THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE
EVIDENCE
OTTAWA, Monday, May 2, 2022
The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence met with videoconference this day at 2:01 p.m. [ET] to examine and report on issues relating to security and defence in the Arctic.
Senator Tony Dean (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: Welcome to this meeting of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. I’m Tony Dean, chair of the committee and I’m joined today by my fellow committee members: Senator Jean-Guy Dagenais from Quebec, deputy chair; Senator Peter Boehm representing Ontario, who will be here shortly; Senator Pierre-Hugues Boisvenu representing Quebec; Senator Marty Deacon representing Ontario; Senator Mobina Jaffer representing British Columbia; Senator Larry Smith representing Quebec; and Senator Hassan Yussuff representing Ontario.
We are continuing our study on security and defence in the Arctic, including military infrastructure and security capacity.
This is our fourth meeting. In our first meeting, we heard from senior federal public servants and senior members of the Department of National Defence, who provided an overview of security and defence-related threats to the Canadian Arctic. In our second meeting, we heard from expert witnesses on the geopolitics of the Arctic, and we heard a second panel on governance and cooperation in the Arctic.
Last week, in our third meeting, we shifted focus to geopolitical competition in the Arctic with a focus on Russia’s strategy — a session that, like some of our earlier ones, brought a bit of a sharper edge to our discussion, if I could put it that way.
Today, we continue our focus on geopolitical competition in the Arctic and its impact on security and international cooperation, specifically today, focusing on the interests of non-Arctic states, such as China, in the Arctic.
In the first panel, we welcome Mr. Guy Saint-Jacques, Former Canadian Ambassador to China from 2012 to 2016; Dr. Jessica M. Shadian, President and CEO, Arctic 360; and Dr. Ron Wallace, Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute.
Thank you all for joining us today by video conference. We’ll now begin by inviting you to provide your remarks, to be followed by questions from our members. We will open the day with Mr. Saint-Jacques. Great to see you again. Welcome to the committee. You may begin whenever you’re ready.
Guy Saint-Jacques, Former Canadian Ambassador to China (2012-2016), as an individual: Thank you, chair. It’s good to see you and members of your committee that I have met over the years.
[Translation]
Good afternoon, everyone. Thank you for inviting me to testify before your committee.
I will focus on three issues today: China’s interest in the Arctic, cooperation between Canada and China, and what the future holds.
[English]
Regarding China’s interest in Arctic questions, as you probably already know, China started its research program in Antarctica in the 1980s, which it expanded significantly in the 1990s with permanent research stations. China explains its interest in the Arctic because of the potential impact of climate change on the country. In this regard, China, like many other countries, already experiences more frequent freak weather events such as large floods, heat waves, and so on.
The northern part of China is getting dryer, not to mention that there are legitimate concerns with sea rising levels for coastal cities like Shanghai.
The government is preoccupied on the impact this could have on food production, infrastructure and similar issues. Also, because of strong public pressure on the impact of air and water pollution on health, the Chinese government had no choice but to make a 180-degree turnaround when it announced, in October 2013, its ecological civilization policy and started to invest heavily in renewable technologies and environmental protection. However, China remains a land of paradox as heavy reliance on coal makes it the first emitter of greenhouse gases in the world.
After a sustained campaign, China finally obtained observer status at the Arctic Council in 2013. China also published its first official Arctic Policy in 2018 which outlines some of its goals, but it doesn’t address security issues.
China defines itself as a near-Arctic state despite the fact that it’s about 1,500 kilometres away from the Arctic. Using the same rezoning, Canada could claim to be a near-Asian state.
To conclude this section, we should not forget that China is also interested in the Arctic as a source of minerals and food, especially fish. In this regard, getting better information on summer sea ice retreat is important for future harvesting activities.
In terms of minerals, I would like to underline how systematic China has been in acquiring supplies of critical minerals. This is one of the main objectives of the polar Silk Road initiative which has been tagged to the Belt and Road Initiative launched by Xi Jinping in 2013.
[Translation]
Concerning bilateral cooperation on Arctic issues, I would like to provide a brief historical overview. The first Canada-China workshop on the Arctic was held in February 2010, followed by a second one, in 2012, in Halifax. When I became ambassador to China, in October 2012, it was clear that China wanted to increase its collaboration with Canada and get our support to join the Arctic Council as an observer.
Why collaborate with China? Arctic countries came to the conclusion that support from non-Arctic states was needed to agree on measures that would apply to the offshore area — the area beyond 200 miles. That applies especially to fisheries resources in the central part of the Arctic Ocean.
When I was ambassador, China was very interested in developing military exchanges with us, and it was showing an interest in attending Canada’s military exercises in the north. I always cautioned National Defence about that, as the strategic value of such participation would give China a better knowledge of the extent of our activities in the north.
I also have an anecdote for you. In 2015, I made a presentation on Canadian Arctic policy at the Research Institute of Polar Law and Politics of the Ocean University of China in Qingdao, one of the main centres for polar studies in China. During discussions, the institute director told me that he was planning, along with some 50 researchers and support staff, to establish a research station on Herschel Island, in the Yukon, the following year. He was proud to say that this would create jobs for local Indigenous populations. I then asked him whether he had discussed the project with anyone on the Canadian side, saying that the Canadian government may have an opinion on the matter. That hadn’t crossed his mind.
I also want to say that the governments of Yukon and Northwest Territories have gone on a number of missions to China to try to develop trade relations and attract Chinese investment.
[English]
Let me now turn to the last part, namely, what to watch in the future.
We have been able in the last few years to better understand the direction that President Xi Jinping has given to the country. For instance, we see a China that is a lot more assertive and aggressive on the international scene and determined to acquire, by all means, the resources essential to its development.
It should be noted that China has never taken a position on the Northwest Passage. If China were to claim access, it would weaken its position in the South and East China Seas.
Let me also remind you that, in July 2016, China rejected the decision of the international tribunal set up under the Convention on the Law of the Sea concerning its artificial islands building in the South China Sea.
[Translation]
Finally, China’s global strategic partnership with Russia, announced on February 4 of this year, is troubling and may affect the development of the Arctic. So far, the majority of Chinese investments in the Arctic have been made in Russia, mostly to build infrastructure and to extract natural resources.
Should Russia remain apprehensive of Chinese goals in the Arctic out of fear of internationalizing the region, its isolation following the invasion of Ukraine could force it to collaborate more with the Middle Empire.
When it comes to Canada, we may have an opportunity here to make China understand that it is in its interest to work with us more than with Russia.
Thank you for your attention. I will be pleased to answer your questions.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Saint-Jacques.
Next we will hear from Dr. Jessica Shadian.
Jessica M. Shadian, President and CEO, Arctic 360, as an individual: Thank you, all, for having me here today.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally changed Arctic politics. In Canada, this means we are seeing a heightened urgency to focus on priorities that should have been in place prior to now.
I’m going to touch on several topics: The Arctic Council, geopolitical shifts, energy security and diplomacy.
The Chair: Sorry, Dr. Shadian. Could you hold your microphone a little closer to your mouth? That will help with the sound quality.
Ms. Shadian: Is this better? Do you want me to start over?
The Chair: If you wouldn’t mind.
Ms. Shadian: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally changed Arctic politics. In Canada, this means we are seeing heightened urgency to focus on priorities that should have been in place prior to now.
I will touch on several topics: Arctic Council, geopolitical shifts, energy security and diplomacy.
The Arctic Council.
Returning to formal diplomatic relations with Russia is not going to happen soon; thus, an Arctic Council that fully includes Russia is not near-term. Beyond the Arctic Council’s states and the permanent participants are the Arctic Council observer states.
When Russia invaded Crimea and the West placed sanctions on Russia, we saw that China stepped in to fill that void.
China’s investments into Russian Arctic infrastructure and energy projects are now accelerating amidst new sanctions. What does this mean, given that China has observer state status on the Arctic Council? India, similarly, refuses to place sanctions on Russia and India is also an observer state to the Arctic Council.
If we add to this that Sweden and Finland are moving toward joining NATO, and while security was never part of the Arctic Council mandate, it has been argued that bringing NATO’s activities into the Arctic realm would jeopardize the achieved peaceful cooperation that the Arctic Council has created for the region.
Arctic geopolitics going forward will undoubtedly be tied to NATO geopolitics. Then how do these NATO realities and an Arctic Council that may not include Russia, but does include China for example as an observer state, then complicate a future functioning Arctic Council? It’s too soon to tell but, really, there is a larger issue here at play; that is, what an uncertain Arctic Council means for Canada’s Arctic foreign policy focus.
Canada has put most of its foreign policy toward the Arctic Council. By doing so, Canada has become increasingly out of step with the changing Arctic geopolitics that have been under way for more than a decade.
In terms of international Arctic security cooperation, once Sweden and Finland join NATO — if they do — it will likely increase NATO’s already growing focus on the Arctic. Its 2030 report called for creating an Arctic strategy, so perhaps this will be realized.
In short, we can assume there will be more security cooperation in the Arctic than we have seen to date.
We should be reminded that, next to Russia, Canada has the largest Arctic Ocean coastline and rivals only Russia in terms of its size as an Arctic state. Canada will need to lead in concert with its geographic size, not least because it is how Canada can hope to ensure its Arctic sovereignty and security, yet Canada’s Arctic is also critical to regional security.
Without Canadian leadership, other like-minded Arctic and non-Arctic states will seek then to fill that void, not least to offset efforts of non-like-minded states engagements in the region. For example, the AUKUS agreement announcement seemed to coincide almost directly with a top U.K. military commander offering to, “help Canada do what it needs to do as an Arctic country.”
Non-Arctic states, like China, as was mentioned, may or may not decide in the future whether to seek approval to transit the Northwest Passage. What happens if they do not ask for permission? If they do, is Canada even in a position to say no?
Without massive multi-purpose and strategic infrastructure and defence investments — but also proactive diplomatic efforts — our ability to defend our security and sovereignty are compromised. This gets to Canada’s Arctic diplomacy. Again, it can not only be about the Arctic Council. Around the Arctic, and even beyond, diplomatic cooperation exists outside the Arctic Council from the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, Nordic Arctic Cooperation Programme, et cetera.
In the North American Arctic — Alaska, Canada and Greenland — there is a lot of movement toward strengthened collaboration. However, I would say — beyond the Inuit — the vast majority of that is actually between Greenland and the U.S. While Canada and the United States have signed, for example, a critical minerals agreement, the U.S. has a separate critical minerals agreement with Greenland.
Herein, I think, lies Greenland’s global geopolitical significance. Like Canada’s north, Greenland has a plethora of critical minerals that the world needs and wants and is trying to secure. Consequently, global energy security, and thus national security issues, are playing out not only in Greenland but the whole of the North American Arctic.
For example, Greenland’s minerals are crucial for the U.S. as they seek to pivot away from reliance on China. At the same time, China wants Greenland’s critical minerals. Akin to the Canadian Arctic, China has actively sought to invest in Greenlandic infrastructure and mining projects. The U.S. has been extremely overt in forcing out Chinese investment through working with Denmark.
Yet, the U.S. has also been very successful in deepening its relations with Greenland via a very enthusiastic soft diplomacy. This has included supplying Greenland with aid money to strengthen collaboration in mining research, but also through formal diplomatic presence in Nuuk, five full-time staff, which now sit next to Iceland and will soon include the EU and U.K.
It does not take much imagination to connect world events to on-the-ground conversations in Nuuk and without Canada.
Greenland has existing and new diplomatic outposts around the world in Brussels, China and Iceland. Then the U.S. and Canadian representation sit in Washington, D.C.
Thus, my recommendations are the following: strengthen North American Arctic cooperation, the more institutionalized the better; create a full-time, diplomatic post in Nuuk and lobby for Greenland to open its own, separate representation in Canada; strengthen Arctic-specific diplomacy with Nordic Arctic cooperation; ensure our critical minerals strategy focus is on our north; use our mineral advantage in strengthening bilateral and sub-regional Arctic cooperation; formulate an Arctic foreign policy to define Canada’s role that it will assume in the region, specific areas of leadership, including regional collaboration and domestic contributions, e.g. infrastructure; support a policy-focused Arctic think tank — Arctic360 comes to mind — to undertake proactive tracks 1.5 and 2.0 Arctic diplomacy here in Canada on the global stage; and, last, create an Arctic ambassador that is separate from Canada’s SAO.
Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Dr. Shadian. If you could, as we go forward, have the microphone closer to your mouth and slow down a bit, if you would.
Our last witness on this panel is Dr. Ron Wallace.
Dr. Wallace, you may begin. Thank you for joining us today.
Ron Wallace, Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, as an individual: Thank you so much for this opportunity to present to you today.
First, I want to endorse the thoughts of Ambassador Saint-Jacques and by Dr. Shadian. We obviously didn’t collaborate before our presentation, but I can’t imagine a better alignment for what I’m about to say to underline their presentations.
My presentation is focused not on military strategic political developments in the Russian Arctic. It’s focused on Russian-Chinese economic cooperation in the Arctic region. I submitted a presentation that has some illustrations, which I’m assuming has been made available to the committee.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation has invested extensively in Arctic oil and gas production facilities, some of which I worked at quite extensively over a period of five years in the Yamal region.
In the material that I presented to you, I gave you an illustration of the gigantic LNG gas facilities at Sabetta and Yamal, that’s currently operated by Yamal LNG.
Significantly, this very material US $27 billion facility is owned by the Russian independent gas producer Novatek, 50%; TotalEnergies, 20%; but most significantly CNCP, 20% and China’s Silk Road Fund at around 10%. That means that that facility is 30% owned by Chinese interests.
This enormous Russian gas export facility, supported by Western and Chinese investment, demonstrates the nature and the degree of Russian Arctic investment in hydrocarbon development for export throughout the world. Recent events in Ukraine are materially altering Western investment in the Russian oil and gas sector. There are indications that Chinese interests may be contemplating expanding even further their financial interests in these facilities, which will result in gigantic breakdowns for Western oil and gas companies, and material opportunities for external investors who are maybe interested in taking over those Western interests.
Western oil and gas operations and corporations, as they face these material write-downs as they attempt to disassociate from these Arctic investments, are also going to face not just capital write-downs, but also write-downs in terms of their cash flows and their shareholder distributions because of the loss of access to those facilities and to those export markets.
These developments mark a significant turning point in Arctic resource development and for Western economic investment, for which Russia has now become a major international player.
One of the world’s largest LNG projects now, Yamal LNG is currently developing the 4.6 billion barrels of oil-equivalent reserves from the giant onshore South Tambey gas and condensate field located near the Yamal Peninsula.
The material that I submitted had illustrations, but one example of the Russian ongoing commitment to Arctic LNG development, the Yamal LNG project, is now comprised of three liquefaction trains of 5.5 million tonnes per annum per LNG train, which is supported by a large operational fleet of Arc7 ice-class LNG tankers. These tankers delivered more than 100 LNG cargoes going east and west through the Russian sea route, with 7.5 million tonnes of LNG produced and delivered to five continents since the project’s first shipment in 2017.
I will say that by 2021-22, 40 shipments were made, east alone, through the Arctic Sea Route, and more than 50 million tonnes have been delivered from Yamal worldwide since March 2021.
My presentation shows the ice breaking LNG tanker Christophe de Margerie, which is one of 15 world-class LNG tankers now traversing the Northern Sea Route, both east and west, and I have listed off the names of all those tankers for your interest.
In the recent past, Russia has invested significantly to develop, maintain and protect its Northern Sea Route. I’m not going to talk about the military aspects that have been associated with that; I’m sure you heard about it. But as the opening Arctic sea lanes both to Asia and the West are developed, it is clear the Russians are prepared to maintain and to further develop those hydrocarbon export facilities from the Arctic.
These LNG sea routes, along with pipelines that reach into Western Europe from the Yamal and planned new pipelines to China from the eastern Sakhalin region constitute material export for the Russian Federation. Indeed, Russian exports would account for more than 40% of the Russian economy.
I presented some illustrations in my materials showing the Northern Sea Route in Russia operating east and west into Asia. I also showed the European gas pipeline system that extended into Western Europe, and, of course, the now famous in Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines running directly into Germany.
As these figures illustrate, Russia has developed an immense Arctic hydrocarbon production infrastructure with capabilities allowing them to export by both sea and land.
While recent events have shaken global financial and energy markets, Western corporate interests in these projects are now very much in flux; however, Asian interests continue unabated, and in fact, will probably materially and significantly increase.
In concluding, I will bring attention to recent deliveries from China for huge topside Arctic production facilities for the Arctic LNG 2 system developed by Novatek at the Belokamenka gas field delivered from China, fully constructed, and installed in Belokamenka via the Northern Sea Route. This recent development indicates that Chinese interests not only in investment but also in production construction and operation are accelerating. I see no indications that the current situation in Ukraine will diminish those Asian interests in those Russian export capacities from the Arctic.
My last words are that following my time at the National Energy Board, I was appointed to the Inuvialuit’s Environmental Impact Screening Committee based in Inuvik that deals with these Arctic developments.
I can pass on to you an anecdotal story of how the people in Tuktoyaktuk awoke one morning to find a Chinese icebreaker, the Snow Dragon 2, sitting in their port unannounced. That caused tremendous excitement among the Inuvialuit and should be causing tremendous excitement in the Canadian government as we go forward. It shows, as Ambassador Saint-Jacques so eloquently indicated, that the Chinese have only just begun their interests in the Canadian Arctic.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you, and I’ll be prepared to answer any questions.
The Chair: Thank you, Dr. Wallace. That’s a very interesting image to leave us with at the end of your statement.
I will now proceed to questions, and the first question goes to our deputy chair, Senator Dagenais.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: My first question is for Mr. Saint-Jacques.
Mr. Saint-Jacques, it is always a pleasure to see you. In 2018, China proclaimed itself a near-Arctic state. I would like to know what your understanding of that statement is. How does China benefit or hope to benefit from that statement? What are the consequences of those Chinese intentions for Canada?
Mr. Saint-Jacques: Thank you, Senator Dagenais. China declared itself a near-Arctic state to try to justify its interest in the Arctic, as a number of concerns were raised after icebreaker Xue Long visited Tuktoyaktuk, in 1999.
As I was saying earlier, China is trying to justify this by saying that what is happening in the Arctic affects the global climate and that it’s entirely legitimate for it to try to study what is happening in the region, but I think that China’s main interest is access to resources. I remember having discussions in Beijing. Of course, China consumes a tremendous amount of seafood. If we look at the map of the Arctic, there is an entire region in central Arctic that is not under any national jurisdiction. International discussions were held on that to try to develop a treaty to regulate fishing, but I am worried that we will quickly start seeing Chinese fishing vessels going that far.
On the other hand, as I said earlier, China is trying to get its hands on as many mineral resources as possible. It knows there are a number of strategic minerals and rare earths in the Canadian Arctic. We know that a Chinese mining company was also interested in purchasing a gold mine in Canada’s north. That purchase proposal was rejected for good reasons, owing to the closeness of our radar station in that part of the Arctic. I think that all this shows the growing interest of China, which is first and foremost looking to ensure its access to future resources. There you have it.
Senator Dagenais: My second question is for Ms. Shedian. We know that Prime Minister Harper attributed a high level of importance to the Arctic. That doesn’t seem to be the case with the current Prime Minister, despite the many messages that have been sent, including by the Senate. However, when he was Liberal Prime Minister, Lester B. Pearson referred to the north as “a land of the future.” In June 2019, you wrote in the National Post that it was time for Canada to act like a northern country. We can’t say that you have been heard or understood. What are Canada’s flaws and what are the consequences of the current political inaction?
[English]
Ms. Shadian: This goes back to my earlier comments that too much of our focus has been on the Arctic Council. While the Arctic Council is an important forum, we have been absent in many other sub-Arctic, regional and bilateral initiatives, programs and discussions under way.
Of course, we haven’t really been extremely proactive in building the very necessary critical infrastructure that we need in the North. That is infrastructure that should be multi-purpose, multi-user and strategic that serves defence interests and economic development in the region that we sorely need, as well as social infrastructure.
So we’re not doing that at the domestic level, but we’re also not running around and paying attention to other conversations that are taking place.
I had mentioned that there are other instances of Arctic cooperation. Those are even non-Arctic. For instance, India is now having its second India-Nordic Summit. There is the Trilateral High-Level Dialogue on the Arctic that takes place between China, South Korea and Japan.
There are a lot of important things going on. We need to not only try to engage with those but also figure out where we want to place our focus, where we want to play a leadership role and in what way we can better work with our neighbours to serve our own national interests in a proactive way, which we are not doing.
The Chair: Thank you, Dr. Shadian.
[Translation]
Senator Boisvenu: A big thank you to our witnesses, who have provided us with very useful information. My first question is for Mr. Saint-Jacques. Do you know whether China, which we know is investing huge amounts of money in infrastructure, with Africa as an example, has invested in Russian military infrastructure in the Arctic?
Mr. Saint-Jacques: To my knowledge, China has not yet invested in Russian military infrastructure. However, when someone builds a port, it must be recognized that the port can be used for purposes that are not only civilian, but also military. As I said in my presentation, China has invested a great deal in exploiting oil and natural gas, as Mr. Wallace also pointed out, but it has also invested in infrastructure. From that perspective, I think any investments China makes should be looked at carefully.
Senator Boisvenu: Ms. Shadian, you talked a lot about the Arctic Council. We know that the members of the council refused to attend the latest meeting in Moscow. As you see it, you say that diplomatic ties should be enhanced. Should Russia be readmitted to the Arctic Council? Considering the Ukraine situation, should more diplomacy efforts be made with Russia or China?
[English]
Ms. Shadian: I think the Arctic Council will most likely wait until the next chairmanship to pick up its activities as a functioning Arctic Council.
This is taking place in real time, so right now, things are very tenuous. Down the road, what will likely and possibly take place is that we will see the beginning of collaboration that includes Russia on the research side, among academics. As many have pointed out, the Arctic Council has done and is doing in an ongoing fashion a lot of extremely important research. Cutting that research collaboration was stopping it in full, and cutting Russia out of it will not have good implications for future issues, from climate change to search and rescue and those types of activities.
It will take a while before we can include Russia in any sort of formal capacity, but I think it will probably start with lower things, such as research, but not at any time in the near future.
Senator Boisvenu: Thank you.
Senator M. Deacon: Good afternoon. Thank you to our speakers. There are some really complementary and yet different experiences together. I really appreciate that this afternoon.
My first question is connected to the access to the Arctic Ocean. It is specifically a question around the Bering Strait.
As I understand it, that waterway presents the only Pacific Ocean access for a country like China, which considers itself a near-Arctic power. Since 2012, the Russian coast of the strait has been a closed military zone.
With only 55 miles separating Alaskan and Russian coasts at the strait’s narrowest point, could the Bering Strait serve as a potential flashpoint in any potential great-power rivalry in the region? Also, have we seen any Chinese-Russian cooperation in that militarized zone?
I’ll ask for a response to that question from Dr. Shadian, but anyone is welcome to respond.
Ms. Shadian: Some of the military cooperation is beyond my expertise, so I think you would be better to ask somebody else in terms of that.
In terms of an Alaska-Canadian Arctic seaway, it’s a space for potential conflict, but it’s also a space for potential collaboration between the United States and Canada in trying to figure out how it wants to manage and control the whole of the seaway. That is, from the whole great circle route, through Canada and even over toward Greenland. This is where I am again going back to those kinds of conversations that we’re not having with our like-minded Arctic nations.
What is to come of that? We are not doing anything proactively. We are not building infrastructure there. We are not doing anything to help secure our own security and sovereignty there. How we want to engage with our Arctic neighbours in that area is something we need to consider and take seriously and decide upon going forward. Otherwise, we see even the United States having discussions with other Arctic nations about the Arctic Seaway, as it’s called. That, in itself, indicates it’s understood as an international waterway by other Arctic nations. That undermines Canada’s own position on the Northwest Passage at least, right?
These are conversations we need to be thinking and reflecting on. That is, who do we want to engage with and how are we being proactive in trying to mitigate from some potential conflict in the future?
The Chair: One minute remaining, Senator Deacon, if you want to ask a fresh question or pursue this with another witness.
Senator M. Deacon: I’ll see if any other witnesses would like to respond.
The Chair: Who would like to jump in?
Mr. Wallace: The LNG icebreaking tanker fleet that I talked about earlier is already going through that strait on the Russian northern sea route and accessing, across that sea route through those straits, these tanker shipments directly into China.
More significantly, regarding the Novatek Belokamenka development, where these gigantic modules were shipped from Chinese module assembly and fabrication yards, they went the opposite way, from east to west, all the way to Belokamenka.
The strait that you are referring to is already actively used east and west by both Russian and Chinese interests building these Arctic capacities.
The Chair: Thanks very much, Dr. Wallace, and for your question, Senator Deacon.
Senator Boehm: Thank you very much, chair. I would like to thank our witnesses and also welcome my former colleague, Guy Saint-Jacques. Great to see an active former ambassador asking and presenting issues. My first question would be to Mr. Saint-Jacques.
In your comments, you mentioned the variety of interests that China has in the Arctic. They tend to be commercial and fisheries, but I would like to zero in on the security element.
In particular, if we are looking at a future scenario where Finland and Sweden do join NATO, would the Chinese interests become more security focused, in your view? That is, getting beyond the more commercial aspect, and getting beyond the traditional rhetoric that we receive about cooperation and win-win situations.
My second question is related to that and related to what my colleague Senator Deacon just asked to Dr. Wallace. The Bering Strait gets pretty crowded. It’s not that wide. China is looking for nuclear powered submarine capacity and is probably working on it. Will this cause more of an arms race in the Arctic area, again, particularly if we see a greater NATO posture?
Mr. Saint-Jacques: Thank you, Senator Boehm. Great to see you, and also great to see a former senior official remaining very active in another capacity.
You are right. I think that China has lots of interests, and security is always paramount in its thinking and its strategy. Of course, if you were to ask them what they think about Finland and Sweden joining NATO, they would say that this is not conducive to world peace and that NATO should refrain from expanding further.
In fact, this is their mantra. They say that the war in Ukraine was caused by the United States and by NATO because it wanted to expand to the border of Russia. I think that they would look at the question more from a security standpoint.
You were talking about nuclear powered submarines. In fact, China already has nuclear powered submarines. They are working on the nuclear-powered icebreaker. When you look at the investment that they are doing, China is investing very heavily in the military. In my view, an arms race is already going on in Asia. Clearly, China wants to be in a position to tell the rest of the world that they are a military well prepared to ensure their interests.
When we deal with China, this is something that we must keep in mind all the time.
Senator Boehm: Dr. Wallace, did you want to pick up on that?
Mr. Wallace: Thank you, senator. Briefly, I would echo Dr. Shadian’s comments about Canada acting as a northern power. I want to remind the Senate that the Inuvialuit settlement region, for which I sit on one of their regulatory boards, extends well out into the Arctic Ocean in the Beaufort region. The Inuit are heavily dependent and very concerned about the Arctic resources, particularly the fishery resources, marine mammals, and so on, throughout that region.
Our committee is currently looking at as many as five transit cruise ships this year that we’re going to be looking at that are going to be coming through that region. If you add on to that not only the northern transportation route but also Chinese access, as was mentioned earlier, to the fishing resources of that region, this will be something of great and growing concern to the Inuvialuit and the Inuit across that whole region.
That’s an aspect that we have not been able to talk about much, but one which is something that the committee should turn its attention to. Dr. Shadian’s comments about the value of the Arctic Council is something that the Inuvialuit and the Inuit watch very carefully and have a great interest in.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Saint-Jacques and Dr. Wallace. We now move to Senator Smith.
Senator Smith: Thank you, chair, and thank you to our witnesses. We talked a lot about what Russia and China are interested in doing.
If you, as a group of panellists, had to put your heads together and come up with a three-point plan for Canada from both an economic and a geopolitical or militaristic point of view, design, what would be your immediate steps?
Maybe we can start with Dr. Wallace and move through with Mr. Saint-Jacques and Ms. Shadian.
Mr. Wallace: Thank you, senator. I’ve been writing on this through the Global Affairs Institute for the last 15 years. My first thing is developing some Arctic search and rescue, or SAR, capacity. Right now, our capacities are located as far from the Arctic as you could possibly get on a geographic map in Trenton. People have been calling for more capacity, especially with cruise ship transits and other things. There is no better way to exert sovereignty and economic control than by demonstrating that you’re active in a search and rescue capacity. That would be my first point.
Ambassador Saint-Jacques quite rightly pointed out the effects of that potential gold mine acquisition that was declined by the Government of Canada, quite correctly, which would have provided the Chinese with not only a gold mine facility in the North but also material port facilities for them to access going east and west, taking out those minerals.
Canada needs to develop an icebreaking capacity with port facilities, not only in the Baffin region, but in the Western region.
Search and rescue, port facilities and icebreaking capacities for the North would be my three recommendations to pass to you.
Senator Smith: Ambassador and Dr. Shadian, could you give us a quick three?
Mr. Saint-Jacques: Senator Smith, my quick three are very similar. We have to invest a lot more in shipbuilding. We need the capacity to operate for longer periods during the year. We also need more infrastructure in the North; in fact, we could kill two birds with one stone in this case because it would also satisfy our need to invest more in the military. That would be our contribution to NATO. As was mentioned previously, I think our NATO partners will be looking to us and to our seriousness. It’s an area where we need to act pretty quickly.
Finally, in terms of mineral policy, we need to clarify the rules that will apply to development in the North and that would also satisfy, for instance, the agreement that we have with the United States on the supply of critical minerals.
Ms. Shadian: Those are great comments so far, and I’ll piggyback off of those.
Two of my three actually have to do with infrastructure. Absolutely, we need more icebreakers. We need more infrastructure in general — civil and military. As it was said, we need to be creating infrastructure that satisfies exactly our contributions to NATO, to NORAD modernization and that is also creating the opportunities for economic development that we need.
When we’re still talking about infrastructure, that pivots into the minerals piece of this. We have a critical minerals strategy that will be coming out soon. We also know our North has a lot of critical minerals. Going back to the former comment, even though it was a gold mine, for example, we should be thinking about the fact we have these critical minerals, we should be developing them and then perhaps selling them to the Chinese, if they need, or to whomever we want to sell them to. It’s crazy to think that we can’t get investment into the North, so therefore the only bidder then is China that wants to buy and develop a mine that would be connected, as was said, to a port. I believe there’s an airstrip there, too.
The third thing we need to do is more proactive diplomacy. This is why I think collaborating with Greenland is crucial, because Greenland is an excellent place where you can have these much larger Arctic and extra-Arctic conversations. There are a lot of geopolitics to what’s happening in Greenland, but we also have a lot of reasons to want to be cooperating with Greenland, from Inuit to international reasons.
I think diplomacy and building up North American Arctic cooperation are things we need to take seriously, and we should be doing those going forward.
The Chair: Thank you, all three.
Senator Yussuff: Thank you to the witnesses for being here today.
It would appear that the Arctic will be far more militarized than we could possibly imagine, with NATO playing an even greater role. With Sweden and Finland potentially joining NATO, wouldn’t that change the equation completely in how we actually deal with Arctic sovereignty, given that the majority of the countries — all of the Arctic countries except for Russia — will have a direct interest in how we cooperate, collaborate and build our military defences to ensure NATO has the capacity to perform when it’s required to do so?
I’ll allow all three of our witnesses, of course, to comment on this.
Ms. Shadian: In the very long term, the more there is a chance that NATO that could include Sweden and Finland, the more difficult it will be to cooperate with Russia. Russia does occupy a large portion of the Arctic, and it will be very difficult to move forward with things that are extremely important, from climate change, search and rescue, and a whole host of other things, even Arctic fisheries and those kinds of activities, if there will be heightened tension. If the Arctic will be divided between NATO and Russia, how do we then bring the Arctic Council back together in the long term?
We just need to talk about these things very carefully. Obviously, there will be a lot more Arctic states part of NATO going forward. The Arctic countries are going to have to figure out how to navigate those kinds of situations, because we can’t have a region that will be in tension and conflict for the long term. It creates a lot of insecurity in the region.
The Chair: Thank you. We have one minute each for Mr. Saint-Jacques and Dr. Wallace.
Mr. Saint-Jacques: I would hope that the two can take place in parallel. In fact, we have to recognize that useful collaboration has taken place in the past, and I hope that would continue, as Dr. Shadian just outlined.
When you think about climate change, everything is linked. The Arctic will suffer a lot of global warming if we are not able to tackle climate change rapidly. We have to recognize that in the case of China, they have acquired interesting expertise through their work in Antarctica.
However, it’s a matter of arranging this collaboration in a way that can be done, taking into account our security interest. Of course, it should be part of our overall strategy with China. On that, I’m waiting to hear more about the strategy of the federal government that has been promised. Military and security aspects will be fundamental, but I would hope that we can continue to work in terms of bilateral cooperation.
Mr. Wallace: Thank you. I’ll be very brief.
I want to echo Dr. Shadian’s comments. Canada has to step up its diplomatic and foreign affairs game in the Arctic in a big way. Given the traffic that I’ve referred to on the Russian northern sea route, you can expect that there will be, at some point, some very serious commercial traffic coming through Canada’s Northwest Passage.
When you’re shipping out 40 tanker loads of LNG on vessels that are three football fields long and that have more icebreaking capacity among them than all of Canada, much less the Russian Arctic icebreaking and the developing Chinese icebreaking fleet, you can be sure that with that amount of development on the eastern side of the circumpolar region, at some point it’s going to come to Canada on the western side.
We have to be prepared for that. I think the best way to have a seat at that table is to step up the diplomatic and engagement game, and to pursue the three recommendations that I gave you: capacity development, both air and sea ports, and capacity in working with the Inuit and the Inuvialuit. Those are their ceded lands and territories. They are not at the table.
Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much. I’m afraid that brings us to the end of our time. I want to thank you, Mr. Saint-Jacques, Dr. Shadian and Dr. Wallace. We are extremely grateful for your time, expertise and the thoughtfulness you’ve brought to this very important discussion for us at this point in our hearings. Your contributions were insightful, direct and helpful, so thank you very much. We hope to see you again.
We are now shifting to our second panel. For those joining us live, this meeting explores security and defence in the Arctic, including military infrastructure and security capabilities. Our focus today is on geopolitical competition in the Arctic and its impacts on security and international cooperation. We are specifically looking at the interests of non-Arctic states, such as China, in the Arctic.
We welcome today Dr. Marc Lanteigne, Associate Professor, Political Science, University of Tromsø, Norway and Dr. Jeffrey Reeves, Vice-President Research and Strategy, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada. We are hoping to be joined by Dr. Anne-Marie Brady, Global Fellow, Kissinger Institute on China and the United States and Global Fellow, Polar Institute.
For now, we are starting off with our two witnesses. Thank you for joining us today by video conference. I invite you to provide your opening remarks which will be followed by questions from our members. We are starting today with Dr. Mark Lanteigne. Whenever you’re ready, please begin.
Marc Lanteigne, Associate Professor, Political Science, University of Tromsø, Norway, as an individual: Thank you very much. It’s great to be here.
We have heard some fascinating commentary so far. I just wanted to pick up on some of the points regarding China’s role. China is the largest non-Arctic state that has developed a significant far northern policy, but it’s certainly far from the only one. I will get back to that point later in my presentation.
I wanted to start talking about the current state of a lot of Beijing’s Arctic Policy in regards to the Polar Silk Road. Over the past five years, there has been a lot of discussion about what China was seeking to accomplish in the Arctic. There were quite a few high hopes in the Chinese government that the Arctic would become a major part of the Belt and Road over time.
Some of my academic contacts were referring to the Belt and Road as one belt, one road and one circle. That it shows how much the Arctic was becoming important. Fast forward to today, and we see that many of the plans Beijing had put forward for the Polar Silk Road have not come to fruition. Much of the PSR is now pretty much centred on Russia, which has obviously caused its own complications. In addition to plans for Canada, the Hope Bay project was mentioned. There were infrastructure projects in the Nordic region here that were looked at carefully, which haven’t come about; mining projects in Greenland which have also not come about. I would say that China is now having to rethink its position on many of its Arctic projects, including what has been happening in regard to its economic plans.
Now, to get to the situation today, in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, this has obviously put China in a difficult position in regard to its Arctic cooperation with Moscow. The fact is, much of what China is seeking to accomplish with the Polar Silk Road is incompatible with Beijing’s “neutrality policy” toward the conflict. We are seeing quite a bit of evidence of this in many directions.
We are seeing some reluctance of Chinese energy firms to further engage in Siberia. We have started to see significant pulling back of scientific cooperation between Russia and China, Russian and Chinese scientists, and China has expressed a concern that by getting too close to Russia economically — by beginning new projects in the Arctic or elsewhere; bilateral cooperation — China would run the risk of being subject to the same sanctions that Russia is currently experiencing. This is certainly not something which China is seeking, especially under current economic conditions.
If anything, China needs to take a much more conservative approach to its Arctic Policy in light of the fact that many of its Arctic plans have run into difficulty; that diplomatic relations between China and some Arctic states have run into trouble over the past few years, not only Canada but I would add Sweden to that list as well; and the fact that China is still trying, in many ways, to find out exactly what it is seeking in the Arctic.
For all of the discussion of China having a grand strategy in the region — and often there has been discussion of China’s military ambitions — China is still a newcomer to the Arctic. It is still extremely dependent not only the good will of Arctic governance but also on the knowledge of Arctic governance. I can point to scientific cooperation, to economic projects and to cases of governance.
Where does this leave China? What is happening now — and we’re seeing this up here in northern Norway — there were discussions before about Arctic militarization. Over the past few years, Russia has moved or opened up quite a few assets along its Siberian coast. We can certainly discuss the merits of that, but we have seen NATO take a much stronger interest in the Arctic before the subject of potential Sweden and Finland membership came about. The fact is, for all of the discussion that China would somehow benefit from greater militarization of the Arctic, I believe the opposite is true. I believe that if we do see the Arctic become more militarized and the subject of hard security policy, China, as well as other non-arctic states, lose out.
A lot of academic papers over the past 10 years referred to the melon problem. That would be the scenario that the Arctic is cut up like a melon among the eight Arctic states. If you’re not in an Arctic state, you don’t benefit. Beijing has made it clear that this is a scenario that it does not want. Many of its policies are dependent on an open region where trade and economic cooperation, as well as science diplomacy, are very much in place. At the moment, we do not seem to be heading in that direction.
I would also argue that a long-term pause in the Arctic Council activities is also certainly not in China’s interests. Much of China’s work as an observer in the Arctic Council goes through working groups and the various task forces dealing with particular Arctic issues such as climate change, such as safe navigation, and so forth. That avenue is currently closed. We don’t know for how long. This means that China will be much more dependent on bilateral diplomacy with Arctic states. It will be much more dependent on Track II subgovernmental organizations and on other regimes, for example, discussions about the Polar Code and, as was previously mentioned, the central Arctic fishing ban. This does not put China in a very good position. As China is still in need of cooperation and information-sharing with Arctic states, how that will come about under current circumstances is very much a consideration.
Going back to a previous point, cooperation with Russia in the Arctic, especially in the economic realm, will be very tenuous at best in the short term. There have been discussions about China continuing oil and gas cooperation with Russia, but I do not see any particular movement toward new projects, for the simple reason that China is very risk averse to being subject to the same kinds of sanctions that Russia is currently experiencing. There is a Chinese expression which loosely translated means, “don’t look for trouble and it won’t find you.” I think that is very much a factor in how China is addressing Russia at this point.
In conclusion, it is necessary to look at other major non-Arctic players in the region. I point to Japan, the U.K. and Germany. Countries have also started to look at the Arctic through a strategic lens. If we’re talking about non-Arctic states in the region, we need to look at not only where China fits but also how other non-Arctic states seeking a role in the region will be engaged. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Dr. Lanteigne. We will now hear from Dr. Reeves. Whenever you’re ready, please proceed.
Jeffrey Reeves, Vice-President, Research and Strategy, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, as an individual: Thank you very much for the opportunity to share my perspectives on these important issues. I am Vice-President, Research and Strategy, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, and I’m also the author of a recently published report from the APF Canada entitled A Canadian Arctic Policy for the Indo-Pacific on which I’ll base my comments today.
To start, I would like to offer my bottom line up front, which is the simple idea that the Arctic is becoming a more crowded geopolitical and geostrategic theatre, primarily the result of non-arctic Asian states interests and activities in the region. Canada needs to reconsider its broader strategic approach to the region accordingly.
When I talk about the non-Arctic Asian states I am referring exclusively to China, Japan, South Korea and Singapore. These four states gained observer status in the Arctic Council in 2013 and have developed Arctic-specific strategies, policies, institutions and activities at pace since this time. Notably, India, which is also an Arctic observer, is an outlier within Asia and the Arctic, as it has thus far failed to operationalize its stated Arctic ambitions.
While it was our intention to include a section on India in our recent report, we ended up leaving India out entirely as we could not point to concrete examples of an Indian operational approach to the region, even after speaking with the country’s predominant Arctic scholars. This, however, was an interesting data point in and of itself.
Regarding China, Japan, Singapore and South Korea, I’ll offer a few points that could possibly lead and contribute to further discussion.
First, China, Japan and South Korea all have official Arctic policies that identify national Arctic state and non-state networks, allocate resources to Arctic engagement and diplomacy and highlight national priorities in the region.
While there are, of course, differences between the states’ approach, their Arctic strategies do share some common features.
First, they rely primarily on a network of actors that are either state controlled, state sponsored or state affiliated at the national and provincial levels.
Second, they prioritize scientific research, Arctic governance and networks and economic development as their primary goals in the region.
Third, they rely heavily on multilateralism, both within the Arctic Council and its affiliate institutions and on new Arctic institutions between the Asian states themselves, such as a northeast Asian trilateral dialogue series between China, Japan and South Korea that addresses issues including Arctic shipping routes, fisheries, research and resource development. The three countries have also established an Asian forum for polar sciences. The region’s first multilateral organization aimed at fostering collaborative polar science research between Asian states.
Fourth, they are more accommodating of Russian interests in partnerships, particularly with respect to developing a northern sea route between Northeast Asia and Europe.
While Singapore does not have a national level plan at the moment, it operates primarily along the same strategic lines and strategic priorities with the added goal of ensuring its involvement in Arctic transit and port developments, primarily working with Russia. The Singaporean government is concerned that a northern sea route could undermine its value as Asia’s premier entrepôt.
What this means for Canada is now a parallel set of states and interests active in the Arctic that operate both within the region’s traditional governance and institutional structures and within distinctly Asian institutions in which Canada has little or no voice.
These states are investing disproportionately in the development of material means to operate in the Arctic, with South Korea, in particular, leading the way in icebreaker construction, and will likely move forward with their Arctic agendas regardless of the Arctic Council’s direction.
To ensure proactive diplomacy toward these actors, so as to ensure the national interests in the region, Canada’s best approach is engagement and dialogue. While Canada would necessarily have to increase the resources that it allocates to its foreign Arctic Policy to realize the full potential of the bilateral and multilateral engagement opportunities in Asia, there is little question that the country’s strategic regional posture would benefit as a result. Indeed, as Canada’s policy priorities expand in the Arctic, Ottawa will likely find partnership with the Asian Arctic states is critical to achieve its objectives, whether defined in socio-economic development or in security terms.
Further, as the region’s geopolitics become more fraught with great power competition between China and the United States, or Russia and the European Arctic states, particularly in a post-Ukraine strategic environment, Canada will also find it beneficial to increase its presence in Asian strategic dialogues and working groups on the Arctic if only to ensure its foreign policy efforts include both transatlantic and trans-Pacific components. Indeed, greater Canadian engagement with Asian states in the Arctic will necessarily grow in tandem with those same states’ growing regional influence, which is outpacing their European and North American counterparts.
In addition, closer coordination with China, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore on Arctic issues, carries with it the added strategic value of deepening Canadian involvement in Indo-Pacific affairs.
A necessary corollary to cooperation with the Asian Arctic states is greater Canadian enmeshment in Indo-Pacific-based dialogue mechanisms and working groups at both the bilateral and multilateral levels. Canadian cooperation with Asian states on Arctic affairs would, therefore, give it far more direct access to the region’s predominant economic and security actors than it could otherwise achieve through a stand-alone Indo-Pacific strategy, particularly one that treats Canada’s Arctic affairs in isolation from its Indo-Pacific relations.
With that, I’ll conclude my comments. Thank you.
The Chair: Thanks very much, Dr. Reeves.
Apologies, senators around the table. Dr. Brady, we looked very much forward to hearing from you, so I apologize for the technical issues.
Colleagues, we will now proceed to questions.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: My first question is for Mr. Lanteigne. Mr. Lanteigne, despite Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Canada still seems to be prioritizing diplomacy instead of preparing its military to deal with emerging threats — in my opinion — in the Arctic.
Do you think there is still room for diplomacy in this file? How are countries that are more invested in terms of military capacity in the Arctic seeing the Canadian government’s wait and see approach when it comes to protecting the Arctic, a territory that Russia and China are currently coveting?
[English]
Mr. Lanteigne: Thank you very much.
First of all, it is very important to note that when we talk about the Arctic, especially in terms of security, we are not dealing with a blank or an open space; there is still very much the prevalence of international law. When we talk about interest by Russia or China in Arctic shipping or resources, for example, that has to be taken into account, along with the fact that we are dealing with very specific legal safeguards, which most countries have very much identified.
On the subject of how Canada has responded to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Canada has responded with a lot of concern that there is the potential for this to spill over in the Arctic in many ways and that such will be quite profound. That has reintroduced questions in Canada about protecting Canadian waters and dealing with Arctic sovereignty.
But the fact is that there are also going to be a lot of questions that need to be answered very quickly, not necessarily because of militarization but, as was previously noted, because much more of the central Arctic is going to be accessible very soon. Now we have the issue not only of safe transit of civilian vessels but the question of more military activity just due to the fact that more of the region is becoming accessible for all kinds of different economic activities.
Very quickly, I would add that Canada is involved in specific disputes over central Arctic sovereignty, specifically the status of the Lomonosov Ridge. Right now, that is primarily a diplomatic issue, but I am concerned that under security circumstances, it will become more of a security-related issue in the near future.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: Mr. Reeves, should Canada prioritize the transportation of goods through the northern passage instead of focusing on the development of certain resources?
[English]
Mr. Reeves: I’m not entirely sure the option is one versus the other. In terms of Arctic transit, it’s certainly a priority with respect to maintaining a diversity of trade routes between Canada and its trade partners. In terms of resource exploration and exploitation, those are also potential areas of economic opportunity for Canada in the Arctic. Canada should think long term about developing both areas and both lines of effort, in particular.
[Translation]
Senator Boisvenu: Once again, I welcome our witnesses. My question is for Mr. Lanteigne. According to what you said, you see China as very careful and conservative in terms of policies in the Arctic. What is your view of things if the conflict in Ukraine was to get worse or take on international dimensions and affect the Arctic territory?
If the conflict was to escalate, what do you think China’s position would be on the protection of its private interests and on its friendship with Russia?
[English]
Mr. Lanteigne: Thank you. That is an excellent question. It goes back to the point I made previously about China’s very difficult attempt to put forward some kind of neutrality policy regarding the conflict.
The fact is that, with all the discussion about where China stands, the best way of answering your question is to say that China is on the side of China. China is interested in any outcome that benefits its own situation, economically, politically or strategically.
While we talk about the very close relationship between China and Russia, and, as was mentioned, the no-limits relationship policy that was signed back in early February, it’s also important to note that China has very important interests in Ukraine, Eurasia and Europe, none of which can be discarded either. That is the main reason why China is still trying to attempt some degree of neutrality, if you will, calling for an immediate end to hostilities.
What China is now trying to reconcile, though, is the fact that this has disrupted a great deal of the Chinese economy. China’s economy is now facing some very significant headwinds, not only due to the zero-COVID policy but because many imports that China has been counting on have been disrupted in various ways.
China is seeking, in the end, any particular policy that will benefit its own interests, especially since the country is heading into not only a very difficult economic period but also what is proving to be a complicated party congress. If history is any guide, the politics involved in that are going to be critical for where China goes from here.
[Translation]
Senator Boisvenu: My second question is for Mr. Reeves. You talked a lot about the dialogue between Canada and actors present in the Arctic. Do you think the real diplomatic issue concerning the Arctic is China, in the sense that Canada and the United States must do everything they can to ensure some neutrality from China if ever the conflict escalated, to ensure that China would not side with Russia?
Do you think the real issue for Canada and the United States is to maintain those diplomatic ties with China at the highest level?
[English]
Mr. Reeves: I certainly believe that dialogue is a critical component of crisis avoidance and crisis mitigation, whether that’s with respect to the Arctic or the broader geopolitical, strategic competition we are seeing emerge in the Indo-Pacific or in Europe.
Fundamentally, in Canada’s and the United States’ interests to engage in dialogue with China, specifically to try to find areas of common security agreements and common interests in order to avoid conflict. That’s going to be critical with the Arctic.
Part of that, however, extends beyond Canada-U.S. relations, and Canada can be far more proactive in engaging with China within the Indo-Pacific region, in particular in concert with other Asian states that have interests in the Arctic and that have long-term strategic concerns around China’s rise, but that also have a close working relationship with China on Arctic issues. Many of those issues are embedded in the idea of the importance of Arctic governance in coordination with the Arctic Council, trying to move toward international standards and best practices around Maritime law, security and communication.
There is a huge opportunity for Canada to play a proactive role in bringing the voices and concerns of a trans-Atlantic community on Arctic affairs to the Pacific and to position itself as a bridge between the two sides. It’s an important strategic role that Canada can play. It plays to our geography, and it plays to our multidirectionality in terms of engagement. It’s the perfect role for a middle power in terms of international geopolitics. It raises Canada’s value as an Arctic actor.
Senator Boisvenu: Thank you.
Senator M. Deacon: Hello, and thank you both for being here today. Your expertise is greatly appreciated.
Colleagues, I hope you’ll help me to embellish a little bit. I want to build upon a question from the last round that has come up in a couple of different ways around the table.
As we are all aware, both Finland and Sweden are considering joining NATO. My question is straightforward and is outside of Article 5: What, if anything, would that do to change the western defensive situation in the Arctic? Are we already intertwined enough in this area that it would be more of a cosmetic change only or are there some interoperability arrangements that have yet to be explored that could be bolstered by them joining the alliance?
I will first direct that question to Dr. Lanteigne and then pass it after that.
Mr. Lanteigne: Thank you very much. That’s an excellent question.
Absolutely, there have been many occasions where NATO has cooperated directly with both Finnish and Swedish military actors. So in terms of understanding various security policies, military viewpoints, there would not be too much in the way of additional information required at this stage.
What is very significant, though, and this is a discussion here in Norway because we have a border directly with Russia up here in the Norwegian north, we would now have a much longer border between NATO and Russia. That means that border security, which obviously is a great consideration if we’re talking about Norway or the Baltics, suddenly becomes that much more complicated.
It also goes to the idea, as was noted, that in regard to Arctic security — because of the fact that we now have two other Arctic states that will be directly involved within NATO — that means that, once again, the Arctic becomes much closer to the issue of militarization and NATO versus Russian military policies.
I would also point out that this also creates an interesting situation for the Baltic states, because they would also be more greatly intertwined in many of these security questions, especially considering the very close relationship, for example, between the Baltics and Finland.
In regard to border security, I think that’s probably where we’re going to be seeing the most change in thinking and also change in policy-making.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you. I wasn’t sure if Dr. Reeves wanted to add a viewpoint on that.
Mr. Reeves: I think Mr. Lanteigne’s comments are spot-on with respect to the transatlantic component of this.
I would just highlight that starting in early April there was a NATO foreign ministers meeting where Asia-Pacific actors, including Japan. South Korea, Australia and other like-minded countries from the Indo-Pacific, came together and identified the opportunity for greater cooperation between some of the partners — in particular the U.S.-led alliance system within the Asia-Pacific and NATO — to cooperate not only on security within Europe but to talk more about how that coordination and cooperation could take place within the Indo-Pacific.
Of course, if Japan and South Korea become more enmeshed in NATO’s architecture, and both have interests in providing some sort of security presence in the Arctic, that will have long-term implications for the way that China thinks about the region and certainly could potentially lead to greater security tensions across the Arctic.
Immediately after the foreign ministers’ meeting of NATO, China came forward and said this expansion of NATO into the Indo-Pacific is a direct threat to our national security. We see it very much as Russia with respect to NATO’s increasing expansion toward our border, as an existential threat, and will respond accordingly. Those dynamics are certainly there, and Japan and South Korea play an important part in that dynamic as well.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you for the question and for two very strong answers.
Senator Boehm: Thank you very much. My question is to both of our witnesses today, starting with Dr. Lanteigne.
We heard in your remarks and, indeed, in remarks made earlier in the previous panel about how Canada should step up its diplomatic game. We are, of course, on the Arctic Council. At our embassy in Oslo, we have a small office that is dedicated to the Arctic and the Arctic Council.
Dr. Lanteigne, you’re sitting there in Tromsø, far north of Oslo. Is there anything that we could learn from the Norwegians? Norway has been in a similar position as we have been in, catching the ire of China; this is a few years ago, but you will know it well from the Nobel Peace Prize award and the banning of Norwegian salmon.
Are there best practices that we could engage with, particularly with Norway and with the Nordic countries, in terms of how we could combine our diplomatic skills in some way to engage more with China, or at least make comparisons that are relevant? That would include informal discussions on the Lomonosov Ridge issue that Russia has created in terms of its claim in the Arctic.
Should we strengthen our mission further? There was a suggestion made by Dr. Shadian earlier that we should put a consulate into Greenland. We had one once during World War II. That was for security reasons so we could detect German submarines.
What are your thoughts? Do you have any practical suggestions? I would start with Dr. Lanteigne and finish with Dr. Reeves. Thanks.
Mr. Lanteigne: Thank you. Excellent questions.
One point to make about the Norway-China relationship, during the period of the diplomatic freeze, one area where Norwegian and Chinese representatives, scholars, academics were able to sit down and discuss were areas related to the Arctic.
For example, the Arctic Frontiers conference which takes place here every January, normally this was an area where politics was pretty much checked at the door. There was discussion about mutual concerns regarding climate change and various socio-economic issues in the Arctic.
Across in Iceland, there are also very large-scale Track II organizations, the Arctic Circle, where many non-Arctic states have come forward to not only compare notes with Arctic scholars but also to bring forward their own Arctic policies.
I definitely think this is an area which Canada should be looking at more closely. Several countries, including non-Arctic states, have started to put forward various academic and research initiatives designed to bring together scholarship in areas of mutual concern, especially in the area of the environment. I think that is an area that Canada would be in an excellent position to look at much more directly.
Also, I second the argument that Greenland, especially, has taken the opportunity over the past two years, ever since it was put into the news back in 2019, to update its own visibility through these various Track II areas and, again, Canada is in a very good position to assist with that.
I would also point out that talking about other non-Arctic states, Japan and Korea especially — and I would probably also add Singapore to the list — have all, despite the fact that they are not Arctic states and that they are also relative newcomers, have really gone forward to look for various ways of inviting research collaboration with Arctic scholars, to set up various projects, various events and conferences, in order to share information. This is something which should absolutely be encouraged and Canada should be looking at much more closely.
Mr. Reeves: Would you like me to add to that?
The Chair: If you could very briefly, Dr. Reeves.
Mr. Reeves: Absolutely. Just to pick up on Mr. Lanteigne’s point, the opportunities across the Asia-Pacific or the Indo-Pacific with the non-Arctic Asian states is significant. Almost all of them have dialogues focused on sustainability, on long-term climate change mitigation, engagement, the focus on building networks of scholars, of youth in particular, to raise awareness around the Arctic exists within Japan, China, South Korea and Singapore. All of them have committed projects, committed scheduled events that take place both within the Indo-Pacific and with European counterparts in particular.
There are many opportunities within the Asia-Pacific to be involved in working level groups that are focused on not only developing pragmatic operational approaches to Arctic problems, but are also focused on thinking long term about Arctic standards with respect to development, transit, engagement and particularly around issues related to governance and stability, which is a priority across the Indo-Pacific toward the Arctic.
Senator Boehm: Could we entice the U.S. to engage more?
Mr. Reeves: I certainly think that’s a value that Canada could bring to the Asia-Pacific, the Indo-Pacific in particular, to be able to act as an interlocutor for American interests with some of these key players.
I think in particular in relationships like China, when there’s a low level of trust between the United States and China, Canada can work with other states within the region, not only with Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific states, but also with other Arctic Council members to engage, for example, with Japan, with South Korea, to build certain capacities and programs within those national economies that then could translate into China and provide an opportunity, a very measurable opportunity, for U.S. engagement as well in the region.
A lot of the issues that China is focused on in the Arctic tend to be on the softer side in terms of its foreign policy. We talk about having a cooperative relationship, on the one hand, with China and a competitive relationship where needs be and we often identify issues like climate change, environmental protection, as areas where we can cooperate. Many of those opportunities exist specifically within the Arctic, where China is interested in more long-term thinking about climate, more interested in thinking about natural resource management, sustainable development. Those are the areas — when we do tend to talk about potential for collaboration — that usually come up as a list of those potential opportunities.
The Chair: Thanks very much to you both.
Senator Smith: Thank you to the witnesses. In listening to the testimony, something shot out in my brain — and maybe I don’t have much of my brain left after all the years of physical contact, but — Indigenous cooperation. I am just wondering, for both of you, have you had a chance or have you spent time or are there lessons that we can take from the Indigenous folks, whether it’s in North America or in Europe, that can be beneficial to the development of military infrastructure sites or climate change — we know that climate change is a very, very serious problem. I’m just wondering what level of consciousness does the Indigenous population have in the planning for construction infrastructure, et cetera, in the North?
Mr. Reeves: I can provide some value around this discussion more with respect to opportunities for engagement on Indigenous development issues with the Asia-Pacific economies in particular, and perhaps Mr. Lanteigne can tackle the more specific Indigenous opportunities for development.
Across the Asia-Pacific, whether you’re looking at China, Japan, South Korea, even Singapore, there are robust lines of effort within their Arctic strategies to develop Indigenous opportunities for their own Indigenous populations to recognize the Indigenous value and the Indigenous perspectives around sustainable development in the Arctic in particular. And they’ve done that both in terms of their national strategies and also their engagement with the Arctic Council and other Arctic-relevant institutions.
That focus on Indigenous relations is a huge area for potential cooperation, whether it’s bilateral or multilateral, from Canada to the Indo-Pacific, in particular. Certainly, I think that’s one area that the Asia-Pacific states themselves are very interested in pursuing because it provides a very easy entry into Arctic affairs with respect to engagement, a common strategic priority for all the Arctic actors within the region. But it also demonstrates that they are committed long-term to the sustainable, inclusive and diverse approach to the Arctic, which has become such a central part of Canada’s foreign policy in particular.
Mr. Lanteigne: Thank you. I have just two quick points to add. First of all, if you are going to be an observer in the Arctic Council, it is understood that one of the roles you must play is looking for ways of engaging Indigenous peoples in the Arctic, to share information, to understand what is happening in a variety of areas, in socio-economic development and so forth.
Several observer countries, and I would especially point to Korea, Japan and Singapore, have been extremely active in this type of engagement. Other potential Arctic Council observers have also been encouraged to look at these areas of cooperation.
Speaking from a Norwegian viewpoint, there was a lot of discussion here a few years ago about the potential development of a railway system linking Kirkenes, Norway to Rovaniemi in Finland, and there was again some discussion about Chinese investment in it. It caused all kinds of discussion, but it was met with a great deal of concern by local Sami populations here because of the direct effect on the environment, as well as on traditional reindeer herding.
The project is now in abeyance. I don’t see it coming about any time soon, but this is one example of the fact that if we’re going to be talking about the engagement of non-Arctic states in the Arctic, it’s not enough to go to Oslo, to Helsinki, to Stockholm. It is also necessary to come to the region, to understand the economics of the region, the peoples of the region, and very often that gets lost in the shuffle. Depending on measurement, there are 4 million people who live north of the Arctic Circle here. There is a tendency to not necessarily take that into account when discussing the areas, for example, of infrastructure and economic development, including shipping.
Senator Yussuff: Thank you, witnesses, for being here today and thank you for sharing your breadth of experience. Canada’s history in the North has been served by diplomacy, collaboration and cooperation. If you reflect on it, it’s been to our advantage over the years. Granted, climate change and the hostility with Russia will obviously change a lot. Can we not continue on the same path?
Do you see a great deal of diversion into another direction, given what we have achieved throughout our history and how we have been able to maintain our sovereignty but also maintain cooperation and collaboration for the greater interest? We have been trying to, of course, respect the traditions of the North and the northern people who occupy the region. In their interests, they would not like to see hostility among any nations. We recognize they have self-interests among themselves. Do you think there needs to be a great deal of departure from what we have pursued in our interests throughout history? I would ask both witnesses to respond.
Mr. Lanteigne: That is an excellent question. I know it is being asked not only in Canada but also here in Norway, along similar lines.
Although many issues have maintained some similarity over time, there are two major changes in the Arctic which simply can’t be ignored. The first is the fact that we are dealing with the rapidly changing environmental situation. That is affecting so many different parts of the region. If you’re looking at the environment, if you’re looking at economic development, if you’re looking at traditional practices, all of that is now starting to change at a very significant clip.
I can point to all kinds of different reports. The latest IPCC report which just came out really is starting to sound an alarm bell about the fact that we are getting very close to a point of no return, not only in regard to global climate change but especially up here in the Arctic.
We are still trying to estimate how that will affect many parts of the region with regard to what will happen to the peoples who live in the Arctic. We are still trying to catch up with a lot of these changes.
The other significant change which has happened here, which has been discussed and is the main topic of this meeting, is the fact that the Arctic is becoming much more of an international space. Now, that doesn’t mean that there will be challenges to international law or that the Arctic Council will be subject to any kind of dispute, but look at the sheer number of international actors who are interested in engaging in the region, in becoming Arctic stakeholders in various ways. As was noted, it is becoming a very crowded space here.
Accommodating the interests of Arctic governments, the interests of Arctic peoples, Indigenous populations, and many non-Arctic governments and organizations that would also like to engage in this region, will be a very significant challenge.
There have been all kinds of discussions about, well, do we need new organizations? Do we need a treaty? Do we need any kind of new forms of governance? These are debates which we absolutely should be having, but it all goes down to the fact that we are dealing with a rapidly changing situation, both because of climate change and the fact that we’re dealing with so many actors who want to look at the region, who want to play a part in how the region will be governed.
Mr. Reeves: I don’t have much to add to that, other than the idea that, until recently, in particular the last 15 years, it has been possible for Canada to work primarily on Arctic relations through its transatlantic ties. The North American relationship was critical for defence and relationships across Europe and the Arctic Council. Within the Arctic Council, multilateralism and bilateralism — all the types of engagement that Canada was able to bring to the Arctic, it could affect those through that transatlantic body of relationships.
That’s becoming increasingly less viable as the Indo-Pacific stands up an alternative set of actors and institutions and interests and approaches to the Arctic that will require a well thought out, well coordinated Canadian foreign policy response. This isn’t an oppositional approach to state relations. This is an acknowledgment that there are now clearer interests from the Asian region within the Arctic that have to be responded to.
The one wildcard there, of course, is how these Arctic observer states to the Arctic Council interact with Russia going forward. There are deep relations between all of the Indo-Pacific states and Russia, whether on energy, on icebreaker technology and ship development, on port development, or on transit route development. Many of those relations are on hold right now, but there’s no certainty that the relations between Asian states and Russia, in particular, will diminish over the medium to long term. Canada has to understand that there’s a whole situation of Arctic relations and players that need a strategic response. That’s going to require more resources and it will require more proactive diplomacy at the state level, all the way down to the person-to-person relationship, whether at universities or through exchanges in student development or youth councils. That will be the long-term direction that the Arctic has taken.
The Chair: Thank you, both.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: I have one last question for Mr. Reeves.
In the negotiations on the use of the Arctic territory by various countries, to what extent could Canada put on the table the environmental positions often brought up in those political projects?
[English]
Mr. Reeves: Within the Arctic, at least for the moment, environmental issues are at the top of the agenda for all of the self-acknowledged Arctic states, whether that’s China or the existing Arctic Council members, or the observers.
When you look at the strategic policy statements coming out of Tokyo, Seoul, Singapore and even India, when it articulates what it hopes to accomplish within the Arctic, environmental issues, climate change, environmental mitigation, clean technology, are at the top of their priorities in terms of what they hope to accomplish through their engagement in the Arctic.
Of course, parallel to that is the idea of economic developments, resource exploration and exploitation, often which butt heads with the reality of being able to deal with environmental issues. You have two competing issues.
For Canada, it will be critical, within established forums and multilateral institutions, like the Arctic Council, to continue to raise climate as an area of top priority for Canada’s own national approach to the Arctic, but also as a unifying theme for all of the Arctic players, almost as a precondition to come into the Arctic.
I think Canada is in a good position to raise that sense of responsibility among Arctic players and demonstrate that commitment, essentially as a precondition to coming in and being involved in the region. I do believe that’s the direction that many of the Arctic players are already taking, understanding that the region is particularly vulnerable and is particularly under threat from some of the forces that are driving climate change across the globe.
Senator Smith: Both witnesses, this is my $50 question. You have two minutes to come up with the three-step plan to set up a diplomatic effort outside of what exists today. If you were hired on a retainer basis, what would be the three steps that you would implement?
That’s my 50 bucks. It’s worth not too much to these guys.
The Chair: Two minutes each to solve that one. Let’s go back to Dr. Reeves to start.
Mr. Reeves: Mine, unsurprisingly, would be focused on developing trans-Pacific ties and relations. I think that Canada should be more proactive in finding opportunity for involvement and engagement in transatlantic state relations, institutions and dialogue mechanisms. I believe that Canada should prioritize engagement with Japan and South Korea, in particular, long-term in the Arctic to integrate their security concerns as well as NATO relationships, whereas Canada’s approach with North America and NORAD should try to ensure there are good communication and cooperation between the Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific like-minded states in Canada’s own approach to the Arctic.
I believe long term that there is a benefit in engaging with China, but certainly engagement with eyes wide open and understanding the potential impacts of that engagement. However, also understanding that in the Arctic Canada has particular value added that they can bring to the relationship with China that should be leveraged in other areas of the Canada-China relationship.
If Canada’s going to support China’s activities in the Arctic, it should look for areas of reciprocity in areas in the Indo-Pacific where it is also seeking deeper engagement and could use Chinese support to achieve that strategic end state.
Senator Smith: Thank you.
The Chair: Dr. Lanteigne?
Mr. Lanteigne: Thank you. To build on these points, first, I completely agree that Canadian engagement with the Asia-Pacific is very key here. However, I would add that the stage is very much set for a great deal of Arctic cooperation with the Nordic region as well. There is a lot where the two actors can teach each other. We already have a lot of potential outlets where that can be undertaken.
Second is education, education, education. There is so much that Canada can bring to the area of information sharing that is being heavily sought, not only by non-Arctic states in Asia but also by Europe as well, especially those countries that are just still very new to the Arctic and are trying to understand what is happening on the ground as opposed to just capital-to-capital.
Third, there needs to be a discussion about the Arctic future. There needs to be some kind of mechanism to say what is the Arctic going to look like in 2035. Not only in regard to the environment itself but the political situation and the actual socio-economic situation. I think that a lot of planning needs to be much more deeply undertaken. Looking at the environmental situation, this is definitely a case of all hands on deck.
The Chair: All right, thank you very much. Senator Deacon has the last question.
Senator M. Deacon: I debated this, so thank you. Dr. Reeves, you made a comment that I just couldn’t resist in raising this again.
One of our previous witnesses recently did an op-ed with the Financial Times about winning and Russia presently winning the energy war. You just touched on this. I agree specifically with the point that as long as Europe relies on Russian gas, sanctions and other measures will move very slowly.
Forgive me if my question seems a little naive, but I feel as long as we insist on developing and relying on fossil fuels, especially with an opening Arctic, we’re only going to perpetuate an energy war where Russia, and like-minded OPEC states with laws that are more lax in regulations and less concerned about climate change, may have a natural advantage. Therefore, it would be more advantageous in the West, including Canada, threw everything they had at developing sustainable sources of energy rather than insisting on investing resources to extract fossil fuels.
Is this feasible? Can we win on this? Or are we simply trapped in a spiral of regularly competing carbon-intensive industries, bringing all the goodies that it brings with it, with all the actors? I love that word today.
The Chair: You have all of one minute to answer that one.
Senator M. Deacon: I know; I’m sorry.
The Chair: Good luck.
Mr. Reeves: I’ll give an aspirational response.
I certainly hope so. I think that, if anything, the war in Ukraine has exposed the vulnerability that we have with respect to our energy supplies and our energy supply chains, and the difficulty that we have in the short term to respond in a meaningful strategic way to energy dependency anywhere between any actors.
We’ve known this for a long time, but I think that we now have it more clearly front and centre and in the public’s mind than we have at any time perhaps since the first or second Iraq wars.
In particular, there’s a huge opportunity in the Arctic. Again, I’ll circle back to the Asian states. The focus on the sustainable development goals, the focus on sustainable development in clean technology for energy, for sustainable energy supply, is a huge priority in the region. If you look at some of the most vulnerable states with respect to energy dependency, they are in Northeast Asia. They depend on trade routes that go through the South China Sea, a potential area of conflict, through the Arctic, which still has challenges around accessibility. A lot of those states would be interested in working with Canada for the long term in the Arctic region to figure out ways to move away from fossil fuel dependency toward more reliable, renewable, clean sources of energy. I think that’s another very important area where we should look for cooperation, not just in Asia, of course, but with all of our Arctic states and partners.
The Chair: Thank you very much. What a terrific end to a great meeting. It does bring us to the end, and thank you both for bringing the best of your expertise to this important discussion. You’ve guided us through a very rich afternoon and have given us much to think about. We appreciate the time you took today to be with our committee.
Colleagues, our next meeting will take place next Monday, May 9, at our usual time of 2 p.m. ET. With that, I wish everyone a good evening. The meeting is now adjourned.
(The committee adjourned.)