THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
EVIDENCE
OTTAWA, Thursday, June 1, 2023
The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met with videoconference this day at 11:29 a.m. [ET] to study foreign relations and international trade generally.
Senator Peter M. Boehm (Chair) in the chair.
[Translation]
The Chair: My name is Peter Boehm. I am a senator from Ontario and the Chair of the Foreign Affairs and International Trade Committee.
[English]
Before we begin, I wish to invite committee members participating in today’s meeting to introduce themselves.
[Translation]
Senator Woo: Good morning. I am Yuen Pau Woo from British Columbia.
[English]
Senator Coyle: Mary Coyle, Antigonish, Nova Scotia.
Senator Greene: Steve Greene, Nova Scotia.
Senator MacDonald: Michael MacDonald, Nova Scotia.
Senator Harder: Peter Harder, Ontario.
Senator M. Deacon: Welcome. Marty Deacon, Ontario.
Senator Boniface: Gwen Boniface, Ontario.
Senator Richards: Dave Richards, New Brunswick.
Senator Greenwood: Margo Greenwood, British Columbia, and I’m sitting here for Senator Ravalia this morning.
The Chair: Thank you very much, senators. Welcome to all of you. Welcome to all who may be watching us across the country on SenVu.
Colleagues, as part of our ongoing plan to receive regular updates on the matter, we are resuming our meeting to discuss the situation in Ukraine. I would like to point out that this is the committee’s ninth meeting on the subject since March 2022.
To provide an update, we are pleased to welcome as individuals Professor Dominique Arel, Chairholder, Chair of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Ottawa and Anastasia Fomitchova, PhD Student in the Ukrainian Studies program at the University of Ottawa. By video conference, we have Maria Popova, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science at McGill University. Welcome, and thank you for being with us today.
Before we hear your remarks and proceed to questions and answers, I wish to ask members and witnesses in the room to please refrain from leaning in too closely to your microphone or removing your earpiece when doing so. This will avoid any sound feedback that could negatively impact the committee staff and others in the room who might be wearing the earpiece for interpretation purposes.
We are now ready to hear your opening remarks. We have allocated a lot of time today, colleagues, so I think we should have enough time for a couple of rounds if that’s what committee members want.
We’ll begin with Professor Arel. You have the floor.
Dominique Arel, Chairholder, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa, as an individual: Thank you for inviting me.
Despite the incessant real-time coverage, there are many things we don’t know about the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war, such as, for instance, the actual number of casualties, which is estimated minimally at 15,000 deaths on the Ukrainian side and probably 40,000 to 50,000 on the Russian side.
Yet one major trend gets clearer by the day. Russia has exhausted its capacity to capture territories. It no longer has capable assault troops. The infamous Wagner Group has been devastated, with its leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin himself, announcing a rate of 40% to 60% casualties, including injuries. The Russian Donbas offensive is a failure, at the cost of rendering large cities uninhabitable.
The question is whether Ukraine has what Russia lacks: the ability to conduct an effective offensive. We are now at the doorstep of what could be the turning point of the war. Strategically, the main objectives in the short and middle term are the isolation of Crimea by driving a wedge in the land bridge linking the peninsula to Russia by way of Mariupol, southern Zaporizhzhia and southern Kherson and the destabilization of eastern Donbas by advancing into territories lost in 2014. The unknown is whether Russian forces have the capacity to defend territories.
Here, the intangible, which is the will to fight, could be the main factor at play. There are numerous indications that morale is low among Russian soldiers while the men of fighting age in the Donbas territories occupied by Russia for eight years have been crippled. If the Ukrainian counteroffensive is successful in regaining some critical ground, even well short of the objective of full reconquest, Russian political dynamics could veer into unchartered territory.
There are minority voices demanding a ceasefire and immediate negotiations. For some, it’s because Ukraine should not win — this is China’s position. Russia would keep what it occupied and cannot be too weakened as a world player balancing U.S. and NATO power.
For others, Ukraine cannot win. This is a position of the anti‑American left and of the realist school in international relations. Both believe that Ukraine has no chance of defeating Russia and that American imperialism or NATO expansions are the main culprit.
With the exception of Hungary, none of the NATO allies buy this narrative, and they understand that freezing the current military borders would be unsustainable for Ukraine and threatening to the world order.
The Russian and Chinese narrative is that neither Ukraine nor Europe have agency, both being dictated by the United States. The reality is upside down. U.S. intelligence agencies know, in fact, far more about Russian military plans than Ukrainian ones, and President Zelenskyy’s ability to public shame western allies into action has been remarkable. What is more, the American turnaround over the delivery of Abrams tanks and F-16 fighter jets came because of European pressure. There is emerging multilateralism, but not the one imagined by Putin.
Thank you.
The Chair: We will now go to Professor Popova, who is joining us by video, and then come back for Ms. Fomitchova afterwards.
Maria Popova, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, McGill University, as an individual: Thank you for this opportunity to address the committee.
Overnight, as we Canadians slept peacefully, Ukrainians in Kyiv were again, for the seventeenth time this month, woken up by a Russian missile attack. Several people are dead, including two children, on International Children’s Day.
However, despite these air raids that seek to terrorize the Ukrainian population, Russia is headed to defeat in Ukraine. Russia’s winter offensive failed. Western support for Ukraine has only increased, and Russia’s international isolation has grown. Ukrainian victory is possible — even likely — and Canada and our allies need to help Ukraine win faster to save Ukrainian lives and to bring back stability to Europe as soon as possible.
Why do I say Russia is losing? First, as my colleague Professor Arel pointed out, the winter offensive in the Donetsk region did not achieve a breakthrough. Russia lost a lot of troops. This is now the deadliest war for Russia since World War II.
Second, western support for Ukraine has not just held steady, it has increased. American support has included extensive military aid, a February visit to Kyiv by President Biden and a bipartisan consensus among two third of Americans that Ukraine’s victory is in the national interest of the U.S. Predictions that the Republican Party would turn against Ukraine, thus constraining future American aid, did not come to pass.
Europe has also remained steadfast, despite Russia’s threats of freezing it by cutting off energy supplies. Instead of caving to this blackmail, Europe diversified away from Russian gas without suffering major economic consequences. After a protracted debate, the German government green-lighted the supply of tanks to Ukraine. Denmark has committed its whole military budget to Ukraine’s defence. Zelenskyy’s trip to Western European capitals was extremely successful. Military and financial aid keeps flowing, and most European citizens approve.
My third point is that systematic war crimes by Russia have made Russia’s national brand increasingly toxic and have fuelled international isolation for Russia. The world learned about the kidnapping of Ukrainian children by Russia, watched gruesome executions of unarmed Ukrainian POWs and read about torture chambers and mass graves in the liberated territories. The child deportation policy led to an International Criminal Court arrest warrant for Russia’s president himself and for his children’s rights commissioner.
The narrative of a Global South being supportive of Russia’s supposed push for multipolarity is no longer convincing. While some leaders are still, of course, hedging bets, few are willing to strengthen their ties with Russia.
Former allies are slowly taking steps back. Despite an official visit to Moscow, China’s president has not committed military or other aid and has not formally chosen a side. On the contrary, China insists on portraying itself as a neutral party and is seeking some sort of negotiation. China and India, as well as Russia’s ostensible military allies Armenia and Kazakhstan, recently supported a UN resolution that called Russia an aggressor state. That’s a significant step.
Russia tried, but failed, to obstruct the election of Ukraine to the WHO Executive Board so its reach in the Global South is waning. President Zelenskyy attended the G7, had a cordial meeting there with India’s President Modi. In fact, recent polls find that across the Global South, public opinion about Russia’s leadership has become more negative over the past year. Now 57% of global citizens disapprove of Putin and only 21% approve.
My point here is that Russia is losing its grip, but Ukraine has not won yet. Canada and all of Ukraine’s allies need to step up military support to save Ukrainian lives, hasten Russia’s defeat on the battlefield, or force Russia to negotiate on Ukraine’s terms. It’s time to supply Ukraine with all the arms it has asked for, aircraft and long-range missiles. Canada should work to increase consensus within NATO toward this goal. Thank you for the attention.
The Chair: Thank you, Professor Popova. We will now go to Ms. Fomitchova. We’re looking forward to hearing your particular story.
Anastasia Fomitchova, PhD Student, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa, as an individual: Thank you.
[Translation]
Fifteen months after the start of the war and a winter filled with attacks on civilian and energy infrastructure, the people of Ukraine emerged weary from the winter’s power outages, cold and attacks. This did not diminish Ukraine’s resilience, however, or the preparations for the long-awaited counteroffensive announced weeks ago by Ukraine’s president.
I experienced that resilience personally throughout 2022 as a member of a battalion of volunteer paramedics. I participated in the defence of Kyiv and the eastern front, as well as the counteroffensive to take back Kherson. I witnessed both tremendous suffering and the relentless determination of Ukrainian society.
Despite constant attacks on civilian infrastructure — from hospitals and residential areas to energy facilities — and the ongoing battle in Bakhmut, in eastern Ukraine, the spring of 2023 has given way to the sense that Russia is failing to meet its objectives despite the resources it has dedicated to the invasion into Ukrainian territory since February 2022. Polls continue to show that Ukrainians have great confidence in the country’s Armed Forces and strongly support Ukraine’s president and military chief of staff.
According to Ukrainians in Kyiv, there is a sense that things are returning to normal since the winter ended, despite the warnings and attacks, and the fact that threat management is now a routine part of day-to-day life.
In addition to that general feeling, there are political expectations around continued government reforms, with Ukraine being granted candidacy status to join the European Union, in the wake of reforms undertaken after 2014. In line with expectations, reforms are targeting corruption, public service development and the country’s postwar economic development.
Despite how long the war has been going on, the war effort is not diminishing. In fact, studies show more people are joining the Armed Forces in 2023. At the same time, a growing number of families who left Ukraine as refugees following the start of the full-scale invasion are returning.
With the counteroffensive preparations under way, the people of Ukraine remain very united in their support of the Armed Forces. For months, the military has been preparing for the operation, and the population is preparing for massive bombing strikes on the cities behind the front line in retaliation. Even though Russia recently deployed nuclear weapons in Belarus, the people of Ukraine no longer take the nuclear threat seriously. They see it as a form of blackmail and bullying by Russia directed at the West.
The counteroffensive in the Kharkiv and Kherson regions in the fall of 2022 showed that liberating territory occupied by Russian troops comes at a heavy cost, in both human lives and military equipment. Still, Ukraine’s political, civilian and military actors remain committed to liberating all Ukrainian territory before entering talks with Russia on security guarantees. It is hoped that the delivery of long-range missiles, F-16 fighter jets and other weapons needed for an operation on that scale, as requested by the Ukrainian government, will come through in order to save human lives. The people of Ukraine hope that, with the support of Western partners, the operation will be short and lead to the swift withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukrainian territory.
Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Ms. Fomitchova.
I want to let everyone know that we now have Senator Gerba from Quebec with us.
We will now begin the question and answer portion. I wish to inform the senators that you will each have a maximum of four minutes for the first round. That includes questions and answers. I would ask the senators and witnesses to please be concise. We can always go to a second or third round if we have time.
[English]
Senator Richards: Thank you for being here. I was just wondering about the Abrams tanks, the F-16s and how long before Ukrainian military are proficient in operating them. Do we have any idea about that? They have different computer systems and different management systems and it’s going to take a while. Will they be able to be in the spring offensive, which has now become maybe a summer offensive because it hasn’t gone forward yet?
How much has the Russian’s bog down in Bakhmut enhanced the Ukrainians? They are bogged down. No matter if they say they claim the city, they were bogged down for months. Those are just some general questions.
Mr. Arel: Obviously, I won’t claim expertise in tank maintenance and training in particular. But it seems that the trend for all this high-end military equipment has been that it will take a long time and it ends up taking much less time. The recent estimate is that the Abrams tanks could be operational by the end of summer, so four months as opposed to the 16 months that was initially mentioned by the U.S. Army.
Again, I have no idea when the counteroffensive will begin, but the German tanks are already in Ukraine. It’s not clear to me that Ukrainian army will wait. We have on record the top political and military officials saying that we’re ready. They won’t tell us when but we are ready, even if much equipment including eventually the fighter jets will come along.
Senator Richards: As far as strategic victory, if not an actual victory, do you think Bakhmut was a strategic victory for the Ukrainian army?
Mr. Arel: Of course, as Anastasia Fomitchova and Maria Popova mentioned, the ultimate objective is the complete withdrawal of Russian troops. That’s also the official NATO and Canadian position, and so forth.
It would seem to me that if a major dent is done strategically — in the south in particular because isolating Crimea by driving this wedge, and perhaps even bonding anew the bridge, but this time with long-range missiles and a better position if they get back southern territories — it could render the military situation in Crimea unsustainable.
It’s one thing to ask, well, does the Ukrainian army have the military capability to actually retake Crimea? That would be really, really hard, but there are other ways of changing the military and therefore the political dynamic.
We have no idea. There’s never been such a counteroffensive of that magnitude since World War II, but if it happens, even sufficiently to destabilize Russia, who knows what could happen? Also, in the east, what if they get into territories lost in 2014? In the South, it’s 2022; it’s last year. That was the Achilles heel of the Ukrainian defence — incredible resilience, the defence of Kyiv, which Ms. Fomitchova was part of — but in the south, they couldn’t, so they lost these territories without much battle in early March 2022. If they manage even to get to Donetsk, again, we would get into uncharted territories in Russia. We don’t know how the system would react to such defeat.
Senator Richards: I realize you can only speculate, and I was speculating with my questions, too. Thank you very much.
The Chair: I know our other panellists probably will want to come back on that as well because it’s a very interesting question.
Senator Boniface: Thank you very much for being here. I have just returned from a NATO meeting in Luxembourg last week, so the timing of this is really very interesting, compared to what I heard from there. It’s quite clear from those few days that there is a strong unity across Europe on this issue.
I’ll direct my question to Ms. Popova because of your comment that Russia is losing its grip. Could you give me a little more sense of what that means, and what are the chances of seeing something nuclear?
Ms. Popova: Thanks for this question. I meant by “losing its grip” that Russia is losing its capability to conquer more territory, and it is losing its ability to block Ukrainian initiatives at the international level.
I don’t expect a nuclear reaction. The Russians still think that they may win this war because they still believe that they can outlast Western resolve in supporting Ukraine. I don’t think they are reaching for the nuclear escalation at any point soon or ever. Actually, so far, we’ve learned in this year and a half of war that they’re very quick to make nuclear threats, but we don’t have any serious indication that they intend to make good on those threats because every time they are defeated on the battlefield, they act rationally and they withdraw and they retreat. There is no strong evidence that they will go nuclear.
Senator Boniface: Thank you. My second question deals with China’s potential role for the future. I’m not sure which one of the panellists said that China has not chosen a side. What do you see as China’s options? Perhaps you can enlighten me. Mr. Arel, maybe you can start?
Mr. Arel: China has chosen a side; it’s pretty clear. Even symbolically, there was the state visit to Moscow and then a quick Zoom meeting with Zelenskyy, under duress almost, a few weeks later. It’s clear that, politically, China — in a complete reversal from the Cold War — is now becoming the big brother to Russia, which is becoming a junior, a partner.
China is the only major consequential political ally that Russia has, but China will not commit militarily. That’s the big question. If China were to change its policy, then the war would again go into something unpredictable. There is no indication that China is prepared to do that.
On the question of territorial integrity, China has been ambiguous. We understand their position on territorial integrity is also ambiguous in its own backyard, right?
I wouldn’t say China is on the fence. It’s more on Russia’s side, but it is again most likely because of Russia’s economic interests worldwide. It’s quite significant that the so-called partnership or alliance without limits that had been declared two weeks before the February 2022 invasion is showing itself to have great limits so far. That has been perhaps the striking revelation of the first 16 months of the war, globally.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you all for being here today. I really appreciate it.
I’ll ask Professor Popova this question first, but I do welcome responses from all, on the topic of Ukraine’s potential membership in NATO.
When some of you appeared here last March, you encouraged the West to integrate Ukraine into institutions like the EU and NATO. On the latter, Ukraine has since applied for NATO membership.
What do you think that process will actually look like? I have heard about the unity comments also from my colleague, but I’m thinking about how this might actually unfold. Surely, we would have to wait for war and fighting conflict to end, or it would trigger Article 5. What conditions should exist on the ground for NATO to welcome Ukraine as an official member?
Ms. Popova: Thanks. This is a really important question. In the last year and a half of war, we have seen that, indeed, consensus has shifted toward an understanding that Ukraine as a member of NATO eventually is the only way to guarantee peace in Europe. We have seen a shift away from a position that maybe Ukraine needs to be a buffer zone between NATO and Russia. Russia has now made it clear that this will not be possible. When Ukraine is neutral, as it was up until the start of the full-scale invasion, Russia saw that as a green light to invade.
It is really important that this shift has taken place. There is now a realization that eventually Ukraine needs to be in NATO. The question, as you pointed out really well, is that it is difficult to imagine exactly how that would happen. Some creative thinking will be necessary on how exactly to make this happen.
President Macron, at the GLOBSEC conference in Bratislava yesterday, said something about possibly giving Ukraine guarantees and support stronger than that given to Israel and a path to NATO membership in preparation for this. Exactly what that would look like will have to be specified. It’s very important that the realization is there. The consensus is growing that, eventually, Ukraine needs to be in NATO.
Some thinking is needed around what will happen if Ukraine does not regain all of its territory. It is useful to start thinking of parallels to Germany which, of course, entered NATO without being fully in its borders, with its eastern part de facto occupied by the Soviet Union. It is important to start thinking along these lines and thinking about how to bring Ukraine into NATO because that is really the only way to achieve lasting peace.
Mr. Arel: I wouldn’t say a discordant view, maybe an alternative view. My reading is the incredible shift which occurred in NATO in the last year is unprecedented military assistance making the Ukrainian army basically the only army in the world, other than Russia, able to conduct that kind of World War II warfare that we’ve been seeing for a year.
Here comes the Israel analogy that President Macron just mentioned. It’s one option which is actually in progress because all the red lines are falling in terms of, sure, we’re going to give you the tanks; now we’re going to give you the F-16, then the long-range missiles. The British have already made the steps to transform Ukraine into some kind of fortress so Russia would no longer have the ability to attack Ukraine, short of the political commitment that if Russia does that, then Canadians will be sent to fight for Ukraine, which is a big political question. That’s Article 5.
Short of that, Ukraine has made an incredible jump here in terms of actual unprecedented military assistance. I don’t know if the NATO question will really be on the table in terms of Article 5 two or three years down the road. We’ll see; perhaps the institutionalization of what has already been happening and growing for 16 months. But, of course, it’s a political commitment as opposed to a legal one.
The Chair: Thank you very much, professor.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: Thank you to the witnesses for being here and helping to provide us with an overview of the situation. We certainly appreciate it.
On May 18, the U.S. representative to the UN Security Council, Robert A. Wood, made a statement reiterating that Ukraine mustn’t use U.S. military equipment to carry out attacks inside Russian territory. Of course, he made clear that the United States had the right to defend itself, but not to enter Russian territory.
For a while now, there have been reports of Ukrainian allies conducting military actions and incursions on Russian territory.
What do you make of that statement, which was endorsed by Great Britain and France? Do you think we’re headed for an escalation of the war?
Ms. Fomitchova: Thank you for your question. The incursions you’re referring to, whether they were conducted by short-range drones or Russian volunteers, have not been tied to the military chief of staff or the Ukrainian government. It seems that, after Russia’s first invasion into Ukrainian territory in 2014, networks of Russian volunteers, networks of supporters, began self-organizing in anticipation of an attack on this scale. There are actors in Russia as well seeking change internally.
Senator Gerba: What’s your overall assessment of the situation, since, as you say, there’s no evidence tying the attacks to Ukraine’s military chief of staff? If these kinds of attacks continue and there’s no evidence as to which side they’re coming from, what’s your personal take on the situation?
Ms. Fomitchova: It’s obvious that Ukrainian society expects some mobilization in Russia, so real change internally. There is hope that the situation will lead to a change in power and an end to the war.
The Chair: Thank you.
[English]
Ms. Popova: There isn’t really a very strong danger of escalation because Russia has actually downplayed these acts rather than considered them a major provocation. They have emphasized that they have responded well and shot down the drones. There’s not a ton of attention to the incursions in the Belgorod Oblast, in the region near the Ukrainian border. I don’t think this is actually a red line that is going to trigger some kind of stronger response from Russia.
There’s realization that this may well be internal Russian opponents of the regime, and they have a bigger issue to deal with, which is the Ukrainian army in Ukraine. This has been more of a distraction, really, than a major step. I personally would not be too worried about this.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Senator Coyle: Thank you to all of our witnesses here today. I was also going to ask about the drones, but I want to probe more in the direction of the Russian population.
Do any of you have a sense, a good read or much of a read on the temperature in Russia in terms of support for this war, where there have been so many losses of Russian lives, not a whole lot of success on the front lines?
You have these irritants, these drones, inside the borders of the Russian state itself. What is the general temperature of the Russian population, if it’s possible to say? What might be affecting that?
Mr. Arel: There’s this new book by a young British political scientist named Jade McGlynn called Russia’s War, not Putin’s war, but Russia’s war. She’s done a lot of field work since 2022, and she claims that on the whole, Russia’s population supports the war. It’s a popular war, but it’s passive support, except for a more militant constituency.
It’s on the whole passive support, and Putin is very much aware of that. The mobilization last fall was not a full mobilization. It was a so-called partial mobilization, especially in the depth of the provinces, much less in the capitals. Putin fears — and by all indications the regime fears — the mobilization of its own population, even the political mobilization. They don’t want people to even to support the war. Again, it fears any kind of improvisation or spontaneity, civil society has been devastated in Russia.
If the war gets much worse for Russia, that could mean serious defeats. The population would begin to feel as though the war is getting closer and closer as opposed to initially, at the beginning, it was almost like the war in Syria; it’s far away, even though Ukraine is not very far; it doesn’t really affect us. Again, the dynamics could change in Russia.
My sense, the sense of Jade McGlynn — and a lot of my colleagues and other Russianists, probably including Maria Popova here, who’s done work in Russia, is that there is a kind of ambiguity in Russia. The war is popular as long as it’s not really affecting us. The cost of sacrifice here, the willingness to sacrifice for a cause that remains abstract, meaning existential war in Russia? Really? There’s no invasion of Russia. The invasion is in Ukraine. That could prove to be the weak spot in this whole so-called special operation.
The Chair: We have a few seconds left, if Professor Popova would like to intervene.
Ms. Popova: Sure. I’ll just add that it doesn’t seem like the recent incursions of the drones have moved the Russian population in any direction. They do indeed continue with this passive support, where they would basically support whatever the regime does. As polls have shown, about a two thirds majority of Russians say that they would support if the war ends tomorrow or they would support if Russia takes another run at Kyiv. So whatever the Kremlin decides to do, about two thirds are backing it.
The Chair: Thank you.
Senator Harder: Thank you to our panellists again for joining us. I’d like to shift from the war front to the domestic front in Ukraine. President Zelenskyy has put great effort into ensuring that a reconstruction effort was under way. It was part of his pre-war agenda of bringing change and anti-corruption.
Could you report to us how that process is unfolding and what degree of success he has been able to achieve in terms of both reconstruction and anti-corruption initiatives?
[Translation]
Ms. Fomitchova: The political agenda today is basically dictated by the needs of the war. There has nevertheless been some progress and an acceleration of reforms promised by the Ukrainian government in relation to “de-oligarchizing.” Measures were taken to reduce the influence of oligarchs on politics. They are eagerly awaited and have the support of the Ukrainian people.
The efforts to tackle corruption have led to institutional and legislative progress. In particular, the war has helped give political leaders the tools to implement the anti-oligarch law, which was adopted in 2020 but without the necessary enforcement tools.
[English]
Senator Harder: Professor Popova, could you add to that? Is there an update you can provide us?
Ms. Popova: Sure. In the last few months, there have been several steps taken toward anti-corruption. They have been encouraging. Basically, Ukraine in the last eight years had set up an institutional architecture for anti-corruption, investigative bodies, a court. Now they’re really moving and the wheels are turning in full motion. There have been major cases brought. People are now going to stand trial. There are encouraging signs for sure, and this is noted by Ukrainian society. If you look at polls that ask people whether they believe corruption is increasing or decreasing, in 2021, only 4% of Ukrainians thought that things were going in the right direction. In 2022, this figure is up to over a third, about 40% actually believe things are going in the right direction.
One piece of evidence that we have that the state is strong in constraining corruption is that we have a lot of evidence that the arms that are going to Ukraine are being used as they should. There is no black market for arms. I think this is a major achievement of the Ukrainian state, to be able to control this massive inflow of arms and to really account for it. While I think the partners have monitored this closely and are confident that arms are not being smuggled. I think that’s a great sign.
Senator Harder: Thank you.
The Chair: — on that segment, but we can always come back in the second round. Thank you, professor.
Senator MacDonald: I’ll address my first comments to Professor Arel. I agree with your assessment on NATO, and they’ve obviously made a substantial commitment in supporting Ukraine. I am curious, though, obviously, as long as Ukraine is not a member of NATO, Article 5 will not be triggered. There will be no troops on the ground in Western countries.
But short of that, is there any type of military support that could possibly be given to Ukraine? I’m thinking in terms of different types of equipment, military support that, if made available and employed, could tip the balance and help the Ukrainians secure a victory when things are at their most unstable? Is there something that could be done militarily, besides putting troops in, that could change the direction and finalize the war?
The reason I’m bringing this up is that initially we weren’t going to send any planes. We heard that for a year. Now there are planes coming.
Mr. Arel: Yes. It seems all the barriers are eventually falling. On the one hand, of course, there is criticism and exasperation, certainly by our Ukrainian friends, why is it taking so long? But it’s remarkable the degree of political consensus, and political consensus takes time to build. As I indicated by my remarks, the model has not been U.S. imposing or U.S. coercion. Often it’s the other way around.
In terms of the equipment, if you get to a point — and they’re not there yet — middle term or long term that Ukraine as an air force capable of preventing the kind of bombardment that we see on a daily basis, even intercepting these missiles at the source, then the game will change completely and the famous long-range missiles. I think that’s basically the Eldorado here. Once you get that equipment plus an army that has been trained and retrained and has what no other armies in the world, even the American army, the experience of fighting that kind of war, then Ukraine is very strong. Whether it’s part of NATO Article 5 or not, that’s the big political question ultimately.
Where Ukraine finds itself now, we’ll see the counteroffensive could not be predicted by anyone, certainly not Putin 16 months ago, that we would be at that point.
Senator MacDonald: Does anybody else want to contribute?
Ms. Popova: I agree. The key is to supply the weapons faster as Ukraine is asking for them. It’s true, consensus takes time, but at this point, consensus has to be that Ukraine needs all the help to win because it is plausible. The faster all the weapons are delivered and capabilities enhanced, the better.
Mr. Arel: It all rests on the political commitments. Were Donald Trump or Ron DeSantis to win the American election next year, who knows what could happen. There’s an instability at the heart of the American political system.
But in Europe, this is a war of aggression. Everything changed in February 2022. Even the Netherlands and Denmark — as mentioned by Maria Popova — Spain, and even a so-called neo‑fascist coalition government in Italy, absolutely and totally committed to the defence of Ukraine, because the principle of openly and militarily seeking to destroy a state that cannot stand, and all European states have felt, since February 2022, directly threatened. That’s not likely to change next year. The so‑called fatigue, I don’t think that’s going to happen.
Again, short of Article 5, that could be something very solid for Ukraine, but we do have the instability in the American system that, obviously, is worrying.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Senator Woo: Thank you, witnesses.
I was going to ask the question about whether you had any doubt that the provision of all the armaments Ukraine is asking for would, in fact, be a decisive point in ending the war in Ukraine’s favour. I’m not going to ask the question, because I think you all say “yes” to that; you have no doubt that that would happen if the Americans and others provided exactly what Ukraine wanted.
I’m going to ask the question that you pose: Why is it taking so long? I just want to ask our witnesses to go into the minds of the Americans. I mean, ending the war quickly is the humane, in a way, and, perhaps, the moral thing to do. Why would the Americans want to drag this out?
I think we can set aside the nuclear threat, because Professor Popova has discounted that. Perhaps we can set aside the question of whether Ukrainians will misuse equipment.
What else is there?
Mr. Arel: The fear of escalation is not only nuclear escalation. Russia has not carpet bombed Ukraine. That would be a massive escalation if they sent their bomber jets and literally levelled cities like they have done in Syria. Should we add like they’ve done in Syria without much international ripple effects. Certainly, it was not major news, but it was exactly what they have done. They levelled cities.
They haven’t done that. Why? Perhaps because they can’t do that, because they fear that their planes might be shot down, especially now with the system in place.
Again, the terrible things that Russia can do, they haven’t done. It’s not entirely clear, and I can only surmise that in the minds of decision makers in the Pentagon or in Europe again, it was not entirely clear to them also. Perhaps, increasingly, they realize that, in fact, Russia is not able — perhaps not willing and not able — to do that; and, therefore, the caution here in terms of the delivery of arms is, kind of, diminishing. That’s my reading.
We learned many things from the leaked documents a few months ago, and on the American side, the fear of escalation was that China could actually decide to intervene if Russia gets too weak, even internally, if there were to be attacks within Russia itself. That was the China factor that appeared to have been a brake, but it seems that even the China factor — again, in calculations — perhaps, is receding. That’s my reading.
Senator Woo: Professor Popova?
Ms. Popova: Thank you for this good question.
I think the fear of escalation is there, including nuclear. We are becoming more confident as time goes by that the nuclear threat is not as high, but from the beginning, I think the nuclear blackmail that Russia was trying to do was more credible in the beginning of the war.
I think the reason this is going slowly is that there is a fear of escalation, possibly nuclear, and an overwhelming assumption that Russia is a superpower and will somehow manage to win this war. It takes time to update these assumptions. It’s not a malicious, sort of, let’s drag this out kind of thing, but it takes time to really take in all the information and draw the conclusions that Russia is weaker than we thought, that Russia is going to act rationally and Putin is not really a madman who is going to immediately reach for the nuclear button.
Of course, that has happened in the United States through a debate within the foreign policy community that has been going on this whole year and a half. What we’re really talking about now is the outcome of this debate, but in order to reach these conclusions, it takes time, as Professor Arel also pointed out.
The Chair: Thank you very much, professor.
Senator Greenwood: I’m going to shift to talk about children.
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, also known as the OSCE, report documents that only a small number of Ukrainian children have returned to Ukraine after having been forcibly relocated to the Russian Federation.
What role can Canada play along with other allies to ensure that these children are returned back to their families? I would appreciate any of your thoughts on that.
Thank you.
[Translation]
Ms. Fomitchova: The tragic situation of children being deported to Russia is something that Ukrainian society and civil society organizations are paying very close attention to.
What really helped shine a spotlight on the situation were the efforts of civil society organizations in Ukraine and in Russia, including those operating in exile. They highlighted what was going on.
Personally, I think Canada could play a role by making the issue more of a priority in bilateral negotiations. Perhaps a delegation could be sent to examine that situation specifically, as was done in relation to political prisoners in Russia.
[English]
Mr. Arel: We all know that the International Criminal Court, or ICC, has issued arrest warrants to Vladimir Putin and the Commissioner for Children’s Rights on this question, because this is a question, of course, of the deportation of children across an international border. That’s a kind of war crime that is easier to document, because it’s objectively across an international border as opposed to inside, when it’s far more complicated.
I think the fact that suddenly the ICC is involved — so there is not just political but a legal focus — is unnerving Russian officials. I don’t know about Putin. Nobody knows what’s in his mind, but other officials have to be unnerved, even though in the Russian narrative, which is another way of saying Russian propaganda, but in the Russian conception, of course, they haven’t crossed an international border, because they have decided to annex all these territories. That’s why we have a war, and it’s basically to deny even Ukrainian sovereignty.
Again, that kind of international attention in several forums, and then Canada here can play a role. I always believe that Canada has a comparative advantage compared to its other NATO allies because of our history, which is, basically, an intimate knowledge of Ukrainian politics and society. Canada can certainly raise the temperature on that particular question.
The Chair: I would like to acknowledge that Senator Omidvar of Ontario has joined the committee and will have an opportunity to ask a question, if you want to, but first I will ask a question as chair, if that’s all right.
The witnesses have mentioned the nuclear threat and how it seems to have diminished, but there is another nuclear threat out there and that, of course, is the Zaporizhzhia plant. The IAEA has had inspectors there, and Director General Grossi has made comments. There have been some, can we say, unusual goings‑on around there over the past year or so in terms of digging. Citizens in the neighbourhoods have been evacuated. What are the chances that there could be a manufactured-type accident that would have nuclear implications for the area and could, in fact, be a tipping point in this war?
Mr. Arel: Chances are not zero because of the recklessness of the Russian army that has transformed the Zaporizhzhia power plant into a military base. The shelling that has been going on from the beginning, since early March 2022. We keep hearing about, it came close, it came close, and they are off the grid for a while and they need to get back in a hurry on the grid. An accident — not premeditated because it certainly wouldn’t play in the Russian interest to have a nuclear incident on a territory it claims to be eternally theirs anyway, it’s been annexed.
The only way that can really be solved is what happened to the Chernobyl nuclear plant — the Russian army leaves. They made the political determination that they couldn’t win that particular front so they withdrew.
If the counteroffensive is successful in retaking, in particular, Zaporizhzhia, then the Russian army will leave. It’s not that they will blow up the plant and contaminate not only the province but even Russia which is next door; that won’t happen. But until then, it’s highly dangerous.
Ms. Popova: Yes, I agree. It’s dangerous, mostly because there is the possibility of an accident as opposed to a premeditated sabotage. The best way to avoid this is for southern Zaporizhzhia to be cut off in the counteroffensive and force Russian withdrawal. I think it is possible, but until that happens, the danger is indeed there.
The Chair: Thank you very much. We will move to round two.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: I have a question about the Black Sea Grain Initiative, which helps to ensure that numerous countries receive grain and food.
It was extended at the last minute, but only for 60 days, despite the fact that more than 45 countries have been able to receive more than 30 million tonnes of grain since the agreement was signed.
Are you optimistic about the agreement’s extension? Where do things stand? What can Canada do to ensure that the agreement remains in place beyond those 60 days?
[English]
Ms. Popova: I am an optimist that this will be renewed. It’s actually one of the pieces of evidence that Russia is acting in a rational way. It does take part in these negotiations and will probably renew again. Now that Turkish President Erdoğan has been re-elected, it’s the same actors involved. So I’m optimistic that the grain deal will stay in place.
Mr. Arel: There were high-level negotiations in the first month of the war and then Bucha happened and that was it. There have been negotiations. The two positions are completely — Russia’s position is that Ukraine should capitulate and Ukrainian position is that Russia should withdraw.
As Ms. Popova said, there has been this one instance and a second one, the exchange of prisoners, where there have been ongoing negotiations. Why? Because Russia values not all of its soldiers, it seems, but some of them, some of the prisoners. Sometimes they are political figures like Medvedchuk, who was traded 200 to 1 even fighters for him because he was seen as high value for Russia. That’s one.
Then the grain issue. We talked briefly about the emerging south. This is one aspect here, where Russia is seeking politically to make inroads in Africa and Asia in the context of this war. The blockades were victimizing, first and foremost, the Global South starting with Africa and Asia. Here, it was quite remarkable that Russia, despite all the bluff and the threats and so forth, ultimately yielded. The pattern has been every 60 days or so they threaten to stop it, but they continue because it is in their international interests to do that. That’s not negotiating with NATO here. It’s negotiating so they don’t lose the South on this question.
There is not much optimism here on the war, but that’s one aspect that has been partly successful because, of course, it’s not full 100% export, but it has been an achievement.
The Chair: Thank you.
Senator Richards: Thank you for saying that, professor, because that’s what I believe. I mean, they are negotiating with Africa, not with the NATO in this idea of grain shipments and whatever. Thank you for that.
Beyond Article 5, Canadians and others are training Ukrainian troops. I am wondering if we have any idea or is this something we can’t talk about or don’t know, but how many foreign troops might there be in theatre in Ukraine? Do we have any idea of that? I know Canadian, U.S. and British troops have been killed there. I have a friend who is a medic who has come over fire over there and has been over there now for four months. Do we have any idea of how many of the international troops that are over there fighting alongside the Ukrainians?
Mr. Arel: We’re talking about the international legions. We know there are a number of these foreign legions. One of them is Russian and has actually been part of these incursions into Russian territory a few weeks ago — or was it last week? Another is kind of international in composition including Canadians. There is no evidence of significant casualties or even significant participation. We don’t know about special forces. There might be some special forces roaming around.
On the question of training, if I may — I think Ms. Fomitchova could have something to say with a very concrete experience — my very general understanding is that the training by Canadians and others has changed the culture of the Ukrainian army. Could you say something about that?
[Translation]
Ms. Fomitchova: Ukraine’s experience with war after 2014 helped the country organize its defence in 2022, while relying on the expertise of Canada and other countries. As far as combat practices are concerned, I would say it’s extremely valuable, just as much as any weapons that may be provided in support.
[English]
Mr. Arel: It’s a culture that is more bottom-up whereas the Russian army has remained heavily Soviet without any kind of initiatives. The kinds of battalions that Ms. Fomitchova joined and then observed is that kind of initiative at ground level, with officers that have the wherewithal and even the margin of manoeuver to make decisions on the fly, responding to particular ongoing challenges without constantly having to refer to the top.
That has been a gradual but significant change that occurred perhaps invisibly between 2015 and 2022 and then became obvious. It’s more than the technical training, but the way of basically conducting a modern western army.
Senator Richards: Thank you.
Senator Coyle: Thank you. I have asked you the question about the temperature in Russian. We have heard a bit about the temperature in Ukraine in terms of the population and that people are showing incredible unity in spite of the terrible losses and incredible inconveniences.
I’m curious if anybody has any information on the will of the general population in Ukraine around Crimea. It was 2014 — now it’s 2023 — and there wasn’t what you would have expected at that time in terms of international support. What are the Ukrainian people feeling about Crimea and where things may or may not go as this moves, hopefully, to a conclusion?
[Translation]
Ms. Fomitchova: The occupation of Crimea since 2014 is an extremely painful topic in Ukraine. It was the first step marking the occupation, the start of an occupation of a part of Ukrainian territory. In the years prior to the full-scale invasion in 2022, the stalled military situation caused people to lose hope that all of the occupied territory, including Crimea, would be liberated.
The full-scale invasion that began last year ignited people’s hope that Crimea could finally be taken back and that those who had been forced to flee the peninsula could return to live there as they had before 2014.
[English]
Mr. Arel: Something fundamentally changed in 2022. Crimea was lost in 2014. It’s painful, but there was no Ukrainian resistance for the annexation of Crimea. That was then. There was massive resistance in the east for Donbas, but none in Crimea.
What changed in 2022? It changed in the north because Belarus was now a vassal of Russia, which was not the case in 2014. So, bang, they invade through Belarus, but also Crimea turned out to be a launching pad for the full-scale invasion. That’s how they got south from Kherson to Mariupol. So now for any Ukrainian it is no longer abstract whether it’s realistic to get Crimea back. Of course, we need to notarize Crimea because that’s from where Russia is attacking us. A lot of the missiles are being launched from the ships.
My sense in trying to get the pulse of Ukrainian society is that Crimea has to be neutralized one way or another because you cannot get any kind of guarantee of security otherwise. That is from 2022, as a result of the invasion.
The Chair: Professor Popova, there’s time for a quick comment.
Ms. Popova: Opinion polls in Ukraine show that when Ukrainians are asked about how they define victory, they define it including the recovery of Crimea. About 93% of Ukrainians believe that victory means liberating all of Ukrainian territory, including Crimea. They are very united on that as well.
The Chair: Thank you.
Senator Harder: Professor Arel, I wanted to give you the opportunity to respond, when you were so rudely cut off, on the domestic situation in Ukraine. I would also like to ask a question about Belarus because that’s the update we’re missing as we look around. Do you have any insight to report on the precarious nature of the Belarus dictatorship?
Mr. Arel: Should I start with the reconstruction before I get into more difficult territory for us, namely, Belarus?
Senator Harder: Please.
Mr. Arel: On the reconstruction, a huge question is who is going to pay because the bill will be half a trillion dollars according to the latest estimates. The big elephant in the room is Russia. Is there a mechanism here of some kind of reparations that Russia would need to pay? Then the question comes, “Well, can Russia’s assets abroad be seized?” I know there is a test case here, a legal case in Canada; there is also a legal case in Europe. It’s not clear-cut if that kind of asset can be seized.
There is a concerted effort, including in Canada and perhaps with Canada leading the way here, politically. We’ll see if it musters a kind of legal test.
The second question is the extent of the devastation, especially in the east. We have to remember that in this devastating full‑scale war, the cities that have been most damaged are the eastern cities, in particular, the Donbas cities. The paradox here is that if Ukraine were to be able to retake the Donbas that it doesn’t control — starting with Mariupol, 90% destroyed; Bakhmut; and last summer we had Severodonetsk, and so forth — if the war is to be moved to Donbas, there may be more destruction because that’s how Russia defends itself, by destroying cities that it claims are destroyed by Ukrainians, but in the realm of propaganda.
You’re talking here about the kind of post-World War II reconstruction in Germany, where the cities are levelled. The Ukrainian government is at the point of estimating not only how much it would cost but also how you rebuild a heavily industrialized area that doesn’t need all these industries moving forward. It’s enormously challenging. These are the questions certainly on the table on Belarus. Perhaps Ms. Popova will help me out here.
Ms. Popova: Sure. The Belarusian situation is that it seems that Lukashenko is resisting some continuous pressure from Russia to commit more resources to this war. He is probably resisting it because he doesn’t feel confident enough at home to be taking these decisions because he was almost toppled in 2020 and basically survived in power only through Russia’s help. He is between a rock and a hard place. So far, he is trying to do as little as possible.
The Chair: Thank you.
Senator MacDonald: I want to pick up on the Chinese question that Senator Boniface touched upon.
Late April, Zelenskyy and Xi had a phone conversation 14 months after the war started. I’m very leery of any conversation with President Xi when it comes to this war, but, realistically, is there potentially any positive contribution that sort of engagement could make in terms of finding a resolution for the war?
The second question: How do you think China sees this particular war in regard to its sabre-rattling around Taiwan? How would the conclusion to this war affect China’s approach to dealing with the Taiwan situation?
Mr. Arel: These are big questions regarding China. On conflict resolution, it’s hard to imagine — China won’t be a mediator.
Senator MacDonald: No.
Mr. Arel: But it could be an asset in basically trying to convince Putin of doing X, Y, Z, depending on the state of power politics because, again, of his situation of dependence. He is dependent on China. He may be dependent now on the Iranian drones, but Iran is an isolated, sanctioned state.
That could be the asset. But we just talked about reconstruction. China would be enormously helpful here in terms of investment projects, so certainly we don’t know, obviously, what has been discussed, but that is certainly on the table. Most likely, China is also part of their consideration.
Senator MacDonald: They like buying agricultural land. There is no shortage of it in Ukraine.
Mr. Arel: Agricultural land, but also just reconstruction of cities and brand-new cities. It’s not like they will reconstruct Soviet cities based on the extraction of metallurgy and mining. That’s something else altogether. Could be even at the vanguard here in terms of environmentally safe and so forth.
Your second question was on the —
Senator MacDonald: In terms of its approach to Taiwan. To elaborate on that a bit, in Ukraine, we have the U.S. obviously highly involved financially and militarily; but in concert with NATO, the U.S. would be very important if something happened to Taiwan, but there is no NATO. So I’m just curious what you think are their plans?
Mr. Arel: That’s a question of precedent here. When we say there is a war of aggression, that changed everything in 2022. There is a minority view, as I said, even in international relations, that won’t distinguish the U.S. intervention in Iraq and the full-scale invasion of Russia. The U.S. intervention in Iraq, however controversial, bypassing the Security Council and so forth, was not aimed at the destruction of Iraq as a state.
All the military intervention post-war, with the exception of the Kuwait one in 1990, were aimed at changing the regime, perhaps, or facilitating or fuelling the succession of a territory but not destroying a state as a state. That is the precedent. My reading, that’s why Europe in particular has been so united on the question, and it’s a question again of precedent and international politics that could have a direct consequence here to China’s reading of, again, the temperature or what is allowed, what is tolerated de facto in international politics. So to me it is fundamental —
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you. Two quick questions.
Ms. Fomitchova, I read about you, and I believe you are the first witness we have had who has seen direct fighting and conflict. The chair might wish to correct me on that. I don’t want to miss this opportunity to get a sense of morale in the Ukrainian Armed Forces from someone who has been there and hear your thoughts on anything that we may not have heard or that you may wish to address that Canada and the West are missing in its military support for Ukraine.
Jets and tanks are getting the headlines, for sure, but there are kit and other supplies. So it’s very important to us to hear from you.
Ms. Fomitchova: I will answer in English. Something very important about this war and the experience of the war in Ukraine is that a lot of people who decided to join the armed forces are simple citizens. Addressing the question of life now at the front line, it’s really about surviving all together, surviving and protecting others.
When we speak about Ukrainian resilience and resistance, I think some things that not everybody expected at the beginning of the war, the full-scale invasion last year, is that Ukrainian society is fully committed and involved in surviving and protecting their beloved and their families and friends. About practices of fighting, it’s something that needs to be very well understood. It’s groups of friends and people fighting together but willing to resist and surviving all together.
When Professor Arel was speaking about the difference with the Russian army, I think this is one of the most important things. The decentralized aspect, the autonomy of the units because there is a question of trust, which is very important on the field, and is willing to de-occupy the country from the Russian troops.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you.
We talked about the China factor. I do think about the U.S. factor a little bit. There is the U.S. election coming up next year. There is a possibility that Mr. Trump might be leading the Republicans at that moment. I’m wondering if that discussion comes up at all, the concerns around his influence as a U.S. potential president and cutting off support to Ukraine or if that conversation or speculation is happening at all at your tables.
The Chair: Unfortunately, senator, you have used your 30 seconds with your question. It’s a big one, I know, and we’ll probably be returning to it.
Senator Omidvar: Thank you for accommodating me. I believe I am well advised to cede my time to Senator Deacon’s question.
The Chair: Thank you. I will take that time and use it myself, because we’re almost at time anyway.
What I wanted to add — and in particular to our two professors who are with us today — is this committee issued a report on Canadian sanctions law a couple of weeks ago. We had a number of recommendations, but in the overall sanctions picture, I would be very interested in your views as to whether sanctions are being effective, particularly as we are moving into the second year of sanctions, and they are being tightened in some areas, including legislatively by us and by other countries as well. So, Professor Arel, quickly if you can, and then followed by Professor Popova.
Mr. Arel: On the question of sanctions, we perhaps had the false expectation that they would have an almost immediate or fairly rapid impact on the conduct of the war or even on the decision making by Putin to do certain things. Once he went — I shouldn’t say “nuclear”; that’s not the right analogy — but he used the ultimate, short of nuclear weapons, weapon, which is the full-scale invasion that no one could possibly have ever imagined, then nothing could stop him, really, certainly not sanctions.
There are indications that now, 16 months into this, it is gnawing at the Russian economy and even the ability to produce weapons and to maintain planes and so forth. I just read that Russia is losing its foreign market, even losing Serbia as a client of fighter jets because of the whole issue of components that are beginning to be lacking.
It is weakening Russia, but we’re talking about the long term, not in terms of its conduct of the war, because in practice, it’s very difficult to assess the suboptimal — to say the least — performance of the Russian army, the dysfunctionality. To what extent is it a matter of sanctions perhaps or corruption that’s been rotting even the Russian army?
The Chair: Thank you for your comment. I’d like to go to Professor Popova quickly if we can.
Ms. Popova: One thing I will emphasize is that we cannot trust the figures that are coming from the Russian state. It is highly likely that the state of the Russian economy as a result of sanctions is now worse than what Russian figures are reporting. There’s been quite a lot of discussion about that, what to do, because, of course, we don’t have the actual figures, but economists are cognizant of the fact that things are probably worse than they seem. That testifies to the effectiveness of the sanctions long term, as my colleague Professor Arel emphasized.
The Chair: Thank you very much. On behalf of the committee, I’d like to thank our witnesses — Professor Dominique Arel, Professor Maria Popova and Anastasia Fomitchova — for your comments today. It was a very rich discussion, and you made it that way. Thank you for appearing before the committee today.
(The committee adjourned.)