Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Issue No. 58 - Evidence - Meeting of February 27, 2019
OTTAWA, Wednesday, February 27, 2019
The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met this day at 4:16 p.m. to study foreign relations and international trade generally.
Senator A. Raynell Andreychuk (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: We are the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Before I introduce our guests for this panel, I’m going to ask the senators to introduce themselves.
Senator Greene: Stephen Greene, Nova Scotia.
[Translation]
Senator Massicotte: Paul Massicotte from Quebec.
[English]
Senator Coyle: Mary Coyle, Nova Scotia.
Senator Housakos: Leo Housakos, Quebec.
Senator Bovey: Patricia Bovey, Manitoba.
[Translation]
Senator Dawson: Dennis Dawson from Quebec.
Senator Saint-Germain: Raymonde Saint-Germain from Quebec.
[English]
Senator Boehm: Peter Boehm, Ontario.
The Chair: And I’m Raynell Andreychuk from Saskatchewan, chair of the committee.
The committee is authorized to examine such issues as may arise from time to time relating to foreign relations and international trade generally. Under this mandate, the committee will hear today from government officials on the situation in Venezuela.
The committee heard witnesses back in 2016 and 2017 about the political situation and the growing economic crisis in the country. Two reports were published, one in June 2016 and one in July 2017. We have followed up with a response from the government on March 20, 2018. We have taken the opportunity to update ourselves and the issues and developments in Venezuela. We’ve heard from some witnesses to date, and I’m pleased that a very quick response was forthcoming from Global Affairs.
I’m pleased to welcome to the committee Mr. Michael Grant, Assistant Deputy Minister for the Americas; Cheryl Urban, Director General, South America and Inter-American Affairs; and Patricia Atkinson, Head, Venezuela Task Force, South America Relations. All are members of the Global Affairs Department.
Thank you for coming. We understand there is one presentation and all of you will be available for questions. I think you’ve testified before, so you know the procedure in the Senate.
Welcome to the committee. Mr. Grant, the floor is yours.
[Translation]
Michael Grant, Assistant Deputy Minister for the Americas, Global Affairs Canada: Thank you, Madam Chair. I warmly welcome this opportunity to discuss the rapidly unfolding situation in Venezuela and Canada’s response.
As you are well aware, the situation in Venezuela has drastically evolved since Global Affairs Canada last addressed the committee on this issue in June 2017. Since the beginning of this year, in particular, we have seen unprecedented developments in the situation.
[English]
On January 10, Nicolás Maduro swore himself in for a second term. It’s important to look at the events that led to that. In April 2013, he was elected to a presidential term. It was an election where the international community had concerns, but it was deemed to be free and fair. That term ended on January 10. However, in December 2015, following the opposition winning control of the National Assembly, Maduro set in motion a number of actions that have led us to this day. Specifically, he essentially manipulated the Supreme Court to nullify the National Assembly, and he created the National Constituent Assembly, a parallel legislative body that began to enact legislation. He then used the National Constituent Assembly to move to early elections in May 2018, elections that Canada deemed to be neither free, nor fair, nor legitimate.
On January 10, when he swore himself in for a supposed second term, that was, in fact, the end of his legitimacy. On January 15, united opposition parties passed an agreement in the National Assembly on four points: first, the usurpation of power by Maduro; second, the provision of amnesty and guarantees to military forces that contribute to the peaceful and democratic transition; third, seeking the international community’s support in freezing regime assets overseas; and fourth, the need for humanitarian aid.
On January 23, Juan Guaidó, the President of the National Assembly, assumed the interim presidency of Venezuela, based on articles in the Constitution which, in the case of vacancy of the office of the presidency, designate the leader of the National Assembly as interim president in order to call for new presidential elections. Since that time, over 50 countries, including Canada, its Lima Group partners, as well as Ecuador, Australia, Japan and most EU members, have publicly recognized Guaidó as the legitimate interim president of Venezuela.
The popular demonstrations of support for Guaidó following his acceptance of the role of interim president have been impressive. Thousands have taken to the streets to defy the Maduro dictatorship, demonstrating a united people calling for change. Unfortunately, the regime remains intransigent, and Maduro retains his hold on nearly all of the levers of power. A few more defections have occurred among military officers and diplomatic representatives, but they have yet to reach a critical mass.
At the same time, instability and humanitarian impacts continue to grow. According to Amnesty International, as of last week, 41 people have died and more than 900 have been arbitrarily detained since January 23. This number has risen further following the violent clashes this past weekend, as the regime attempted to block the entry of aid into the country.
On the economic side, hyperinflation has now reached 2 million per cent and is expected to reach 10 million per cent by 2019. Severe food shortages and record hyperinflation have put the purchase of basic necessities, such as food, well out of reach for many Venezuelans, while the collapse of the health system has further impacted their well-being. Over 3.3 million people have fled Venezuela since 2015, many of whom are currently residing in neighbouring countries such as Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, which are demonstrating remarkable generosity despite significant impacts on host communities. Colombia alone now hosts more than 1 million Venezuelans. The United Nations estimates that, should the situation persist, the population of Venezuelan refugees and migrants outside the country could reach 5.3 million by the end of 2019.
While lack of access makes accurate statistics difficult to obtain, credible reports indicate that an estimated 90 per cent of Venezuela’s population has dropped below the poverty line. According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, as of November 2018, there were around 3.7 million malnourished people in Venezuela, roughly 11.7 per cent of the population. That places Venezuela as the country with the highest level of malnutrition in the region. There has also been a resurgence of preventable and treatable diseases like measles, diphtheria and tuberculosis, both within the country and among the migrant population. Treatment for chronic diseases has also suffered.
A very limited number of humanitarian organizations are able to operate under restrictions in Venezuela, and the Maduro regime continues to deny the existence of a crisis.
On February 23, Interim President Juan Guaidó rallied Venezuelans in defiance of a blockade by the Maduro regime that has kept tons of stockpiled relief items from entering Venezuela. Hundreds of thousands of volunteers sought to bring stockpiles of aid into the country; unfortunately, this effort met with little success, as the regime closed the land border with Brazil; the sea border with the Dutch islands of Aruba, Bonaire and Curaçao; and blockaded entry points along the Colombian border.
Due to attacks by regime forces, civilian casualties were reported among the Indigenous Venezuelan population near the Brazilian border and among both Venezuelans and Colombians seeking to transfer aid at the Colombian border. Canada has condemned these attacks and the ongoing denial of humanitarian access and has called for an investigation.
[Translation]
Since Venezuela’s slide into dictatorship began, Canada has taken an active leadership role in regional and global efforts to restore constitutional democracy and respect for human rights in Venezuela, and has been integral to sustaining a strong and coordinated international response to this crisis.
Canada was present at the formation of the Lima Group in August 2017, and has attended every meeting of the group to date. Canada successfully hosted ministerial meetings of the group in October 2017 and on February 4 of this year.
The recent meeting in Ottawa welcomed the participation of Venezuela’s interim government under Juan Guaidó to the Lima Group, and helped broaden consensus on Venezuela by inviting international partners to participate.
Canada also launched the Ottawa Declaration for Venezuela, a document confirming support for democracy in Venezuela that has already been endorsed by 19 countries, including the Czech Republic, Ecuador, Georgia, Kosovo, Israel, Poland, the United Kingdom, the United States and Lima Group partners.
The Lima Group met in Bogota on February 25 with Minister Freeland’s participation. It served to maintain the momentum generated in Ottawa and condemn the events of last weekend, while sending a clear message to the Maduro regime that it must relinquish its grip on power.
It issued strong calls on the international community to join efforts to restore democracy and on international actors such as the International Criminal Court, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the UN Human Rights Council and the UN Secretary-General to respond to the worsening situation in Venezuela.
The Lima Group also called on the Venezuelan armed forces and judiciary to recognize the legitimate authority of Interim President Guaidó, and reiterated its commitment to a peaceful democratic transition led by Venezuelans, within the framework of international law, and without the use of force.
[English]
In the last 18 months, Canada has also imposed targeted sanctions against 70 Venezuelan officials and individuals linked with the Maduro regime who are responsible for or complicit in the deterioration of democracy, gross violations of internationally recognized human rights or acts of significant corruption.
In May 2018, in response to the fraudulent presidential elections, Canada officially downgraded diplomatic relations with Venezuela, restricting engagement with Venezuelan officials, banning bilateral military cooperation, maintaining a ban on Canada’s support for Venezuelan candidacies to multilateral and international organizations, and imposing a ban on formal bilateral military cooperation.
In September 2018, in cooperation with Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay and Peru, Canada referred the situation in Venezuela to the International Criminal Court. Canada took this historic step, the first time that states have referred another state to the court due to credible allegations that serious international crimes had been committed in Venezuela.
At the same time, Canada has been at the forefront of efforts to address the situation in Venezuela through multilateral fora, including the Organization of American States and the United Nations Human Rights Council.
On February 4, 2019, Canada announced almost $53 million towards an integrated stabilization, humanitarian and development response to support the people affected by the Venezuela crisis, bringing our total contribution to date to more than $55 million. This includes an envelope of $16 million in humanitarian assistance funding to support experienced humanitarian organizations for the provision of life-saving assistance such as food, health care, water and sanitation to vulnerable and crisis-affected populations, including in host communities both in Venezuela and in neighbouring countries.
Canada has been clear that the peaceful restoration of democracy and the rebuilding of the country must be driven by Venezuelans, but the international community, the Lima Group and Canada will continue to support them, as we have, since the early days of the crisis to seek a peaceful democratic transition, guided by the Constitution of Venezuela.
Looking forward, we must plan for the hard work that will follow transition so that Venezuelans can put themselves back on a path of economic prosperity as quickly as possible. Thank you, honourable senators.
[Translation]
Senator Saint-Germain: Welcome and thank you for your fascinating presentation. My question is about the $53 million that Canada announced for the delivery of humanitarian aid to Venezuela at the meeting held a few weeks ago in Ottawa.
We’ve since learned that only $2.6 million of that total will go to Venezuelan humanitarian organizations and that the bulk of the money will go to Peru and Colombia, to help them cope with the influx of Venezuelan migrants.
My question is twofold. First, why is such a small portion of the funding going directly to Venezuelan humanitarian organizations? Second, seeing as President Maduro refuses to allow international humanitarian aid into the country, I’d like to know what Canada’s approach is in terms of sending funds to Venezuela’s two nearest neighbours.
Mr. Grant: Thank you very much. I’ll start with your second question.
It’s clear that the needs are real, both in Colombia and Peru and in Ecuador as well. There are now over 3 million Venezuelans in those countries, and that’s putting a lot of stress on their systems. We need to help Venezuelans there, as well as the countries receiving these migrants. Our aid is going to Venezuelans in those countries.
Senator Saint-Germain: Have you signed an agreement to that effect with Colombia and Peru, to guarantee that the money will really go to Venezuelan migrants?
Mr. Grant: In those countries, as in Venezuela, we have an agreement with the international organizations.
Senator Saint-Germain: So it’s not nation to nation, it’s via NGOs?
Mr. Grant: That’s correct. But it’s clear that the funding is being used for the needs identified in those countries. It’s not exactly an agreement, but we are working together.
Senator Saint-Germain: Okay.
Mr. Grant: As for the proportion of aid allocated to Venezuela, it’s very hard right now to find organizations we can work with in Venezuela. We have some experience with local NGOs, but the necessary conditions aren’t in place to facilitate the use of this funding. Even international organizations like the United Nations and its agencies don’t have as strong a presence in Venezuela as in other countries facing the same situation. That’s why the proportion is different.
Senator Saint-Germain: Very different. Thank you.
Mr. Grant: No problem.
[English]
Senator Bovey: Thank you. I want to turn to the military, if I may.
With what we’ve been reading and seeing, in order to overturn Maduro, the military is first going to have to abandon him. I could be being very simplistic on that.
If that’s true and the Venezuelan military is being clearly identified as a key player in propping up the Maduro presidency, I understand that members of the military have been offered the amnesty protection that you mentioned for alleged corruption in human rights and abuses to any member who defects to Guaidó. The military is very heavily involved in state oil. The military presides over imports and exports, holds contracts for public housing projects and has mining and oil services commissions.
They’re pretty well positioned; they have a fair number of resources in their hands. With this type of wealth controlled by the military, what motivation exists for the top generals to defect to Guaidó?
Mr. Grant: It’s an excellent question, and it’s one that, for those of us who follow Venezuela and analyze and try to understand, we ask ourselves often.
Not to dissect too much the events of last weekend, I think there was a higher level of expectation in terms of the defections that we saw. I think Guaidó and the National Assembly expected many more to defect.
One thing that Canada and others have done is tried to target the people around Maduro with very clear sanctions, including those at the top of the military. You make a very good point that those who have lived off of the corrupt practices of the regime are reluctant to abandon Maduro.
What we are seeing, though, is for those who have defected, they’ve made very clear statements that the military is swinging towards Guaidó and that, while the numbers of defections have improved, there is a high percentage of soldiers who are not supportive of Maduro, but they are living very much in fear, as is the population in Venezuela.
We’ve seen, on January 23 and also on February 23, the two most important days of demonstration, that those in the military proper have not confronted citizens. We’ve seen demonstrations where the military has turned aside and where the military have let protests go through. Unfortunately, they are not the only ones with weapons in Venezuela. We have seen un-uniformed — they are called colectivos — these are shock troops, if you will, who have carried out violent acts and who have murdered. They seem to be at the pointy end of the actions of the regime.
You ask about the motivation for staying with Maduro. I think it is one of fear primarily. Clearly there are some at the very top who have benefited economically, but for the vast majority, they are concerned with what will happen to their families if they are to defect.
Senator Bovey: At what point will that fear be a fear of not having left?
Mr. Grant: That is a very good question. It is one that we also ask of all Venezuelans. We have seen tremendous courage in taking it to the streets and showing support for the Constitution and democracy. That has not yet proven to be enough to turn the tide, but the determination is strong.
Interim President Guaidó was at the recent Lima Group meeting and made it clear that, while February 23 was not successful in getting aid because of the actions of the Maduro regime, he will continue to try to bring in food and medicine for his people and he will continue to lead. I think what we will see is a growing level of support for him on the streets of Venezuela.
The Chair: You talked about the colectivos. I am receiving reports that they are, in fact, very active at the moment against members of the National Assembly. Are you aware of that? Is that, first of all, factual? Second, is that systematic of the fact that desperation is creeping into the Maduro regime? Allegedly there are gangs, bands or collections that are loyal to Maduro and that are attacking members of the National Assembly, or at least threatening them. Is there some desperation there?
Mr. Grant: We have seen over the past few years a number of actions against political actors in Venezuela. A number of them have been killed. Quite a few remain in prison or are under house arrest. In recent weeks we’ve seen action against Guaidó himself. He and others have been detained in the National Assembly.
We are aware of reports that today, a number of armed individuals entered into the National Assembly to disrupt the proceedings. Just before departing, I read on WhatsApp something that was indirectly from a member of the National Assembly who said it was unfolding, and the National Assembly was trying to continue its operations. I don’t have the latest on what’s happening, but it is an extremely troubling development.
The fact that these bands of colectivos and armed thugs of Maduro continue to operate so widely is very concerning. We’ve seen evidence of their actions over the past few days, specifically in the attempts to bring through aid, that there is virtually nothing that they won’t do. This is extremely disturbing. I believe, as we move forward and as the international community continues the support and the international community continues to grow for Juan Guaidó, we need to continue to raise our voices against these actions. Canada has and will continue to do so in the United Nations. This was very much a part of our decision to refer the situation in Venezuela to the International Criminal Court. Attention needs to be heightened on these actions.
[Translation]
Senator Massicotte: Thank you for being here this afternoon. This is a sad and very serious situation, and people’s lives are being threatened. Could you tell us a bit about how Canada is handling compliance with its international agreements in relation to Venezuela’s sovereignty?
Some of our agreements restrict our actions. Canada is heavily involved with Lima. Canada has made it clear that it’s not interested in military intervention. However, Mike Pence in the United States often talks about sanctions. The United States wants the United Nations to play a bigger role.
Do you think Canada is managing or complying with its agreements, in spite of everything? What solution are we aiming for? The obvious goal is a democratic solution, but how do we get there?
Mr. Grant: I think the solution is simple, and it’s the Constitution of Venezuela. It makes it clear that if there is no president, as was the case on January 10, there is a procedure to follow. The National Assembly assumes presidential authority. The President of the National Assembly becomes the interim president. The sole purpose of that government is to hold elections. That’s that Juan Guaidó is supposed to do. However, it’s complicated because, as interim president, he doesn’t have access to all the necessary government resources to hold elections. The international community needs to maintain its support for the legitimate government and continue to oppose the Maduro regime. The only solution is democracy and elections.
Senator Massicotte: You just said it’s clear that there is no president and that the president should be the President of the National Assembly. What international agreement entitles us to say whether the interim president isn’t doing his job properly? What international agreement gives us the right to impose our opinion?
Mr. Grant: The 1999 Constitution of Venezuela and the authority of the National Assembly of Venezuela.
Senator Massicotte: I don’t understand. What international agreements provide standing for declaring the president’s election to be inconsistent with the acceptable rules? Is our opinion superior to any other?
Mr. Grant: It’s not just the opinion of the international community. It’s the opinion of Venezuelans themselves, through the National Assembly, the legitimate authority of Venezuela. It clearly said that the 2018 election was not legitimate and that President Maduro’s term ended on January 10, the term that had started in 2013. That’s perfectly clear under the Constitution of Venezuela.
Senator Massicotte: You’re saying the people have spoken. As I understand international agreements, it has to be the government itself that invites us to intervene in its country, not the National Assembly. It hasn’t been established that this is what the people want. Why are you saying the people have spoken? Was there a legitimate interim election? No. They’re out in the streets, but —
Mr. Grant: There was a legitimate National Assembly election in 2015, which is when the opposition to Maduro was elected. Maduro then took steps to illegally change Venezuela’s system by setting up a new legislature, the National Constituent Assembly, as a parallel parliament operating alongside the National Assembly, but the 2015 election and the 1999 Constitution are clear. If there is no legitimately elected president, power passes directly to the National Assembly, and the interim presidency is assumed by the President of the National Assembly.
Senator Massicotte: You know, many countries are saying the opposite. We had a meeting on that subject last week. All four witnesses clearly said what it would really help is for a feasible succession plan to be put in place, for the president to make an honourable exit, not go to jail, and for the United States not to threaten to attack. However, over the past two days, military threats have been made. Even the new president is calling for U.S. intervention. The strategy seems to be inconsistent. Even members of the military are afraid of being punished. In the meantime, what’s needed is an honourable escape valve. Am I missing something?
Mr. Grant: I can’t speak for the U.S., but Canada’s position is clear. There is a peaceful democratic transition. That’s what we need. Now, even Venezuela, under Juan Guaidó’s government, is part of the Lima Group. Furthermore, the declaration issued by the Lima Group two days ago was clear. It wants a peaceful process, a peaceful democratic transition, without the use of force. Venezuela, Guaidó’s government, agrees with that position. I can’t speak to the United States’ position, but that’s the position of Canada, the Lima Group and Juan Guaidó’s government.
Senator Massicotte: Thank you.
[English]
Senator Boehm: Thank you, Mr. Grant and team, for joining us. My colleague Senator Massicotte has introduced an interesting element that I want to follow up on. Essentially, I have two questions and I will ask them in sequence.
Regional dynamics. So in the hemisphere in the past, there have been other regional initiatives. I can think of the Contadora Group in the 1980s for peace in Central America. Of course, there is the regional organization, the OAS. But as the Lima Group constituted itself, the U.S. was a bit more of a benign actor and suddenly it is not so much. Of course, there is a lot of history and the people of Latin America know this. By extension, then, Nicolás Maduro is using this to bolster his ultranationalist credentials.
In the meantime, the EU and Mexico are working on things, toward mediation, but it seems to me that not everyone is on board with the Lima Group, and there might be some hesitation right now.
I would be interested in your take on the atmospherics. I knew you were in Bogotá as well with the Minister. That is my first element.
Second, the reconstruction phase. Recently this week there was a CARICOM event that I attended, and I spoke with a number of representatives from the Caribbean.
There is a real concern that as Venezuela moves toward a transition phase, PetroCaribe, the subsidized oil that was coming from Venezuela to many of these countries, will not be there. This affects the dynamic in the OAS as well. I’m wondering if Canada is using all its diplomatic levers to look ahead into reconstruction and transition. By that I mean the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, where credits will be required, and I think downright technical assistance, particularly in the oil sector.
And there, of course, you then have a very important diaspora — the Venezuelans who left early, who did not leave with their feet, like those who are in Colombia or Peru, but who flew to Miami and stayed there.
So I am wondering if, as you look ahead, there is a lot of planning going ahead on that front.
Mr. Grant: Thank you, senator.
First, in terms of regional dynamics, I will point out a few things. When it comes to Venezuela itself, there have been, over the last eight years, a number of processes to try and find dialogue, to try and find a way forward. Some have been led by the region, others by actors outside. All of them have been, in one way or another, abused by the Maduro regime, used to play for time and whatnot.
I think the emergence of the Lima Group represents both a frustration that none of those have really taken hold, as well as a bit of a frustration that the main body, multilateral body in the region, the OAS, has also failed to really take a clear stance.
It is also, perhaps, the first time in modern history that we’ve seen a group of leading countries in the region come together to take very clear action against another country in the region. As I believe you know, this is a region that prides itself on taking care of its own issues, and this is a historic development of the Lima Group.
I think one reason why I believe the Lima Group has been able to be very clear to really set the path for the world to come in behind — and I will mention in a second some of the other processes that you mentioned — I think it is because it has been led by the region. Canada has played, I believe, a very important role as a regional member but also a key multilateralist. Whether it is in the OAS or the UN, we brought this experience to this group, and I think it is an element that the other members appreciate.
The fact that the United States is not part of the Lima Group, I think was quite intentional from the beginning. Given the history in the region, some members of the Lima Group were very clear that, to be effective, it needed to be without the U.S., but Canada’s role is quite complementary to what they are trying to do.
In terms of other processes or other views of the region, if you look at the Ottawa Declaration for Venezuela, it really sums up what we stand for. That is, we support the will of the Venezuelan people to follow their own Constitution to democracy. We believe we need to provide humanitarian support, we believe human rights need to be respected, and we believe the international community has a role in the reconstruction of Venezuela once we get to the point of the transition.
I think those principles are well supported internationally. There is, perhaps, a slight difference of opinion when it comes to, say, the EU initiative, which is called the Contact Group. They actually elaborate the same principles. On our part, we make it clear what we mean when we say the Constitution should be followed and democracy should be followed. What we mean is that Maduro does not have any legitimacy left and the process has to move forward without him. The Europeans have not been that detailed. Frankly, I think it is a bit of a shame that they have not gone that far as to say what they mean by following democracy.
For the most part, we share the exact same objectives. We stay in very close contact with them, as the Lima Group does with other actors, including Mexico. Minister Freeland spoke to her counterpart yesterday, after the Lima Group meeting, including the United States, which is an important player on this, and including a growing list of countries. Japan recently announced that it supported Juan Guaidó as the legitimate authority.
This is very important now in terms of demonstrating political support for Guaidó and opposition Maduro, but it will be very crucial when we get to the part that you mentioned regarding reconstruction. Canada has already been engaged in dialogue with the Inter-American Development Bank, the IMF and the World Bank that plans need to be prepared, and we need to be ready to demonstrate with resources our commitment to Venezuela’s reconstruction.
During the February 4 meeting of the Lima Group, we included a session that was led by an academic who has been working on a plan which has now been adopted by the National Assembly as the reconstruction plan for Venezuela. It’s a very comprehensive plan. It’s one that’s being studied in the international financial institutions. All that to say that this work is already beginning. It will take a significant amount of resources from the IFIs when we get to the reconstruction phase. It’s not simply Venezuela proper. You’re absolutely right to point out those countries that have relied on cheap Venezuelan oil for a number of years and Canada has excellent relations throughout the Caribbean. We have been having a very strong dialogue with our partners there throughout the process. There are two Caribbean countries that are members of the Lima Group, St. Lucia and Guyana. We believe their voices need to be heard as we move forward on reconstruction.
Senator Coyle: Thank you very much, Mr. Grant, for your presentation and an update on where we are today, after the difficult weekend that didn’t go the way people were — well, who knew how it was going to go? It didn’t go well. You’ve outlined very clearly for us the state of affairs in Venezuela and in the surrounding countries where the refugees are now present, and also Canada’s desire, which I think all of us agree with, to help restore democracy via peaceful means and in line with the Constitution of Venezuela.
Last week, we had a couple of other panels here. I want to test something with you. We heard from Dr. Donald Kingsbury. I’ll quote him directly. He said:
Finally, the present resembles the past in that a majority of Venezuelans identify neither with Chavismo, nor with the opposition. A majority wants Maduro out, but that does not always or even often translate into unconditional support for the opposition before or after Guaidó’s announcement that he was assuming the presidency. . .
We heard from former Ambassador Rowswell also that some polling had gone on and testing the waters with various groups in Venezuela. I want to know what your response is to what Dr. Kingsbury said to us and what the current situation is according to your findings in the country.
Mr. Grant: We don’t really do studies of popular support within Venezuela. But what we see, our analysis would lead us to believe that there is growing support for the National Assembly, led by Juan Guaidó, who is now the interim president, to lead Venezuela towards free and fair elections. I think this is the essence of where Canada stands and where the Lima Group stands.
It’s interesting to look at how Juan Guaidó became the interim president. While I think he’s done a very good job of communicating to Venezuelans and to the world, he in fact became interim president simply because he was the President of the National Assembly. He became President of the National Assembly on January 5. In the system of the National Assembly, there is a rotation between the main political parties, and it was his political party’s turn and he was the leader of that party, and so he became President of the National Assembly on January 5. On January 10, Maduro’s legitimacy ended and the Venezuelan Constitution kicked in. According to the articles of the Constitution, he became president.
I think what you’re seeing in Venezuela is not so much a rallying behind a person; I think it’s a rallying behind legitimacy and democracy. Venezuelans want to get to free elections. They want their freedom back, essentially. This is growing, and it’s clear that it’s growing, whether it’s by the size of the demonstrations or, frankly, by the actions of Maduro and his thugs. It’s clear that they see it as well, that the support for the interim president, for the National Assembly and for the legitimate authorities, is on the rise.
Senator Coyle: The actions of Maduro and his thugs, which you spoke to in your remarks, are you saying that the international community is noticing a change in that because their backs are up against the wall in a serious way and that has shifted the approach of Maduro and his thugs? Is that what you’re saying?
Mr. Grant: Over the last few years we have seen a number of reprehensible actions by the Maduro regime. Actually, the basis of Canada and a number of other countries making the referral to the International Criminal Court was a study done by the OAS. I think it came out last spring. There are a number of actions which have predated the events we’ve just seen.
I think the actions we saw over the weekend clearly demonstrate that the Maduro regime is seeing growth in support for Guaidó and the National Assembly, and the results are the actions they’ve taken to literally burn the food and medicine destined to the hungry and sick people of Venezuela.
The Chair: It may be provocative, but you used the term there’s no role for Maduro. Is that not the slight difference between the European group and the Lima Group, where they’re saying they’re not presupposing who will be in the equation because they’re looking for some peaceful transaction? I see the Lima Group saying “peaceful transactions” and “transfer of power,” but they’re saying no role for Maduro. One of the difficulties for Maduro, therefore, is what’s the exit if we’ve already said you’re going to the International Criminal Court? It reminds me very much of the Zimbabwe situation with President Mugabe and the army. One very important factor was, what will happen to me if I step down? The same thing with President Bashir, and it’s unfolding as we speak in Sudan. One of the great conditions there is the ICC, do we put it aside or not? Some Europeans seem to be putting the issue of justice and favouring peace. We’re back to that eternal dialogue.
Is the Lima Group open to some peaceful negotiation for an exit for Maduro, not driven by the Lima Group but driven by the National Assembly and the people of Venezuela?
Mr. Grant: Thank you, senator. The Lima Group has made it very clear that what should be a peaceful, democratic transition process needs to be led solely by the Venezuelan people. The only legitimate authorities at this point in time are the National Assembly, according to the Venezuelan Constitution itself.
If you look at the Europeans and the Contact Group — and I described the slight difference in principles — at the same time the vast majority of EU countries have said that they recognize Juan Guaidó as the only legitimate authority in Venezuela.
You ask about the role of Maduro. It is up to the Venezuelans themselves. It’s up to the National Assembly. It is their Constitution that says there should be an interim government; that interim government should lead to elections. Those elections, we all hope, will be managed properly and be free and fair. And the outcome of the elections will be determined by Venezuelans. We should support that process.
The Chair: I guess my point — because I have two others now that want to intervene, and we have five minutes. It’s the messaging that has to be very clear. You’ve put it the way that I think the Lima Group intended it. When you say there’s no role, the National Assembly has legitimacy, legally, according to the rules, but what happens next is open to the people. I think it’s just a messaging difference.
We now have four minutes left.
Senator Boehm: There’s one significant actor that we’ve not talked about in this meeting today, and that’s Cuba. We had Mexican parliamentarians here this week, and we had a good discussion on Venezuela, on the Estrada Doctrine and all these things we know in terms of our relations with Mexico. But Mexico and Canada are uniquely placed.
We have good relations with Cuba. We never split from them, in terms of diplomatic relations. Should there not be — or maybe there are — discussions with the Cubans behind the scenes, given their large presence on the security and intelligence side in Venezuela — all through the country — and potential reassurances, too, that if we are looking for exit strategies, or if they’re looking for an exit strategy for Mr. Maduro, then something could be worked out? I’m just speculating here, but it’s classic behind-the-scenes diplomacy, if it works.
Mr. Grant: Thanks, senator.
Yes, there should be, and there is. In fact, if you look at the Lima Group’s last statement — certainly the last one, I believe, on January 4, and we may have said it on February 4, as well — the Lima Group believes we need to have dialogue with all actors. As a group and as individual members, we have regular engagement with the Europeans, Americans and with Cuba. We’ve also made it clear — it’s not stated explicitly in the declaration — we believe we should have engagement with others, including Russia and China.
Regarding Cuba specifically, Canada does have a productive relationship with Cuba. Recently, we held our annual consultations at a senior official level, and I can say clearly that Venezuela was a topic during those discussions, with a view to sharing points of view and trying to find a common way forward.
Did we? No. We had a fundamental disagreement. We’ve been talking quite clearly today about the position of Canada, and the position of Cuba is not aligned with that. But they are a key player in the region; they’re a key player on this file. There are some areas where we have concerns over the positions and some of the approaches being taken by Cuba. But we have the kind of mature relationship where we can make that point very clearly, and we do.
The Chair: I’d like to thank you, Mr. Grant, Ms. Urban and Ms. Atkinson, for your presentation. I must say we do have a lot of presentations from Global Affairs here. The way you structured it today was very helpful to the senators and to our audience, who need to know more about the situation. You put it in a format that gave us a bit of historic context, bringing us up to date and that clarified a lot of questions for those of us who have been studying Venezuela. We are going to continue studying the issue. We’re very concerned. It’s in our hemisphere.
We appreciate that you were able to answer most of the questions, and that the government and Global Affairs are in the same position as we are: looking at the situation, wanting to find some role of assistance to a legitimate government in Venezuela and a way out from the situation in a peaceful way. We can only hope.
We thank you for adding to our deliberations, and we trust that we can continue this format in the future.
We will be turning to a video of Professor Dubé, whom we were not able to connect with. We hope it works today and we can efficiently finish before our regular time, if it all works out.
Thank you again to our witnesses.
Honourable senators, we will continue the discussion that took place during the first part of today’s meeting on the situation in Venezuela. The committee is committed to keep apprised of developments in Venezuela, the challenges facing the Venezuelan people and the implications for the region.
We had scheduled our next witness to appear last week by video conference from Colombia. Unfortunately, because of technical difficulties, the video conference had to be discontinued. We are now trying again and are hopeful that the connection will allow us to proceed with the full hearing.
Again, I’m pleased to welcome, by video conference, Sébastien Dubé, Professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Universidad del Norte - Barranquilla, Colombia.
Professor Dubé, welcome to the committee. I trust you can hear us, and I trust that we will hear you, which was the part that was difficult for translation. Welcome to the committee, and may we start again with your presentation.
[Translation]
Sébastien Dubé, Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Universidad del Norte - Barranquilla, Colombia, as an individual: Hello, Madam Chair. Thank you very much.
In light of the events of the past few days, I think it would be a good idea to review the likelihood of a regime change in Venezuela and the risks for Canada’s foreign policy. I should also mention that Juan Guaidó is outside Venezuela at the moment. He was here in Colombia for the Lima Group meeting. Yesterday, he announced that he would be returning to Venezuela today. A few hours ago, however, he announced that he would be going to Brazil for a two-day meeting. We’ll see if he tries to go back to Caracas on Friday and if the authorities try to stop him from returning to Venezuela or arrest him. If that happens, everything in the current context could shift dramatically.
Today, the outlook is bleaker for those who support a regime change and those who support free elections in Venezuela. The objective of Canada’s foreign policy, which is aligned with that of the Lima Group, now seems even more unattainable than it was just a week ago.
What does the situation look like now, five weeks after Guaidó’s declaration on January 23? First, I think the opposition’s momentum has stalled somewhat, and I think the power balance between Maduro and Guaidó seems to be tilting back towards the president, Nicolás Maduro. Just a month ago, a future without Nicolás Maduro was foreseeable in the short term, but in my view, that prospect seems much more distant today. The opposition’s stalled momentum can be seen in various ways.
First, the opposition is not making much headway, despite the political and diplomatic coup attempt that happened on Saturday, and the regime is not visibly weakening. There are no signs of division among the political and military leaders. We’re not seeing a wave of defections, and one other thing that I think is significant is that there has been no popular uprising, despite the indignation that could have been sparked by the opposition’s failure to get food into the country on Saturday.
That being said, Maduro’s grip on power remains intact. His regime is still politically strong, but socially, it is still just as fragile. This situation has five major consequences.
First, we are still seeing Nicolás Maduro rejecting all calls for openness to negotiation and new elections. I don’t think Nicolás Maduro would agree to hold elections he could never win. He has everything to lose in a free, transparent election, so that scenario is highly unlikely.
Second, there is no real interest in negotiating, and a dialogue between Mr. Guaidó and Nicolás Maduro is not an option for either the regime or the opposition. Guaidó’s power is eroding, and the only thing that would increase it would be threats of intervention, which is also a risky strategy. What’s more, since yesterday, Nicolás Maduro has been talking about negotiating not with Guaidó, but with the President of the United States directly. It looks like Maduro is trying to redirect the debate in an attempt to isolate Juan Guaidó even further. As I see it, the scenario of a solution being negotiated between the regime and the opposition is equally unlikely.
Third, Guaidó’s amnesty offer to the military is insufficient and comes with no real guarantees. As a result, high-ranking officers still aren’t convinced, and I believe that a military coup is becoming more likely, albeit still highly complex, than a series of individual defections weakening Maduro.
Fourth, given the political deadlock, the scenario of intervention is looming larger, though it remains highly unlikely.
Fifth, for Maduro, the challenge is to play for time, hoping that the opposition runs out of steam and eventually collapses due to possible internal divisions, and another part of his challenge is to maintain social stability with the help of Russia, China and Turkey. That strategy has served him well since 2014, and his allies can also extract maximum gain from the Maduro regime.
Lastly, I would add that in spite of everything, it looks like the Maduro government would be capable of coping with new sanctions, at least in the short term, and I have no doubt that the scenario of potential military intervention will divide the Lima Group over the coming weeks and months.
Consequently, I predict that the conflict will become radicalized, with increased repression against Guaidó and the National Assembly on the one side, and a radicalization of the opposition on the other. I also foresee a rift forming between moderates and radicals and, on the social side, a rise in public discontent.
That being said, for Canada’s foreign policy, I would recommend going back to basics and establishing what Canada’s main objective in Venezuela is, namely a democratic transition with free elections in the short term, or, as a second, recommended option, improved social conditions in the country.
In closing, I believe Canada should maintain its position of rejecting military intervention. It should maintain its position of supporting the holding of new free and transparent elections, even though that is a very difficult scenario. It should support the deployment of humanitarian missions led by international organizations that can ensure transparency and political neutrality. It should consider a medium- and long-term strategy to keep the Venezuelan regime from following Cuba’s example. Lastly, it should decide how the government might react if the repression against Juan Guaidó and the National Assembly increases over the coming days and weeks. Thank you.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you.
Senator Dean: You may have answered this question with your presentation, but my question was going to be what keeps you up at night? You’ve certainly referenced a few things. In the short term, what do you worry about most?
[Translation]
Mr. Dubé: I think what we’ve learned from the history of Latin America is that as negotiations break down, radicals on both sides of the table can become more and more powerful.
I think the opposition’s whole strategy of positioning Juan Guaidó as President of the National Assembly was designed to project a moderate image, an image of reform as opposed to division. But the Maduro regime has responded by refusing to negotiate with the more moderate position, so I worry that Juan Guaidó’s position within the Venezuelan opposition could be weakened, and that tensions could rise, along with social tensions.
Senator Massicotte: Thank you, Mr. Dubé.
You talked about how the likelihood of military operations and intervention is higher now than it was two or three weeks ago.
Are you talking about a military coup d’état that would depose Maduro, or do you think that would happen under Maduro?
Mr. Dubé: Those are the two most likely scenarios if there is no possibility of negotiation. In the first scenario, at this time, I think a military coup is more likely, but I don’t see that happening in the short term. There is definitely a great deal of discontent within the armed forces and among senior officers, and the power structure is very good at eliminating all visible dissidence. The other part of the problem is that the President of the National Assembly is the one offering amnesty. There is no guarantee. If you are a senior military officer who gravitates around Maduro, you can negotiate with Juan Guaidó, but you have no guarantee that, if there is a free election, Juan Guaidó will be a candidate and the next elected government will honour his guarantees of amnesty. To me, that makes it very difficult to convince top-level military officers to cut ties with Maduro.
I still think that a foreign military intervention is unlikely because no Latin American country wants that to happen. I don’t really see the President of the United States being able to justify a national security threat from Venezuela. Unless there is really a major provocation on Venezuela’s part, such as attacking a ship from Puerto Rico transporting humanitarian aid, that scenario is highly unlikely.
Senator Massicotte: Even so, if there is a coup, do you think the United States would stand by and not intervene if there’s a change in government?
Mr. Dubé: I think President Trump has his own internal political strategy. I think there has been a rapprochement in recent days. The Lima Group declaration is very clear and rejects any form of outside intervention or military intervention. At the same time, though, Mr. Guaidó is meeting with Mike Pence and keeping his options open.
I am concerned that the Venezuelan opposition could radicalize in the absence of progress and become more openly in favour of military intervention. If that happens, we might see a military intervention without the support of the OAS and Latin American countries.
Senator Massicotte: Can you clarify something for me? You know Venezuela better than we do. People often refer to the Constitution, which clearly states that the President of the National Assembly becomes the country’s president in the absence of free and fair elections. Venezuela now has two parliaments, one controlled by the opposition leader and the other by Maduro. Does the Constitution clearly state that the President of the National Assembly, not the president of the other legislature, becomes the country’s president?
Mr. Dubé: My reading of Article 233 of the Constitution is a little different. Article 233 of Venezuela’s Constitution states that, if the president dies, resigns, or is physically or mentally incapacitated, the Supreme Court will declare the vacancy and the vice-president will become the interim president, who must then call a presidential election within 30 days. Constitutionally, the only way the President of the National Assembly can become interim president is if the president becomes permanently unavailable to serve between the election and the inauguration. According to my understanding of the Constitution, the President of the National Assembly, Guaidó, does not have the constitutional right to proclaim himself president. However, the other part of the problem is that the executive president has not been acting in accordance with the Constitution for a number of years. Legally, a strict reading of the Constitution does not allow for the proclamation of Juan Guaidó. However, actors have been operating outside the constitutional framework for some time, and Juan Guaidó is the most legitimate political authority because he was elected by his National Assembly peers, which is the body most recently elected in a free and fair election in Venezuela.
Senator Massicotte: Thank you.
Senator Saint-Germain: Thank you, Mr. Dubé. Your testimony has been interesting and unique because you have introduced ideas that are new to us as North Americans. I am interpreting some of what you’ve said a little, so I’m sure you’ll correct me if I’m wrong. If I understand you correctly, the Lima Group’s action and stemming the tide of Venezuelan refugees crossing into neighbouring South American countries could result in Maduro holding on to power longer thanks to the backing of Russia and China and the strong support of the Venezuelan army.
In other words, since these communist countries and former communist bloc countries are very powerful, could their relationship with the United States — because those relationships are still important, especially the relationship between the United States and China — be part of an equation that is keeping President Maduro in power?
[English]
The Chair: Senator Saint-Germain, we’ve lost the video conference. You look very nice on the screen.
Senator Saint-Germain: I need an answer. I just ended my question.
The Chair: You were actually covering that part where there were the interruptions, when Senator Dean had asked the question. I think you’re filling it in. We’re going to try to get the connection back. I’m not sure when you came on the screen. I was then told that meant he was off.
Senator Saint-Germain: I would prefer him to be on the screen, because we want the answer.
The Chair: It’s an Internet connection, and apparently the problem is in Colombia, not here.
We are connected again.
Senator Saint-Germain was in the process of asking a question. Perhaps you could repeat it for the record.
[Translation]
Senator Saint-Germain: That depends on what you heard, but I’ll summarize it because I don’t want us to lose you. Your answer is important. When it comes to international issues like this, our response to what’s happening in Venezuela is a North American one. The Lima Group looks at issues with relationships between the United States, Canada, Mexico and Cuba. However, you have introduced another dimension, which is the alignment of the communist countries, Cuba, China and Russia. I’m interpreting here, so don’t hesitate to correct me. You indicated that, with humanitarian aid from those countries and help from Canada and the Lima Group, the flow of migrants can be managed. Limiting the flow of migrants, which is a major issue for other countries, will have to be relatively well managed. Neighbouring countries will be holding elections in the coming months. Are we underestimating the importance of support from Cuba, China and Russia and the United States-Russia connection to keeping the Maduro regime in power?
Mr. Dubé: Yes, I am convinced that, considering sanctions against the regime and top officials, the Maduro regime is surviving thanks to the support of Cuba, China, Russia and Turkey. Legal and illegal gold mining for export to Turkey is making up for the lack of dollars coming into Venezuela because of American sanctions such as those against PDVSA, the oil company.
Russia’s role is mainly political. Russia sold a lot of arms to Nicolás Maduro’s regime, but it is strictly a geopolitical ally. China has invested a lot of money in Venezuela’s oil industry to build infrastructure, but I think China could switch allegiances if Juan Guaidó and the opposition convince it to. That is what Guaidó tried to do two weeks ago. He tried to convince China that a free, democratic, transparently elected government would better be able to honour its financial agreements with China than the Maduro regime, which is practically bankrupt. We need to know the key factors to understand the situation. Latin American and South American countries are primarily concerned with stemming the flow of migrants. They can live with a rogue regime as long as they don’t have to cope with another massive wave of immigrants.
Senator Saint-Germain: What lessons are there in this for Canada, which has close ties to the Lima Group? Are there other alternatives you can recommend for Canada under the circumstances?
Mr. Dubé: I think the European Union’s attempt was a good try, but Juan Guaidó and the opposition flatly rejected it. Things are at a dead end now, because over the past four years, all kinds of attempts at negotiation have failed. When the European Union floated its proposal for analysis and negotiation, the Venezuelan opposition said it was totally impossible because all the overtures and good faith they have shown the regime were in vain. That is why we’re dealing with something totally different here. If Canada detects a change in tone from the Venezuelan opposition and an openness to military intervention on the part of the United States or some other country, Canada will have to figure out where it stands because it will face a dilemma. It wants a regime change, but how does it want that change to happen?
Senator Saint-Germain: Thank you for your unique perspective. Thank you.
Senator Bovey: Thank you very much. That was very interesting. I have a question about Mexico.
[English]
We heard from witnesses last week that Mexico could play a larger role, that the Mexican president was obviously maintaining neutrality, but had offered to mediate a situation and I’m beginning to feel we’re way beyond that now. I wonder, with where we are today, what your opinion is of Mexico’s position now. Do you think they could help the crisis or do you think we’re past that point completely?
[Translation]
Mr. Dubé: Unfortunately, I don’t think President López Obrador has the political will to do that. To a certain extent, they have similar ideologies, but I think the key here is that Mexico has a democratically elected leftist government for the first time in history and a president with a massive reform agenda who is counting on the support of congress.
The Venezuelan situation is causing rifts within political parties and leftist coalitions in Latin American, and I think López Obrador’s decision has a lot more to do with internal political dynamics than with foreign policy principles. Mexico does have a tradition of non-intervention, but reaching out to facilitate negotiations means participating in the current debate.
Senator Bovey: Thank you.
[English]
Senator Coyle: Thank you very much, Professor Dubé. I have two questions. I want to clarify the potential scenarios that you have suggested Canada needs to consider. If I understood you correctly, I think I heard three. Maybe there are more. Given the stalemate, the impasse that you have described in Venezuela, would Canada get on board if there was military intervention? That is scenario number one.
Scenario number two: Hopefully stay on board with the peaceful democratic transition, continue to work the various levers that we have with our Lima Group partners.
Finally, and who knows when and how this would happen, but content ourselves with an improvement in the social conditions without the political transition.
That’s my first question. Were those three possible scenarios that I heard you express to us for Canada to consider?
[Translation]
Mr. Dubé: The context is that I expect a fresh crackdown on Juan Guaidó and the National Assembly in the next few days in that we are seeing the radicalization of the opposition. Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro used the strategy of extreme polarization for many years, and it has always served the regime well. My main concern with respect to Canadian foreign policy is the following. If the opposition radicalizes, it would move further and further away from this moderate discourse and the call for free elections, and closer to a much more interventionist discourse. While the country’s objective is a democratic transition to free elections, intervening is a dilemma for us. The Maduro regime cannot continue to behave in this manner. However, intervening also does not guarantee that there will be quick and peaceful transition to democracy.
[English]
Senator Coyle: I have one supplementary question. So here we are. We still, obviously, have some hope that something can happen to tip this in the direction that we hope it will go, which is towards some kind of escape valve for Maduro and his people — we don’t know how that’s going to happen — and that then conditions will be in place towards legitimate elections and peaceful transition to a legitimate democracy.
We heard a little bit last week from other witnesses providing testimony — and I do not have the name right now — but one of our witnesses spoke about the possibility of the Vatican being one potential lever. Is that a possibility? I don’t know if you share that opinion. But are there other things you see that could move us beyond this impasse other than something drastic?
[Translation]
Mr. Dubé: I am not certain that the Vatican still intends to be a mediator because its various attempts have failed in recent years, and the pope sent a rather pointed letter to Nicolás Maduro about a month ago. The most democratic, constitutional and institutional way out would be to remind Nicolás Maduro that the Constitution of Venezuela gives the people the right to ask for a mid-term recall referendum. That could be a dignified way out. However, I do not believe that the current Venezuelan opposition or the people have the patience to wait three years before having this opportunity.
Senator Coyle: Thank you.
[English]
Senator Greene: Thank you very much. I would like to ask a question about how much support Guaidó has within the National Assembly. As I understand it, the National Assembly is a multi-party assembly and Guaidó holds his current position as president of the assembly because it was the turn of his party to hold that position.
In terms of his party, does he have a majority party? Is it a significant minority? How many contenders potentially are there within the assembly? Are there other people in the assembly who wish that they were in Guaidó’s position at this moment? How much support would he have? Would he have 100 per cent support or would he have 50 per cent support?
Senator Coyle: In the National Assembly?
Senator Greene: Yes, in the National Assembly.
[Translation]
Mr. Dubé: The National Assembly and the opposition have united behind Guaidó today. Instead of thinking along party lines, we must examine the different opposition leaders. Juan Guaidó is the one who has managed to rally the support of opposition forces.
However, the Venezuelan opposition is a coalition of non-Chavista centre-left parties and many more closer to the right. The only element uniting the opposition is their rejection of the Nicolás Maduro regime. I do not know if you can hear me.
[English]
The Chair: We can still hear you. Can you continue? We can’t see you, but we can hear you. Your words are important.
[Translation]
Mr. Dubé: Juan Guaidó has the support of the opposition today. He is the so-called “free” leader, and the one best able to mobilize. He has received the most international support and recognition. He has the best political capital among opposition leaders at this time. However, my fear is that he will be imprisoned on Friday when he returns to Venezuela because the Maduro regime did not let him leave Venezuela, but he still did so. We will have to see what happens to him. If the opposition does radicalize, if there is more repression, I fear that the more radical elements of the opposition, which are closer to the United States and more in favour of intervention or a coup, will trump Juan Guaidó.
[English]
The Chair: Senator Dean, I think your question was very important and it was being answered, but we were interrupted in that sequence.
There were parts of the testimony when we went in and out of the connection. Senator Dean, if you could ask your question again, perhaps Professor Dubé can answer it and we can then end the session.
Senator Dean: Thank you. First of all, Professor Dubé, let me add my thanks for your wonderful insights today. I’m going to go back to my question earlier because we lost part of the translation, which goes to the two or three things that keep you awake at night. You provided a fairly lengthy answer to that question and I wonder if you wouldn’t mind repeating it for us now.
[Translation]
Mr. Dubé: I’m afraid of two things. I’m afraid that there will be an escalation in tensions between the opposition and the government. I don’t fear a civil war in Venezuela. I think there could be an increase in popular discontent and a stronger wave of repression, but I don’t think that there will be a civil war.
I will tell you that the other thing keeping me up at night is the impact of migration flows into other Latin American countries and the possibility of violence and xenophobic behaviour against Venezuelan migrants in Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Chile, Argentina and Brazil.
[English]
The Chair: Professor Dubé, thank you very much for persisting and being with us. I think your evidence is very compelling and a different point of view. It adds more dimension to our study. We thank you for trying last week, and we very much appreciate that you were here in voice and through the Internet.
If there are any other thoughts you would like to leave with the committee, please contact the clerk, and you can do it in written form at some point. We very much appreciate your second effort, and particularly your perspective. Thank you again.
Senator Saint-Germain: Madam Chair, I want to say that today I did something that I had never done before. For Professor Dubé’s testimony, I listened to the interpreters in French and in English.
[Translation]
I would like to congratulate them for the quality of their interpretation. I was very impressed and I believe that we don’t highlight this enough. The subject today was particularly complex.
[English]
To all of you, congratulations. Very professional work.
The Chair: Thank you, Senator Saint-Germain. I was so preoccupied with the connections from Colombia that you’ve brought the very necessary tools that we use here in the Senate, and that is our translation and interpretation services. I think the committee echoes your comments. I don’t know if Professor Dubé is there. Your persistence is welcome too.
Thank you to everyone.
(The committee adjourned.)