at risk because of the changes? No, I do not think there are more people at risk, and certainly not in unionized workplaces. It's important to remember that when we have a refusal in a unionized workplace, the person is not doing it alone. There is a business agent, there is a job steward and there is a union that's there to advise them and guide them through the refusal process. Non-union workplaces are a different issue. They're always a concern, about how things are handled, but I've done consulting for a number of non-union workplaces over a number of years because they take safety as seriously as unionized workplaces.
Senator Dyck: Thank you for your presentations this morning. You've clearly given us a lot to think about.
I want to go back to this chart that you have provided to us. It's very helpful. At one point, Mr. Beckett and Mr. Farrell, you said that too often the labour affairs officers have been injected into this process as first responders. Where would they have been put in currently, according to this model?
Mr. Beckett: The items in black are the current model, which is a three-step process. Basically, the two middle steps — sorry, the step with the safety committee would be missed. Essentially, in areas where tension is high and the workplace is frustrated, inevitably what happens, if the employee says there's a danger and the supervisor says no, there's not, then you get the committee involved. They committee comes along and says, ``There's a danger, no sense of investigating it. We're not going to agree,'' and then the labour affairs officer is called. There's really not a proper investigation that occurs.
Senator Dyck: It sounds as though the old process would actually be okay, except that, for some reason, the referral to the safety committee has been skipped.
Mr. Beckett: Right. So the changes in here actually enhance the role of the safety committee. Now the employer must involve an employer and employee representative of the safety committee. It enhances the role and legitimatizes the role of the refusals, and they have to write a report to the employer.
Senator Dyck: In a sense, it could actually help the employee if there's any future dispute as to the decision making, because then you would have a written record as opposed to some meeting where there were no minutes.
Mr. Beckett: That would be our view, yes.
Senator Dyck: So would it be your view that this wouldn't slow it down but actually ensure that the decision making was kept to the people within the workplace, to the people on the safety committee, who likely have a good understanding or maybe a better understanding than the labour affairs officer?
Mr. Beckett: It's important to remember that safety committee members are actually required by the code to be trained in their activities and duties. They are trained. This will create a different level of training, obviously, because it's a new role for them, but I don't believe it will slow it down, absolutely not.
Now, if the refusal is in the middle of if night, everything gets slowed down because the people aren't around, but there are many ways that employers get around that, by having people on call, by having people by the phone, but I don't believe this will slow any refusal down.
Senator Dyck: You mentioned that about 80 per cent of refusals to work were not founded, and we were actually given a table that indicates it's just under 1,000 refusal to work incidents over a period of 10 years, which is only 100 a year, which is not very many. I'm not sure that the argument that you need this because of that is very strong, because the actual number is actually quite small. A hundred a year is seven or eight a month.
Mr. Beckett: I'll make two comments. One is, even at that number, with that many non-danger, that's a waste of energy and government resources and a waste of officers who could be focusing on prevention.
The second point I'd like to make is that whenever there's a refusal — I just dealt with one that took four days. In four days, nothing got done. That's a bit of an anomaly. The important thing to remember is when there is a refusal and tensions are high, it doesn't end when the decision is made by the officer. The decision may not be agreed to by either party. Then there are appeals, and appeals take years. There is a lot of cost in the system beyond what happens on the day when the officer shows up and writes no danger or danger.
Senator Dyck: I was also looking at the graph that you provided with respect to work-related injuries, and they have been steadily decreasing as we increase regulations. It is now at about 15 injuries per 1,000 workers, which looks very good. I believe Mr. Manning said that, even with all the legislation we have, the number of fatalities has not changed. Do you think that the improvement to the process will in any way affect the number of fatalities, the number of deaths to workers?
Mr. Beckett: The first comment I'd like to make is that, like the 80 per cent where we don't know where the number is coming from, or the detail behind it, I don't know the details behind the 900 deaths. I do know there is a fair number of asbestos deaths in there, which is a 20- or 30-year latency period.
I do believe that this will enhance the Federal Public Service. I don't believe this in itself will reduce any more accidents or make it more dangerous. It's an enhancement to the process that requires the employer to do a much better job than they have been doing. The important point behind that slide is what is being proposed in Bill C-4 is what exists in the provincial jurisdiction. The provincial jurisdiction makes up 92 per cent of all the work that happens in Canada. That graph shows an injury rate of 50 injuries per 1,000 workers in the 1990s down to 14.7 in 2010, showing there's been a steady decline of accidents as employers and unions and employees get more knowledgeable, better trained, better equipment, and 92 per cent of what occurs in the provincial jurisdiction drove those accidents down. What is being proposed in Bill C-4 is exactly what happens in the provinces. The facts from my perspective are that this will not make work in the Federal Public Service any more dangerous than it already is.
Senator Dyck: My final question is, in the cases where the employee is refused and told that they have to get back to work, so they get a no answer from the investigation, are there statistics that indicate whether or not a significant proportion of those denials are where the worker is actually injured?
Mr. Beckett: No, we don't have those statistics, but I'd be confident in saying that if an officer came in and said there was no danger, nobody would have been hurt after the fact, or before the fact.
Senator Dyck: Thank you.
The Chair: Before moving to the second round, with regard to your slide, there is a question that I want to put to you. The answer is implicit in everything you've said, but I'd like to have it on the record. During these five red steps that you have identified as being added to the system, the employee is not forced back to work during that time; is that correct?
Mr. Beckett: That's correct. There are a couple other rules around that as well. The employee is not forced back to work. The employer cannot assign somebody to do the work without full knowledge of the individual. Basically what has occurred has stopped. Now, there are some exceptions to that. They're very specific. If the refusal occurs during the operation of a ship or aircraft, you can't stop flying the aircraft or steering the boat. There are some exceptions but, by and large, when the refusal is done, the work stops and nothing happens until a decision is made.
The Chair: My point is, and it has been implicit in the way all three of you have answered the question, but I thought it was important for the record to clarify that there's no change in that regard in terms of forcing employees back to work.
Mr. Beckett: No.
Senator Eggleton: Let me pick up on that because, again, I can't understand why this is a better system from the employer's standpoint, let alone the employee's standpoint. All these things in red are going to take more time. You described earlier how it's done verbally, which sounds like a pretty fast-moving system, whereas this is a much slower system. You've got to get things in writing. You have to report in writing. You've got to go to the minister. The minister has to appoint somebody. It's taking a fair bit of time to do all this red stuff, so I have a hard time understanding why that's any better. Yet you say the employee is not going to be forced back to work. The employee is not going to lose anything in terms of pay or benefits, I trust?
Mr. Beckett: That's correct.
Senator Eggleton: You said that somebody could be put in to replace them. The employer can put somebody in to replace them, but not without the knowledge of the employee who is objecting to the safety situation.
Mr. Beckett: Right.
Senator Eggleton: ``Not without the knowledge,'' what does that mean? Does that mean permission as well?
Mr. Beckett: I'll give you an example. I had a refusal last week on the waterfront where I work. We had an operator of a crane who refused to pick up a fairly unique setup of a container out of a ship. He basically said there was a danger. The business agent came down and met with the employee and said, ``I don't agree with you that this is a danger.'' The business agent then said to another crane operator, ``Here's the issue. Here's the situation. Do you agree to lift the load?'' That particular operator did. That's allowed in the process. You have to remember that the refusal is based on the individual's belief that there is a danger. It doesn't mean necessarily that everybody agrees with that. That's why we have the process to come to an agreement.
Senator Eggleton: Let me ask you another question. Different provinces have different ways of doing this, as I think was pointed out earlier. Let's take one province, the province of Ontario. How does either the existing system or the proposed new system in terms of danger compare to what Ontario does?
Mr. Beckett: I have no idea. I can talk about British Columbia and Alberta, because that's where I'm from. In B.C., it's exactly what's being proposed here.
Senator Eggleton: Okay. Thank you.
Senator Enverga: Most of my questions were answered through Senator Dyck's questions about the work hours and how much we have lost because of the old proposals. Thank you.
[Translation]
Senator Bellemare: Most of my questions were also answered, particularly on the death rate but I have a comment to make.
Mr. Manning, you talked about the internal responsibility system that would be affected by Bill C-4. What I understand, and this is why I am asking the question — I cannot see how, at the end of the debate, this system will be affected. Can you explain this to me? And if the employer side has more comments, I would be very happy to hear them.
[English]
Mr. Manning: Well, as I said, our issue with this whole thing is the bureaucracy that's now involved with this written report, that written report and this written report. That's where we think it's flawed.
Senator Seth: Clauses 176 and 179 of Bill C-4 give more power to the minister to give more directions regarding health and safety in the workplace. How does the union feel about this? Do you feel the process will be more efficient?
Mr. Manning: No. We've got an issue with the minister having the control that's inferred in this new legislation. We feel that the occupational health and safety officer is the trained expert in dealing with those issues, and now it all falls back on the minister who can appoint or delegate — and I know this may be far-fetched — whoever she pleases, and we've got a problem with that. Everything goes back to the minister, whereas before it was left with the health and safety officer in the workplace.
Mr. Beckett: I don't think the minister is going to assign whoever she pleases. She has a duty of care, like the rest of us do. None of this is taken with any kind of frivolity or vexatious behaviour.
I agree with Mr. Manning's statement that the health and safety officers are experts, but they're not experts in everything. The officers are often hired because of their background in either nursing or construction or manufacturing or nuclear power, which is regulated by the federal sector. This allows the minister to do a number of things. They have an issue on a nuclear power site. She has the ability to assign somebody who has some background there to be able to go in there with some knowledge, as opposed to the officer who gets called. That's generally how the system works. Whoever gets the call, that's who goes, regardless of their level of expertise. The more complex the issue, it makes sense to be able to assign somebody who has some specific expertise, or they may have dealt with the issue in some other industry to be able to be parachuted in to deal with the issue because they already have that expertise. It speeds up the process. We actually support that wholly.
One of the things that happens in some sectors is that employers and workers game the system. Right now, an individual could say there's that danger, and that's resolved, and then the next person can say there's a danger, and the next person, which slows and grinds the employer down to a halt. The minister has the ability to combine those, to say it's all one because they're all the same issue, so that's a new part of the process as well.
There are some real changes here that allow her to manage the resources, which are finite. We all have that problem. We all have more work than people. This allows her to actually manage the finite resources to the benefit of us all.
The Chair: I thank the witnesses for their presentations. I think you've all helped us understand the details of this bill, and your answers have been clear to us. I thank my colleagues for the range of their questions.
On that basis, I declare the meeting adjourned.
(The committee adjourned.)