THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
EVIDENCE
OTTAWA, Wednesday, October 18, 2017
The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met this day at 4:17 p.m., to study on foreign relations and international trade generally; and consideration of a draft agenda (future business).
Senator A. Raynell Andreychuk (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade is meeting this afternoon to continue to examine such issues as may arise from time to time relating to foreign relations and international trade generally.
Under this mandate, the committee has invited the next witnesses to give committee members a briefing on the key geopolitical dynamics and players in Asia and their implications for Canadian regional interests and ties. This includes issues arising in the subregions of South Asia, Southeast Asia and East Asia. The committee also has a particular interest in the foreign policy and commercial priorities of such regional powers as Russia, China and India.
The committee heard from government officials on this topic earlier this month and we are now pleased to welcome two experts. We have given them a broad range of topics. Both gentlemen are known to me and many of the members here. I couldn’t think of two more qualified people to make their presentations.
Appearing by video conference from Vancouver is Paul Evans, Professor, Institute of Asian Research and the School of Public Policy and Global Affairs at the University of British Columbia; and with us here in Ottawa is Brian Job, Professor, Department of Political Science and Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia. We thank both of you for accepting our broad mandate to give us some geopolitical information of the area that may be of benefit to members as we continue to study the area.
I should say to both of our witnesses — I think you both testified here before — we have passed around bios and we would want your valuable time on the presentation and questions at the end. Welcome to the committee. We invite Professor Job to begin.
Brian Job, Professor, Department of Political Science and Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia, as an individual: Good afternoon, honourable senators. I thank the committee for the invitation to appear to consider the vital importance of Canada and Canadians coming to terms with the realities of Asia. As you noted, Madam Chair, this is my third appearance before this committee.
Before proceeding, I would like to give my respects to Senator Yuen Pau Woo and to acknowledge the pleasure of working with him during his leadership of the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada.
The short paper that has been distributed focuses upon the immediate crisis presented by North Korea. While I refer to North Korea in these remarks, I will do so in the broader context that Madam Chair has sketched regarding regional and global changes concerning Asia that affect Canada.
I would title my remarks this afternoon, if asked, as “Power Transitions and Power Transformations: Positioning Canada Vis-à-vis the Contemporary Asia.”
I look to make four points. The first is that the fundamental functional relationships between economics and security in Asia have changed. The second point is that power transitions are under way in both regional and global contexts. The stereotypic characterization of the U.S.-China power transition in certain ways misses the broader point. Third, power and influence and security must be understood in broader dimensions than simple military capacity. This is the nature, if you will, of power transformation. The fourth point is that Canada must reposition itself in light of these fundamental changes, transitions and transformations. So I shall proceed accordingly.
On point one, the post-World War II Asia “miracle,” if we call it that, commencing with the revitalization of Japan, the development of Southeast Asia and the economic rise of China was due to the complementary relationship — the synchrony — of economics and security in the region. In the simplest terms, the U.S. provided both. Washington’s political and military dominance guaranteed the stability of the region through its alliance system and maritime dominance. The U.S. supported the Bretton Woods international financial system and provided the underpinnings of the marketization of Asian economics to both theirs and the U.S.’s advantage. But this fundamental complementarity between economics and security dynamics has become unstuck.
On the economic side, the U.S. is no longer singularly capable of managing the world’s trade and finances. It is increasingly apparent since the financial crisis of 2008, with the impact of globalization upon advanced economies and with the emergence of China as a global economic power. On the security side, while the U.S. in terms of vast physical capacity remains superior, the political security architecture of the region is changing dramatically.
In effect, the centre of gravity has moved to the Asian continent, where China has increasingly extended its influence in security and economic terms. For the economic terms we only need to witness the One Belt, One Road initiative, which is unmatched by any U.S. or Western presence and, indeed, in some ways it dwarves what was involved even in the Marshall plan.
Point two is that power transition — or indeed power transitions plural — are a fact of the dynamics of Asia today. There are numerous power transitions going on. That is a situation where a once dominant player is being challenged by one or more other players. Most attention today is focused on the U.S.-China power transition, cast in its traditional terms. This is a situation involving a challenger and a status quo power, with the danger that one or the other will pre-empt to displace or remain on top.
Conservative analysts, especially in the U.S., see China as aggressive and endangering regional stability. Others, including China, see China coming into its own as a global power, seeking to re-establish what it regards as its appropriate sphere of influence. History gives various answers to the outcome of such transitions, many pointing to conflict, but others citing the peaceful transition involving the U.S. replacement of Britain after World War I. I think it is not really viable to draw a specific conclusion about where this is going.
Usually the power transition, as I said, is discussed in terms of military capacities, defence budgets, et cetera. In other words, the traditional language and assets of military security. But, to be understood, the power transitions under way today have to be appreciated as involving more than military power projection. They have to be cast on a broader stage, considering not just the regional stage but also the terms of their international systemic and global parameters. China’s power transition has moved it to becoming a global power and a force in global governance as seen, for instance, on climate change and on many other fronts.
Now, the current North Korea crisis also has to be appreciated as involving a power transition. If conflict breaks out, the security framework of Northeast Asia will have to be entirely reconstructed. If conflict does not occur and we find ourselves living with a nuclearized North Korea, this will be a demonstration of the failure of U.S. deterrent policies and the U.S. then with a reduced role and, on the other hand, the determining role to be played by China.
On point three, we have to appreciate power as seen in its broader and more complex dimensions than military capacity. The phrase I am using is power transformation to refer to this need to understand these dimensions. Today, a state’s power spectrum has to be seen to include its capacities to control information; to advance its political, social and cultural agendas, which many refer to as its soft power; to be cognizant of the power and threats of digital, cyber and space technologies; and to manage the forces of nationalism and extremism.
So, too, must security be understood in broader terms. Peace and stability depend upon sustaining economic growth and equanimity within a population. You have to realize the foreign policy of all Asian states is driven by their government’s domestic priority to sustain the expectations and well-being of their populations. The human security of these populations depends on, among other things, managing natural disasters, controlling disease, advancing environmental protection and sustainability, all of which are aspects of sustaining the security of the state.
Turning to point four, Canada’s engagement with Asian states must take into account these power transitions and power transformations. We must reformulate in light of our interests and comparative advantage on the different components of power and influence. We cannot aspire to a military role in Asia. Also, though, a simple transactional approach focused on trade and short-term economic gain or loss will not rebuild the relationships that Canada requires to sustain a long-term role as a relevant player in both regional and global contexts.
Canada needs to develop an “Asia strategy” that re-establishes in Asian capitals the perception that we are a relevant and a committed player. It is unfortunate that, by and large, we are no longer viewed in this regard. This is the consequences of inattention, of not taking an active role in regional institutions and of reduced funding and human resources. This is on both the official Track 1 and unofficial Track 2 dimensions.
I regard Ottawa as needing to focus on the following: proactive re-engagement in Asia-Pacific regional institutions — the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting, otherwise known as the ADMM-Plus, the ASEAN Regional Forum and others.
Second, appreciate that Asian states, especially China, are now global actors, which means that we need to think about engaging with them in global forums and also in regions other than Asia, particularly, I think, in Africa.
Third, we need to focus on our comparative advantages which include, among others, our advantages in communications technology, in sustainability, in education and in multicultural relations.
Fourth, we need to develop and sustain national expertise on Asia and Canada-Asia relations and the role of Asian communities within Canada. What once was a vibrant and positive relationship involving experts, academics and the departments of defence and then foreign affairs has been substantially eroded. Of interest is that the national defence review addressed this by committing $3 million a year to rebuilding those networks, particularly in developing and supporting a younger generation. Global Affairs Canada should take note and commit to contributing towards and cooperating on this agenda.
Finally, for the last moments, what can or should Canada be thinking about vis-à-vis North Korea? First, maintain our limited lines of communication. We have them, and that is demonstrated through the recent success in obtaining Pastor Lim’s release. We should be alert to any niches through which information may be funnelled, particularly to Pyongyang.
Second, we should sustain our humanitarian assistance programs, demonstrating that we are attentive to the human security needs of the North Korean population.
Third, we should look to support and expand, to the degree possible, the NGO and people-to-people initiatives that are already being undertaken.
Fourth, we should look to engagement with regional and international partners at the UN, especially other “middle powers” like Australia and the Scandinavian states, who have already begun to insert themselves into these considerations.
For the longer term, continuing as above, we need to open dialogue and vet the prospects for a future regional order, one that looks to a stable Korean peninsula and to integration of the North, in whatever forum, into regional, global trade and financial systems.
One final note: One can’t ignore the looming prospect of failure in the North Korean crisis; that is, if a conflict breaks out. The aftermath of any attack on a civilian centre will be a humanitarian crisis that can only be engaged through coordinated international response. Ottawa needs now to evaluate how it can and will respond to a multi-dimensional crisis beyond the scale of any recent natural or human disaster.
Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you. We will now turn to Professor Evans.
Paul Evans, Professor, Institute of Asian Research and Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia, as an individual: Thank you, Senator Andreychuk. I hope my voice is coming through clearly from a Vancouver that is in the midst of the biggest rainstorm of the year. The deluge is upon us.
I welcome the opportunity to speak with the committee, albeit on short notice. I apologize for not having a written text but can provide one later, if that would be helpful.
You are addressing a very broad sweep of security matters that are essential as we look to deepen our economic influence across the Pacific. I hope this is a step towards the formulation of a carefully prepared and widely discussed Asia strategy to have influence in Asia at this point. We need one.
I concur with the general sketch offered by my colleague Brian Job, who has been particularly active on Northeast Asian security issues for 25 years. Let me build on his remarks and focus a bit more on the idea of a strategic transition, what it means for Canada, the changing perspectives that I think Canadians have on the rise of global China and how we need to respond to it.
First, on strategic transition, as Brian has noted, this is not a time of business as usual. The return of Asia as a major force in world affairs is in full swing. A key factor in this is the fourth rise of China, this time not on just a regional scale but a full scale. The decisions of Chinese leaders, citizens, businesses and consumers have worldwide impact. As we are seeing the nineteenth party Congress that began as we are holding our discussion today, those discussions in Beijing could signal an important set of shifts not only in domestic China but how China will connect with the region and the world.
Today, questions about China’s role in the world becoming a responsible stakeholder in the international system that made sense a decade ago now seem off point. China is already a major player in existing institutions and becoming very adept at helping to create new ones on an enormous scale. As Brian Job mentioned, the Belt and Road Initiative represents a Chinese investment and international collaboration at least 10 times the scale of the Marshall Plan in Europe 60 years ago. This is not business as usual; this is a changing international structure in which China is at the centre.
On global issues, China is not just an important player but a leader in several areas, including climate change, disease control, financial systems and its G20 role, and something I will refer to a bit later — peacekeeping. Under Xi Jinping, China is positioning itself as a defender of institutions and some of the principles that Mr. Trump’s America is stepping away from.
At the regional level, China is emerging as the principal trading partner of virtually every country in Asia, at the centre of the regional economy, but at the same time it’s becoming more assertive in pressing its neighbours on territorial, diplomatic and some other security issues. China’s rise is shifting the ground of the regional economy, diplomacy and security.
This ground is being shaken further by President Trump’s approaches. In the past year, I have visited eight Asian countries to talk with them about their response to Mr. Trump’s America First. I think it’s fair to say that friends and enemies alike see the U.S. now as unpredictable and untrustworthy, even as they aim to protect their bilateral relationship with Washington. The question they are asking is, can we sustain a multilateral world order without China being a central pillar, as the United States appears to be taking several steps backward from the order that it helped create.
To focus the discussion, I would like to draw on a public opinion survey on Canadian attitudes of China that we were just able to release yesterday. It is a major, comprehensive survey of 1,500 Canadians with 60 questions that paint a very interesting picture of how Canadians are responding to these big shifts that Professor Job outlined and I think he portrayed accurately.
The results of the survey paint a picture of pragmatism — a desire for deeper economic relations with China and deeper partnerships with China in addressing global issues related to the environment, counterterrorism and peacekeeping. At the same time, in Canada, there is a growing anxiety about China’s regional roles and its military buildup. What we found most interesting were new concerns about the growing presence and influence of China inside Canada. Dealing with China on security issues is not only about things taking place elsewhere but developments inside Canada itself.
Let me point to five findings that may be of interest to the committee. First, almost 70 per cent of people are now supporting the negotiation of a free trade agreement with China. FDI issues are complicated and there is more resistance, but in controlled experiments, we discovered that with more information provided about the level of Chinese foreign investment and the protections currently in place, the allergy to deeper Chinese investment in the country almost disappears, at least to the same levels that we have anxieties about French, Japanese or even American investments.
The second finding: In comparison to the United States, attitudes towards the United States and U.S. leadership are only slightly more favourable than toward China. The warmth of Canadian feelings about the current government in the United States is significant. In several areas, China is seen as the more responsible global player, including maintaining peace, stability, predictability and involvement in climate change and the environment. This is a remarkable shift from where we were five years ago in these studies.
The third point is about human rights, which remains a significant concern for Canadians. But what is interesting is that this is now a distant fourth in terms of public preferences for what our government should be focusing on. The first three are deepening economic connections, partnering with China on global issues and protecting Canadian values and institutions at home — all far ahead of the promotion of human rights and democracy in China. What we see in a secondary set of questions is that this boils down to the idea that we can best promote human rights through trade and trade agreements, rather than the idea that you either do trade or human rights. It’s something of a watershed in Canadian thinking on this matter.
The fourth point is that the level of concern about the Chinese presence inside Canada is rising. Its main dimensions are housing affordability, threats to jobs, cyberattacks and espionage. But we found a somewhat amorphous but serious concern about challenges to Canadian values and the way of life in our country. China is on our doorstep, and Canadians are concerned about some of the elements of that presence.
Finally, as worried as Canadians are about some Chinese behaviour in its Asian neighbourhood, they are strongly opposed to increased defence spending to counter China’s rise. Only a small number would favour Canadian military support of the U.S. in the event of a military conflict with China, suggesting a very different positioning of Canada as an ally of the United States, at least as it intersects with China.
Let me conclude with three ideas about how to position Canada that build upon what Professor Job mentioned. We need an Asia strategy, and we need to have China as a central part of it. It needs to be broader than a trade strategy, and it needs to reposition what Professor Job mentioned as an engaged middle-power role in this shifting geopolitical landscape. We can’t be bystanders and observers. We can’t deeply influence major outcomes, but we can play a mediating role in working across a power transition as we hope to build a rule-based system, even as we understand that the specific rules will change in response to new political and military values. We have to listen to China as well as try to constrain it.
Second, we need to give more attention to understanding and responding to new patterns of Chinese presence and influence inside our borders. This is a sensitive issue that can be sensationalized and singularized. The growing Chinese presence here is part of a deeper relationship but one that we have to watch very carefully and, in some cases, intervene to protect Canadian values and interests here at home.
Finally, let me talk for a moment about a common interest in peacekeeping. We are looking at a new set of Track Two activities with China on the experiences of a China that is entering the world of UN-sponsored peacekeeping as the largest of the P5 contributors and also on the front line of some of the most difficult UN operations, particularly Mali and South Sudan.
In a recent visit to China, where I had a chance to talk with a number of Chinese military officers, retired and serving, who have experience in those, the person they wanted to ask me most about was Roméo Dallaire. They were asking about former general Senator Dallaire because of his involvement on the front line and very difficult issues related to civilian protection and protection of our own forces. China is now on the front line of many of those difficult operations and is looking for ideas and partnerships on how it can play a more responsible role in civilian protection. It strikes me that if there is one area we can strike with the Chinese quickly, what they call a win-win and our American friends call a slam dunk conversation, it’s on peacekeeping.
Final line: We need to partner with China where we can, and I think the Canadian public increasingly supports that for very pragmatic reasons, but we must protect ourselves as best we can, as there are some challenges here.
Thank you so much.
The Chair: I thank both of our witnesses today. You have covered a lot of ground. We expected no less of you, since you’ve been here before. We will begin with questions.
Senator Woo: Thank you, Professor Job and Professor Evans, for your very thoughtful, insightful and comprehensive presentations. I have a question for each of you.
The first is to Professor Job on the question of the power transition. The question really is to ask you to project where the power transition will lead. What are we transitioning to? I know there will never be a fully established steady state, but to the extent that there could be a steady state in a transitioned power situation, what would that look like?
Second, because I know a lot of people, particularly you might say conservative hawks, would hope for the power transition to fail. Perhaps there’s no guarantee there will be a power transition, so could you also comment on what a failed transition would look like and if that is something we should wish for or wish against? Those are for Professor Job.
Professor Evans, you alluded to the “amorphous threat” that some Canadians feel about the presence of China in our own country. You didn’t say much more about that, but then you did allude to the need, from time to time, to intervene in instances of Chinese presence in our country to protect Canadian values. That was a little cryptic and tantalizing. I wonder if you would care to elaborate on it.
Mr. Job: I anticipated nothing less than a tough question.
The power transition argument is often cast in the sense of being concerned and drawing on history, which suggests that it is usually the dominant power that seeks to pre-empt against the rising challenger. It’s interesting that much of the discussion we have today about the power transition involving China and the U.S. often focuses on the notion that it is China, in fact, that may make some precipitous gesture.
Where the current power transition is leading — let’s begin where it was. It was in a situation of complete U.S. maritime dominance and a system of alliances where the U.S. could very easily manage any perceived threats within the region. It was also a system that was put together during what was a very quiescent China. What we see now are changes on all three of those dimensions. Needless to say, China is asserting itself. They would say reasserting, and that is a trend that is going to continue. I don’t necessarily see it as a trend that leads inevitably to conflict — certainly not.
U.S. maritime dominance is, in one sense, still complete but in another sense being eroded or changed in that, essentially, as one looks into Southeast Asia, the role that China is beginning to play is a subtle and sophisticated one that involves, if you will, gaining access to territory and reaching bilateral deals that advance its interests.
The hub-and-spokes alliance system is becoming a bit shaky. One sees concerns on the part of both South Korea and Japan, in particular, regarding the prospect of a U.S. security guarantee. This is one place where the North Korean crisis really comes into play, because whichever way that goes will have a substantial impact on the power transition.
What does a failed power transition look like? It depends on where you’re sitting. My perspective is a failed power transition is a major conflict regardless of who emerges. If you were sitting in Washington and it should occur, if they perceived that they came out of it being dominant or continuing to be, that would be seen as a win.
The Chinese perspective is less focused on the notion of precipitating. I think it’s much more focused on avoiding and simply seeing the incremental changes that it has set in motion already as progressing, to be blunt, until the changes are inevitable. Part of what has gone on there, senator, is well under way, and that is, as I referred to in my remarks, the shift to the centre of gravity of Asian security being now on the continent. If you look at China’s influence on continental Southeast Asia, on Central Asia and to a certain extent Southwest Asia, central Asia, in all of those environments, the Chinese have moved to assert themselves into positions of, in some cases, dominance, and in others certainly of substantial influence and greater influence than the U.S.
Mr. Evans: Thank you, Senator Woo, for opening up a matter that we’re going to need more discussion about and a deeper understanding of in the months to come.
In several countries, including Singapore, New Zealand and Australia, there has been an explosion of recent concerns about attempted political influence inside their countries.
In Canada, when we did the polling, the concerns were of a more economic nature, but we also sensed that there was some questioning of some of the practices of the Chinese government and representatives of the Chinese government inside Canada in terms of what they were trying to do to influence the general pattern of Canadian thinking.
This is an important difference. There is an important difference between trying to influence, which many countries do. We do it regularly in the United States. Americans do it regularly here. There are all kinds of ways that we try to get the outcomes we wish.
In occasional instances, there is interference, and sometimes that relates to fugitives and the return of fugitives, which is an issue of concern. It also relates occasionally to harassment of Canadian citizens here and in China because of their positions on various political issues.
Influence is legitimate. We need to monitor it and consider it. Interference isn’t. My own sense is that this is less of a problem in Canada than in many other countries. We do need to watch it carefully because of this anxiety. More interactions with China are going to bring all kinds of new complications and more complex issues that we’re going to need to work out.
I think that we’re all going to be watching the Party Congress that’s under way now for where it is going to land on the question of the China nation and how far Beijing sees its relationship with overseas Chinese and others as changing towards a new form of patriotism and new forms of connection. That’s not to say that whatever Xi Jinping’s government decides it’s going to do, Canadians will agree with it, but there is a global process by which China is trying to become more active and influential in the countries where its economy and people are based.
Senator Bovey: This is a very interesting topic, and thank you for your insightful comments.
Professor Job, you talked about the soft powers. You mentioned cultural and social concerns when you were talking about the power influence transition being greater than military, and you also referred to education. I wonder if you can elaborate on the roles of soft power as we take a look at this global transition of powers. I would be very interested in where you see that tying in with civilian protection and the role of peacekeeping. I would be very interested in both of your viewpoints.
Mr. Job: The notion of soft power came up about 20 years ago. It was seen, if you will, as the counterpart or the other side of a state advancing its interest in nontraditional military ways. Clearly that spectrum, as you think about it, becomes broader and broader. Certainly the U.S. was seen as having substantial soft power, and evaluating how a country has it or does not have it becomes an interesting exercise among academics.
But I raise the point in two ways. One is that we are not going to advance our interests in Asia or elsewhere in the world through our specific or notable military contributions. We’ll have a relevant presence in some, but that’s not going to be what takes Canada into the minds and thoughts of many other countries.
When other countries look at Canada, what are they seeing and what are they trying to emulate? They’re trying to emulate a society which is culturally diverse, has dealt with multicultural tensions very effectively and has advanced technologies in communications, health and education, and those are the resources that they would see that would be of advantage or benefit to them if they can attract and bring us into their relationships.
The counterpart to this is that countries, particularly in Asia, are playing the long game. That means it is a broader game that requires building cultural understandings and social relationships that extend beyond the trade agreement of today or the sale of yesterday.
You asked about civilian protection and peacekeeping. Countries undertake peacekeeping, as Canada has, for national interests, much of which have to do with soft power. We have been engaged as a traditional peacekeeper, and it’s important to say a traditional peacekeeper. We have been engaged for reasons that have advanced the Canadian reputation abroad in ways that cannot be matched or could not have been matched with other agendas.
Peacekeeping of today, however, is not peacekeeping of yesterday. Peacekeeping of today is a complex operation that almost always involves the use of military force in societies where, at the moment, there is no peace to be had or peace has to be made. In that context, you reach a real dilemma with regard to the consideration of forceful power and soft power. That’s where the current Canadian government finds itself in a bit of a dilemma as the November peacekeeping summit moves towards us.
Civilian protection is important. It’s a part of virtually all existing UN missions and in some ways is an impossible mandate. It is difficult to see how forces, peacekeeping units, in the tens of thousands can extend effective civilian population protection in countries as large as the Democratic Republic of Congo or in South Sudan or at various times in Somalia and elsewhere. We have worked very hard at that. We have had some failures, Somalia being one for sure.
One of the interesting things about the initiative that Paul Evans mentioned vis-à-vis the Chinese is that they are interested in our experiences in places like Afghanistan. It is the civilian-military relationship that we developed in places like Kandahar that they perceive as having been a relatively effective or positive way in which to manage. That is the answer to your question about civilian protection. It is not easy.
The other interesting element in this is the gender issue because there is an increasing sense — certainly our Canadian Department of National Defence realizes it and seeks to take advantage of it — that women in the forces play a full role, certainly, as serving military but also are seen and approached by civilian populations in much different ways and with different effectiveness than their male counterparts. That, too, is in this agenda, if you will, of civilian protection.
Senator Bovey: Professor Evans, do you want to add anything to that?
Mr. Evans: Senator, perhaps I could reply to the part of your question about education. In the polling, one of the overwhelming interests of Canadians is in seeing deeper partnerships but also educational exchanges and other things with the Chinese side. That’s high on the agenda, but, curiously, there is very strong resistance to China’s universities opening institutions here in Canada. This is something that is part of this next wave of China connecting to the world of higher education. It is opening campuses, not just foreign universities opening them in China but them opening them overseas. It is one of the areas that is promising. It is something we’re pretty good at. We would like to have fair exchanges. It is also one that comes with some new challenges. On issues like academic freedom, issues of what is taught and how it is taught, China can sometimes push agendas that are quite different than ours.
I think where we need to have those difficult but important conversations with our Chinese colleagues is not that this is a completely open system moving in two directions but that we do have certain academic values that we protect here. In Australia, this has become a major debate. I don’t think it will become as big of a debate here because our institutions have done a great deal more to integrate students from China and other parts of Asia into our universities, but it is beneath the surface. The roles of students, student associations and how we navigate across some value differences on this is a topic where that middle power role we play in defining some rules and having a good dialogue on this — not to lecture the Chinese on exactly what is right but to find out how we mesh two quite different systems — is a big challenge for all of us who are educators.
Senator Marwah: Thank you, Professor Job and Professor Evans. Those were very insightful and thought-provoking comments.
You spoke at great length about China and its, as you call it, “power transition” or “power transformation” and the need for a China strategy. Could you talk a bit about a similar transition taking place in India, albeit on a much smaller scale and at a slower pace? It is taking place. How do you see this playing out between two large regional players that have been in competition and, very often, in conflict? India has been largely focused on domestic issues for now and still is, but they have rising global ambitions as well as they reach out. Sooner or later, that is going to come into conflict in the region. I’d like both of your thoughts on that.
Mr. Job: I expect that you have more expertise on this question than I do, but I do have a few quick thoughts.
If one puts this into more simple geostrategic considerations and also puts it into the context of geography, India is in a critical position or a key position. This has to do with its land borders, obviously, but also with its oceans. Where we are seeing interesting developments by external players is China’s increasing efforts to establish maritime influence. In conjunction with its One Belt, One Road but also in conjunction with what observers see as an extension of maritime naval capacities, they are certainly moving into that region. You have, quite remarkably now, the Chinese having established a military base in Djibouti, which is of substantial concern, I suspect, to New Delhi.
India’s relationship with China has always been, at least in the narrow sense of its borders, a tense one. One gets the sense that this has recently increased — that is, the tensions on the borders. At the same time, China and India look to each other for considerable complementary economic advantage. You have the Chinese, for instance, advancing infrastructure projects; you have the Chinese and the Indians looking at their markets.
To quickly temper my comments, I think the dynamics that are going on are, as I put it, geostrategic and in terms of expanding or, for China, protecting its sphere of influence. But, also, the economic dynamics that are involved, in many ways, I think, will prove to be the more profound.
Mr. Evans: I want you to know that not everyone at the University of British Columbia thinks the same things. Let me take a slightly different position on this than Professor Job. I think he is right to emphasize the broad economic complementarities and possibilities, some of which are emerging. The geoeconomics and some possible common interests in what happens in Central Asia and across Afghanistan bode fairly well.
Second, China and India have many differences — border conflict, differences over Tibet, the Dalai Lama, a whole set of big, difficult issues — but, on balance, they have been able to manage them quite well for quite a long time. There have been some kick ups at the border, but, on balance, China and India have found ways to avoid overt and heavy kinds of conflicts.
What I think is the interesting dimension of where India and China go is that the discussion we had two years ago is not the discussion we are having now with a new president in the United States and a geopolitical equation that has shifted. Efforts to strengthen a U.S.-India arrangement to contain China, or at least to limit China’s influence, are receding. India is increasingly acting as an independent player. It is fascinating to see the increase in its military capabilities, its naval capacity, et cetera. This is part of the new multipolar reality of Asia.
But what is changing is that India is still avoiding the kinds of concepts of an alliance with the United States, which it too can no longer trust in the same way. In this strange moment of Mr. Trump and in the last year, the calculations of everyone are shifting, from Japan, where there is, for the first time in my lifetime, a serious discussion of what nuclearization, a nuclear weapons capability, might mean, to similar kinds of discussions in South Korea. These are the reactions to our unstable geopolitical world because of the uncertainty about the United States. I think that’s going to mean a redoubled effort at institution-building, where the United States is not going to be the dominant actor. It may not even be an important actor at all, except with its military capabilities. The India-China relationship, and what Canada and other middle powers can do, is look for building some institutions now to manage a multipolar world in which the United States is not number one.
Senator Gold: Thank you for your wonderful presentations.
With the retreat of the United States, the transformations you have described and the rise of China, can you comment on how you see the future of the democratic values and vision that those of us who grew up in the 1950s and 1960s took for granted, values that did, in fact, and in many ways, accompany the Marshall Plan and post-war progress, as we looked with satisfaction and gratitude at the democratization of Germany and Japan? At the risk of asking you to look into crystal balls, what is the future for the democratic values that we cherish in Canada given these transformations?
Mr. Job: Given that Paul addressed some of these issues in his comments, I am putting this one to him first.
Mr. Evans: Senator, I think liberal democracy is in trouble. It is in trouble in various parts of the world, especially in our neighbour to the south. The values and institutions that we expected Americans to hold domestically and to hold the flag internationally, we are in a moment where things are being shaken. Liberal democracy is in difficulty because of social fissures and pressures internally, not just in the United States but in a variety of countries. From Turkey through to Thailand, this is not the moment of the democratic advance.
Further from the United States, we have a special concern. President Trump and some of the thoughtful people around his administration are essentially signalling that America is getting out of democracy promotion as we understood it in the past. It can promote those values in its own country, but we have seen the diminution of American support for NGOs and others that are in the democracy and human rights promotion business. We have seen Mr. Trump moving closer to work with some characters who, at a minimum, are not interested in the liberal human rights agenda that we have admired in the past.
Add that to the fact that there is no indication that China is moving in the direction of liberalization. The hope that economic opening will bring political liberalization is something that many Canadians still feel but most experts don’t. China is going in a different direction where it is more authoritarian than less.
Where does that leave Canada? This is an interesting question because Canadians do believe in these values. We increasingly think we can promote some of them not by shouting and shaming but by working economically on rule of law and other things.
For Canadians, we are in a moment where our interest is less in changing other countries than in working with other countries and partnering with them. We haven’t given up on our values. We have strong and active NGOs. We have a government that is committed to them, but the resources we will commit, the style of what we are going to do, as high as we want to wave that liberal internationalist flag, it isn’t going to be on the grounds of us trying to sell democracy and human rights elsewhere, at least not as we have done in the past. This is very difficult for Canadians to accept.
For the liberal international order where we felt the Americans were a central champion and where trends were moving in our direction, this is a winter of discontent that I think will last for several years.
Senator Ataullahjan: Thank you for your testimony. I have a question regarding the friendship between China and Pakistan, specifically the over $82 billion investment with the economic corridor where China is building the highway and they are going to develop the Gwadar Port. People in the region see that as a game changer. They built the Karakoram Highway, which is considered the eighth wonder of the world. Also, we have been hearing of signs in Chinese coming up along that highway. Will that impact the region in any way?
Mr. Job: In some ways, the picture you just painted partially answers the question. That is, if you see what is the opening, if you will, of Pakistan to China in the way you described, then China will clearly have increasing influence in the economy and, more generally, in the political and social character of the country.
What I don’t understand — and this not an expression of lack of knowledge, but a curiosity — is how China finds itself in a country that is otherwise notable for political instability. China wishes to have stable environments for its economic agenda. To the extent that they see themselves in a country like Pakistan where I will aver that that is lacking, I’m not certain if they will seek to address that consideration or if they can operate in that environment without being concerned about it.
The Chinese are increasingly figuring out that their long-term interest — and you see this in African countries — is not necessarily in supporting regimes or in supporting regimes that are propped up and unstable. Their longer-term relationships have to be built on relatively stable societies. I leave that question open. I don’t have an answer to that.
Mr. Evans: The Pakistan-China relationship is also evolving. Your question was formulated in a very interesting way because it is essentially about new infrastructure and new kinds of investments that, depending on your point of view, either open Pakistan and make it part of this new vision of a more regionally integrated area of common prosperity that China is pushing, or this is a new instrument of Chinese influence in the Indian neighbourhood
What is interesting recently is the number of Pakistanis who are questioning how deep the economic embrace of China should be — some really interesting questions about trying to encourage other investors in Pakistan to work on some of these projects so that, like every country, there is a desire to avoid undue dependence on China going forward, not only as a military semi-ally but as the key economic investor and trader.
I am betting that if what unfolds on the Belt and Road, if what unfolds in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, of which Canada is now a member and we take our seat there beginning in January on the board, if we can multilateralize these big projects, it will reduce the anxiety of the countries involved in them, Pakistan and others. But it also can reduce the geostrategic anxiety that this is a Chinese power play. It will not diminish Chinese influence but, if these institutions work properly, if decisions are made in the right way and if we do have a real multilateralism, of which there are encouraging signs, then the China-Pakistan relationship can be part of a much more constructive win-win relationship for everyone, if we can avoid war.
Senator Ataullahjan: My second question is about Afghanistan, which is still looking for stable leadership. We had Karzai, who failed as a leader, Ashraf Ghani is very weak because he has to share the power with Abdullah Abdullah, who constantly undermines him. We have now had Gulbuddin Hekmatyar come back and the feeling is that he will run for the presidency. We all know the reputation he has and what happened in Kabul when he was running the show. On the other hand, you have the Pakistan foreign minister saying that they have suffered greatly because of their friendship with the U.S., because what happens in Afghanistan impacts them and, every time something goes wrong, accusations fly. Is there any hope Afghanistan is going to get stable leadership?
Mr. Evans: Senator, would you be kind enough to come to the University of British Columbia to give us your views on this subject? We have a new Central Asia initiative led by a former Afghan diplomat. We are working intently on this question. I wish we had a positive and convincing answer on what leadership combination can bring stability to a country that may be moving backwards in terms of its unity and the prospect for that kind of stable governance. As I say: Will you come to the University of British Columbia and given us your views on that subject?
Senator Ataullahjan: I would love to.
The Chair: No further answers, I see. I have a second round and we will be going in camera. I will hope that the in camera portion will be short so we can extend this a bit longer and get questions in from Senator Woo and Senator Marwah on the second round.
Senator Woo: To pick up on Professor Job’s reference to Track II activities, which Canada was involved in some decades ago, and the evisceration of those programs in the last decades, there is perhaps some revival in interest in Track II activities. Could you say is a bit more about specific areas where you think Canadian Track II participation in Asian networks, including academic exchanges, could be beneficial for Canada and for peace and security in Asia?
Mr. Job: Senator Woo refers to engagement that Canada had, especially in the 1990s and into the early 2000s, where we were an active player in several key regional institutions that were devoted to advancing cooperative security and security dialogues among experts and academics. He used the word “eviscerate”; I am not sure I would use quite that one but the effect was the same, namely that because of lack of financing in particular, unlike all the other participants who received government support, Canada withdrew and we are at a point where we cannot regain our membership in some of these institutions because of issues of back dues and so on.
With respect to looking forward, given what we have described as the flux of the regional security picture, we are at a time where the existing Track II institutions themselves need to be redesigned. I think the criticism of Talk Shop has begun to hold on some of them but, more importantly, talk shops are fine provided they are considering new ideas.
There is where I think Canadian steps can be taken in looking to Asian partners who wish to advance discussions on a number of dimensions. Some of these may well be quite functionally specific. Broader issues of human security demand or look to Track II engagement of experts on disease, environmental sustainability, responsible mining and so on. There is a whole agenda of functional types of Track II that can go forward, some in ad hoc ways and some in quite organized ways. I think we need to look for that and think about it. It is incumbent, to be blunt, on people like Professor Evans and myself to initiate good ideas.
The other thing that has to be done addresses what was an increasing dilemma about Track II as it was in its heyday; to be blunt, it was a bunch of people of my generation. We have to revitalize and reinsert or attract, if you will, younger Canadian academics and experts into a new Track II context. There are a couple of Track II entities we should be targeting. I think some of them are likely to proceed with Southeast Asian partners, Indonesia, possibly with Korea and Japan. We have Canada FOROS with each of those and they need some reorientation, or I will be critical and say revitalization. They exist; we could make them do more.
Senator Woo: Can we get Professor Evans to comment quickly on that?
Mr. Evans: Senator Woo, I have two ideas. First, ASEAN is one of our most important partners at the government-to-government level as a mid-power broker in this very unstable situation we are in. I would say double down on ASEAN as a partner. We can do bilaterals with other countries, but double down on the regional processes that ASEAN has put in place. If we are effective in an Asia strategy, we might be able to get into the doors of the East Asia Summit at the ASEAN defence ministers meetings.
There is a specific area that I think is an example of where Canadian initiative could make a difference, and that is on the South China Sea. We don’t need to send our naval vessels and submarines, if we have any functioning, into that area. We do have a concern about human security that comes from declining fish stocks. No country knows better than Canada what disasters can happen and how fast fish stocks can collapse. We had a track record at supporting meetings on the South China Sea that didn’t deal with the sovereignty questions but the real issues of human security, and fish stocks is pretty high up on that list of concerns.
Senator Marwah: I would like to hear your thoughts about some of the historic criticisms of China, like its disregard of IP, corruption, a weak or non-existent human rights record, weak rule of law and autocratic rule.With that as a background, I have two questions. Do you see this changing materially? It seems to be changing somewhat, but do you see it changing materially as China’s global influence rises? Second, for Canada, how do we square the circle? On one hand, you tell me these are all areas of deep concern to Canadians, yet you tell me 70 per cent of Canadians now believe that economic issues should trump, and no pun intended there. What is your thought there?
Mr. Job: I will give this to Paul because he was dealing with what you just described.
Mr. Evans: Predicting where China will go in future is still a complicated game. I think at this moment we see that some features of authoritarian rule in China will become more authoritarian rather than less. The Leninist element of control in their system is increasingly tightening.
However, in areas like industrial espionage and cyber-attacks, China has to participate in an international economic order where there are some rules but also rules for self-protection. China’s concern about hacking has intensified. It has issues within its own country, and it has to protect its own intellectual property.
I think the frontier is going to be on rule-of-law questions. For some of us, rule of law and a Leninist Communist Party — you can’t put the two ideas in the same sentence. But in a variety of commercial areas as they relate to e-commerce, industry, they may just be able to connect to some intra-party reform issues the way the party intersects with the government.
I would say your general picture is accurate, but that picture is moving in directions that are both more dangerous from the perspective of our values but at the same time there are some entry points. The alternative to not working with China on these matters is that, so far as we have any influence, we might be able to do some nudging, as we’ve done with lawyers — although many of those lawyers are now in jail — but that we have done in the creation of a Chinese legal system.
If so if the glass is half-empty, do we want to see it drain more, or, to go back to the other senator’s question about how we insert some of our values into this system, the answer is that it’s through protracted partnerships and engagement with them,rather than shutting the door.
The Chair: I will appeal to senators to put short questions, and perhaps we’ll get short answers, and perhaps we can get everyone in.
Senator Oh: We talk a lot about China rising. I want to know what is the American influence. After 20 years, the U.S. in the Middle East has moved the six navy fleets into the Pacific. What is America’s influence now with China rising? Do you see any special plan that the U.S. is influencing the six fleets in Asia-Pacific?
Mr. Job: There is no sense in which the U.S. is not seen as dominant in the maritime environment probably for the next 20 years, if we looked at some notion of head-to-head comparisons.
Of interest and concern are the developments of nonconventional technologies and strategies that, in many ways, make vulnerable the traditional aircraft carrier-based presence that the U.S. has in the region. You think about cyber, space and various forms of asymmetric missile attacks and so on, and that’s what the U.S. is worried about. But in terms of whether China will have an aircraft carrier capacity that will match the U.S., no it won’t. Are they going to try to get it? I doubt it. The Chinese are concentrating their efforts at the moment in the areas that most directly hit on what they regard as their core interests: the Taiwan Strait to prevent U.S. submarines and vessels from travelling through those waters. That’s a major concern.
Paul has mentioned the South China Sea. Again, you see strategies that don’t require military superiority vis-à-vis the U.S., but they still take advantage of ways in which they can advance their influence.
Senator Ngo: I just want to ask a question of Professor Evans. He mentioned the South China Sea and the fish stocks. You say China has the big political and economic influences in South Asia. Do you see China as a security threat in South Asia? You can see the aggressive actions in the South China Sea, like China building the harbours, airstrips for military purposes and so on. Do you see that as a security threat in the South Asia region?
Mr. Evans: It is certainly perceived to be threatening by the other claimant states. ASEAN member states are quite concerned by what’s happening. But I think there is also a view that the rising Chinese presence and capacity can be managed — that codes of conduct are not there yet but can come about if we don’t get into a direct conflict over sovereignty but over joint development. A year ago, we didn’t think that was possible. With a different and unpredictable United States and with Chinese capacity increasing, ASEAN and Southeast Asia can adjust to this.
I would add one other thing. As I speak with defence and security officials in several southeast Asian countries, their principle long-term concern about China is not the overt military dimension, the rising pressures and territorial disputes. They’re concerned about that, but their biggest concern is the changing pattern of Chinese influence and presence inside their decision-making in their countries. This issue of the dual citizenship ideas, of the concept of Chinese patriotism and the Chinese nation that seem to be expansive — I think they see that as a more existential threat to them than Chinese military.
The Chair: Thank you. Needless to say, I had a lot of questions and haven’t put any to you, so perhaps we have to have another session somewhere. If you can answer this quickly, fine, and if not, you can think about it and respond. China has entered into the world in many ways, and very aggressively. Taking into account the U.S., that’s led to China having opportunities to create new institutions and influence world decision-making.
One of the things that I’ve been tracking is not the fact that they are changing our institutions and creating new ones but that they’re using the language we’re used to but defining it differently. Think “development.” We spent decades in Africa and Latin America, putting conditions on it. Along comes China, saying, “Here’s the money.” I think we were rebutting, saying there would be long-term consequences and different strings. Now when you go in, you’ll see the debate coming from the countries that took that aid, talking about quality of workmanship, leaving all of the workers who were supposed to be training the Africans going back allegedly to China but finding out, no, they’re still there; they’re running the businesses. So there’s a whole dynamic shift.
It is the same thing with the term peacekeeping. Peacekeeping means something very different to the Chinese, if I understand. They haven’t gone to front-line work. They’re into medic corps and technical issues. I’ve been to Djibouti, and there is the whole question of what China doing there. Then you’ve got Japan and the U.S. They’re all there. It started to do with the Suez Canal and all the piracy there. They were protecting their routes.
Is there any thought in the university circles of not only the shifting landscape of who’s playing it but using the terms differently? That is changing the international order more, in my opinion, than some of the other overt things. Am I on the right track for those academics who will talk to me?
Mr. Job: I think so. Go ahead, Paul.
Mr. Evans: Senator Andreychuk, you have painted a big canvas. I think what is happening with Chinese interactions, in many parts of the world at the same time, is that they are challenging some of the premises that we held on development, peacekeeping, a whole range of things. We have had an evolving but pretty clear set of understandings on the OECD and other groups. You’re right; these are being challenged. But not completely.
What we find on peacekeeping, for example, is that China is now on the front line of some of those very difficult operations. This is not just building medical facilities and schools. This is now front–line combat troops who are involved in defence of their peacekeepers as well as some civilian populations.
I guess the feeling that we have, and where universities try to get involved with this, is that China is becoming a rule maker. It is not just a rule taker. We don’t think that’s going to be reversed.
The question is: What systems actually work best? If we look inside the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, some of the procedures the Chinese are putting in place are better than what the Asian Development Bank has. Not all of them, but some of their governance structures are improvements.
I’m still of the optimistic view that the world order that’s coming isn’t going to be exactly the one we’ve known but it is one where China, in its own self-interest, will find many of these processes, as they become more powerful, of value to them and the places they’re operating in the world. So China can learn, as we’re going to have to learn too.
Mr. Job: I’m going to add only that I think your perception or your argument that China has taken a different approach, if that’s the right word, to advancing its interest through development projects is certainly correct. That’s probably most apparent in Africa, but it’s also in Africa now where you’re beginning to see pushback from the African states themselves through the African Union and otherwise.
In certain ways, China is beginning to realize that building relationships with corrupt and repressive governments does not give them a long-term future in the country. There is one interesting example of that. The Chinese got very close to the Khartoum regime in Sudan and suddenly found they had to get on side with South Sudan. The shifts that were required there have given China pause in other contexts and they have been, in some cases, beginning to isolate themselves from that.
A final comment is that we have to take note that the U.S. itself has now declared it is no longer in the state-building business, and this may become a larger issue altogether in terms of how development and development assistance proceeds.
The Chair: As you can see, you’ve generated a lot of interest and covered a lot of ground. I think we need to do more of this. As you say, the world shifts so quickly, and we want to be part of the discussion. Thank you for leading us in this discussion today, and certainly the committee has benefited from that. Again,Professor Job and Professor Evans, thank you for coming.
Senators, we will be receiving a brief next week from Mr. Benoit Hardy-Chartrand, Senior Research Associate, Centre for International Governance Innovation. He was invited to come. He cannot be on the list, but he wants to provide a brief. You can look forward to having more information on the topic, and hopefully we will receive that brief next week.
We will now proceed with our in camera discussion.
(The committee continued in camera.)