Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Issue No. 60 - Evidence - Meeting of April 4, 2019
OTTAWA, Thursday, April 4, 2019
The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met this day at 10:30 a.m. to study foreign relations and international trade generally (topics: update on the situation in Mozambique; the Arab Spring — eight years later).
Senator A. Raynell Andreychuk (Chair) in the chair.
The Chair: Honourable senators, welcome to the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. This committee is authorized to examine such issues as may arise from time to time relating to foreign relations and international trade generally. Under this mandate, the committee will hear today from government officials at Global Affairs Canada, who will provide us with an update on the situation in Mozambique.
Before we do that, I will ask the senators to introduce themselves.
Senator Greene: Stephen Greene from Nova Scotia.
Senator Housakos: Leo Housakos from Quebec.
[Translation]
Senator Massicotte: Paul Massicotte from Quebec.
[English]
Senator Ngo: Thanh Hai Ngo from Ontario.
Senator Dean: Tony Dean, Ontario.
Senator Busson: Bev Busson from British Columbia. Welcome.
Senator Boehm: Peter Boehm, Ontario.
The Chair: And I’m Raynell Andreychuk from Saskatchewan, chair of the committee.
I’m very pleased that Global Affairs Canada has accepted our invitation on short notice to come to update us on Mozambique. With all that is going on in the world — there is a lot of attention elsewhere politically — but we believe that not only is Mozambique important at this point in its political developments, which were interesting and difficult, but the disaster presently is overwhelming. Canadians and this committee need to hear more of your perspectives on behalf of the Government of Canada.
Having said that, I’m pleased to welcome Ms. Alexandra Mackenzie, Acting Director General, International Humanitarian Assistance; Ms. Cheryl Boon, Acting Deputy Director, Mozambique Program; and accompanying them is Mr. Louis-Martin Aumais, Director, Southern and Eastern Africa, Bilateral Relations Division.
Again, thank you for accepting our invitation. The floor is yours. As usual, we will have questions to put to you.
Alexandra Mackenzie, Acting Director General, International Humanitarian Assistance, Global Affairs Canada: Senator Andreychuk, standing committee members, I’m happy to provide an update on the humanitarian situation in southeastern Africa still dealing with the impact of Cyclone Idai. My colleagues and I are pleased to share the actions taken by the Government of Canada to address the ongoing crisis. I am accompanied today by Cheryl Boon, Acting Deputy Director, Mozambique Program; and Mr. Louis-Martin Aumais, Director, Southern and Eastern Africa, Bilateral Relations Division, all of us from Global Affairs Canada.
I will begin by providing a brief overview of the current situation in southeastern Africa following Cyclone Idai. I will then outline Canada’s response to date to the crisis and the actions being taken by our humanitarian partners on the ground.
Overnight between March 14 and 15, tropical Cyclone Idai made landfall in southeastern Africa near Beira, Mozambique, causing devastation to communities in Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. To date, more than 700 people have been reported dead in these three countries, and hundreds more remain missing. Strong winds, rain and flooding have destroyed tens of thousands of homes, displacing more than 200,000 people across the region. Damage to wells and water systems has left people without access to safe drinking water and cleaning, greatly increasing the risk of water-borne diseases, including cholera, while the destruction of health facilities has left local authorities unable to respond to potential disease outbreaks.
Further, as the storm destroyed crops on the eve of the harvest season in a region already beset by widespread food insecurity, its impact will be felt for months, if not years. Overall, the cyclone has impacted more than 3 million people across southeastern Africa.
The humanitarian needs resulting from Cyclone Idai are immense and varied, but there are three critical sectors and two crosscutting themes that must be addressed to immediately save lives and protect the most vulnerable.
First, in terms of sheer numbers, food security has been identified as the greatest need arising from the cyclone. More than 711,000 hectares of crops have been destroyed, even as people prepared for the annual harvest season. In Mozambique, an estimated 1.78 million people were facing acute food insecurity before the cyclone hit. It is now estimated that this number has risen by more than 44 per cent to over 2.57 million people in need of food.
In Malawi and Zimbabwe, more than 3 million and nearly 5 million people, respectively, were acutely food insecure due to drought before Cyclone Idai. How its impact will affect these numbers remains to be seen.
Second, widespread flooding has damaged water and sanitation infrastructure. Damage to already fragile systems has meant that access to clean drinking water and adequate sanitation services is limited, threatening lives and increasing protection risks for women and girls, who must travel further afield to find water or even a private spot to relieve themselves.
Third, access to health care has become a major concern. The lack of clean water, combined with overcrowded displacement centres, has increased the risk of the spread of communicable diseases. Already, more than 1,400 cases of cholera have been registered in Mozambique, despite an emergency vaccination campaign. And cholera is only one of many health concerns raised by the storm. Malaria could also spike, as the potential breeding grounds for mosquitoes have grown. Many people suffered injuries or bites from snakes. With health centres damaged or destroyed, even routine services have become inaccessible.
Finally, protection and gender are crosscutting issues that affect the entire response.
Of the nearly 3 million people affected across the countries, 1 million are children. The impact of the cyclone on children is significant. Some children have lost their parents, while others have been separated from their families as they sought to reach safety. In addition, over 3,140 classrooms have been damaged, disrupting schooling and normal activities for children. Many schools are currently being used as temporary shelters.
Protection risks, particularly for women and girls, are also high. An estimated 74,650 women impacted by the cyclone are pregnant, and more than 43,000 women in flood-affected areas are estimated to give birth in the next six months. Cyclone Idai caused major damage to health facilities, with at least 45 health centres damaged in Mozambique by the storm and subsequent flooding.
Concerted humanitarian action is required to meet the needs of populations affected by tropical Cyclone Idai in southeastern Africa. The situation on the ground remains critical, and households displaced by flooding or otherwise impacted by the storm need both immediate and ongoing assistance.
I will now turn to the Government of Canada’s response to Cyclone Idai.
The Government of Canada responded quickly to the impact of Tropical Cyclone Idai in Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe, working through existing partnerships with the Red Cross and Canadian non-governmental organizations. As more fulsome needs assessments were completed, we expanded our response and our range of partners to include critical United Nations agencies, as well. The Government of Canada has now announced a total funding envelope of $10 million to address humanitarian needs in Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe.
This funding has been aligned to address the critical food, water and sanitation and health needs that I’ve outlined, as well as to address the crosscutting gender and protection needs.
Significant funding to the UN World Food Programme is being provided as an unearmarked allocation, targeting the three cyclone-affected countries. This will allow WFP to flexibly address emergency food needs where they are greatest, based on the most recent assessments from the ground.
The Government of Canada is also supporting non-governmental organizations working to ensure access to safe water and proper sanitation in affected communities. These partners, such as Save the Children, Oxfam, Plan, and CARE, had already been working in the affected countries and have quickly shifted their attention to respond to critical needs arising from the cyclone. The supply of emergency water through trucking and, ultimately, the repair of wells and other water points, will save lives, and the provision of adequate sanitation facilities will prevent the spread of disease and protect the safety and dignity and women and girls.
To address the spread of cholera and other water-borne diseases, as well as other health problems arising from the cyclone, the Government of Canada is providing support to both the Red Cross, for an emergency field hospital in Mozambique, and Doctors Without Borders, to provide emergency medical care to affected populations in all three countries. These organizations specialize in the provision of medical assistance in emergency situations.
All of the Government of Canada’s partners consider critical gender and protection issues when designing their responses, ensuring that the unique needs of all those affected by humanitarian crises are met. In this context, the particular vulnerabilities of displaced women and children will be addressed by assuring that services such as health care and sanitation not only remain available but are provided in such a way as to reduce protection risks.
Finally, the Government of Canada has launched the Cyclone Idai Matching Fund, in partnership with the Humanitarian Coalition, to help engage average Canadians in the response to the devastating crisis. The matching fund will increase funds raised by NGOs responding to the crisis, while also working to raise awareness of the government’s response.
In conclusion, Senator Andreychuk and committee members, the humanitarian situation as a result of the cyclone in Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe is alarming. The Government of Canada remains committed to saving lives and addressing the most critical needs of people affected by ongoing disaster. Be assured that Canada responded early to the disaster, and we are continuing to work with our partners to ensure that our response is needs-based, efficient and reaching the most vulnerable across the region.
Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you. That’s the presentation on behalf of the department.
I’ll ask the senators who have come in since the introductions to identify themselves for the record and for our guests.
Senator Coyle: Senator Mary Coyle from Nova Scotia. Sorry I was a little late. We were hosting the Daughters of the Vote down in the chamber.
Senator Bovey: Patricia Bovey from Manitoba. I apologize for being late. I’m afraid I was meeting with an ambassador. Here we are, all on topic.
The Chair: I think everyone else was here. I wanted everyone to know who our guests are and who the senators are.
Senator Dean: First of all, thanks for joining us. More importantly, thank you for the really important work that you do every day and the people who work with and for you do for Canadians and through Canadians on the ground in some of the most difficult situations around the globe. It’s a wonderful opportunity to hear you showcase that.
You’ve told us that there are a large number of government and non-governmental organizations on the ground, which is comforting and good news.
From the perspective of a distant observer, what’s your sense of the degree of coordination among that large number of disparate actors? From an organizational perspective, who is in the crow’s nest? I just wonder about that general question, but it’s probably one that’s common to lots of emergency situations. If there’s some way that you could provide some information on that, it would be of interest.
Ms. Mackenzie: Thank you very much for the question. Indeed, it’s an excellent question and one that we spend a lot of time on in terms of responding in specific contexts and also working through engagement with all of our humanitarian partners at the global level to make sure we’re learning from each response to improve the coordination, efficiency and effectiveness of humanitarian action.
In the context of Mozambique and in neighbouring Malawi and Zimbabwe, there has been very effective coordination from day one and the onset of the crisis. Of course, this engages the local governments and the national capacities to respond. We certainly look to a number of key elements in terms of the Red Cross movement and its ability to coordinate and draw up an appeal that outlines the needs and does an initial assessment. Our initial response was very much looking at that appeal and drawing from that degree of coordination amongst those actors.
Of course, the UN family has a humanitarian country team that was immediately mobilized in this instance. They’ve been undertaking assessments and, in the case of Mozambique, released an appeal about 10 days ago that we have reviewed. Our subsequent response has been very much tied to the needs that were outlined in that appeal.
To get back to your question, those bodies and those coordination structures are very well-established. They have members from the NGO community and, obviously, from UN agencies and the Red Cross movement, so they are tied together and look at specific sectoral areas so that there is a well-coordinated first assessment of needs but then also a response.
Regarding the partners we are supporting through the $10 million envelope that I mentioned, we look at ensuring that they are very much engaged and tied into that coordination. That’s a critical factor in terms of determining who is best placed to deliver those resources and that support.
Do you have anything further to add?
Cheryl Boon, Acting Deputy Director, Mozambique Program, Global Affairs Canada: Our mission on the ground is also participating in those meetings of the various clusters that are working on health and protection, so they are also participating in the coordination of those activities.
Senator Dean: Thanks very much.
Senator Coyle: Thank you for being here. That was a terrific question and is often a very important one in these quick-response situations. I, too, applaud our government for the quick response. I like the way you have approached it, which was: Okay, we have to do something immediate. Let’s assess and then let’s see how, with the new intelligence, we will move forward.
I would like to understand where Canada is in terms of its partnerships in the region on supporting disaster preparedness. What have we done before such a disaster has hit this region to help build that capacity locally? Is there something that we’re seeing in terms of Canada’s development assistance and the trends in that support to disaster preparedness?
Ms. Mackenzie: Our ability to respond quickly relied very much on mechanisms that have been established and that Canada has been supporting over a long period of time. An excellent example of this would be the Central Emergency Response Fund, or CERF, managed by the UN Humanitarian Coordinator, the emergency relief coordinator for the UN.
Our contributions to that of roughly $30 million each year are then available for the UN to activate very quickly in response to crises. That’s a good example of how we’ve helped develop a system that is agile and quick to respond after a disaster strikes.
In terms of preparedness and our long-standing engagement in Mozambique, I’ll ask Cheryl to add to that.
Ms. Boon: In fact, I don’t have a lot to add. The development funding we’ve been doing in Mozambique has been largely focused in the areas of education, health, and governance to some degree. Disaster preparedness has not been a significant area of our engagement. Certainly as part of all of our projects we do risk assessments, and some consideration of cyclones, for example, is one of the considerations in particular regions, but it’s not an area we’ve been doing significant work that I’m aware of, in recent years.
Senator Coyle: Thank you. I’ve visited and worked in that region and certainly have visited the beautiful country of Mozambique. I’m aware of Canada’s development assistance program there. Can you tell us the impact of this disaster on our efforts on the development side, and then what will happen now as we have to immediately deal with the humanitarian situation and then transition, hopefully, over a period of time back to that attention?
Ms. Boon: I’m sure you can understand it’s still early days to be able to answer this particular question. A lot of the assessments are still going on. Canada will be involved in responding to the crisis, of course. We are engaged right now in talking with all of our partners who are working on the ground about the impacts of the cyclone on their particular projects, on their organization and on the work they’re doing in coordination with other donors who are working in the area to see where we can best respond.
Given our history of work in the area of education and health, those would be the areas that we would most easily and most quickly be able to move in and make some adaptations. For example, right now we provide significant funding to the ministry of education through a basket fund that supports their construction of schools, their delivery of education. Within that basket we are able to do some redirecting of some of the funding to assist with some of the more immediate needs, both around delivery of education and the reconstruction of schools. Similarly in the area of health, some of the funding we are providing through donor mechanisms there also allows some flexibility. We anticipate some of that money will be going towards the reconstruction of some of the health facilities and provision of nutrition to prevent and treat malnutrition.
Fortunately, a lot of our projects have not been in the particular area that was worst hit. Some of the districts have been touched, but not so significantly as much of the other parts of the province. Our partners also have projects in some of those other areas, so they’re a little distracted right now by the rebuilding efforts.
Senator Boehm: Thank you for being here. I have a few questions.
One is following up on Senator Dean’s question on coordination and the SOPs, standard operating procedures, that you have. As these weather events become more intense globally, are you changing the approach?
Related to that, part of the approach has been — and various governments have done this — to set up matching funds with the Humanitarian Coalition. In my experience, not so long ago, we would open up a matching fund. Canadians are very generous. We would open it for a prescribed period of time and then match the amounts coming in. In some cases, the amounts fell short of expectations because there was use of the matching fund repeatedly. It is an expectation, I know, from the Humanitarian Coalition, all great actors and devoted to the cause.
Are you looking at reviewing or seeing how matching funds actually work, since these events are not going to go away? There are more coming.
My last point is with respect to policy and shifting policy. One of the things that leaders and organizations have been looking at, including last year at the G7 summit in Charlevoix, was the issue of coastal resilience, whether it’s the impact of a hurricane on Puerto Rico or Florida, a typhoon in the Philippines or this tremendous disaster in Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe. Some of the thinking on development assistance and preparedness should reflect concerns about coastal resilience and infrastructure, and building in a way that will be resistant for the next big storm that comes along. I don’t know if that’s work that’s going on in the OECD, the development assistance committee or within Global Affairs Canada, but I’d like some comments on those three points.
Ms. Mackenzie: Thanks very much. With regard to coordination, our standard operating procedures and how we’re potentially changing our approach, we have a constant effort of reassessing and understanding the responses that we’ve been undertaking in the context of emergencies and sudden onset emergencies. Over the last year, in particular, we’ve done some things internally to make sure that our resources are aligned within the department to be able to be most effective in terms of getting the right information, mobilizing across the various lines within the department, and having our humanitarian considerations joined up in those responses in sudden-onset emergencies.
In this context, I think some of the benefits we saw in terms of our ability to get the right assessments from the field from the various partners and be able to turn around response and draw down from existing mechanisms that we had in place, were benefits from previous crises where the mechanisms didn’t exist and we were delayed.
A great example of that is the Canadian Humanitarian Assistance Fund, the CHAF, a mechanism we put in place with the Humanitarian Coalition. It is a pre-existing drawdown fund that can be mobilized. This has been used for CARE, Plan and Save the Children in this response to be able to access the funds they needed to be able to shift their operations towards the emergency response in a very timely manner.
After this crisis, we will again do a revision of what worked well and what didn’t work well, or where we could make improvements. We’re constantly looking to innovate and improve because every crisis has its unique aspects, but we’re certainly very open to making adjustments and innovating in that way.
In regard to matching funds — and thank you very much for raising that — that’s another example of where we’ve made significant adjustments.
In the past, we had funds that were titled “relief funds” because they actually weren’t matching funds in the same sense of providing resources to the organizations that fundraised in Canada. We were matching those funds that were raised but providing it through the organizations that were best placed to respond in terms of the operational capacities.
In this context, we’ve now shifted to using a genuine matching fund. On April 1, Minister Monsef announced that we would be matching funds raised by the Humanitarian Coalition and its members, up to a cap of $2 million, over a period from March 15 — the onset of the cyclone — through to April 14. There’s a period for the Humanitarian Coalition and its members to engage Canadians, which is the primary objective of our matching fund tool, and have them, hopefully, make donations to those actors. The government will be providing up to $2 million of a match back to the Humanitarian Coalition to then divide amongst its members based on their operational capacity and ability to respond in-country.
It’s a slightly different model than what we’ve done in the past. We changed it in order for it to be more timely, easier to communicate and a genuine match. That’s an innovation that has been made with this cyclone matching fund.
Lastly, with regard to coastal resilience, I completely agree. I think this is a critical topic and has been raised globally, not only within the G7 but also within a lot of the fora where Canada is engaged to look at humanitarian and development issues, especially what we call the nexus, where those two approaches need to be brought to bear in context. It is something we’re following closely.
In the specific case of building coastal resilience in Mozambique, I don’t have anything to add at this point, but I think with regard to the response, what we should be doing is looking at, obviously, in the recovery phase, ensuring that the international community is building back better to be able to ensure that we, or they, are better prepared for any kind of cyclone or other weather event in the future.
My colleagues may have more to add.
Louis-Martin Aumais, Director, Southern and Eastern Africa Bilateral Relations Division, Global Affairs Canada: For the information of the committee, the Sustainable Economy Conference was in November of last year in Kenya. It was cohosted by Kenya and Canada. President Nyusi of Mozambique was there and is an active participate on that topic, so much so that the Government of Mozambique and President Nyusi himself have committed to hosting a “Growing Blue” Conference later this year. Right at this moment we’re looking at ways to support this initiative. The understanding we have is that they are still seeking to host this conference.
Prior to the disaster, I presume the focus was very much on contribution that the blue economy can bring to the economic and social development of coastal countries. In the context of the disaster, I can anticipate that there will be greater attention paid to coastal resilience in the context of the conference. Right now the Government of Canada is looking at how we can be of assistance to Mozambique in that context.
The Chair: To just clarify, the money that the government has absolutely given, that is spread in all of the ways you’ve said, is how much? How much of this up to $12 million is dependent on the matching funds?
Ms. Mackenzie: Thank you for the question. The entire envelope is $10 million that’s been committed, and that includes the up to $2 million amount for the matching fund. It also includes a $3.5 million amount that was announced on March 23, and an additional $4.5 million that was announced on April 1. So $3.5 million on March 23, $4.5 million on April 1, plus $2 million of the match. So we’ll see what the Canadian organizations, the Humanitarian Coalition, are able to raise. We anticipate that it should be, we hope, very much close to the $2 million or the $2 million amount or even above the $2 million, but our commitment is to match $2 million.
The Chair: Math is not my strong suit, but up to $12 million doesn’t add up with what you’re saying. So what’s the gap?
Ms. Mackenzie: So it was $3.5 million that was announced on March 23, and then an additional $5.5 million on April 1.
The Chair: My math isn’t any better.
Ms. Mackenzie: Sorry, let me just double-check my notes. So the $3.5 million was the initial funding envelope, then $4.5 million was the April 1 announcement and $2 million with the matching fund. So $3.5 million plus $4.5 million plus $2 million equals $10 million.
The Chair: Not $12 million.
Ms. Mackenzie: No, it’s $10 million. The total envelope is a $10 million envelope.
The Chair: So it’s only $10 million, not $12 million.
Ms. Mackenzie: Yes. Forgive me for the confusion there.
[Translation]
Senator Massicotte: To continue on the same topic, $10 million in financial aid provided to a cause that is so important to these people can seem like very little. When you look at all the money a government spends, this is a negligible amount.
How do you decide on the amount that will be granted, and whether it will be $10, $20 or $30 million? We are influenced by our participation and our regional partners. However, these decisions have to be made quickly when there is an emergency. How do you determine the amount?
Ms. Mackenzie: That is an excellent question.
[English]
I can tell you that the $10 million envelope is commensurate with our responses to previous similar crises. So we look at the coordinated appeals and assessments from our partners and then make an assessment based on proportionality and the response that Canada has made in previous similar crises.
We also look at making sure that there is a proper distribution amongst the various actors that are well placed to respond. I mentioned the diversity of actors in this case includes non-governmental organizations, but also the Red Cross movement and UN agencies. So we consider who is well placed and what values they would bring into terms of the needs and responding to those needs. We very much rely on the assessments made by our partners in looking on the ground and providing those.
In the case of this cyclone, there have been a few different assessments and we’re expecting a few more as well, particularly regarding the situation in Malawi and Zimbabwe. The UN has yet to issue its appeals for those two contexts.
[Translation]
Senator Massicotte: When you do the calculation, is it a scientific calculation based on precedents, or can a prime minister or a foreign president call on our Prime Minister? Is it discretionary, or is it really methodical in the sense that all countries are treated equally?
[English]
Ms. Mackenzie: We are very much focused on ensuring a needs-based response. We try to be as objective as possible with regard to our humanitarian assistance. It’s really important that it respect the fundamental humanitarian principles and that it be needs-based, neutral and very much focused on those impartial assessments that are provided in each context so that we can make sure that Canada is contributing in a way that is supportive of addressing the most vulnerable and the biggest needs globally. So it’s very much dependent on those assessments.
[Translation]
Senator Massicotte: So, if the Prime Minister calls someone in your office and says that $10 million is not sufficient after having discussed it with the President of Mozambique, and recommends a $30 million envelope, is there enough resistance to ensure that there is fairness and consistency?
[English]
Ms. Mackenzie: Yes, very much. We look at the proportionality of our response very seriously and try to make sure that Canada is being proportional in looking at the many needs globally. As you rightly point out, the needs are immense. I’ve described very significant needs in this context, but, as you’ve probably heard about other contexts globally, the humanitarian needs are immense. So we look at how we can make sure that our contributions are very much proportionate to those needs so that we are a positive contributor in all humanitarian contexts where we can make an important contribution.
[Translation]
Senator Massicotte: Thank you.
[English]
Senator Busson: Beyond the funding of cash and/or matching funds for these issues, clearly one of the big issues is water and the potential ongoing crisis that’s being caused by the lack of clean water. In your presentation you spoke about people actually using stagnant water and the cholera and malaria. Has there been any conversation about more tangible, on-the-ground kinds of humanitarian response, i.e., desalination stations and those kinds of things that we do have some capacity to supply?
Ms. Mackenzie: What I can say with regard to water and sanitation is that it really is a core focus of the support that has been provided to date. All of our partners are very focused on the needs for all the points that you’ve raised and that we covered in the presentation, but I can specifically mention a few that will give you some details around what is happening at the moment.
For example, Oxfam Canada is responding in Mozambique, and they are working in a consortium with CARE and Save the Children to provide emergency water and sanitation as well as shelter and protection in that context. So over the next six months, they’re working together and really focused on the water and sanitation issues.
Again, Plan Canada and CARE Canada, both working in Malawi, are similarly focused on water and sanitation, as well as shelter in Malawi.
In Zimbabwe, our partners, in this case Save the Children Canada, are looking again at emergency water and sanitation to ensure that they are reducing the risk and spread of water-borne diseases. Those are some of our NGO partners that we’re supporting.
In addition to that, another good example would our support to the Canadian Red Cross and through the Emergency Disaster Assistance Fund. Through the Red Cross societies, the International Federation of the Red Cross, again they’re looking at responding to that sector.
I think it’s a major focus for good reasons. We have seen in recent weeks the increased spike in cholera cases. There is a very strong focus on that across the response.
The Chair: Senator Coyle, you had a question, and then I want to put some. Is it on the aid part?
Senator Coyle: It’s back to disaster preparedness.
The Chair: Okay. Go ahead.
Senator Coyle: I want to get a bigger sense of Canada’s overarching preparedness ourselves for our role as an international actor in partnership with the countries and others that we’re seeing affected by this. Beyond that, in this trending situation of severe effects of climate change and other natural disasters, I want to have a sense of whether any of you are able to give us an answer as to what the thinking is and what the actions are at your levels and beyond within Global Affairs Canada in anticipation of and in response to what we’re seeing here.
Ms. Mackenzie: In terms of disaster preparedness, perhaps one way to look at it is the support that we provide through the International Federation of the Red Cross and through the national societies in countries around the world. In Canada we’re very supportive of our Canadian Red Cross colleagues, of course, but also the International Federation of the Red Cross and trying to build those emergency response capacities so those organizations can be well placed to ensure the preparedness infrastructure is in place in other countries. In general, that’s one approach we’re taking.
The other aspect that may be useful to highlight is that we’re seeing natural disasters or even drought affecting a variety of contexts. For example, we need to take different approaches to bring together both the humanitarian, short-term emergency kind of window with the development work that’s being done and that Canada is supporting in contexts in many countries.
One initiative that’s very much an innovative approach is looking at building resilience to countries that are prone to famine. In that case, over a five-year period, we’ve set up an interesting engagement with the World Food Programme, the Food and Agriculture Organization and IFAD — also food related but looking more at the financing side — to make sure their tools are all being brought to bear to help build resilience. In this case it’s in three countries: Niger, Somalia and the DRC. Understanding that those contexts are prone to famine and drought, how can we be more proactive in building their capacity and resilience?
In that particular project, we’ve asked those three agencies and incentivized those three agencies to work together across that spectrum of response, and we’re getting some very good results from it. We’re also helping to promote those results so that other governments can help incentivize similar more innovative approaches to some of these shocks and gaps that we see in the more siloed, traditional humanitarian and development approaches.
Obviously, that’s not directly relevant to the cyclone, but it’s definitely an example of how we’re trying to be innovative and more proactive in bridging those approaches and bringing about better resilience from local communities.
Cheryl, is there anything on the Mozambique side to flag?
Ms. Boon: Yes. We are part of a donor community and we participate in dialogue and groups locally in Mozambique with other donors. Different countries have different areas that they have focused on, but they also discuss amongst themselves and participate in engaging with government on these issues and try to talk about how to support this country — Mozambique, for example — on the issue of disaster preparedness.
I’m sure that those conversations are happening now and will continue. We will continue to look at our own programming to see where there are opportunities for us to contribute. At this point in time, however, it’s difficult for me to say more concretely.
Senator Coyle: Thank you for that. I didn’t use the word “resiliency” of programs because I wanted to hear if it would come out through you. That’s the trend we are seeing internationally and one that I imagine we’re going to see much more of in terms of marrying the two and looking at the nexus between the disaster preparedness and the development preparedness for disaster. Then, of course, there’s the whole mitigation effort. Thank you very much for that.
The Chair: I want to pose a question slightly differently. Mozambique has suffered through drought and flood. This is not new. This is historic for that area, including Malawi. That is one thing, namely that it is not unexpected. However, it is the force with which this one came that is unusual.
There’s also the difficulty of the lack of infrastructure in Mozambique. When we talk about health facilities not being there, they were minimal anyway, and that’s the dilemma. The more overwhelming problem is the governance issue. This is a country that’s had internal strife. The last election certainly raises questions. The commitment to attacking the most fundamental problem in that country, being corruption, and the ability to govern and understanding the governance is an area that’s very difficult. The infrastructure is another issue. You can’t even get to the north if you want to do so.
To what extent are we looking at the disaster now? When you talk resilience, or whatever phrases you want to use, it’s very much dependent on governance. To what extent is the Mozambique government responding to this crisis? Are they there? Are they an impediment or cooperative? What are the long-term issues?
It seems to me that there was more involvement with Canada a number of years ago with Mozambique and less now because of the issues I’ve raised. Maybe Mr. Aumais wishes to answer part of that and Ms. Mackenzie the other part.
Ms. Mackenzie: Certainly. On the coordination piece, I will confirm that, yes, the Government of Mozambique is very much in coordination with the response. They’re very much core to the emergency response and then obviously over the longer term recovery that will be required. So not an impediment, but very much a key partner in this response.
On the governance issues, I’ll defer to my colleague.
Mr. Aumais: In fact, the president had a cabinet meeting in Beira, from what we understand, to get his cabinet ministers to see the extent of the crisis. From what I understand from our post, he has also assigned different parts of disaster-struck areas to specific ministers for accountability. From what we see, the government is very much focused on the response.
On the broader issue of governance, you’re absolutely right. Governance in the country is not optimal, and despite the fact that the two main parties, the government party, if you will, that has been in power since independence in the 1970s, and the main opposition party, despite their willingness to resolve a number of political issues before the next election, are talking about decentralization of power and military issues, there is still some work to be done. In Canada, we watch that very closely. Our High Commission in the country keeps us apprised of developments and very much focuses on that, especially in the lead-up to the election.
The Chair: I think that is the concern of some of us who follow foreign policy, that it was an overwhelming problem of trying to work with the opposition, or at least give a voice to the opposition, and the willingness of the opposition to work with the government, one party.
So with an upcoming election and now with this disaster, will the aid flow where it should? Whether there will be a positive and continuous response is even now more worrisome than before. I think the Canadian government could find a place in encouraging that role beyond immediate relief.
Senator Greene has a follow-up question.
Senator Greene: To what extent are other African countries participating in relief?
Ms. Mackenzie: I actually don’t have a good answer for you on that, but we can definitely look into it and get back to you. I just don’t know offhand.
Senator Greene: Is it your perception that disaster relief in this particular area is a Western-led initiative rather than an African initiative?
Ms. Mackenzie: I wouldn’t say that. My colleague has been very helpful in pointing out that the South African National Defence Force has been apparently aiding. That wasn’t top of my mind. That’s an example.
I think, generally speaking, what I can say is that as developing countries largely in the region, many times the contributions aren’t of the financial contribution nature. It depends on the situation, obviously, but a lot of the traditional donors, the largest donors to humanitarian response, tend to be wealthier, non-developing countries. There are obviously exceptions, as in this case, where the South African National Defence Force is making a contribution.
There have also been media reports about the Indian deployment. There was a ship offshore, so they were quickly deployed to help in the response. You do see those types of examples, but I would say in general, the vast majority of the humanitarian system’s financial support comes from the G7 countries. They are the largest. I think they account for about 80 per cent of the humanitarian assistance that’s provided publicly, through public funds. That gives you a bit of a sense.
Canada is, writ large, one of the largest. We’re among the top 10 donors in the humanitarian system, so we are a very significant contributor along with other traditionally wealthier governments.
The Chair: Thank you for coming before us today. As you pointed out, it is a very difficult situation for the people in Mozambique, and the worst is not over. The recovery will be very long and difficult, and we need to continue to focus on this issue. Thank you for bringing it forward to us.
The committee will now hear from an official from Global Affairs who will provide us with an update on the Arab Spring eight years later and the implications for Canada’s engagement in North Africa.
I have had a conversation through our clerk. We have before us Mr. Troy Lulashnyk, Director General, Israel, West Bank and Gaza, Egypt and Maghreb. Of course, there is the issue of Algeria at the moment, and it is evolving.
I have said to Global Affairs, and I’ll say it now to Mr. Lulashnyk, that we understand it is difficult for you to report on Algeria at the moment because it is in such flux. You were kind enough to come and speak about the other issues of the Arab Spring, but I would like to forewarn you that at a later date we would like you to come to update us on Algeria and Canada’s perspective on that topic.
Welcome to the committee. The floor is yours on all the other issues before us relating to the Arab Spring.
Troy Lulashnyk, Director General, Israel, West Bank and Gaza, Egypt, Maghreb, Global Affairs Canada: Thank you all for the invitation to speak with you today about the Arab Spring, its aftermath and the implications for Canadian engagement in North Africa.
As you know, it all began in December 2010 and protests in Tunisia spread a wave across North Africa and the greater Middle East. It was really predicated on populations seeking significant political and economic changes to systems that had been in existence for several decades.
When we look back eight years later, the outcomes have been varied across each of the countries, and we’ll go through those briefly. I will say that we have seen a large number of common features throughout North Africa. We continue to have ongoing political instability or tensions in a number of these countries, the presence of extremist groups, terrorism, trafficking in weapons, drugs and people across borders that are at times porous. They continue to be plagued with significant migration challenges, weak economies coupled with very high unemployment, and particularly among the youth — and the entire region has a very young population, so it is particularly acute — and then a weak package of governance that is exacerbated by issues of corruption and a weak institutional capacity.
It’s in this climate and in this environment that we look at the progress of the countries and the way we can move forward.
I’ll say a few words about Algeria. As the senator mentioned, it is unfolding rapidly in real time. I can say that since 2011 the Algerian government sought to work out with its population a number of issues. In a joint compact for security and stability, they worked on issues, increasing subsidies, increased social housing, public-sector wages and employment rates. That really prevented major conflict and issues within the country.
The Algerian economy has suffered because they retain their very strong dependence on oil sales and they have suffered from falling oil prices and depleted foreign currency reserves. They’ve been trying to diversify their economy, but the progress has been limited.
They have a very large defence budget, a strong security apparatus and a very large army. Of course, you have seen that we have had, over the last six weeks, major protests on the streets in concert with former President Bouteflika’s stated intention to have a fifth term. Those have unfolded, and I’d be very pleased to come back to the committee and discuss that situation in due course.
You have all heard that the president has resigned and factually, according to the constitution, it means that in 90 days a new government may be formed. We will see how that unfolds because it is not clear whether the people support the current government and the current players. That will evolve over the next couple of weeks.
It’s remarkable that the mass protests have been largely peaceful and the protesters even cleaned up after the demonstrations, which were particularly large on Friday.
Turning to Egypt, I’d say that Egypt is a very large and influential country in the Middle East and North Africa. They have undergone very significant changes as well. You had Mubarak leaving in 2011, then you had elections of President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood. They were in power for about a year and removed in 2013, following widespread protests. Subsequently you had the former Minister of Defence el-Sisi elected president in 2014 and was subsequently re-elected in 2018.
There is also a motion before the Egyptian parliament that went forward in February to allow the president to have additional terms. If it is agreed, then he might be permitted to stay in place, theoretically until 2034.
On the economic front, Egypt had very significant structural challenges and very high unemployment. In 2016, the IMF agreed to a $12-billion loan for Egypt that was conditional on a whole series of economic reform measures, like reducing subsidies, devaluation of the currency and introduction of a value-added tax.
Egypt has, rather impressively, implemented many of those reforms and the economy has improved and is beginning to show the results of those reforms, although the situation is still very problematic. It is a country of 100 million people and growing at a very fast rate. It has very high unemployment, and the development of small and medium enterprises is something they continue to struggle with.
On the overall environment in Egypt, the human rights groups have reported a tightening of controls over the environment and great concerns about the abilities of speech and assembly.
The Egyptians are chairing the African Union in 2019 and they’ve put as their priorities for the whole of the continent, migration and refugees, economic integration, sustainable development and peace and security.
They continue to have security challenges, particularly in Sinai, where the military is actively, on a daily basis, involved in fighting terrorist organizations.
In Libya, the situation is also very problematic and fragile. After Gadhafi, there were attempts to form a unity government and disband the unregistered militia. In December 2015, there was a Libyan political agreement negotiated, and this was an endeavour to unify and bring together the parties. Unfortunately, there have been persistent rivalries in the east and in the west, and indeed the south of the country, which is defined tribally. Most recently — and in fact this is another crisis that is unfolding today and over the past few weeks — you have the head of the Libyan National Army Haftar, who has made movements across the country from the east to the south, and now moving quite close to Tripoli, where the GNA, the UN-backed government, is in place. There are great concerns about how that will unfold.
In 2017, in New York, the UN launched an action plan for Libya, talking about a new constitution, a national conference and elections. They set a date for the conference as the springboard for those actions and reforms to take place in April of this year. There’s the operational situation on the ground, coupled with the efforts to bring together east, west and south in the form of a conference in an effort to unify the country. It’s a small population, considerable oil reserves. Eventually, if they can get themselves unified and reformed, it should be able to stand strong. But right now, it’s a series of competitions politically, coupled with weak governance and corruption that is impeding the development, growth and evolution of Libya.
I have some good news on Tunisia. It has had some significant progress with respect to democratic evolution. In 2014 parliament adopted a new progressive constitution. In 2018 there were Tunisian municipal elections, which Canada helped support. These were the first free and fair local elections in the country’s history. There, of course, remain political issues between the president and prime minister, and the coalition partners are in the midst of challenging one another. There will be presidential and legislative elections later this year, so this is a test of the developing Tunisian democracy. The IMF approved a $2.8-billion loan for Tunisia to provide much-needed support.
On security, they do have returns of terrorist fighters that present a significant problem, and again the southern border has the flow of illegal weapons and goods that continues to undermine the stability in Tunisia. But I think they’ve made some progress in access to justice, women’s rights, respect for the rule of law and political and civil rights. It needs to be nurtured. It needs to continue down this path. I’m happy to say that Tunisia will host the XVIII Summit of La Francophonie in 2020. This is a sign, I think — a very positive one — of Tunisia’s growing international engagement.
The story in Morocco is also positive. There were peaceful demonstrations in 2011 linked to socio-economic conditions. There was a commission created on constitutional reform, giving a larger role to parliament and a more independent judiciary, and a commitment to individual liberties and gender equality.
There have been pockets and moments of unrest in Morocco, the Rif region in 2016, in particular. There were protests in May 2017 related to job creation, economic development of the north. Recently, in March, we had protests related to teachers seeking increased wages.
So there are tensions, but it seems to be causally connected to the economic situation in Morocco.
Morocco has taken a leadership role on migration, and indeed they hosted an intergovernmental conference to adopt the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, and it was indeed very successful. It is approaching human rights in a positive way and they have been making improvements, but there’s still some room to grow there.
There are security challenges related to migration, particularly to Spain; foreign terrorist fighters and extremism; trafficking in weapons. These are consistent threats in Morocco and across the region.
Just a brief word on Mauritania. Again, generally peaceful protests. The political situation has remained tense and the reforms have been quite slow. The major opposition parties boycotted the presidential elections in 2014, denouncing the legitimacy of President Aziz. He was nevertheless re-elected, and the new presidential elections will come forth in June of this year. The incumbent, the president, has indicated he will not run for a third term.
Canada is a major foreign investor in Mauritania, particularly the mining sector, but they are struggling with basic issues of water, housing, economic development and unemployment.
That’s a picture across the region. We are watching the human rights space for civil society in Egypt. Libya’s situation is very fluid. We encourage Libya to unify, following the UN action plan.
We’re working closely with Morocco on countering terrorism and violent extremism. Indeed, we will co-chair with them the Global Counterterrorism Forum, which is a major international forum to deal with counterterrorism issues.
We are hoping for a peaceful, timely and democratic transition in Algeria, and we will continue to support Tunisia’s efforts to consolidate its democracy.
All through the region, at the core of this is aspirations of young people — jobs, employment, a hope for the future — and these are values, attributes and goals we all share. They simply will need support on this path, and that support will need to continue. That, more than anything else, will help move this Arab revolution and Arab Spring in a direction that is positive and leads to prosperity for the region.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Lulashnyk. You’ve covered a lot of territory.
In the newspapers we hear a lot about Libya, that it’s a transit point into Europe and the Mediterranean, and the horrific boat problems, et cetera. That’s been a movement migrating from the Afghanistan situation, everything in that area, whether it’s Iraq, moving through Sudan and the other countries. There’s the issue of Somalia, et cetera. So I think we’ve heard that part as a transit point.
However, increasingly, the issue is of migration from sub-Saharan Africa through these countries and the destabilization that may cause. Recently, one analyst has said that right now sub-Saharan Africa involves movement of people who have money, and some of the stations in Tunisia, et cetera, are transit points with a lot of nefarious actors there. But if there were to be further movements from any of those countries — not just Mali but all the other countries — from the villages, it’s going to be an even more horrific transit point because of the instability in these countries. Can you comment on that?
The other is that Egypt, of course, is asserting itself now through the African Union, rediscovering Africa and its role, but there is the competition of Turkey and that relationship. Can you comment on that?
Mr. Lulashnyk: Thanks very much. Certainly migration is a huge problem for Libya. There is a massive movement of sub-Saharan African migrants going through Libya and trying to make it across the Mediterranean, and that journey has been very dangerous and resulted in catastrophic deaths.
There are daily efforts to try to address this problem. The Europeans have been significantly engaged. Indeed, the number of arrivals from Libya has diminished significantly as a result of funding and training. However, the problems still remain. I think there’s somewhere in the neighbourhood of 690,000 migrants in Libya right now. The conditions are, in most detention centres, quite abhorrent, very problematic, and the security situation in Libya is itself very problematic.
The folks that are coming up, looking for a better life, are being exploited by organized crime and by people smugglers. It’s a very significant problem, and we are seized with it.
We give significant humanitarian funding to Libya, but I would say the whole world is looking at this rather catastrophic situation that has a combination of desperate people in sub-Saharan Africa and a very unstable and dangerous situation in Libya, and that is a combination that militates towards significant human problems.
On Egypt and the African Union, I think they are taking it very seriously. They are trying to be active in their presidency. And I would agree with you, senator; they have turned their attention to Africa and looking at building those relationships much more closely. I think they are, and they have quite a difficult relationship with Turkey.
With respect to Africa, they feel Africa is theirs, and they are African and on the continent. I think they’re more worried about Turkey’s influence in the Middle Eastern portion, and they will handle Africa with their bilateral and multilateral partners in the African Union context.
Senator Coyle: Thank you very much for being with us. That was an incredibly comprehensive report that you gave us.
One of the last things you said was the aspirations of the young people are important drivers and were, obviously, very important drivers in the launch of the Arab Spring. This will date me. Back in the early 1980s I was doing graduate research and looking at donor assistance to the small and micro-enterprise sector in Egypt and some other countries on the continent of Africa.
At that point, we already knew that there was a huge issue looming with youth unemployment, be it wage employment or self-employment through business. I’m very curious. When we watch the explosion of the pro-democratic aspirational groups, we know they’re often very young and they’re anxious for both inclusion in the governance of their countries, as well as inclusion in the economy of their countries.
What have you seen over this period that is giving you any kind of glimmer of hope in terms of the kinds of investments that governments are making in the economic aspect and the benefits that those are accruing to the youth populations and how those might relate to their capacities to also have better voices in the governance side of the equation? Do you know what I’m getting at?
Mr. Lulashnyk: Yes. Thanks very much. I would say absolutely we, Canada, have been very engaged in development support, supporting the growth of small and medium enterprises, micro-enterprise support as well. In Egypt, in particular, we’ve had a program in place for 40 years and very significantly focused on this sector, recognizing for decades that it is about jobs and the youth, and very much about this movement.
The catalyst was simply young people wanting a different way, a new way, that gives them freedom, success and prosperity. The change that has transpired or been challenged has been mixed across the region and it has not been perfectly successful anywhere. But the one positive thing I can say is that the young people have this aspiration and continue to voice it, so governments ignore the views of young people at their peril.
There is a new voice, and it’s a very powerful one. Governments are notoriously slow with implementing reforms and inculcating the changes required, but young people know exactly what they need and want. They will create new apps and they will start smaller, innovative businesses that are consonant with the environment in real time. So I would say we have the young people who are dragging governments into the future and building the small and medium enterprises that are absolutely needed. Governments, that’s not their tendency; they’re slow by nature. And they have had a historical system that has been in place for a long time.
Certainly the young people are forcing this change. It’s happening slowly and there is resistance, but it will happen. As time goes by, these changes will happen more and more, and I suspect more and more rapidly.
Senator Coyle: What is the role of young women in what you’re seeing?
Mr. Lulashnyk: Yes. This is the basis for our international development policy. Women and girls are the drivers. They manage daily life more than anyone else and they are, I would say, more entrepreneurial, risk takers, and really changing the face of the economies in the region.
What we see, particularly in North Africa, is that the participation of women and girls in the economy is very low compared to men. But that metric is changing, and the economy is growing significantly, disproportionately, as a result.
Senator Boehm: Mr. Lulashnyk, thank you very much for your comprehensive overview. I want to really just ask you about one country in particular. It’s one you know well because you’ve been our ambassador to Egypt. It’s about this strange dichotomy. We see internal abuse of human rights, denying freedom of the press and journalists in jail. We’re seeing the system being wired in such a way so as to ensure a very long tenure in office for what appears to be an increasingly authoritarian regime.
On the other hand, there’s the element of stability that’s required. You’ve mentioned the Sinai, and we know that Egypt and its military work very closely with the Israeli defence force in the Sinai. A stable and very secure Egypt is also in Israel’s interest, and, of course, we’ve had Canadian Forces in the Sinai, too, under the UN.
Canada, of course, has a bilateral relationship with Egypt. We pursue various programs, and you’ve explained some of them. Some of this is constructive engagement or the quiet diplomacy that people talk about. But if we really want to ensure that there is a movement on values, and in a positive way, how do we do that? We’re also, of course, very convinced and need to support Israel in its security policies as well. So it seems to me that it’s a bit of a tightrope in terms of the engagement we seek. I welcome your comments.
Mr. Lulashnyk: Thank you very much. It is difficult, and in your relationship with any country there are often competing objectives and goals. Certainly it’s in everyone’s interests to see a secure and stable Egypt: 100 million people with a foot in Africa and a foot in the Middle East. You mentioned the relationship between Israel and Egypt. In fact, over the past several years it has improved significantly and they appear to have security as a common goal.
This part is very important, but so is the values piece. What we try to do is not to present it as a zero-sum game. You’re either a country of values or you’re a country that is secure. Sending those messages that if you want a strong, secure country, that requires a polity, open discussion, criticism, a healthy environment for your citizens to discuss, debate and participate. You can gain, in the short term, security through repression and control, but over the long term you get this frustration below the surface that can really exacerbate the overall situation.
It is trying to change the zero-sum nature of that discussion, but I would say that only takes you partway. We have many discussions with our Egyptian colleagues to say these values are critically important. Human rights are critically important. And they will say, “Yes, they are, but we also have serious security concerns so we need to calibrate how we approach that.”
I don’t have a magic answer, but I will say it’s incumbent upon us to continue to raise with our colleagues how we can help them build a strong country that is firmly founded on values, not because we think it’s a good idea but because that’s how real security and real stability will be created.
Senator Greene: What role does China play in the region? Are they targeting specific countries, or is it a general approach to the region?
Mr. Lulashnyk: China is very active, and I would say every year that goes by they are more and more active. It’s principally on economic terms. They are acquiring and building huge infrastructure pieces throughout North Africa and, indeed, throughout Africa, but you definitely see it throughout North Africa, I would say, in most of the countries.
In Libya it’s a little more challenging right now given the security situation, but they are everywhere. They’re developing those relationships and they are buying or entering into partnerships. They are competing for large contracts. Their influence is very significant.
Politically speaking, I think they have not been outspoken about all of the developments. They are watching them closely. They are very well informed. But they have chosen to develop their partnerships on an economic basis, and they are long-term partnerships, meaning this is not just for a particular tactical advantage. This is a long-term relationship that they are building.
Senator Greene: If we could look eight years into the future, taking account of where we’ve been and how we’ve gotten to this point, what is your prediction for the region eight years hence?
Mr. Lulashnyk: Related to China or generally?
Senator Greene: Related to China in particular.
Mr. Lulashnyk: In eight years, if the trend continues — and I have every reason to expect that it would — you will see increased investment by China and increased involvement of Chinese companies and the whole Chinese apparatus in these companies more and more.
We do see a bit of pushback from the host countries to say, “We appreciate China and the funding, which is much needed,” but they don’t want to be exclusively partners with China. They want to diversify with their international partners as well.
I think you’ll see China increase. It’s an inexorable conclusion, but not exclusively.
Senator Cordy: Thank you very much for an extensive overview of the North African region. You did it very well. I was going to ask about the young people. Senator Coyle did that very effectively but, to follow up, are the young people staying in the region? How many are migrating, or are most staying?
Mr. Lulashnyk: There are so many, and many are educated and unemployed, so you will see protests throughout the region of masters and PhD students often complaining about the inability to get jobs. If anyone has offers to escape to a different environment where there are jobs, they will leave. There has been a significant movement of young, educated professionals through Europe as the destination of choice, and sometimes to the U.S. and even to Canada.
Canada is a very strong educator of students from North Africa, so we do have those very close connections, and many who study here would like to continue to be in Canada.
Those who can leave would like to, not because they dislike their country, it’s just a question of economic prospects.
We see a movement of people out of these countries in North Africa, but as the situation changes or improves you might even see a flow back once things stabilize a little more. But they will go if they can because the situation is desperate in many places.
Senator Cordy: I’m also wondering about Egypt. It’s a very influential country. I know it’s got a long way to go, but is it looked upon by the other North African countries as a role model within the context of the North African countries? Are they actually working together, or is it “me against you”?
Mr. Lulashnyk: The answer is both. They are cooperators and competitors. It depends upon the issue.
I would say in the context of Libya, Egypt is on one side geographically and the others are on the other side, so they both want to see Libyan stability, but because you have an east-west bifurcation, that creates some tensions politically between them.
The cooperation has been very limited. They tried to inculcate more. Even in the Maghreb, the cooperation has been challenged. That’s because the situation in Libya is problematic. Even in Tunisia and Morocco things have been better, but it’s still challenging.
Cooperation with your neighbours is important but they’re really just trying to right their own houses, and that’s preoccupying.
Senator Massicotte: Thank you for being with us this afternoon. You gave us a very good picture. Everyone had very high expectations of the Arab Spring. We always thought the democracies would flow and everybody would be happy, but we learned that it is not so easy to install these values and customs in those institutions. There has been somewhat of a regression from our expectations; maybe that’s just being practical.
You answered questions about Egypt. In that process of the Arab Spring there was a point when many countries and citizens said that democracy is good, but security, shelter and food are even more important. Having learned that lesson, how about the youth in Egypt? Are they biting their tongues relative to the current quasi-dictatorship, or are they going to persist with their dreams irrespective of the lessons learned in the last eight or nine years? What’s the outcome of that? Is it turmoil or do you think there will be general progress to get to a better place?
Mr. Lulashnyk: It’s a difficult question. I would say there were these very strong aspirations. Mubarak was in place for almost 30 years, and when he was removed I think the young people in particular were very hopeful for democracy and a new breath and a new beginning.
Then you had a year of very difficult chaos and uncertainty. Then you had elections where everyone did vote, and it was a very close election in 2012. It was someone who, for many people, represented the old system. Then you had Morsi who ran and ultimately won 13 million to 12 million. I think many people thought they would give President Morsi a try.
When he came in, I don’t think he enjoyed the support of the courts, the bureaucracy or the military, and even the population, they previously didn’t enjoy significant support.
So they had an elected president and they exercised democracy, but the practice over that next year didn’t go very well and it was seen ultimately as a failure, creating more chaos. The economy suffered, and then it was a conflict between the presidency and the institutions as well.
You had aspirations and democracy, and the result was two or three years of chaos. So President el-Sisi came in and really said that security is the number one priority. Terrorism was also quite embedded there as well. Then you got into a more secure environment, and the situation in Egypt is much more secure now than it was at that time period.
The end result is that they have radical change, they tried democracy and that didn’t work, so now we have a new system where I don’t think it fulfills their democratic aspirations, but it’s more stable and the economy is growing.
What that means for the future and whether you’ll get those democratic aspirations realized in Egypt and elsewhere, again, that’s an evolution. It’s something that is very difficult to create overnight. Having elections is not the exclusive democratic exercise. It has to be predicated on a whole host of institutions, groups, developments and changes in mindset. It’s a process.
Senator Massicotte: Thank you.
Senator Dean: Thank you very much. I join my colleagues in commending you.
I take it from something you said a few minutes ago that Egypt and Libya, if I can put it this way, are probably on the “worry list” as we think about this group of countries. What are the kinds of risk factors that would turn the red lights on in each of those countries for you if you saw them emerge on the radar screen?
Mr. Lulashnyk: With Libya right now, there is fighting. You don’t have a central government. You don’t have the stability required, and the small population is suffering significantly. It’s in the red right now.
The UN and all the partners supporting Libya have been trying to get to a place where Libya can unify. The one positive thing there is that it’s a small population. You don’t have the religious differences or sectarian strife. Once the oil continues, they can more than provide for the population. So it’s a different scenario, theoretically, than other cases in Syria and elsewhere.
Really, it comes down to the institutions and political competition. Trying to get the players — all of them — not to think tribally or to their own specific self-interest, but think like Libyans together, unifying the country and working together. That’s the goal we’re working on, and we’re hopeful that will happen.
The concerns, and what the UN Secretary-General and we have said, is that finding a military solution for Libya is very problematic. It has to be negotiated politically in a way that is inclusive and involves all sectors of Libyan society. So going deeper into the red would not heed the warnings of the Secretary-General, us and others.
That’s what Libya would look like, and we are hopeful that we can come to something positive and prosperous.
On Egypt, I think the challenge there is that you have a massive 100-million-person country, a lot of youth and you have terrorism. There’s the phrase that is often used: Egypt is too big to fail. If it implodes or its condition becomes catastrophic, that will invariably have a major impact throughout the region. So we very much want to see it stable and prosperous, and would work to those ends.
It’s not easy for them or for us helping them, because the needs are so great, but we’re trying to stave off that sort of outcome.
Senator Boehm: On Libya, I’m curious as to how our representation has evolved. I understood that we had an ambassador accredited out of Tunis. Is that correct? Is that still the situation?
Mr. Lulashnyk: It’s still the situation. A few embassies have moved back to Tripoli. We remain in Tunis with our ambassador and mission there.
We absolutely will go back when the security situation permits. Right now, it’s still very volatile. In fact, over the last week it has been extremely volatile. We’ll see how that unfolds, but we very strongly support returning once the situation improves.
We do travel in and out periodically to meet with the Libyan government. I was in Tripoli a few months ago, but we don’t have a permanent position there now.
The Chair: The African Union has gone into regionalism very strongly in this time, which has been a strength on the trade sign. It’s working in ECOWAS. There is even talk in IGAD, et cetera. So the African Union is building on a regional basis, particularly in trade. COMESA, for example, was on paper only. It is functioning now. The East African community is talking about a customs union. There is a lot of talk about regionalism, and Egypt is going to lead.
Where is the regionalism in North Africa? Is it on hold? We don’t hear of much going on there now, where it used to be the strength for North Africa on a regional basis.
Mr. Lulashnyk: I agree. Each of the countries will make positive statements about the importance of that regionalism and increasing trade, but in terms of the actual results on the ground, it’s not happening yet. It’s being impaired largely by the Libyan situation. Also, Algeria and Morocco continue to have significant problems over Western Sahara, which limits those interactions. As I think I mentioned, internally they’re all grappling with their own problems.
They need an influx of capital, funds, technical support and expertise. They’re all looking for help but they’re not looking to each other so much; they’re looking to the broader international community.
I really see it happening. It makes perfect sense, and they should be doing it much more. This will help them propel into the future and have a win-win scenario across the board. They’re all close and similar in many ways.
I would expect to see that much more in the future, and we just need to stabilize a bit more to get there.
The Chair: Would you comment on Mali? We seem to be withdrawing. The UN is asking us to stay. It’s more destabilized now. It’s critical, and it is having an impact on North Africa, as well as, I think, the world. Where are we at on that situation?
Mr. Lulashnyk: I’ll just comment insofar as it affects North Africa, but the borders present a significant problem in terms of disruptions and the flow of terrorism, people, weapons and drugs. A destabilized Mali creates a very significant problem for its neighbouring countries in North Africa.
Many times my interlocutors will say that we need Mali to improve if we want to improve. There is a knock-on effect of things that happen there. It’s absolutely critical to the overall stability of North Africa.
The Chair: There are so many questions we could put to you, but thank you for coming. It has been very helpful to review the region. As you pointed out, it affects our security as much as it does Africa’s. Thank you for coming, and we look forward for your next presentation.
(The committee adjourned.)