Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Issue No. 33 - Evidence - Meeting of October 26, 2017
OTTAWA, Thursday, October 26, 2017
The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met this day at 10:40 a.m. to study foreign relations and international trade generally.
Senator A. Raynell Andreychuk (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: Honourable senators, we’re ready to proceed. The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade is now called to order.
The committee is authorized to examine such issues as may arise from time to time relating to foreign relations and international trade generally. Under this mandate, the committee has invited the next witness to give committee members a briefing on the key geopolitical dynamics and players in Asia and their implications for Canadian regional interests and ties. This includes issues arising in the sub-regions of South Asia, Southeast Asia and East Asia. The committee also has interest in the foreign policy and commercial priorities of such regional powers as Russia, China and India.
We are pleased to welcome Benoit Hardy-Chartrand, Senior Research Associate, Global Security and Politics, Centre for International Governance Innovation. Thank you for accepting our invitation and being so accommodating for us. We had you on the program at one point. It had to change, and then, due to a vote yesterday, we had to again defer you to today. I think you seem to understand the process in Parliament and have been very accommodating for us. So I thank you, and we are now eagerly awaiting your contribution to our study. Welcome to the committee.
[Translation]
Benoit Hardy-Chartrand, Senior Research Associate, Global Security and Politics, Centre for International Governance Innovation: Thank you for the invitation, Madam Chair. It is an honour to be here with you today.
East Asia is a region in transition. With the rise of China, Japan’s increasingly proactive foreign policy, uncertainty regarding the role of the United States, and the new immediate and real threat posed by North Korea, the parameters and premises used five or ten years ago to understand and analyze the region are no longer valid. The last year has been particularly eventful and may mark the dawn of a new era in East Asia’s geopolitical landscape.
The election of Donald Trump sent a shockwave throughout the region, especially among the United States’ traditional allies. Since January, my conversations with representatives of the governments of South Korea and Japan, who are the United States’ two most important allies in the region, have confirmed all of the uncertainty and concern that is widespread throughout the administration of these countries. Despite statements that are meant to be reassuring from the Trump administration, as well as visits from the Secretary of State, Mr. Tillerson, and the Secretary of Defence, Mr. Mattis, in the region a short time after Donald Trump’s election, Seoul and Tokyo’s fears have not been eased. Although it might be exaggerated to talk about the end or a lessening of American influence in the region, as some analysts have stated, there is no doubt that since January, a relative disengagement of the United States in the region has been observed, with profound consequences on regional balance.
More than anything, American policy regarding East Asia represents an unhoped-for opportunity for China to grow its influence in the region and beyond. Washington’s approach is such that Beijing can continue to act upstream and do so aggressively, with relatively little opposition, as is the case, for example, in the South China Sea. Since President Xi Jinping took power in China in 2013, China has opted for a more aggressive foreign policy which constitutes a net break with the conservative approach that had prevailed until then. The nineteenth congress of the Communist Party, which ended the day before yesterday, confirmed that the trend observed since 2012 is not about to change. The speech given by President Xi Jinping during the congress a week ago clearly outlined the vision that he has of his country and the direction he intends to take. Repeatedly describing his country as a “great power,” which is in and of itself relatively new in official Chinese discourse, Xi Jinping explained that his country is now entering a new era, an era in which the interests of his country go well beyond its regional limits.
China’s ambitions, for the first time in its history, are now international. The consolidation of his power at the head of the Chinese political hierarchy, and this week’s addition of his name in the constitution, the Communist Party of China’s charter, confirms what we suspected for some time already, which is that Xi Jinping is the most powerful leader in China since Deng Xiaoping, and probably since Mao Zedong. That means that Chinese foreign policy direction will not change for the next five years, at a minimum. Although it is normal for a country the size of China to occupy a significant place on the world stage, Beijing has demonstrated through these actions, namely in the South Chinese Sea, that it will not hesitate to act to the detriment of its neighbours if it considers it to be in its interests to do so. We must now prepare for a period of growing tension between China and the United States, on the one hand, and China and its neighbours on the other.
In addition to the nineteenth congress of the Communist Party of China, another event that took place last week will have impacts on the region’s geopolitical landscape. In Japan, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was re-elected after calling early elections. He took advantage of an opposition in disarray, and his coalition won by a significant majority, keeping two-thirds of the seats at the Diet. Since his election in 2012, Abe has adopted foreign and defence policies that have been more proactive than those of his predecessors, citing North Korea’s advancements in its nuclear and missile programs, as well as the rise of China, among other things. He has gradually reduced the constraints on Japan’s Self-Defence Forces, which now have the ability to conduct operations outside Japanese territory under certain circumstances. He also wishes to revise Japan’s pacifist constitution by 2020. Despite the public’s opposition to revising the constitution, over the next few years, the Japanese prime minister will be able to continue modernizing the country’s military and working on the long process of normalizing Japan’s foreign and defence policies. This process may even be accelerated given Tokyo’s concerns over the reliability of the U.S. commitment to Japanese defence. This will continue to cause friction with China and South Korea, which were both victims of the actions of the Imperial Japanese Army before and during the Second World War.
Finally, in speaking of the geopolitical dynamics in the region, I would be remiss if I did not talk briefly about North Korea. As you all know, over the past months the Korean Peninsula has seen the most tension since the end of the Korean War in 1953. I am regularly asked how to end the crisis and return to the negotiating table, and how to convince Kim Jong-un to abandon his chosen path. The problem is that Kim Jong-un has never been so close to achieving his ultimate goal, which is to have the ability to reach the U.S. with an intercontinental ballistic missile fitted with a miniaturized nuclear warhead. It will therefore be impossible to prevent the regime from reaching its goal, whether through sanctions or promises of vast sums of money to denuclearize.
The President of South Korea, Moon Jae-In, who was elected last May, came to power promising to re-establish a dialogue with North Korea and has put many proposals forward to Pyongyang, but Kim Jong-un has ignored all of Seoul’s offers, clearly demonstrating the North Korean regime’s complete lack of interest in diplomacy. It is time for the international community, including Canada, to accept the reality that North Korea will have nuclear weapons, and to focus more on non-proliferation and military deterrence rather than on denuclearization. This of course does not mean that North Korea must be recognized as a nuclear state, which would do long-term damage to the non-proliferation system. We must continue to officially call for denuclearization, but instead of aiming for a goal that would be very difficult to achieve, we must focus on military surveillance, information sharing, military deterrence and the building of the capacity of other countries and international agencies to block any attempts at nuclear proliferation by North Korea.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you. You’ve generated a long list of questioners.
Senator Downe: Thank you for your presentation. It was very interesting. Given that there’s a long list, I’ll simply ask one question.
I’m wondering about your association, the Centre for International Governance Innovation. I checked your donors prior to this meeting and who funds it. Tell me about your independence from the donors. For example, the embassy of the Government of Japan is one of your donors. Are you in contact with them about presentations or any concerns they may have? Do they suggest any courses of action for your association?
You may not know, as senior research associate. If not, I can ask the president the next time we see him.
Mr. Hardy-Chartrand: Rohinton Medhora, our president, would certainly be in a good position to answer this question. However, what I can tell you, based on my experiences at CIGI and my association with the Embassy of Japan — which was for one project in particular, one forum that we put together in Toronto last year, partly funded by the Embassy of Japan here in Ottawa — is that there have never been any requests, nor suggestions of any sort of tack that we should take for our reports, nor any other output for any of our projects.
They did fund this project, but other than the financial support they offered, there was no direct interference. We did provide them with the report. The report, when we provided it to them, was final, and they were not in a position to make any suggestions for this report.
Other than that, as part of my work I often have meetings with other stakeholders, such as representatives, as I mentioned, from the Korean and Japanese governments. But again, these are mostly consultations for my colleagues and me to better understand their visions, as well as their foreign and defence policies.
As far as our other donors at CIGI are concerned, in terms of my own work for the past three and a half years, and through several publications, media appearances and other outputs, there has never been any sort of interference, and no interference from superiors either, as a matter of fact. My views remain my own, and I’ve always been very free at CIGI and at our think tank, as are my colleagues, to publish our views, even if they may be in contradiction with those of our superiors. We are very free on this matter.
Senator Ngo: Thank you very much for your presentation. In your presentation you said that China’s policy globally and in Southeast Asia likely won’t change for the next three years under Xi Jinping. You also mentioned security in the South China Sea.
China has continued to claim sovereignty over the South China Sea. During that time they have been militarizing buildings, artificial islands, military islands and so on. Under the United Nations conventions, these man-made islands generate no entitlement.
I have two questions. How do you think China is hoping to solve this dispute through bilateral talks, while they completely disregard international law?
Second, do you think China has been taking concrete steps to ease tensions in the South China Sea?
Mr. Hardy-Chartrand: Thank you very much, senator. In terms of how China is hoping to solve the situation in the South China Sea, certainly since the ruling last year, on July 12, of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, we have seen China adopt a somewhat different approach to the South China Sea. It had been advocating — for a long time, actually — bilateral talks, as you mentioned. It has always been wary of the multilateral approach in the South China Sea, for the simple reason that China knows that its position would be undermined if it were to advocate for its position facing several other countries in the region.
We have seen since last year — again, since the ruling — that China has done pretty well in that regard. Let’s look at the case of the Philippines. The Philippines was the country that brought this case to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2012. The case was overwhelmingly ruled in favour of the Philippines. President Duterte of the Philippines could easily have used this ruling to try to advance the Philippines’s interests in the South China Sea. This is not what happened.
Right after the ruling we saw a rapprochement between China and the Philippines. We have seen several meetings between President Xi Jinping and President Duterte of the Philippines. That has led to promises of Chinese investments in the Philippines, among others, and a certain relaxation of the Chinese approach to territorial waters around the Philippines. For example, China has finally allowed, after a few years, Filipino fishermen to access their traditional fishing grounds, which was not the case before the ruling of 2012.
So far, we can say that China’s approach has worked, and the same thing for the island building and the militarization of these islands. We know that despite previous Chinese declarations about not militarizing these islands, they have militarized and put several assets on many of these islands. This has been done with relatively little opposition, other than declarations from the United States, Japan and other stakeholders. This is why I’m saying that overall we can see that about a year and a few months after this overwhelmingly bad ruling for China, it has not had a very negative impact on the Chinese.
I believe you asked me about the concrete steps that China has taken with regard to — I’m sorry; could you repeat the question, senator?
Senator Ngo: The concrete steps in order to ease tensions in the South China Sea. Because the claim is overlapping among Vietnam, Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia and so on. It’s happening to other countries besides the Philippines, even though China did not recognize the arbitration.
Mr. Hardy-Chartrand: Right, absolutely. In the last year they have started talking about a framework for a code of conduct in the South China Sea. I believe this is one way for the Chinese to assuage the fears of the other claimant states in the South China Sea.
This code of conduct has been on the table; people have been talking about it for more than a decade now. This would lead to binding rules in the South China Sea concerning how different claimants would act in terms of encounters at sea, among other things. This is one way the Chinese have taken a concrete step in the South China Sea in order not only to assuage the fears but also to try to show a slightly different approach in the region. That is one way they have done it.
Another somewhat concrete step is that it seems that since the ruling last year, they have not emphasized the so-called nine-dash line. The nine-dash line is the basis for their claim in the South China Sea. We have heard reports recently that the Chinese, in various meetings with American counterparts, have not talked about the very controversial nine-dash line because they know that this elicits way too much opposition from other parties. Therefore, they have started adopting a new approach talking about the four sets of islands, the “four sha,” as they call them, hoping that talking about their entitlements at sea without referring explicitly to the nine-dash line will be favourable to them, will lead to, perhaps, less opposition.
The reality, however, is that there is absolutely no indication that the territorial and maritime claims of China in the South China Sea have changed since the ruling.
Senator Ngo: You mentioned the code of conduct. Would it be worth this effort? We know that the code of conduct is not binding at all.
Mr. Hardy-Chartrand: They have a declaration on the code of conduct so far, a declaration that is solely a statement of intentions. In theory, if this code of conduct is ever agreed upon by all parties, it would lead to binding rules in the South China Sea. It would be an international agreement. However, what we know is that, so far, the deliberations, the talks between all parties supposedly leading to this code of conduct, have not led to anything. The Chinese, in reality, do not seem very interested in reaching this code of conduct.
Senator Ngo: If that’s the case, then what can Canada do to support the region and the allies of Canada in Southeast Asia?
Mr. Hardy-Chartrand: Right. I think, senator, there is, unfortunately, relatively little that Canada can do in this regard, other than perhaps doing capacity building, helping in capacity building, with some of these claimant states, specifically Vietnam and the Philippines, for example, as well as the training of coast guards in the region, in some of those claimant states. That would perhaps help these countries uphold their claims in the South China Sea.
Other than that, in the 1990s Canada was behind what we call the South China Sea dialogues, I believe, which were, I think, partially led by the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada. This brought together several claimants in the region, and these sorts of Track II and Track 1 1/2, dialogues were very conducive to positive dialogue between the states in the region. I believe this would be another way through which Canada could have, potentially, a positive impact on the situation in the South China Sea.
[Translation]
Senator Gold: Welcome to the committee. If I understood your remarks correctly, the world must deal with North Korea being a nuclear state. We must use diplomatic or other means to contain proliferation and counter the use of nuclear weapons against its neighbour or the U.S.
Could you comment on how “rational” the North Korean regime is? What does it respond to? Is it sanctions, or can it be persuaded behind closed doors? We should not kid ourselves, Canada does not have a significant role to play in this conflict. What measures could be put in place to ensure that this nuclear state stays calm?
Mr. Hardy-Chartrand: The rationality of Kim Jong-un’s regime is a question often raised in a number of circles. When, from the outside, we examine the actions of Kim Jong-un’s regime, it is sometimes tempting to qualify the regime as irrational. However, I do not think this is true, as if we examine the situation objectively, the North Korean regime has up to now suffered little from the consequences of its actions. If we go back to Kim Jong-un’s predecessor, when the founder of the country, Kim Il-sung, died in 1994 and when his son Kim Jong-il, the father of the current leader, came to power, a number of observers expected North Korea to fall within a few years. In the mid-nineties, there was a great famine and it was logical at the time to think that North Korea would collapse.
Despite expectations and pressures and sanctions imposed by the international community, North Korea survived. Today, all indicators and my own observations when I travelled there show that this country is doing relatively well — ”relatively” being the operative word. Some estimates show that over the past few years its economy has done much better. We have heard of 2 per cent growth. Of course, it is very difficult to precisely estimate statistics because the government publishes none. However, with regard to North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, the Kim Jong-un regime has progressed rapidly, and, generally speaking, with no real consequences on the internal stability of the regime or the stability of the country in general.
You spoke, senator, about sanctions against North Korea. Sanctions, particularly the latest that were imposed in 2017, go well beyond previous rounds of sanctions. For many years, it seems that North Korea was the most sanctioned state in the world. This, however, is simply not the case. Until this year, North Korea was subject to far fewer sanctions than countries such as Iran or even Zimbabwe.
The other problem is that North Korea has always succeeded in side-stepping the sanctions effectively. Today, we have a better understanding of international networks, the illicit networks North Korea is using to gain access to money and to continue developing its nuclear and missile programs. In recent months, however, since the most recent sanctions, China appears to be more exasperated than ever before, and there are many signs that China is enforcing the sanctions much more rigorously than in the past. North Korea appears to be starting to have some economic issues resulting from these sanctions.
So generally speaking, and to answer your question, the Kim Jong-un regime, in my view, is rational. To move forward and try to change the regime, even if, ultimately, the diplomatic option will always be the best one, at present, and given North Korea’s blunt refusal to commit to the diplomatic approach, we must continue to strengthen the sanctions. Above all, we must also ensure we have China’s cooperation. We must clearly understand that the effects of the sanctions won’t be felt immediately. The fact that North Korea is not reacting or changing its approach leads people to say that the sanctions are not effective. As I have already said, we need to be patient. This regime is extremely resilient, but the sanctions appear to be starting to take effect. So we have to be patient.
[English]
Senator Marwah: Thank you, Mr. Hardy-Chartrand.I think your comments have been very insightful.
You mentioned in your comments Japan’s passivist history and constitution. In fact, that’s very much true, but over the last couple of years that has been shifting slightly. You now have three major things that have changed: President Trump and America are really concerned over whether it will support its traditional allies; North Korea and its nuclear capabilities, which are increasing; and President Xi Jinping in China, and you yourself have said that he is the new global muscle.
Given that, do you think that stance of Japan will change? If it does eliminate its passivist constitution and starts arming itself, what are the implications for the region? Will the implications be muted, or are the implications going to be severe?
Mr. Hardy-Chartrand: First, when we speak about the potential revision of the Japanese constitution, specifically Article 9, which is the specific article that forbids Japan to possess war potential, despite the Liberal Democratic Party, Mr. Shinzo Abe’s party, and its stated goal to revise the constitution, I think we are still very far from this.
Although they theoretically have the numbers they need to revise the constitution — they have a two thirds majority in both chambers of the National Diet —I think generally there is still a lot of opposition to a change in the constitution in Japan. Also, the coalition partner of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s party, the Komeito, is not very keen to change the constitution. This constitutes a major problem for Shinzo Abe.
However, the change of the constitution is more symbolic than anything. When we look at Japan’s evolution, it is important to see that this evolution has been going on for a long time. Although Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has been more proactive than his predecessors — and as a matter of fact one of his guiding slogans for foreign policy is a so-called proactive contribution to peace — what we have seen is more of an evolution than a revolution.
The gradual loosening of restraints on the Self-Defense Forces is not new. This has been going on even since before Shinzo Abe has been in power.
As I mentioned in my opening comments, the current state of affairs in East Asia — as you mentioned, senator, the arrival of Trump in the United States, the relative disengagement of the United States, proactive and more assertive foreign policy for the Chinese and the growing threats from North Korea — makes it quite possible, and quite likely as a matter of fact, that this process of loosening and of greater proactive engagement from the Japanese is going to go further. It is going to accelerate.
In the past few months, we have seen a few indications of that, even before the election. We have seen that the Japanese are now more involved in the South China Sea, for example. Despite the fact that Japan is not a claimant in the South China Sea, it has a very direct stake in freedom of navigation, since about 90 per cent of its petroleum imports go through the South China Sea. Therefore, it has sent its largest warship, the Izumo, for a tour of the South China Sea as well as training in the region with India, among others.
This is a trend that is likely to accelerate. It will, as you pointed out, senator, quite likely lead to further frictions with China. It could also lead to friction with South Korea. We know that South Korea and Japan have had fairly tense relationships for two main reasons; they have a territorial dispute in the Sea of Japan as well as disputes over history, the comfort women, among others. Despite this, I think currently the mood between Japan and South Korea is relatively good.
Since the election of Moon Jae-in, South Korea has been quite concerned with China’s policy towards South Korea related to the American missile defence system deployed in South Korea, the THAAD system, as a result of which the Chinese have taken a lot of measures to restrict trade with South Korea, to forbid tour groups and to reduce the number of tour groups that go to South Korea, among other things.
Despite the fact that this greater proactive approach by the Japanese may lead to friction with South Korea, I think the reality is the current context doesn’t lend itself to this. I think South Korean President Moon Jae-in understands that. He hasn’t taken any steps recently regarding Japan on the comfort women, for example. He wants to keep the relationship quite stable.
We’re more likely to see friction between Japan and China due to Shinzo Abe’s foreign policy.
Senator Oh: Thank you, Mr. Hardy-Chartrand. I want to talk about two pieces of recent news. It would be interesting if you could put them together.
First, the U.S. agreed to sell an electromagnetic aircraft launch system to India. Second, the Indian air force wants out of a fifth-generation fighter aircraft program with Russia. What are your thoughts about this? What is India’s foreign policy under Prime Minister Modi? Is it still non-alignment or, as they say, neither passive neutrality nor isolationism?
After the partition and independence of India in 1947, India’s role as a keeper of security in Asia has slipped away. In recent news, Congress Vice-President Rahul Gandhi today said that rising unemployment in India is Modi’s disaster and that trust in Modi’s government is dead.
Do you share Rahul Gandhi’s comment?
Mr. Hardy-Chartrand: First, senator I think India is perceived by the United States as an important bulwark in the region against China. However, India’s internal policies and foreign policy are outside my area of expertise. Therefore, I would rather refrain, if you allow me, from answering this question.
The Chair: That’s a frank answer. Thank you very much.
Senator Bovey: Actually, I’m going to pass. My colleague asked my question, which you answered very fully. Thank you very much.
Senator Woo: Welcome, Mr. Hardy-Chartrand. It is nice to see you again, especially in this context.
I have a slightly different question. It concerns the capacity of Canadian scholars and researchers to do serious work and serious thinking about and analysis of geopolitical and economic issues in the Asia-Pacific region. We’re very lucky to have you as the next generation of scholars in the Asia-Pacific security arena.
A few weeks ago we had some more senior scholars come here to talk about the great need to cultivate a next generation of experts in Canada.
It has always been my sense that we are punching below our weight, and we don’t have as much critical mass as we need. You’re on the front lines of this work now, and you work with scholars who are older and younger.
Can you give us a lay of the land in this country on the state of Asia-Pacific research, the state of our research institutes and universities that may be doing work in this area, and benchmark us with our peer group — the Australians, New Zealanders, Americans and maybe even the Europeans?
Mr. Hardy-Chartrand: Thank you very much, Senator Woo. It’s a pleasure to see you as well.
You are perfectly right in stating that we punch below our weight. That has been my feeling ever since I have been working in this field for close to the past 10 years now. In Canada there is still — except perhaps in Western Canada — the idea that Asia, as a whole generally, is not sufficiently on our radar and agenda.
As a matter of fact, the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada has done great work in that regard. But when it comes to helping to build a new generation of scholars in Canada, we have a long way to go.
When I go to the United States and speak with my counterparts — you mentioned Australia as well — we see much greater emphasis on Asia. We see a lot more Asian studies programs in place.
If I can talk about my personal experience, I teach on Asian geopolitics at the University of Montreal. When it comes to Montreal, or this university particularly, we do have Asian studies programs, but they are relatively small. Often students have to go to other universities or go to Western Canada.
This is a very important issue. Given the future and how much of a presence China is going to be and how much the economic weight is shifting to Asia, as we all know, we simply cannot afford to pursue the current path. It is on all of us here to make sure that there is more funding for Asian studies programs, as well as, perhaps, a greater emphasis on exchange programs specifically to Asia.
Again speaking about my personal experience, what brought me to the path I am on now was a fateful exchange program that I did in 2007 at Yangtze University in South Korea. In my case, I wanted to do an exchange program in Asia, but there were very few programs, whereas there were a lot of similar opportunities in the United States and Europe.
This is one relatively easy and concrete step we could take — make sure our deans of different universities in Canada emphasize partnerships with Asian universities. I found it difficult to go there. There were not many options. That is the first step to cultivate this interest and to build our next generation of scholars because it is what put me on the path that I am on now.
If there were more such exchanges, undoubtedly we would find ourselves in a better position to build a next generation of Asian scholars. Again, because of the tremendous growth of China and other countries in the region, we simply cannot afford to continue on this path, senator.
The Chair: When we were doing Asia-Pacific, this committee was studying how to make that a priority for all of Canada. We knew that Western Canada had embraced, and obviously British Columbia more, but as you moved east, there was less appetite or understanding of Asia, and that permeated trade, political, universities.
You say the universities should have a greater appetite to pick this up and create it, but universities are often driven by the needs of the community, responses to the political structures and the money that comes with it. How do we accomplish the universities being able to get that collective force going to make sure that Canadians understand that it is not a western flank of Canada that should be preoccupied, that it is in the best interests of all of Canada? That would be the appetite that I would see. We said trade could do it, understanding, but how do we get universities to do it?
Mr. Hardy-Chartrand: I think we’re victims of our geography. In Eastern Canada we simply have fewer ties with Asia than our Western counterparts have. That’s always going to be an issue.
There are positive steps that have been taken as far as links are concerned. Montreal, for example, will get their first direct flights to Asia, if it has not already been done. That’s a step in the right direction.
Other than that, to get universities to be more interested or to be driven to have more partnerships with Asian universities, this impetus has to come from the universities themselves to understand the importance of building on that.
Once you at least offer these opportunities to the students, it’s more likely that the students will be interested and take this opportunity. Because, again, I’m sure I was not the only student in that situation where I was not offered a wide variety of choices. I’m sure in certain cases students would rather go to Asia but end up going to another area; therefore, we lose a potential future scholar of Asia.
Again, this impetus has to come from the universities. That would be a first step in the right direction, Madam Chair.
The Chair: Thank you. We had been discussing that we are getting more students in, and some of them from the reaction of countries we have gone to, but getting students out, I think, is our next challenge. I apologize for intervening.
Senator Woo: I want to congratulate what Mr. Hardy-Chartrand is doing and to encourage him to continue doing what he is doing and to work with his students and others to keep building the capacity in this country. Because ultimately if we don’t have the smarts and the people and the institutions to understand and explain to Canadians what’s going on, we won’t respond in the right way.
Senator Eaton: This committee took a trip to Singapore to look at the ASEAN countries. I’m wondering, if Canada was really engaged in TPP and the ASEAN countries — sometimes academics follow business, and the more our business demands that we understand China and Japan, I would think, and India and Korea and Vietnam, the more scholarships, the more seminars would probably follow. That’s just a comment.
To continue on Senator Marwah’s question about Japan, even if they don’t start taking up arms, do they have global aspirations? If we look at the way China has invested in Africa, for instance, is investing in Pakistan right now, is Japan doing the same thing? Is Japan trying to extend its influence globally as being a counterweight to China?
Mr. Hardy-Chartrand: It is, but to a lesser extent than China is at the moment. Japan remains one of the first providers of ODA, official development assistance, in the world, but its geographical reach is more limited than China’s. China has been investing —
Senator Eaton: Isn’t it a mental state, though, with the Japanese? They’ve always been more closed, societally.
Mr. Hardy-Chartrand: It could be partially because of this. Until 1853, Japan was a completely closed country until Commodore Perry forced it to open up. The Chinese, however, were also quite closed until recently. They were an important power in the region until the mid-nineteenth century. It could be partially because of this, but also, traditionally Japan has mostly concentrated on its own region, especially including Southeast Asia.
The area in which we see this sort of competition between Japan and China, more than anywhere else, is Southeast Asia.
Senator Eaton: In what countries?
Mr. Hardy-Chartrand: Southeast Asia has been —
Senator Eaton: Are there countries that are actually going head to head?
Mr. Hardy-Chartrand: Absolutely. The Philippines is one of the countries with which Japan has very strong links. Japan has been providing help and equipment as well, including coast guard vessels, to countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam, both of which are embroiled in this territorial dispute with the Chinese.
This sort of help and capacity building that Japan has been undertaking with these countries has obviously not been very well received by the Chinese. However, because of the important stake that Japan has in Southeast Asia, and the South China Sea specifically, it will continue to be present in the South China Sea and continue to invest in these countries to reinforce defence cooperation with these countries. Indirectly, as you mentioned, senator, this comes to a head with China.
Senator Eaton: What are its relationships with Australia, say, or Singapore?
Mr. Hardy-Chartrand: Japan has very strong defence links with Australia. They have undertaken joint military training exercises together. Also, last year, when Australia was looking to buy some new submarines, Japan was one of the leading contenders to provide these submarines to Australia. In the end, Australia chose a French company, but it does not change the fact that the defence cooperation links between Japan and Australia are very strong, as they are with other countries, such as Singapore, as well.
Senator Eaton: Thank you.
Senator Housakos: Thank you. I was listening to the question by Senator Woo when he was articulating the fact that Canada might be punching below our weight. Of course, that theory has been expressed on a number of occasions and not just in this region of the world. I always find that quite fascinating as a Canadian because I think, more often than not, that we punch exactly at our weight all over the world. The reality of the matter is we have certain limitations.
I heard, again, your answer to his question, and if I understand correctly, I heard that what’s required is more funding. As you can see over the last few years, the federal government has had limitations in terms of putting money into diplomacy and our foreign service. We’ve been closing down embassies and various services within embassies. In the last two years we have now a new government that is knee-deep in debt, yet they still haven’t necessarily resolved the issue.
What leverage is there that we haven’t been leveraging when it comes to dealing in this particular region? At the end of the day, you have to have some leverage in order to punch above or at your weight. What leverage is there, besides funding, which clearly isn’t there, that we haven’t been using that has resulted in punching below our weight? That’s my question.
Mr. Hardy-Chartrand: Right. Thank you, senator. I think partly it is a matter of priority. You’re right that there are limited funding and limited resources, whether on the military, political, democratic or economic front.
Considering the importance of what we have been talking about today, universities are links to the region. In large part, I think it’s a matter of prioritizing. There must be a way that we can, without undermining other aspects of our diplomacy, at least understand that a certain shifting of resources can be undertaken so that we place more weight on the Asian region.
The Chair: I have a question about the consolidation of power in Xi Jinping’s hands and no successor being named. I’m reading that that is a signal we should look at because that kind of power concentration hasn’t been there for decades. It is an interesting route that he has taken with his background.
Does that shift, this consolidation looking inward into China and saying that they will be concentrating internally on their consumer activity — if I can call it that — mean that they have the capacity to grow within their country as well as spreading out? What does that do to our foreign policy? Do we shift anything?
Mr. Hardy-Chartrand: Thank you, Madam Chair. While I think it is true, if we look at what happened last week with congress, all that we have been seeing there for the past few years is the concentration of power at the apex of the Chinese political hierarchy. Xi Jinping, as you mentioned, has not so far named a successor.
It’s quite likely, given how his thought has been enshrined in the party constitution, that even after the twentieth congress in five years, Xi Jinping, even if he’s not officially in power at that time, will remain a dominating figure in Chinese politics to the same extent that Deng Xiaoping was after he didn’t officially have these powers any more.
As for Canada, we have to contend with that fact. We have to understand that this foreign policy we’ve seen from the Chinese will continue to follow these trends for the next five years at minimum and probably continue after the twentieth congress.
Therefore, if Canada, for example, pursues the path of a free trade agreement with China, this trend in foreign policy is something we have to keep in mind and to contend with in the near future.
The Chair: Does that mean we will be able to count on behaviour from China being more consistent, or will it be less so? We were listening to a scholar just yesterday who said it’s interesting because there’s a consolidation, economic stability and influence that’s coming.
But on the other hand, where’s the political situation going? As a certain professional said, does this mean that there will be a bump in the road coming down the line that we should be aware of? Or is that now being put further down the road?
Mr. Hardy-Chartrand: Well, I think there will be bumps in the road because Chinese ambitions are extremely broad and important. Look at some of the initiatives that they have put forth in the last few years, the main one being One Belt and One Road, or the Belt and Road Initiative, which is a massive initiative that covers 68 countries and between $4 trillion and $8 trillion of investment coming up.
No doubt there will be road bumps ahead for the Chinese, including in several countries in which they are investing massively, among those being several areas of Pakistan in which they are investing. They’re fairly unstable and a lot of these investments are high risk.
Indirectly, that has an impact on Canada. If our companies want to have a share of that pie and want to invest in or be a part of this Belt and Road Initiative, we have to be aware of the risks associated with a lot of the projects directly associated with it.
The Chair: Thank you.
Senator Ngo: Last week we had two academic experts who spoke about China’s move to be a rule maker in the international institutions.They also mentioned that there is anxiety regarding China’s influence in the academic field. Could you speak to us regarding that kind of observation, if you can?
Mr. Hardy-Chartrand: The second part of your question is about academia?
Senator Ngo: The academic field.
Mr. Hardy-Chartrand: Yes. For the first part of your question regarding rule making, undoubtedly China has been disappointed or disaffected, to an extent, by the rule-making powers of the United States or of the Western world. Although China has obviously benefited immensely from Western rule making and the international order that was built by the West and the United States, we can see clearly from Chinese actions in the last few years and declarations by Chinese leaders that it wants to keep following these rules and be perceived as following these rules, but, increasingly, we can see that it is willing to and will do all it can to build an order, especially an Asian order, that will abide by Chinese-led rules rather than Western rules. It wants an Asia ruled by Asians, and it has said so explicitly, in one instance. President Xi Jinping has said that in the last few years. So in that sense, this is, I think, the direction that the Chinese are going in.
As far as academia is concerned, I think it goes back to what we were talking about previously with the academic links and exchange programs with the Chinese. In China specifically, we have to be wary of one specific aspect, which is academic freedom. There have been, I think, negative trends in the last few years in China, under President Xi Jinping, concerning academic freedom. There has been an increase in orthodoxy, and there has been a real push in Chinese universities to push out what are considered Western ideas, mainly ideas of democracy, ideas of the rule of law. There have been several professors, in several universities in China, who have had to deal with the consequences of criticizing Chinese orthodoxy or Chinese communism or the Communist Party of China and a push for greater orthodoxy, making sure that professors follow the guidance of the Chinese Communist Party. I think that is an unfortunate trend that is not likely to change in the next few years. If Canada wants to increase links with Chinese universities, we have to be absolutely aware of and conscious of that. There is also the so-called “soft power push” by China, the fact that it has opened hundreds of Confucius Institutes around the world, institutes that are part of different universities, in which they teach Chinese language, as well as Chinese culture. These institutes have been known to lack academic freedoms. In some universities, certain teachers, as part of Confucius Institutes, are under quite a lot of restrictions under these institutes.
These are things that we have to be aware of if, for example, we allow these Confucius Institutes to open up more branches here in Canada, among others.
Senator Oh: My question for you relates to an FTA with China. I think that, in the last two days, UBC had a survey come out that said 70 per cent of Canadians are now pushing for an FTA with China. Australia, as you know, has been doing very well with China on their FTA of two years ago. Can you comment on that, the trend that is shifting because of NAFTA talks in the U.S.? Is there a waking up?
Mr. Hardy-Chartrand: Thank you, senator. This is a quite striking trend indeed. In the last few years, every poll and survey has shown this increase in support for an FTA with China. The current situation with regard to the renegotiation of NAFTA undoubtedly will continue to lead to further support for the FTA. I think it’s imperative for Canada to look at other markets, and China is an obvious one. The fact that Australia and other countries in the region have signed FTAs with China shows that it is important for us to look at this possibility, because the later you get into this game, the more difficult it will be to reap the rewards of the FTAs.
It has been the case, for example, with our FTA with Korea, the CKFTA, the very first FTA that Canada signed with an Asian nation. It is a great step in the right direction, but the reality is that this could, probably should, have been done earlier than this. The later we move into the game, the smaller the share of the pie will be.
It’s important, I think, despite the caveats and the risks associated with an FTA with China. It’s important, given the overwhelming importance of the Chinese market, that we at least move in this direction. We simply cannot afford to remain on the sidelines, and support from Canadians for the FTA will also continue to grow. This will lead to, I think, more pressure to push in that direction.
Senator Oh: Thank you.
The Chair: You certainly have covered a lot of ground and have been very kind in going over time with our questions. I think it has been extremely helpful and has updated us on perspectives in the Asia-Pacific area. We are engaged in that. We have been, and we continue to follow the developments and changes as we believe they’re important for Canada. And you’ve underscored that.
Thank you for your indulgence in changing your program so many times to be here, and, particularly, thank you for the information you have given us.
Mr. Hardy-Chartrand: Thank you, Madam Chair.
The Chair: Senators, we are adjourned.
(The committee adjourned.)