THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
EVIDENCE
OTTAWA, Thursday, April 28, 2022
The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met with videoconference this day at 11:29 a.m. [ET] to examine and report on the Canadian foreign service and elements of the foreign policy machinery within Global Affairs Canada; and to study foreign relations and international trade generally.
Senator Peter M. Boehm (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: My name is Peter Boehm, I am a senator from Ontario and Chair of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Before we begin, I wish to introduce committee members participating in today’s meeting: Senator Gwen Boniface, from Ontario; Senator Jane Cordy, from Nova Scotia; Senator Mary Coyle, from Nova Scotia; Senator Marty Deacon, from Ontario; Senator Amina Gerba, from Quebec; Senator Stephen Greene, from Nova Scotia; Senator Michael L. MacDonald, from Nova Scotia; Senator Victor Oh, from Ontario; Senator Mohamed-Iqbal Ravalia, from Newfoundland and Labrador; Senator David Richards, from New Brunswick; and Senator Yuen Pau Woo, from British Columbia.
[Translation]
I wish to welcome all of you as well as people across the country who may be watching. We are conducting a hybrid meeting and I’d like to remind senators and witnesses taking part by videoconference to please keep your microphones muted at all times, unless recognized by name by the chair.
I will ask senators to use the “raise hand” feature to be recognized. Those present here in the committee room can signal to the clerk their desire to ask questions or to comment.
Should any technical challenges arise, particularly in relation to interpretation, please signal this to the chair or the clerk and we will work to resolve the issue.
Today, for the first hour of our meeting, we continue our special study on the Canadian foreign service and elements of the foreign policy machinery within Global Affairs Canada. We began this study on April 7 so we are still in the early stages.
[English]
For the second hour of our meeting, we will welcome the Minister of Foreign Affairs with whom we will discuss the situation in Ukraine specifically. At a later date, we will invite the minister to appear on this foreign service study, so the opportunity to ask the minister questions on that topic will come in the future.
I would now like to introduce our three witnesses this morning. I think in your notes you’ve seen their biographies. They are all distinguished Canadians. Abbie Dann, an experienced former diplomat, was Canada’s ambassador to Ukraine from 2005 to 2008 and is now a member of the board of directors of the Canadian Executive Service Organization.
[Translation]
We have with us Gilles Rivard, a former diplomat and ambassador, who is now a Fellow at the Montreal Institute of International Studies. In 2013, he was appointed Assistant Deputy Minister responsible for the amalgamation of CIDA and, as Global Affairs Canada was then called, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, or DFAIT.
[English]
Finally, Len Edwards, who has basically done it all, former diplomat, former deputy minister of both international trade and foreign affairs, G20 sherpa, G7 sherpa, Deputy Minister of Agriculture and ambassador to Japan and Korea. Mr. Edwards is now a policy fellow at the Johnson Shoyama Graduate School of Public Policy.
I would like to welcome our three panellists and thank you for joining us. I wish to remind you that opening remarks should be no more than five minutes each or I will, unfortunately, have to cut you off. After your remarks in sequence, we will then go to a Question Period with senators. Ms. Dann, the floor is yours.
Abbie Dann, Member of the Board of Directors, Canadian Executive Service Organization, as an individual: Good morning, senators, colleagues and friends. Thank you for the opportunity to address this committee. The subject you’re tackling is critical to Canada’s success as a nation in advancing the interests of its citizens and the interest of all global citizens.
First, to answer the big question, “Is Canada’s foreign service fit for the purpose of delivering on our foreign policy objectives?” I would say, by and large, for current purposes, yes. Looking at the most recent Global Affairs results and the plan for next year, it is clear we have a solid foreign service that delivers current programs. But do we have the best foreign service that we could have, and will it continue to meet Canada’s needs with a planning horizon of, say, the next 25 years? I have some suggestions for making our foreign service better and even optimal in serving Canada now and in the longer term in this tough and increasingly volatile world.
I will speak to three points: first, the new foreign policy challenges of our world and how they affect the fit-for-purpose issue; second, foreign service recruitment and composition education; and third, comparative advantage. Who is the foreign service competition? Where are the models?
First, emerging policy challenges. Over the last 15 or so years, GAC’s policy development capacity, including geographic expertise, decreased as governments gave priority to program delivery. The latest departmental plan suggests this may be changing. However, are we adequately preparing our foreign service to face the challenges of this very uncertain century? We need well-thought-out policies and trained professionals capable of dealing with new horizontal factors affecting international relations, such as cyber warfare, disinformation, interaction with social media and countering the manipulative step track diplomacy by autocratic governments who use it to distort international rules-based systems.
The department is the natural nexus to lead an all-of-Canada program with academics, experts and international-relations NGOs to prepare realistically for these challenges.
Second, composition of the foreign service. In recent years some have questioned the very concept of maintaining a dedicated foreign service. Their idea is that our international interests can be served just as well by rotating interested public servants in and out of single assignments. I fundamentally disagree with this view. The point of the foreign service is foreign service. Diplomacy is a professional skill like medicine, teaching or law. You train for it, and you commit to practising it. Ideally, it’s a vocation. You cannot just take a smart person, add diplomatic powder, stir and, voilà, you have a diplomat. The foreign service needs a core group of trained rotational diplomatic professionals, perhaps 70% of the foreign service component, which can be complemented, certainly, by individual specialists who may transfer in and out of the foreign service. Why? Because, as a diplomat, your reputation and networks travel with you and you build knowledge, contacts and creditability in international circles. This professional baggage becomes an asset for Canada. All foreign service officers need to go through a shared core program of professional development to optimize the continuity of Canada’s international diplomatic presence.
To have an optimal foreign service, it is best if the majority of the departmental leadership has also acquired this foreign service experience so they can understand the demanding context people work in, and they are seen as professional diplomats by their international counterparts.
Our foreign service also needs a straightforward recruitment process to enlist our best and brightest from across Canadian society and a plan to retain them by offering a clear and rewarding career path. Until very recently, this process has been exceptionally opaque and off-putting to our young people.
Finally, historically, the foreign service has been a key department supporting Canadian identity and nation building by recruiting across regions, groups and languages. As we become ever more multicultural and diverse, fostering a sense of Canadians committed to international goals in our foreign service is more essential than ever. Bottom line: We need a dedicated foreign service.
Regarding my third point, diplomatic comparative advantage and Canada’s positioning, no foreign service exists in a vacuum. I urge the committee to conduct a comparative analysis of what the most successful foreign services in the world are doing. They are our competition. Other countries — the Scandinavians, Germans, Brazilians — continue to invest considerable policy energy, education and funding in their foreign services. What are they doing to prepare their foreign services to be fit for future purpose, especially in the area of education?
The Chair: Ms. Dann, I’m sorry, but I’m going to interrupt you. We passed the five-minute mark. Perhaps the last point can be teased out in Question Period. Thank you for your remarks.
[Translation]
Mr. Rivard, the floor is yours.
Gilles Rivard, Fellow, Montreal Institute of International Studies, as an individual: Thank you for inviting me to testify before you today. My presentation will deal with the impact of the merger of DFAIT and CIDA on the foreign service and on foreign policy. Well before that decision was made, when I was making a career at CIDA, I always believed that development aid was an integral part of our foreign policy “toolkit.” That view was not shared by everyone at CIDA, who saw the agency as somewhat more independent. When the decision was announced in March 2013, it was a shock for some people; they saw it as CIDA being swallowed by DFAIT, with the big fish gobbling up the little one.
There were positive things about the government’s decision at the time, though. Putting foreign affairs, trade and international development under the same roof helped to make our international relations more coherent. Differences in views or strategies before the merger — for example, the countries chosen for focusing bilateral aid — sometimes caused pointless friction in policy terms. With the merger, the situations could be better resolved among the deputy ministers and assistant deputy ministers.
Because I was one of the assistant deputy ministers responsible for the merger, as you said, Mr. Chair, I quickly became aware of the challenges to be met. Nine years later, a number of challenges remain.
First, let’s talk about human resources. Career advancement and rotationality within the department, with its FS — foreign service — levels are unique in the public service. CIDA personnel, on the other hand, had a career advancement system common to the entire public service, with its PM — project manager — and EC — economic and social science — groups. Without going into the technical details, that situation caused very complex problems with integration, and the human resources sector is consequently still working to unravel that Gordian knot.
Second, there is this perception, which is still alive and well in the department, that the people who work in development aren’t the “real FS.” On that point, I quote my colleague Margaret Biggs, who testified before this committee recently:
[English]
To be frank, history shows that foreign ministries traditionally see development as a secondary vocation. And integrated ministries in other countries have warned that development expertise bleeds away after a few years, weakening capacity and performance.
[Translation]
Global Affairs Canada didn’t escape that fact. The integration of CIDA into the department, where development was not central to its mandate, the lack of recognition of the crucial role of development, not to mention the people who were unable to join the FS stream — this collection of issues resulted in a number of professionals with wide experience in development leaving: program officers, contracts officers, financial officers, specialists, and so on. Important expertise was lost over the years and has only been partially replaced.
The arrival of a deputy minister of international development with thorough knowledge of development and the recent appointment of an assistant deputy minister for Africa with the same type of experience are good news for Global Affairs Canada.
We have to expand our efforts to recruit managers and officers who have development experience, at department headquarters and outside Canada, in order to rebuild our expertise. The Foreign Service Institute should expand and diversify training in project and program planning and management. We have to do more when we recruit new officers, in all streams, to encourage them to acquire development expertise.
A long-term solution to improve management of development-oriented positions, including our missions abroad, has to be found. Officers in the PM group or the “international aid” stream must not feel that they are at a disadvantage when it comes to career advancement and assignments abroad.
The merger has also had a significant impact on our bilateral relations with certain developing countries and the coherence of our development policy.
When this government came to power, it wanted to restore its relations with multilateral institutions, and this was an important and positive gesture. However, as the years have passed, and because of multiple crises, more and more aid funds have been transferred to the multilateral institutions to respond to those tragedies, the most recent being Ukraine.
It is much less risky to transfer funds to multilateral institutions than to work directly with governments of countries in need. It is visible in the short term, fast, and concrete, and it doesn’t need a lot of human resources to meet the demand. However, our reputation as a major donor and reliable partner is suffering as a result. Canada has a lot less influence in certain parts of the developing world than 10 or 20 years ago. The budget allocated to development aid has stagnated at around 0.3% of GDP, which is far from the 0.7% target. This committee should consider taking a look at the issue.
In closing, speaking of this committee, something easy could be done to give development the status it deserves, and that would be to rename it the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and International Development.
The Chair: Thank you for your presentation, Mr. Rivard.
[English]
Mr. Edwards, you have the floor.
Len Edwards, former deputy minister of international trade, foreign affairs, as an individual: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me begin by thanking the committee for inviting me to testify on this very timely study on Canada’s foreign service. With two distinguished former foreign service officers and ambassadors also testifying today, I thought I would try to give the perspective of a deputy minister looking down on and overseeing the foreign service and the value of what it means for the government.
Certainly, as deputy minister of both international trade and, later, foreign affairs, I was able to see that value. I was able to see the value the trade commissioners and foreign affairs services were contributing to Canada. However, with the relaxation of geopolitical tensions that followed the end of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the international economic boom time that began in the 1980s, that value was, perhaps, less evident. With so many government departments directly active abroad, there was, I could sense as a deputy, some doubt in government as to whether the foreign service was really necessary, especially given the cost and management complexities.
Today we live in a much more dangerous, complex and unpredictable world, and Canada needs a multidisciplinary foreign service of the highest quality to advise and inform governments in decision-making and to deliver the best results. Every domain of foreign activity has become more demanding: political relationships, diplomacy, maintenance of peace and stability, functioning of the multilateral system, economic and trade relations, assisting businesses abroad, promoting development and protecting Canadians working and travelling outside Canada.
Moreover, while in the past these areas could be pursued almost as separate activities, security and foreign policy considerations have increasingly impacted economic decision-making. Technology and the digital world are strategic assets. Economic measures are used to extract political concessions and punish aggressors like Russia in the Ukraine. Free trade agreements are giving way to lower-discipline special arrangements with non-trade elements. Deep experience is necessary in country and subject matter, such as international negotiation, developing interdisciplinary policy options and recommendations, creating and leading international partnerships, managing demanding relationships and the list goes on ending, of course, on an important factor: living in dangerous locations. These and other qualifications are now back in high demand and will remain so for decades to come.
While the new global environment raises machinery issues for leadership and coordination in government, not the least of which concerns Global Affairs’ role, its mandate for the oversight and management of our foreign service and its several branches certainly will be maintained.
First, in terms of oversight, I would suggest that one of the full deputies in Global Affairs be given the official role of head of the foreign service, reporting to the Clerk of the Privy Council as head of the public service. Ideally, it should be the deputy minister of foreign affairs, but it should always be someone who has been in the foreign service and understands its role and unique characteristics. This person would undertake to champion and lead the rebuilding of Canada’s foreign service to being one of the very best in the world.
Second, to do its job well in representing the government’s interests abroad, Canada’s foreign service must be exposed more directly to the work of domestic ministries most involved in international activities. This has always been a challenge — it was when I was deputy — but it could be done through an organized collective administrative agreement among Global Affairs and the involved departments to run a system of two-way exchanges that overcome the difficulties posed by different appointment systems.
Third, there should be a specific effort at the centre to select high potential foreign service executives, or EX, for senior assignments and domestic ministries to broaden outlook, develop executive skills and prepare them for assignment to associate and full deputy positions outside Global Affairs. Without such a system, it seems less likely that the Clerk of the Privy Council will have deputy-level individuals with foreign service experience available to fill deputy positions within Global Affairs.
Fourth, I believe that a high-quality rotational service, as others have mentioned, requires dedicated training and personnel resources to manage the foreign service given its specific needs and conditions of service. I would encourage the committee to look at this, to evaluate the current foreign service directors for their intended and unintended impacts and how they are interpreted.
Fifth and finally, the government should, if it has not already done so, return to a recruitment process to attract the very best men and women across Canada for the foreign service, people who reflect Canada’s makeup in every respect. Now, more than ever, we need this kind of representation abroad.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Edwards, for your presentation.
[Translation]
Colleagues, before turning it over to questions, I would remind committee members who are participating remotely to use the “raise hand” feature to indicate that you want to be added to the list our clerk is keeping.
[English]
I also wish to inform senators that you will each have a maximum of four minutes in the first round of questions. This includes questions and answers, so I would suggest that you keep your questions concise, and please indicate to whom you wish to direct your questions. We will begin with Senator Oh.
Senator Oh: Thank you, witnesses, for being with us today. My question is for Mr. Len Edwards.
Mr. Edwards, I want to ask you a question related to global governance in the new world order following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Based on your experience in the past, you have written about the role of the G7, noting that it is “our principal voice in supporting the reform and continued prevalence of the Western rules-based liberal order.”
How do you see the role of the G7 evolving given the sharp divide that has emerged between democratic nations and authoritarian nations like China and Russia?
Mr. Edwards: Thank you very much for that question. Since I was G7 sherpa, or G8 in those days — and Senator Boehm, of course, has more recent experience with the G7 and might have a better answer than I do — my view is that the G7 needs to evolve to this situation. The G7 is no longer the pinnacle of the global order when it comes to organizations that represent the majority of power, both economic and other, in this world. G7 countries have just over 50% of the global economy, so they are still a powerful unit.
However, other countries that are not in the G7 share some of the views of the G7. It might well be in the G7’s interest to develop relationships and perhaps even include them in future meetings of the G7, either expanding the G7 or having meetings with other countries. Here I am thinking, obviously, of democracies, countries that support the order that we have set up after the Second World War, which can work with us to deal with the threats we face from autocratic political systems but also from systems of economic governance that favour powerful states versus the broader community of interest.
Senator Oh: Do you believe that the G7 can continue to function effectively as the principal voice in sustaining a rules‑based international order in this kind of divided world?
Mr. Edwards: Yes, I do, but I think it’s not the role it has played before. It must be reaching out to other players much more, including emerging economies and democracies. While it could meet and continue to be a cohesive group, I think it needs to do more to engage other politically and economically like‑minded nations, especially those that are growing and that will assume more power in the future.
Senator MacDonald: Thank you to the witnesses. It’s good to see Mr. Edwards again. We met a few years ago at a conference in Korea.
I will direct this question to Mr. Rivard, as a former ambassador to the UN.
Mr. Rivard, I wanted to get your thoughts on the implications of the recent vote at the UN condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. That vote was widely reported as 141 to 5, but more than 40 states, including China and India, abstained or did not vote.
Would you view this number of abstentions, or not voting, as a product of these states seeking to keep their options open? Do you view Russia as being as isolated as has been reported?
Mr. Rivard: What happened during this famous vote, that the General Assembly took such a vote, has happened only a few times in the history of the UN. The fact that 140 countries supported this is a strong signal against Russia. The high level of abstentions also means that many countries that would normally support Russia didn’t support it. This is how one must analyze this.
Let me draw your attention to something that happened this week at the General Assembly. The General Assembly took a vote to invite countries that are using their veto to go before the General Assembly and make their case. When I was at the United Nations, Canada was pushing for a big reform of the Security Council. I will not get into details, but this is one of the first times members of the Security Council have been invited to explain their right of veto. If this had existed since the beginning, it means that Russia would have been invited about 140 times in front of the G8.
For me, this is a big signal that at least Mr. Guterres and the General Assembly are trying to take measures to change something in the UN, which is getting less and less useful to solve problems around the world.
Senator MacDonald: Going back to the way the UN is operating today, there has been speculation of the possibility of stripping Russia’s veto power, although we presume that China would never allow this. Are we facing a return of the United Nations to the divide that existed during the Cold War? What impact do you see in the functioning of the United Nations given Russia’s invasion of Ukraine?
Mr. Rivard: It’s very interesting. First, not only would China not permit that, but if you open the door, it could affect the P5, the five countries that are permanent members of the Security Council. This will not change tomorrow.
The problem is also that Russia being the aggressor increasingly shows the fragility of the Security Council’s system and the famous right of veto, which has been seen by many — even a former secretary-general, whom I will not name — as a cancer that is destroying, slowly but surely, the validity and pertinence of the United Nations.
The Chair: Honourable senators, I would like to gently remind you that we seem to be drifting into a foreign policy discussion. That is for the second panel. I would encourage you to try to stick to the comments that have been made by our witnesses today and we can extrapolate questions from that. Thank you.
Senator Ravalia: Thank you to our witnesses. My question will focus on locally engaged staff in the Foreign Service. We’ve heard some implications that Canada is perhaps not as competitive as it once was in this field.
Mr. Edwards, my question is for you. How would you assess the manner in which Canada supports and compensates its locally engaged staff? What is Canada doing to attract high‑calibre, locally engaged staff to support them with ongoing training in our missions?
Mr. Edwards: I would be delighted to try to answer that question, but I will have to put in the reservation ahead of time that for the last 10 years I haven’t been familiar with our practices there.
I do know that when I was active, both as an ambassador in a couple of posts and then back in Ottawa, we tried to have a system for locally engaged staff that would ensure that we were getting among the best available. We often had policies and salary structures that were competitive with similar embassies — usually, to go back to the G7 group, those salaries structures and so forth.
I agree with you entirely, the locally engaged staff, or LES, are the backbone of our operations abroad. Without an effective LES system of compensation, of management, of giving LES the kinds of roles that they need to have to maintain professional and also satisfying careers with the Canadian government, this is a constant issue that needs to be attended to. There have, unfortunately, been times in the past and at certain missions when we have seen the LES as kind of second-class citizens. This is a thing we must take every step possible to avoid and to give them the responsibilities and also the compensation and representation they deserve representing Canada.
Senator Ravalia: Ms. Dann, my question is focused on the fact that we are rapidly entering what is becoming a more digitized world. Do you feel that Canada has been appropriately responsive in implementing the necessary digital policies, security, et cetera, to keep up with what is currently happening worldwide?
Ms. Dann: You’re quite correct that this has emerged very quickly as a major factor in foreign policy and international relations. No, I don’t think we have taken it seriously enough in an integrated way as a government. I think there is quite good work being done on the security side, but there are so many other aspects of looking at digital analysis and digital interaction that influence foreign policy and international relations. This is something that I know the Foreign Affairs department is certainly looking at. But it’s something you would want to ask the Deputy Minister when she appears — is it happening fast enough?
We see very clearly from the Trump election and now the war in Ukraine how important it is to have the digital foreign policy and security side down and also to have the digital operations within your own department down. This is key.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you to our guests today. I greatly appreciate each of you being here. I would like to focus on some things around mentorship, risk and foreign affairs as, frankly, a lifestyle. My first question concerns mentorship, both formal and informal in the foreign services.
In preparing for this meeting today, Ms. Dann, I came across a 2017 article where you were quoted as saying in Brazil that your boss took the time to take you under his wing and took an interest in your professional development. You said you don’t get the sense that this happens much anymore.
I was hoping if you could elaborate on that. Do you feel the same way about this? If so, could you make some suggestions on how we could get some of that culture that you appreciate back on track?
Ms. Dann: Yes, thank you very much for that. When I joined in 1980, it was just understood that your elders would take you under their wing, and it was just part of their job to do that and show you the ropes. It was kind of like an apprenticeship, almost. You did some formal studies, but it was basically how to be a diplomat and do the job that you’re expected to do. I would say that has fallen away as we have had a leavening or a dispersion of the foreign service cadre, and also as we have had much more emphasis in the Government of Canada on management in the foreign service as opposed to the work of the foreign service. I have young people that I mentor, young officers. I know many of us here do. The reason is because they are just not finding that type of mentorship the way we did in our time.
That being said, I know the department is making some efforts to make mentors available. I think Gilles can probably comment on that from the Canadian Foreign Service Institute perspective. The foreign service is not a job, it’s a vocation. That’s how our elders looked at it. I’m not sure that all of the management leaders in the department necessarily have the background experience to pass that on.
Mr. Rivard: Thank you, senator, for this question. I’m happy to tell you that about two years ago, Global Affairs Canada launched a mentorship program recruiting former heads of mission like me. We are about half a dozen. This year, for example, with the recruitment of new ambassadors, this program will be announced, and I will be part of this training program with heads of mission.
The program, in my view, works very well. For example, in my case, I have been in touch with an ambassador posted in a very small country with whom I was in touch through that system to try to help her fix very serious issues in her mission. In a certain way, the program, in my view, is successful. We have been told that the budget is limited this year. What I would recommend to this committee is to support the increase of that budget if it is possible. Thank you.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you.
Senator Woo: Thank you again to the witnesses for appearing. What is already emerging in this panel and the previous panel is the tension between subject-matter expertise and the expertise of diplomacy. The challenge for a fit‑for‑purpose foreign service, it seems to me, is trying to reconcile the two or trying to incorporate as much subject expertise as can be incorporated into a foreign service, which at its core has an expertise called diplomacy.
I wonder if Ms. Dann, and perhaps the other witnesses as well, can help us understand a little more. What is this expertise called diplomacy? What is this unique skill that a foreign service officer brings that is comparable or that is indispensable to the subject-matter expertise that we know our colleagues in Agriculture Canada, Finance, Environment and all the other departments have? They have this huge expertise. What is the unique value-added? Can you help us define it? Thank you.
Ms. Dann: Yes, I think the biggest aspect of diplomacy is having a consistent, on-the-ground network of personal relations. That’s what a diplomat really brings to every area of expertise that his or her mission is working on. You only get that if you live somewhere, you learn the language, you understand the people and you understand the geography. This is where diplomacy really comes in. I would say it’s the ability to establish, certainly, the knowledge of the country and the language, but also to establish this network so you can get things done in a way that someone coming in with expertise may not necessarily be able to do.
The other thing is, it’s an intercultural question. You know, we’re a very sort of low-context, transactional culture here in Europe and North America. We’re the anomaly in the world. Most cultures are very high context, very dependent on personal relations and trust. This is what diplomacy builds up for Canada. Depending on where you are, you have to be very careful and very respectful about how you do this in a constructive way. At times, too, you just have to call people’s bluff. This is a skill that you build up over time. I’m not saying other people who are experts can’t have it, but it’s important.
The other thing is not everyone can really roll with the punches in an international environment. Some people want to go home. Some people are intimidated by foreign things. Some people may know their area well, but, frankly, do not have the social skills to be a diplomat. It is difficult to completely describe, Senator Woo, but it’s a gift in a way.
I don’t really like the line of thinking that it’s either a general diplomatic service or it’s an expert one. I think you need both. I do think you have to have a core of foreign service diplomats who can provide that supportive international network to all of the programs and all of the experts that are out in the world defending Canada’s interests or advancing them. I hope that might help a little bit.
Senator Woo: That’s very helpful. If I can just add —
The Chair: I’m sorry, Senator Woo. That’s it. I could see that Mr. Edwards, Mr. Rivard and the chair were eager to engage in this discussion, which could go on for a very long time. I’m sure it will come back to us in the course of our study.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: Thanks to our witnesses for being here today. My question is for Mr. Rivard in particular, but all the experts who are here could answer it.
At the last meeting of this committee, the speakers seemed to take different positions on the proposal, or rather the proportion of GAC resources that should be concentrated in Canada as compared with resources that should be deployed abroad. There were some who argued the need to maintain a large structure in Canada that is capable of planning the organization’s activities, bringing a comprehensive vision to various issues, or ensuring strong ties with other components of the government. Others seemed to argue the opposite and criticized an organization that was too focused on itself in Ottawa, leaving too few of its officers to go into the field and severely limiting their latitude abroad.
Do you think GAC should move toward a more flexible model by putting more emphasis on the foreign service, or, on the other hand, should it maintain a large, centralized structure in Canada so it can better plan and integrate its operations?
Mr. Rivard: Thank you for that question, senator. In my time abroad — and I spent 13 years of my life abroad — I was able to observe that one of the fundamental problems was that the department had adopted divergent positions, depending on the point in time and financial issues. For example, sending an officer abroad costs on average, depending on the country, $250,000 per family. That’s a very high cost. In countries where we make bilateral relations the priority, it is important to ensure that we have the necessary resources abroad, in spite of what it costs.
On the other hand, I have also seen major reductions in Canadian personnel, who were replaced by local resources. As important as it is, that capacity, that knowledge of the country is lost. In my remarks, I talked about the fact that since the government came to power in 2015, it has worked a lot with the multilateral institutions. The problem with these issues is that the resources abroad are put to much less use, in a way, and this intelligence that we can develop in bilateral relations tends to be lost.
My answer is that the important thing is to have an excellent balance, but we have to avoid eroding our resources abroad, which are extremely expensive to train. Just learning Chinese takes a year of leave with pay outside the department and we have to make sure that the benefits of these resources are used to the maximum. I think there is certainly work to be done in that regard.
Senator Gerba: Right, thank you. Do I have a minute left?
The Chair: Thirty seconds, unfortunately.
Senator Gerba: I’ll pass on my time, then.
[English]
Senator Boniface: Thank you very much. I welcome our witnesses. Thank you for being here. My question is a follow-up on Senator Gerba’s question. Perhaps Ms. Dann can lead on this and I welcome the rest.
At our last meeting, I asked a question of Mr. Rowswell, President of the Canadian International Council, suggesting that the hierarchal structure of Global Affairs management seems to be archaic and should be more focused. In his response, Mr. Rowswell mentioned the diplomatic corps operates in two ways: as a hierarchy and as networks. He suggested he would not necessarily eliminate the hierarchy but put more emphasis on the networking to empower those throughout the ranks, including locally engaged staff, where the bulk of the network power resides.
Could you comment on his assertion, particularly around the hierarchy versus networking issues and which should be prioritized for the best functioning?
Ms. Dann: Again not to fudge the question, but you do need both. You have to look at the foreign service as kind of a diplomatic army, next step war. Because of that, and because you are out in the field — and frankly, we’re told in our briefings that the ambassador is like a field commander in the army — we call the shots on the ground there. You have to have a command structure that is respected to be able to have a foreign service that will work. It can’t be a democratic mutual suicide pact at every post. That won’t work.
Obviously, if you have good management skills, good people skills, and if you understand how to use your team to accomplish goals — that goes for headquarters or at post — you can work it out.
That being said, networks are really the point you’re there. Networks that can deliver your mandate and your goals in that country or to that organization is why you’re there as a diplomat. As a foreign service officer, you really love being overseas because when you’re back at headquarters, there is so much unnecessary control, which seems to have gotten much worse over the last 15 or so years. There are many levels of hierarchy, very many levels of approvals, et cetera. I think you need some hierarchy, but I would like to see more emphasis on initiative and creativity and more ability to absorb risk in terms of the foreign service. It’s like any organization. It’s not the easiest thing to do, but perhaps the hierarchal aspect, particularly at headquarters, has become too heavy.
Senator Boniface: Perhaps Ms. Dann could complete her comments on her final point.
Ms. Dann: In terms of us competing with other countries, is our Canadian Foreign Service Institute comparable? Is it the right kind of place that we need? I think it needs much more investment, and I think we should be comparing ourselves to the Germans and the Brits.
Lastly, we have always had a strong francophone diplomatic representation within our foreign service. This has really fallen off in terms of senior people in the foreign service acting within the francophone diplomatic world. It’s a terrible lacune that has to be addressed within the context of foreign affairs.
The Chair: Thank you very much. Thank you, Senator Boniface, for your generosity.
Senator Coyle: Thank you, Ms. Dann, Mr. Rivard and Mr. Edwards, for your thoughtful and helpful testimony this afternoon.
My question is for Mr. Rivard. Ms. Dann described the Global Affairs department, if I’m correct, as the national nexus for Canadian experts and Canadian institutions working on foreign policy. Mr. Rivard, you oversaw the merger between the Canadian International Development Agency, CIDA, and the Foreign Affairs department into what we now call Global Affairs Canada. You have mentioned some challenges with that merger, including the complex HR integration issues, and I believe you also mentioned the loss of many development assistance experts. Could you tell us what you believe what the reasons were for losing that development assistance expertise? Also, with the exit of those experts, has Global Affairs, in your opinion, had its role as a nexus in development assistance expertise in particular been weakened?
Mr. Rivard: Thank you for that question, senator. Thank you for raising those very important points. Senator, I joined the foreign service centre in 1983. At that point, I joined the aid stream. In other words, the department created a stream of aid and development in 1983 but dismantled it in 1989. I think that was a big mistake. I think that if we had kept that stream at that time, we probably would have kept many more people working through that stream when the decision in 2013 was taken.
Now, the problem that happened — and I remember when the decision was made to merge. We foresee the big Gordian knot, as I mentioned in my intervention. That will happen. How can you merge these situations? One of the issues is that FS is a unique structure. The development people were not seeing — and I’m sorry to say this — as equal when they joined with CIDA. For all sorts of reasons. A lot of people at that time saw the development officers as people who signed contracts and signed cheques. It’s much more than that. The situation has changed, but there is still a lot to do because there is still perception.
I give a lot of training sessions with the Canadian Foreign Service Institute regarding diplomacy 101, how to work with multilateral institutions. I’m connected with these people. This perception, at some points, still remains today. There is a change in culture to make. There is a need to hire many more people who are interested in development. Also, at the Canadian Foreign Service Institute, there is the need to teach many more courses in development so that it becomes attractive to join that service and to offer much more flexibility in postings because being a development officer means that you can only go to developing countries. You have to be able to develop your expertise in other streams so you have a much more complete and well-informed officer to deliver their mandate. Thank you, senator.
The Chair: Thanks for that question, and the response, Mr. Rivard. It’s a subject we will be coming back to.
I also want to note that Senator Omidvar has joined us and would like to ask a question. I’m afraid we won’t be able to get to it, but perhaps in the next panel, if it’s appropriate.
Senator Cordy: Thank you very much for being here today, witnesses. Ms. Dann, I was interested in your comments when you spoke about the department, the hierarchy within the department and the need to modernize. I once heard a provincial minister say that there were levels of bureaucracy where sometimes the roles seem to be taking care of other levels of bureaucracy, which was very frustrating for him and he was attempting to change it. Nonetheless, COVID has certainly taught us that we can do things differently. You are appearing to us by video. In the past you would have all been here in person, so sometimes we can have witnesses from much further away. So how can we do things differently? We all know that every time the word “restructuring” is mentioned concerning a government department, there is a chill that goes over the department because they immediately think it’s going to mean huge layoffs. Without having a chill, how can we modernize? Because younger people who may consider a career in the foreign services certainly don’t want archaic systems in place. I am wondering if you could comment on that.
Ms. Dann: That’s a very big question. It’s more than $64,000, believe me. I think that over the last 15 or 16 years, there was a risk-averse culture that developed across a lot of the federal government. This resulted in many more structures, hierarchy, checking and red tape.
I think what the department needs to do, in terms of the foreign service, relates a bit to my first point. Look at what your foreign policy is and what its objectives are in terms of the interests of Canadians. Really prioritize things and then focus and channel your energy on the big stuff. Trust your people. Millennials will not put up with this stuff. Any kind of government that is overly bureaucratic, they don’t want to hear about it.
We know that we’re losing some of these people because they can’t hack the overhang of hierarchy all the time. But you know, the other side of that coin is that we need the political side to support the fact that if you take some risks, not everything is going to turn out. It doesn’t always work out too well for a public servant to take a risk and step out of line. I think it’s a big discussion that we certainly have to have in our foreign service, and frankly, why foreign service officers love to be overseas is because they can take risks, and they do have more autonomy and agency. I don’t have a magic bullet for that one. It’s tough, and it would take the support, understanding and trust of the political level to get it right.
The Chair: Thank you very much. I would like to thank our witnesses for their presentations today and for this lively question-and-answer period.
Colleagues, for the second part of our meeting today we are switching focus to the situation in Ukraine. We are pleased to welcome the Honourable Mélanie Joly, P.C., M.P., Minister of Foreign Affairs. She is accompanied by her officials, Sandra McCardell, Assistant Deputy Minister, Europe, Arctic, Middle East and Maghreb, and Kevin Hamilton, Director General, International Security Policy.
[Translation]
Welcome to the committee, minister, and thank you for taking the time to come and meet with us. The floor is yours.
The Honourable Mélanie Joly, P.C., M.P., Minister of Foreign Affairs: Thank you, Mr. Chair. I am happy to be with you today.
I am with you today to talk about the current situation in Ukraine. I welcome your study on the subject because the situation is critical. We have all seen the images from Bucha and other Ukrainian cities and we learn about new atrocities committed by Russian troops against Ukrainian civilians every day. The images cannot be forgotten. We have a duty to stand up to support the Ukrainian people, who are facing illegal and unjustifiable Russian aggression.
I would like to take this opportunity to explain how we are working with our allies to ensure that the Putin regime is held accountable for its actions. I am in contact with my Ukrainian counterpart, Dmytro Kuleba, and President Zelenskyy’s chief of staff, approximately every two or three days, to discuss recent developments and how Canada can continue to support Ukraine through this crisis, in terms both of military and humanitarian aid and of diplomatic aid, in multilateral bodies such as the United Nations and its agencies, at the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court, and in peace negotiations.
I am also in continuous contact with my G7 counterparts to coordinate our response to this crisis. It needs to be said that the G7 and NATO are united and coordinated to a degree unparalleled in recent history. Vladimir Putin underestimated our determination and he and his allies are facing a strong and united response that they underestimated.
I am going to start with the subject of sanctions. Since February, we have imposed severe sanctions on nearly 1,000 Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian individuals and entities that are complicit in this illegal and unjustifiable war of President Putin’s. That is in addition to some 400 sanctions imposed since the invasion of Crimea by Russia in 2014. We are therefore at about 1,400 sanctions at this stage.
Canada has played a leading role in this regard and we are working closely with our allies and partners. Our collective response has been unprecedented, in both its scope and its level of coordination. Some of the entities and individuals we have sanctioned have close ties with the Russian regime. They are, first, Putin himself and his ministers, but also his oligarchs, the members of the ruling class in the finance, defence and energy sectors. We have sanctioned Russian banks, members of the Duma, the State Duma and the security council, Ukrainian disinformation agents, family members of the Lukashenko regime in Belarus and family members of several of these people, including the daughters of President Putin himself.
Canada has also imposed export and import bans on Russia. We have also prohibited Russian vessels from entering Canada’s ports and Canadian waters and we have closed Canada’s air space to all Russian and Belarusian aircraft operators.
[English]
We have also severely restricted Russia’s access to the global financial system, including sanctioning the Central Bank of the Russian Federation and major Russian financial institutions and supporting efforts to remove key Russian banks from the SWIFT financial system. We have revoked Russia’s and Belarus’s most favoured nation status, applying a 35% tariff on all imports from Russia and Belarus.
[Translation]
The goal of these measures is to make President Putin and his accomplices pay for their crimes in Ukraine and force Russia to stop the war and withdraw its troops and military equipment from Ukraine’s sovereign territory. As well, in the 2002 budget, we are going further and proposing measures that will enable Canada not only to seize, but also to confiscate assets of sanctioned individuals and entities. These measures will also enable us to compensate victims.
I would like to recognize the work done by Senator Omidvar who is with us today and who has done an enormous amount to ensure that the government is able to start making these changes in the right direction. Thank you.
These changes will make Canada a leader within the G7 in terms of sanctions. That is why I want to highlight the senator’s work.
To move on now to our ongoing support for Ukraine and the Ukrainian people, after the invasion, we acted rapidly with our partners to support Ukraine and isolate the Putin regime politically and economically. We are continuing to engage in intense diplomacy to support Ukraine. We are asking that international humanitarian law and human rights be respected. We are calling for the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian aid for civilians and protection of civilians and civilian infrastructure.
We are deeply concerned about the aggravation of the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine, the growing number of refugees in neighbouring countries, the global impacts on food security, and the other humanitarian needs caused by this unjustifiable invasion.
I am hearing it from my counterparts around the world: This poorly planned invasion is having major impacts in every country. Since January, Canada has committed $245 million for humanitarian aid, and of that amount, $145 million has been paid out to the Red Cross, the United Nations and partner NGOs. Canadians have been very generous and have given more than $126 million to the appeal launched by the Red Cross, with a further $30 million in matching funds from the government of Canada.
We have also committed more than $164 million in military contributions since January. That includes the military equipment requested by Ukraine, funding for weapons, munitions, and materiel, and satellite imagery.
[English]
Last week, the Prime Minister announced that Canada has provided a number of howitzers and a significant amount of Carl Gustaf anti-armour ammunition in response to direct requests from Ukraine. The Canadian Armed Forces and the Communications Security Establishment, CSE, have also been providing cyber support to their Ukrainian counterparts so that Ukraine can enhance its resilience against cyber attacks. Canada is also assisting our allies and partners in delivering aid to Ukraine via a C-130 aircraft. We have therefore made many shipments possible for countries across Europe looking to supply military aid to Ukraine.
As part of Budget 2022, we have committed an additional $500 million in military aid to support Ukrainians in further defending themselves against Russian aggression. We are in close contact with Ukraine to discuss their more pressing needs and how we can better help.
Further support for Ukraine that we have announced includes: $1 billion in new loans through the IMF — this is in addition to the $620 million in loans offered earlier this year bilaterally directly to Ukraine — $145 million in humanitarian assistance, which I just mentioned and $35 million in development assistance to provide direct support to Ukrainians who have been affected by the illegal invasion.
There is $117 million to implement two new immigration streams for Ukrainians coming to Canada. The first one is the Canada-Ukraine authorization for emergency travel and the other is an expedited path for permanent residency through a new family sponsorship program.
Meanwhile, our diplomatic efforts continue at NATO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, or OSCE, the G7, the Organization of American States, or OAS, the UN and across engagements with my foreign counterparts.
One of the major forums that has allowed the coordination of the global response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been the G7, which has met six times since December on this matter. I would like to remind senators that we usually meet twice a year. The Prime Minister has had, on his part, three G7 meetings already.
We strongly advocate for two successful UN resolutions condemning Russia’s aggression and drawing attention to the humanitarian consequences of their invasion. We have been working around the clock diplomatically to support Ukraine and isolate Russia, including the following: first, working with the International Atomic Energy Agency in response to Russia’s attack on nuclear power plants; second, leading a walkout against Russia at the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva; third, pausing participation in the work of the Arctic Council while Russia is chair; and fourth, frequent calls between the Prime Minister and President Zelenskyy. I have travelled to Ukraine, Poland, Romania, Germany, France, Switzerland, Finland and Belgium for NATO and the EU to help coordinate our response, and we have reached out to many countries, including Moldova, Egypt, China, Brazil and many others. I visited Vietnam and Indonesia and held a Canada-CARICOM, or Caribbean Community and Common Market, virtual summit.
Canada was one of the first countries to announce that it would refer the situation in Ukraine to the International Criminal Court in early March due to the many allegations of serious crimes by Russian forces, including war crimes and crimes against humanity. We have also supported Ukraine in their application to the International Court of Justice and are exploring how we can continue to assist them in that case.
Through the OSCE, Canada, together with 44 other states, invoked the Moscow Mechanism to establish an independent fact-finding mission that, on April 13, 2022, issued a report on the first weeks of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. That report concluded that Russia and its forces are committing serious atrocities and human-rights violations in Ukraine.
Canada is contributing to reinforcing NATO’s eastern-backed allies in response to Russia’s invasion. Through Operation REASSURANCE, we are now deploying approximately 1,375 troops to NATO’s eastern flank. This is Canada’s largest international military operation. Our forces include members of all three branches of the Canadian Armed Forces, as well as frigates, CF-18s and patrol aircraft. One hundred CAF troops have also been deployed to Poland to assist with the arrival of Ukrainian refugees and to provide medical support.
I can also assure you that my department is providing 24‑7 consular services to Canadians, permanent residents and their families throughout our network of missions in Eastern Europe and the emerging Emergency Watch and Response Centre in Ottawa. As of today, it is our understanding that most Canadians who want to cross the Ukrainian border without a visa have left the country. Our consular work is now focused on communicating with any Canadians in the region, delivering needed services to them and engaging with neighbouring countries to ensure we can assist them with the difficulties they are facing in light of the 5.2 million Ukrainian refugees who have left the country to go to Europe.
I want to end by saying that Russia’s war on Ukraine is a war on freedom, democracy and the rights of Ukrainians and all people to determine their own future. The people of Ukraine have the right to their sovereignty and territorial integrity and to live free and without fear. We stand with them in defence against the unjustifiable and illegal invasion of their territory by Russia, and we will continue to support them to win this war.
I can tell you this is a whole-of-government — and I would say a whole-of-country — effort, and we will keep increasing the pressure on President Putin to end his war.
I now will happily take any of your questions. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much, minister, for your statement.
Colleagues, I will give you a gentle reminder that we’re going to try the four-minute rule again; otherwise, not everyone will get a chance. I would encourage you to be very precise in your questions to allow the minister more time to answer within that four-minute interval. Priority will go to members of the committee, and if there is time, to our guest senators as well.
Senator Greene: Thank you for being here.
During World War II, a key war aim of Franklin Roosevelt was the creation of the United Nations after the war as a way to keep all the allies on the same page. The United Nations was meant to end all wars. As we know, that hasn’t happened.
Given the lack of relevance that the UN has in this particular exercise with Ukraine, shouldn’t it be a war aim of Canada now that we embark upon discussions and work on the creation of “United Nations, Part II?”
Ms. Joly: That’s a good question, and we could talk about it for hours, but I only have a few minutes.
Yes, indeed, the United Nations needs reform. We know that; we’re not the only country that knows that.
I commend the work that Bob Rae has done recently with regard to the Security Council and the veto right of any member and asking them why they used their veto. Canada has benefited from multilateralism and from the construction of the very institution that underpins this international rules-based order. That’s why, since we not only benefited — because, actually, we participated in its construction — we need to be there for its reform. We need to be there also to work on the key pillar part of the international system, which is sometimes the one that is most undermined: accountability. That is why we pushed matters before the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court. That’s also why we are supporting, for example, in this instance, not only the processes that are before those two courts but also the OSCE and the investigation done by the UN Human Rights Council. We need to make sure that justice is done at the end of this war. There will be an end to this war. Usually, it is done through diplomatic means, once the parties agree to stop their military offences.
Meanwhile, we need to use every single tool in our toolbox to make sure that we push the cause of Ukraine and to bring other parties to the table to make sure there is more stability in the world, because without the UN, the world would not be as stable, even in the face of instability in certain regions.
Senator Oh: Welcome, minister, to the committee. I have a simple question. I have been following on YouTube and the internet, and I noticed in the last two or three days that there is important news that one Canadian military officer was trapped under a steel mill on the ground. Is that true, and are we getting him back safely?
Ms. Joly: I can’t provide specific information on Canadians abroad, because this is information that, due to legislation in place, we need to protect. That being said, we’re always there to make sure that Canadians abroad, including in Ukraine, are provided diplomatic supports. That’s what I can say on this very issue.
Senator Oh: Thank you.
Senator Richards: Thank you, minister, for being here today.
I have a question that everyone has, I’m sure. We don’t want a wider war. We’re in a wider war. Genocide is happening before our eyes. Mariupol is proof of that. We still don’t have a no-fly zone, which I think is imperative to have against Russia. I don’t think the international court matters to Putin at all. I’m wondering how we can — and I believe we should — become far more robust in our handling of this crisis.
Ms. Joly: Thank you, senator. I agree with you; many atrocities are being committed in Ukraine. In the face of these atrocities, we need to step up. We’ve done a lot, but there is always more to be done, and we will do more.
It is fundamental that we cannot act alone. We need to act with our allies, and we need to ensure that the unity of the allies is strong, which it is as we speak.
Ukrainians have been asking us for two things: weapons and sanctions. You’ve seen in the media and you’ve heard from my colleague the Minister of Defence and the Prime Minister on this as well. Canada has sent military aid. I mentioned the amounts. We are also sending heavy artillery and providing training for it, and other countries are doing so as well. The U.S., the U.K. and even Germany have decided to provide heavy artillery. That is what will help Ukrainians on the ground in defending their territory in eastern and southern Ukraine.
You mentioned Mariupol. I share your preoccupation and deep concern. The issue we have right now is that while Ukraine is trying to negotiate with Russia for humanitarian corridors for civilians, Russia has been using these ceasefires to regroup and ensure they have a stronger offensive and even continue to target these humanitarian corridors. We need to continue to impose strong sanctions against Russia because that is the way to get to Russia and to the Russian regime.
In terms of the no-fly zone and this becoming an international conflict, since the beginning we have been united in trying to ensure that this does not become an international conflict. This is our steadfast objective. That is why we have been working with Ukrainians on all fronts — from military, to diplomatic, to humanitarian. Canada is one of the closest allies with Ukraine. Our role within the G7 is not only being the bridge between Europe and the U.S. but also being the best friend of Ukraine and providing feedback to the G7 on what is happening on the ground in Ukraine.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: Thank you for giving us some of your precious time today, Madam Minister.
In recent years, relations between Russia and the African continent have grown stronger and numerous African countries now find themselves in a state of virtual dependency on Russia.
If we look at the food sector, 30% of the wheat consumed in Africa comes from Russia. It is even 100% in the case of a country like Benin, for example.
In the energy sector, there is nearly $3 billion US worth of coal, gas and oil imports per year, but also in military cooperation, as the protection of the Malian regime and the very recent renewal of the Russia-Cameroon defence agreements attest.
These African markets for exports undoubtedly comprise an escape route from the sanctions the West has imposed on Russia. Moreover, by deepening its relations with Russia, Africa is gradually moving away from the West. Canada, for its part, is losing ground in Africa. In so doing, it deprives itself of important strategic allies, particularly at the United Nations, where the support of the continent for getting a seat on the Security Council is virtually essential. We’re talking about 54 votes when the ballots are cast.
I am convinced that our country must play an important role in Africa and that the African countries are just waiting for our government to extend a hand, to come closer to Canada in both diplomatic, security and economic terms.
Minister, is Canada aware of Africa’s strategic importance, both today and tomorrow? If so, what is Canada doing to help Africa and rally its support in relation to the war in Ukraine?
Ms. Joly: Thank you, senator; I’m pleased to see you again. Your question is very much on point. Yes, we are united within NATO and the G7, but we absolutely need to make sure we don’t lose support, whether in Africa, Latin America or Asia.
That is why last week, about 10 days ago, my team and I travelled to Asia, to Indonesia and Vietnam.
Our parliamentary secretary, Robert Lee Finn, was in Nigeria and Senegal, and my other parliamentary secretary, Maninder Sidhu, was in Panama and the Dominican Republic. The goal was to understand more about the situations in those various countries, certainly in Africa, and not just to understand their relations with Russia or other countries like China. I had a long conversation with General Dallaire yesterday about the African question, and I will be going to Africa with the Prime Minister later in June, since the Commonwealth summit will be held in Kigali. I will also have an opportunity to go to Rwanda, and I will be able to speak more about food security later.
[English]
Senator Coyle: Thank you so much, Madam Minister, for being with us.
As you and we are all aware, rape is a brutal weapon of war. We’ve seen it used for decades in many locations. You spoke about the horrifying atrocities and human rights violations throughout Ukraine that have already been documented, particularly in Bucha.
Madam Minister, could you tell us what Canada is doing to support the Ukrainian government, or other organizations on the ground, to protect women and children from further sexual violence? Secondly, what are we doing — you did mention a bit about this — to support the preparation of the evidence required to support the eventual prosecution of war crimes?
Ms. Joly: Thank you, senator. It’s a very relevant question.
Indeed, the question of sexual violence against women and girls is a priority for Canada and also for me personally. That is why I joined Foreign Secretary of the U.K. Liz Truss in writing an op-ed, recently published in the U.K. and in Canada. We both decided to support the Murad Code, which is based on Nadia Murad’s work at the UN and for which she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. This has two aims: first, to support victims psychologically and ensure that we can support them in documenting their own experience, and afterwards, making the link with the right authorities who will investigate.
As we speak, there are four investigations that are happening. The first one is with the UN Human Rights Council, which is indeed looking at the issue of sexual violence, but overall war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. That’s the first one. I had conversations with Michelle Bachelet, the head of the UN Human Rights Council when I was in Geneva. The second one, as I mentioned in my speech, is the OSCE and the Moscow Mechanism. The third one is through the International Criminal Court. Canada was one of the first two countries along with Estonia to petition the ICC on this very issue. There is an investigation that is also being done by the prosecutor. We’re also working with the International Court of Justice.
These are four ways to seek accountability. They all have their own ways to collect evidence. What we want to ensure is that a victim doesn’t have to testify four times. Every time it is traumatic, so we want to make sure that the evidence is collected, but at the same time that there is a form of reliance on these different multilateral accountability bodies regarding the evidence that is being drawn by each and every one of them.
I also think that the goal of this campaign that Liz Truss and I launched was to bring more of a focus on the issue, and we will bring that to the G7 in two weeks. I’m going back to Germany in two weeks because Germany is chairing the G7 this year. Canada has an important feminist foreign policy. It is in line with our work on that.
The Chair: Thank you, minister.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you, minister, for being here today. We’re happy to see you and thank you for hosting last night with the Americas. Another very important event.
I’m really happy, in a tragic situation, to hear my colleague Senator Coyle with her questions today, and thank you for the clarification on the Murad Code because I was really wondering what Canada’s role and leadership were in that.
I’m going to shift focus to my question around our weapons and thinking around weapons in support of Ukraine. Recently, the government sent a number of M777 howitzers to Ukraine. It was a boost in the kind of heavy arms the Ukrainian government has been requesting since the start of the conflict. I am hoping that you can inform us today about some of the behind-the-scenes processes in which weapon requests and transfers are done and honoured and perhaps denied. What considerations go into approving and denying certain requests from the Ukrainian government? Do we ever look at our kit and consider what we could offer them that they may not ask for? Or is it strictly requests that are either approved or denied by the government? Any insight at this moment would be appreciated.
Ms. Joly: Thank you, senator. It’s an important question, indeed. Ukrainians have been reaching out to many countries, including Canada, to get support in terms of weapons for the past month. There has been an evolution of how different countries have decided to provide that assistance. At this moment, what we see is that it’s a whole range of weapons that are being sent. Some countries were, at the beginning, a bit more reticent to send heavy artillery, and we advocated sending heavy artillery quickly. I think we were able to positively influence our allies to do so.
Now, because coordination is important, we have been working with our allies to offer that coordination, particularly the U.S., the U.K. and France. We have also been providing an airlift through the C-130 aircraft. For example, if the Netherlands wanted to send weapons, we could work and send them to Ukraine through the C-130.
This is what I can provide you without providing sensitive information. We are in a period where coordination and training is important, because the new types of weapons that we are sending are not necessarily weapons that Ukrainian military troops have been trained for. Canada has trained many Ukrainian forces in the past through Operation UNIFIER, so we have a lot of experience in training these forces, and my colleague Anita Anand is working on this.
Senator Boniface: Minister, welcome and thank you for being here. I can’t imagine how busy you and your staff are these days. We appreciate you taking your time.
The Russian foreign minister said earlier this week that the West shouldn’t underestimate the elevated risk of nuclear conflict over Ukraine. I think for many people, many Canadians, this was a shocking statement to make, considering the atrocities already occurring in Ukraine. Does this commentary alter Canada’s response to the unfolding situation in any way? Second, how seriously should we be taking these words as the idea of a nuclear conflict on the table?
Ms. Joly: I think that we have to be ready for all scenarios. At the same time, I think that this won’t be the last time Russia makes threats, in light of the fact that Ukrainian forces are resisting way more than they thought. They thought that this invasion would happen within a couple of days and that they would be able to seize and capture Kyiv and that everybody would be clapping their hands and be extremely happy to see Russian troops. Clearly, their invasion is a failure, and will continue to be a failure. We won’t stop our efforts until Ukraine wins. When I say Ukraine wins, I mean that Russian forces leave Ukraine, and that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine are respected. That is why we need to make sure that we work with allies on this and that we cover different types of scenarios.
Senator Boniface: I want to swing, if I can, to talk about Finland and Sweden. Obviously, they have indicated their interest in joining NATO. I am just wondering what discussions are ongoing with those two countries given their vulnerability. Thank you.
Ms. Joly: That is one of the reasons why I decided to go to Finland three weeks ago. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and I have had many conversations throughout the last month, and, of course, we are very supportive of Finland and Sweden joining NATO. We believe that because of shared values and because of the fact that they are already strong partners with NATO that we can definitely work with them within NATO. The Prime Minister also had long and good conversations with the Prime Minister of Finland when he was in Germany. Of course, we will continue to engage with them. I look forward to working with my colleague Ann Linde from Sweden, whom I had the chance to meet on many occasions. Of course, the decision to join NATO will be taken by the people of Finland and Sweden themselves. Should their decision be positive, we would definitely work with them.
Meanwhile, one of the things that I’m working actively on is the sovereignty and the security of the Arctic. Not only are we working on NORAD marginization with the U.S., but we are proactively engaging our Nordic friends. That’s one of the reasons why I was in Finland, to ensure we could sign a common declaration on Arctic cooperation.
The Chair: Thank you, minister.
Senator Woo: Thank you, minister for your testimony. You have been very forceful in articulating the need for military support so that Ukraine can defend itself against Russian aggression. You have said in your testimony that we should do so until Ukraine wins the war. You then clarified your answer to Senator Boniface’s question that winning the war means the total withdrawal of Russia from all of Ukraine’s territory. It sounds to me like our government is content for the war to play out for as long as it needs to.
What are we doing to try to broker an early end to the war so that we can reduce human suffering? What are we doing directly with the belligerent Russia or indirectly through interlocutors who have credibility?
Ms. Joly: Canada has no personal interest in making sure that the war lasts a long time. We don’t. Every single life lost is an atrocity. We will do everything diplomatically to make sure that we can broker a deal. The problem is neither Canada nor Ukraine at the negotiation table. We don’t believe there is good faith on the part of Russia, and we question whether the negotiators have a clear mandate from their president. We will continue to engage proactively on how negotiations can happen and to provide the right assistance on what can be done in times of conflict. We have a great legacy in peacekeeping and finding ways, like we did in Colombia, to bring different belligerents to the table. We’ll continue to do that work.
At this point, our reading and our allies’ reading is that Russia only answers to strength and force. That is why we need to make sure we provide weapons and strong sanctions.
Senator Woo: What about working with third parties that still have some standing with Russia to try and broker peace? I haven’t actually heard what we are doing to wage peace. I have heard a lot about what we’re trying to do to counter Russia. That all makes sense to me, but I haven’t heard anything that our government is doing to try to bring about peace.
Ms. Joly: The Prime Minister speaks to President Zelenskyy pretty much every week. I speak to Andriy Yermak, Chief of Staff of President Zelenskyy, every two or three days, as well as with my counterpart Ukrainian Foreign Minister Kuleba. The Deputy Prime Minister speaks to the Prime Minister of Ukraine; Anita Anand speaks to the Minister of Defence. This is how we engage.
We’re also in close contact with the negotiators at the table. At this point, however, the negotiations are at a stand still, particularly since Russia has decided to withdraw from Kyiv and to concentrate on the eastern and southern part of Ukraine. Because of this military operation and the fact that Russia is doubling down, in view of May 9, which is an important date for Russia as well, that’s why allies all agreed to provide more support, militarily speaking, quickly to Ukraine.
Meanwhile, I have had conversations definitely with Turkey and with China. The Prime Minister has engaged with Israel. I was talking to Egypt again yesterday. Many countries have tried to reach out to Putin. The Secretary-General of the UN, Mr. Guterres, was there yesterday. There is a willingness to engage Russia, but not necessarily a willingness for Russia to engage.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Senator MacDonald: Welcome, minister. Earlier this month, you held a phone call with the Chinese foreign affairs minister Wang Yi. China and Russia are closely aligned. Earlier this month Canada’s Chief of the Defence Staff, General Wayne Eyre, told the Senate Defence Committee the following in relation to Chinese and Russian cooperation in Ukraine:
. . . China is learning from what is going on, tactically and operationally, what is happening in the information environment, technologically what works, what lessons they take away as they continue to underwrite the atrocities that are happening . . . underwriting through political, moral and economic support.
Does your government agree with that statement from our Chief of the Defence Staff?
Ms. Joly: I always respect what the Chief of the Defence Staff says. On the diplomatic side, I had my first phone call with Wang Yi for the first time in three years since Canada was actively engaging at the political level, in light of the fact that the two Michaels, Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig, have been returned from China to Canada. I reiterated to him our willingness to work with China on a peaceful resolution of Ukraine; our feeling that China has a decision to take on what type of future they want for Ukraine and the world; and our thoughts that they could practically be working to find a diplomatic solution.
I am not the only minister to reach out to China. All the G7 ministers have done so. Many other ministers and heads of state around the world have done so. We need to reiterate our position. Clearly, we know that China is looking at what is going on in Ukraine when thinking of its own policies.
Senator MacDonald: In your call with the Chinese foreign minister, did you specifically convey the view that their position on Ukraine is unacceptable to Canada and to Canadians?
Ms. Joly: I said that we didn’t agree with the fact that the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine were maintained — not at all. Actually, we thought there was a grave violation.
I also said directly to my counterpart that as a member of the Security Council, China had an obligation to be helpful in this situation and therefore this was our expectation. That is also what my entire diplomatic corps has been relaying to China throughout multilateral organizations.
For us, it is important to engage with China to ensure that we’re able to have a conversation, although we fundamentally disagree on many aspects of their foreign policy.
Senator Ravalia: Thank you for being here and for all your efforts in the past couple of months. It has been a busy time.
In early April, several countries, including the U.K., France and Italy, announced that they would be reopening their embassies in the Ukrainian capital. Are we considering such a move? Is there a security risk, and in the meantime, how have our embassy staff been doing with being relocated to neighbouring countries?
Ms. Joly: Your question is timely, senator, because I met with our ambassador to Ukraine, Larisa Galadza, just this morning. She was at Global Affairs Canada. It was great to see her. I met with her when I was in Ukraine in January, and I’ve been on the phone with her on many occasions, including the night of the invasion. Actually, Sandra McCardell was with us in Ukraine.
It is clearly the goal of the Government of Canada to reopen its embassy in Ukraine. We are looking at different scenarios right now, and my objective is to do so in the coming days and weeks. We need to make sure there is a secure environment for our staff, and we’re looking at what our other Five Eyes colleagues and allies are doing as well.
Senator Ravalia: If I can switch gears, I’ve been thinking a little bit about the potential for Russian expansion, particularly the situation in Moldova and potentially further outcomes in areas like the Balkans, where Bosnia and Kosovo have both expressed concern about potential Serbian aggression as a surrogate state. Are we monitoring those situations carefully, and if so, are you able to elaborate a little?
Ms. Joly: Well, I’m very concerned with what is going on in Moldova. I had a long conversation with president Maia Sandu a month and a half ago — I think I was with Kevin Hamilton at that time — and Prime Minister Trudeau spoke to her this week.
One of the striking things President Sandu said to me was how much she and her country were under a very important disinformation campaign, which was led by Russia and was aimed at vilifying Ukrainian refugees seeking refuge in her country. Hundreds of thousands of them have gone through or are still in Moldova, which is creating a lot of pressure on her small country.
She mentioned that that disinformation campaign is all about showcasing Ukrainian refugees as being violent and dangerous to Moldovans to try to provoke fearful reactions on the part of Moldovans and, therefore, further destabilize her democracy. That is why I spoke about that with my German counterparts, and Annalena Baerbock, who is now a good friend of mine and my counterpart in Germany, organized a summit on Moldova. We went to Germany. I went to Germany to support her in that summit, and we were chairing the part of the summit on Moldova on refugees. So, yes, we are very much aware of what is going on in Moldova, and we have also worked with our ambassador to Romania, Bulgaria and Moldova on this issue, Annick Goulet.
Senator Ravalia: Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you. We have come to the end of the question list, but I’m going to ask Senator Omidvar if she would like to ask a question as a guest senator here, and then I will use my prerogative as chair to also ask one at the end, if I may.
Senator Omidvar: Thank you, minister and staff, for being here. I’m delighted that in the Budget Implementation Act your government has seen fit to embrace the spirit of the bill that the Senate has debated, S-217, not just to freeze assets, but seize, confiscate and repurpose them for the benefit of the victims. Congratulations. You have stepped forward on the global stage as the leader in this way, and already President Biden has signalled his intent to follow suit. I wish you luck in persuading your other G7 partners to do so too.
There is a significant difference though in language. S-217 put forcible displacement, mass forced displacement, as one of the grounds to seize and repurpose the assets. And for good reason, because we’re seeing such an influx in forced displacement, 5 million people alone from Ukraine. Your bill does not include that language. Could you weigh in on that?
Ms. Joly: Yes. A couple of things on that.
What we’re trying to do is also empower two pieces of legislation that exist already, the Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act (Sergei Magnitsky Law) and the Special Economic Measures Act, or SEMA, legislation. The Magnitsky act includes the human rights component. SEMA does not. Sometimes it is better to have good legislation — that is in line with the Constitution, of course — but that the level of evidence to show, for example, forcible displacement can be included in the SEMA legislation. It is included anyways. Actually, it becomes easier for the government to go ahead and just do the work while it is the same intent. The more we become specific, sometimes, the more it becomes burdensome for the department to provide the entire evidence.
Right now, while we are clearly in line with our constitutional powers, we can do so already through the SEMA approach without going into collecting the entire evidence of the 5.2 million people that were displaced, et cetera.
Not only that, right now, clearly forcible displacement is evident. Maybe in certain contexts it is less evident, so that’s why we thought being just a bit broader could be much more helpful to meet the intent of the bill and certainly your intent, senator.
Senator Omidvar: Thank you for that explanation.
The Chair: Minister, I have been looking at this issue ever since it started and even before in 2014 when we were still a G8, and I wanted to pick up on something my colleague Senator Greene said at the very beginning about a “part 2” to the UN.
In World War II and afterwards, there was a lot of work done on post-hostilities planning, and I’m wondering whether your ministry, which is full of very bright minds — some of them I know — is doing some work with allies, and whether it is also happening at your level in terms of looking ahead? These are not necessarily off-ramps for Vladimir Putin, but what about reconstruction of a destroyed Ukraine? What about peacekeepers along the Donbas? What will happen with Crimea?
I’m just wondering if that work is going on, given the fact that you are having a lot of international meetings and there is that coming together of allied minds that we haven’t really seen since World War II.
Ms. Joly: Thank you. Yes, we are. A couple things on that. Clearly, we’re looking at how we can make sure there is a diplomatic off-ramp — we are — and we are engaging with many of our allies on this. This is what keeps me up at night.
Clearly, also, as mentioned by Senator Woo, whose questions were extremely relevant, is we have a lot of experience in peacekeeping, in arms control as well, and we can provide that expertise.
Also, of course, Ukrainians are very much aware that under the Budapest Treaty, they lost their nuclear capacity, so there are some fears there, but it is clearly Canada’s role to continue to support negotiations. Not only negotiations, but a way that could be forward thinking that is different from the Minsk accord. At the same time, while we can provide that expertise, we need to bring other countries to the table who can make sure that, at the end of the day, Ukraine has a status that will ensure it is secured and safe country.
Meanwhile, what is also a part of my own thinking is the impact of Ukraine on the entire world.
What is going on in the Indo-Pacific is clearly also something that I have top of mind. That is why we are actively working on an important Indo-Pacific strategy, and that is also taking a lot of my team’s time.
Canada has never had an Indo-Pacific strategy. We have been very much more eastern or transatlantic leaning. Also, we are a Pacific country with an important Pacific coast. We need to make sure that we take stock of that in our own foreign policy.
The Chair: Thank you very much, minister. On behalf of the committee, I would like to thank you for taking the time to be with us today. Rest assured, we’ll be asking you to come back again in the future. Thank you.
If there is no other business, senators, the meeting is adjourned.
(The committee adjourned.)