THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
EVIDENCE
OTTAWA, Thursday, November 21, 2024
The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met this day at 11:30 a.m. [ET] to study foreign affairs and international trade in general.
Senator Peter M. Boehm (Chair) in the chair.
[Translation]
The Chair: Hello, everyone. My name is Peter Boehm. I am a senator from Ontario and the chair of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade.
Before we begin, I want to invite the committee members in attendance today to introduce themselves, starting on my left.
Senator Gerba: Welcome. Amina Gerba from Quebec.
[English]
Senator Greene: Stephen Greene, Nova Scotia.
Senator Ravalia: Welcome. Mohamed Ravalia, Newfoundland and Labrador.
Senator Adler: Charles Adler, Manitoba.
Senator MacDonald: Michael MacDonald, Cape Breton, Nova Scotia.
Senator Woo: Good morning. Yuen Pau Woo, British Columbia.
Senator Harder: Good morning. Peter Harder, Ontario.
Senator Busson: I’m Bev Busson from British Columbia. Welcome.
Senator M. Deacon: Welcome. Marty Deacon, Ontario.
Senator Coyle: Good morning. Mary Coyle, Antigonish, Nova Scotia.
The Chair: I would like to welcome Senator Adler, who is here as a guest today. Welcome to all of you and those who may be watching us across the country today on Senate ParlVU.
Today, we are meeting under our general order of reference to receive updates on the situations in Sudan and Myanmar. We will start our first panel with Sudan, and we are pleased to welcome the following witnesses from Global Affairs Canada: Caroline Delany, Director General, Central, Southern and Eastern Africa Bureau, who is making her fourth appearance here at this committee; Giles Norman, Director General, Transnational Threats and Conflicts Bureau; Pamela Moore, Executive Director, Peace and Stabilization Program, International Assistance Partnerships and Programming; and Julie Desloges, Deputy Director, International Humanitarian Assistance Division.
We welcome you to the committee. Before we hear your remarks and proceed to questions and answers, I would ask everyone present to please mute notifications on your devices so that we don’t have distractions.
We are ready now to hear your opening remarks. As usual, these remarks will be followed by questions from the senators and answers from our witnesses. Ms. Delany, the floor is yours.
Caroline Delany, Director General, Central, Southern and Eastern Africa Bureau, Global Affairs Canada: Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you for inviting us to discuss the situation in Sudan. It has been a year since we met, and the scale of human suffering, significant human rights abuses and potential for regional destabilization make this conflict an important issue for Canada.
[Translation]
The conflict began 18 months ago. The situation is getting more complex. Various actors in Sudan and in the region want to protect their interests, with serious consequences for the civilian population.
Mediation efforts are ongoing, but without much success. Hostilities are ongoing between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, with no signs of easing.
[English]
In April 2023, the Sudanese Armed Forces, or SAF, relocated to Port Sudan in the east and maintain control there along with the north. The Rapid Support Forces, or RSF, consolidated control over most of Darfur and, late last year, began pushing south and east toward SAF territory. The RSF still controls much of Khartoum and its surrounding areas, although the SAF recently reclaimed some parts of the city.
Over 8.3 million people are internally displaced, and, in addition, more than 3 million have fled to neighbouring countries, making Sudan the world’s largest displacement crisis. More than 24,000 lives have been lost in this conflict.
In August, famine conditions were confirmed in North Darfur, including in the Zamzam camp for internally displaced people. Famine is also likely occurring elsewhere in the country. Sudan is facing the worst levels of food insecurity in its history, with more than half of its population suffering from acute hunger. An estimated 17 million children are not in school.
Credible reports, including from the UN, have documented widespread violations of international humanitarian law and human rights by all parties, including indiscriminate attacks against civilians, ethnically motivated violence and conflict-related sexual violence.
Sadly, there has also been a recent intensification of violence across the country. In October, the RSF increased its attacks against civilians in Al Jazirah state with the widespread use of sexual violence. Fighting continues in the Darfur and Kordofan regions, as well as in Khartoum.
Since Global Affairs Canada last attended this committee to discuss Sudan a year ago, Canada has advanced its response along multiple lines.
[Translation]
First, Canada is providing humanitarian assistance to meet the needs of the populations affected by the conflict. Since January 2024, Canada has provided more than $100 million in humanitarian assistance to Sudan and neighbouring countries.
In 2024, Canada allocated $31.5 million in development aid for Sudan and neighbouring countries to address sexual violence and gender-based violence, and for education in emergencies.
[English]
Second, Canada has maintained a high level of diplomatic engagement. Canadian ministers regularly raise the conflict in bilateral engagements, including at the recent Canada-African Union Commission High-Level Dialogue, and in multilateral forums such as the UN and the G7.
At the UN Human Rights Council, Canada co-sponsored the resolution in 2023 that created the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, which is mandated to document violations of international human rights and humanitarian law in the interests of pursuing accountability and ending impunity.
Canada has undertaken advocacy on human rights access, including on October 18 when we issued a joint declaration with the U.K., the U.S. and the European Union, amongst others, calling on the parties to facilitate humanitarian access in accordance with international humanitarian law.
With the prolonged suspension of operations of Canada’s embassy to Sudan in Khartoum, Canada shifted its engagement to our embassy in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and, in August, deployed new personnel there dedicated to Sudan.
[Translation]
Third, Minister Joly announced new sanctions under the Special Economic Measures Act. Canada imposed sanctions on two individuals and four entities for directly or indirectly undermining peace, security and stability in Sudan, and for human rights violations.
[English]
Finally, Canada is working to ensure that any future peace process includes civilian voices. Canada is providing funding to support human rights defenders and women peace builders to enhance their capacity and to convene and engage in mediation efforts. In August, Canada supported U.S.-led efforts to bring Sudanese women to Geneva to influence ceasefire talks. Our Ambassador for Women, Peace and Security, Jacqueline O’Neill, joined them there.
In conclusion, the situation in Sudan is unlikely to improve in the short term. The longer the fighting lasts, the greater the likelihood of increased involvement of other actors. This is likely to further entrench the conflict and worsen the humanitarian crisis.
[Translation]
Canada continues to monitor the situation closely. We are continuing to identify access points for Canadian initiatives and using the tools available to limit the impact of the conflict on civilians and to promote peace and stability and the eventual return to a transition to democracy.
Thank you for your attention.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you very much, Ms. Delany. I would like to acknowledge that Senator Mohammad Al Zaibak of Ontario has joined the proceedings.
Senator MacDonald: Thank you to the witnesses. Since this current conflict began on April 15, 2023, Canada announced one round of sanctions on individuals and entities promoting the conflict in Sudan or otherwise engaging in human rights violations. This announcement came on the one-year anniversary of the conflict on April 15, 2024, and it included sanctions on two individuals and four entities. On May 23, 2024, Nicholas Coghlan, former head of office of the Embassy of Canada to Sudan and former Canadian ambassador to South Sudan, told the committee that this is a small set of sanctions relative to the issue, and it came a year late.
My questions are the following: How were these six individuals and entities chosen? Why have only six individuals and entities been sanctioned? Why did Canada wait one year to issue these sanctions?
Ms. Delany: Thank you, senator. Global Affairs Canada has a rigorous due diligence process to consider and evaluate the circumstances that may warrant the use of sanctions. Wherever possible, we coordinate with those who are like-minded to ensure the effective use of sanctions, and there are often differences between like-minded partners in how each of us impose sanctions due to our different legal systems.
In addition to the autonomous sanctions that you have outlined, Canada also adheres to the UN Security Council sanctions list, including an arms embargo — in our case, covering all of Sudan.
Our processes are quite rigorous. They are based on evidence and research, which means it does take some time to be able to determine and have sufficient evidence to cite people for sanctions.
Senator MacDonald: There are numerous reports that suggest that the U.A.E. is allegedly supporting the RSF, while Russia, Iran and Egypt are allegedly supporting the SAF in Sudan.
Will Canada sanction any individual or entity from the countries involved, such as Russia or Iran?
Ms. Delany: We do monitor quite closely international actors involved in their different interests in the region. Russia is of particular concern with respect to their engagement in Sudan, which seems to be very much driven by their interests in terms of access to Port Sudan, as an example, as well as gold from the country. They have shifted their engagement quite a bit over the course of the last year, from an initial emphasis on working with the RSF to one that is now more closely working with the SAF.
In terms of our assessment of regional actors, it’s difficult for me to comment on that because it does implicate other parts of the department in terms of their assessments of what’s feasible and not feasible in terms of moving forward on any responses there.
Senator Coyle: Thank you very much to our witnesses for being here today.
It’s even much worse news than a year ago. We have been following it, obviously, individually since we met here. You have mentioned the security situation is such that we can’t have our embassy open with the personnel on the ground at the Canadian embassy, but we have dedicated personnel based in Addis Ababa.
Could you elaborate a little further for us? How many people are there, what are their specific roles and how are they tied to actors on the ground who can help us determine what our actions should be?
Ms. Delany: Absolutely. In our embassy in Addis Ababa — which now has responsibility for our relationships with Sudan — with the suspension of operations, we have transferred positions from the Khartoum embassy to our embassy in Addis Ababa. One is a Canadian foreign policy officer who is responsible for liaising, for example, with like-minded and other ambassadors in Addis Ababa — there’s quite a group that is responsible for Sudan there as well — as well as with the African Union and with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. In addition, we have a Canadian development officer who is engaging with humanitarian and development actors operating out of Addis Ababa, as well as out of Nairobi, and she travels to Nairobi as well to be able to engage with those partners there.
We look to both of them to be, as close as possible, our ears on the ground in terms of the analysis and the understanding of the current context and feeding that back to our team here in Ottawa who is able to support them in terms of advocacy responses or responses with new programming, for example.
Senator Coyle: Thank you for that answer. Are you seeing any kind of movement or anything that gives you some indication of possible hope or optimism toward bringing the parties together — I mean, there’s the humanitarian side, which we absolutely have to deal with, of course, but that’s going to get worse if we don’t address the conflict.
What is actually happening there? Who are the main players? How can we be helping in other ways? You’ve mentioned a number of ways, but if you could go deeper there, that would be great.
Ms. Delany: I’ll turn to my colleague Mr. Norman to talk about the mediation process.
I will just preface it with our assessment that the trajectory is fairly negative. We will see an increase in fighting over the coming months. There are mechanisms for mediation, which we need to be realistic about in terms of where they are at this point, and Mr. Norman can touch on that more.
Giles Norman, Director General, Transnational Threats and Conflicts Bureau, Global Affairs Canada: Thank you, senator, for the question.
Since the outbreak of violence, there have been several initiatives. There are a lot of regional and international actors that have launched several attempts to try to bring the belligerents together to the table and alleviate the suffering of civilians and the access of humanitarian.
Most recently, in August of this year, there was an initiative called the Aligned for Advancing Lifesaving and Peace in Sudan, or ALPS, which attempted to bring the SAF and the RSF together in Switzerland. The SAF did not send a delegation, even though the RSF did.
The ALPS initiative is essentially building on what was known as the Jeddah talks that took place in Saudi Arabia before. It’s a U.S.-Saudi initiative, with additional support from others.
Egypt, the African Union and the UN have all been active in trying to bring the belligerents to the table. Unfortunately, despite all these efforts — and it’s a crowded space — the belligerents have shown no indication that they are willing to stop. I think both of them are actively seized with the military objective of defeating the other, even though there’s a relatively equal balance between the two forces.
Senator Ravalia: Thank you for being here. If I could, I’ll continue along the lines of Senator Coyle’s questioning. You talked about the failure of the Switzerland talks. There are increasing suggestions, particularly in a recent article in The Economist, that Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, the leader of the RSF, was planning to take a tour of African capitals where potentially he would be welcome as a president in waiting. It would appear that the momentum is on the side of the RSF and that the SAF are viewed increasingly as a side partner.
To what extent are we committed with our international partners, and particularly the African Union, in attaining some degree of dialogue to get these parties together?
Ms. Delany: Thank you, senator. On the Geneva talks, I wouldn’t necessarily classify them as a failure. A lot of these talks are very focused on ceasefire and humanitarian access — a way to really focus the efforts of the mediators and the belligerents on perhaps some achievable gains.
There was an agreement in Geneva to have access to open the Sudan-Chad border for humanitarian access. That has flowed to various degrees since that point, but it is at least one point that the two groups were able to agree on.
In addition, with regard to the African Union, Mr. Norman might have more to add. I’ll just flag here that we have a representative to the African Union who is based in Addis Ababa — very closely engaged with them in terms of discussing the situation in Sudan — as well as our team in Addis Ababa more broadly.
The African Union did announce a high-level panel on Sudan called the Inter-Sudanese Political Dialogue, which is an important mechanism for identifying ways forward perhaps for the African Union to be able to support. However, like the other mechanisms, with the two belligerents being unwilling to really negotiate even a ceasefire, it has made it really difficult to know which path is the right one going forward. Canada’s efforts really focus on the role of civilian actors.
If I have time, I will give my colleague Ms. Moore a moment to discuss what we’re doing on supporting civilian actors in the mediation space.
Pamela Moore, Executive Director, Peace and Stabilization Program, International Assistance Partnerships and Programming, Global Affairs Canada: Thank you for the question, senator. I would just add that one of the ways that we’re seeking to support dialogue is by reinforcing civil society, so we’re funding activities right now. We’re funding an organization that is a broad coalition of civil society voices led by some influential stakeholders. It has a strong representation of women, youth and other Sudanese voices. We’re providing funding to help them to organize themselves and to be part of the dialogue process to develop their positions, because any type of mediation process — when there may be a new opportunity for talks between parties — will only succeed if it has taken into account an inclusive perspective of views.
We’re doing this sort of back-end support work to ensure that they can advocate in the meantime with international stakeholders, the African Union and others to advocate for what they think needs to be part of an inclusive process for when those times are right. Thank you.
Senator Ravalia: On the situation in Darfur and the whole concept of a united Sudan versus a divided Sudan, where do we stand on that?
Ms. Delany: Our assessment is that the longer the conflict goes on, the more likely we’ll see an entrenchment of the two sides. I’m not certain we would agree with the assessment that the SAF is marginalized at this point. They are the recognized government of Sudan, and really it’s a stalemate between the two parties, even though there is a bit of movement around the margins.
Again, the longer this goes on, the more there might be an entrenchment.
We would support any credible peace process that comes to a conclusion as to what the next steps are for the country, so don’t have a specific position on that question.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: Thank you for that update on the situation in Sudan. It is greatly appreciated. I would like to pick up on the issue of foreign interference in the conflict in Sudan. I am referring to Russia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates and others. I gather you are in discussions with certain allies to limit that interference. Is your work with our allies helping to counter that interference specifically?
[English]
Ms. Delany: Thank you very much for the question. I’ll start with touching on some of the regional interests and how we engage with our allies, and then I’ll turn it over to Mr. Norman for comments on some of the other actors.
In this venue, I won’t be able to get into a lot of discussion around the particular interests that exist in the region. There are different interests, and some of them are related to economic ties, historical engagements, interests related to gold or agriculture and those sorts of things. And certainly they influence how the countries in the region support or don’t support different sides. Some countries are very active in that regard, and other countries are much less so.
We monitor it closely, and Canada’s position is that we call on all actors, both regional and international, to refrain from specific support, particularly military support to the RSF and SAF. We see this as a real impediment to peace when outside actors are providing support to individuals who are engaging in violence inside Sudan.
In terms of working with our regional and international partners, one of the things that we do is use venues like the G7 to discuss this issue amongst our partners. Commitments around humanitarian assistance, humanitarian access and those sorts of things are very much part of that G7 dialogue and encouraging all parties to adhere to international human rights law.
Mr. Norman: If I may continue, for example, Ms. Delany mentioned the G7. Sudan has been on the G7’s agenda for quite a period, and there have been many statements and declarations in the last few months. The most recent was in June where the leader summit essentially encouraged all Sudan actors to engage with national dialogue, not just the belligerents. Also, of course, we condemned the grave concern in the deterioration of the humanitarian situation.
Russia is probably the most visible and difficult actor, as most recently evidenced by the fact that they just vetoed the UN Security Council’s call for a ceasefire, and they were the only country that did so. And Russia has publicly declared its support to the SAF and is continuing to provide it.
Other regional actors are playing to various degrees, but they are a lot less public about it than Russia. Iran, for example, is also very public in its support for the SAF.
In particular, Canada worked with the U.S. and others in terms of supporting the Geneva talks, and we will be taking over the G7 presidency next year. I am very confident that Sudan will feature on the G7 agenda of Canada. At this stage, it’s too early to say in what shape or form, but we are seized with Sudan being a major part of that agenda.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you for coming back. As my colleagues said, things look pretty rough, and this conflict doesn’t seem to get the attention that it warrants. Our Munk School experts talk about it being the number one atrocity in the world at the moment, and it’s something to keep in mind in that spirit.
I’d like to get into some of the spillover effects that we could see as things continue to deteriorate and spiral out of control. We have already seen what militias in the Red Sea can do in the way of impacting global trade. Sudan, as I understand it, has an 800‑kilometre coastline with the Red Sea. I’m wondering who currently controls that eastern coastal territory and if there is a risk of warlords or other entities turning to things like piracy or similar.
Mr. Norman: That area is firmly under SAF control. The SAF essentially controls the east and the RSF controls the west. It’s too simplistic. There is fighting all over the provinces, but it’s roughly that. The fact that the SAF controls the Red Sea coast and the port is one of the reasons that Russia in particular and Iran see them as such a valuable partner, because they want access to that coast.
The potential repercussions for Egypt in particular are very significant. Egypt’s security and stability are impacted by the flow of refugees. Many of the Sudanese refugees have headed north, and, of course, the Nile is of fundamental and existential importance to Egypt’s economy and livelihood.
Chad is another country that has been highly impacted by the flow of refugees, and those two have sort of borne a lot of the brunt of refugees, but South Sudan is another country that has had a very difficult history. Of course, it was created out of the civil war in Sudan. So far, South Sudan has not been drawn into the conflict, but, of course, one of the other concerns is it will spread south. Many South Sudanese who had moved to Sudan in Khartoum are now displaced for a second time. That cycle continues.
As for what the belligerents could do with their access to the Red Sea, I’m afraid that’s a little hypothetical. It’s difficult to comment, but it’s certainly true that their presence and control of the port are of interest to some of the more malevolent actors — as I said, Russia and Iran — and we can’t rule out that could be used for other purposes.
Senator M. Deacon: Okay. When we speak of the SAF and the point that you are making here today, my understanding is that both Russia and Iran have demanded a Red Sea port in exchange for funding from the SAF. How realistic is this outcome? What impact will that have?
Mr. Norman: We will have to see. At the moment, there is Port Sudan, and it’s quite crowded. At the moment, the SAF has made commitments, but whether they are actually going to go through with those commitments and allow the port is unclear at this stage.
It would be a significant undertaking and investment, and there are no signs that the port is actually being built yet, but we can’t rule out that will be one of the prices, particularly if the conflict continues. As the conflict continues, the SAF and RSF are going to become more and more dependent on the external partners and, therefore, more and more open to those kinds of demands.
Senator M. Deacon: With that question and the extension of that question, I do wonder when we look at getting supplies in and out of the country and bordering in seven nations — and it’s the first part of this question — what is your primary port source to make this work and where?
Mr. Norman: It’s —
The Chair: I’m sorry; we’re out of time, but it’s the question that I also wanted to ask later on, so I’ll pick up your question, Senator Deacon, if that’s all right.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you.
Senator Harder: Thanks for coming back. I wanted you to unpack this a little bit for us: Who are the like-mindeds? Who are the regional actors? Are the regional actors part of the like‑mindeds? What hope is there that we could at least contain this to a frozen conflict as opposed to a deteriorating conflict?
I recognize that all the initiatives you are doing are entirely appropriate, but we are modest players in this, so you have to recognize that modesty, which is not always a characteristic of ourselves. It is great to have a G7 statement, but it will just be another G7 statement. I’m not asking you to confirm my despair but simply to give us a little bit more on who has leverage and how we can coordinate that leverage amongst like-mindeds, regional actors and the G7 actors.
Ms. Delany: It is the right question but one of the harder ones. I’ll start with the Geneva talks as the example because I think it does illustrate some of the most influential actors involved in this particular crisis. These talks and the Jeddah talks that took place earlier in the conflict were U.S.-led. Over the course of the whole conflict, one of the countries with the most ability to bring the two belligerents together has been the United States, both at Jeddah and Geneva, but they haven’t been doing that alone. Saudi Arabia has been involved in both and extremely active in playing a mediation role between the two sides.
Switzerland and Saudi Arabia co-hosted the Geneva talks. Obviously with Switzerland’s background in peace mediation, they bring a lot to the table in terms of being able to host an event like that. Others who observed were the African Union, whom we have talked about before, in terms of their efforts to look for a pathway. The African Union, I would say, is very much looking for a pathway that’s as inclusive as possible.
The Jeddah talks and the Geneva talks were focused on questions of ceasefire and humanitarian access, with the African Union looking for ways to bring in more actors and civilian voices into what might eventually be a peace process or a more fulsome mediation process. Also, there was the United Arab Emirates that has significant interest in the country, as well as Egypt, which Mr. Norman has talked about. The UN observed as well. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development, or IGAD, has also tried to play a mediation role, but their efforts have not borne as much fruit because there are so many actors involved.
That’s where I would try to illustrate the like-mindeds who are most involved in looking for an outcome which is positive in this regard. Others have expressed an interest in being involved in mediation, such as Kenya, for example. One of the challenges is how many actors there are.
Mr. Norman: To build on that — and I don’t wish to be overly pessimistic — the leverage is limited because the belligerents are so committed to essentially a military outcome between the two of them that they have shown no signs of listening.
Unfortunately, there seems to be no shortage of players or actors — some are non-state — willing to provide them with weapons to continue their conflict. It is not as if they are dependent on one or two, and even if they were, they could probably shift to someone else.
This is part of the reason Canada’s focus has been the following: The first is ensuring there is at least a space for nonbelligerent actors because a legitimate, sustainable political solution will not just involve a ceasefire between the two. It has to involve a representative group of Sudanese. The second, of course, is ensuring humanitarian access. I think we are in the game of trying to keep the space open for humanitarian access and make the case for the protection of civilians, but it is challenging.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Norman.
Senator Al Zaibak: I must say that I am quite impressed by the depth and breadth of Canada’s efforts in Sudan, and I am surprised that these initiatives may not be widely known to the public. Despite some criticism and genuine demands on Canada to do more, I hope these initiatives and efforts will have the potential of making a meaningful impact on the ground. So I want to thank you and all of your colleagues who are involved in these initiatives for your hard work and dedication in making these initiatives and efforts.
My question here is this: What more is Canada doing to bring an absolute end to the conflict in Sudan, and how would you describe the state of these efforts?
Ms. Delany: Thank you for that question. One of the things to note when looking back at how Sudan got to where it is today is this continued challenge on the part of the country to have truly civilian democratic rule.
There was a significant amount of hope in 2019 that the revolution at that time would lead to real change following a long and very dark period in the country. Unfortunately, the coup in 2021 reversed that hope, and, more recently, the war has made it even more challenging for moving forward. I give that history because this is relevant to where we see Canada’s value-add, which is very much that engagement with civilian actors to ensure that when there is a ceasefire and a peace process, it is not just a peace process or a mediation process between the two belligerents that ultimately brought the country to where it is today. We think it is also important to distinguish between the two belligerents. This is really a fight between the RSF and the SAF.
There are, admittedly, other groups involved, but it is not a fight between civilians. They are largely the people who are the victims of the long history of oppression in Sudan. Through support — and I’ll let Ms. Moore speak to this a little more — to the peace process and to capacity building with women, human rights defenders, peace builders, civilian actors and leadership who are trying to think through with the civilian activists in the country regarding the question “What could a peace process look like, and how can they influence the peace process?” and by doing that work now, we are hoping that when there is an opening for dialogue on a real peace and cessation of violence, the civilians are ready to be able to influence that in a way that would ensure there is a much more peaceful and stable Sudan going forward.
Ms. Moore: I would just add that in addition to the examples I mentioned earlier, we are funding a range of different organizations. I provided one example. Through some other projects, we are funding other Sudanese civil society organizations to give them a voice with the African Union and the UN. There are multiple organizations that we are funding in that space.
We are also doing capacity building through some projects and organizations on the ground, where we are capacitating local organizations to create peace committees to feed in views, again, for the purpose of being able to have a voice if and when there is a peace process of some form.
Then, a related thing we are doing that may be relevant here is that we are also doing work to provide protection to some of these people. One of the risks for people involved in peace processes and human rights defenders is that they risk their lives to do this kind of work. We are funding organizations that provide small grants to some of these human rights defenders that help give them very specific advice or support on communication tools so that they have more secure communications and they can relocate to safer spaces.
These are a few examples of the things we are doing in the background, you could say, but it’s work that we can publicly acknowledge and that is in the public space to support these efforts. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
I’m going to try to channel a little bit of Senator Deacon’s question into a response that Mr. Norman gave to Senator Harder’s question, but I’ll expand it a little bit.
The issue on the humanitarian side is how to get assistance in. All the donor countries work with various agencies of the UN and other agencies to ensure best efforts to do that, if this goes beyond a G7 dialogue, and I agree that Sudan has been on the agenda for a long time even when I was still active in the other world.
Is there a coordinated effort, given the level of this catastrophe that is manifest in the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, or OECD, in terms of coordination with major donors? Because there are some major donors who are not necessarily members of the G7. Are there efforts being made in getting the humanitarian assistance through?
Ms. Delany: Thank you, Mr. Chair. I’m going to turn it over to Ms. Desloges for a response on the humanitarian side.
Julie Desloges, Deputy Director, International Humanitarian Assistance Division, Global Affairs Canada: Thank you. I can speak to some of the challenges being faced.
There are several coordination efforts happening, whether it is on the ground with the actors that we are supporting or the UN system, but also the International Committee of the Red Cross that works with parties to the conflict to negotiate access. We also support the civil society humanitarian actors there that also participate in these coordination efforts.
I want to make the point that it is not just about getting supplies in but also about getting them around the country, and the cross-border Adre is one. One of the issues right now is trying to open up further border crossings not just from Chad but also looking at South Sudan. There are efforts on that front from the UN community as well.
The other is the crossline assistance, which is very important to be able to move supplies and goods from RSF-controlled to SAF-controlled areas and vice versa.
We have participated, and I think I’ll hand it over to Ms. Delany.
Ms. Delany: There is also coordination with regard to advocacy on humanitarian access. A couple of examples are from October 2023 with a letter with like-mindeds — the U.K., EU, U.S. and others — to the Government of Sudan to lift bureaucratic and administrative impediments. Quite specifically, of course, the Government of Sudan is the SAF, so one of the challenges for humanitarian access is customs clearances and visas for humanitarian workers. There is continual advocacy on the government to lift those bureaucratic impediments.
Then, in October 2024, our joint donors also issued a statement toward both parties to facilitate cross-border and crossline access. I think it is a very challenging situation, so all we can do is advocate and continue to use humanitarian coordination mechanisms that are well established in Sudan as well as elsewhere around the world in terms of how humanitarian actors proceed. But in an environment where the two belligerents are not that cooperative, it is difficult to have a real influence.
The Chair: In just a few seconds, can you tell me how many staff you have at our mission in Addis Ababa dedicated to humanitarian questions?
Ms. Delany: On Sudan, we have the one foreign policy officer and one development officer who would also cover humanitarian. We are hiring locally engaged staff as well.
The Chair: So it is a fairly small footprint in that respect. Thank you. Is there any other senator who would like to ask a question in the first round? If not, we are going to move to round two.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: I would just like to go back to your cooperation with the UN because last December, at the request of Sudanese authorities, the Security Council ended the UN’s political mission. In its resolution, the Security Council called for a ceasefire as it was alarmed by the continued violence, the humanitarian situation and the serious violations of rights. Following that, are you still working with the UN? How has Canada pursued its implementation as part of a viable political process?
[English]
Ms. Delany: The most recent development is the UN Security Council resolution that was vetoed by Russia, calling for a ceasefire and also around the protection of civilians. This is, obviously, of particular concern to Canada. When there is a veto at the UN Security Council, it triggers a debate in the UN General Assembly. Canada plans to participate at that point, likely with our calls for continued adherence to international humanitarian law and protection of civilians. Our mission in New York is very active with regard to engaging on Sudan at the UN and, in that context, keeping abreast of what is happening at the UN Security Council as well as the reports from the Secretary-General on expressing increasing concern with regard to the situation there and the violations of human rights, and also using our avenues such as at the UN General Assembly for expressing Canadian views on the situation.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: Thank you. And with the recent dialogue in Toronto and the appointment of two special envoys, do you already have a date for the decision to appoint those envoys? Will they also be responsible for Sudan?
[English]
Ms. Delany: Thank you, senator. We are quite pleased with the announcement of a Canadian special envoy for Africa as well as a special envoy for the Sahel. I don’t have a date with regard to this — there will be a human resources process related to nominations for those positions as well as the political-level decision.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: Will they be responsible for Sudan in particular?
[English]
Ms. Delany: I think the special envoy for Africa will have responsibility for the whole continent. At the time of that person’s nomination, we’ll have to see how we want to prioritize and structure their work. But we also have, of course, our representative for Sudan who will be based in Addis Ababa and who has specific responsibility for Sudan and Canada’s representation to Sudan.
[Translation]
The Chair: You have a minute left, if you wish.
Senator Gerba: Thank you, I appreciate that. I think we have covered all the topics. We at this committee have discussed the global women, peace and security program a number of times. We also welcomed Jacqueline O’Neill, who spoke to us about Canada’s key ambitions in that regard. The program has various objectives and for each of those objectives, and specifically regarding the conflict in Sudan, how would describe that crisis right now in relation to the global women, peace and security program?
[English]
Ms. Delany: The situation with regard to women, peace and security is severe. One of the advantages of having the Ambassador for Women, Peace and Security — as I think she spoke about when we were here a month or so ago — is that as part of a U.S.-led effort on the margins of the Geneva talks, there was a specific engagement with women peace builders and human rights activists. Again, it’s another area where having something like an Ambassador for Women, Peace and Security gives us an opportunity to really influence that dialogue and support women to be mobilized as part of the mediation space.
I think, broadly speaking, the situation of sexual and gender-based violence as a result of this conflict is severe. You would have seen a lot of media reporting on the very widespread use by both sides of this conflict of sexual violence as a tool of war. It is programming that we can go into in more detail — all three of us could speak to that — in terms of Canada’s approach to try to address that particular issue.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Senator Coyle: A couple of weeks ago, we had a visit from former senator Roméo Dallaire. He was talking with some of us about what you were talking about: the dire and dangerous situation, particularly for civilians, the sexual violence, and also the fact that everybody wants to protect those civilians, but there is not a political appetite right now for the typical peacekeeping force that we might think of. But there are a number of innovative ideas that have been floating around and put forth for a more nimble multinational, perhaps African Union-led protection force, with troops provided by willing countries mounted to protect those civilians. Can you speak to any action on that? What’s Canada’s role in any of that? We would like to hear whether that has gone anywhere and what could be done to further that.
Mr. Norman: I would like to give a bit more of an optimistic scenario. Part of the challenge, of course, is that the UN, as we heard earlier, has been essentially removed from Sudan at the request of the SAF.
The UN Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan, Ramtane Lamamra, has the primary task to make recommendations on the protection of civilians, working with other regional groups like IGAD and the African Union. The problem is the geopolitical dynamics are such — and we just saw that with the Russian veto — that the UN Security Council has to authorize a peacekeeping mission under Chapter VII. That will not happen given the Russian view in the short term. The other is that the host nation has to consent. The SAF leader has already indicated he would physically oppose any external intervention force. This has put a real marker down for those who wish to try to participate externally from outside.
The African Union has suspended the Sudanese government and has not reinstated them since 2021. They continue to talk to the belligerents and so does IGAD, but, at the moment, no one has been able to either get a mandate through the UN Security Council or have any indication that the belligerents would essentially not welcome that force with violence.
At the moment, we are in the realm of having good ideas, and Canada definitely is interested in trying to participate with whatever is viable, but given those dynamics, at the moment, the optimism is not really shared in terms of an intervention getting in there any time in the near future.
Ms. Moore: Thank you, senator. I would just add that the context, as Mr. Norman explained, is not looking particularly optimistic. However, in all forums, whether it’s the UN General Assembly or whether it’s other discussions on Sudan, both the protection of civilians and addressing sexual and gender-based violence or conflict-related sexual violence have been very big priorities for Canada. We are both strongly advocating for addressing those issues, whether that be in a humanitarian dialogue, a development dialogue or a peace and security dialogue, and we are providing funding support through all of our different foreign affairs programs to those issues in this space that Mr. Norman has described, which is very challenging.
Senator Coyle: Thank you.
Senator Harder: I wanted to continue on with the humanitarian questions. I’m interested in what work is being done with those refugees outside of the territory and to what extent and how differently the peacebuilding interventions or the humanitarian relief has evolved. Is there, at least, greater hope with that cohort, or, in a sense, are they just as divided?
Ms. Delany: I’ll maybe give some general context about how we see the region and then turn it over for the specifics on the humanitarian assistance being delivered to the regional neighbours.
I think the reason that this is such an important subject is because of those risks for the region. It is a fairly fragile environment with the neighbouring countries having a number of their own fragility and stability challenges that are only exacerbated when they are seeing the kinds of challenges that they are seeing right now. This includes things like arms flows through South Sudan and also through Chad, as well as the significant number of refugee flows.
For a place like South Sudan, we have touched on it a little. This is a country that has experienced multiple civil wars since it gained independence from Sudan in 2011. The pressure that the flows of — I don’t know if we would call them “refugees” because a lot of them are actually South Sudanese citizens who were in Sudan to get away from the wars in the south. They have had to go back not necessarily with a lot of resources, and it puts a lot of strain on the existing systems.
Also, regarding those divisions that exist in Sudan, as we all know, the borders are not firm, so the influences, the concerns and the alliances that exist within Sudan also play out across the border in the other countries. It’s particularly concerning, I think, rather than optimistic in terms of the potential effects that the prolonged conflict in Sudan could have on the neighbours.
Ms. Desloges: Given the mass volume of people who have arrived in these neighbouring countries that already had their own humanitarian situation, whether it is Chad or South Sudan or Ethiopia, we are now seeing secondary displacement into Libya and Uganda as well. There are over 180,000 people who have arrived in Libya and 61,000 arrived in Uganda. More are continuing to be expected. In Chad, there was a pre-existing complex crisis from several places, and now 716,000 people have arrived in the east.
The challenges are numerous. Obviously, the humanitarian community has adapted their response. They have increased shelter and transport. Some of these areas are often very hard to reach as well. There has been mass flooding across the region. That has made it even more difficult for them to access. There is a lot of effort to transport the arrivals from their initial point of arrival at the border to safer areas a bit further. A major concern is also health: the spread of pandemics from crowding, whether it is in settlements or within host communities as well, which also need to be supported. We have seen concerns over outbreaks of cholera coming from Sudan into these areas as well.
The Chair: Thank you very much. Colleagues, this has been, of course, very sobering. It is a great tragedy that is continuing to unfold in Sudan. I will offer my advice as the chair but also as someone who has had a bit of experience in these matters.
There was a summit a long time ago — I think it was the G7 or maybe even the G8 — in Kananaskis. Mr. Chrétien was the prime minister at the time, and there was a G7 strategy developed for Africa. Canada showed a lot of leadership at that time. There will be another summit in Kananaskis in June. This also represents an opportunity for Canada to push, not just at the leaders’ level but also in the ministerial meetings that will be taking place. I would only encourage you to push and be persistent because this is a very important global issue that is too often overlooked these days.
On behalf of the committee, I would like to thank Caroline Delany, Giles Norman, Pamela Moore and Julie Desloges for being very good witnesses today and for responding to our questions. As much as I hate to say it, I suspect we will have you back again to address this very important subject.
For our second panel, we are now ready to receive a briefing on the situation in Myanmar. We are pleased to welcome the following witnesses from Global Affairs Canada: Weldon Epp, Assistant Deputy Minister, Indo-Pacific; Julanar Green, Director, Southeast Asia Division II; Louise Corbin, Deputy Director – Myanmar, Southeast Asia Division II; and Jane Palmer, Deputy Director, South Asia Division.
Thank you for taking the time to be with us today. We’re ready now to hear your opening remarks which, as usual, will be followed by questions from the senators.
Mr. Epp, you have the floor.
[Translation]
Weldon Epp, Assistant Deputy Minister, Indo-Pacific, Global Affairs Canada: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Honourable senators, ladies and gentlemen of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, thank you for inviting us to provide an update on the situation in Myanmar, including the devastating effects of the military coup in 2021 and the critical situation of the Rohingya, as well as Canada’s response to those interrelated conflicts.
[English]
I will begin by updating the committee as to why this situation is considered a dual crisis. In August of 2017, the Myanmar military launched a brutal campaign of violence against the Rohingya minority, including massacres, widespread rape and arson, which killed nearly 7,000 civilians and led to a mass exodus of Rohingya from Myanmar, including more than 770,000 to the neighbouring Bangladesh.
This followed decades of systemic discrimination, persecution and denial of rights, which still continue. Currently, the Rohingya are the largest stateless population in the world. There are over a million Rohingya refugees living in dangerous conditions in Bangladesh with little hope for the future.
Following Myanmar’s 2020 elections, the armed forces deposed the civilian government in February 2021. They formed the State Administration Council. They arrested the civilian leadership, protesters, journalists and pro-democracy activists, and their actions effectively reversed a very fragile democratic transition that had been under way, as well as efforts to resolve the Rohingya crisis.
These actions also present a major barrier to any safe, voluntary or sustainable return of Rohingya refugees and have exacerbated their plight — those who remain in Myanmar as well as those in Bangladesh. Since then, the military regime has not altered course, although it is losing ground. Instead, it’s escalating its indiscriminate attacks, committing gross and systemic human rights and international law violations to consolidate control and eliminate resistance across the country.
All of this is despite the international community’s condemnation, repeated calls to halt violence and diplomatic efforts, not least of which are those led by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, to engage the regime in inclusive dialogue toward peace.
Since the coup, active resistance has spread throughout the country with people’s defence forces engaging in guerrilla-style fighting against the regime. Pro-democratic groups, such as the National Unity Consultative Council, or NUCC, and the National Unity Government, or NUG, are opposing the regime.
Ethnic armed organizations continued decades-long conflicts with the regime forces, and as the regime has been losing ground, it has been retaliating with increased intensity and brutality. Civilians, including but beyond the Rohingya, are increasingly fleeing the conflict across borders, seeking safety in nearby countries. With few exceptions, asylum has been refused.
I just want to turn to Canada’s response.
[Translation]
Since 2017, Canada has played a key role in responding to the crises affecting Myanmar and the Rohingya by addressing the underlying causes through a two-phase strategy. Canada has provided more than $600 million in international aid to strengthen the resilience of at-risk and crisis-affected populations in Myanmar, as well as refugees and host communities in Bangladesh. We continue to provide vital humanitarian assistance to the Rohingya and to vulnerable populations affected by the crisis in Myanmar. Canada has unreservedly condemned the military coup and called for an immediate ceasefire, unrestricted humanitarian access and stopping the supply of weapons and resources that enable the regime to continue its egregious violations. Canada has increased pressure on the regimes in Myanmar through six series of targeted and coordinated sanctions against individuals and entities associated with the regime. We are actively engaged, through bilateral and multilateral diplomatic channels, in exerting pressure on the Myanmar regime to comply with the ASEAN action plan known as the Five-Point Consensus.
Canada is also supporting the efforts of the United Nations to promote lasting solutions for Myanmar, the Rohingya and the region as a whole.
[English]
Finally, I just want to make a couple of comments about why Myanmar matters.
The situation in Myanmar is critically important to peace and stability in the region. It’s arguably the single largest hot conflict in the whole of the Indo-Pacific region. It has spilled over into neighbouring countries, including those hosting refugees who have been forcibly displaced, and the country has long been regarded as a hub of international crime, illicit drug production, online scam centres and money laundering.
These problems are not only growing; they are not regional problems anymore. They are becoming global problems. They will be increasingly affecting Canadians.
It is a country that is rich in natural resources such as gems, critical minerals, timber and rare earths. For both a negative trajectory and also a possible hopeful future trajectory, these resources matter. Currently, they are being exploited by all manner of groups for criminality to support conflict, but there’s a future in which there’s another picture for Myanmar.
As other ASEAN member states, Myanmar is really a test of their diplomatic unity. It’s the most challenging test for ASEAN in its history. It’s causing instability on their doorstep, and that instability is increasing. It’s ranked as the third most deadly conflict in 2024, according to the armed conflict index. It’s really been pushed toward a failed state status, economic collapse and, therefore, a worsening humanitarian crisis.
At the UN General Assembly last month, UN Special Rapporteur Tom Andrews said that Myanmar has become invisible. It remains out of sight and out of mind to most of the world. International tension has been, sadly but understandably, drawn to a myriad of other global crises.
If I could say this for Global Affairs Canada, we very much appreciate the time and attention this committee is providing to this very important issue.
Canada, the Government of Canada and the people of Canada remain committed to supporting the people of Myanmar, engaging with pro-democracy forces and advancing cooperation with other states to offer the people of Myanmar, including the Rohingya, a chance to live in a peaceful and inclusive democratic society.
I’ll close by saying that I have terrific colleagues with me collectively, as several have served either in Myanmar, repeatedly on Myanmar or covered Myanmar from neighbouring countries when we’ve been cross-accredited. If the chair will permit, I will also draw on their expertise in answering any questions you may have.
Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Epp. Certainly, the chair will permit that and even encourage it.
[Translation]
Honourable senators, I want to tell you that you have a maximum of four minutes for the first round, including questions and answers.
[English]
I would ask that you keep your questions and preambles concise, and the same goes for the responses from our witnesses.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: Thank you for the update on the situation in Myanmar. According to the UN special rapporteur on the human rights situation in Myanmar, China is one of the main suppliers of weapons for the junta, along with Russia. Can you explain China’s objectives in the conflict in Myanmar? How could it contribute to its resolution?
Mr. Epp: First of all, thank you for the question. It is a very important one. China is playing a key role, as a neighbouring country and a regional power.
[English]
I would say that for China, the current situation in Myanmar presents it with a number of challenges that it perhaps had not anticipated.
China has major investments in Myanmar such as infrastructure investments. It is one of the largest investors in that country. It has long had cross-border management challenges. Its bet has been on the stability of the hard central state in Myanmar.
Increasingly in the last year, with civil war breaking out in multiple directions through multiple vectors, this is proving to be a very difficult bet.
The Chinese government has been continuing to hope to see the authorities in Naypyidaw regain control and central administrative capacity. We expect they will continue to try to support stabilization through one central government. From their point of view, the talk of upcoming elections — whether real or sham — which could see stabilization of a central authority is going to be their goal, so their arms sales are in support of that.
For China — including yesterday at the UN — it continues to push back on the idea that the challenge of Myanmar is a challenge for the UN Security Council and a challenge of transnational or international security.
Canada and most other countries take a very different view, including most of our partners in the region. It has clearly and manifestly become a problem that’s not just a domestic civil problem but also a cross-border problem. Frankly, that problem has had its own impact on China, including increased criminality, scam centres, et cetera.
While we don’t expect China to change its position, I do expect it will continue to sell arms to the regime. China is looking at, dealing with and engaged on Myanmar with a degree of alacrity and concern that reflects a situation that’s out of control on its border.
Senator MacDonald: Given the ongoing challenges facing Myanmar’s military junta and the significant implications of events such as Operation 1027, how is Global Affairs Canada engaging with regional actors such as ASEAN and other partners to encourage stability and support efforts toward a peaceful resolution in Myanmar while maintaining broader regional security in the Indo-Pacific?
Mr. Epp: Thank you. On this question, I will make a couple of high-level comments and then turn to colleagues to add some more granularity.
I would say there’s a couple of main directions of travel and work. Global Affairs Canada has been working for several years now through a number of diplomatic tracks on accountability — accountability through processes that we are party to at the International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice and a mechanism that is collecting evidence for potential future accountability trials, so it’s the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, or IIMM. We can provide more on that.
We are providing funding to support. We are providing diplomatic leadership. Also, through Ambassador Rae at the UN, Canada chairs the Group of Friends on Myanmar at the UN and is regularly organizing to make sure Myanmar stays on the agenda for that organization.
We also fund through the Peace and Stabilization Operations Program, or PSOPs, of Global Affairs Canada; senators may be familiar with this programming to help in governance work. That work includes a multi-donor fund. Canada’s Ambassador to Myanmar currently chairs that fund. There’s a number of aspects of work around accountability.
The second would be through humanitarian support, both within the country and also beyond. We have been continuing to provide — through tools that Global Affairs Canada manages — interventions that are targeted but also more long term, especially in the case of the Rohingya population in Bangladesh which is longer term.
The last thing I would say is the diplomacy matters. In Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, the government increased resources to have more boots on the ground, particularly in Southeast Asia. There is not a solution to the situation in Myanmar that doesn’t come from within Myanmar but also from within the region, and we accept that.
In all humility, from Ottawa and from Canada, there is only so much Canada can do to have an impact. We do need and do continue to work closely with colleagues from the countries of ASEAN who are seized with the issue.
I’m the senior official for the Government of Canada to ASEAN. In every meeting I have, I ask for an assessment. What’s their prognosis? What are the opportunities for engagement? Indonesia, among others, recently hosted talks. Disappointingly, the administration in Naypyidaw did not participate. It was the first time the various ethnic armed organizations — the National Unity Government and others — met together.
We need to continue to support and get behind, but also be pushing our counterparts in ASEAN to keep this as a top issue with our support.
Are there any comments to add in terms of other aspects of our tool kit?
The Chair: I’m afraid we’re running out of time on that segment.
Senator MacDonald: You’re obviously well versed in this matter.
Global Affairs Canada announced in 2022 that we were going to name a special envoy. Are we going to do it? It’s been going on two years.
Mr. Epp: At this time, there’s no expectation that we are immediately naming a special envoy, but it’s not precluded either.
The role of a special envoy was particularly important at the beginning of the crisis and with the coup. It was busy. There were a lot of meetings. Canada needed to be represented.
Canada, I would say, continues to be very ably represented, including in the same personage now in the United Nations, and that’s where a lot of the action is happening.
We don’t preclude the government taking a decision on naming a special envoy at such time as there may be need, but in the meantime, we also don’t want to get in the way of excellent work being done through our respective ambassadors. Should there be a peace process or multi-donor efforts where special envoys would be required, I would expect the government would either deputize somebody who is already playing that role or name one, but at this point in time, there’s not been an immediate need.
The Chair: Thank you.
Senator Coyle: Switching geography a little bit, but staying with the Rohingya people, I’m wondering about the situation in Bangladesh. I had the good fortune to meet with an old friend and colleague Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus last week at COP. He’s got a lot on his hands — as the interim leader of the government in Bangladesh — in terms of trying to bring stability back to Bangladesh.
He also has a lot on his hands because Bangladesh is the host country, as you have mentioned, of close to a million refugees, I believe, from Myanmar.
Could somebody update us on what the situation is of the Rohingya people in the refugee camps and beyond in Bangladesh and whether the instability and situation that Bangladeshi people are living with right now is having any impact? I’m just curious about that.
Jane Palmer, Deputy Director, South Asia Division, Global Affairs Canada: Thank you very much for the question. We recognize Bangladesh is enormously generous in hosting over a million refugees since 2017, and more of them are coming across the border.
The interim government that’s led by Muhammad Yunus has expressed a commitment to the Rohingya response and, at every opportunity, is asking donors and other people to help them in dealing with managing and supporting that enormous population.
At the same time, as you say, they are grappling with their own domestic issues, and at the beginning of the revolution, there was a period where there was an impact, but now things are coming back mostly to normal in the refugee camps.
In recognition of the fact that this is a really important issue for Bangladesh, just this week they announced a special high representative who is going to be specifically working on Rohingya issues and who is also going to be working more as a special envoy for Bangladesh.
Senator Coyle: Are we helping them to help the Rohingya?
Ms. Palmer: Yes, we are. We had two phases of support for the Rohingya up until 2024. Actually, the last phase of that is continuing on now, although the funding was spent a couple of years ago.
We’re providing support for health, education, skills and livelihoods, and also support for things like cooking gas, which may sound unimportant but it is actually very important in terms of the environment and also in terms of protecting women who have to go out and collect wood.
We are also providing support to humanitarian assistance on a needs basis, so each year we respond according to the needs.
Senator Woo: Thanks, Assistant Deputy Minister Epp and team, for being here. When we were talking about South Sudan just a few minutes ago, we learned about Global Affairs Canada’s efforts in promoting civil society involvement in any potential resolution to the crisis. I’m interested to hear about similar initiatives, particularly track 2-type initiatives. I understand there’s a knowledge for diplomacy work going on.
Does that work or any other track 2-type work reach into Myanmar itself? Or is it only with the asylum refugees, essentially, who are out of the country?
Mr. Epp: There are a couple things. First, Global Affairs Canada has been able to fund a number of initiatives over the years — programming amongst others — through the form of federations, providing capacity building and conversations with various elements of society on looking over the horizon past the immediate disaster to a world in which they return to democracy and more inclusive governance and, with such a diverse and complicated polity, potentially some form of federalism. That’s been one track of work that has been important as an investment to date.
There have also been a lot of engagements through using tools like the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives. You’re right; a lot of the conversations have now shifted out of Myanmar.
I was last in Bangkok after the Prime Minister was at the ASEAN Summit, and I had a chance to check in with one of our partners over the years who is based in Bangkok. Although the conversations can still happen in Myanmar, actually regarding a lot of the decision makers or the influencers — the capacity of civil society — unfortunately, more and more have fled.
I think there is an opportunity for Canada to continue to set the table and use the tools we have to generate conversations and ideas, but increasingly that will be around Myanmar, not in Myanmar. And it’s not because we want to encourage the brain drain, if you would, but particularly once the Myanmarese government brought back or enforced its conscription law, you started to see a lot of the urban Myanmarese, who had been sort of distancing themselves or perhaps waiting out a civil war, make decisions about where they wanted to be.
Julanar Green, Director, Southeast Asia Division II, Global Affairs Canada: Thanks very much for the question. As Mr. Epp mentioned, we fund some local democracy and human rights organizations that are actually operating in Myanmar through the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives.
Another project that we’re doing is via the International Development Research Centre with Canadian universities to provide training, scholarships and mentoring for young Myanmar academics, scholars, human rights defenders and civil society actors, so we’re helping them prepare for when they do eventually return to their country. We had an opportunity to meet with them recently, and it was very inspiring to meet them and hear their plans to go home and bring some of what they have learned here.
Senator Woo: I recently met with ASEAN counterparts in Vientiane, and I can confirm the rest of ASEAN is very uncomfortable with what’s happening in Myanmar, and increasingly so.
But we also hear from our ASEAN friends that they want us to treat ASEAN as a group still and not to shun Myanmar or to exclude them from discussions with ASEAN writ large.
What is the policy at Global Affairs Canada on this issue? Do you have any advice for parliamentary diplomacy when it comes to working with ASEAN counterparts?
Mr. Epp: There are a couple broad lines on that. First, we do have a restricted engagement policy. We have sanctions, but as I mentioned in my opening remarks, those are targeted on individuals, not entities. It is not the case of — as it was previously at a different point in Canada’s history with Myanmar — a blanket sanction on economic activity at all.
We do still have Canadian entities that have been there a long time and remain, such as Manulife and others. There are vectors for engagement. One is commercial.
The other is government-to-government, but for government-to-government, we are very restricted. By design, we are not engaging with the military junta directly, but it is the case that through ASEAN, which we will continue to engage — and we need to engage ASEAN as a whole community — the ASEAN community, through the five-point consensus plan, has basically reduced participation from Myanmar, as you may know, to a certain non-political, lower-level bureaucratic presence. I have some engagement with them. We heard from the Myanmarese representative when the Prime Minister presented at the summit in Vientiane.
I think elements of the bureaucracy try to continue to engage meaningfully including in, as you are aware, Canada-ASEAN free trade agreement negotiations. The fact is that should a free trade agreement be passed, it would still be impacted by Canada’s restrictions on Myanmar. But there is no way to move forward with the community of ASEAN and externally set the terms for a consensus-based organization that has been quite frank internally and also externally. If you look at comments from member states at forums like the UN, they are not holding their fire. But, as you mentioned, senator, they are committed to keeping a door open to working through ASEAN tables with Myanmar.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Epp. I’m interrupting you. We are well over the four minutes there, but it seems I’m generous today.
Senator Ravalia: Thank you for your very valuable insights and contribution. I’m just wondering about the status of the refugees who have ended up outside of Bangladesh — Pakistan, Indonesia and India — where some have been repatriated. It’s particularly those who have made the difficult journey to Indonesia and often faced retribution and attacks from locals in that country. Are we able to monitor that, and are we able to support these individuals?
Mr. Epp: Canada has been able to work with those partner countries and the International Organization for Migration for a degree of resettlement of Rohingya refugees. I’ll flip to the numbers in a second; I think they are interesting. There are commitments by Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada fairly recently in terms of the levels committed to regarding Canada’s willingness to resettle more.
We have worked closely particularly with Malaysia, where a lot of the overland movement that did not end up in Bangladesh has ended up. The Malaysian government is very appreciative and knowledgeable of our efforts to work through the UN system to resettle. That resettlement continues. Obviously, the biggest community is in Bangladesh, as we have discussed. All parties agree that the conditions are not there for return, but ultimately the solution is not for a million refugees to move out of Bangladesh to third countries. That volume of people waiting to return is too huge.
It is two-pronged. We are among the few major donors that are not only providing humanitarian assistance, but we also have a pathway to movement to Canada through refugee tracks, and we continue to do that. At the same time, we are working with others to make sure there is a more durable solution for the vast majority who are in Bangladesh.
I don’t know if you have the numbers. I can provide those if you are interested.
Senator Ravalia: On a completely separate note, it was reported by The Telegraph in the U.K. that land mines killed or maimed more people in Myanmar than in any other country in 2023 with at least 1,000 casualties. This was both the junta and anti-regime forces laying land mines. Given our expertise in demining, have we had any voice in this particular avenue?
Mr. Epp: I may be corrected by colleagues, but since the coup d’état in Myanmar, I believe we are not working with the authorities in this regard. In the region obviously — and senators are probably aware — there’s a lot of work within Cambodia and Laos. So regionally, yes. But currently we are not doing any programming, I don’t believe. Obviously, we are not working with the junta, and there are restrictions through our sanctions even in terms of financial assistance directly to the regime. To the extent that it is demining from various armed forces using these, I don’t think we are in a situation where the civil war on the ground would permit that.
But it is an area where Canada is known in the region for leadership, and I think in the future, should the opportunity present itself, we would probably be expected to be among the donors to step in with expertise and funding to support demining.
Senator Harder: Thank you for being here. My question is to Assistant Deputy Minister Epp to ask a two-part question. First, you referenced the work in Indonesia as “done.” Could you unpack a little bit more on individual ASEAN members’ activities and how we are working with them, if at all? The second part of my question is this: Have we repaired enough of our relationship with China where we can have a discussion with China on this that could be meaningful?
Mr. Epp: Thank you. The second question is a tough one. I’ll come back to that. Just quickly, with the major non-immediate neighbour states of ASEAN — Indonesia, Malaysia, obviously Singapore and Brunei — we have conversations. We have been supportive of their own diplomatic initiatives. Earlier, I mentioned Indonesia trying to convene and support dialogue. It will be interesting to see this as the chairmanship of ASEAN shifts in the new year from the Lao People’s Democratic Republic to Malaysia. Malaysia has been quite seized with ASEAN’s integrity on the issue but also its own diplomacy. I do expect that based on comments from their foreign minister at ASEAN but also at the UN, Malaysia has taken from the community, I would say, a very strong accountability role. Indonesia has very much played a more active behind-the-scenes role, as they have in past interventions.
What I would say, though, is that for Canada — and my counterpart colleagues from these countries will know this from various meetings we have had — we do press them. It cannot be the case that ASEAN centrality and their terminology, which is very important — seeing ASEAN as the core to security architecture and security conversations in the region is something we do support. We, therefore, then need ASEAN to step up. We need to see as much energy from ASEAN as an organization but also from individual member states on Myanmar, and on the Rohingya in particular, as we see on other issues as far afield as the Middle East.
We see some terrific energy about other global issues. We would like to see the same amount of diplomacy energy and, frankly, public engagement in their own countries around tough issues in their own neighbourhoods.
In Indonesia, we have seen increasingly local resistance to boat people from the Rohingya. It is a very tough situation. For Malaysia, as I said, we have had active conversations to say, “Because we have a refugee track, we want to help relieve pressure by being part of the solution.”
Those are some of the ways in which we are trying to encourage the large members of ASEAN to play an active leadership role. Many of them are. How can we come in and support?
In terms of China, I wouldn’t say there is a barrier to discussing this. I was with Minister Joly meeting Minister Wang Yi a few days ago in Lima, and everything is on the table. We have robust conversations with the Chinese at all levels. There is a lot on the agenda. As this is one of their neighbours, I’m not sure the Chinese are particularly open to ideas from Canada on how to manage a very difficult transnational situation, but it is raised.
Senator Harder: Was this issue raised in that bilateral meeting?
Mr. Epp: I would have to check my notes, but we had a brief meeting in Lima, and I do not believe we got to Myanmar.
Senator Harder: Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much. I’m following on Senator Harder’s question, and it gets to the issue of leadership. We have more discussion going on with ASEAN countries now than there has been for some time, including negotiating a free trade agreement and the like.
Mr. Epp, you mentioned that Canada chairs the Group of Friends in New York. I would be interested in knowing what the Group of Friends does and how it can possibly work in coordinating. But what I’m moving to — and it will not surprise you one bit — is that starting in January, we will have the G7 presidency. There are a lot of different tracks in that as well, including foreign ministers and others and, of course, the leaders’ track.
Does the situation in Myanmar present an opportunity for Canada to channel some of these ASEAN concerns, or is that something where we feel that maybe Japan carries more interest and more influence? I would just like your policy sense on this if you can provide it.
Mr. Epp: From the policy sense point of view, I would say our partners — such as Japan — have more equity in the region. They have baggage in the region historically as well that we don’t.
We are also working outside the G7 but adjacent, if I would, closely with countries like Korea which is under the UN administration; it takes a more contributive global approach to its foreign policy which is very welcome. Countries like Korea and Japan with much larger investments in Myanmar — in Japan’s case, many of those continue — do have influence that we don’t on the ground. We’ll have to continue to work closely with them — I don’t want to say take the cue from them, but I’m not sure we are going to be able to get out ahead of the kind of influence that other G7 countries like Japan have in the region.
It is the case that through our Indo-Pacific Strategy, one of the areas where I think we have moved the fastest — and it accrues some degree of increased influence and dialogue — is with ASEAN. When the Prime Minister made an incredibly long trip for the sole purpose of listening to and talking to his counterparts from ASEAN in Vientiane recently, one of the explicit premises was that we are going to be chairing the G7. We need to be hearing ASEAN views on global issues, including on regional issues. I think they are comfortable with that channel being open at all levels. That was reflected in the kind of conversations that the Prime Minister had down in Lima again.
You’re right; we have an opportunity and the relationships to make sure that should there be opportunities to move forward particularly during Malaysia’s chair year — if they take initiatives that land more effectively with the regime in Myanmar than their counterpart countries to date — we have an opportunity through the G7 to give that some energy.
With respect to the UN, I will ask Ms. Green or Ms. Corbin if they want to add. We are active there including as recently as yesterday.
Louise Corbin, Deputy Director – Myanmar, Southeast Asia Division II, Global Affairs Canada: Thank you very much for inquiring about the Group of Friends. This is very much an area where Canada is showing a lot of leadership within the UN. We are very fortunate to have Ambassador Rae chair the group, given his long-standing expertise in that area.
What the Group of Friends does is it serves very much as a coordination and discussion body on Myanmar. In part, there is a symbolic role in terms of keeping the issue of Myanmar and Rohingya issues at the forefront of discussions in New York between member states, but also more concretely it helps coordination between the various actors. That includes discussions with civil society, diaspora groups and interest groups of various kinds. Also, recently we have had pointed conversations with the UN Special Rapporteur for Myanmar through the Group of Friends in terms of exploring the gravity of the situation but also other steps that member states can take to keep the pressure on the regime. That’s very much one area where Canada is demonstrating leadership in terms of keeping the pressure, whether it be through sanctions or other coordinated means, to try to get the military regime to change course.
The Chair: Thank you very much. That’s very useful.
Senator Woo: Are you expecting anything to come out of ADMM-Plus that resembles something fresh on Myanmar? More broadly, are we still trying to seek membership in ADMM-Plus, and how is that going?
Mr. Epp: “No” would be my short answer to the first one, to be clear. On the second question, yes, we are still seeking membership. ADMM-Plus membership is more than one thing or a once and done. There are working groups that Canada has participated in, and we are looking forward to hearing soon on what we expect to be renewal —
The Chair: Can I interrupt for the benefit of some and our viewers? Can you define what it is?
Mr. Epp: Yes. ADMM-Plus is the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus. And the “plus” refers to it being ASEAN member states plus other core regional members but beyond the region, such as China. When you think about membership, the membership will be granted on a consensus basis. It is kind of the “plus” that is challenging for us, if you see where I’m going.
I don’t know that we’re going to get full membership any time soon, but on some of the subsidiary working groups, we will continue to probably participate in them.
Senator Woo: [Technical difficulties].
Mr. Epp: Senator, now you have me. It will come to me in a moment.
Senator Woo: It’s off topic, I know.
Mr. Epp: It is the working group, I think, on peacebuilding — I’ll come back to you on that. Yes, just at the moment, I can’t recall.
The Chair: Thank you. It brings back memories. I was working on that a decade ago.
There are no other questions from senators. On behalf of the committee, I would like to thank Weldon Epp, Julanar Green, Louise Corbin and Jane Palmer for being here as excellent witnesses today. We appreciate your comments on Myanmar. Obviously, it’s a big issue, and it’s an ongoing one, so thank you.
Colleagues, thank you for your questions.
(The committee adjourned.)