THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
EVIDENCE
OTTAWA, Thursday, November 30, 2023
The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met with videoconference this day at 11:30 a.m. [ET] to carry out a study on foreign relations and international trade generally.
Senator Peter M. Boehm (Chair) in the chair.
[Translation]
The Chair: Honourable senators, my name is Peter Boehm, and I am the chair of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. I invite my colleagues to introduce themselves.
[English]
Senator R. Patterson: Welcome. I am Rebecca Patterson, a senator from Ontario.
Senator Ravalia: Good morning and welcome. I am Senator Mohamed Ravalia, from Newfoundland and Labrador.
Senator Coyle: Mary Coyle, Antigonish, Nova Scotia.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: Amina Gerba from Quebec.
[English]
Senator Harder: Peter Harder, Ontario.
Senator M. Deacon: Marty Deacon, Ontario.
Senator Richards: Hi. Dave Richards, New Brunswick.
Senator MacDonald: Michael MacDonald, Nova Scotia.
The Chair: Thank you, senators. I welcome all Canadians who are watching us today on SenParlVu.
Colleagues, we are meeting today under our general order of reference to discuss the humanitarian situation in Sudan.
I acknowledge that Senator Woo, British Columbia, has just joined us as well.
To discuss this subject, we are very pleased to welcome, for our first panel, from Global Affairs Canada, Cheryl Urban, Assistant Deputy Minister, Sub-Saharan African Branch; Caroline Delany, Director General, Southern and Eastern Africa Bureau; Julie Desloges, Deputy Director, International Humanitarian Assistance; and Sébastien Beaulieu, Director General and Chief Security Officer, Security and Emergency Management. Welcome and thank you for being with us.
Before we hear preliminary remarks and proceed to questions and answers, I wish to ask members and witnesses in the room to please refrain from leaning in too closely to your microphone or to remove your earpiece when doing so. This will avoid any sound feedback that could negatively impact the committee staff and our interpreters who would be wearing the earpiece for interpretation purposes.
We are now ready to hear your opening remarks, to be followed by questions from senators. Ms. Urban, the floor is yours.
[Translation]
Cheryl Urban, Assistant Deputy Minister, Sub-Saharan African Branch, Global Affairs Canada: Thank you for the invitation to discuss the situation in Sudan. The crisis in Sudan began on April 15, 2023, as a confrontation between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, following months of negotiations aimed at a return to civilian rule. As time goes by, the conflict is becoming more complex as various players within Sudan and in the region seek to protect their own interests.
[English]
Efforts at mediation have not yet produced results and, until recent weeks, the Sudan Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces appeared to be in a stalemate. However, the Rapid Support Forces have made significant gains, now controlling the majority of Khartoum and Darfur and expanding eastward through Kordofan.
Over 5.1 million people are internally displaced, and more than 1.4 million have fled to neighbouring countries. In Sudan, 3.8 million people are expected to experience emergency levels of hunger in the coming months. In addition, over 19 million children are not in school, exacerbating the long-term impacts of this conflict. Reports out of Sudan suggest widespread human rights violations by all parties to the conflict, including bombing of urban areas and the use of sexual and gender-based violence as weapons of war.
The sudden onset of the crisis in April came as a surprise to many, challenging the capacity of Canada and our like-mindeds to protect staff and citizens in the country. In response, Canada established an Interdepartmental Task Force to coordinate efforts to ensure the safety of Embassy of Canada staff and to undertake the consular response. Six Canadian staff and dependents were evacuated on April 22, 2023. Working with partners, the Government of Canada facilitated evacuations of 462 Canadian citizens and permanent residents and over 200 of their immediate family members.
[Translation]
In addition to the immediate response to the crisis, Canada has been working with our partners across several lines of effort to address humanitarian needs and encourage long-term solutions. I will outline these efforts in four parts.
First, in 2023, Canada allocated over $165 million in humanitarian assistance to Sudan and neighbouring countries. This funding provides emergency food and nutrition assistance, health services, and access to clean water.
[English]
Second, Canada has engaged on this crisis at the highest levels, including phone calls by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and Minister of Foreign Affairs Mélanie Joly to their counterparts in the region, the Middle East and with regional organizations, including the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, or IGAD. Minister Joly travelled to Kenya in April to meet evacuated Canadians and discuss the crisis with interlocutors there. In September, she co-hosted an event on Sudan with the International Criminal Court to discuss avenues for ensuring accountability for violations of international humanitarian law. Further, at the United Nations Human Rights Council in October, Canada supported a resolution to establish a fact-finding mission on alleged human rights violations and abuses and violations of international humanitarian law.
Third, Canada is monitoring the mediation space for possible entry points; however, this space remains complex with a number of possible avenues that are still being explored by the parties to the conflict, countries in the region, regional bodies and others. In the meantime, Canada is aware of the central importance of the participation of civilian voices and has therefore surged its support to existing programming with civil society organizations in Sudan to support the advocacy and protection of human rights defenders and women peace-builders.
[Translation]
Fourth, Canada has supported existing development partners to pivot to the new context on the ground. Existing programming in education, food security, and sexual and reproductive health and rights is being adjusted to respond to new needs and to move to more permissive operating environments.
[English]
And yet we are aware that the situation in Sudan is unlikely to improve in the short term. An intensification of violence is likely as the two sides, and increasingly other players, are jockeying for control. The longer the fighting lasts, the greater the likelihood of increased engagement by other armed groups and by regional players with interests in the outcome. This is likely to further entrench the conflict and worsen the humanitarian crisis. There is some hope in recent developments in the mediation space which could signal a clarifying of the path forward amongst the variety of available pathways for mediation.
[Translation]
In conclusion, Canada continues to intently monitor the situation, to identify the Canadian entry points, and to use the tools available to us to mitigate the effects and encourage a path towards long-term peace and stability. Thank you for your attention.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you, Ms. Urban.
Colleagues, in our question round, as per usual, you have only four minutes. Please keep your preambles and questions as concise and pointed as possible. If there is time, we’ll have a round two.
Senator Ravalia: Thank you for being here today.
Could you outline for me the implications of the United Nations’ decision to withdraw the UNITAMS political mission from Sudan?
Ms. Urban: Canada was supportive of the United Nations mission and was disappointed in the request that the United Nations mission end. This is also part of a trend that has taken place, although the reasons for this are complex and more than just anti-colonial sentiment. Peacekeeping missions are, right now, in a period of transition. Some thinking is needed about that transition. Canada is engaged in that, although not being a member of the UNSC, the UN Security Council.
I will turn to my colleague Caroline to continue.
Caroline Delany, Director General, Southern and Eastern Africa Bureau, Global Affairs Canada: A request has come from the Government of Sudan that UNITAMS come to a conclusion. The meeting of the UNSC is on December 3, where the annual renewal would take place at the UN Security Council. As of this moment, the mission still exists, but, of course, peace missions, special missions like this one, can’t exist without the consent of the host country. December 3 will be the date to watch in terms of the future of UNITAMS.
Senator Ravalia: To follow up, is there any possibility to leverage some of our contacts within the UN Security Councillor the African Union, the AU, to ensure that this mission continues?
Ms. Urban: Not being a member of the UN Security Council, we’re limited in our ability to influence over the decision, but we are engaged at our permanent mission in New York. We do talk to our counterparts, and we do have a new permanent observer to the AU who is engaged in discussions. That is something that we can pursue with our like-minded partners.
Senator Richards: Thank you very much for being here.
Can food and medical assistance be delivered in such chaos at all? Can you rectify that in any way with so many combatants in the area and with the threat of a wider regional war? Are any deliveries of medical assistance and food being made on a daily basis to the hundreds of thousands who need it?
Ms. Urban: Canada is providing humanitarian support, and humanitarian support is being provided; however, there are challenges. Some of the challenges are with securing visas for humanitarian actors, with the port of entry being the Port of Sudan for some of that. Work is under way to resolve the challenges of delivering humanitarian assistance.
To give you more details, I’ll turn to Julie.
Julie Desloges, Deputy Director, International Humanitarian Assistance, Global Affairs Canada: Thank you.
Yes, it is very challenging. We have numerous challenges, and it’s not just the ongoing fighting. It’s the bureaucratic impediments, as mentioned, and fuel shortages across the country. However, we are seeing our humanitarian partners deliver assistance throughout the country as access permits, not necessarily on a daily basis but on a somewhat regular basis. We work with very experienced partners who have the experience and the security protocols in place to work in these challenging environments.
I can confirm that between April and October, we and other donors have supported 154 humanitarian partners who have managed to reach 4.5 million people across the country with food, medical assistance, clean water and other types of life‑saving assistance.
Senator Richards: How many points of food delivery stations have become areas of conflict? They must be overtaken by forces that either want the medical assistance or the food to barter for themselves?
Ms. Desloges: I don’t have the exact details. We can come back with the number of food assistance points. WFP, the World Food Programme, works throughout the country.
Senator Richards: But that’s an ongoing problem?
Ms. Desloges: There is an ongoing issue, yes, but they are managing to deliver assistance to people in need throughout the country, depending on security conditions on a daily basis.
Senator Richards: Thank you very much.
The Chair: Ms. Desloges, I will throw in a quick follow-up to Senator Richard’s question. You mentioned the World Food Programme, which, it seems to me, is rather stretched. We spoke with the deputy chief last week on Gaza. Is it stretched? Is it being consistently delivered in Sudan?
Ms. Desloges: You might recall that they had suspended operations early in April following the death of three of their staff members. They resumed operations later in May. Since then, they have been scaling up. They are, however, very financially stretched across the globe, including in Sudan. That does impact their ability to deliver assistance, but some assistance is being delivered in terms of general food assistance and other specialized food items.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: I would like to continue on the topic of humanitarian assistance. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has stated that this is an unparalleled catastrophe. It estimates that half of the population or 25 million people currently need humanitarian assistance in Sudan. At the start of the year, the United Nations issued a revised call for humanitarian assistance for Sudan in the amount of $2.56 billion U.S., only a third of which has been funded thus far. Is the $28.3 million in funding announced by Canada the final amount or is that an initial commitment that might be increased at a later date?
Ms. Urban: I’ll let Julie take that question.
Ms. Desloges: As Ms. Urban already said, Canada has contributed more than $165 million — close to $170 million — to Sudan and neighbouring countries. In 2023, humanitarian assistance has thus far been allocated on an annual basis for the calendar year. So we are in the planning stage for the next phase in 2024. For Sudan itself, before the crisis, we were already providing $30.65 million in humanitarian assistance. We have now reached close to $41.73 million. So we have substantially increased our contribution in keeping with the plan.
Senator Gerba: I see. Thank you.
I have a follow-up question. You said there is a team that is still working over there, but you have repatriated certain people. Does Canada still have permanent representation in Sudan at this time? If not, who is responsible for monitoring the situation on a daily basis?
[English]
Ms. Urban: Thank you.
Unfortunately, we did have to evacuate our mission because of security reasons. While we anticipated that would be a short‑term measure, where we had to temporarily shutter our mission, but it’s looking like the conflict is extending. While we continually evaluate our presence to see when it will be safe to return, in the immediate near future, it is not looking like that’s going to happen.
We do have a number of high commissioners and ambassadors in the region who are engaged on Sudan and who report to us at headquarters at the moment. That includes very active representatives who are in Egypt, Addis and Nairobi. We engage with our missions in those countries to get information. We also have a team at headquarters responsible for tracking and reporting on Sudan and developing policy for Sudan. We continue to monitor the situation and to evaluate where we can have resources in the field, on a continual basis, to see where we can make changes.
Senator M. Deacon: I think the question I’m about to ask has been about 97% answered. I wouldn’t want to be repeating, but I think it’s perspective. I want to make sure you have a chance to complete it. A quote came up in our Hill Times paper from a former ambassador saying that, yes, Canada, from what you have described, has largely withdrawn from the region:
… The single thing we’ve lost, above all, is having a senior point person responsible for Sudan …
You started to talk about other ambassadors. To ensure we finish the loop on that, I ask how we are maintaining a presence in the region. How are we communicating? I feel this has been addressed, how we’re communicating and how we’re keeping a strong presence in the region.
Ms. Urban: I will just add an additional point to what I was just talking about. One of the ways in which we are communicating is about the degree to which we’re engaging with the AU through our permanent observer. Publicly, we are making it known that Canada is increasing its political engagement on the continent, including especially multilaterally, recently, which is a new development.
Ms. Delany: It’s true that we have closed or temporarily suspended operations out of the embassy in Khartoum, but the engagement from the region and also from headquarters is still quite robust. If we use the AU observer example that Cheryl just raised, it’s because the AU has a central role in finding a pathway towards mediation to find a resolution to this conflict. The presence of that observer gives us a real opportunity to engage with AU and AU members in terms of how they are supporting the mediation process.
In addition, in Cairo, Egypt is very engaged on the subject matter. Having our ambassador there, talking to them about their interests and concerns and how they see a way forward, is proving to be quite a valuable opportunity, and we have Kenya as well. Kenya is currently the lead of the regional organization IGAD and is charged with leadership with respect to finding a way forward on mediation and negotiation. Our High Commission in Nairobi is also very much engaged in discussion with Kenya on what the way forward is.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you so much for rounding that out.
In your opening statement, Ms. Urban, you said two numbers, 5.1 million people displaced and then the number of children not going to school. Was that 9 or 90 million? It was a high number.
Ms. Urban: It was 19 million.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you. That is quite concerning, as it is in other countries of the world. Very concerning. What does it mean for children out of school for so long? It feels like another lost generation. I wonder if you wouldn’t mind commenting on that.
Ms. Urban: I’ll start off by saying how concerned we are and how seriously we are taking this situation. We have a variety of different types of assistance that we are providing to people and citizens of Sudan. Some of that that you have heard about is humanitarian assistance. We also have some assistance that is related to peace and security where we are supporting human rights defenders and peace builders. We are also continuing for citizens some of our international assistance, and we have modified it so it’s better suited to the present environment.
I’ll turn to Caroline to continue on that.
Ms. Delany: Senator, the impact on children when there is a break in education is severe and significant and does have knock-on effects in terms of their psychosocial health and their ability to participate in the economy and have livelihoods and that sort of thing. There is increasing awareness on the need to make sure that there is continuity of education services in the context of violent conflict.
In the case of Canada, in terms of how we are supporting, we had existing development education programming in the country, which is being adjusted to respond to the specific circumstances there now, as well as an announcement of $6 million from the Crisis Pool to add additional funds in development funding, half of which is targeted to education in emergencies. It’s things like helping people catch up on lost schooling, safe spaces for children to learn and those sorts of activities that work well in an emergency context to try to prevent that long-term break in education.
The Chair: Thank you. I would like to acknowledge that Senator Greenwood of British Columbia has joined us as well.
Senator Coyle: Thank you to all of our witnesses for being with us and for this work. Unfortunately, given the multiple crises in the world, we’re not hearing nearly enough about this, so it’s very important for us to have you with us here today.
I’m going to drill down a little bit further on this. How do we know what’s going on without our mission there? You have talked about our missions in the region. You have talked about the AU and our connections there. Those are very important. Are any other of our allies, for lack of a better word, still having missions that are open there that we rely on? Also, what is our relationship with our civil society partners which you have mentioned in terms of getting the lay of the land on a regular basis?
Ms. Delany: It’s a really good question, and it is an extremely challenging context because, of course, the fighting is in the capital, it’s in Khartoum. None of our like-mindeds have embassies operating in the capital at this stage. Everyone is in a little bit of the same position and in the same position as Canada in terms of trying to sort out what their regional presence should look like going forward.
There is some activity in capitals like Addis, for example, and Nairobi as well, and a lot of the UN organizations for the region are headquartered in Nairobi. These discussions around humanitarian access and development access do take place in Nairobi, and then some of the political engagement is taking place in Addis. There is a real opportunity there.
There are also regular calls of different types of coordination groups that we have in any country, whether or not that’s broadly on development or on humanitarian issues. Canada does participate in those.
I can also use an example of a recent letter from countries concerned about humanitarian access that was sent to the government of Sudan. Canada was a signatory on that. Despite the absence of an embassy operating in the country, we’re still able to signal our concerns to the government with regard to some of the administrative challenges related to humanitarian access.
Senator Coyle: I would like to probe a little bit more on the fact-finding mission that I heard mentioned. Could you tell us a little bit more about that? I believe it’s on violations of international human rights. Could somebody go a bit more deeply on that?
Ms. Urban: Yes, there was a Human Rights Council resolution, and that was to establish a fact-finding mission. That resolution was in October. The mandate was for the fact-finding mission to focus on human rights violations and violations of international humanitarian law.
Do you have any additional information?
Ms. Delany: No, I don’t.
Ms. Urban: That’s the information that we have.
Senator Coyle: What’s our involvement?
Ms. Urban: We were a signatory to the resolution.
Ms. Delany: Yes, we supported the resolution.
Ms. Urban: Yes.
The Chair: Okay. Thank you.
Senator R. Patterson: I’m going to pull on that thread a little bit more and talk about where we are supporting humanitarian actors and where Canadian money is focused. It certainly is on food and clean water, which is critical, and health aid, plus or minus. This is a two-part question. We’re looking at sexual violence as a tool of war and the resulting consequences to the people subjected to it. We also don’t believe in child soldiers, and we have signed resolutions to that effect as well. Do we know how much of the money that Canada is contributing to the humanitarian actors is going to the actual support on the sexual violence front and demobilizing — I realize it’s a bit soon — of child soldiers?
Ms. Desloges: I can speak to the sexual and gender-based violence piece of this.
The vast majority of our humanitarian assistance is provided flexibly to our humanitarian partners, which means that they are able to allocate these funds based on needs and priority areas. One important place where we contribute is the Country-Based Pooled Funds managed by OCHA, which Senator Gerba mentioned earlier. This fund does allocate to subprojects. We contribute along with other donors, and these projects will contribute directly to sexual and gender-based violence. No, I cannot give the specific amount that goes to these projects, but I can confirm that we are contributing to responding to those needs as well. Through our Canadian partners, we have a project that supports comprehensive packages of service for at-risk refugees and SGBV survivors as well in Sudan.
Ms. Delany: I will add from the development channel that in terms of the $6 million from the Crisis Pool, $3 million is allocated to a UNFPA project specifically to do work on prevention and then also addressing cases of sexual and gender‑based violence in the country.
We also had an existing project that was focused on working on the issue of female genital mutilation. That project is adjusting its approach from more of an advocacy type of engagement to looking at the specific needs that are arising in the context of this conflict, including on SGBV.
Senator Harder: Thank you for joining us today.
I would like to pursue the references you have made to possible mediation steps that are under way. It seems to me that this is a crisis in which there are some unusual like-mindeds that need to step up or be encouraged to be more active. Could you describe a little bit how Canada is working with the so-called like-mindeds that could be positive in pursuing the mediation steps? I would also like to have a little bit of an insight into those malevolent forces, who are probably the usual suspects, and whether or not there is any effort being exerted by some of the unusual like-mindeds to at least thwart or tamp down their malevolence. That’s enough code for everybody to get what I’m trying to say.
Ms. Urban: I’ll begin and then turn to my colleague.
Yes, the mediation space is very crowded. It’s got different actors and five or six different main kinds of pathways concurrently that are running. The Jeddah talks that started, which was led by the Quad and predominantly the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States, seems to have been paused for a while and now have recently restarted. There has also been recent promise in Ethiopia with some meetings involving civil society.
For Canada, we are certainly advocating with like-mindeds that civilians and civil society be a strong voice as part of mediation and discussions. There may be another meeting in Addis to follow up from the recent one.
Ms. Delany: As you are outlining, senator, there are a lot of interests in the region, and some are more benign than others. The longer this goes on, the more challenging it is for regional actors not to get involved in terms of trying to address their own particular concerns. Like-mindeds are trying to undertake advocacy in terms of minimizing other types of engagements, but there is limited opportunity to influence that.
Cheryl touched on this a little bit, but I will just flag that from the Canadian perspective, it’s essential that civilians have been driving the path forward to a civilian-led government and a transition to democracy. Trying to support them in their engagement in finding a political settlement to this is where Canada sees its value add and has also been one of the focuses of Minister Joly’s engagement in the region as well. The challenge is finding the right avenue. The AU is extremely involved in looking for a way forward, as is IGAD, led by Kenyans, and our role at this point is to monitor all of those, express Canadian support and then identify that potential opportunity, or more, where Canada can provide support in terms of actually making that happen.
Senator Harder: And the malevolents?
Ms. Delany: I can be explicit with respect to Russia, of course. Russia’s interests in the region are well known, and their interest in the situation in Sudan in particular, as well as the presence of Wagner, which is also tied to the presence of gold in the country. This is extremely concerning and a real risk factor with regard to the continuation of the conflict itself. As for others, in this venue it is a little more difficult to talk about.
The Chair: Thank you. It is too bad we only had 30 seconds for malevolents, but maybe we can return to that at some point.
Senator Woo: I am not as well versed on the code that Senator Harder referred to, and I was going to see if I could press you to say a bit more, but you have to be comfortable with how you respond.
I would like to get some colour commentary on the structural roots of this conflict. Should we think about it as elite factions within the military competing with each other? Are there ethnic or tribal dimensions that we should think about? Senator Harder has touched on the external interventions. One has been named. Perhaps there are others that you can talk about. We won’t come to a solution unless we understand the roots of the problem. I am a novice in this area, so I would love to get an education.
Ms. Urban: I will start just to say that the conflict has deep roots and is very complex. Any type of description that it is just two generals fighting with each other is an oversimplification of a long story and a conflict that involves multiple interests and increasing numbers of belligerents in different parties.
Ms. Delany: It is the exact right question in terms of the framing as well in trying to understand the conflict that is taking place right now. Historically, Sudan’s power centres, and the affluence of the country has really rested within the capital, with the regions vastly neglected by former President Bashir, which is one of the reasons that led to a revolution in 2019 led by civilians and the toppling of former President Bashir. But it is a country with significant fractures and challenges that his approach to governance really fostered in terms of creating divisions between regions and between ethnic groups that has left this country in a pretty fragile state.
Following the revolution and the attempts at a civilian-led transition to democracy, there was a coup led by the two leaders of the parties who are engaging in the conflict now — the RSF and the SAF. It is the argument between the two of them that has triggered the most recent return to violence in terms of what the next steps are in that transition to a civilian government and the discussions around how the RSF were to be integrated into the formal SAF forces. They were not able to reach an agreement, and ultimately, of course, in April, it triggered a return to violence.
The risk is all of those other fractures that exist in the country and the degree to which they will side with one side or the other or start to defend their own interests going forward.
Senator Woo: The fractures are along ethnic lines and more?
Ms. Delany: Yes. There are ethnic dimensions to it. As always, it is not a sufficient explanation because of resources, geographic proximity, regional or international interests that might align with different factions, but there are definitely ethnic dimensions to the fighting, as has been reported in the media, in particular in Darfur in recent months.
Senator Woo: How is this playing out with the diaspora in Canada? From time to time, we see demonstrations and protests. Can you give us some colour commentary on how it is playing out domestically in so far as the diaspora is concerned?
Ms. Delany: That’s not something on which I have a lot of knowledge.
Senator Woo: Fair enough.
The Chair: My question is for Director General Beaulieu. Your bureau, consular emergency preparedness and all those other things that you do, is being tested a lot these days. Of course, you were quite involved in the evacuation of Canadians from Sudan, as you have been since in Israel and in Gaza. How are you handling the consular demands of those Canadian citizens who might still be in Sudan? In the old days, we had protecting powers or another country that might look after our citizens, as we do for others in some parts of the world. Do you feel that you are getting enough experience on all of this to look at standard operating procedures, even when every crisis tends to be different in some ways? Are you sufficiently resourced to do that?
Sébastien Beaulieu, Director General and Chief Security Officer, Security and Emergency Management, Global Affairs Canada: Thank you for the question.
Over the course of this crisis, it was a major effort among partners, and it enabled us to evacuate almost 500 Canadian citizens and permanent residents and about 200 members of their immediate families.
Today, with the suspension of our operations, there are a number of Canadians who remain in Sudan. It’s very difficult to offer assistance to them, but if there are specific cases, our consular officers are working to assist, whether it is with travel documentation or other information that we can provide remotely.
You mentioned protective powers. In many situations, we work with our partners on the ground or those who remain on the ground. In this situation, as my colleagues alluded to, this situation is very difficult.
In terms of learning and resources, all crises are different, but in each case, we do have standard operating procedures. We also dedicate ourselves to finding the specific solutions to get Canadians to safety, as we did in this instance and as we continue to do in ongoing crises.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Senator R. Patterson: Ms. Delany, this is probably a question for you. It is very hard to look forward when the conflict is ongoing and unrolling. I was struck by your comment about working to reinstall democracy, because we know that they have been there before. What sort of concrete actions will Canada take to actually help create a democracy that works for Sudan as opposed to one that works for the West?
Ms. Delany: That is a really good question. It is a bit challenging to answer because at the moment we are most focused on how to support civilian engagement in a political settlement. I would say the most important aspect going forward is that a sustainable peace can’t just be an agreement between the two belligerents. It needs to be a political settlement that will work for the whole country. As we’ve seen, these competing interests within the country underpin the instability that exists. From a Canadian perspective, our role is very much to support those civilian voices.
I can give you a couple of examples of how we are doing that right now. Through existing programming, we have worked with human rights defenders in the country, including women’s rights activists. We were able to increase and adjust that programming when the conflict started in order to, for example, support them in terms of immediate protection needs. It might be a move or it might be their own security. Digital security was a big part of that. In addition, it is supporting them in terms of their capacity to engage in those political dialogues and to coordinate themselves in order to be able to participate. Civil society is quite robust in Sudan, so just a bit of enabling support from Canada can make a big difference with regard to ensuring that they are ready to be at the table.
Senator R. Patterson: Earlier, we spoke about funding. Do you see that being directed in that general direction, even in terms of connecting people? We know that digital connection has been used elsewhere in order to bring civilians and marginalized groups to the table.
Ms. Delany: Yes. The Peace and Stabilization Operations Program has about $2.6 million this year in funding, specifically to support civil society organizations, human rights defenders and women peace builders, as I said, to strengthen their ability to undertake their own protection in this context, as well as to engage in the political processes going forward.
Senator R. Patterson: Thank you.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: My question is really for Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC). I know they are not here today, but I would like to ask it anyway.
Canada established a visa program for Ukrainians that allowed anyone with a Ukrainian passport to get a three-year Canadian visa. In the case of Afghanistan, Canada promised to accept 40,000 Afghan refugees. Could similar measures be taken?
I am asking you in the hopes that you have a partnership and cooperation with IRCC. Could similar measures be taken to help people of Sudan, the majority of whom are currently displaced, as you said, particularly women and girls, who are suffering a great deal in the current situation?
Ms. Urban: I’m sorry, but that is really IRCC’s mandate, so I cannot comment on that.
Senator Gerba: I see; thank you for your answer. I think I will have to ask IRCC in writing.
We talked earlier about the diplomatic steps that were attempted, specifically to reach a lasting ceasefire. Those initiatives were proposed in particular by the United States, Egypt, Saudi Arabian and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. Can you tell us more about your work with the African Union in that regard to date? When you discuss the African Union, do you talk about a ceasefire?
[English]
Ms. Delany: In terms of the engagement we’ve undertaken on the advocacy side, this has been through phone calls by the Prime Minister and Minister Joly to the region — including, for example, Egypt, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Saudi Arabia at the time of the event, as well as with IGAD and the African Union. Canada supported the UN Human Rights Council resolution that created the fact-finding mission. We’ve undertaken some advocacy on social media as well, in particular, in response to a recent report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, or OHCHR, on their findings with respect to SBGV violations in Darfur, as well as an event co-hosted by Minister Joly in September entitled “In the Margins of the UNGA 78,” along with the International Criminal Court, specifically to discuss the situation in Sudan.
[Translation]
The Chair: Senator, could you tell us what you would like to receive in writing?
Senator Gerba: Yes, I would like to receive a written answer as to whether we have taken similar measures as those taken for Ukraine, Afghanistan and even Syria. In the case of Syria, we welcomed more than 25,000 Syrians. Could something similar be done with IRCC? We have just heard about the situation of women, girls and children in Sudan. Perhaps we need to think about bringing them here.
[English]
The Chair: If you could provide that in writing, as best you can, through the clerk of the committee, that would be great. Thank you.
Senator Richards: I think this question has been answered, or at least partially answered. I will turn again to Ms. Delany. There has always been food dependency in Sudan. It is a large country, by African standards, and extremely poor. Who controls it from the outside? I think you mentioned the Wagner Group. Who is parasitic on this war in terms of outside forces? Is it Russia or other countries? Who is supplying the generals with weapons and what they need for influence within the country itself and for access to the assets that Sudan does have?
Ms. Delany: Thank you, senator. Discussing the details of the different influences and interests from countries in the region and elsewhere is a bit sensitive, so I can’t go into much detail here.
In terms of where their resources come from, it is a resource‑rich country. For example, the Sudanese Armed Forces, or SAF, has control over the oil revenues — which are quite significant, coming up through pipelines from South Sudan — and they are available to them to finance their interests. In addition, the Rapid Support Forces, or RSF, have significant control over gold mines in the country, and they work with the Wagner Group to be able to export those resources in order to finance their efforts.
Senator Richards: So the Wagner Group is still a force in Sudan?
Ms. Delany: Yes.
Senator M. Deacon: I will parlay this to a comment versus a question, because we have touched on this. Senator Boehm spoke about it. I think about how stretched and overstretched staff must be. As senators, we listen to try to understand our global affairs and what is happening around the world. We’ve been listening long enough to wonder whether there are common solutions or templates. I’m thinking about children and learning and the efforts being made in order for them to continue to learn in safe spaces. There is the virtual piece, but you need connectivity. Is there some common energy, learning and responses, even for unique situations? As we try to bring in Canadians, we will be asked how IRCC is handling Sudan versus Ukraine versus Syria. We do our work and try to respond in the best way we can, but there is concern about sustainability and the stretching of resources in terms of whether your teams are able to develop hard work over here that can also help over there. It is really just a general comment.
Ms. Urban: As an initial response to that, the department has been benefiting from the thinking that was done around the future of diplomacy and about how we can have a spirit of continual improvement and transformation of our Foreign Service. As part of that, we have a transformation implementation plan. As we are thinking through how we can grow and develop as a department, one of those aspects that we are looking at is crisis preparedness and how we as an organization can accumulate those lessons learned, share experiences and develop more common practices so that we are a better crisis-ready organization in this environment globally where there are more and more overlapping crises.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you.
Senator Coyle: I have so many questions. You’ve mentioned in general terms the support that Canada is giving to those countries to which the Sudanese are moving, where the displaced people are going. Can you describe in a little more detail where most of that support is going and what the conditions are in those countries? What is Canada and our partners doing in those countries to help out with these displaced people?
Ms. Desloges: As mentioned, we are actually at over $170 million now in neighbouring countries. I don’t have the total; I will do quick math. That places us at about 130 million outside Sudan in neighbouring countries in terms of humanitarian assistance. Ongoing needs had pre-existed the arrival of the Sudanese, or the returnees in the cases of South Sudan and Chad. We have also scaled up that assistance and provided additional assistance. There is quite a comprehensive package happening there.
As has been pointed out often, severe underfunding exists in humanitarian assistance worldwide, so there are significant challenges. Right now, the rainy season is also making the situation more difficult. People have been arriving in very remote areas, which are already underserved, creating a surge in need in those areas. Humanitarian partners have been trying to relocate them to safer areas in some instances, and that’s also very expensive. We are providing flexible funding, as I mentioned earlier, to allow them to allocate it where the needs emerge and where it works best and have the flexibility to respond.
Ms. Delany: Another example is South Sudan to the south. Hundreds of thousands of South Sudanese have been resident in Sudan. Now, they find themselves in the very unfortunate situation as refugees crossing the border back into South Sudan. That’s a significant challenge for a country that is already facing its own humanitarian crisis.
Choke points along the border are creating particular challenges in terms of accommodations and that sort of thing. Our UN partners on the humanitarian side — sorry, Julie, I am speaking a little bit for you, but I do know that context fairly well — are working to move people quickly through those choke points, either back to their home villages or, if not, on to where they want to go. That movement of people has an exacerbating effect on what is happening in the region.
Senator Coyle: My colleague mentioned child soldiers earlier, and we see this issue of young girls being victims of sexual violence. Often, the two things go together. Can you tell us anything about that situation of the young girls and their roles within the cadres of child soldiers?
Ms. Urban: The International Criminal Court, or ICC, has opened an investigation on war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the focus is on children and sexual and gender-based violence. Clearly, if they have opened an investigation, then there are sufficient concerns and signs of potential evidence of that taking place.
I don’t know if you have anything to add?
Ms. Delany: Not specifically in the context of child soldiers.
The Chair: Some of my colleagues have touched on this already, as you have in your responses, whether in the context of the transformation that Minister Joly has started in your department or perhaps in anticipating our report, which should be out soon, I hope. Is there a role here for Canada in a mediation-type capacity, maybe even Track Two? This is the stuff that is never really advertised. You don’t put out press releases on this. It’s just getting down and doing some work with the like-minded and maybe the not-so-like-minded. Given the geopolitical stressors on all of this, maybe this is a natural role for Canada as Canada looks to project more into Africa — we will be beginning our Africa study soon in this committee — and also given our traditional relationships with Commonwealth and Francophonie countries on the continent. Do you have any thoughts on whether, within the cadres of Global Affairs Canada, there can be some movement toward developing a mediation‑type facility?
Ms. Urban: This is an issue that’s certainly worth exploring. I will say, too, that the department is really looking forward to the work of the Senate committee on exploring engagement with Africa. That will be extremely helpful. We ourselves have been reflective on Canada’s past engagement with Africa and the opportunities that the African continent presents for Canada.
As you may be aware, we’ve already been undertaking some consultations about work on Canadian engagement in sub‑Saharan Africa. Some of that stems from Minister Ng’s mandate letter commitment which was to enhance economic cooperation and diplomacy with countries in Africa. We have undertaken public consultations about that.
As well, Parliamentary Secretary Oliphant has been having many discussions with interlocutors, including African interlocutors, on how Canada can deepen its engagement and diversify the type of engagement that Canada has with African countries. This is important work, and exploratory thoughts can take place in the coming weeks and months.
The Chair: On behalf of the committee, I thank Assistant Deputy Minister Urban, Director General Delany, Director General Beaulieu and Deputy Director Desloges for joining us today and providing a comprehensive overview of the complicated situation in Sudan. Thank you.
For our next panel, we are pleased to welcome Professor Awad Ibrahim, Full Professor, Vice-Provost, Equity, Diversity and Inclusive Excellence, University of Ottawa; and by video conference from Washington, D.C., we’re delighted to have Susan Stigant, Director, Africa Program, United States Institute of Peace. Welcome to you both, and thank you for being with us today. We’re ready to hear your opening remarks. Professor Ibrahim, we’ll start with you.
Awad Ibrahim, Full Professor, Vice-Provost, Equity, Diversity and Inclusive Excellence, University of Ottawa, as an individual: Thank you. If you permit me, I have a written statement I would like to go through. Given the opportunity that not too many Sudanese have of being around this table, I hope you will permit me more than just five minutes.
The Chair: I think we can do that.
Mr. Ibrahim: Senators and respected members of the audience, good afternoon to you all. I begin my testimony with an acknowledgment of the land. I physically bow my head in gratitude to the Anishinaabeg and all Indigenous people across this beautiful land of ours for their hospitality and who, despite colonialism and genocide, are still standing.
[Translation]
I am addressing you not only as a full professor in the University of Ottawa’s education faculty, the Air Canada professor on anti-racism, and the vice-provost for equity, diversity and inclusive excellence, but also as a Canadian who is very proud of his Sudanese roots.
[English]
Senators, the worst that any nation can do to itself is to decide to destruct itself. The operative word in this sentence is “decide.” In the case of Sudan, to understand how Sudan decided to destruct itself, a bit of history is imperative.
As the record shows, an extreme Muslim Brotherhood government was in power for 30 years, 1989-2019, which was toppled by a popular uprising in December 2019. Some scholars, myself included, would qualify this uprising as a revolution. Between early 2020 and October 2021, there was a civilian government led by Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok. Unfortunately, a coup d’état took place in October 2021, which continued until April 15, 2023. April 15 of this year is a day like no others. Two generals — one representing the so-called official army, General al-Burhan, and one representing a militia that the official army itself created, General Dagalo — were friends and did the coup d’état together. They decided to enter a war where no one is winning and the big loser is the nation itself. The capital Khartoum and Darfur are the most affected. Twenty years after, sadly and unfortunately, Darfur is witnessing genocide all over again.
Senators, my reading shows that, if this war is not stopped by all means and if peace is not set forth, we are watching another Afghanistan in the making. We may wake up one morning only to find the world’s ISIS and Muslim Brotherhood all in one place, which means not only Africa will be affected but also the Middle East and the region. Sudan is too important geographically and in terms of resources, which is why we are witnessing the entrance into the war by regional players like Egypt and UAE and international players like Russia. These should not be seen as just accusations, and I hope I am not seen as too alarmist.
Senators, Canada could and should be playing an important role. Indeed, why is Canada’s seat empty in the negotiation in Jeddah? As part of the Five Eyes, I as a Canadian of Sudanese origin call on the Government of Canada to be prominent in that negotiation. I call on the government to protect women and children and to provide humanitarian assistance right now.
We are watching 6 million of the most displaced people on the planet in Sudan, with 16 million people on the verge of famine and 1.3 million as refugees in neighbouring countries. I call on Canada to help Canadians of Sudanese origin to bring their loved ones by facilitating their sponsorship. May I suggest that the government should think about a special sponsorship program similar to what was done with the Syrians and Ukrainians and bring their relatives who find themselves in Chad, South Sudan, Ethiopia or Egypt? Of course, rules have to be followed, but it would be very Canadian to create such a special sponsorship program. Our generous spirit is called for in this moment.
Think hard about what would happen after the war. Let us build an international coalition and fund for nation building led by Canada similar to what we have done in Afghanistan. That fund should be dedicated to infrastructure, but let us also dedicate some of that fund to bring Sudanese experts from outside the country or at least help them to build the country after the war. This will be similar to the UN. I hope senators know about the TOKTEN program.
Senators, let me finish by saying that, as humans, we are condemned to choose, so let us choose that which is right and that which is just. Let us keep the hope and let us work as hard as humanly possible to bring peace to Sudan, a country that has been suffering and off the radar for far too long. Meegwetch. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Professor Ibrahim.
We will now go to Susan Stigant, Director of the Africa Program, United States Institute of Peace. You have the floor, and if you need a few more minutes than five, we are prepared to offer that as well.
Susan Stigant, Director, Africa Program, United States Institute of Peace: Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Deputy Chairman and honourable senators. Thank you for the committee’s attention to the war in Sudan and for inviting me to address you today.
As was noted, I serve as the Director of Africa Program at the United States Institute of Peace, which is an independent federal institute established by the United States Congress to prevent, mitigate and resolve violent conflict around the world.
I will just note that I started my career with the Parliamentary Information Centre in South Africa as part of the International Youth Internship Program that was run by the then Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Since then, I have worked in and on Africa for more than 20 years, with a focus on mediating and advancing inclusive political transitions.
Senators, I was in Khartoum two weeks before the war started, and I had spent considerable time working with my team to support the transition since the 2019 revolution and in support of civic leaders in the decades before. At that time, we saw that there was a clear escalation and escalating tensions. Negotiations and decisions on the structure of the security, in particular, were hitting at the core interests, concerns, fears and aspirations of the two leaders, General al-Burhan and General Hemedti. At that point, nothing was on the table that truly addressed or managed a way forward.
That said, few anticipated that a confrontation would lead to a sustained war. In some ways, I worry that the international response today has yet to match the depth, the scope and the entrenchments of the war that is taking place. Someone said to me recently that if the war lasts eight months, it may well last eight years.
Previous witnesses have spoken about the horrendous human consequences of the war: the 6.5 million people who have been forcibly displaced, the 19 million children out of school, the documented sexual and gender-based violence, the 25 million people who are awaiting and are dependent on humanitarian assistance, and the thousands of people who have been killed, which is only an estimate, because nothing yet has been done to get an actual number or establish a rigorous mechanism to determine excess mortality. Many people have died in crossfire and in fighting. Many have died from starvation or lack of access to basic medicines for medical assistance. Many have died in what are increasingly documented as targeted attacks on civilians.
I’ll note the United Nations Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide warned in her latest statement that the attacks that have taken place in Darfur, if confirmed, may constitute acts of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.
Several of you have talked about and raised questions about the negotiations that are taking place. Those that are jointly facilitated by the United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Jeddah have resulted in commitments or re-commitments to obligations that both parties already have under international humanitarian law and human rights law. However, these words have not been matched by action. Progress towards any sort of serious cessation of hostilities has been elusive.
By most assessments, the Sudan Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces remain locked in a logic of war and are both convinced that they can make gains, either in control of territory or towards tipping the balance of power through military means. Indications are also clear that both belligerents are resourced for this fight and that international diplomatic leverage has not been effective or sufficiently applied.
Allow me to offer a few thoughts broadly on priorities looking ahead.
Firstly, in a context where it appears, tragically, that this war and the resulting humanitarian suffering will likely persist, there is an urgent need to strengthen the humanitarian response. The humanitarian forum that was agreed through the Jeddah talks is a useful platform for a coherent, consolidated, diplomatic pressure on the belligerents to uphold their obligations, but this would be more effective if there were civilian representation on that forum, including women and those Sudanese who are leading the front-line humanitarian response.
It is a bit astounding to me that in 2023 we need to make the case to say that women and those most impacted by violence need to be at the table. I was at an event last night where I was reminded that women’s participation increases the probability of a peace agreement lasting by 20% and the probability of 35% that a peace agreement would last more than 15 years. Yet, in Jeddah there are still no women.
Strengthening the humanitarian response cannot simply be done outside Sudan. There needs to be increased capacity to facilitate front-line negotiations inside the country to allow for the safe passage of the urgent humanitarian assistance as well as for safe passage of civilians out of harm’s way.
Finally, on the humanitarian front, delivering humanitarian assistance requires direct funding and creative funding mechanisms to local organizations. It is Sudanese civilians who have been and remain on the front line of relieving the suffering through the establishment of what are called “emergency response rooms.” These aggregate tremendous capacity — from doctors to midwives to distribution of limited medicines and supplies. These organizations represent the legitimacy, the credibility and, in fact, I would argue, the basis of the nation of Sudan that remains inside the country. Dedicated and specific support to these entities, including for women and through women-led organizations in response to the physical and psychological impact of conflict-related sexual violence, is also important.
Secondly, and broadly speaking, there is a need to activate protection and prevention mechanisms in places where there is escalating conflict and the risk of mass violence. This includes in Al-Fāshir in West Darfur. There are clear warning signals that the situation could get much worse, despite the efforts that are being led by traditional and religious leaders. There will need to be outside support. There will need to be clear messages that the world is watching and consequences if the parties fail to uphold their obligations.
The Chair: Ms. Stigant, I am afraid I am going to have to interrupt you. We’re several minutes over. I’m sure you will pick up in the question and answer period on some of the other points that you were wanting to make.
Colleagues, we’ll proceed as per normal, four minutes, and if there is time, we’ll have a second round.
Senator R. Patterson: Thank you very much for both of your opening comments. I picked a common thread out of both of them, and it’s about the ability to de-escalate the violence so we can move towards whatever sustainable peace looks like.
I’m wondering from both of you if I could hear a bit more about Pillar 3 and Pillar 4. I would be quite interested. Professor Ibrahim, you talked about bringing in more support. What does that look like beyond money and beyond Canada’s leading? I would also push the same question to the good doctor down in the U.S. Thank you very much.
Mr. Ibrahim: I think, as I outlined in my testimony, the prominent presence of Canada would be the first thing that I would highly emphasize. Even though there is a lot of work that’s being done behind the scenes, and we saw this even in the testimony of Global Affairs Canada, the Sudanese are not feeling that. Worldwide, even, we’re not feeling it. Be prominent, be present and be articulate in pushing for peace, because without that, nothing will happen. We can send a gazillion in assistance and everything else, but if you don’t have peace, then you are just putting the treasury in a hole, and it disappears eventually. For me, the first thing is being prominent and having a clear vision.
Once it is framed that way — and I hope the committee will think seriously about this — as Susan, the colleague from Washington, just mentioned, it is the civilian support. The missing thread, both in the negotiation as well as in what happens after the war, the vision behind it, is that there is a lot of work being done by civilians that has not been acknowledged and is not being supported. That will be my second thing, besides the peace.
Ms. Stigant: On the overall picture in terms of the mediation, we’re still at a moment where, as was noted earlier, there are five to six different efforts. Recently, the Secretary-General of the United Nations appointed former Foreign Minister Lamamra from Algeria as his personal envoy on Sudan. This offers an opportunity to push toward a more coherent approach on what the international mediation could look like. We shouldn’t assume that Minister Lamamra, despite his incredible experience in his own government and also with the African Union, can do that alone. Canada can play a role in its role in the UN and in activating its close partnerships with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in the region, with Egypt, with Chad and with other countries that have shown a clear concern and interest in ending the conflict in a particular way.
Senator R. Patterson: Thank you.
Senator Coyle: Thank you to both of our guest witnesses here today.
My first question is for you, Professor Ibrahim. You mentioned the external interests that are at play here. You mentioned Egypt, and I believe you mentioned the U.A.E., and also Russia. You are in a freer position to talk to this than our previous panel. Could you go a little bit deeper in explaining to this committee what your concerns are and also possibly what the remedies could be?
Mr. Ibrahim: Yes. I have to preamble my remarks by being careful as to what I say. I think the Egypt connection is very clear. The Russian connection is very clear as well. Even on April 15, when the war started, the fact that there was an Egyptian army on the ground inside Sudan speaks for itself.
Where it gets tricky is with the other regional actors, namely U.A.E. This is why I began my remarks talking about resources. The mystery for me is why the U.A.E. is supporting the RSF. When I say “supporting,” I don’t mean in the banal sense of supporting. We know for a fact that the U.A.E. and Saudi Arabia were major financiers of the RSF when the war of Yemen was happening. Should it surprise us and should there be a legitimate question as to them stopping? I don’t have any proof to them stopping. Do I have the absolute bulletproof that I can provide to you? I think no one can. However, if logic, as Socrates would say, is our guide, then there is a deductive logic to my argument. I’m going to leave it at that.
Senator Coyle: You mentioned earlier that Canada needs to play a prominent role, have a clear vision and support the civilian efforts. Can you speak a little bit more about what you mean by that? What do you mean by a prominent role?
Mr. Ibrahim: Why are we not present in Jeddah? That’s a question I was hoping you could ask of Foreign Affairs. Why are we not prominent? Given the position of Canada as peace‑loving — I don’t mean that in a cliche sense. No, we really cherish peace. We really work for it. The fact that we have this committee testifies to that fact. Clearly, there is a genuine desire for us to do something about it. The fact is that we are not using those resources, and we’re not using what we are known for, which is basically pushing not only for peace but being prominent in negotiation.
For me, the other part that could be played — hence the emphasis of my testimony — is the question of why we are not making use of the resource of Canadians of Sudanese origin. There are tons of resources that we could make use of. That’s why my concrete suggestion, if I may, is that I would love for us to think about after the war. One of the concrete suggestions I am going to put on the table is this: Can there be a way for us as Canadians — particularly as the Canadian government — to have an entity or some formation within Foreign Affairs that would support Canadians of Sudanese origin to help in the process of nation building? But it would have to be a concrete program — one that is clear, has its budget and can be supported by different actors. The UN TOKTEN program can be our guide.
The Chair: I have to interrupt. We have gone over time on that segment.
Senator Ravalia: My question is for both of our witnesses. Thank you very much to you both for being here.
I appreciate the complexity of the current situation, and you have outlined many factors: the geography, resources and the impact of the Muslim Brotherhood and ISIS as well as regional actors. To what extent, in your mind, is ethnicity a factor in the persecutions and killings that we are witnessing today, particularly when we look at what is happening, for example, with the Masalit.
Ms. Stigant: Thank you, senator.
The reports coming out of Darfur suggest that there are instances of ethnic-targeted killing and efforts to move the population — the Masalit in particular. In many ways, I would consider that there are multiple wars taking place in the country at the moment. The approach in Darfur appears to reach back to 20 years ago and even prior and is redressing some of the claims and fights that have yet to be resolved. The fight for Khartoum is very much about the fight for the centre and the fight for the national government. This, of course, complicates the situation when what is driving the conflict and the violence — what is potentially the red line or not a red line — looks different in each of these locations.
I also think we don’t have a very clear picture of what the end game is for both General Burhan and for General Hemedti in particular. Some think that General Hemedti would like to form a separate government and would be happy with administering Darfur on its own. That doesn’t seem to be what’s taking place on the ground right now. Others question whether he would have the ability to govern the country overall. I think we need to better understand that and therefore what solutions might be possible and what compromises need to be made.
Mr. Ibrahim: Thank you for the question. You will be surprised by my answer.
I would throw out the word shadism, which is linked to your question around ethnicity. Let me explain myself. Sudan has a tension, and that tension is both tribal as well as ethnic in nature. It also has — and I’m going to air some linen here — a question of race. The question of ethnicity is used almost to talk about the question of race. Sudan has an unresolved identity crisis in terms of the Arabs who came in about two centuries ago and the Indigenous people. Shadism is creating a race that is neither here nor there. Shadism is the people who would look like me, in the middle. If you are darker, then you are something else, and if you are whiter, you don’t belong and you are not local. That’s the tension.
That might surprise a lot of people here, but that’s how we think about ethnicity. It is a shape that we created. In one article, I call it inventing a race. We invented a race, which you would describe as ethnicity. But that is the reason — if I could just stick to what Susan was talking about — that is exactly the tension, particularly in Darfur. Susan is absolutely right that the centre of Khartoum is a whole different ball game. It is about power and who has more testosterone, basically. But Darfur has that tension, the invented race that seeks to control. If we think about it from that perspective, then we have a better grasp as to what we mean by ethnicity.
The Chair: Thank you. You are out of time, but I let it go over because, like all of us, I found it a fascinating discussion.
Senator Woo: I want to give Professor Ibrahim a chance to elaborate upon his previous comments by asking him to tell us about the Sudanese in Canada. When did they come? Where do they live? What backgrounds do they have, and what are they saying about the conflict?
Mr. Ibrahim: I appreciate the question. I’ve written two books on the topic, by the way.
To understand your question, there is a need for us to make a distinction between two terms or categories. One is immigration, and the other is what we call migrants or the people who go outside the country to find work, mostly in the Gulf countries. Normally, you work and you know you are coming back.
Around 1990, the Muslim Brotherhood government came in, and in about a month, they let go of 300,000 civil servants. All of a sudden, most of us — me, included, by the way; I was a TA at the University of Khartoum — were let go, particularly those who found themselves either in opposition or on the left. It wasn’t a choice for us, myself included. I came to Canada as a refugee, by the way. You either find yourself in a situation where you will be killed or something might happen to you, or you had to flee the country; hence, the mass exodus. For the first time, we came to know about refugees, and we came to know about immigration as in displacing oneself, knowing fully well you are not coming back. You will seek another passport and everything. This is a totally different phenomenon for us as Sudanese. Canada received quite a number of them since that time, particularly in 1990.
Now, we are seeing a massive amount of Sudanese. Unfortunately, we don’t have specific stats on them, but we know the number increased by the thousands and increased substantially in a very short time. They live primarily in big cities. They are highly educated. Like a lot of people who come to Canada, they encounter the Canadian experience, so they find themselves, all of a sudden — doctors, engineers and everything else — driving taxis, and they are still doing that. Fortunately, Canada is realizing the significance of those people, and opportunities are being created for them.
The Chair: I think we have to stop there on that very interesting subject.
Senator M. Deacon: That narrative information is interesting and very important. I do thank you. I was trying to make the connection. I have read Black Immigrants in North America. I knew you wrote a lot of books, and I was trying to figure out which one it was. Thank you for that rich information.
My question is about our moment in time right now. It is clear that the conflict is being overshadowed by the one in Gaza. In Gaza, there has been much focus on the risks of setting off a wider regional war. I’m wondering about this conflict, looking at the geography of Sudan being a huge country situated in an unstable region, as we would define it, and bordering Libya, which is divided between two governments, as well as other countries. While the world is focused on Gaza, we are at the eight-month mark, so is it this conflict in Sudan that might also set off a wider regional conflict in your mind?
Mr. Ibrahim: Is it addressed to both of us, me and Susan?
Senator M. Deacon: Yes.
Mr. Ibrahim: Absolutely. I really appreciate that question.
I want you, senator, to take my remarks with the utmost seriousness. I hope I’m not being too alarmist in saying that if we don’t reach peace fairly soon, we are in the process of, and we might wake up to, another Afghanistan. I really do not mean that as being alarmist, as Susan, my colleague from Washington, D.C., outlined. The two generals are not interested in peace. They have no interest in peace. We are confronted by a situation where these two men — it is totally illogical. Two men with just a hunger for power. Two elephants are there, and the grass is suffering.
If this is to continue — and I hope it won’t, particularly with the recent agreement between the people who signed the agreement in Juba, which is the militias, let’s call them, although I don’t have the technical term for them. The peace agreement in Juba brought together a number of people who were fighting the government, particularly in Darfur. I’m talking about Darfur here. About a week ago, they decided to align themselves with the official army. That’s a very dangerous signal. That means the government is now in alliance with the militias of certain groups. These groups are in opposition to RSF. It is setting up a situation where we don’t really know the outcome will be other than to say this will be bloody and long-term. I want us to hold on to that picture, as serious as I am describing it.
Maybe my colleague from D.C. would have a little more to add.
The Chair: She probably does, but not in this particular segment. We are out of time, but I’m sure we will pick up on it.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: I want to thank our two witnesses. Professor Ibrahim, let me begin by saying that we are truly delighted to finally have a member of the Sudanese diaspora with us. You are here to describe the situation, which is very worrisome. What you say resonates, especially with regard to Afghanistan since there is a risk that we will end up with the same situation as in Afghanistan. I would also say that there is a risk that we will be facing the same situation as in Libya.
You said the international community is not doing much to help and that Canada should do a bit more. My colleague talked about the diaspora and the Sudanese who are in Canada. My question has two parts. Is the diaspora that you represent fairly unified? What role could it play in the current context? Could Canada use the diaspora to try to solve the problem?
Mr. Ibrahim: My answer might come as a big surprise to you. On the whole, I would say that the majority is opposed to the war. Strangely, though, there are a few members who support the army. I find this very strange, but it is the case.
To answer your question directly, I think we can really support the local community, the diaspora. I would say the vast majority opposes the war. They do whatever they can for peace. I think it would be worthwhile, senator, to consider holding a meeting to hear from them directly. I know you have a lot of work to do, but I wonder whether it would be helpful to invite a few community members to come and talk to you. Considering the consequences of the war, that might be a possibility — even here, I truly hope — that peace can be achieved. If you use my suggestion to create a program to help members of the diaspora travel to Sudan — even for a short time — to help the country, why not? In that case, I would suggest holding a meeting about that.
Senator Gerba: Very well.
[English]
Senator Harder: My question is for Susan Stigant. I would like you to expand, if you could please, a little bit on possible mediation routes. We had some conversation in this panel and in the previous one on what paths are presently perhaps dimly understood. Could you give us your view on what is the most likely or, perhaps differently, the most possible route forward? Could you describe the actors, both in terms of those that are necessary to encourage the mediation and those who have the most to lose should mediation be pursued successfully?
Ms. Stigant: Thank you, senator.
In this instance, because there are these five or six different initiatives, we have what we call in the peace process business a lot of forum shopping taking place. Many people just critique that there are so many different fora, but to me the more important story is that there are many countries whose interests are at stake. The reason that the neighbouring countries came together is because they are worried about their borders. They are worried about the future of how Sudan looks. The reason that the regional economic community, IGAD, came together is because they also have a whole set of interests and concerns. The reason that the United States and Saudi Arabia came together is for serious reasons as well. At this stage, we need an architecture that connects those interests together and that helps to harness them.
First of all, there needs to be a clear definition of what the problem is in Sudan. Each of those different fora currently diagnose it differently, and as a result, the path that is being pursued and what would be an acceptable outcome looks very different. As I said, the appointment of Ambassador Lamamra, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Algeria, is an opportunity to put together some sort of high-level panel. This has also been called for by the AU Peace and Security Council that could bridge across the different countries and entities that have shown that they are clearly interested.
Then there needs to be a delineation of roles and responsibilities, one that could be focused on the diplomatic support needed to secure humanitarian access, a second that could be focused on silencing the guns, and probably a third that needs to focus on the longer-term and civilian engagement. Most importantly, there have to be connection points because, to get the guns to silence, there will have been to be deals and bargains made that implicate the long-term planning.
If I may connect it back to the question on the region, I think the risk that Sudan spills over is serious, but the risk of instability and turbulence in the Horn of Africa and East Africa more broadly and reaching out across the Red Sea and reaching very close to what’s happening in Gaza is an even greater risk. Ethiopia is deeply turbulent. Things are escalating between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Sudan has to be looked at as where each of those countries is playing out their interest not just in Sudan but in the Horn of Africa and all the way across to the Sahel as well.
Senator Harder: Thank you.
Senator Richards: Thank you for being here.
My question is for the professor from Washington. It has kind of been answered. I was going to ask about mediation. To a further point, the United States has always been asked in one way or another to intercede in these matters, either at times militarily or diplomatically. What is the United States’ position on Sudan? It probably, in some ways, will have to be a major player, won’t it, if there will be peace?
Ms. Stigant: Thank you, senator.
I don’t speak for the United States government in any way, but my assessment is that the United States sees seriously its leverage on the parties. The United States knows that both the Sudan Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces want a relationship with the United States. The U.S. also knows that some of its closest allies and partners in North Africa and in the Gulf have a really critical hand in this war. The question — and the difficult question that we are all facing — is how much leverage is the United States willing to put on those partners at a time when there are very big geopolitical questions at play.
My assessment right now is that this is something that is being addressed with the policy leaders on Africa and not necessarily by the White House. Many have advocated that there needs to be a special envoy who reports directly to the President of the United States to get the level of attention and leverage that would be needed to actually make some progress toward ending the violence and getting on a path toward peace.
The Chair: I have a question for Ms. Stigant as well. In your opening statement, you mentioned emergency response rooms, and I thought that was very interesting in terms of grassroots, local-level responses for international development assistance and its distribution.
In a previous incarnation, before I came to this place, I was involved in international development issues and specifically in the development of the Feminist Internationalist Assistance Policy that Canada still follows. It seems to me that bringing a Feminist International Assistance Policy to the fore at the grassroots level should be a bit of a no-brainer, but it is very difficult to achieve because usually you go with traditional partners and there are established ways of doing that. The dispersion of funds becomes very difficult at ground level, to the point where, at the end, when you can’t disperse, then you just dump into the multilateral organizations — not that they are doing a bad job. That’s what they are there for. But trying to target the assistance becomes much more difficult. Do you have a comment on that based on your research and your travels?
Ms. Stigant: Thank you, senator.
You are exactly on point in terms of the challenges that exist. Maybe I can just share that people have pushed the U.S. to activate its localization policy and approach in the case of Sudan and encouraged the U.S. Congress to signal to the U.S. Agency for International Development that there would be a tolerance for some risk in how funds are disbursed if the decision is made to pass them to local organizations. It may mean you don’t have a full proposal. It may mean you can’t get an audit. It may mean you get a concept note on WhatsApp. But what we see in terms of the effectiveness of humanitarian response is absolutely clear. Large multilateral organizations are hamstrung by the administrative procedures that the government is putting in place. They simply don’t have the mechanisms or the muscle memory to be able to support these localized organizations.
The Chair: Thank you very much. That’s exactly what I wanted to hear.
We have one senator for second round, and it’s you, Senator Coyle. I will give you three minutes. How’s that?
Senator Coyle: That should not be difficult because you just asked my question. But I will take a minute.
Susan Stigant, thank you for being with us. You talked about the importance of women at these tables. Could you speak a little more about that? Frankly, what do you think it will take to get women at the table to talk about mediating this situation?
Ms. Stigant: Thank you, senator.
Let me speak briefly about a couple of different tables. The talks in Jeddah have been very limited, very closed and very exclusive. The facilitators, the United States and Saudi Arabia, have said that they have a very limited mandate, which is on humanitarian access, and therefore they should be just between the parties. I think the facilitators need to be taken on in that assessment. We know that the way to deal with humanitarian access actually has to be on the ground and that any diplomatic push at the top needs to benefit from the insights of those most impacted.
I am aware there is at least one instance where Sudanese women organized themselves and reached out to the parties to articulate their priorities. They had a good reception. Women talked about some of the core needs they had and some of the guarantees they hoped to see in any future agreement. To me, that suggests that there could be an opening if someone were to make it a priority.
The facilitators are so focused on getting people to the table and keeping them at the table that I think it is easy to lose sight. You really only get to have one or two priorities at a time. In that way, if Canada or some other entity together with Canada could really think about championing that issue, it would be important.
On the civilian front, the meetings that took place in Addis and that are anticipated, there was a commitment to have at least 30% women. Women’s organizations have said that’s insufficient and they want at least 40%. There’s a useful conversation there and one where I think diplomatic partners can align and champion the messages that Sudanese women are already driving.
The Chair: Thank you very much. On behalf of the committee, I want to thank Awad Ibrahim and Susan Stigant for joining us today. Your commentary and responses to our questions were excellent. It has given us a lot to think about. I suspect, as this appears to be a protracted crisis, that we may return to the subject again and invite you back.
Colleagues, before we adjourn, I wish to inform you there will be no meeting next Wednesday. Our report on the foreign service will be tabled next Tuesday or Wednesday. Maybe some day we will even get to my motion in the Senate Chamber. We will need some time to focus on that. Once tabling day is clear, we will advise members and staff. Regarding next Thursday, the clerk will be in touch as soon as witnesses are confirmed, but I do hope to begin our study on Canada’s engagement with Africa next Thursday.
(The committee adjourned.)