THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS
EVIDENCE
OTTAWA, Wednesday, October 19, 2022
The Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs met with videoconference this day at 4:18 p.m. [ET], to study Bill C-5, An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.
Senator Pierre-Hugues Boisvenu (Deputy Chair) in the chair.
[Translation]
The Deputy Chair: [Technical difficulties] to introduce my colleagues around the table. Starting on my right, I will let them introduce themselves in turn.
[English]
Senator Batters: Senator Denise Batters, Saskatchewan.
[Translation]
Senator Dalphond: Pierre Dalphond, Quebec.
Senator Gagné: Raymonde Gagné, Manitoba.
Senator Dupuis: Renée Dupuis, independent senator for The Laurentides, Quebec.
Senator Clement: Bernadette Clement, Ontario.
[English]
Senator Klyne: Hello, Marty Klyne, Saskatchewan, Treaty 4 territory.
Senator Cotter: Brent Cotter, senator from Saskatchewan.
Senator Pate: Kim Pate here from the shores of the Kitchissippi, the unceded, unsurrendered territory of the Algonquin Anishinaabeg, otherwise known as Ottawa.
Senator Simons: Senator Paula Simons, Alberta, Treaty 6 territory.
[Translation]
The Deputy Chair: We are continuing our study of Bill C-5, An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. Today, because we’ll only be hearing from one panel of witnesses, we’ll have a little bit more time, so committee members will have five minutes each, perhaps more, to interact with our witnesses.
Today we have Beeta Senedjani, Dialogues Program Coordinator, and Nicole Luongo, Systems Change Coordinator, both from the Canadian Drug Policy Coalition. We also have Niki Bains, Policy Staff Counsel for the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, and Safiyya Ahmad, Student-at-Law, by video conference. Also with us is Caitlin Shane, Staff Lawyer for the Pivot Legal Society. Finally, we have Julian Roberts, Professor of Criminal Justice, University of Oxford, as an individual.
Ladies from the Canadian Drug Policy Coalition, you may begin.
[English]
Beeta Senedjani, Dialogues Program Coordinator, Canadian Drug Policy Coalition: Good afternoon and thank you for the opportunity to speak today. My name is Beeta Senedjani, and I work for the Canadian Drug Policy Coalition. We will speak mainly to the suggested amendments in Bill C-5 related to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.
This is an issue that we take very seriously, and the time for change is long overdue. Bill C-5 is coming in a context where decriminalization is a national reality. Next year, B.C. will be implementing decriminalization, and municipalities and provinces across the country are in the process of decriminalizing. There’s broad consensus that criminalization of people is deeply problematic. It is not clear to us that Bill C-5 will have an impact on reducing criminal charges related to possession.
Bill C-5 does not go far enough. We would like to refer you to our submitted brief and our national civil society decriminalization platform called Decriminalization Done Right: A Rights-Based Path for Drug Policy for further details on recommendations related to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and reform to the CDSA in general.
We recommend full decriminalization of simple possession and necessity trafficking. This is the best way to ensure legislative reform has a better chance of supporting civil rights in this country.
In particular, we would like to draw the committee’s attention to subsection 10.2(2), proposed by Bill C-5, related to warnings and referrals for possession. While proposed subsection 10.2(1) states that peace officers shall consider alternatives to laying charges by considering whether to take no further action, to warn the individual or to make a referral to a program, agency or other service provider for assistance, proposed subsection 10.2(2) maintains that any charges are valid, despite the failure of a peace officer to consider these aforementioned options.
We would like to see proposed subsection 10.2(2) struck from the bill. Not doing so would severely undermine the purpose of the bill, which is to address disparities in sentencing among Black, Indigenous and other Canadians. Striking subsection 10.2(2) would help ensure reduction in criminal charges for possession.
Secondly, we’d like to refer the committee to proposed section 10.6, which is the sequestration system for setting aside any records of convictions related to possession, which would come into effect after two years. Of course, stigma being rampant, we would like to see proposed section 10.6 amended to state that the sequestration system must be implemented immediately rather than including a lag period of two years and that within one year of the system being implemented, we see those records fully expunged as soon as possible.
I’ll pass it over to my colleague Nicole to continue on. Thank you very much for this opportunity.
Nicole Luongo, Systems Change Coordinator, Canadian Drug Policy Coalition: Thank you very much. My name is Nicole, and paying heed to time, I’m going to speak to the declaration of principles in the bill, as well as evidence-based diversion measures more broadly. We want to critically interrogate the underlying premises of these principles and how they are contravened by the actual contents of the bill.
First, it is crucial to recognize that most substance use is not problematic, so we recommend eliminating the word “problematic” from the principle set out in proposed subsection 10.1(a), as it relays nothing about one’s relationship to drug use. It derives meaning in this context solely from the fact that the drugs in question are illegal.
Related, those who develop chaotic or compulsive relationships with illegal drugs usually do so alongside material deprivation and exposure to trauma, including the trauma linked to poverty, homelessness, negative encounters with police and discrimination. We thus recommend amending the principles set out in proposed subsections 10.1(b) and (d) to highlight that all interventions for both possession and necessity trafficking must protect the human rights, dignity and health of people who use drugs by being entirely voluntary and addressing structural vulnerabilities.
We also recommend amending proposed subsection 10.1(d) to commit to investing public resources in societal reintegration versus a narrower focus on individual rehabilitation.
Pertaining to warnings and referrals, the federal government regularly states that it seeks to mitigate structural stigma related to drug use. However, rather than reduce stigma, the assumption that all people who use drugs require interventions can paradoxically exacerbate it.
For example, research demonstrates that first responders and medical service providers perceive people diagnosed with addiction as dangerous. Interviews conducted with employers reveal a low willingness to hire people who are diagnosed with addiction. This interpersonal stigma can also feel like internalized stigma.
The majority of treatment for addiction is ideologically rooted in programs designed nearly a century ago, and they are widely criticized for being unsupported by contemporary evidence. Research on the effects of these programs suggests that enrolments contribute to viewing oneself as unstable, incompetent and untrustworthy, and people are at a significantly increased risk of non-fatal and fatal overdose immediately following discharge from these programs.
Acknowledging the disproportionate impacts of prohibition on Black and Indigenous communities, as well as Canada’s stated commitment to reconciliation, and in the spirit of enhancing public health, human rights and bodily autonomy, we strongly discourage the introduction of any diversion initiatives that are not entirely consensual, which is not actually possible under our framework of prohibition. I’ll leave it at that. Thank you very much.
[Translation]
The Deputy Chair: Thank you very much.
[English]
Safiyya Ahmad, Student-at-Law, British Columbia Civil Liberties Association: Good afternoon, members of the standing Senate committee. Thank you for having us here today. My name is Safiyya Ahmad, and I’m joined by my colleague Niki Bains. We are from the BC Civil Liberties Association.
I’m joining from the unceded territory of the Musqueam, Squamish and Tsleil-Waututh nations. Acknowledging the territory upon which we live and work reminds us all of our obligations towards Indigenous people, and this informs our work today on Bill C-5.
BCCLA supports many of the changes the bill seeks to make, but in our view, it does not go far enough. Currently, the bill is unlikely to have the desired impact of addressing systemic discrimination in the criminal legal system. In our written brief, we outline for the committee four areas of concern with Bill C-5.
First, we recommend that all mandatory minimum sentences be repealed. There is considerable research and case law to show that mandatory minimums contribute to the mass incarceration of Indigenous and Black people and cause disproportionate harm to people with mental illnesses. We also have decades of scholarly research establishing that mandatory minimums do not provide the deterrent effect with which they are so often justified. Mandatory minimums thus cause immense harm without any apparent benefit, which is why we strongly urge the committee to repeal all remaining mandatory minimums.
If Parliament is not willing to take this step at this time, at the very least, we urge the committee to add a provision allowing judges to use their discretion to depart from a mandatory minimum. Such a provision should not be restricted to exceptional circumstances, as this would unfairly place the burden on marginalized individuals to prove the disproportionately harmful effect of mandatory minimums. We emphasize that this provision would be a stopgap measure until the remaining mandatory minimums are fully repealed.
Niki will address the other three areas on behalf of BCCLA.
Niki Bains, Policy Staff Counsel, British Columbia Civil Liberties Association: Thank you, Safiyya. Good afternoon, senators. I am speaking to you from Amiskwaciwâskahikan, Treaty 6 territory.
Our recommendation is to remove all unnecessary restrictions on the availability of conditional sentence orders, CSOs. Bill C-5 removes some, while leaving in place three restrictions contained in paragraphs 742.1(b), (c), even as amended, and (d) of the Criminal Code. Consistent with the original form of the CSO provision introduced in 1996 and the need to repeal all mandatory minimums, section 742.1 need only be restricted to sentences of two years less a day and the requirement that serving the sentence in the community would not endanger community safety and be consistent with sentencing principles, as is already set out in paragraph (a).
As outlined in our written materials, expanding the availability of CSOs creates space for Indigenous legal orders to be respected and implemented. Indigenous nations are actively working to reclaim and reinvigorate their systems of law and governance, systems that have been targeted by the state — including Parliament itself — for hundreds of years.
Community-based sanctions like CSOs provide an opportunity for Indigenous peoples to hold citizens accountable in ways that are meaningful to them. Expanding the availability of CSOs is a small but important step Parliament can and should take to support Indigenous peoples’ work in revitalizing their legal orders.
Repealing mandatory minimum sentences and expanding the availability of CSOs are necessary steps to address the mass incarceration of Indigenous, Black and other racialized people.
Our third recommendation is to repeal section 4 of the CDSA and to decriminalize necessity trafficking, which we define as:
. . . the selling and sharing of a controlled substance for subsistence, to support personal drug use costs, and to provide a safe supply . . .
In the interests of time, we will refer you to our written materials.
Finally, in our brief, we provide a detailed list of recommendations respecting the diversion measures proposed under the CDSA. If simple possession and necessity trafficking continue to be criminalized, the approach taken in Bill C-5 must be strengthened in order to protect human rights and promote equitable outcomes. In particular, we are concerned about the reliance on police and prosecutorial discretion in the bill.
Further, the bill should not require the identity of the individual to be included in police records of warnings or referrals. Importantly, people who have been convicted of simple possession prior to Bill C-5 coming into force should not be arbitrarily excluded from the mechanisms available for expungement of records of conviction.
Thank you for the opportunity to participate in these proceedings. We look forward to discussion and questions.
Caitlin Shane, Staff Lawyer, Pivot Legal Society: Good afternoon, honourable members of the committee. Thank you for having me today. My name is Caitlin Shane. I’m the staff lawyer of drug policy at Pivot Legal Society and I’m joining you from Vancouver, B.C., on the stolen lands of the Musqueam, Squamish and Tsleil-Waututh nations.
I’ve circulated a more detailed brief that explains Pivot Legal Society’s position in full, but for today I’m going to focus on Bill C-5’s proposed amendments to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and specifically those under proposed part I.1, evidence-based diversion measures.
In short, Pivot is concerned that by proposing measures that lessen, but don’t fundamentally alter, the criminalization of drug use, Bill C-5 is currently fated to maintain the status quo and, in doing so, to fail its own stated purposes. I’ll unpack that a bit. Bill C-5’s principles correctly identify that substance use is not a criminal issue but a health and social issue. It rightly finds that interventions should be founded on evidence-based practices that protect the human rights, health and dignity of people who use drugs. It recognizes, significantly I think, that criminal sanctions for drug possession increase stigma and “are not consistent with established public health evidence.”
But despite accurately identifying the principles and evidence in issue, Bill C-5 proceeds to propose solutions that don’t follow those principles or evidence to their logical conclusion. If Bill C-5 wants in good faith to honour its principles, it should actually decriminalize drug possession and necessity trafficking. This is being called for desperately by people who use drugs, their families, numerous chief public health officers, over 180 civil society organizations across the country, the province of B.C. and various entities of the United Nations. It is time to listen to the experts and legislate accordingly.
I’m primarily concerned that when it comes to people who are actually being criminalized for drug use, these diversion measures will just continue to cycle people through the criminal justice system, and I’ll explain why.
Bill C-5 retains police and prosecutorial discretion to lay drug possession charges, and it explicitly provides that if police fail to follow protocol, there are no consequences, either for the officer or the person who has been failed. We know that poor and racialized drug users are consistently disproportionately targeted for drug possession charges. If these provisions don’t actively combat that reality, we cannot expect it to change.
Bill C-5 requires that police collect information, including personal identification, from people who receive warnings or referrals. That information is then made available to police and the courts. This provision alone mimics criminalization and is absolutely enough to keep drug use driven underground. The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that even the most informal interactions between police and marginalized communities are experienced as detention. Provisions respecting extensive data collection must be removed in their entirety.
Though the record suspension provisions are well intentioned, they also won’t protect most people who are criminalized for drug possession. Record suspensions are easily revoked, including where a person commits an indictable offence or they’re considered not to be of good conduct. An indictable offence can be something as minor as breaching a probation condition that requires abstinence. I would urge the Senate to consider a more effective approach to suspending and expunging records for drug possession offences.
Those are my overarching concerns and, of course, my core recommendation with respect to the diversion measures is to decriminalize drug possession and necessity-based trafficking. Short of that, there are amendments that can be made. I’ve included those in my brief. But it is with the earnest caveat that this framework, this current iteration of Bill C-5, will not serve the bill’s stated purposes and is not truly a public health or human rights approach to substance use.
Thank you. Those are my submissions.
The Deputy Chair: Julian Roberts, the floor is yours.
Julian Roberts, Professor of Criminal Justice, University of Oxford, as an individual: Good evening, senators. Thank you for the invitation to testify here today. It’s much appreciated.
For the benefit of committee members — you probably don’t know who I am — you may be wondering who is this geezer from Oxford coming to tell us about Canadian sentencing. I’m a Canadian. I just happen to have been living and working at Oxford for the last 18 years, but my experience in sentencing goes back to the 1984 Canadian Sentencing Commission. I have a book Sentencing in Canada with Justice David Cole. To give you an idea of who I am.
I support the bill. The remarks I’m making here briefly today are relating to the mandatory minimum sentences. I think it’s very good that the list is being swept away. I have an amendment to propose which has been referred to by one of the other witnesses.
First, just a couple of words about mandatory minimum sentences. Another witness has noted the lack of deterrent effect, and it’s quite clear from research all around the world these sentences do not buy you any additional crime prevention.
The second justification sometimes used is that maybe mandatory minimum sentences are not so effective, but the public like them. They feel like Parliament is getting tough with offenders — mandatory sentence, no judicial discretion. Great, the public will love it. They don’t. Canadians oppose mandatory minimum penalties. Don’t take my word for it. Look at the research by the Department of Justice. I happen to have it here, which shows that 90% of Canadians agree that Canada should give judges the flexibility to impose a sentence that is less than the mandatory minimum in exceptional circumstances. That’s the amendment that I’ll be referring to.
Anyone looking for political capital or popular support for mandatory sentences, they won’t find it with the public.
You may say, well, what’s the harm? It looks good. It’s on the books. The harm is that any mandatory sentence of imprisonment of this kind is incompatible with section 718.1 of the Criminal Code, which is the principle that the severity of the sentence should be proportionate to the seriousness of the crime and the culpability or responsibility of the offender. That’s the common law bedrock of sentencing that goes back to Magna Carta. It’s not judge-made, although the courts, of course, have affirmed it. It’s not an academic principle. It’s parliament’s principle. You codified it in 1996. And these mandatory sentences undermine that principle. That’s the principal reason why you should get rid of them.
The second point hasn’t been mentioned. If you legislate mandatory sentences or imprisonment, as you have done, they are a message to the judiciary: “Your Honour, we don’t trust you. We don’t trust you to impose the appropriately severe sentence, so we’ll do it for you, and we’ll take away your discretion.” That’s a poor message, because parliament sets the framework, the objectives, purposes, principles and sentencing factors, all this stuff, but the determination of sentence is the work of an individual judge. And that’s a poor message to send to the judiciary.
I think if you are going to retain these other mandatory sentences, you should do what every other common law jurisdiction has done that operates mandatory sentences, which is to include an exceptional circumstances clause, something to the effect that a court could impose a lesser sentence if imposing the mandatory minimum would be contrary to the interests of justice or unjust in the circumstances and so on.
Now, we have those in this country. In England and Wales, a court may go below the mandatory sentence in exceptional circumstances or if it would be unjust. And the courts have narrowly tailored this. Only a small number of cases actually get saved this way. So it’s not the case that the mandatory sentence is blown open by one of these clauses.
I urge you to add an amendment to the existing mandatory sentences, which enables a court to do justice. Sentencing is about justice: individualized, proportionate and determined by an independent judge, not by a committee or legislature. Thank you very much.
[Translation]
The Deputy Chair: Thank you, Mr. Roberts.
[English]
Senator Gagné: My first question is for the BC Civil Liberties Association. It was noted on your website that conditional sentences can be an especially important tool when an accused person is not a Canadian citizen. Could you expand on that? How would a permanent resident be impacted differently from a prison sentence versus a conditional sentence order?
Ms. Bains: Thank you for the question. The important thing — and this ties back into Dr. Robert’s comments — is removing the requirement to impose a mandatory minimum or the restriction on a CSO allows a judge to look at a person coming before them in all their circumstances, which may include the immigration implications if sentenced to a term of imprisonment.
So a person that is not a Canadian citizen — such as a permanent resident — can face removal if they receive a certain type of sentence. If a CSO is barred in particular circumstances, we are essentially not only directing the courts to impose imprisonment where it may be unjust, but we are also forcing this person then to deal with removal proceedings — which may add another layer of injustice that they are forced to face — and the court’s hands are tied when they are sentencing an individual such as a permanent resident or someone without citizenship. So, I’m glad that you found those materials on our website, and I hope that answers your question.
Senator Gagné: My next question is for the Canadian Drug Policy Coalition. Thank you for sharing your views about drug decriminalization. I note that the legalization of cannabis alone happened after many months of study and consultation and a whole dedicated legislative process. The upcoming decriminalization of drug possession in B.C., due to take effect in early 2023, has been the product of a great deal of consultation between levels of government. Hopefully, we’ll learn lessons from that.
I’m not sure we should use a simple amendment to this bill to decide a multi-jurisdictional policy question. But this issue is going to keep coming up, so I wonder if you can give us some of the pros and cons of decriminalization models elsewhere in the world. For instance, we often hear of the Portuguese approach, but I understand the Portuguese model involves a whole system of drug diversion courts, which your organization opposes. Could you please comment?
Ms. Senedjani: Yes, thank you for this question. Nicole and I will work together to address your questions. First, I’ll speak a little bit to the scope of this bill.
At the Canadian Drug Policy Coalition, we actually would rather see a single regulatory framework to regulate all food and drugs together, as was also recommended by the federal expert task force.
With regards to the piece on diversion, we do not advocate for a diversion model of decriminalization. We would like to see those harmful laws removed without reinstating and recreating the harmful conditions of those original laws.
Any programs must be entirely voluntary and non-coercive. If the conditions to avoid receiving a criminal charge are mandatory treatment or participation in programs, it is not completely free, and therefore, we do not support that approach.
I’ll pause there to see if my colleague wants to add additional words, other examples or whatnot. Thank you.
Ms. Luongo: Certainly. I am based in Vancouver. B.C., of course, has a fair bit of insight into how the B.C. decriminalization exemption process went. Although there was consultation with groups of people who use drugs, the power of their voice or the weight that was given to their testimonies was not evenly distributed among other stakeholders, i.e. police.
Our perspective is that a fragmented and fractured landscape of decriminalization exemption requests coming from municipalities or provinces is less favourable than is a federal piece of legislation to standardize decriminalization.
I know you referenced Portugal. I would encourage all members to look into, for example, the International Network of People who Use Drugs’ publications on the Portuguese model. There has been a lot of resistance to it by people who use drugs, who feel that they are coerced into attending mandatory addiction treatment or related initiatives.
As I mentioned in my original submission, much drug use is not problematic. It is not something that would be qualified as addictive, and most people who use drugs do so episodically or recreationally. The problems primarily arise from the drug policy environment around the drug use, which does criminalize, stigmatize and, in some cases, medicalize. Hopefully, that answers all or most of your question.
Senator Gagné: Thank you.
Ms. Senedjani: If I may, earlier I mentioned that we are advocating for the regulation of food and drugs under a single framework. I misspoke earlier. We are wanting to see all psychoactive substances regulated under a singular framework. Whether or not coffee falls under that is up for debate, but I wanted to offer that distinction with respect to food. Thank you for allowing that last comment there.
Senator Dalphond: Thank you to the witnesses. I will focus on my questions to Professor Roberts. I read something you wrote in the Montreal Gazette in 2016, so I know you have Canadian roots.
Professor Roberts, you have the benefit of being an expert in sentencing in Canada, as well as now living in the U.K. and being at a very prestigious university. You are interested in sentencing principles and guidelines and their practice.
You say in your testimony and in your writings that mandatory minimum penalties don’t work and they should all be removed. But if we keep them, we should have what is called in England an escape clause or what is called here a safety valve. In England, does the escape clause apply to all kinds of crimes that come with a minimum sentence?
Mr. Roberts: Thank you, senator. Yes, it does, with the exception of the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment for murder; there is no alternative to that. However, if we look at possession of an illegal firearm, for example, this offence carries a five-year mandatory minimum, but there is the ability in exceptional circumstances for a court to go beneath that. However, as I say, it’s not invoked in half of the cases. It has been narrowly interpreted by the courts to be exceptional.
Senator Dalphond: In the case of murder, is that for both first-degree and second-degree murder?
Mr. Roberts: We have a single offence of murder, which carries a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment, and there is a minimum term that corresponds to the second- and first-degree minimum periods in Canada.
Senator Dalphond: Thank you. When you refer to the use of the escape clause, you said it’s restrictively interpreted. It’s not easily used, as I understand it.
Do you have any data about how often it is granted compared to the number of times it is requested? Do you have any data about when it is granted? Is it granted more to specific groups? Are there some groups that have easier access to the escape provision than other groups?
For example, in our system here, we see forms of systemic discrimination, particularly towards racialized and Indigenous groups, where we not only have over-policing but also over-charging and a higher number of imprisonments compared to the overall population. Do you see the same kind of phenomenon with the application of the escape clause in the U.K.?
Mr. Roberts: I couldn’t tell you. The statistics are not available for that interpretation. The percentage of cases in which the exceptional clause is invoked will vary from offence to offence, and I can get you those statistics. I don’t have them at my fingertips. As to different applications across different groups, we don’t have that information.
Senator Dalphond: Does the case law define, with criteria, when the escape clause can be exercised, or is it left to judicial discretion and the British Court of Appeal to decide exactly when it should be granted or not?
Mr. Roberts: It’s largely left to the discretion of the courts. The Court of Appeal criminal division will have given guidance, but it would be of a general nature. It wouldn’t be, for example, a series of conditions that have to be fulfilled, at which point the exceptional clause may be invoked. It’s quite flexible, and the guidance is quite general from the Court of Appeal.
Senator Dalphond: If there is no specific data about specific groups, is there some data available about the number of times it was applied for and the number of times it was granted or denied?
Mr. Roberts: There are statistics that will show the number of sentences for a mandatory minimum offence that fell below the mandatory and which therefore would have been triggered by the escape clause, as you put it. But we wouldn’t have statistics on the number of times in which a defence advocate has argued in favour of it and it’s been declined by the court.
Senator Dalphond: Mr. Chair, could I invite the witness to be kind enough to supply us the data that is available?
Mr. Roberts: I’ll do my best, senator.
Senator Dalphond: Thank you very much. It will be very much appreciated. I envy you being at Oxford.
Senator Simons: My first question is for Ms. Senedjani and Ms. Luongo. We have talked a great deal on this committee about mandatory minimum sentences, but I want to speak to you about the warning and referral section.
It’s my understanding, speaking to various police chiefs, that in most Canadian cities, certainly in my own city of Edmonton, this is already de facto what people are doing. So I’m just wondering, first, if you feel that the proposed additions of sections 10.1 and 10.2 to the CDSA would make a substantive difference to the way drug offences are being enforced on the streets.
Second, could you speak to any concerns you might have about leaving this very much to the discretion of individual peace officers rather than police departments?
Ms. Luongo: I’ll begin, if that’s all right. I would challenge the belief that decriminalization is being enforced de facto. I think that the testimonies of people who use drugs and drug-using communities, including in Edmonton, tell a very different story. Just because something is said by a police officer or someone who represents the criminal justice system, that does not necessarily mean that plays out on the ground, so I think it is imperative to actually codify that into law. I will leave it at that and pass it on.
Ms. Senedjani: Thanks, Nicole. Just to add onto that, in research that was done by the CCSA that looked at how cannabis was legalized — which looked at the perspectives of RCMP officers and other top enforcement officials implementing legalization of cannabis — something that these officers and officials mentioned is that it’s a bit of a nightmare going through the training required to implement this cross-jurisdictionally. So we would like to see that any law really addresses the whole country rather than leaving it up to chance for jurisdictions to enforce the law differently. We would like to see a structure of law that better supports public health and human rights and eliminates the variations that we’re seeing in sentencing; it seems to me that the stated purpose of this bill is to really get at the variations in sentencing. We recommend structures and laws, as much as possible, to deliver this desired change.
Senator Simons: If I have time, I have a question for Professor Roberts.
When we’re discussing the potential for an amendment to deal with this escape hatch, as we call it sometimes, I’m wondering if you could tell me your opinion on the legal difference between a phrase such as “exceptional circumstances” or “substantial and compelling circumstances.” You are saying the British law uses “exceptional,” but weighing those two formulations, what would you say the difference between them is?
Mr. Roberts: Well, there are various formulations. There are others too. It could be that a court may go below the mandatory minimum if it would be contrary to the interests of justice.
I don’t think there’s any clear answer to that. “Exceptional circumstances” does sound a bit tougher than the other wording, but it’s a matter of legal drafting. Basically, you want a form of words that will permit a court to go below, but only if the case is somehow different and the mandatory minimum sentence would be disproportionate or inappropriate. You need some form of words that would allow that.
I don’t think the wording is hugely important because it varies around the world — South Africans have a slightly different language — but the idea is quite straightforward, obviously. It’s just that the mandatory sentence applies unless a court finds exceptional circumstances or finds that would be contrary to the interests of justice and so on.
Senator Simons: Is there a form of words that is typical in Canadian law as opposed to British or Australian or South African?
Mr. Roberts: I think “contrary to the interest of justice” would be the most common or popular one in other common law jurisdictions, but it does vary. Looking informally at the wording in different jurisdictions, it didn’t strike me that one wording was more exclusive or permissive than another. Judges will interpret the wording in a way that permits them to do justice. I guess I’m saying I wouldn’t get too hung up on the wording, but there are a number of drafting alternatives that you could consider if you were so minded.
[Translation]
The Deputy Chair: I have a question for you, Professor Roberts, which is in the same vein as my colleague’s question. We recognize the power of legislators, whether they are senators or members of Parliament, to establish minimum sentences in the Criminal Code. You recognize this power, do you not?
[English]
Mr. Roberts: I do.
[Translation]
The Deputy Chair: So, to send a clear message, in cases of crimes against children or domestic violence, for instance, we could maintain these minimum sentences in the Criminal Code — for those who preach the abolition of minimum sentences — and rely on the judge’s discretion to depart from a minimum sentence. This would be in a context where the sentence could be disproportionate to the context in which the crime was committed. Do you agree with this principle?
[English]
Mr. Roberts: Yes, senator. That’s the point I’m making; if you retain the mandatory minimum, it makes sense from the perspective of justice to allow a court to do its job, which is to individualize sentence and to avoid an injustice where one will be triggered by the mandatory sentence.
[Translation]
The Deputy Chair: The judge also exercises discretion when imposing a maximum sentence.
[English]
Mr. Roberts: Yes. Parliament has established the maximum penalty and a judge can impose any lawful sentence up to the maximum penalty. Minimum penalty is intruding and removing the discretion to individualize and render a truly proportionate sentence.
Senator Batters: My question is to Caitlin Shane from Pivot Legal Society. Ms. Shane, isn’t eliminating minimum sentences for gun crimes in Bill C-5 completely inconsistent with the Trudeau government’s actions in trying to restrict legal ownership of guns? To me it seems like this is criminalizing law-abiding citizens while easing up on the actual criminals, those who use illegal guns to commit crimes.
Ms. Shane: Thank you for the question. I suspect perhaps my colleagues at the BCCLA or Professor Roberts might be better poised to answer this as my submissions focus on the piece around drug diversion. Certainly, we have advocated consistently at Pivot and in our community for the repeal of all mandatory minimum sentences, including those that are contained within Bill C-5. We feel that refusing to do that would deny judges the ability to craft a fit and proportionate sentence and to determine, based on the individual characteristics of the person being convicted, what sentence makes most sense. To deny the repeal of mandatory minimums is to work at cross-purposes with principles like proportionality and will lead to scenarios where, as is frequently the case in B.C., courts are finding that principles like denunciation and deterrence are not having a productive effect and are working at cross-purposes with public health and safety.
Senator Batters: I was focusing on gun crimes and doesn’t that seem to be — Would you prefer that I ask BCCLA about that? Your submissions were more dealing with drug policy and that sort of thing.
Ms. Shane: I would still submit that there needs to be a full repeal of mandatory minimum sentences, especially if we’re looking at who is being criminalized, what the harms of criminalization are and the fact that Bill C-5 has consistently maintained a desire to look at the fact that it is Black, Indigenous and people of colour who are being consistently, systematically targeted by criminal laws. There needs to be some kind of compromise there.
Senator Batters: Perhaps, then, I could get an answer specifically about my question about eliminating minimum sentences for gun crimes. For the BCCLA, doesn’t that seem to be going against what the Trudeau government is actually trying to do in restricting legal ownership of guns? How do you react to that particular part of it?
Ms. Ahmad: Thank you for the question, senator. To clarify, again, BCCLA supports the repeal of all mandatory minimum sentences, and that includes for things like possession and use of firearms. Our concern is that there are situations, and we’ve seen situations, where it’s not appropriate to apply the mandatory minimum sentence, and yet, as things stand, judges have no ability or no option to do anything differently. This is our concern with the prevalence of mandatory minimums in the Criminal Code. We don’t see that as inconsistent in terms of what you were asking. I hope that answers the question.
Senator Batters: Not really. I’m sorry. What I was particularly getting at is that right now we have a situation where the Trudeau government is doing things like doing a mandatory buy-back program — or what is really a confiscation program — for legal gun owners, yet for people who have been convicted of serious gun crimes, they’re eliminating these minimum sentences. So wouldn’t that seem to be inconsistent? I know that it’s not particularly what you’re arguing here, but I’m asking you for a comment on that particular aspect regarding gun crimes.
Ms. Bains: I can add something, senator. What I would say is when we’re looking at this issue as a public interest organization focused on civil liberties, we want to make our decisions and put forward suggestions based on evidence, which also includes people’s lived experiences. When we’re advocating for the repeal of mandatory minimums, we’re less concerned about political implications on other issues. But I think what the committee has heard throughout these proceedings is that there’s a key distinction between a fit sentence and an available sentence. What this bill does is it gives judges flexibility and discretion to impose fit sentences by removing restrictions on what’s available. The implication that gun crime may be treated differently as a result — Well, what’s targeted there is where mandatory minimums are producing unjust results. That’s not something that anyone would want to maintain.
I think that distinction between what is fit and available in the circumstances is an important one to consider when we’re talking about different ways to address gun violence.
Senator Batters: Maybe I could go back to Pivot with my second question. Conditional sentences require the offender to have somewhere to live. Will conditional sentences then only potentially benefit those who have safe, stable and sufficient housing?
Ms. Shane: Certainly you have identified a real issue with Bill C-5, which is that for people who are living at the intersections of poverty and homelessness, this bill will not go far enough to address their circumstances, and continuing to use the criminal law as a tool to address something that is so much bigger than the activity that is violating a potential law is not evidence-based. That is part of the reason why we’re suggesting a full decriminalization of simple possession. Decriminalization would remove the interaction between the individual and the criminal justice system, which cycles that person through the criminal justice system over and over again. Yes, we would love to see supports, including housing and employment and livable income for people, so that we can actually find solutions that work.
Senator Cotter: Thank you to all of the witnesses for your presentations and responses to the questions. I’m interested in all of it, but my questions mostly are for Professor Roberts and related to mandatory minimums.
First, you observe that the position in England and Wales is that murder is excluded from the special circumstances regarding the application or non-application of mandatory minimums. Can you speak a bit to why that’s the case in England and whether it is in a certain way inconsistent with the overall principle and philosophy that you spoke about?
Mr. Roberts: Let’s be clear. The mandatory sentence of life imprisonment for murder, there is no exception to that, and a court must impose that.
But the minimum term, which will be determined by the court before the offender can apply to the Parole Board of England and Wales varies. So you could have a minimum term. In theory, you could have a minimum term of a year. You could have a minimum term of 50 years.
In other words, there’s a mandatory sentence for every offender convicted of murder, but the court, even for the most serious offence, is able to calibrate the amount of time that the offender will spend in prison, calibrate it to the seriousness of the murder and the culpability of the offender. So proportionality is preserved even though there’s a mandatory sentence.
It’s the same logic for, for example, the mandatory sentence for possession of an illegal firearm. It’s five years, and that applies to everyone unless — and this permits a court in exceptional circumstances to go below.
Senator Cotter: My second question in this regard is that some have suggested that the approach most effective with respect to exceptional circumstances is to identify criteria that judges should be guided by and require that they give reasons for their deviation from the mandatory minimums.
Can you provide your thoughts on those two points?
Mr. Roberts: Yes, in reverse order. I definitely think they should give reasons. Courts should always give reasons for all their adjudications and particularly at the stage of sentencing. In fact, in many jurisdictions there’s a requirement to give reasons and to explain the impact of the sentence to the defendant. That’s important.
Sorry, I’ve forgotten your first point. Just remind me of that, senator.
Senator Cotter: Criteria built into the legislation to guide judges in their exercise.
Mr. Roberts: I don’t think it’s necessary because what will happen is the courts of appeal in Canada or the Court of Appeal of England and Wales will develop an appellate jurisprudence where they will indicate the kinds of circumstances that would be deemed exceptional. By upholding or overturning particular sentences, it will become clear to the lower courts that, for example, factor X is insufficient to qualify as exceptional. You could legislate these criteria, but then you’re getting into Parliament saying to judges, “Here are the criteria.” I would encourage you to have more faith in the judiciary.
Senator Cotter: At least theoretically, would you be in agreement that judges should be able to deviate from mandatory maximums as well and impose a higher sentence?
Mr. Roberts: No. Courts should not go beyond the legislative maximum, whatever it is — 14 years, 20 years and so on — because Parliament has set that as a maximum. You don’t want an individual judge saying, “Well, 14 years is not quite enough. Let’s make it 20.” That is always respected in other common law jurisdictions.
Senator Cotter: Thank you.
[Translation]
Senator Dupuis: I thank the witnesses.
I have a question for the Canadian Drug Policy Coalition. You referred to the work of the substance use panels and the panel’s recommendations, including the recommendation to eliminate all criminal sanctions and coercive measures.
You talked about sanctions for simple possession of drugs and said that legislation should instead be adopted for all psychoactive substances, and this should be done within a single public health legal framework.
Can you elaborate on what you mean by creating public health legislation that would encompass all these psychoactive substances?
[English]
Ms. Luongo: In reference to that recommendation specifically, that was referring to Health Canada’s Expert Task Force on Substance Use, which convened a group of experts across the country from every jurisdiction. One of the recommendations there was that all psychoactive substances, including alcohol and cannabis, should be legislated and regulated under a single public health regulatory framework. The rationale there was that, again, many of the harms that we attribute to illegal drug use are actually harms that are derived from the criminalization of drugs.
So although legislating all psychoactive substances under a single legal framework would not eliminate, for example, the potential for some people to develop chaotic or compulsive relationships with drugs, there would not be that additional driving force of criminalization and the stigmatization associated with it that prohibits people from seeking support if needed.
For example, some people identify as experiencing alcoholism. In seeking help for that, they don’t have to actually hide their alcohol use from the criminal justice system.
[Translation]
Senator Dupuis: If I understand correctly, what is behind the position on this recommendation is the fact that there is nothing, in essence, that distinguishes one psychoactive substance from another, whether it is a drug, alcohol or anything else; is that right?
[English]
Ms. Luongo: Yes. When we say that, we mean innately in terms of the pharmacologic or chemical properties. Obviously, some drugs are highly stigmatized. When we look at the actual bodily effects of something like crack cocaine or methamphetamine, they are not that much different from currently legal drugs. What happens, though, is that the actual composition of the drugs, because they’re illegal, get altered.
Of course, we have a huge toxic drug poisoning crisis happening in Canada right now. People are dying at staggering rates. That’s not because the chemical composition of certain drugs is that much more dangerous than legal drugs. It’s that because they’re illegal, the supply chain is contaminated. As drugs are imported or manufactured domestically and then change hands multiple times through the illicit market, they are being adulterated with unknown substances, so the potency and toxicity of the illegal drug market is impossible to predict.
Our rationale is that if these drugs were legalized and regulated through a public health framework, there would still be risk associated, but people, as with alcohol and cannabis, would know precisely what they were getting and in what quantities.
[Translation]
Senator Dupuis: If I understand the reasoning correctly, criminalization has more to do with the moral judgment that can be made or that society can make about this type of substance versus that type of substance; is that right?
[English]
Ms. Luongo: Absolutely, yes. Of course, Canada’s history of prohibition is inextricable from settler colonialism, anti-Black racism, anti-Asian racism. When you look at the history of at what point in time certain drugs have been criminalized, more than anything, it has to do with the racial and ethnic groups that were associated with that drug. We haven’t left that legacy behind. We’re nowhere near leaving it behind.
Yes, it’s absolutely a kind of historic moral judgment, as well as a very material kind of economic impetus, to criminalize certain drugs. Our belief is that, moving forward — again, in the spirit of reconciliation, paying heed to Canada’s Anti-Racism Strategy 2019-2022 — we need to seriously address and reckon with why these drugs were criminalized in the first place and what justice looks like moving forward.
[Translation]
Senator Dupuis: My next question is for the Pivot Legal Society. Mr. Shane, you spoke in your presentation about what you call necessity trafficking, which should be decriminalized in the same way that possession should be. How do you define this necessity trafficking?
[English]
Ms. Shane: Thank you for your question. Necessity-based trafficking is effectively trafficking that occurs typically at street level by people whose motive for engaging in dealing is for their own personal drug use, for their own sustenance or to provide a safe supply to another.
Oftentimes in the community that I work in, we’ll see folks purchasing substances for their partner or for a person who lives in their building who has mobility issues and can’t have regular access to their dealer. There are a lot of reasons, both geographic and physical, in relation to potential avoidance of danger and engaging with the illicit market, for which people rely on others to purchase substances for them or for why people engage in dealing in the first place.
The reason why we advocate for the decriminalization of street-based trafficking is because criminalization is not stopping the practice from occurring; it’s actually driving it. The B.C. Court of Appeal recently found that criminalizing necessity trafficking is encouraging drug use and drug sales, not ceasing the practice.
There’s also an important role, whether we like it or not, that drug dealers are playing in the current unregulated market, which is that they are testing their drugs and providing a safer supply to people in their community that otherwise doesn’t exist in an entirely unregulated market. Thank you.
Senator Pate: Thank you to all the witnesses for being with us. My initial questions are for Professor Roberts.
When you were involved in the sentencing commission here, as well as since you’ve been at Oxford, you’ve written a fair bit about the Canadian sentencing situation, including the position of judges with respect to the desire to have discretion. I’d be interested in your comments on the work you’ve done, as well as the research that shows what the desire of judges is.
In addition, to follow up on some of the questions of my colleagues, since the last time I had discussions with you about this, I think you’ve kept well abreast of the sentencing provisions in Canada. As you know, the last time the life sentence alone was looked at in Canada, it was in Luxton. At that time, we still had the faint hope clause: the judicial review at 15 years. The court was fairly clear in saying that they didn’t consider the constitutionality of the life sentence because of the faint hope clause.
As you know, since then we’ve had Lloyd and Bissonnette and a significant suggestion that the mechanism you’ve described that exists in the U.K. might be more appropriate.
I noticed in the information that’s available about the U.K. situation, as you’ve already mentioned, they look at mitigating factors as well as aggravating factors along the lines of sentencing principles. I was particularly struck, given the number of Indigenous women in this country serving life sentences or long sentences for homicides, by the issue of battering and abuse, and the impact of “excessive use of self-defence” was actually some of the terminology.
Could you comment on what you would see that we might draw from in terms of all of that information as to what could happen here and how it could remedy some of the over-incarceration of particularly racialized populations if we develop that kind of discretionary provision that you’ve talked about that exists already in many common law jurisdictions?
Mr. Roberts: Thank you, senator, for the question. You said an awful lot there. It’s a little hard to react to it, but let me go back to the first thing you said.
You spoke about judicial reactions. The judges I speak to, whether here in Canada or overseas, feel frustrated that they are required to impose a proportionate sentence and are restricted from so doing by a mandatory sentence. And practitioners are the same. The lawyers I speak to like discretion, bounded discretion. It’s not wild discretion. It’s a judge applying the principles and purposes and all the contents of Part XXIII of the code that Parliament has created. I think the judiciary do resent this intrusion into their legitimate exercise of discretion.
In terms of the latter comments you’ve made, I’d sum up the position from my perspective in this way: We have guidelines. Of course, you don’t have those in Canada, although there was talk about them 20 or 30 years ago. The guidelines are useful because they give the court greater structure, greater information and greater consistency. You can build steers into the guidelines.
For example, in our guidelines for firearms offences, judges are told that Black and minority ethnic defendants — that’s the term we use — are more likely to be imprisoned, and for longer periods, when they’re convicted of this offence. The guideline alerts the judge and the court to this differential outcome. So guidelines can be useful in various ways.
On the murder regime, I do think it’s a better regime when you’ve got a mandatory sentence — and I think most people still support a mandatory sentence for the most exceptional crime, which is murder — in which the court can calibrate and choose. In Canada it’s 10 to 25 years or 25 years. Then, of course, we’ve got the multiples, which have been ruled unconstitutional.
These sorts of absolute thresholds don’t make sense from the perspective of proportionality, because you want a court to be able to calibrate. Maybe the sentence, the minimum term or the period of parole ineligibility shouldn’t be 25; it should be 22 or 19 or 28. That’s what I mean by allowing courts the discretion within a regime to individualize and to render the sentence truly proportionate to the offender appearing at sentencing.
With respect to Indigenous people, BAME respondents — Black, Asian and minority ethnic people — in Britain are overrepresented in the prison population and receive longer sentences. We’ve got that problem here. In order to do something about that, you need a system that allows a judge to take into account the circumstances that brought this offender before the court. It may have to do with the racism to which they’ve been exposed, or harassment, which has played a role. If a court has discretion, it can recognize that as a form of reduced culpability for the offence.
I’m not sure if that answered your question, but you did put a lot on the table.
Senator Pate: Thank you.
Senator Klyne: Welcome to all the guests on our panel here this evening. My question is for Professor Roberts.
Professor Roberts, you’ve opined on this generally, and I don’t want to cover the same ground, but in some of your published work you recommended the adoption of sentencing guidelines similar to the United States’ federal system, which you suggest would lead to more predictable sentences without the rigidity of mandatory minimums. You also suggest allowing judges to depart from the guidelines when mitigating or aggravating circumstances dictate. You can elaborate on this if you wish.
Could you please let this committee know what effects these changes would have if they were applied to the Canadian system, and are there any possible drawbacks with this approach?
Mr. Roberts: Thank you for that.
Just to be clear, I have never held up the federal guidelines as a model for Canada or any other jurisdiction. Of course, they are advisory now as a result of a decision by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Booker.
As to a guideline system, there are good guidelines and bad guidelines. The federal guidelines were bad guidelines. The English guidelines are good guidelines, and the guidelines in other countries — for example, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, South Korea — these are guideline schemes where the court is given a range and a starting point sentence, factors to consider — aggravating or mitigating — and the court works through a series of steps but has discretion. If imposing the guideline sentence or a sentence within the guideline range would be contrary to the interests of justice, the court steps out of the guideline and imposes a different sentence, giving reasons. The case can be appealed by one of the parties, and up it goes to the Court of Appeal. That’s the kind of scheme that I would recommend.
I have always advocated this for Canada. I think it would work well. This is what the Canadian Sentencing Commission recommended in 1987. The federal government was going to introduce this, and it didn’t in the end. That’s all history now, and it seems unlikely that any guideline scheme will come to Canada in the near future, but I think it would be useful for the reasons that I have identified in my publications and which I hope I have summarized just now.
[Translation]
The Deputy Chair: Before we move on to the second round, I’d like to thank our guests, because we’re keeping you longer than we expected. We thank you for your presence. I will allow two senators to ask questions in the second round and then we will conclude our business.
[English]
Senator Dalphond: Professor Roberts, I am going back to you.
To all the witnesses, thank you very much for all these comments.
In England, I don’t think you have the equivalent of Section 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which gives power to the courts to declare unconstitutional a minimum that will be considered to be a cruel and unusual punishment. Does it change the picture as compared to the U.K. because we have this safety valve, in a sense, which is the Charter protection?
Mr. Roberts: I don’t think it changes things materially, senator, because a Charter challenge is complicated and time-consuming and so on, and, of course, there are many constitutional challenges underway.
The challenge remains whether or not you have the ability for a court to declare a provision unconstitutional. The challenge is that the mandatory sentence removes judicial discretion and prevents the court from imposing an individualized and proportionate sentence. Something needs to be done to restore that element of justice.
One thing to do — the best thing — would be to repeal them all and trust judges to do the right thing. I don’t think that if the mandatory minimums were all repealed Canadian judges would suddenly go easy on offenders convicted of these serious offences. Quite the contrary.
If you are going to retain them, then I think you should retain them in the form that they exist around the world in other common law jurisdictions with this limited judicial discretion to depart where a departure is necessary.
Senator Pate: I’m coming back to Professor Roberts as well.
One of the issues that you just raised was that in the Sentencing Commission there were recommendations in terms of sentencing guidelines. Much has been made by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls about the fact that the current mandatory minimum penalty regime prevents the application of section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code, which was brought in specifically to reduce the rates of incarceration and bring in principles of restraint, most particularly with respect to Indigenous people but which has been expanded to talk about those of African descent and other racialized groups.
Would you care to elaborate on that and how that would dovetail with the recommendations that you and others made as part of the Sentencing Commission? How would you see us best structuring the kind of amendment you recommended?
Mr. Roberts: I would be happy to send a draft wording of the amendment I have in mind. I’ll zip that out to you tomorrow.
Section 718.2(e) has been, on its own, ineffective. The overrepresentation of Indigenous persons in Canadian prisons is, obviously — I don’t need to tell anyone this — the great scandal of Canadian criminal justice. There are, obviously, many initiatives underway: Aboriginal courts, Gladue reports and Impact of Race and Culture Assessments for other racialized communities. Much more needs to be done, and to the extent that these mandatory minimums are contributing to the over-incarceration of Indigenous populations, they have to be removed. That’s why Bill C-5 is a step in the right direction.
For the other offences that remain, there needs to be the ability of the court to recognize that if it’s appropriate — and it may well be invoked more frequently for Indigenous persons — they can go below that mandatory minimum.
It’s all part of a piece. It’s another step in trying to remedy what I think is Canada’s longest-standing and most serious sentencing problem, which was touched on in the 1987 report. I think people assumed in 1987 that Indigenous over-incarceration would go down, and it didn’t. Much more needs to be done, and this is one of the levers that you have.
Senator Pate: If we could request that draft wording that was offered. If you could send that along, Professor Roberts, that would be great.
Thank you.
Mr. Roberts: By all means.
The Deputy Chair: I will conclude with a question to Ms. Senedjani from British Columbia.
[Translation]
I know that in British Columbia there is a major problem with opioids. The bill before us would allow the police to avoid laying charges when a user is arrested with a certain amount for personal use. However, we know that the Public Prosecution Service of Canada has issued a directive that the Crown counsel may withdraw the charge or not lay a charge.
How would this bill impact the opioid crisis if the Crown already has the power to withdraw charges and not put these people on trial?
[English]
Ms. Senedjani: Thank you very much for the question.
When it comes to the need for legislative reform, I think we should keep in mind that the goal is to reduce contact with the criminal justice system as a whole. That would include not letting it flow all the way up to the Crown prosecutor level, but rather save the resources that are being used in enforcement and implement, particularly, that removal of the proposed subsection 10.2(2), which would state that charges for possession would remain valid, despite a peace officer’s ability to consider the options laid out in the previous proposed subsection, such as taking no action or warning the individual.
With respect to the opioid crisis — or rather, what we are calling a drug poisoning crisis, because it is a fact that the drug market is illegal and unregulated and unpredictable — any kind of reform that helps take away the stigma that comes with substance use is a step in the right direction. This bill does not go far enough, but I believe it is a step in the right direction. Any removal of criminal sanctions associated with the CDSA can only help address that stigma.
[Translation]
The Deputy Chair: Thank you very much.
Honourable senators, this concludes our meeting. I remind you that the plan is to move to clause-by-clause consideration next week.
Any comments on the bill must be presented to this committee in both official languages. If you wish to submit an amendment, you are encouraged to consult with the Law Clerk’s Office to ensure that your amendment is properly drafted in accordance with the principles of the committee.
See you tomorrow.
(The committee adjourned.)