THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
EVIDENCE
OTTAWA, Monday, June 20, 2022
The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met with videoconference this day at 10:30 a.m. [ET] to study Bill S-9, An Act to amend the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act.
Senator Peter M. Boehm (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: Honourable senators, my name is Peter Boehm, I am a senator from Ontario and the Chair of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Before we begin, I wish to introduce the committee members who are participating in today’s meeting.
This morning we have Senator Marty Deacon from Ontario; Senator Gerba from Quebec; Senator Stephen Greene from Nova Scotia; Senator Peter Harder, deputy chair, from Ontario; Senator Stan Kutcher from Nova Scotia; Senator Victor Oh from Ontario; Senator Ratna Omidvar from Ontario; Senator Yuen Pau Woo from British Columbia; and Senator MacDonald from Nova Scotia.
[Translation]
I wish to welcome all of you as well as people across Canada who may be watching. We are conducting a hybrid meeting. I would like to remind senators and witnesses taking part by video conference to please keep your microphones muted at all times, unless recognized by name by the chair.
Today, we begin our consideration of Bill S-9, An Act to amend the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act.
[English]
Bill S-9 was referred to our committee by the Senate on June 14. Colleagues may remember that a previous virtually identical iteration of this bill was considered by the committee during the last Parliament in December 2020. The committee adopted Bill S-2 without amendment.
After third reading in the Senate, the bill was sent to the House of Commons but died on the Order Paper when Parliament was dissolved at the end of the Second Session of the Forty-third Parliament.
It is now before us again, and to discuss the newly introduced Bill S-9, we welcome three officials from Global Affairs for the first hour of our meeting. We have Trevor Smith, Acting Director at Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Division; Andrew Halliday, Deputy National Coordinator, Canadian National Authority to the Chemical Weapons Convention; and Gregory Newman, Senior Counsel, Global Affairs Canada Legal Services.
Welcome, everyone, and thank you for being with us. I understand that Mr. Halliday will give the opening remarks and it will be followed by questions from senators. Mr. Halliday, the floor is yours.
[Translation]
Andrew Halliday, Deputy National Coordinator, Canadian National Authority to the CWC, Global Affairs Canada: I have been invited to speak to Bill S-9, An Act to amend the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act.
In March 2018, the world was shocked to learn that the military-grade nerve agent Novichok had been used in an attempt to assassinate Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia Skripal, in the city of Salisbury in the United Kingdom. This attack sent the Skripals, a law enforcement officer, as well as an innocent bystander to the hospital, in addition to causing the death of another bystander, Dawn Sturgess.
Canada and its allies assessed that the Russian Federation was most likely behind the attack. In the United Kingdom, three alleged Russian military intelligence officers have been charged in absentia in connection with the incident.
This attack came several months after the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) certified that the Russian Federation had completely destroyed its declared chemical weapons stockpile.
This is not the only example of a chemical weapons attack in recent memory. No fewer than eight chemical weapons attacks in Syria have been attributed to the Bachar al-Assad regime and dozens more are suspected. Islamic State has used chemical weapons in Syria and Iraq. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s half-brother was assassinated with the nerve agent VX and the nerve agent Novichok was used again in the assassination attempt on Kremlin critic Alexei Navalny.
Today, as Russia continues its unjustifiable and unprovoked war against Ukraine, there are serious concerns that Russian forces will use chemical weapons, possibly even in a false flag attack to try to justify more oppression.
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was signed in 1993 and came into force in 1997. It prohibits any state from developing, producing, acquiring, stockpiling, retaining and using chemical weapons. Over the past 25 years, the CWC’s implementing agency, the OPCW, has overseen the destruction of almost 99% of existing declared chemical weapons stockpiles.
[English]
Honourable senators, the CWC includes an Annex on Chemicals. The annex, also called the schedules, is a list of the most common toxic chemicals and their precursors that are of relevance to chemical weapons production. Schedule 1 chemicals are extremely toxic and have no commercial or industrial applications and thus may only be produced or used for purposes related to preparing a defence against these chemical weapons. Schedules 2 and 3 have some uses in industry so their restrictions are looser.
In response to the 2018 Novichok attack in Salisbury, Canada joined with close allies — the United States and the Netherlands — to create a technical change proposal to add new families of toxic chemicals to Schedule 1 of the Annex on Chemicals. After considerable diplomatic work, a total of four new categories of toxic chemicals were officially added to Schedule 1 on June 7, 2020.
What does that mean for Canada? Effective June 7, 2020, Canadians were no longer permitted to handle these chemicals without a licence issued by the Canadian National Authority to the CWC, which is located in Global Affairs Canada. Thankfully, since these chemicals have no use in industry, the impact of this change is effectively nil. Those who are permitted to handle Schedule 1 chemicals must now declare their work with these new listed chemicals and are subject to verification — [Technical difficulties]
The Chair: Mr. Halliday, I am afraid that you are frozen. We’ll see if we can get to the bottom of the technical issue.
Mr. Smith, would you have Mr. Halliday’s opening remarks and could you step in?
Trevor Smith, Acting Director, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Division, Global Affairs Canada: Certainly, Mr. Chair.
The Chair: Thank you.
Mr. Smith: The CWC Implementation Act codifies the prohibition on chemical weapons in Canadian law. It bans anyone in Canada from possessing or using chemical weapons. The act includes a copy of the original CWC Annex on Chemicals and its schedule, which is now out of date. However, the convention and its annexes are defined by reference to the legal text of the CWC, as amended from time to time.
In case of conflict between the CWC and the schedule of the act, the convention always takes precedence. Because of that provision, even though the copy of the schedule in our current act is now out of date, the correct list of chemicals found in the CWC Annex on Chemicals is what applies to Canada.
Canadians became bound by the amended list automatically, even if the schedule in our legislation is out of date. However, that is not the best nor the most readily transparent way to govern. Canadians should not have conflicting information about what chemicals they are prohibited from handling without authorization. The government has decided that the best way to make and keep the CWC Implementation Act current is to remove the schedule altogether from the act. Therefore, Bill S-9 amends the CWC Implementation Act by repealing the schedule in its entirety. Bill S-9 also amends the definition of “convention” under subsection 2(1) and deletes subsection 2(3) entirely. These last two amendments remove references to the now-repealed schedule.
Repealing the schedule prevents possible confusion among Canadians that would otherwise see one list of chemicals in their domestic legislation and another list on the website for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. It will be obvious to all Canadians that the correct list of chemicals is the one maintained by the OPCW. There will be no doubt and no possibility of confusion. Repealing the schedule does not impact how it applies to Canadians and does not change Canada’s obligations for commitment under the CWC. It also means that we will not need to amend the act again should the state parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention decide to amend the Annex on Chemicals yet again. Bill S-9 is quite straightforward. It is an important and necessary step to ensure that Canadian legislation is clear and easy to understand.
We would now be pleased to take any questions on the bill. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Smith, and thank you for stepping in there. Sorry, Mr. Halliday, there was a technical problem. We could not see or hear you. But your colleague stepped in — in the best traditions of your department.
Mr. Newman, it is good to see again. Do you want to raise any comments from a legal perspective?
Gregory Newman, Senior Counsel, GAC Legal Services, Global Affairs Canada: Thank you, Mr. Chair. No, I have nothing really to add at this point other than to say that I think it is an amelioration and offers greater clarity.
The Chair: Thank you very much. We will go to questions.
Senator Omidvar: Thank you to our witnesses. My question is to either Mr. Halliday or his colleagues. The logic for these changes is indisputable. I agree with the changes completely as they have been presented —
The Chair: Senator, I’m sorry to interrupt you. There is a problem with your microphone. There is a scratchy sound coming through.
Senator Omidvar: Please go ahead to the next questioner.
The Chair: Senator Kutcher next, and then we will revert to Senator Omidvar. I also note that Senator Tony Dean has joined the meeting.
Senator Kutcher: Thank you to the witnesses.
My questions are not so much about the specifics of the bill, which are pretty clear, but about two other issues.
The first is on the disinformation plague that we are currently involved in. We’ve seen disinformation about bioweapons. We have also seen disinformation about chemical weapons coming out of the Ukraine-Russia conflict, particularly the blowing up of a fertilizer plant and it being spun as Ukraine trying to do chemical weapons.
I’m wondering what Canada is doing proactively to pre-bunk or debunk chemical weapons disinformation and misinformation for Canadians.
The Chair: As a reminder, we are doing this in four-minute segments.
Mr. Halliday: Thank you, senator, and thank you, chair. My apologies about my internet cutting out. It came back fairly quickly.
In terms of the disinformation campaign, we are, indeed, following this very closely. Part of my job is receiving all of these diplomatic notes that both the Russian side and Ukrainian side put forward in the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, or OPCW, and then following and checking them for what is true and what is not and preparing talking points for use in the OPCW.
The next session of the executive council happens in just two weeks or so, during which we will address the issue of Russian disinformation quite clearly in both the opening statement and in later interventions.
Perhaps Trevor or my other colleagues have something to add. Thank you and, again, my apologies.
The Chair: Thank you. Mr. Smith, do you have something to add?
Mr. Smith: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Disinformation that we are seeing in the context of the Ukraine invasion is, unfortunately, not a new challenge. We have similarly faced disinformation challenges with the war in Syria and the repeated and systemic use of chemical weapons in that conflict. I’m very pleased to say, Mr. Chair, that we have worked very hard with our allies — Canadian-led — to debunk such misinformation. I would refer the committee to a fantastic online resource that the Government of Canada has supported called Nowhere to Hide. It is a resource that is prepared by the Global Public Policy Institute out of Berlin. It provides a comprehensive, data-driven overview of all the different attacks that have been made in that particular conflict. Again, the idea is to help debunk these different myths being put forward by perpetrators of chemical weapons use.
In the context of Ukraine, I may also say that we are working in closest collaboration with our partners through the G7-led Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. I would note to senators that the global partnership was launched at the Kananaskis Summit in 2002 as the then G8’s signature response to the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, and will celebrate its twentieth anniversary next Monday. In the context of the global partnership, Canada worked with its colleagues, led by Germany — which is currently chairing the partnership — to issue a statement in March committing to support the Government of Ukraine and committing to work to further debunk all disinformation coming from the Russian Federation about all weapons of mass destruction. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Senator Omidvar: My question is either to Mr. Halliday or his colleagues, and it is a simple question. Now that the Schedule of Chemicals will be removed from our legislation because there is the master list at the CWC, how will Parliament consult with Canadian stakeholders and inform Parliament when additions are made to the list at the CWC?
Mr. Halliday: Thank you, senator. Any edits to the schedule henceforth will actually still be subject to adoption — I believe that term is correct — per the terms of the Tabling of treaties in Parliament rules. Therefore, as we did for this amendment, we will table any amendments to the schedule in Parliament for adoption for 21 sitting days. That will be before a formal adoption by the Governor-in-Council. As I said, that happened in the previous round in early 2020, and it will happen again should there be subsequent amendments.
In terms of the Canadian public, we also post the schedules through direct links to the OPCW website on the special website of the Canadian National Authority, a resource for Canadian industry affected by An Act to amend the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act. Thank you.
Senator Omidvar: I imagine any additions or deletions to the schedule are of great interest to Canadian industry. Looking forward, how will Canadian industry be not just informed but consulted when additions are made? How will they be consulted?
Mr. Halliday: Thank you. This is about the difference between Schedule 1 and the other Schedules 2 and 3. If something is a Schedule 1 chemical or could have the potential to be a Schedule 1 chemical — and this isn’t purely a Canadian judgment; the Scientific Advisory Board for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons analyzes this as well — there are specific guidelines for what could or could not be a Schedule 1 chemical. If the Schedule 1 chemical exists, it is not useful in Canadian industry or in industry at all. So if we are planning on proposing or agreeing to an amendment to the schedules and it is Schedule 1, we will consult very closely with National Defence, for example, which will have a stake in that.
If something is going to be added to Schedules 2 or 3, however, that will indeed require a much broader consultation with industry, with whom we will work both through the Canadian National Authority and our own inroads in various companies. We also have other colleagues at Industry Canada or in the export and import controls side of things at Global Affairs, who have contacts in industry and industry associations, et cetera, and who can respond.
Again, Schedule 1 essentially has zero impact on industry, so that consultation is much less necessary. If it does come up for Schedule 2 or 3, this is absolutely a critical component. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you.
Senator M. Deacon: Good morning. Thank you to our witnesses for being here this morning. It is greatly appreciated.
As indicated earlier, we have spent a fairly significant time on this in the past and are just refreshing our memories on this to make sure we are on top of it today.
I want to ask a specific question about Russia. It is our understanding that Russia is a signatory to the convention. Given his history, a protracted conflict in Ukraine could tempt Putin to employ chemical weapons on the battlefield. It’s a reality that we think about.
If he does so, what options are available to Canada and other signatories specifically within the framework of the convention?
Mr. Halliday: Thank you, senator and chair. I would defer this to Trevor Smith.
Mr. Smith: Thank you for the question. There are different mechanisms within the convention itself and more broadly for Canada and its allies to support the government of Ukraine should the Russian Federation or another party use chemical weapons.
One mechanism that we have been supporting extensively for many years is actually outside the OPCW, and it’s called the United Nations Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Biological and Chemical Weapons. Canada has been a lead supporter for a very long time of strengthening this mechanism to ensure that if and when chemical weapons are employed by a state party that the country that is attacked — in this case, it could potentially be Ukraine — would have a resource that it could turn to.
Critically, this mechanism is not tied to the Security Council. There is no potential for it to be blocked. It would operate sovereignly under the auspices of the Secretary-General, him or herself. This would provide a vehicle for a rapid detection of the type of chemical that was used, if in fact one is used, and for the international community to take an appropriate response. Thank you.
Senator M. Deacon: I’m familiar with the United Nations piece there, and I’m comforted that it would still be, I suspect, a superseding matter on top of must-do action that would continue throughout this work that we’re doing. Thank you for that response.
Mr. Chair, I am happy to defer the rest of my time to Senator Kutcher to finish his question, if that works.
The Chair: Certainly.
Senator Kutcher: I thank the senator for that lovely gift. I appreciate that.
It’s more of a question of personal interest, but since we’re talking about chemical weapons, I would ask it. We are familiar with nerve agents and vesicants and cyanogenic agents, but there are also psychotomimetic agents, which are chemical weapons, such as aerosolized LSD and anticholinergic drugs. How are these dealt with in the CWC schedules of chemicals, and what kind of information is available to Canadians about these compounds?
Mr. Halliday: Thank you, senator. You are actually asking a very timely question because, just very recently, the OPCW and the states parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention took a decision on this exact point.
These sorts of other chemicals, which we often collectively refer to as central nervous system-acting chemicals, which mainly includes things like fentanyls and their derivatives, they are not on the schedules. However, the states parties to the CWC have agreed that they are not to be used as riot control agents, for example. This comes from potential previous incidents where they could have been considered for that purpose. Essentially, the states have all agreed — things like LSD, I’m not actually certain if that is included. There is no specific list tied to this decision. However, fentanyls and similar central nervous system‑acting chemicals are the ones that are top of mind for that decision, where you are not permitted to use this for law enforcement purposes.
In terms of awareness-raising for Canadians, I will have to actually get back to you on that, sir.
Senator Kutcher: Thank you very much.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: My question is for Mr. Halliday. South Sudan is one of the four countries in the world that have not yet ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention. However, some studies seem to indicate that these weapons have been used, including in Darfur in 2016. What is the rationale for this country not yet having ratified the convention, and what is Canada doing with its allies in these cases to get the countries to ratify the convention?
Mr. Halliday: Thank you very much for the question, Senator. First, to answer the question about why South Sudan has not ratified the convention as of yet, I don’t want to speculate about the actual reason. It’s a fairly new country — maybe that is the reason — but I don’t want to go into detail because I don’t know. But what can Canada and its allies do? Universalization of the Chemical Weapons Convention is a priority for Canada. As for the countries that have not ratified the convention, namely South Sudan, Egypt, Israel and North Korea, if there is an opportunity to contact these governments we always stress the importance of ratifying the convention as soon as possible. It is a priority, as I said. This convention is very universal; we are almost there. The ratification of the convention by these last four countries is a priority. Thank you very much.
Senator Gerba: Am I to understand that some of these countries are unreachable or difficult to contact?
Mr. Halliday: Take North Korea, for example; diplomacy with that country is very challenging. I’m not an expert on the issue, but that’s the way it is. Open sources speculate that North Korea has a fairly large number of chemical weapons. It is likely and highly probable that North Korean agents used VX against Kim Jong-un’s half-brother. That was several years ago. We really want North Korea to join the convention and have the stockpile destroyed.
It’s the same thing for Egypt, where open sources indicate that the country used chemical weapons during the conflict with Yemen in the 1960s. We also want Egypt to join the convention and declare all the weapons it has and everything it has done in the past. I’m an expert in chemistry and biology, not in diplomacy. So I would ask that someone else answer those questions. Thank you.
Senator Gerba: Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
[English]
If no other senator wants to ask a question, I would like to thank our three witnesses for joining us and for their very clear answers.
Honourable senators, we will move to clause-by-clause consideration of this bill. Our witnesses are still with us if we have questions of a technical nature, but I encourage our witnesses to please turn their cameras off during this period.
Is it agreed, honourable senators, that the committee proceed to clause-by-clause consideration of Bill S-9, An Act to amend the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act?
Hon. Senators: Agreed.
The Chair: Carried.
Shall the title stand postponed?
Hon. Senators: Agreed.
The Chair: Shall clause 1 carry?
Hon. Senators: Agreed.
The Chair: Shall clause 2 carry?
Hon. Senators: Agreed.
The Chair: Shall the title carry?
Hon. Senators: Agreed.
The Chair: Shall the bill carry?
Hon. Senators: Agreed.
The Chair: Thank you.
Is it agreed that I report this bill to the Senate?
Hon. Senators: Agreed.
The Chair: That will do it for this particular bill. Thank you, colleagues.
(The committee adjourned.)