Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
National Security and Defence
Issue No. 10 - Evidence - Meeting of December 12, 2016
OTTAWA, Monday, December 12, 2016
The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence met this day at 1:01 p.m. to examine and report on Canada's national security and defence policies, practices, circumstances and capabilities; and to study issues related to the Defence Policy Review presently being undertaken by the government.
Senator Daniel Lang (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: I would like to call this meeting to order. I would like to welcome our viewers to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence for Monday, December 12, 2016.
Before we begin, I would like to introduce the people around the table. My name is Dan Lang, senator for Yukon. On my left is the clerk of the committee, Adam Thompson. I would like to invite the senators to introduce themselves and state the region they represent, starting with the deputy chair.
Senator Jaffer: My name is Mobina Jaffer. I'm from British Columbia. Welcome.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: Jean-Guy Dagenais from Quebec.
[English]
Senator Boniface: Gwen Boniface, Ontario.
Senator White: Vern White, Ontario.
Senator Beyak: Lynn Beyak, Ontario.
The Chair: Today we will be meeting for three hours. During our first panel, we will hear from the newly appointed National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister, followed in panel 2 by the Parliamentary Budget Office, and in panel 3 we will hear from the Commander of Joint Task Force North. At the end of the session, we will meet in camera for a short discussion.
Colleagues, joining us in our first panel today is Daniel Jean, National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister. Prior to serving in this capacity, Mr. Jean served as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for three years, in addition to previous roles within immigration and the public service. It's important to note that the role of the National Security Advisor was established in 2004; however, it has yet to be given any statutory authority. Today, the National Security Advisor serves as a co-chair of the deputy minister's national security committee, and as such, he plays a key role in the intelligence priority-setting process.
We're pleased to have Mr. Jean here today to shed some light on his role. Welcome. I understand you have an opening statement, Mr. Jean. Please begin.
Daniel Jean, National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister, Privy Council Office: Thank you, chair. Good afternoon and thank you for the invitation to speak to you today. I am pleased to have this opportunity to meet with you after my first six months as National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister. I would like to briefly outline the role of the National Security Advisor, and then touch on some of the government's key national security and foreign and defence policy priorities. My responsibilities align with the core functions of the Privy Council Office, namely, advice to the Prime Minister, support to the cabinet, and interdepartmental coordination. As principal advisor to the Prime Minister on national security and foreign defence policy, I support the Prime Minister and the government in their acts of re-engagement at the international level, both at the multilateral level and with numerous key bilateral relationships, as well as with the ambitious national security and defence policy agenda that they have initiated.
My team and I in the National Security Advisor Branch of the Privy Council Office are also responsible for supporting cabinet by acting as the secretariat for three cabinet committees: the Cabinet Committee on Intelligence and Emergency Management, which is chaired by the Prime Minister; the Cabinet Committee on Canada in the World and Public Safety; and the Cabinet Committee on Canada-United States Relations. These committees have provided the opportunity for good deliberation among ministers and officials so as to advance progress on a number of priority issues identified by ministerial mandate letters. Additionally, ministers have benefited in these committees from briefings on emerging geopolitical, national security and defence issues to increase their situational awareness of threats to Canadians and to Canada's interests at home and abroad.
With respect to my coordination role, I lead and facilitate day-to-day coordination between my deputy ministers to ensure there is cohesion across the security intelligence community on policy initiatives and government responses to issues and crises. This function is performed with respect for the independence of each department and agency.
I would now like to say a few words about current national security and foreign and defence policy priorities. The government has made a priority of actively engaging bilaterally and multilaterally with Canada's international partners. Bilaterally, the Prime Minister's visit to Washington, D.C., in March led to a series of announcements on Canada-U.S. cooperation, including on continental defence, security and border management, which reinforced the importance of the two countries' close partnership.
More recently, the Prime Minister visited Beijing in August to meet with President Xi and hosted Premier Li in September to establish a renewed Canada-China bilateral relationship. The outcomes of the Prime Minister's visit included the establishment of a leader's dialogue and several other important initiatives, such as a Canada-China national security and rule of law dialogue.
Multilaterally, Canada has been a leading player in the negotiation and aftermath of the Paris Agreement on climate change and in addressing the plight of victims of the war in Syria.
In March 2016, the government also announced its bid to seek a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council for a two-year term beginning in 2021.
From a defence perspective, the government has pursued an ambitious agenda, including the launch of the defence policy review and its associated public consultations, which provided the public an opportunity to help shape decisions on the future role of the Canadian Armed Forces at home and abroad.
Operationally, the government announced a whole-of-government strategy in Iraq and the region that includes a new mandate for the Canadian Armed Forces to work with the coalition to train, advise and assist Iraqi security forces and their partners to regain control of territory as they fight Daesh. These military efforts are complemented by stabilization, humanitarian and resilience initiatives to support affected populations both in Iraq and in countries in the region affected by the significant influx of refugees.
The Canadian Armed Forces are playing an important role elsewhere, including with NATO, where they contribute in a variety of ways to reassurance missions in Europe and will soon lead a multinational battle group in Latvia. In the Ukraine, Canada delivers military training and capacity-building programs under Operation UNIFIER. We also continue to seek opportunities for peace operations further to the government's announcement in August of increased contributions.
[Translation]
From a national security perspective, Canada continues to face threats at home and abroad. Canada's threat level hasn't changed since October 2014. The level is medium, meaning a violent act of terrorism could occur in Canada. The threat level serves as a tool to identify risks and vulnerabilities from threats and, in turn, determine appropriate responses to prevent or mitigate a violent act of extremism. The principal terrorist threat to Canada is posed by violent extremists who could be inspired to carry out an attack in Canada.
Recently, Daesh has lost territory and influence in Iraq and Syria. If this trend continues, it could lead to an exodus of Daesh fighters, including Canadians. Many of these extremists may relocate to other conflict zones across the Middle East and Africa. However, others may seek to return to Canada.
The internet has allowed for violent extremist ideologies to be more easily propagated, influencing individuals to conduct terrorist acts in their respective countries and abroad. Earlier this year, the Minister of Public Safety spoke about the importance of countering violent extremism. This is a critical element in our toolkit to combat terrorism.
As the world moves online, so too have criminals, terrorists and foreign government adversaries, who use it as a platform for theft, fraud, stealing classified information, threatening critical infrastructure, and attracting people to terrorism. The cyber security review that the Minister of Public Safety is conducting should inform our future strategies for dealing with these threats in the new digital world, while offering our citizens and businesses access to the innovative opportunities provided by this technology.
In my role as national security advisor to the Prime Minister, I hope to continue to help Canada's security and intelligence community identify and implement the means to address these threats in a manner that respects Canadian values. With that in mind, my colleagues in the security and intelligence community and I welcome the creation of a committee of parliamentarians that would increase the review mechanisms that currently apply to national security activities.
Canadians must feel confident that the government's national security institutions remain compliant with the law and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. To maintain that trust, it would be useful to establish a committee of parliamentarians that can be better informed of how these institutions deal with threats within the legislative framework.
For most of my 34 years of public service, I've been actively engaged in the defence policy, national security and foreign affairs community of the federal government. I'm humbled to work with the numerous professionals across the community who are dedicated to advancing and protecting Canadian interests at home and abroad. I hope that I can continue to make a modest contribution to the government's efforts, and I look forward to working with the committee.
Thank you for allowing me to share my thoughts.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Jean.
Colleagues, with your indulgence, I would like to ask the first question, which has to do with national security and the question of the terrorist threat that faces the world and Canada.
Mr. Jean, you mentioned this in your opening remarks as being an area of much concern, obviously, in relation to the position you hold. As you're probably aware, two years ago this committee was informed that there were 318 radical Islamic jihadists who were Canadians, 140 of whom were abroad. They were identified by the law enforcement agencies.
Two weeks ago, CSIS advised this committee that an additional 40 Canadians are involved in supporting terrorism abroad. In fact, over the course of the last couple of years we have seen an increase from 140 to 180 Canadians involved in terrorism overseas that have been identified by our authorities. There may be others as well. Last week, in Europe, a report identified that 1,500 Islamic jihadists have returned to Europe and are in the process of establishing terrorist cells.
In view of the fact that 180 Canadians have been involved in terrorism activities overseas, primarily in Iraq and Syria, and that they may or may not be returning here, can you tell us if any of the 180 or the 90-plus Canadians who have returned and are back in our country have been identified by the Five Eyes as having links with the 1,500 jihadists who have now returned to Europe? Can you tell us if any of them are plotting attacks on Canada and Canadians?
Mr. Jean: Thank you, Mr. Chair. As you mentioned towards the end of your question, the number that the director of CSIS has been using recently is 180. He has estimated that about 60 of these individuals have returned. Based on the best estimates we have, a little fewer than 100 of those would be in Iraq and Syria. Of course, given the intensity of the fight taking place in recent weeks, we don't know whether any of those, or many of those, would have died in combat.
Our authorities — from a domestic perspective, CSIS working with the RCMP and the Canada Border Services Agency — always make sure that we have the best information systems in place to be able to monitor the return and identify people when they come back, as well as determine what appropriate monitoring may be required, always within our legal system.
As to your question of whether some of them have linkages with a number of foreign fighters coming from Europe, some of them would have contacts, of course. Within our legal framework, we constantly share information with our partners, many of which include European partners. For example, we know that in the context of some of the previous terrorist attacks in France, Canadian information was useful in following up on some of these terrorists because they have had contacts with our folks.
On your question of whether or not there is a risk of a terrorist attack, as I said, the risk is currently at medium, which means the risk is present. We think the risk is greater for what we call somebody acting under incitement, as Daesh has been capable of doing on the Internet. In this context, as you know, in August, the RCMP, with the support of our Canadian Security Intelligence Service, were able to disrupt a lone-wolf attempt in southern Ontario.
The Chair: I'd like to pursue this. The information that was made public in Europe — and I believe it was Germany — was an intelligence report that was released by the government to inform the general public that 1,500 terrorists had come back to Europe and were setting up to perhaps organize terrorist attacks. The public was made aware that they were there so that they would be more alert and pay attention on a day-to-day basis to such an incursion into their communities and their country.
This is my question to you, and this is what I think is important to Canadians: As a matter of policy, if you're made aware, either directly or indirectly, that some of these terrorist fighters are coming back to Canada, and there is a possibility for them to set up various terrorist cells throughout the country, are you going to inform the general public that that possibility exists, similar to what they have done in Europe?
Mr. Jean: The threat alert that I discussed, which is identified as medium right now, is precisely to do this. Maybe I could help you by taking the example of southern Ontario in August. If we had not been able to identify the location of the individual we were looking for, but we knew that an individual in the vicinity of Toronto — in the London area — was planning an attack, we would probably have considered moving the alert in Toronto from medium to high, or even severe, because we would have had information showing that it was a high risk that something could happen in Toronto.
In this case, the CSIS director, who is responsible for that, didn't have to do that, because during the course of the day we were able to identify the location and the name of the individual that the RCMP needed to locate.
Now, if tomorrow we were to receive information that there is a high risk that an event will take place in Montreal, and this evidence is credible, yes, we would have a responsibility to inform the public.
Senator Jaffer: Thank you, Mr. Jean, for being here. Your work on this issue is well-known, and we are very appreciative of your being here with us. Your remarks were very comprehensive. I am only allowed to ask a few questions. I'm pleased you spoke about your work on rights and freedoms with the Charter.
I have two questions, so please keep a tight answer, and then you can give a longer answer in writing if you wish.
One of the things I would like to have you address is what you are doing to make sure the communities work with the different securities and that they feel confident that there is a partnership rather than an issue of them and us.
Mr. Jean: That's an excellent question, senator. That's one of the reasons Minister Goodale, the Minister of Public Safety, announced $35 million, with $10 million ongoing, to develop a countering violent extremism strategy in Canada. This is very much building on the practices in Montreal, with which I'm sure many senators are familiar and which have become a model that a lot of countries are using. This is precisely a model where people external to government are working with community groups and basically play a prevention role with kids who have started to become radicalized. They do an accompagnement to try to prevent them from passing from thought to action.
Senator Jaffer: I have a completely different question, which is on women, peace and security. We were the leading country in the 2000s when it came to women, peace and security. We unfortunately lost our position. I'm hoping we are now starting to recover it. Our committee went to New York and met with the UN women. They also spoke about women, peace and security. I would like to hear about how you are including women, whether it's in the Armed Forces or in your work, so that we have both women and men represented in the work you do.
Mr. Jean: A good example of that is the strategy that the government announced in August to enhance our efforts around peacekeeping. In the principles, the objective and the criteria that were put in the strategy around identifying some of the future peacekeeping missions, there is a strong lens to look at the protection of the most vulnerable, that is, women and young girls. There is also a strong objective to try to increase the participation of women in these activities, whether they are military or police.
Senator Beyak: As Senator Lang said, Canadians watch this committee in record numbers, and they have concerns about terrorism. Our committee is concerned when we hear about 318 radical jihadists that have been identified and 800 incidents of terrorist financing. We wonder why more charges haven't been laid. Could you elaborate on that?
Mr. Jean: It's a question that comes back often. We often say in French that money is the nerve of the war. To go after the funding is a good way to try to derail terrorist attacks. Our organizations work closely with FINTRAC and CRA, which make efforts to try to identify some of the funding flows.
We have looked at that in particular in parallel on the organized crime side, and I would say that very often in some of these cases that are identified, the charges are not laid under the fundraising. They may be laid on other aspects of the Criminal Code because the evidence is stronger and maybe these charges will bring higher sentences. The fact that there is no charge doesn't mean that its motivation is not critical in identifying not only terrorists but also sometimes people on the organized crime side.
Senator Beyak: Have you studied some of our partners like France and the U.K. and their actions in holding these people more accountable? It seems to be working. Sometimes we can learn from a model that is already working.
Mr. Jean: I have only been on the job for six months, but I've had a chance to spend a fair amount of time in France. My role is split into three different individuals in France. I have met with the three of them, and we've had extensive conversations on some of those things. I have also had the chance to meet with many of our U.K. colleagues, including my counterpart.
I would say that we are all struggling in the same way. In France the number of foreign fighters is much higher than here. And as much as we want to prevent terrorism in any location, in any play, as you know, they have had some very serious cases. They certainly have devoted a lot of resources following these incidents to try to prevent, but I would say that when we look at your specific question of fundraising, we haven't seen one country in particular that is a lot more successful than others in trying do that. In fact, this is an area where we want to spend more time and see how we can refine our strategy further.
The Chair: Perhaps, colleagues, I could pursue this before we leave the terrorist financing.
This committee learned over the course of a number of hearings that this terrorism financing had been identified, and now the numbers are up to 800 identifications of terrorist financing. To our knowledge, not one charge has been laid. In fact, the law at the present time is so lax that if you're the director of a non-profit organization, your penalty is that you can no longer be a member of the organization.
Is the government reviewing this legislation so that these individuals who are directors of an organization and are involved in terrorism financing can be charged for the misappropriation of funds and putting Canada in jeopardy?
Right now, quite frankly, what's on the books is a joke.
Mr. Jean: Chair, this is an excellent question. Indeed, we are reviewing how we could make our tools stronger on this. There are also some situations, if you take the example of Daesh, where even if you add stronger tools you would not be able to act. Fifty per cent of their revenues were done through oil sales, and most of them were done in cash. A large portion of the rest was done through taxation, which was extortion of the local populations where they were occupying.
We definitely need to have sharper tools, and I absolutely agree with your point on that, but there are some situations where it will be a necessary but not a sufficient tool.
The Chair: I understand the Daesh and how they operate. It's the question of the non-governmental organizations that are set up here to launder money for the purposes of terrorism activities elsewhere around the world, or even here. My point is — and I think I can speak for all members here — it must be taken seriously. To date, there is no point identifying 800 terrorist and financial transactions and not use the information.
Mr. Jean: Point well taken, chair, and we're doing work with the agencies on that.
The Chair: We will be look for an update in six months.
Senator White: Thank you for being here today, Mr. Jean. My question is going to focus on the relationship with China. We had an expert speaking at an event here a couple of months ago, I think in September, a former cybersecurity professional with the Home Office in London who talked about the issues around China and any relationship that developed in relation to cybersecurity. I do see that there is an effort toward improving our relationship with China, unlike the U.S. a few years ago which came out against China and stated that if you attack us, we will attack you from a cyber perspective. We haven't done that.
Can you walk us through where you see us having to be in the future to protect ourselves against direct or indirect Chinese cybersecurity threats, whether that's through corporations that are operating in Canada, that are obviously directed by China or China directly?
Mr. Jean: Thank you. That is an excellent question. In September, in the context of the two high-level visits, we announced a dialogue on national Syrian rule of law with China. The Americans set up a similar dialogue a few years ago and so have the Brits. In the context of these conversations, we are having conversations with the Chinese on cyber and cybersecurity, and we also have conversations where we reinforce that in the global world that is managed by trade law, there should be no theft of intellectual property by cyberattacks.
This is an area the Chinese would not have discussed with us a few years ago. They are now prepared to discuss. There are a lot of people who believe that as they move up the supply chain they will be more and more in the role of having to protect their own intellectual property. They will become more and more interested in these areas.
We need to have a strategy where we engage with them. We need to have a strategy also where we need to protect ourselves. In this context, a lot of work has been done, particularly at the government systems level. There have been good efforts with some of the critical infrastructure, but the cybersecurity that the Minister of Public Safety has just completed will provide a lot of avenues where maybe we could do even better in identifying areas where we can protect ourselves, protect our critical sectors better and maybe assist our private sector in a better way and citizens with how to protect themselves from cyberattacks or cyberdeath.
Senator White: We're looking at a relationship that will improve relations — possibly trade and others. Is there something we can do from a penalty perspective that if China is engaged in such activity, there would be — I find it difficult to get close to someone I do not trust. I don't trust China right now, so I find it difficult to have that relationship.
I'm trying to figure out how we have a relationship that maybe requires some form of threat when it comes to trade, if we continue to see China active, because we know they're active. I know that from the presentation we had. The Canadian government has evidence that they are active. I'm sure that if you were permitted to tell us in this forum, and you're not, you could identify to us directly some of the activities they are involved in.
I find it very difficult to feel comfortable that we're going to actually be in a position to manage that threat. Do you not agree? I had to make it a question. It's like "Jeopardy!''
Mr. Jean: Actually, I think I can do better than that, in the sense that part of engaging with China is to promote the right behaviour. As you know, about two years ago the National Research Council of Canada was attacked by a cyber-sponsored actor from China, and the government took China to task and raised it with them. In the context of the engagement that we have right now with the U.S. and the U.K., China has agreed to sign an agreement where they say that they will not conduct international espionage.
Some people say that maybe this is not going to be 100 per cent perfect. Some of our colleagues in the United States and the U.K. say if you have an incident later on, at least you can raise that with them, that they made the commitment.
I think this is an area where we need to continue to engage and promote better behaviour with all countries, not just China, and at the same time we need to have our own safeguards in place so that we can protect our government system but also critical infrastructure and our key private sector interests.
Senator White: Thank you for your frankness.
The word "strategic'' appears a lot with deputy ministers today, in particular when it comes to national security. I'm trying to get my head around where our national security strategy is going in the future. Could you brief us quickly on where you see us in the next 3, 6 or 12 months?
Mr. Jean: I think the review that the Minister of Public Safety has just completed on national security, the review that he's about to complete on national security, and the one he just completed on cybersecurity will provide us with very good elements for refining our strategy on national security.
On the one hand, we will have good tools that are faithful to our values and our rule of law, but good tools in terms of targeting the threats, maybe on the terrorism side, on the organized crime side.
When President Obama was here in the spring, he said we have probably reached a stage where there's now more crime committed in cyber than there is in the analogue world, and all kinds of crimes, from terrorism to criminal activities to child pornography and all of those things. To me, this means that we need to update our strategy and our tools to deal with the new world we're in.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: In 2015, our committee recommended that the government develop and implement clearly identified legislative powers to help national security oversight agencies. The goal was to promote a more fluid operational information exchange between the different agencies to protect the lives of Canadians.
Can you elaborate on your government's position regarding this recommendation?
Mr. Jean: Are your referring to the role of national security advisor, in order to give the advisor a statutory role under the legislation?
Senator Dagenais: We hope information will be shared more fluidly between the different agencies. The country has different security agencies. However, they don't necessarily communicate.
Mr. Jean: First, let me tell you more about the national security advisor's statutory role. My colleagues and I believe the ministers have very specific mandates, in terms of legislation, and that their deputy ministers and department support them in that regard. Therefore, it would be very difficult to give a statutory role to the national security advisor, given the type of responsibilities involved.
That said, I've worked in the government for 34 years. I've worked for a long time with agencies such as CSIS and the RCMP. One thing that surprised me when I met with the people in charge of these agencies is how much progress we've made and how the RCMP and CSIS now work well together and with the other agencies. I noticed this at individual meetings with the agencies' representatives. The CSIS director and RCMP commissioner told me that the relationship between the two agencies has never been better. There are ways to avoid conflicts when investigations are launched, whether law enforcement measures or other intelligence measures are involved.
To make sure everything is running well, each morning, when I arrive at work, I attend briefings on the main intelligence issues around the world and all sensitive issues in Canada or abroad. If measures must be taken or if I want to confirm that measures have already been taken, I can immediately contact my colleagues, individually or as a group, depending on the issues.
Each Wednesday, I have at my table the heads of the different agencies, including security intelligence agencies or the immigration department's border agencies. We discuss national security issues and make sure to work well together. We've created a committee that develops common policies in which everyone participates. Also, if there's a particular issue one morning, I can organize a meeting with the key players within the next hour to discuss how we'll coordinate our efforts.
I'm the Prime Minister's principal advisor for these issues. However, we have a shared interest in working well together. I think I have the influence and power of persuasion required to work effectively with my colleagues so that information is shared and measures are taken, and there's no need to include my role in the legislation. For six months, I've always been able to obtain information and ensure that two or three agencies target a particular issue in accordance with their respective mandate and independence.
Senator Dagenais: You would know that Supreme Court justice John Major, who chaired the commission of inquiry into the Air India attacks, recommended that the national security advisor have the power to regulate or coordinate agencies. I understand you agree with this recommendation?
Mr. Jean: Many of these recommendations have been implemented. Regarding the issue of including my role in the legislation, in all honesty, I'm not sure that could assist us further. The community's key players cooperate extremely well.
Senator Dagenais: Thank you, Mr. Jean.
[English]
The Chair: Just to clarify for the record here, at this stage you're not supporting a legislative framework to identify what the national adviser's position is and what his or her responsibility is?
Mr. Jean: What I've said is I'm not sure what it would give me tomorrow morning that I don't have today.
The Chair: I guess the question that comes up, and I think it's an important question, is you said if there is a crisis. It's not the everyday question of whether or not we're going to have a meeting Monday morning. The question is whether or not you have the authority through legislation to direct your colleagues in a certain manner because of the crisis that's taking place. Does that cause you some concern? That could happen. Basically what happens is that nobody is in charge.
Mr. Jean: There's very good understanding among our colleagues that when there's a crisis — in fact, it was exercised to some extent in August when we derailed the incident in southern Ontario — when there's a crisis, either I or one of my colleagues has a conference call with all the deputy heads. In this context, I would be in a position to make sure that all the appropriate actions are taken by the deputy heads within their respective mandates.
One thing we're doing that we did not do in the past is that after every incident, we look at what we could have done differently — lessons learned, or "hot wash,'' as they call it in the jargon of law enforcement.
Unless you're going to start trying to amend what are currently responsibilities that are clearly with ministers and the deputy minister for support, I have all of the roles that are required, all of the responsibility and all of the attention of that community such that if there's a crisis, within 15 minutes I can get them on the phone and they will start working on that.
The Chair: I will not belabour that point.
Senator Meredith: Thank you so much for being here with us this afternoon. I apologize for missing your opening comments as I just arrived from Toronto.
One of my questions is about our Syrian refugees. Canada has welcomed over 37,000 of them to this great country. In fact, last Thursday all of us were invited to hear some of these children sing, and they sang about how they love Canada. It was very moving.
But in the midst of all of that, Canadians are concerned about the screening process that took place. I understand some files were set aside. Can you tell us how many files were set aside? As well, can you assure this committee and all Canadians watching that there were no individuals allowed into Canada who were linked to any radicalized groups? Then I will have a follow-up question.
Mr. Jean: In making the commitment to show good gesture and at the same time helping in the region — as you know, there was substantial investment made in the region as well. In making a good gesture in sharing the burden and taking a number of refugees coming from the region, the government was very clear last year that it needed to be done safely.
We operate under an intelligence priority framework. Under that, we immediately adapted the efforts by our agency, so CSIS and the RCMP would be relocated to support that. Through this process, we were able to identify I think it was somewhere around 83 — don't quote me on the exact number — cases that we did not proceed with at that time.
As you know, we have had these refugees in Canada for one year, and there have been tremendous efforts by Canadians from shore to shore to assist them in settling into a good life in Canada. We never operate in the risk zero, but as you can see, in one year we haven't had a single incident. To the best of my knowledge, not even a single violent criminal incident has happened with any of the refugees that have come in. In fact, members of our intelligence community were recently asked by a number of friendly countries to share some of the practices we used during this exercise last year.
Senator Meredith: With respect to that same line of questions, is there any mechanism or strategy in place to monitor? We understand that some of these individuals still have family members back there and so forth, and we talk about inside threats in terms of individuals being influenced in some way. What kind of mechanism is in place for that, if any?
Mr. Jean: Unless anything comes to our attention from the people who are here suggesting that they would have affiliations that are problematic, the efforts are into integrating these people. But of course we have our normal intelligence activities through information that would come from partners. If we were to identify associations, they would truly be investigated.
Senator Meredith: Thank you.
Senator Oh: Thank you, Mr. Jean. I have two questions for you. First, there is a proposed statutory intelligence committee of parliamentarians. When this committee is created, what role will you play on it?
Mr. Jean: As I said in my opening statement, this is a proposal that actually all members of the committee would very much welcome. As any member of the community — the Director of CSIS, the RCMP Commissioner and the President of the Canada Border Services Agency — we would play a role in the initial phase, providing good information on how our national security tool kit applies. As the activities of the committee go, we would also provide them information on the intelligence priorities framework under which we work, some of our national security identities and some of our challenges. I, like many of the others, would be very much involved in helping the work of that committee in terms of reassuring Canadians that things are done in an accountable way.
To go back to one of the earlier questions, very often the role I play and the role that my team plays is that several agencies are involved, we will often use the convening power to bring one comprehensive, integrated story for the community, as opposed to just bringing the CSIS angle or the RCMP angle.
Senator Oh: I was told — if I'm wrong, let me know — that in a national emergency we do not have a nationwide emergency response unit throughout the country and that there's no communication link that filters down from bigger cities to towns. Is that true?
Mr. Jean: I don't think it's true. I'm not saying that what we have is perfect, but the Department of Public Safety is responsible for emergency preparedness in Canada. They have contact with provinces and territories.
The Government Operations Centre has contact with all the various other operations centres. You just need to look at the response in the context of the Fort McMurray fires to see that there was a fairly good image of connection between Public Safety and the Province of Alberta. Also, throughout the days that followed, there were good coordinated efforts between the federal and municipal roles.
Senator Oh: I was told that if there were a terrorist attack, the information could not be passed down because everyone is operating on their own. Mississauga, Toronto, everywhere has their own emergency response unit, and they are not linked together.
Mr. Jean: If you take an example of the recent incident in southern Ontario that involved CSIS, the RCMP and foreign sources, we had to involve the Ontario Provincial Police and the local municipality, and in less than 10 hours you had an operation that was successful.
That's why I'm saying my answer is that it's probably not perfect, but I think to say there is none would be inaccurate.
Senator Jaffer: At the moment we have this consultation going on across the country on Bill C-51, and I am one of those people who believe that you can't consult on rights. We have a Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and I'm very unhappy with the idea of consulting Canadians on rights. Not that we shouldn't consult Canadians — don't get the wrong sense — but that's sort of the rule of the majority. Our Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms expressly protects the rights of minorities.
I would like assurance from you, our National Security Advisor, that after you receive the consultations, you will still be very active in making sure that our Charter is followed to the letter. We know Bill C-51 does not follow the Charter.
Mr. Jean: As you know, senator, when Minister Goodale, the Minister of Public Safety, launched the consultations, he was clear that they also wanted to look, in particular, at some areas of concerns. One of them was guaranteeing that all CSIS warrants respect the Charter. Another was ensuring that Canadians are not limited in doing lawful protests and advocacy, that the definition of "terrorist propaganda'' is targeted and narrow. Also, as I say, that people would be in the position to be able to continue to do legal protests.
Senator Jaffer: Even as you do the consultations, I am really annoyed that CSIS, even after it was reprimanded by the Federal Court and instructed not to retain data at the Operational Data Analysis Centre, when they appeared before us, did not give us a clear answer, as far as I'm concerned. They did say they would not seek further data, and I asked them to give me a response in writing, and even then they haven't given me a proper response. They have not said what they are going to do with the data that they have already collected on innocent Canadians.
As the National Security Advisor, what will you do to ensure that CSIS follows the court's ruling here?
Mr. Jean: Senator, I think the Director of CSIS explained that this data has been isolated. It's no longer in use.
The Minister of Public Safety has asked SIRC, as the oversight body, to monitor and make sure that it is done in a proper way.
I also think that when he appeared in a different committee last week, he explained that if he were to destroy it now, there are also other court decisions that in the past have criticized CSIS for having destroyed information in an inappropriate way. In this context, what he wants to do is make sure it's no longer used, it's isolated. As I said, the minister has asked SIRC to make sure that this is done in an appropriate way.
Senator Jaffer: If I understand correctly, does "isolated'' mean nobody can access it?
Mr. Jean: They cannot access it, cannot use it. We are talking here about the part that Judge Noël has said was inappropriate, which was the retention. We need to remember that what the court decision said is that all these warrants were legally accessed. The thing that Judge Noël criticized was the retention of associated data. For example, in examining somebody, somehow I came into contact with associated data, such as the phone number or email address of someone who is not under investigation. Judge Noël said that part should not have been retained, or at least not retained for the period of time that it has been.
That part, associated data, has been isolated, cannot be used, and they will be monitored to make sure that it's done in an appropriate way.
The reason they have not destroyed it — and I think the director explained this last week — is that in doing so, they could be in contravention of other court decisions.
The Chair: Could I perhaps follow up on this so we don't leave it? To be clear for the question of the policy going forward, if someone's email or telephone number is accessed because of an investigation and it is not relevant to the investigation, do I take it that that information is immediately destroyed, or is there a period of time that it's kept and then destroyed? If so, what's the policy?
Mr. Jean: If it's associated data as per the court decision, then in compliance with the court decision, it will be isolated.
The Chair: That didn't answer my question. My question is when does it come to the point where you actually destroy it? Is there a timeline? This doesn't seem like rocket science to me. If you have my email and I'm not involved, when will you eliminate my email?
Mr. Jean: As the director has explained, they are no longer retaining that information, that associated data. As for the one that was actually related, they have isolated that.
The Chair: That will be destroyed eventually; is that correct?
Mr. Jean: Well, on that issue, they just want to make sure that they don't put themselves in contravention of other aspects. It's no longer used. It's been isolated. It will be looked at by SIRC.
Senator White: So we're clear, you're not deleting them. They are still being kept by some agency within the Government of Canada. That's what the Privacy Commissioner continues to target, the fact that information is being taken from Canadians. It's not supposed to be taken, and when it's identified as being taken from Canadians, you're still keeping it. "Isolation'' doesn't mean deletion. You're still keeping it.
Mr. Jean: I think that the Director of CSIS would be in a better position to answer that question than I am.
Senator White: I don't accept that, Mr. Chair. Mr. Jean knows the answer.
The answer is you're still keeping them. Isn't that correct?
Mr. Jean: The answer is that from the day that the decision went out, CSIS is now complying with that court decision.
Senator White: Are they keeping the emails? Are they keeping the information that they have told us previously they weren't? Are they keeping that information, or are they deleting it? You said they are isolating it.
Mr. Jean: The information that had been accumulated prior to that court decision has been isolated. It can no longer used.
Senator White: But it's still kept. They still have it.
The Chair: Colleagues, we're not going to get in an argument with the witness. Senator White, just to follow up, the question is this: Instead of isolate, when are you going to delete the information?
Mr. Jean: As I've explained this —
The Chair: No, but when? What's the timeline?
Mr. Jean: I don't know the timeline.
Senator White: Mr. Jean, to be fair, I at least felt you answered the question. Last year, I felt that the question was not answered.
We do know that data is being kept, and it shouldn't be kept. We know that the Privacy Commissioner has already raised this concern, but my question actually surrounds integrity testing.
We know from the Snowden event that one of the challenges they faced and identified is that they did no integrity testing with folks at the NSA. I asked the question last year about integrity testing with the CSE and CSIS and received similar responses, that they were still not doing integrity testing when it comes to employees. We talked about polygraphs and many other things.
Can we expect to see, in a future strategy, responsibility of agencies to do integrity testing on employees?
Mr. Jean: I would have to come back and consult with the agencies on this. As you've said in your question, right now people who are hired are subject to security clearance. They are subject to polygraph in those most sensitive agencies. Some of them have to take a polygraph in the regular way. Their behaviours, if there are things that are out of norm, are monitored.
Nobody is immune against insider threat. We saw it with Delisle in the navy a few years ago, but right now, these are the tools that are used by our agencies.
Senator White: I appreciate that response, but really, the agencies follow the path you give them. I do see a responsibility from the National Security Advisor to actually provide advice to those agencies around integrity testing. We see it internationally as well, but we see it in police agencies all the time. New York City has a spectacular integrity testing program.
People will behave if they believe they are being watched. I hate to say that, but it's a reality, in particular, in those high-profile cases. Snowden would not have gone nearly as far, they would argue in the NSA, had they been integrity- testing him. They would have picked him up a lot earlier.
Don't you agree that integrity testing should at least be considered by these agencies, Mr. Jean?
Mr. Jean: I think the agencies want to make sure they have the best possible tools to make sure we don't have an insider threat, and I would be happy to discuss that with them.
The Chair: Could you report back to us? It would make sense that all the agencies have the same integrity tests that are required throughout the government. It's obviously worthwhile following up.
Senator Meredith: Thank you again for being here. As National Security Advisor, you advise the Prime Minister. Can you walk us through the process of advising him on national security threats?
CSIS, as well, advises the Prime Minister. Do they go through your office in order to do so? How many times a year is this collaborative security briefing given to the Prime Minister, given we hear of President-elect Trump not taking advice about situations? How receptive is the Prime Minister to these briefings and so forth regarding security threats to Canadians?
Mr. Jean: We have regular briefings with the Prime Minister on specific issues on some of the intelligence matters at play. The Prime Minister in this government has decided to —
Senator Meredith: When you say "regular,'' does that mean every couple of weeks?
Mr. Jean: I probably see the Prime Minister once or twice a week. Sometimes it's on specific issues; sometimes it's to discuss more general matters. We have cabinet meetings where some of those things are discussed.
As I said, in the context of this government, they decided to create a committee that is looking at both intelligence and emergency management, and it's chaired by the Prime Minister. It has met regularly, and it's looking at some of the key issues in terms of identifying threats and looking at the tool kit that we have to deal with threats in Canada.
We also brief their senior personnel on a daily basis. Wherever there is a threat, we make sure the Prime Minister is informed. You can imagine on an incident like in August, he was informed fairly quickly during the day. So yes, we have regular contact with the Prime Minister, the key ministers and their officials.
Senator Meredith: CSIS goes through your office as well?
Mr. Jean: CSIS provides information, and if we need to bring the CSIS director or the key experts in, we do so. The Cabinet Committee on Intelligence and Emergency Management is a committee where all the key directors are at the table with ministers, so the CSIS director is there.
The Chair: I would like to go back to your responsibilities with Canada-U.S. relationships. This committee issued a report on ballistic missiles that said Canada should begin negotiating with the U.S. to become a full partner in the ballistic missile defence of North America. Can you update us and tell us whether those discussions have begun? Is it the position of the government that we should become full partners?
Mr. Jean: On this aspect, as you know, this is one of the specific questions the Minister of Defence asked in the context of the defence policy review. He is now assessing what has come out through the context of the defence policy review. They will come with a policy statement at some point.
This is an area where the government has not yet made a decision because they want to know what Canadians have said.
The Chair: Second, I would like to go back to the situation in southern Ontario with Mr. Driver that you referred to a couple of times. He had every intention of committing a terrorist attack, the way I understand it or it was reported. You referred to the fact that there were 10 hours involved with respect to surveillance. From the press reports it sounds like Mr. Driver was not under surveillance on an ongoing basis — is that correct? — because he was known to the authorities.
Mr. Jean: As you have seen, he was under a peace bond; so he had a number of conditions that were relaxed over time because his behaviour seemed to be better than before. Some of the conditions were relaxed. He was still under some conditions when this incident occurred.
The Chair: He wasn't under surveillance seven days week, 24 hours a day.
Mr. Jean: He was not under 24/7 surveillance at that time, no.
The Chair: I would like to go back to the question of the data. You have been very forthright; I appreciate that. When is this data going to be eliminated, deleted, and are the individuals that have been identified going to be made aware that their data was obtained through this illegal process so that they are aware that it has been deleted? Could you provide with us that information?
Mr. Jean: This is a question, with all due respect, that I have to refer to the CSIS director. I don't think it would be within my mandate to respond.
The Chair: But you are the national adviser, and I'm sure you would like to know the answer to that question; right?
Mr. Jean: I will bring the question to the Director of CSIS, yes.
The Chair: This has been a very interesting hour. We very much appreciate your coming. We're looking forward to your next appearance.
Joining us in our second panel of the day is Mr. Jean-Denis Fréchette, Parliamentary Budget Officer, along with members of his staff: Mostafa Askari, Assistant Parliamentary Budget Officer; Jason Jacques, Director, Economic and Fiscal Analysis; and Peter Weltman, Senior Director, Costing and Program Analysis. Do you need all that help?
We're pleased to have the Parliamentary Budget Officer here today as part of our study of issues relating to the defence policy review. It's our hope that we can learn more about the role of the Parliamentary Budget Officer in reviewing defence spending and helping to make sense of it for Canadians.
Jean-Denis Fréchette, Parliamentary Budget Officer, Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer: This is our first appearance before this committee, and that's why we have so many people. We were all excited and wanted to appear before you.
[Translation]
Thank you, honourable senators, for this invitation to appear before the committee to discuss the parliamentary budget officer's mandate and some analyses we've conducted in the past, in addition to some national security and defence analyses in progress.
As I said, this is the Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer team's first opportunity to appear before your committee. I'll briefly describe some parts of our mandate and the proposed changes.
[English]
Our legislative mandate is to provide independent analysis to the Senate and the House of Commons about the state of the nation's finances, the estimates of the government, and trends in the national economy, as well as to estimate the cost of financial proposals over which Parliament has jurisdiction.
As you are aware, the government has the intention to amend the PBO's legislation to make the function independent of the Library of Parliament and to include the costing of electoral party platforms. We're still awaiting a bill to amend the Parliament of Canada Act to be introduced. Furthermore, according to the government's Fall Economic Statement, "The new legislation will also grant the PBO greater access to relevant information held by departments and Crown corporations.''
I hope, Mr. Chair, this greater access to information will materialize in the future because it would be really useful in some of the domains covered by your committee.
As per our current mandate, our analysis is designed to assist Parliament in holding the government to account by better informing senators and MPs about budgetary measures introduced by the government. We do not provide recommendations in our reports, nor do we undertake policy development.
[Translation]
Under our mandate, three parliamentary committees, including the Standing Senate Committee on National Finance, are specifically mentioned in our legislation and can ask us for research on the country's finances and economy. The chair of the Standing Senate Committee on National Finance did so recently. At the request of the Senate or House of Commons standing committees, we can start analyzing estimates. In addition, the committees or members from one of the two houses of Parliament can ask us to assess the cost of all the proposed measures under Parliament's jurisdiction. Of course, we can also conduct studies under our own auspices.
All our reports are released and posted on our website upon publication. We send 24 hours' advance notice of publication to all parliamentarians. The day the report is released, a private briefing is generally provided for parliamentarians and their staff.
The Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer's team includes about 15 analysts, and its annual operating budget is $2.8 million.
[English]
Some of our recent reports include an analysis of the federal spending on education on First Nations reserves and on the fiscal considerations of legalized cannabis, which I believe might be of some interest to Senator Carignan, who tabled a bill on drug-impaired driving.
We also released Budget 2016: Key Issues for Parliamentarians as a follow-up to the government's Fall Economic Statement. On a regular basis, we publish a detailed analysis of supplementary estimates and an update on the government spending plan in the Expenditure Monitor, which often includes references to the budget of the Department of National Defence.
Twice a year, we publish our Economic and Fiscal Outlook, which provides to Parliament a short- to medium-term projection of the Canadian economic and fiscal situation. Once a year, we release our Fiscal Sustainability Report, a long-term scenario aimed at evaluating the long-term prospect for public debt under current fiscal policy.
Work that we have undertaken in the defence and security subject areas includes a cost estimate of the F-35 fighter jet program, an analysis of the security costs of the G8 and G20 summit held in Canada in 2010, the budget sufficiency estimate of the Joint Support Ship program and the Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ship project, and an analysis of the fiscal sustainability of the defence program.
We are currently working on a budget sufficiency analysis for the Canada Surface Combatant program, and very recently we began looking at the terms of reference for a cost estimate of the government's proposed acquisition of the F-18 Super Hornet fighter jets.
I will stop here, Mr. Chair. Thank you again. My colleagues and I will be happy to answer your questions.
The Chair: Thank you sir.
Senator Jaffer: Thank you for your presence here. Thank you for the work you've done. It has been very useful. All the reports we see also help us with our work, so thank you very much.
In a recent report, the Auditor General stated that the Department of National Defence was having difficulties predicting the operating and maintenance costs of major capital equipment. He also stated that that led to overestimated equipment use and underestimated support costs, and under-resourced personnel requirements.
We all know that capital equipment is very important. For me, my concern, especially with the defence review, is the state of our computers. How are they getting the information?
In your capacity as the Parliamentary Budget Officer, do you use the Defence Department's data, or do you create your own data? How do you analyze the data?
Mr. Fréchette: When we have access to the National Defence data, we do use it. As I mentioned in my presentation, sometimes it's kind of difficult personally in terms of costing. But when we do have access, particularly for the budget and so on, we will do that. It is mentioned in our Expenditure Monitor when we are able to have access to the public data.
The problem with National Defence is some of their data for the costing — I mentioned the ships, for example — most of that data is considered confidential for whatever reason, and that is creating some problems.
Mostafa Askari, Assistant Parliamentary Budget Officer, Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer: We only use National Defence data or the government-wide data for costing, essentially. Those have to come from official sources. We cannot really create that data. In cases where we are doing a costing and we don't have access to the official data from Canada, sometimes in the past we have used information from other jurisdictions to do benchmarking and that way provide the approximate costing for certain things. But typically, yes, it has to be official data.
Senator Jaffer: I'm really struggling with this. I don't know if you can answer this. This is on Bill C-22, which is to form this committee that is going to oversee all security operations — I'm putting it in a general sense — and on the other hand you will become a parliamentary officer. Your position will. Yet this new committee will not be able to ask you for information. From what I understand, any questions concerning the government on security, you will not be able to give that vital information to this committee. Am I correct on that? And what is your opinion on that?
Mr. Fréchette: Thank you for the question. You are correct. I'm still not yet a real official parliamentary —
Senator Jaffer: We are pretending.
Mr. Fréchette: As I said, we hope that legislation will come. It is still to be seen.
As for the committee, it is true that there is this gap in terms of their capacity to ask for information. That's our understanding, at least for the moment.
Senator Jaffer: This committee is being formed, and there is a lot of flag flying that this committee is the answer to all the issues we have, especially that concern me regarding the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Yet this committee is not able to get information from you or the Auditor General. Isn't that correct?
Mr. Fréchette: It's because it will not be a parliamentary committee, per se. That's really the limitation, as I mentioned. There are some parliamentary committees from the Senate and the House of Commons that are mentioned in the PBO legislation — three specifically — including the Senate Committee on National Finance. As for other committees that are not considered parliamentary committees, I have no real connection to them, and that will be the situation with that specific committee.
Senator Meredith: My question would have been along those lines with respect to the legislation and the aspect of Senator Jaffer's question about information that we would request from you. With this piece of legislation, would you not consider it problematic that we're no longer able to get that information from you? How do we get around that in the sense of transparency to all Canadians and with respect to data? In fact, we are doing this policy review. We are saying here is a cost of the F-18s, here is the cost of the ships and so forth, but when you become a parliamentary officer we will not have access to you in that regard. How do you explain that in this context of transparency?
Mr. Fréchette: I don't explain it. I'm just realizing that it is a limit. It doesn't mean that a committee like this committee, for example, cannot ask for the information, because it's a standing Senate committee. This committee can ask for costing of the F-18, for example. The other committee Senator Jaffer referred to will not be a parliamentary committee, per se.
The Chair: So it really depends on what authorities are embodied in the legislation in order to perhaps have access to organizations such as yours; is that correct?
Mr. Fréchette: You are talking about the current legislation?
The Chair: Yes, if it was amended to allow for access to utilize your services.
Mr. Fréchette: This committee can ask the PBO to cost whatever you want us to cost.
The Chair: I understand that. I was referring to the oversight committee.
Mr. Fréchette: The oversight committee?
The Chair: Like you say, that is separate. It's not a parliamentary committee. If, in the body of the legislation, they allow and permit access to your organization for the purpose of expertise, then that would get around the fact that it's not a parliamentary committee. Is that correct?
Mr. Fréchette: That is correct. But it's not my decision.
The Chair: I understand that.
Mr. Fréchette: It's in the hands of the legislature.
Senator Meredith: On the same sort of point with respect to your relationship with the Auditor General, how will this legislation impact that, if any?
Mr. Askari: Which legislation?
Senator Meredith: The new legislation that the government is proposing.
Mr. Askari: For the PBO?
Senator Meredith: Yes.
Mr. Askari: I don't think there will be any change in the relationship with the Auditor General. The Auditor General's mandate is actually somewhat different from our mandate. They look at the past. We look forward always in our work. That is not going to change in any way. The legislation is not going to change how we operate. It will change the position of the officer and access to the information and some extension of the mandate.
Mr. Fréchette: Although we don't have all the details. Just to be clear, the Auditor General has its own legislation and reports to one standing committee, which is the Public Accounts Committee in the House of Commons. The PBO right now is under the Parliament of Canada Act, and independent under that, but the PBO right now is under the Library of Parliament. That is really the difference. It's not a specific legislation. It's under the Parliament of Canada Act. It's not a specific legislation, as is the case for the Auditor General.
Senator Beyak: Thank you again, gentlemen. In the work that you have been able to complete so far, have you been able to identify the funding capability gaps in the Department of National Defence?
Peter Weltman, Senior Director, Costing and Program Analysis, Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer: We undertook that sort of a study about a year and a half ago. Our study showed there was a funding gap.
Again, I want to caution that the study was done at a fairly high level, effectively looking at the current situation of the forces, so how much equipment, how many soldiers, what sort of support was needed, projecting forward 10 years based on what we knew the budgets to be and assuming that there wouldn't be any change in capability. So you keep the same number of soldiers, you keep your equipment in a similar state of readiness, and we looked at the cost at that point and time. We did find that at the current level of 68,000 soldiers we would have a fairly significant gap. But we also ran some scenarios on different force structures.
Senator Beyak: Thank you. That leads me to my second point on the reservists. If we have to train the 11,000 reservists for the actual army, are you able to identify the cost of that?
Mr. Weltman: We didn't identify specifically the cost of that, but that's something that we would look at. We were hoping to redo this study in light of whatever new defence policy may come out. We'll certainly include that.
Senator Beyak: Thank you very much.
The Chair: Could I follow up on the reserves? In the course of your study, and I'm not aware of what was in the study that referred to reservists, did you identify that we were short 10,000 to 11,000 personnel minimum, in respect to the reserves that were projected to actually be on staff?
Mr. Weltman: We didn't make a comment specifically on the reservists. We were looking more at the government policy at the time. We assumed that the levels of reservists and full soldiers were consistent with government policy. We did our costing on that basis. We didn't comment on the current state of the forces. We took more of a hypothetical state.
Mr. Askari: If I can add something, chair, I think our focus in these studies was on funding and the budget, not on the functional gaps that may exist. That's not really our area, so we don't really get into whether we have enough reserves or not. It is the matter of the costing and the budget that is really the focus of our work.
Our mandate does not allow us to get into the issues of whether the government has enough reserves or not. We look at these questions: What is the cost? What is the gap in terms of the costing? Given the current structure of our defence system, what would be the gap over time in terms of the funding?
The Chair: Colleagues, I don't know if anybody else is confused, but I'm a bit confused.
Let's take the reserves as an example. We are roughly 10,000 personnel short, currently, in the reserve-projected numbers of military personnel that are supposed to be part of that number that we're looking for in the military.
Are you telling me that if we're 10,000 short, you didn't really take that into account in the numbers that you, Mr. Weltman, came out with in respect of the situation when you actually examined the forces?
Mr. Weltman: We looked at the government policy. We didn't get into the balance between the Reserve Force and the Regular Force in detail. Like I said before, it was a high-level cut. We worked with whatever data was available to us.
The concept was we have a defence program, and it has 68,000 regular forces and it has X thousand reservists. That's what the government policy says. That's what the target is. So we did that, and this is sort of the structure of the force as it sits: so many planes, so many ships and so many tanks. I'm being simplistic.
The Chair: No, be simple. We're happy with that. We don't want you to bamboozle us here.
Mr. Weltman: I'm trying to keep it fairly straightforward. Then, of course, you need people to buy the stuff and keep it going, so you have your support. It's really what the force structure looks like. This is what the government mandated its force structure to be. We know we are not there yet, but we are looking over a 10- to 15-year horizon. We're not looking at a year-by-year situation. So how much money is there today to fund the current ships, planes, tanks, people and support? What is that going to look like 10 years out? What are the budgets that we know of over the next 10 years? Is there a gap or not?
I suppose, listening in hindsight, and I will certainly take that under advisement, if we are not at policy, then that may be something that could be mentioned in a subsequent report. But that wasn't the purpose of the report specifically. It was to say, can we afford the policy given the money we have allocated over the next 10 years?
The Chair: I think I understand this.
Mr. Weltman: Are we getting closer?
Senator Meredith: There is a shortfall. What was the difference? What is it going to take to get to full strength? What is that number? Did you look at that? That was the critical question.
Mr. Weltman: No, we didn't look at that. Thanks for explaining.
The Chair: You may be doing a report here pretty quick.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: We're very familiar with the Auditor General's role in the Senate from having studied it in the past. However, we may need your office as part of our work on the Senate's future.
When you carry out your review mandate with various departments, in particular National Defence, what challenges do you face? Do people sometimes try to hide things from you in order to look good? When you start work at a department as part of your mandate, you open all the books. For example, how are things going with the Super Hornet or CF-35 purchase?
Mr. Fréchette: Like in any family, some people are more difficult to work with. I'm always asked, and not only before Senate or House of Commons committees, to identify the good and bad departments.
Regarding the Department of National Defence, it's a bit difficult. We talked about it before, but we maintain a good relationship. Peter, for example, has good relationships with people inside the organization. I maintain an excellent entity-to-entity relationship. However, when the requests are more formal, like the one made public last Friday concerning the F-18 acquisition costs, it seems that we're always waiting for a response. If several requests of this nature are made, there's a culture that results in the information suddenly becoming confidential.
[English]
Cabinet confidence is something that I read about almost every other week in replies from departments.
[Translation]
There seems to be that type of culture. As we said, we're currently completing the ship calculations. We're receiving information that mainly comes from the United States. All this information is public in the United States, whereas the information is much more difficult to obtain here.
You asked me about the status of our relationships. Our relationships are good on an inter-individual basis. However, in terms of formal relationships, when we need to make requests, it's more difficult.
That said, to be clear, the parliamentary budget officer can only ask for information, according to the legislation. I don't have any coercive means to obtain the information, if it's not a parliamentary recourse granted to me in 2015 by the Library of Parliament Committee.
Senator Dagenais: You said relationships are sometimes more complicated with the Department of National Defence. Perhaps for you it involves trying to predict the future, not in secret, but with fewer opportunities to sound the alarm. Some observers think the decisions could be wrong. When you receive somewhat vague responses and you need to make decisions on the budgets provided, aren't you worried that your decisions are sometimes wrong? Take the purchase of the Super Hornets, for example. As you said, you may not know the maintenance costs or which parts are at the end of their life, and so on. Don't you think this puts you in a position in which your decisions could sometimes be wrong?
Mr. Fréchette: Do you mean the results? The results may be less detailed and reliable than they could have been if we had had access to all the information. That said, we've been using a certain approach for some time. Based on that approach, we've developed a model that enables us to approximate costs fairly accurately, despite the fact we haven't been able to obtain the desired information. However, we're mentioning it, and specifying that it's part of the limits of the analysis as such. It's the only thing we can do.
[English]
Senator White: Thank you. My question is actually on life-cycle costs. When we went through the F-35 scenario a few years ago, we talked about life cycle. I don't know if it was 20 years or 40 years.
Mr. Fréchette: It's 30 years.
Senator White: I knew it was somewhere in there. We talked about life-cycle costs, and it shocked many people on the Hill, as well as Canadians, because all of a sudden they had a much larger number than they believed.
I haven't seen life-cycle costs on the new purchase of the Super Hornets. Is there a plan for the PBO to do a life-cycle costing analysis on the Super Hornets like we saw with the F-35s?
Mr. Fréchette: We are working on the terms of reference.
Mr. Weltman: We are looking at acquisition and life cycle. Life cycle is complicated. When we did the F-35s, it was a very high-level look because, again, the plane was in development. Very little was known about it.
The approach we took and will continue to take is that we are looking at the useful life of the asset. We're financial people. I'm not an airline pilot; I'm not a jet fighter pilot; I'm a finance person. If I'm buying an asset, I'm expecting a certain longevity out of that asset. I'm going to amortize the cost of it over that period of time.
The F-18s, we got over 30 years on them, 36 years in some cases. We checked around with the manufacturer. We checked around with some of our NATO partners to find out what the probable flying hours would ha be on an F-35, and that's how we came up with the 30-year number. It's not that we were looking for a bigger number; that was the life of the asset.
On the other side is if you have a shorter amortization period, your amortization will be higher every year, and you will have to replace them sooner. Overall the dollars aren't going to make much of a difference one way or the other.
Senator White: Thank you. I actually appreciated the F-35 life-cycle costing, and I think it's important for us to have it on any new assets we purchase.
There's a second piece to that, because we will be running two platforms: Have we taken into account the dual platform costs of a Super Hornet versus the F-18? Or is that part of your analysis now?
Mr. Weltman: That's part of the analysis. We have asked DND to provide us with whatever costing data they might have on the acquisition and sustainment. We have also asked them for any incremental changes in cost to integrating a new platform into their existing process. That just went out last week, so I think it's going to be a while.
I've been in touch again informally through contacts that I have, and they are thinking about how to scope that reply, because we know it's important. It may be that we have to do two separate pieces, an acquisition piece first, and then once we have better data on the O&S, then we do that.
The advantage is there is a lot of sustainment data out there. Australia has been flying these planes for a long time. I know they have data, and they are in the process of checking to see if they can actually share it with us.
Mr. Fréchette: For further detail, all of the requests and information letters that we send to departments are on our website. This one was published on December 8, and you will see the bullets and the two requests, exactly the details that we asked of the department. If you are interested, you can visit our website and you will see that.
Senator White: Thank you. Lastly, when can we expect that type of detail? I know with the F-35s we received it prior to any purchase, which was spectacular. I think it gave all of us a chance to discuss it more openly, and I certainly think it became a two-year discussion.
I know in this case here we will probably not have it prior to acquisition, so I'm just trying to get my head around when we can expect it. We'd like a specific date, if you don't mind.
Mr. Weltman: I'm optimistic that we'll be able to do it sooner rather than later because of the fact that it's a plane that's been in the air for a while. There's a lot of data out there. The modelling tool that we use has some built-in calculations already, so I'm crossing my fingers we can get it done in the shorter term, several months as opposed to I think the 10 months it took us to do the F-35s.
Senator White: Thank you.
The Chair: I will just follow up on that question as well because I think it's important. My understanding is that that particular platform, the Super Hornet that we are looking at perhaps purchasing, will come to an end here in the very near future.
In your cost analysis, are you building in the fact that there won't be replacement machines and various other things that are necessary for running the machines over the course of their life?
My question on behalf of Canadians is whether or not we're buying one plane or two planes so that we can continue to be able to fix it when it runs into problems. Are you taking that into account?
Mr. Weltman: Oh, yes. Absolutely we are. The big question there is how long are we planning to keep these? If we buy these Super Hornets, how long are we planning to keep them? In terms of spare parts and that sort of thing, I think production is scheduled to end 2017 or 2018. The line might get extended if their orders justify it.
We'll look back and see what other programs have done in similar situations. This is not the first fighter jet to be built. Many have faced this sort of situation. We'll go back and see typically what happens, and then we'll take all that into consideration.
Senator Meredith: Getting back to Senator Dagenais's question with respect to the challenges around access to information, in this legislation what would you like to see so that the hurdles — you said you've made requests for information and sometimes that information is not forthcoming. What could legislation do to increase that access to free and timely information?
You mentioned that your department has 15 analysts. Senator Jaffer asked an important question with respect to the makeup of those analysts, because today all of you are men appearing before us and there are no women. This is very important regarding opportunities for advancement within your department. Do you outsource analysts from larger accounting firms to aid in your work?
Mr. Fréchette: Last week I was in front of the Senate Human Rights Committee, so I had a lot of these kinds of questions.
Among 15 analysts, yes, we do have women working, not only as analysts; women are doing analysis and all that as well. Recruitment is not only gender-based. It's who can compete and so on.
You talk about the legislation. As I said, we still don't know exactly about the legislation in terms of access to information. What I mentioned about greater access is only what we heard or read in the Fall Economic Statement and also in the mandate letter of the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons, which was a promise of the Liberal Party during the campaign.
What will be important is a clear distinction of what we can have access to. Do we have access to cabinet confidence? I don't want to know what has been discussed and so on, but if that is just data without any comments around them, I would like to have this kind of clarification in the legislation.
As I said, for the moment, my predecessor went to court to have access and get the information, or at least he will have a decision that would allow him to have access to all this information.
I have a parliamentary remedy. In 2015, the Library of Parliament Committee, BILI, said that whenever I have a problem with a department, I should write to the three standing committees mentioned in the legislation — the Senate National Finance Committee, the House of Commons Finance Committee and the Public Accounts Committee — and ask them to use their absolute powers to call for papers and people, which is the powers that you have, to help the Parliamentary Budget Officer to have this access to the data.
We haven't used it so far. Eventually, if it's the only mechanism that is in place, maybe it should be in the legislation or a mechanism similar to that. It should be embedded in the new legislation.
Senator Meredith: When you're trying to produce data that's benefiting all Canadians and us, as committees, in making decisions or supporting an acquisition, and for you to be able to go to court — and it's quite surprising that you would have to do that to get information you need — what kind of costs are associated with all of this and with running your department?
Mr. Jacques, you haven't said anything yet. Maybe you want to jump in on this. I'm just trying to give equity here.
Jason Jacques, Director, Economic and Fiscal Analysis, Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer: Parity across the table. It's much appreciated.
Senator Meredith: I'm an equity kind of guy.
Mr. Jacques: As Mr. Fréchette mentioned, our budget has been set at $2.8 million since the office was established in 2008.
To your point, having worked with the office during the period of time in which there was a decision to pursue a court remedy, it is a very costly and time-consuming endeavour.
Senator Meredith: These are Canadian tax dollars we're talking about.
Mr. Jacques: We're very cognizant of that.
Of course, we don't actually have a clear sense of what the precise legislation will actually look like, as Mr. Fréchette mentioned. At the same time, looking back at the platform commitment and at the more recent commitment in the government's Fall Economic Statement, we do have the broad brush strokes of an outline of what the intended changes are to the office, and on that basis, we did publish a business case.
Looking at the potential changes, in particular, a key change around the potential costing of electoral platforms, we did publish a business case to indicate what some of the operational changes to the office might look like, as well as some of the costs associated with that. I believe the number we were looking at was close to an additional $2 million per year.
Senator Meredith: Is legislation the way to go? You've tried the approach of collaboration, Mr. Askari, with respect to department heads and the requesting of information. Is there any other mechanism, apart from legislation, that could be utilized?
Mr. Askari: Legislation is the first part of it. It's the most important part of it because it mandates the departments to comply with certain rules and regulations.
One of the problems we have in the current legislation is that the wording is very weak and very broad. In some cases, actually, it's very specific because it only talks about financial, and we often need more than just financial data.
For example, for costing a fighter jet or a ship, you need other kinds of information from the Department of Defence on the requirements for fighter jets. It's not just financial data; there are requirements.
Those kinds of things have to be included, and then there has to be a recourse for us to be able to find a way to compel the departments to actually provide the information if they've decided not to. That's the part that is weak in the current legislation, and we are hoping that the government will address that.
Mr. Fréchette: For your information, Mr. Chair, the Auditor General has an MOU with departments and the Privy Council, which gives him more power to access the information. Whether the MOU works perfectly all the time or not, I don't know, but at least there is a mechanism in place.
Mostafa alluded to the Financial Accountability Office of Ontario, which is the Ontario PBO. Jason can talk about it. He helped develop and implement the legislation over there.
The legislation is a little bit clearer because they use ours, and they realize that we don't have the word "information'' or "fiscal,'' just "data.'' They added that, and apparently it helped my counterpart over there to have access to the information. He also has a little bit more power because he reports to a standing committee, the Finance Committee, which can provide him with this kind of access.
Senator Beyak: Over the years, we have heard from many witnesses that there are nations in the world, our allies, who have a military strategy that survives a government election, whether it's a Conservative, NDP or Liberal government. When the government changes, the military strategy stays the same, whether it's a goal, where they're going to be fighting, or what they are buying, ships or air force jets.
Do you see any value in that for Canada monetarily? I do, and I have listened very carefully to these witnesses. We seem to waste — to taxpayers watching these broadcasts — a lot of money redoing contracts that a previous government did, just because we can. All governments seem to be equally guilty of that.
As financial minds, do you see any benefit to that?
Mr. Fréchette: Financial and political minds.
Mr. Askari: If there is a stability and certainty in procurement, in principle, it's going to be cheaper. If you keep changing your requirements and objectives, then you have to redo the contracts and look for other things that may cost more money.
That's as far as I can go in that instance, but the rest of it is a matter of policy decisions by the government of the day.
Senator Beyak: Thank you. Would anyone else have any comments?
The Chair: No, I don't think so.
Colleagues, we are coming to a conclusion here fairly soon, and we have a motion that I would like us to deal with prior to recessing, but I do have a further question on the Super Hornets.
In your analysis, are you going to evaluate the fact that this appears to be a sole-source contract for the purchase of the Super Hornets, and being sole-sourced, is this contract going to be value for money compared to others had they been able to compete? Will you look at this as part of the evaluation?
Mr. Askari: Unfortunately, senator, enough information regarding the cost of sole sourcing doesn't really exist. When we were doing the F-35s, that was one of the questions. We could not provide a good answer for that because there were some indications, some information and some research that sole-source procurement contracts had up to 18 per cent higher costs, but there wasn't really enough for us to actually provide a solid number to parliamentarians at the time.
It may be the same thing in this case because, first of all, this is subject to negotiation between the government and Boeing, and we don't know exactly how that negotiation will end and what kind of a price they can get from that. It is very hard for us to determine exactly whether sole sourcing is actually costing more or less or what the results are.
The Chair: Colleagues, we have a motion here that I would like us to entertain prior to us recessing. If no one else has any other questions, I would like to excuse our witnesses. I want to thank Mr. Fréchette and his delegation, who performed very well. We are looking forward to seeing you in the future, and we may have a further discussion as a committee about whether we may ask you to do some work on our behalf in respect of these capability gaps within the military. You may be hearing from us sooner rather than later.
Colleagues, I would like to move to a motion that the deputy chair will present to the committee. It has to do with the agreement that has been reached regarding the membership of the committees given the changes that have taken place in the personnel within the Senate. You all have a copy of the motion. We will be required to pass this motion in the Senate so that we can expand our numbers from 9 to 12, and this motion will allow us to do this.
Senator Jaffer: This is the motion:
That pursuant to the order adopted by the Senate on December 7, 2016, the membership of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure be increased by one non-voting member chosen from the senators who are not members of a recognized party, to be designated after the usual consultations.
The Chair: Colleagues, I will have to reintroduce the motion as I spoke to it because I was speaking in the broader terms that the numbers in the committee will be expanded by three, the way I understand it, but this has to do with the steering committee, which is part of the agreements that have taken place between all the parties in the house.
I think the motion is fairly clear. It's been moved by Senator Jaffer that we increase the steering committee by one member.
Is it agreed? Anybody against? Carried.
The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, as part of its study on issues related to the defence policy review, is pleased to be joined in our third panel of the day, via video conference, by Brigadier-General Michael Nixon, Commander, Joint Task Force North; and Lieutenant-Colonel Luis Carvallo, Commanding Officer, 1st Canadian Ranger Patrol Group.
The Canadian Joint Operations Command oversees six commands across the country that provides command and control to the military task force deployed on operations in Canada. One of these is the Joint Task Force North, which is responsible for operations in Yukon, the Northwest Territories and Nunavut. It's an area of responsibility of approximately 4 million kilometres, which represents 40 per cent of Canada's land mass and 75 per cent of its coastline.
Gentlemen, welcome.
Brigadier-General Michael Nixon, Commander, Joint Task Force North, National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces: Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, senators, ladies and gentlemen.
First of all, thank you for this opportunity to address you on defence and security issues in Canada's North, an area I feel very passionate about.
As mentioned, I am the Commander of Joint Task Force North. I am one of the formations that fall under Canadian Joint Operations Command, CJOC. As mentioned, I'm accompanied by the Commanding Officer of the 1st Canadian Ranger Patrol Group, Lieutenant-Colonel Carvallo.
The JTFN's area of responsibility, as the chair mentioned, is extremely large. It is about the size of the European Union, but it only has a population about the size of Kingston, Ontario, 118,000, so a dispersed population spread over vast areas.
[Translation]
Joint Task Force North's area of responsibility includes Yukon, Northwest Territories and Nunavut.
[English]
As Commander of Joint Task Force North, my priorities are fairly straightforward: prepare, plan for and conduct operations and build and maintain an area of responsibility of situational awareness, so across the area of responsibility; extend and strengthen regional partnerships; support the Canadian Rangers and the Junior Canadian Ranger Program, support Team North personnel; and equally important, champion necessary infrastructure projects.
The term "Team North'' I use to describe all members of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces that live and work in the North. It's the second-largest federal presence in the North and employs almost 300 military and civilian personnel. This comprises of my headquarters here in Yellowknife, Joint Task Force North headquarters, and a detachment in each of the other two territorial capitals, Whitehorse and Iqaluit.
The 1st Canadian Ranger Patrol Group, 440 Squadron, C Company, the Loyal Edmonton Regiment, and the Junior Canadian Rangers and cadet programs make up the rest of the team.
As you may be aware, Canada has four key pillars for northern engagement and policy interest we use to guide our operational planning. They are sovereignty, economic and social development, environmental protection, and of course good governance.
[Translation]
The most significant operational threat in Joint Task Force North's area of responsibility is climate.
[English]
Temperatures can drop to minus 55 degrees Celsius during winter months, and weather conditions can adversely affect operational equipment and personnel. Like anywhere else on the globe, there is a risk of natural disaster events, such as wildfires, earthquakes and flooding. It is also important to note that while there is a degree of vulnerability due to unique climate and dispersed population, there is also a high degree of resilience and preparedness amongst the three territories that serves to mitigate most of these risks.
[Translation]
The Canadian Armed Forces have primary responsibility for maritime and aeronautical search and rescue. They also provide assistance to provinces and territories for ground search and rescue incidents when requested, to the best of their capabilities and with the resources provided.
[English]
If and when a call comes in to a Joint Rescue Coordination Centre for assistance with a ground search and rescue event, this may trigger the tasking of search and rescue aircraft or any other Canadian Armed Forces asset considered as a secondary resource. The Joint Rescue Coordination Centre that has the lead may also task a local ship or aircraft operating in the area of the search to assist with the effort.
Of note, in 2015, of the numerous search and rescues conducted coast to coast to coast in Canada, fewer than 5 per cent of those that were led by the Canadian Armed Forces occurred north of the fifty-fifth parallel, which is roughly in line with Grande Prairie, Alberta.
Some other potential emergency response missions include dealing with major air or maritime disasters — for which there are contingency plans — a community infrastructure crisis, a community emergency resupply or a health care crisis.
Joint Task Force North, although one of the formations and one of six regional joint task forces, is different than the rest, specifically because it does not have a force-generation mandate. Rather, it is a small, modestly staffed planning and coordination and command and control organization that plans for and then employs assets coming from formations and units from the South, or from the other regional joint task forces.
When it comes to northern operations, soldiers, sailors and airwomen and airmen come from the three services to support. By way of example, the Royal Canadian Navy operates throughout the year, mainly in the summer, navigating the waters in the North and in the winter through the ice with its fleet dive units. Its ships and divers regularly deploy in support of Government of Canada missions either in surveillance, exercises of sovereignty or supporting other government departments.
The forthcoming Harry DeWolf-class Arctic patrol ships and the Nanisivik fuelling station will greatly increase the Royal Canadian Navy's capacity to operate in Canada's North.
The Canadian Army trains and operates in the North in the winter and summer. The units again come from the South and deploy north as required and can be up to 550 personnel in size. The largest unit in the Canadian Army is permanently deployed in the North, and that is the 1st Canadian Ranger Patrol Group and one of the reasons the CO is with me today. It has an established strength of about 1,800 members in 60 communities across the North. They serve both the sovereign presence and a vital nation-building function.
The 1st Canadian Ranger Patrol Group is also responsible for the Junior Canadian Rangers Program in the North. There are about 1,300 junior rangers in 41 communities across the North. The junior rangers are supported by the Canadian Forces, and it is a program for youth aged 12 to 18. Of note, it is one of the fastest-growing youth programs based on population density in the North.
Finally, since its earliest days in the North, the Royal Canadian Air Force has been vital to linking distant points and enabling national and military missions throughout the Far North. The RCAF provides the lift and range to cover the North with both fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. Based in Yellowknife, we have a modest capability, as I already mentioned, with 440 Transport Squadron, which is equipped with four CC-138 Twin Otters.
The Canadian Forces must be able to respond quickly and effectively whenever called upon to assist what is beyond the capability of our partners to do. In order to accomplish this mission, we within JTFN engage with all of the other federal departments and agencies that have an interest in the North, of which there are many, as well as with municipal, territorial and indigenous governments and groups. It is mainly to foster pre-crisis communication to allow those people to know people, which is always important; to ensure there is a common operating picture when a crisis does arise; to ensure comprehensive planning and complete planning; and to ensure the sharing of resources and infrastructure, all of which are vital in the North.
In closing, I'd just like to say I'm extremely proud of the men and women who make up Team North, and I'm honoured and blessed to be their commander. It is the opportunity of a lifetime, and I do not take it for granted. It's an outstanding organization that amazes me every day with its accomplishments.
Mr. Chair, ladies and gentlemen, again, thank you for this opportunity. Lieutenant-Colonel Carvallo and I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.
The Chair: Thank you very much, general. I want to say at the outset that we are also very proud of the men and women who make up Team North. I had the opportunity of participating in Operation NANOOK for one day up in Yukon, and I was very impressed with the military generally, especially all the soldiers, the men and women involved, and the rangers, their capability and their enthusiasm for the job they signed up to do. We can feel very good about what you do, and we appreciate you coming in on I am assuming a very balmy day in Yellowknife.
We are going to start with a visitor to our committee to lead off on questions, Senator Dennis Patterson from Nunavut, who actually brought forward a policy paper for this committee to consider for the purpose of the defence policy review. Senator Patterson, if you want to start, please.
Senator Patterson: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. Thank you to the witnesses. Yes, I did conduct a defence policy review in Nunavut, and I was happy members of JTFN participated.
I would like to focus a question on search and rescue. You mentioned your role, Commander Nixon. Of course, there was welcome news about the new C-295 acquisition to replace the Hercs, which was announced just recently. This is good news because the new aircraft will have forward-looking infrared radar, which the C-130s didn't have. So they are going to be able to look at persons and vehicles on the ground amidst the white. This is great news.
But I was concerned. I have learned that the C-295 at 480 kilometres per hour is really much slower than the C-130 at 660 kilometres per hour. My research for the defence round table showed that none of the Hercs that now fly out of Trenton, Ontario; Greenwood, Nova Scotia; and Winnipeg make Iqaluit in three hours of flying time from those bases right now. So now we will have slower aircraft with better technological capabilities, but it means that the recommendation we came up with in our round table, which was echoed by a recommendation of this committee much earlier, to reposition those aircraft in either Iqaluit or Yellowknife, where you noted you have detachments, or even Cambridge Bay, would significantly improve response time. It would increase the ability of those aircraft to do on- station time with much more fuel.
You're part of the establishment that is reviewing this whole defence policy right now. Do you support the repositioning of these new search and rescue aircraft closer to where they are needed in the Arctic? I don't need to tell you, Iqaluit is in the southeastern part of the Eastern Arctic. This is a huge territory, as you have pointed out. Would we be able to do a better job with search and rescue by repositioning those aircraft closer to the Arctic?
Brig.-Gen. Nixon: Great question, senator. Thank you for that. It was a privilege to have some of my team come to your sponsored discussions of the DPR, which I believe will be out in the not-too-distant future. So I would be remiss not to offer you my thanks, because it allowed us to engage with some folks not only from Nunavut but from all three territories.
With respect to resources and the placing of resources for search and rescue, it's well beyond obviously JTFN's mandate to decide the best locations for resources, except when it comes to a specific operation or a specific event that is determined in advance to things positioned in a place for a temporary period. I would say that would be the case where I would see positioning things in remote locations for a specific series of events, which could drastically reduce response times. But that would be based on a scenario that one was anticipating, such as transit of a cruise ship, for example, that wasn't as well prepared as what we saw last summer with the Crystal Serenity. Another cruise ship may not take the steps necessary in working with the Coast Guard and other partners, so we could look at that.
On a permanent basis, though, that would be a question I think that the folks at headquarters would have to look at and answer. I do know — you mentioned the three-hour transit time from Winnipeg to Nunavut — if that central location, hypothetically speaking, was Yellowknife, it's really no closer geographically than Winnipeg when you look at transit times. The ability of the aircraft assets we have now, whether it's rotary wing or fixed wing, to be able to deploy, refuel and then conduct search and rescue operations is a challenge coast to coast, just because of the vastness of our country.
So I can't necessarily speak beyond what we would look at in a specific case-by-case scenario that we were preparing for versus a permanent bed-down. That question would have to be posed to somebody who had responsibility both for all of the assets and for all of the tasks.
Senator Patterson: Would you agree, though, that these are slower planes than the Hercules and represent a reduction in capability in the sense of response time?
Brig.-Gen. Nixon: I'm not aware of the difference between the two platforms in terms of the speed of transit and the speed of flight. I haven't done a lot of research on that, not being a pilot.
But I do know that the advantage of search and rescue platforms is in loiter time and the ability to conduct the search of vast areas. The North is very vast, as we have already discussed, so the transit times to get from point A to point B would be a factor in planning. As we all know, for response in the North, time is one of the critical factors.
I think the more important factor would be the ability to loiter or to be able to search vast areas for a prolonged period. You're then not necessarily talking about speed but being able to stay on station.
Senator Patterson: I would like to focus on the Canadian Rangers. You mentioned the Rangers. We're very proud of them. They have a presence in all of our northern communities. They are very experienced on the land.
I am wondering if you would have any comments on recommendations made by the Fisheries and Oceans Committee in December 2009, and by my defence policy review, that DND explore a potential MOU with the Rangers and the Coast Guard to provide additional support to marine search and rescue services as exists with the Government of the NWT, the RCMP and the NWT.
Rangers are limited to searching on the land right now. The Inuit, especially our marine people, have knowledge and a capability in not only search and rescue but things like oil-spill response. What do you think about expanding the role of the Rangers to give them a marine capability?
Brig.-Gen. Nixon: Before I refer to the CO, who can offer some comments, I will just say a couple of things.
You mentioned that the Rangers are limited to ground search and rescue. That's the primary region they focus on, but they have conducted search and rescues along coastlines, using personal watercraft. They have done it over snow, over ice with vehicles and systems. I think "surface-based'' is a better way to describe ground search and rescue.
The term you used was "memorandum of understanding'' between DND, the Coast Guard and the Rangers. The Rangers are part of DND, part of the Canadian Armed Forces, so it's one in the same.
An MOU with the Coast Guard kind of exists already because we are both federal departments. They have the lead when it comes to maritime search and rescue. We are in a supporting role regardless of the size of vessel or the number of sailors or soldiers involved.
I know the Coast Guard has expanded and has a Coast Guard Auxiliary in location in several communities already. They are the Coast Guard. They have the technical expertise and, probably, the procurement expertise to be able to decide on the proper size of vessel, whether it's an open or closed vessel, how many horsepower, et cetera.
I would see any support being Coast Guard-led, as it is now, with continued DND — in this case Ranger — support, which, by the way, is very quick and effective if it's requested. If it's asked for and is requested through a request for assistance, I actually hold the authority to authorize that immediately, and we do the paperwork later. It can be done quite quickly. For all intents and purposes, the agreements are in place.
I'll just ask the CO if he has any additional comments.
Lieutenant-Colonel Luis Carvallo, Commanding Officer, 1st Canadian Ranger Patrol Group, National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces: Thank you, senators, for the opportunity to speak before you here today and to answer this question.
When it comes to the Rangers, it's unique by community and what capabilities are intrinsic to that community. We do not provide the vessels to be able to provide this support. It would have to be tailored to what the community already has on hand.
To have something to be able to project far away from the coastline would be a little bit of a challenge for a lot of our communities; we would have to tailor that for each community.
Senator Patterson: Thank you.
The Chair: Before we move off that subject, if I recall correctly, our witnesses here a couple of weeks ago presented some testimony to us that the Coast Guard was considering going into an auxiliary type of arrangement with the Rangers in various communities along the coastline. Do you have any further information on that, along the lines of what was being discussed?
Brig.-Gen. Nixon: From my perspective, senator, I don't have anything specific other than to say that I know that in some communities, based on size, when you look at not only the Coast Guard or the Rangers but the community- based volunteer search and rescue organizations that exist in several communities, in some cases, the individual could be one and the same person.
The Chair: I understand that.
Brig.-Gen. Nixon: I am not aware of any formal agreement between the Rangers and the Coast Guard, unless there is a local initiative that I'm not aware of.
The Chair: We'll check and get back to you on that. I'm positive we had some testimony here that referred to the possibility of an auxiliary wing for the purpose of the Coast Guard.
Senator White: I have a two-part question. First, do our bases in Inuvik and Iqaluit have the ability to house the new aircraft overnight, or are the hangars too small? I can't remember.
Brig.-Gen. Nixon: The locations that are maintained by NORAD, those two locations have the capacity to house anything within NORAD's inventory, not just within the Canadian inventory. The answer to the question would be "yes.''
Senator White: Thank you very much. The second question surrounds the Ranger program. If we look at the next three, five or 10 years out, what does the Ranger program look like? Are you seeing an uptake on recruiting from the Junior Canadian Rangers Program into mainstream Department of National Defence?
Brig.-Gen. Nixon: On the first part of the question, as you project forward, we see some things that are in motion now. If you take the changes to equipment that occurred over the last number of months or last couple of years, we'll go into the next few years. The first thing you will see is an increase in capability that the Rangers have both in terms of personal weapons and in terms of clothing and equipment. The Ranger program, especially in the North — there are six different patrols — is unique, as you can imagine, because of its location.
There is a balance between equipping and austerity that is kind of a sweet spot that you have to achieve. We rely, as the CO has already mentioned, on the Rangers for a lot of their own equipment when it comes to deploying out on sovereignty patrols. Whether that's a stove, a tent or a snow machine, usually a per diem is paid to each Ranger for their equipment.
The equipment side will be one thing you will see based on delivery of a couple of minor capital projects to increase their capability. Then there is the size question as well. That has been asked a few times.
I know during some discussions I have had with folks and my higher headquarters on expanding the Ranger patrol in particular, 1 CRPG, in terms of personnel, in terms of number of patrols, would serve to expand the footprint, for sure, but would have to be predicated on an increase in training and support mechanisms because, as I mentioned, it is the largest unit in the Canadian Armed Forces at 1,800 people and has a very modest support and training tail that is able to keep up with the current construct but would have to increase.
That may be another change you would see in the coming years if, indeed, the Rangers increase would be an increase to the folks behind the scenes that are preparing, training and equipping the rangers.
As far as the Junior Canadian Rangers and whether we have been tracking that, I do not believe we have. It's like the cadet program. I'll let the CO respond to that one.
Lt.-Col. Carvallo: Thank you senator. At this time, when the Junior Rangers reach the age of 18 and leave the program, there is no tracking mechanism to see whether they are joining the Rangers or enrolling in the Canadian Armed Forces.
Ideally what we're looking for in the Junior Rangers is for them to move on to post-secondary education and those kinds of activities, and not necessarily just the military. It's much broader than just a recruiting mechanism for the Canadian Forces and the Rangers themselves.
Senator White: Based on the targets that National Defence has had over the last 5 and 10 years with diversity recruiting, though, I would see it as a bit of an opportunity that there is someone in your hands until they are 18, not to try to move them toward recruiting directly into the military, and particularly when you look at the high school programs in particular in Nunavut. I spent 19 years up in the three territories, and the high school education program certainly isn't always conducive to people moving into the university realm. It is much more difficult. It is certainly a real opportunity for you. I would question not tracking, but I would also question not actually targeting Inuit, Metis and First Nations to increase the numbers based on the demands that are on you for recruiting diversity right now.
Brig.-Gen. Nixon: Thank you, senator. Much like the cadet program in Southern Canada, the ranger program is actually managed under the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, the Director General of Reserves and Cadets. There are limitations that you are not actually able to use them as a recruiting mechanism. They are a youth program, first and foremost, and they are designed to bring out the best in young Canadians.
If an individual does choose to transition into the Regular Force or the Reserve Force, for that matter, after a career as a cadet, that's an individual decision, and we don't necessarily use it as a recruiting mechanism, and I don't think we would start.
The Chair: Speaking as the chairman here, I don't know why you wouldn't, quite frankly. I know that it's a political decision that would have to be taken in respect to ensuring that people like yourself could utilize the tools that you have to encourage people to become part of the military. It's a question that has to be put to the Minister of Defence, not to you. I for one would say that we should be doing it.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: Thank you Mr. Chair and Brigadier-General Nixon.
In your opinion, what should be Canada's primary security concerns in the Arctic? Would they be military threats, search and rescue, commercial vessels in the Arctic, smuggling or terrorism? What's your main concern at this time?
Brig.-Gen. Nixon: Thank you for your question, Senator Dagenais. It's an excellent question. If I knew the answer, I would probably have my boss's job.
[English]
It is difficult to say. First of all, direct military threat is not on the high priority list, from my perspective. I know there's a bilateral agreement for the aeronautical side with NORAD and Canada, for the U.S. and Canada through NORAD to look at that space, the aeronautical space. But from a land-centric perspective and from a coastal perspective, our main focus really is supporting and assuring the security of Canadians living in the North, whatever that means. That can mean everything from a fault in infrastructure, a catastrophic fault of infrastructure that goes beyond the capacity of the community or a territory to deal with and that then requires federal intervention, and then we would be in support of federal public safety, as we're all aware. That is pretty much across the North.
We maintain sovereignty, not just by going on military operations in the High Arctic, but also by supporting Canadians across the North in the various communities and helping deal with challenges that they may one day face. We fortunately have outstanding team members that are part of the federal family up here, but also the territorial constructs are excellent as well for fostering those partnerships that we rely on. So the biggest concern would be protecting Canadians in the North, and that's kind of the soft side of defence if you look at it from that perspective. So there is no major military threat from a ground-centric perspective.
The ability to be able to be good stewards of the environment is also a huge priority as well. It is a fragile environment in the North. Changes to the polar icecap affect not only military operations but commercial activity and private enterprise as well. We do have a concern that comes up every year in the summer and is beginning to be a little bit more prevalent in the winter as well, and that's with adventurers who decide on their own to challenge themselves in Canada's North. For the most part it's done properly with the right level of preparation. Other times it's not, and we have to respond.
So those are the three things: the protection of Canadians in the North, being good protectors of our own environment and then looking after visitors to our territories.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: Brigadier-General Nixon, you said at the start of your presentation that a number of countries surround the Arctic. It's a coveted region. With climate change, the region could be even more coveted. Let's look at the nature and severity of current or future security threats in the northern region. If significant new investments are warranted, should the targets of these investments include warning systems or new satellites that can provide more accurate weather forecasts, an important aspect for your activities in the region? If investments are required, what positions should we invest in and what would you like to see in our report on the matter?
Brig.-Gen. Nixon: That's another good question. As a commanding officer, the most significant capacity for me is probably the ability to communicate everywhere with the Government of Canada. This is a real challenge for us as a result of the current system, but I'm sure our system will be stronger in the future. However, I'm not part of the organization responsible for purchasing these systems or conducting the research to obtain them. In short, this system and capacity are the most significant for us.
Senator Dagenais: Thank you, Brigadier-General Nixon.
[English]
Senator Meredith: Thank you both for representing Canada today and for your service and your family's service to this country. We thank you for that.
With respect to the question that Senator Dagenais just posed to you, the government intention to spend $133 million, what would be your wish list for these funds to be spent on with respect to surveillance and how we move forward here? You see the deficiencies. What should these funds be spent on?
Brig.-Gen. Nixon: That's a good question, senator, especially a couple of weeks before Christmas.
Senator Meredith: There you go. It's a gift.
Brig.-Gen. Nixon: As I mentioned, the enhancement of communications in the North. This is ongoing and has been for a number of years. We face challenges every day with communications. We do have the redundancy in place to be able to communicate effectively across the North using high-frequency systems, but with today's technology, the ability to be able to pass large amounts of data is more advanced.
I will use a very simplistic example. We recently had an issue just off the Hall Beach area in the North where some sounds were emitting from the ice. As part of defence, we were asked to take a look at it. The ability to locate something of interest and to quickly transmit back what that is is perhaps an area where we could use a little investment because we are relying on systems that do work, but they are not necessarily keeping up with the pace of technology that we're used to in the South. Having said that, I do not think we will ever replicate completely on any spectrum, whether it's situational awareness, communications, you name it, in the North what we do have in the South simply because a cost-benefit analysis probably would not support an investment in the requisite infrastructure.
Modest investment is probably the way to go, from my perspective, from my needs here in the North.
For the wider surveillance security of Canada, it's well beyond my capacity to be able to respond to that question.
Senator Meredith: Thank you. Lieutenant-Colonel Carvallo, with respect to the Ranger program, my colleagues have asked about the Junior Ranger Program and the challenges that these Rangers face. Brigadier-general, you indicated there are 1,800 members currently. What are the challenges around retaining them, especially in the North, and how do we equip them to ensure that they are sustained going forward? We talk about the challenges with per diems being paid, and we heard this before from other witnesses with respect to the reservists and the fact that they also have limited equipment when they do go out.
How can you sustain them and ensure that they are retained and trained properly? What is your strategy along those lines?
Brig.-Gen. Nixon: Just before the CO takes over, for clarity, 1,800 is the number that I used to describe the establishment. Manning is somewhere less than 1,800, and that's pretty much standard across any establishment where you have an establishment and you're manned at under your establishment. Luis?
Lt.-Col. Carvallo: Yes, we have an establishment of 1,800. We are presently running around 1,500 Rangers in 1st Canadian Ranger Patrol Group, and that's just north of 60 for my unit alone. As indicated already, there are five Canadian Ranger patrol groups across Canada, and the overall establishment for all of those is approximately 5,000. I cannot speak on behalf of those other units, but in my unit retention is not necessarily a challenge. There's a lot of pride in being a Ranger amongst the communities. In most cases we have a lot of people waiting to get in.
We have been cleaning up the books to make sure that we can open up those positions for more Rangers to come on board. So that is not a challenge.
Maintaining the training is a challenge, and that's primarily, as the commander already said, because there is still a need for more resources, human resources, trainers to be able to be able to project into the communities and ensure that ongoing training for the Rangers.
Senator Meredith: Is there a strategy in place to actually recruit from the communities? What has been the response?
Brig.-Gen. Nixon: Specifically for the Rangers, the Rangers are the recruiters in the community. The moment they put on their red hoodies, they are easily identifiable. I don't have a red hoodie, but I have been asked when in remote communities if I was a Ranger because it is the identifiable component of the Canadian Armed Forces in the remote communities.
With respect to a wider recruiting base for the wider Canadian Forces, the Canadian Forces recruiting group does maintain a team that travels to remote communities to recruit on a regular basis, and part of it is done centrally where they come to a central location and then spread out from there, and other times they just simply go into some of the larger communities and set up their mini recruiting centre for a period of time.
Also, for all of our operations that we conduct, it doesn't matter whether it's focused more on the hard sovereignty exercise operation or more on a community-building exercise operation. We always have a recruiting component to it where we invite the experts, the people who are trained in recruiting, to come with us to set up on the community days.
It's not like it is in a city like Toronto, for example, where there are recruiting centres around. It is more temporary, but that's just simply based on the size and the population, and it's not an easy endeavour. It's just the scheduling to be able to get to the places.
Senator Meredith: Thank you so much.
Senator Patterson: I will be candid with the presenters. I was a little bit dismayed to hear you say in your opening remarks that in 2015 fewer than 5 per cent of SAR incidents occurred north of 60. I'd like to put to you that this is not the emphasis that you should make in looking at search and rescue.
I have a couple of quick facts that came out in my research: 12,000 transpolar flights in 2012, an 1,100 per cent increase over nine years; 2010, five shipping accidents — this is all north of 60 — three vessels were tankers, and the other two were passenger cruise ship types of vessels. With climate change, we can expect more vessel traffic, and many more polar flights are occurring as well.
My point is that, yes, we may have a small number of SAR issues in the North compared to the rest of Canada, but these issues can be catastrophic.
Now, even DND lost a Herc about 12 miles from Alert on approach in 1991. Thirteen passengers, five fatalities because it took 30 hours to get to them from those southern bases, which I think must be reconsidered.
You talked about your mandate to respond quickly and effectively. Considering the chances of catastrophic accidents occurring in a remote location and time being of the essence to rescue marine passengers or commercial plane passengers, isn't that the emphasis that should be made in talking about improving SAR response time in the Arctic?
Brig.-Gen. Nixon: Thank you, senator, and there's no arguing with your statistics. On the transpolar flight numbers that you presented, yes, they are vastly increasing, with a whole bunch of impacts, all the way from the environment to concerns about safety.
The Canadian Armed Forces does maintain a standing operation major air disaster response. That has been around for years. It's very capable with a high state of readiness to respond to just that event, and it's centrally located in Canada, in Trenton, Ontario, to be able to respond to disasters from an aeronautical perspective, and we're talking about a major air disaster here when we're talking about transporter flights.
I'm equally concerned about the multitude of medium-sized lift aircraft such as the 50 flights a week that go into a mine like the Ekati mine in the Northwest Territories here in response to that. Those contingencies are in place.
The 5 per cent north of 60 that I referred to is 5 per cent of the Canadian Armed Forces-led search and rescue missions in 2015. Yes, there are a multitude of search and rescue, mainly GSAR, and almost on a weekly basis, or in some cases a daily basis, in the North, but those are responded to or reacted to or resolved before they become a national issue because of the robustness that I mentioned in my initial comments across the communities in the North.
It's when you have an unforeseen, which you have already mentioned, such as transporter flights, such as a maritime situation which falls under the purview of the Canadian Coast Guard as the lead agency to respond.
Those are all covered with contingency operations. I don't see and I could never see a situation where by placing the resources that we have currently in Trenton with the requisite parachute jumpers, the search and rescue technicians, the troops that are designed to maintain the equipment on the ground to respond to major air disaster, I can't see where putting that anywhere else but where it is right now would be anything but less than as effective as it is right now.
Senator Patterson: Senator White asked you about the FOL locations in Inuvik and Iqaluit. Could you develop the capacity to support the new technically superior but slower C-295 aircraft in Yellowknife and Iqaluit, given the infrastructure that's available there?
Brig.-Gen. Nixon: You mean from a base perspective or from a stopover temporary perspective?
Senator Patterson: From a base perspective, yes.
Brig.-Gen. Nixon: The infrastructure that exists in three locations — Yellowknife, Inuvik and Iqaluit — to support NORAD operations is specifically designed and specifically designated as a NORAD asset. It is, first and foremost, for aeronautical defence responses.
On a temporarily basis, yes it could, but from a basing perspective, that is not what the design is for. The design is for a much faster response capability and a much more direct response than a search and rescue asset. But by all means, we have supported search and rescue out of all three locations in the past, as we have out of other locations, such as the Canadian Armed Forces Arctic Training Centre in Resolute Bay, and a variety of locations across the North.
Whoever is actually running the camera, we're two questions behind on the camera, so we haven't moved, senators.
Senator Patterson: I'd just like to switch back to the Rangers, if I may. I understood that there had been political commitments to increase the size of the Rangers to 6,000, I believe, in the North. Where are we at with that? And second, could you comment on the stage we are at in terms of providing the Rangers with new rifles?
Brig.-Gen. Nixon: On the first part, senator, thanks for that. Yes, I believe 5,000 was the number. It was from a couple of years ago. It wasn't 1 CRPG, it was all of the CRPGs combined to increase. There was an increase that occurred. In some cases, it's still ongoing; we still have a few people who are awaiting the proper checks to be fully enrolled. It is difficult without having a lot of the capacities to be able to deal with that in small communities. That is ongoing.
That is one of the reasons why I made the comment earlier about further expansion. A further increase in size must be preceded by an increase in the capacity to be able to do so. That just makes common sense, to not arbitrarily increase a number without the bits and pieces in place to be able to do it successfully.
On the second question, when it comes to rifles, the new rifle is on the verge of being issued. We have two things that will happen concurrently. The rifle will be issued across the Ranger patrols. I'll ask the CO to comment in a minute. I'm not sure whether there is a sequence that has been established or how the army is going to deliver those.
But there will also be the disposal of the existing Lee-Enfield 303s that have to be properly disposed of in a comprehensive manner. Those two things are happening concurrently. Do you have a follow up?
Senator Patterson: Yes, I have a quick supplementary on the disposal of the trusty Lee-Enfields, which I think many of the Rangers really like because they don't freeze in the cold. They work very well in extreme cold weather.
Prime Minister Harper made an announcement that Rangers would be allowed to keep the old Lee-Enfields when they were replaced. I was alarmed to hear you say they are going to be disposed of. I hope by disposal you meant, "given to those faithful and loyal servants of ours in the Far North.''
Brig.-Gen. Nixon: Senator, thank you. I'm tainted by my past. I did spend two years as the Director of Land Requirements, in which I was responsible for army equipment. In fact, the Rangers rifle replacement was one of the program files I dealt with about five or six years ago.
I used "disposal''; maybe I should have used "divested.'' We are going to get rid of the 303s, so they will not be on our books anymore. I will refer to the CO to talk a little bit, but before I do that, I will say on the new weapon, having seen it in action and having talked to a number of Rangers about it, if given a choice, the Lee-Enfield 303 would be left behind in favour of the new weapon. It is pretty phenomenal.
Lt.-Col. Carvallo: Thank you, senator. I have just two points. The first one is on the C-19 rifle. Right now the army is looking at initiating the issue of a rifle sometime in 2017, starting with the program of actual issue. It may take a little bit more than a year or two to actually get the rifle across to all Rangers, but there is a deliberate plan being developed by the Canadian Army for the issue of the rifle, and you will will probably start seeing something in mid- to late 2017 on that. That includes, at present, some of the train-the-trainer activities that are already ongoing.
On your question regarding the expansion of the Rangers that was already brought up by my commander, the numbers within my unit were brought up to 1,800 under the previous government's request to expand the Rangers. We are not there yet. I'm meeting that number. We're still cleaning up some of our books and still doing active recruiting to get up to the 1,800.
As part of that expansion, we did go up to 60 patrols; we are now at 60 patrols across the North.
The Chair: Colleagues, I would like to follow up on Senator Patterson's question. Are we going to give the old Lee- Enfield rifles when they are replaced with the new rifle? Is that the final decision? I don't think we quite got an answer there.
Lt.-Col. Carvallo: Yes, the intent is to provide it as a gift to existing Rangers who have a rifle in possession at this point in time. There will be a process to make sure that the rifle is gifted properly to those Rangers. We're working in concert with other government departments make sure that is done correctly.
The Chair: I'm sure it can be done fairly quickly at that time, when they get the rifle.
Senator Beyak: Thank you very much, gentlemen. I wondered how long it takes to enroll in the Rangers program. You mentioned the gap of 300, and I wondered how long it would take to erase that gap.
Lt.-Col. Carvallo: Thank you, senator. The initiation of recruitment is unique to the Rangers patrol groups in that we do our own active recruiting and it commences at the community level. Once there is the intent to recruit, first you have to identify other positions still available within the patrols. Some patrols are already at capacity, but where there is capacity available, those patrols can do recruiting. The paperwork is similar to what a normal individual would go through to join the Primary Reserves or the Regular Force. There are still enhanced reliability screenings that need to be done in each of those cases; we still need to follow through with that.
The exact amount of time it takes depends on how quickly we can get the paperwork back to Ottawa to be finalized and processed. But for the most part, we have Rangers already waiting on the sidelines to join at any given time. The biggest challenge we have right now is to create those positions by actively releasing some of the people who have already left the program.
The Chair: We're coming to a conclusion here, so I have a couple of questions. I want to follow up on the Rangers here one more time. I believe I recall, over the course of testimony that was presented in this committee over the years, that at one time I thought there was a number — 5,300 — of positions open for the Rangers and that the long-term objective was to go to a number of 6,000. Are you telling me that the 5,000 is the optimum number?
Brig.-Gen. Nixon: I'll ask the CO to make a comment. I know that 5,000 is the stated number at the present time for the Ranger program writ large, from coast to coast to coast.
Lt.-Col. Carvallo: Yes, that is correct, senator. Five thousand is the number. Since my time coming into command in June, it's the number that has been socialized and advertised.
The Chair: I know why that's the number, but what I'm asking is, in looking forward and going forward to some of the other questions that were asked, are we projecting eventually going to 6,000? Or are you strictly going to maintain it at 5,000?
Brig.-Gen. Nixon: That would be a policy question that may or may not be part of the DPR when it is actually released in the near future. I know that when I have talked to different patrols across the North, there is a common urge to get larger, but that's goodwill. We have to base it on a policy number because it's tied not only to this budget but to the budget of the army.
The Chair: Right now, we will assume that the budget is for 5,000, and it will be up to people such as us to influence if we want to go to 6,000. Okay, we'll pass that.
I would like to go back to the helicopters and Senator Patterson's initial questions about, I believe, the CH-148 Cyclones. The question was that north of 60 is where 5 per cent of the SARs actually took place.
Has a study ever been undertaken that would reflect the difference between the time taken to take off from a place like Iqaluit or Yellowknife to do an SAR, whether it is in the northern part of the province or the North itself? I know that every time we ask this question, we always come back and say, "Trenton is a wonderful place. It's a great place to be. It has been there for 100 years. Why would we move it?'' Now, obviously, technology has changed, and there is more activity in the northern parts of the provinces as well as the North itself. It begs the question that if you relocate it from Winnipeg to say Yellowknife, and you're going south or north, you split the difference as far as time is concerned. I hope I make myself clear here. Has there ever been a study done to say in view of the past history, if we had been located in Yellowknife or Iqaluit, we would have been able to service both ends in a much quicker time? Because we all agree time is the most important factor.
Brig.-Gen. Nixon: Very interesting question and concept, Mr. Chair. I'm not aware of any study done by the search and rescue community. I can say that we do conduct a national search and rescue exercise on an annual basis. This year it was conducted here in Yellowknife, which is central in the southern Arctic, as you're aware. That was in order for search and rescue technicians to practise the skill sets required for the local environment, which is a lot of water and remote terrain to operate in. So I know that was conducted. But as for a study to determine response times and what would have made a difference in certain cases, I'm not aware of any study.
The Chair: Could you maybe undertake to ask that question and to see whether there could be a preliminary general study done of the past five years to see what the difference would be? I think it would be a very good question to ask. At least you would get a sense.
Brig.-Gen. Nixon: I certainly could. I could request the search and rescue experts at my higher headquarters CJOC to comment.
The Chair: That would be great, if you could send it back to us.
I would like to get a little closer to home, since Senator Patterson is from Nunavut. I'm on the other side. I'm from the Yukon, as you well know. I would like to ask if you could give us an update on the pan-territorial multiplex cadet facility that is planned for the Joe Boyle Barracks setting in Whitehorse. We're really looking forward to it. Can you update us on that?
Brig.-Gen. Nixon: I know it has been announced. I believe the ground is being broken this year, if I'm correct. I would have to go back and check with the real property folks. But the ground is being broken this year. It will be there for supporting the cadet activities across the North, across the Yukon, not just for the community of Whitehorse but for the wider cadet movement. As you know, the Joe Boyle camp is a phenomenal facility, but it has seasonal limitations, and the construction of this facility will allow for more activity to occur. If you want, I'll get my real property folks to provide a written update and submit it to you.
The Chair: I would appreciate it. I want to say for the members here on the committee that the plan is to build a multi-purpose facility at the cadet camp. It's projected to be about $5 million. It's going to be a multi-purpose facility, which is primarily, as the general said, for the cadets. We host up to 300 cadets in the summer from Canada but also internationally, and this facility will be a real asset to the community of Whitehorse, and perhaps maybe for the Rangers and others that may use it over the winter. Just as a thought, I want to say thank you very much for that.
One other question has been raised. This is local again, and I'm sure everybody is really interested here around the table. I'm going to put the question. There has been a request to re-establish a regiment in Yukon. We had a regiment in years past. Are any steps being taken towards that direction?
Brig.-Gen. Nixon: I will say that establishing a regiment, which would be an army unit, much like 1 CRPG is an army unit. It's under operational control of my headquarters and me. That's a question best posed to the army. Not to my knowledge are there any initiatives to look at establishment of a reserve unit, which I think is what we are talking about, a field unit or subunit, in Whitehorse at this time, none that I'm aware of. But, again, it would be a question for the army commander.
The Chair: We'll continue to pursue it there. Are there more questions, colleagues?
I want to thank our witnesses. Thank you very much. You have given us a fair amount of information here that I know will be of value as we come to the conclusion on our defence policy review. I want to thank Senator Patterson for attending on behalf of Nunavut because it helped with the discussion taking place.
Gentlemen, thank you very much. We will excuse you, and we will go in camera for a few minutes. So thank you very much.
(The committee continued in camera.)