Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Issue No. 27 - Evidence - Meeting of June 8, 2017
OTTAWA, Thursday, June 8, 2017
The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met this day at 10:32 a.m. to study foreign relations and international trade generally.
Senator A. Raynell Andreychuk (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: Honourable senators, the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade is authorized to examine such issues as may arise from time to time relating to foreign policy relations and international trade generally. Under this mandate, the committee will hear today from Global Affairs Canada officials on recent developments in Venezuela.
We are pleased to have before our committee Ms. Sylvia Cesaratto, Director, South America; Mr. Andrew Shore, Director, Hemispheric Relations Directorate; and Mr. Sean Sunderland, Deputy Director, South America Relations.
We welcome your presentations. As you know, we started studying Venezuela some time ago, as there were areas of concern, particularly for the citizens and for a peaceful resolution of a political impasse. Things appear to be at an impasse politically, and the situation and the plight of the people is of great concern.
We know there has been an OAS meeting and the minister attended it, so we would appreciate your comments on Venezuela and the initiatives in OAS and elsewhere that Canada may have been involved with. Certainly the minister two days ago now, I guess, gave her foreign policy statement, and it would be interesting to see how Venezuela would factor into the initiatives the minister is contemplating, if you are able to give us that.
Welcome to the committee. Please proceed.
Sylvia Cesaratto, Director, South America, Global Affairs Canada: Thank you, Madam Chair. I will start. I welcome this opportunity to discuss with the committee the unfolding crisis in Venezuela and Canada's response.
As you noted, Canada is very concerned with the situation in Venezuela. The Maduro government is increasingly authoritarian. We are strongly committed to working with hemispheric partners on a solution to this crisis. Canada has been very vocal on the need for the Venezuelan government to restore constitutional order and respect Venezuelan citizen and human rights. We recognize that the only viable solution is one that is reached through dialogue among the Venezuelan parties.
Since we presented to you on this topic over a year ago, there has, unfortunately, been a continual deterioration of civil and political rights, freedom of expression and access to basic commodities, such as food and medicine. Venezuelans are suffering. With a state of emergency in place since last spring, the Venezuelan government has increased arrest and harassment of political opponents and limited access to free and independent media.
Since the most recent round of protests began in April, there have been close to 60 deaths. Over 3,000 protesters have been arrested, with some 1,300 still in detention. Hundreds are being tried by military courts in contravention of Venezuela's constitution and every accepted international human rights standard.
[Translation]
Along with insecurity and violence, limited access to basic services and commodities, including food and medicine, is growing in severity. According to statistics released by the Venezuelan ministry of health, approximately 85 per cent of medicines are in short supply, causing many people in state hospitals to die from preventable diseases or to be forced to seek treatment across the border in neighbouring countries.
According to the Venezuelan government's own statistics, infant mortality is up 30 per cent since last year. More than 90 per cent of the population lacks the resources to buy sufficient food and almost 30 per cent of children are at risk of malnutrition.
Inflation is continuing to spiral as the economy shrinks. As was the case last year, inflation is expected to be the highest in the world in 2017 — 720 per cent and climbing, according to the latest IMF estimate. Venezuela's international reserves are at a fifteen-year low, making it difficult to increase food and medicine imports in the near future, while the price of oil — which accounts for over 90 per cent of Venezuela's export earnings — remains depressed.
This has led to a dramatic rise in criminality in Venezuela which, coupled with shortages of basic foods, is having an impact on the flow of people across Venezuela's borders. Growing numbers of Venezuelans are migrating to neighbouring countries, such as Colombia and Brazil, in search of jobs and medical care. As the situation in Venezuela worsens — especially on its volatile border with Colombia — the potential for cascading humanitarian impact and instability throughout the region grows.
[English]
We are in close contact with a variety of humanitarian organizations, either in the country or that are monitoring the situation from neighbouring countries, to better understand the needs of vulnerable and crisis-affected communities. Credible information on the humanitarian situation remains nonetheless limited and often politicized.
We have urged and continue to urge the Venezuelan government to invite experienced international humanitarian organizations, such as the specialized agencies of the United Nations, into their country to conduct an objective needs assessment. Canada stands ready to support the provision of humanitarian assistance as appropriate and based on assessed needs from reputable organizations like the UN and the Red Cross.
However, we must recognize that humanitarian assistance itself does not address the underlying conditions that have contributed to this crisis. Canada, along with much of the international community, has urged the Venezuelan government to fulfill its responsibility to protect the civil and political rights of its citizens, respond to the basic needs, and reform the underlying economic policies, such as price controls and expropriations, which have contributed to these shortages.
Unfortunately, the Government of Venezuela has not consistently upheld its own Constitution, and recent events risk putting the country on a path towards dictatorship.
Examples of this include the suspension of the presidential recall process last fall and postponement of regional elections, the Supreme Court's decision in March to set aside the legislative powers of the National Assembly, and the controversial decision to create a constituent assembly to rewrite the country's Constitution without first seeking the approval of the National Assembly or electing its members.
The result has been almost daily street protests now in their third month, which have been met by violence and arbitrary detentions. This cycle of violence is growing worse, not better. We urge the Venezuelan government and its security forces to demonstrate restraint, to investigate those responsible for causing violence during protests, to fully disarm civilian paramilitary groups, and to agree to outside mediation.
Canada continues to engage strongly on this issue with both the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister recently making forceful public statements calling on the Venezuelan government to restore constitutional order and respect Venezuelans' democratic rights, release all political prisoners, set an electoral calendar without delay, and engage with the international community, particularly the United Nations, to address shortages of food and medicine.
We have also been working closely with the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States, OAS, and like-minded partners in the region to apply coordinated pressure on Venezuela. As mentioned by Madam Chair, Minister Freeland took part in an OAS ministerial meeting on May 31 in Washington. She made it clear in her statement that OAS members need to work together to support a return to constitutional democracy and stressed that Venezuela's intention to withdraw from the OAS does not abrogate its responsibilities to ensure democratic and human rights for its people.
As Minister Freeland said in her intervention, and I quote:
. . . meaningful progress cannot realistically come in the absence of any credible process of dialogue or mediation. When key political leaders are imprisoned and barred from running for office, any prospects of meaningful progress recede beyond anyone's grasp.
The minister will again press the issue when she participates in the upcoming OAS general assembly in Cancun, from June 19 to 21, which we hope will result in a strong, unified regional approach to Venezuela. It is imperative that the democracies of this hemisphere speak with one voice on this subject.
Finally, I would be remiss not to mention the important work that our embassy in Caracas undertakes to provide targeted support for local Venezuelan NGOs in areas like human rights, health and good governance. This includes an embassy-sponsored annual human rights award. Some of you may have had the opportunity to meet with some of the recent winners.
Canada is concerned about human rights and democracy in Venezuela not as an end in itself but because the respect of these contributes to stability and economic prosperity of the country and of the entire region. At this critical juncture, we must stand firm with the people of Venezuela as they seek to restore fundamental civil and political rights. Thank you, Madam Chair.
The Chair: Thank you. Will there be further presentations or just questions?
Ms. Cesaratto: That will be our presentation. We would like to leave time for questions.
Senator Ataullahjan: Thank you for your presentation this morning.
At last week's OAS meeting, members failed to reach an agreement on how to address Venezuela's deteriorating democratic crisis, with some members even insisting that foreign countries have no right to intervene in Venezuela's internal affairs.
At the meeting there were two draft resolutions calling for a reduction in violence. However, there was not enough support for either one of them. From what I have read, it seems the only point of agreement was to keep talking and reconvene in a few weeks.
Given that some countries are standing firm in their belief that foreigners have no right to intervene in Venezuela's internal affairs, what hopes or expectations do we have in regard to the next meeting on June 19?
Ms. Cesaratto: Thank you for the question. I will pass the baton to my colleague who will be able to explain what transpired at the foreign ministers meeting and what we hope to accomplish in the weeks leading up to the general assembly. First I wanted to underline that Canada has been playing a leading role at the OAS in trying to convene both like-minded partners and the rest of the hemisphere to speak as one voice. A lot of that work is negotiating the text of a declaration that could be acceptable to the majority of the member states, and that work is ongoing, but perhaps Andrew can provide more information on it.
Andrew Shore, Director, Hemispheric Relations Directorate, Global Affairs Canada: Thank you very much for the question. I think the fact that the meeting even took place reflected an ability to overcome quite a lot of division. There was a lot of opposition to the foreign ministers meeting prior to the general assembly in the first place, so I think we were not surprised that it was very difficult to achieve the kind of consensus we had hoped for.
The question included some of the criticism that we received about intervening in internal affairs in Venezuela, and that's certainly the rhetoric that we heard from a number of countries. Of course we don't agree with any presentation of the Canadian approach being an intervention, nor of it being a question of internal affairs. There is the Inter- American Democratic Charter which was adopted by consensus of all OAS member states. As it happens, the first time it was invoked was as regards Venezuela at an earlier iteration of its national life.
That's a recognition that when you're dealing with the obligations of being a member of the OAS in terms of the constitutional order, the division of powers, respect for human rights and democracy and so on, those are obligations of membership and they are not internal affairs.
There is a challenge with the Inter-American Democratic Charter because sometimes people do look at it and they kind of jump right to the end of the charter where there's a sanction where it is possible for a member state to be suspended from the OAS, but often the debate skips over the fact that there are very positive ways for partner countries to engage with a country that's facing challenges. Haiti was an example in the past couple of years, where the Haitian authorities approached the OAS and asked for the Inter-American Democratic Charter to be used as a way to help them overcome some of their challenges in concluding a presidential election. That was not seen as a negative thing by OAS members. There were all kinds of ideas how we could work with them. There was a special envoy sent down with the Haitians.
When we talk to Venezuela, and when we talk about Venezuela and when we talk to our partners concerning Venezuela, our emphasis really is on what can we do in a constructive way to encourage dialogue within the country so that they can find their own solutions.
The current Venezuelan government certainly does accuse member states of trying to suspend them. Of course they have announced their own intention to withdraw from the OAS, which has a two-year time cycle for that to take effect. However, your point about the challenges in finding a consensus is something that we continue to work on between now and the general assembly.
There were, in fact, three statements that wound up being debated at the Meeting of Foreign Ministers because the CARICOM countries had had a leaders statement on Venezuela that some of them were, of course, unwilling to back away from.
We're very keen to hear the ideas from countries that may not have the same approach that we have. We think we need as strong a consensus as possible, but it also has to have substance to it, and it has to be something that we think will influence events on the ground and allow the OAS as an organization to really advance the principles and the values that we have all committed to collectively.
The foreign ministers meeting was a step forward in that, and some countries' positions continue to evolve. How far that will go between now and the general assembly that's starting on June 19, we really don't know, but there's quite a lot of activity going on in Washington and among ministers to try and move this forward, in the meantime.
Senator Ataullahjan: You were saying there is a move to try to engage the Venezuelan government in dialogue. What is the sense? Are they ready to be engaged in dialogue? Are they willing to even have this conversation that something is wrong in the country?
Ms. Cesaratto: Thank you for the question. As I have noted in my intervention, we do believe that the solution exists in Venezuela. It takes both parties, both the Government of Venezuela and the opposition party, to be committed to a genuine dialogue to see a path forward.
What Canada and like-minded partners in the region have tried to do is provide the support. As Andrew said, there are mechanisms in the Inter-American Democratic Charter to allow that to happen, but also to keep up the pressure on both sides, to encourage them to come to dialogue in a meaningful way. I don't know if that answers your question, but at the moment the government or the opposition hasn't been that responsive to dialogue mechanisms.
Last fall there were a few that had been under way, one sponsored by UNASUR and another with the involvement of the Vatican. That unfortunately didn't lead to positive progress.
Mr. Shore: It's not a technical point, but one interesting development is when the Venezuelan government said they would withdraw from OAS activities, they signalled they would not be participating in any meetings between now and the two-year time frame when this would actually take effect. They have since said that they will be represented at the foreign ministers level at the upcoming General Assembly. So that means they are present to participate in the dialogue and are not being excluded from it, for whatever that means.
[Translation]
Senator Saint-Germain: Thank you for your presentation which was not only interesting, but also reassuring, since we can see that the government is taking action on various fronts. The multilateral aspect, as you pointed out, is very important, in particular through the Organization of American States. The bilateral aspect is also important, and I have two questions about that. Are we to understand that bilateral relations and communications between Canada and the government of Venezuela have in fact broken off?
Ms. Cesaratto: Do you have another question?
Senator Saint-Germain: It pertains to humanitarian assistance. You said that humanitarian assistance goes through the UN and the Canadian Red Cross. It is reassuring to know that this assistance is reaching the country directly. Can you give us an overview of the plans that will be put in place as regards humanitarian assistance over the coming months, in view of the context you have described?
Ms. Cesaratto: Thank you very much. I will ask my colleagues to fill in the details if necessary.
As to your first question regarding bilateral relations, I hope I have not misled you. No, our bilateral relations have not broken off. We still have bilateral relations with Venezuela. The ambassador here in Canada works with the ambassador in Venezuela. Let me describe our communications with the government. We establish active and open communications with senior officials in both governments. We are in regular contact with the Venezuelan ambassador in Canada. Through our ambassador in Venezuela, with technicians or bureaucrats in the Venezuelan government, we express our concerns and our hopes to arrive at a suitable solution.
Politically, Minister Freeland and the Prime Minister have made various announcements. I have a summary of these announcements. Thus far, there have been three statements from the minister outlining our concerns about the situation in Venezuela. We communicate very actively, using social networks, both at the minister's office and with the embassy in Venezuela. As my colleague pointed out, we are of course supported by the Organization of American States. Canada has made about seven statements and has played a key role in obtaining consensus from a certain number of members of the organization. We always try to make the most of the opportunities that arise to highlight the key points, as I indicated in my presentation.
Senator Saint-Germain: And with respect to humanitarian assistance?
Ms. Cesaratto: Yes, with respect to humanitarian assistance, we always work through the international organizations which whom we engage in talks. We will be ready to respond as soon as we receive an official request from the Venezuelan government.
[English]
Sean Sunderland, Deputy Director, South America Relations, Global Affairs Canada: So the challenge that we face on humanitarian assistance in Venezuela is one of access. Canada does not provide government-to-government humanitarian assistance for obvious reasons. We work through credible and reputable international organizations, like the specialized agencies of the United Nations or the Red Cross.
For the most part, those agencies, although they have expressed a willingness to go to Venezuela and undertake the necessary needs assessments to determine how and what kind of humanitarian assistance may or may not be required, it requires the agreement on the part of the Venezuelan government, and to date that has not happened.
We are in touch with humanitarian actors in the region. Many of them are conveniently located just across the border in Colombia, so it would not be difficult for that to take place, but it does require the consent of the Venezuelan government.
The situation right now in Venezuela is such that these actors do not have the ability to operate there, to provide the necessary needs assessment for us then to make any kind of determination.
However, we do have the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives, which is a small pot of assistance money that the embassy in Caracas is directly responsible for, and we have been able to use those rather limited and targeted funds to support human rights and NGOs in Venezuela that are focused on human rights and democratic development. We are beginning to look at the possibility of providing some capacity building for NGOs that are focusing on the health crisis in Venezuela as well through the Canada fund that the embassy administers.
It's difficult work for these organizations as well because it's such a politicized environment there.
Senator Eaton: I don't want to be rude or awkward, but I find your testimony rather disturbing. We have spent the last two or three times here listening to Venezuelans, either on the ground or in Canada, tell us what a crisis they're in. One parliamentarian told me they really fear for their lives, that in terms of food they are down to sometimes one meal a day.
There are these great meetings of all these wonderful foreign ministers. Our own foreign minister said:
Meaningful progress cannot realistically come in the absence of any credible process of dialogue or mediation. When key political leaders are imprisoned and barred from running for office, any prospects of meaningful progress recede beyond anyone's grasp.
Now I know we don't want violence or war, but have we thought of backdoor strategies like providing Mr. Maduro and the military honchos with an exit to perhaps another South American country with perhaps no prosecution for war crimes? Are we being a little more creative than just sitting around a table?
We look at Syria today and what's happened to Syria, and look at what's happened to some countries in Africa, all because we're sitting around a table being polite, politically correct, mediating. We don't want war. We don't want war and violence, but perhaps we have to go to other kinds of strategies.
About humanitarian aid, yesterday we asked the Venezuelan professor, and he said that what the Mexicans have done to get around humanitarian aid is that when the Venezuelan government turned them down, they simply said, "Well, the Mexican government is standing in solidarity with the people. Would you accept some aid if it was in solidarity with the people?'' And they've done their aid in ways that they're actually getting stuff into Venezuela.
Wouldn't it be a shame if Canada couldn't be as imaginative as Mexico and find ways of actually doing something? Because I know you're diplomats and you have to toe the line and toe the party line; but meanwhile, it's hard for us to sit here and listen to testimony from Venezuelans in Venezuela, and others who live in Canada, telling us how dire the situation is, and the three of you are sitting there saying, "Well, we're having another meeting, and we continue to talk, and the United Nations is great.''
I guess you obviously can't tell us, but are you thinking of using more economic pressure? Is the United States putting more economic pressure and using other strategies like a backdoor exit strategy to get Mr. Maduro and his military companions out of there and into a third country? Perhaps Bolivia, we were told yesterday, would accept them.
Ms. Cesaratto: Madam chair, it is true that the situation in Venezuela is very disconcerting and worrisome, and we do take what's happening there seriously. However, to your particular question about what might be discussed in terms of an exit strategy for the president or other leading members of the ruling party, I really can't speculate on what's happening in terms of backroom discussions or preparing for transition, if it comes to that.
What I can tell you is that the Government of Canada is committed to keeping up the pressure on the Government of Venezuela, to making its voice heard and being a strong voice in defence of democracy and human rights. What I can also say is that our minister has been very engaged in working with like-minded countries in the region to keep applying that pressure, both bilaterally and with the OAS, and both with the OAS's Secretary-General and with the member states of the OAS.
Senator Eaton: I'm sure you'd give me the same answer if I asked you about Syria. Thank you. That's very kind. I didn't mean to put you on the spot.
Ms. Cesaratto: That's fine.
Senator Woo: Thank you for the presentations. I'm really glad to know that we're using all the means of our diplomacy, along with like-minded countries, to try to bring about change in Venezuela, and in particular that we have an on-the-ground presence in Caracas to do some of this work.
I want to ask you about the functioning of the embassy and the staff in Caracas and around Venezuela. Can you give an indication of how able they are to do their work, to meet with civil society groups, opposition leaders, civil society at large; how able they are to get nominations for the Human Rights Award, which is a great idea, and to transmit accurate information to you here at head office, to us sitting around a table speculating? Real credit to the people on the ground doing their work, but how difficult is it for them?
Ms. Cesaratto: Thank you for your question. It's certain that our colleagues in Caracas are not operating in a normal environment. This has been particularly true over the past three months, with the daily demonstrations often taking place where our embassy is located, so in one of the main squares or one of the main thoroughfares in the city centre. On those days, in particular, they have to be particularly conscious of the risk to their health and well-being and to those not only of the Canadians working in the embassy but, of course, of the locally engaged staff. On those days when mass demonstrations are planned, they do have to reduce, say, the number of people who are coming to the workplace or perhaps work from an alternative location, not to be caught up in what we've seen, which sometimes deteriorates into violent altercations.
Despite all of this, they are valiantly continuing to do their work and reaching out to government officials, opposition party members, civil society, and really working hard — through some of our programming, as was mentioned, and with like-minded embassies on the ground as well — to coordinate efforts.
Another area where our embassy is extremely active is on social media, especially on Twitter and Facebook, where we have — I don't know the number of followers, but many. Then, of course, through re-tweeting, we reach a large audience of civil society in Venezuela.
Some of our messaging, including some of the statements issued by our minister, I hazard to say, went viral, so certainly Canada is being noticed in terms of the strong stand we're taking with respect to human rights and democracy and the need for the Venezuelan government to respect its own constitution. So we're working very much at a groundswell level, if you will, despite the difficult working environment.
Senator Woo: And the access is unimpeded or relatively unimpeded?
Ms. Cesaratto: I would say that, up to a certain level, they have fairly good access. There have been many changes in the government's foreign affairs department.
Senator Woo: Sorry, I'm referring more to non-government action: civil society, opposition leaders, unions, academics.
Ms. Cesaratto: As far as I know, yes. The Human Rights Award, which is now in its seventh or eighth year, as was mentioned, is one of the hallmarks of what we're trying to do in terms of democracy and human rights in Venezuela, certainly has not gone unnoticed by the Government of Venezuela. We're well aware that this is a prize that shines a light on some of the work that's being done by its own citizens in terms of defending their rights. So it's not gone unnoticed, but it's certainly not impeding them to be able to do that work.
Mr. Shore: Just to make a point about the bilateral and multilateral engagement, I want to emphasize that we make sure that we pursue it in a very integrated way because, of course, some of the statements that we might make at the OAS may have a detrimental effect on the ability of our embassy to operate, for instance, or it may have a beneficial effect. So we certainly make sure that we're pursuing every opportunity but that it's in a calibrated and, let's say, nuanced way so that there aren't unintended consequences which could occur if the government gets quite upset.
They watch carefully what we say. I've been struck by that. I remember at the General Assembly last year when our head of delegation was making a statement. I looked over at the Venezuela chair, and it was empty. I thought: That's kind of too bad, because we were going to say something pretty frank about Venezuela.
I saw the Venezuelan foreign minister run to the seat. She was looking at our head of delegation and she was taking very careful note. That's good, but it also means that we have to make sure there aren't effects that could be detrimental somewhere else.
Senator Marwah: Thank you for your comments. We heard testimony yesterday that some Caribbean countries that are the recipients of Venezuelan oil — and, surprisingly, even U.S. oil companies — are not receptive to any stronger action being taken. Would you comment on that? Is there any possibility of things being reversed on that front and pressure being brought to bear to act in the regional interest rather than self-interest?
Ms. Cesaratto: Thank you for your question. We were just conferring on how best to answer your question, which is a very pertinent question.
You're referring to, of course, Venezuelan Petrocaribe diplomacy, which they continue. They continue to supply oil at subsidized rates to a number of Caribbean countries, although the amount of the subsidy and the amount of the oil has declined, due to the drop in oil production in Venezuela.
They still continue to exert, I suppose, some influence on the countries that are recipients of this subsidized oil. I do have a listing of those countries, but perhaps I'll leave it to my colleague to describe how Petrocaribe is having an influence on hemispheric unity at the OAS with respect to Venezuela, or disunity perhaps is better.
Mr. Shore: Going back to what I said earlier about how every member state of the OAS has freely accepted to uphold the Inter-American Democratic Charter and everything that comes with that, it's also clear that people have different geostrategic perspectives on the situation, and the economic angle is very important for that.
There are definitely some Central American and Caribbean states that have very active economic engagement with Venezuela. There are some that have a bit more ideological sympathy to them. Some are subject to a great deal of potential pressure on the oil situation, where they really do depend on a continuation of concessional oil arrangements, and our understanding is that Venezuela certainly is not shy about emphasizing that.
So again, we take into account that different members of the OAS are subject to different considerations in terms of how they want to influence the situation and how they want to manage potential impacts on their situation. A lot of the discussion going on right now is about how do we manage a crisis which continues to get worse, even in a context where Venezuela will obviously continue to use whatever levers it has at its disposal. But the economic question is definitely part of that.
Senator Marwah: Would you care to comment on the U.S. oil companies? I found it fascinating that the U.S. oil companies continue to trade in full freedom, so to speak, yet the U.S. government's public stance is against the Venezuelan government. It's like they're talking from two different sides.
Mr. Sunderland: Senator, I can comment on that. Obviously, it depends on the company. ExxonMobil had most of its assets in Venezuela expropriated in the Chávez era. Their former CEO is now the Secretary of State in the United States. Venezuela produces heavy crude. A substantial part of that crude — I don't know if it's a majority anymore — is exported to refineries along the U.S. Gulf Coast. They are specifically set up to process that type of heavy crude, which is another reason why, for example, Canada exports heavy crude as well to the Gulf Coast, because we produce a similar type of heavy crude. So clearly there are economic interests on both sides.
I can't speculate as to what the motivations of individual companies are, or the U.S. government, but there remains substantial trade between the United States and Venezuela in oil for these and other reasons.
Senator Oh: Thank you for your presentation. We have been listening to this for the last few weeks, and somehow there's a lot of talk, even at the United Nations, and nothing concrete is moving into Venezuela. Even the humanitarian aid problem, recourse is now going on. Our Minister Freeland, whatever she does, she still takes advice from all of you. All of you are giving her advice about the situation. Is anything concrete coming since Canada will now be playing an important role on the international stage? Can you comment?
Ms. Cesaratto: Yes. Thank you for your question, senator.
Certainly one of the main pillars of our engagement on the Venezuela issue is through the multilateral forum through the OAS, as I think we've described. We are looking at policy options that could be applied on a bilateral basis. There's a range potentially there, including potentially providing more support to our embassy on the ground to be able to do more with civil society, for instance. So there is a review of some of the policy options that we can propose, which is ongoing at the moment, which I'm not at liberty to go into too much detail on.
Mr. Shore: One point I didn't make earlier about the OAS role bears giving some credit to the OAS Secretary- General. Some of you may have had a chance to meet him either in Washington or when he was here last December. He really has made a mark in his job. He's been there a couple of years now, and he's very different from previous OAS Secretaries-General. He's a former foreign minister of Uruguay, and from day one he basically said he was going to try to put the OAS back on the map in terms of democracy and human rights. He's been extremely outspoken, outspoken to the point that some OAS members really want him removed, including Venezuela, and they have seen this as Venezuela is being unfairly criticized.
It is interesting to note that he's issued a couple of very detailed assessments of the situation in Venezuela — humanitarian, political, everything. One of them was over 100 pages, I believe. As much as some countries were very critical of how he did that and how outspoken he was and they accused him of being selective, I don't remember — maybe Venezuela — hearing any of his critics ever criticize his assessment of the situation. The reports were very detailed and very well sourced and so on.
He has helped move the organization in a direction that maybe a couple of years ago it would have been even more reluctant to do. That's not to say that the situation is moving as quickly as some would like it to in terms of the deteriorating situation on the ground in Venezuela. But the regional consensus is not yet where Canada would like it to be, and this is why we keep saying hopefully in the next few weeks.
There was, for example, a goal that we could propose a mission of foreign ministers could go to Venezuela, that they would seek an invitation by the Venezuelan government, following up on the foreign ministers meeting, to meet with the Venezuelan government and hear their perspective on things, but also to meet with other civil society actors and so on. That did not come out of the foreign ministers meeting. It doesn't mean there might not be more support for it at the General Assembly, and then we would see whether Venezuela wants to engage in that kind of dialogue or not. Up until now, they've basically made it clear that they don't really want to engage in any way that they don't control, but the situation is deteriorating and perhaps their position will evolve.
Senator Gold: First, thank you for your presence and thank your colleagues, both here and on the ground, for the work they're doing. This is a difficult situation, and there are many unsung heroes in this, certainly on the Venezuelan side of things, to be sure, but also here and in our embassy, so thank you.
You spoke about the multilateral and, to some degree, bilateral efforts that Canada makes with our goodwill but somewhat limited leverage. To what extent has Venezuela in this situation figured in your bilateral discussions with China, for example, which plays an important role here, as we've heard; with the U.S., of course; and with Cuba, where Canada has a historical relationship and economic relationship; or any others? Does Venezuela figure on our radar when we're talking bilaterally with those actors?
Ms. Cesaratto: Thank you for your question, senator. I can confirm that, yes, Venezuela does figure as a point of discussion, especially with our hemispheric partners, again not only in the context of the OAS but bilaterally. When our ministers — and not only Minister Freeland but our Minister of International Trade and Minister of International Development — meet with their counterparts from the region, we do try to have a discussion on Venezuela to share perspectives and also to share ideas on how to move the yardstick forward on the situation.
We also put Venezuela on the agenda when we have bilateral consultations at an officials' level, which we have with most countries of the region. We are particularly engaged with like-minded countries from the southern hemisphere on Venezuela because we do believe that it's important that we have momentum as a region and that Canada and the U.S. be joined by hemispheric partners and not stand apart.
In fact, Venezuela has helped to show strong hemispheric unity in terms of where we are positioning with the Venezuela question, which we haven't perhaps seen on other issues.
Mr. Shore: Not that any of us are necessarily experts on the Security Council, but I would just mention that the Americans did bring the Venezuela situation to the Security Council recently on the basis that I think their position was they are trying to prevent a crisis from getting even worse, and this is something that people talk about a lot in UN reform.
My recollection of the situation was that China and Russia, of course, were not at all supportive in any sense of that, which is just in terms of a public kind of acknowledgment of what those governments' positions have been in terms of at least Security Council engagement.
I'm trying to remember. There are countries that are observers at the OAS. I don't remember whether — China has been involved in interesting ways in the Americas, actually, of course, as you know. Venezuela is one example, but I'm trying to remember whether they've sought observer status at the OAS, and I'm afraid I just don't remember off the top of my head.
Ms. Cesaratto: On the question of Cuba, I can say that the Cuban government, just a few days ago, released a very strong statement in support of the Venezuelan government. I don't think that's extremely surprising. It will be interesting to see what role they can play to help mediate or broker a solution going forward. For the moment, they're staunchly behind the Maduro government.
Senator Gold: I can assume from that that whatever leverage we may or may not have — and one should be realistic about our leverage with China in relation to Venezuela. Perhaps with respect to Cuba it is either not being exercised, attempted to be exercised or it has been ineffectual. I'm not clear about whether Canada is actually trying to influence Cuba in this, even if it might be somewhat futile for ideological and other reasons.
Ms. Cesaratto: As I said, it is a topic that does figure in our discussions with authorities. Whether there's been an engagement at the political level, I'm not really in a position to say, but I can say that officials in our embassy in Cuba and elsewhere are engaging with their counterparts to have a discussion on Venezuela.
Mr. Sunderland: If I can briefly intervene to say that aside from the political aspect — this is purely a fact I'm throwing out there — Cuba receives approximately 80,000 barrels of oil a day from Venezuela. I'll let you draw your own conclusion.
Ms. Cesaratto: And apparently there are 50,000 Cubans working in Venezuela at the moment, so there's a tight relationship.
The Chair: I want to pick up on the issue of Canada negotiating in OAS to get more people on board. We keep hearing it's the Caribbean because they get oil, too. We used to have a strong relationship, through the Commonwealth and otherwise, with the Caribbean countries. More recently, within several decades, we have not had the same prominence there. Also, the American situation in the Caribbean has changed a lot as well as in South America. They were certainly interventionists in the past, both militarily and otherwise.
Is there a role that Canada can play, given what I think has not been the strongest emphasis from Canada on the Caribbean, to convince some of these countries that, in their long-term interest, Venezuela is not a good partner for them at present and that they should be supporting the OAS for their long-term future?
Mr. Shore: I'm not quite sure how to answer. The answer is yes, in a sense. That is the basis of the discussion that we have with the Caribbean, that regardless of the understandable constraints they may feel placed under right now, we all have to take a broader view and a longer-term view. If the situation were to continue to deteriorate, some of the impacts of an even worse humanitarian crisis will impact them in a much more direct way than they will us, for example, just because of geography.
The Commonwealth connection has certainly been noted because, of course, as much as we talk about the inter- American democratic Charter in the OAS context, there are similar human rights and democracy obligations through Commonwealth membership. There is a country in the OAS that has actually commented a couple of times on how wouldn't it be good if the OAS had a mechanism like the Commonwealth has to send the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group delegation to Venezuela? Well, we agree. However, it just so happens that the country that has mentioned that is also not supportive of any action being taken on Venezuela.
So theoretically, it's true that — of course, we always want multilateral organizations to have as many tools at their disposal to influence things in a positive way, but in this particular case, there wasn't going to be any follow-through from the proponent of that approach.
So I think there are interesting parallels, and I think that just builds the case that, again, these are not internal affairs. Venezuela, of course, is not a member of the Commonwealth, but it has human rights obligations that transcend its OAS membership as well.
I think all of these examples build a case for why there are different models out there. We don't have to reinvent the wheel; there are solutions to the problems in Venezuela, there are incentives that need to be presented for a dialogue process. Some countries are just not quite there in terms of being perceived as antagonizing the current Government of Venezuela. They're very concerned about the impact that could have on them, and they tend to be Commonwealth countries.
The Chair: Noting the Harare declaration, I don't think it has been very helpful in Zimbabwe — I have to put that one out — nor have UN resolutions in Syria.
I'm wondering, with all the work we have done in Haiti and we've partnered with so many Caribbean countries, that has had no effect on encouraging them to work with us in Venezuela?
Mr. Shore: I can certainly say that in the OAS context, at least, Haiti has not been supportive of what we and our like-minded countries have done. I would also say that they have not been very forward leaning in proposing alternative approaches. For countries that have a closer relationship than Canada does with the current government in Venezuela, we would certainly like to hear ideas from them about alternatives that might influence the situation.
I couldn't say that we have seen that from Haiti, and I mentioned earlier that it's interesting to note that Haiti did approach the OAS not that long ago in order to help find solutions for its own blockage of the presidential election process.
I think Minister Freeland at her speech in Washington last week highlighted Haiti as a particular example to be welcomed where there was a creative use of the OAS, a creative use of the Inter-American Democratic Charter. It was not a sanction against Haiti. It was something that they reached out for because they said, "We need some help,'' and we're not threatened by it.
Essentially it's worth reminding Haiti and other countries that there are successful examples of where this type of offer of support really has helped. It's not meant to be threatening or negative in tone.
The Chair: Following up on using Zimbabwe, there were initiatives to remove President Mugabe, but that wasn't the problem in the end. It was the military who were more fearful of what would happen to them, and so when you looked at the spiralling effect of what had happened in Zimbabwe, removing the president was not going to be the key to the solution because of so many other people who were invested in the regime.
I see the parallel in Venezuela here. On the one hand, we're saying more dialogue is about all the tools we have; persuasion, so how many more partners can we get; and who has influence with Maduro.
In our hearings we haven't heard too much about Russia, and I understand that that could be a lever because they are certainly influencing the present regime or at least supporting it verbally. Is that your take on Russia?
Ms. Cesaratto: I'm just trying to see who is best placed to answer. Would you like to start?
Mr. Sunderland: Russia has significant commercial interests in Venezuela. Russia is the leading exporter of military goods to Venezuela. Russian oil companies are heavily invested in the oil and gas industry in Venezuela. Rosneft, a Russian oil company, recently floated a $1.5 billion loan to PDVSA, which is the Venezuelan state oil and gas company — this is all public knowledge — and took a 49 per cent equity stake in PDVSA's subsidiary operations in the United States called CITGO. So I would think that Russia is probably a country that is heavily invested in the current government in Venezuela. That would be the conclusion I would draw.
The Chair: With the international NGOs that are attempting humanitarian aid, is the feedback that it is getting to some Venezuelans who need it? Or are there obstructions within the government, both for international NGOs as well as locals?
Ms. Cesaratto: I'll begin on that. We know that the government has put the military in charge of receipt and distribution of any food and medicine, or certainly medical supplies that are entering the country. What we can surmise — and I don't know if we're hearing this directly from the international organizations — is that medicine is not all making it to its end destination or where it is most needed. I don't have a good sense that there are many international organizations on the ground assessing, and that's really something that we're pushing for, that those international organizations be allowed to enter and undertake a proper needs assessment.
Yes, the military is in charge of receipt and distribution, and it's not all making it to the end location.
The Chair: I'm not sure I wanted to end on that pessimistic note, but on behalf of the committee I thank you for your appearance here today to bring us up to date from the perspectives of the department and the Government of Canada.
It is a difficult situation and it is in our hemisphere, so it is one that we cannot ignore. I'm not sure whether anyone has yet found a formula to influence the president and his people except, I think, some negative forces. Looking for positive initiatives that might bring everyone back to some negotiation inside of Venezuela is still a possibility that we hope for, increasingly diminishing, however, in the eyes of so many people. Thank you for helping us to understand the Canadian perspectives within Venezuela.
Ms. Cesaratto: Thank you, Madam Chair.
(The committee adjourned.)