THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
EVIDENCE
OTTAWA, Thursday, May 23, 2024
The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met with videoconference this day at 11:31 a.m. [ET] to examine, and report on, Canada’s interests and engagement in Africa.
Senator Peter M. Boehm (Chair) in the chair.
[Translation]
The Chair: My name is Peter Boehm. I’m a senator from Ontario and the chair of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade.
[English]
Before we begin, colleagues, I want to ask everyone in the room to consult the cards on the table for guidelines to prevent audio feedback incidents. Please take note of the preventative measures that are in place to protect the health and safety of all participants, particularly our interpreters, who rely on their earpieces to do their jobs so well.
What that means is that if you are seated, please ensure that the distance between your earpiece and the microphone is maximized. Use only the black approved earpieces. Keep your earpiece away from all the microphones, and when you are not using an earpiece, please place it on the round sticker that you have in front of you. Thank you for your cooperation.
I wish to invite committee members participating in today’s meeting to introduce themselves.
Senator Harder: Peter Harder, Ontario.
Senator Boniface: Gwen Boniface, Ontario.
Senator M. Deacon: Marty Deacon, Ontario.
Senator Woo: Yuen Pau Woo, British Columbia.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: Amina Gerba from Quebec.
[English]
Senator Coyle: Mary Coyle, Antigonish, Nova Scotia.
Senator Ravalia: Mohamed Ravalia, Newfoundland and Labrador.
Senator MacDonald: Michael MacDonald, Cape Breton, Nova Scotia.
Senator Downe: Percy Downe, Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island.
Senator Greene: Steve Greene, Nova Scotia.
The Chair: Thank you very much, senators. I wish to welcome all of you, of course, and those who may be watching us across the country on ParlVu.
Colleagues, today we are continuing our study on Canada’s interests and engagement in Africa. For our first panel, we have the pleasure of welcoming Dr. Ann Fitz-Gerald, Director of the Balsillie School of International Affairs in Waterloo and Professor of International Security. She has vast experience in Africa in terms of peacemaking and peacekeeping operations.
By video conference, we are fortunate to have Dr. Shelly Whitman, Executive Director of the Dallaire Institute for Children, Peace and Security. I want to thank you both for taking the time to be with us today. I want to add that we also invited our former colleague General Romeo Dallaire, founder of the Dallaire Institute, but unfortunately, he wasn’t able to join us today.
Before we hear your remarks and proceed to questions and answers, I would ask everyone present to please mute notifications on your devices. We’re now ready to hear opening remarks, which will be followed by questions from the senators. Dr. Fitz-Gerald, you have the floor.
Ann Fitz-Gerald, Director, Balsillie School of International Affairs and Professor of International Security, as an individual: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. I’m delighted to be here. Thank you to all honourable members for welcoming me here today.
Africa is a wondrous continent filled with natural resources, rich diversity, geostrategic relevance and traditional values, which play an admirable role in strengthening the social fabric of very diverse societies amid competing internal and external interests. Importantly, it is the most youthful continent, with 70% of the sub-Saharan African population under the age of 30.
These rich resources on the continent continue to develop in a profoundly changed world, a world in which the rules-based order of the multilateralism model to which Canada has subscribed has been undermined by geopolitical rivalry and a winner-takes-all set of rules, where the new playbook for middle economies like Canada remains undetermined and undefined, where power is based on who owns and controls data and intellectual property and where countries like Canada need a playbook and policy orientation to suit the new reality of an intangibles world.
I wish to share with you today four significant issues that I feel impact on peace and security on the continent and three important potential areas of policy response.
When we think about Africa, we should think about trusted partnerships, the reform of regional security sectors, institutional professionalism, higher education and our own capability to understand the continent better.
The first issue I wish to raise is trust-based partnerships. Based on the way in which African countries depend on long-term loans and debt relief, a wider rift has opened between Africa and the West. While the high interest rates of the North are now being imposed at unaffordable levels on the South, countries like China offer much more attractive packages to Africa in the form of loan payments accompanied by much-needed and much-valued infrastructure. This leads to countries like China to also gain a political voice across the continent, linked to their long-term infrastructural presence in the development of cities, ports, airports and road and rail systems. This also explains why the reform of the international financial architecture is a current priority of the UN’s forthcoming Summit of the Future in September as one way of rebuilding back trust with African countries and demonstrating that the preferred partner should be the West.
This breakdown of trust between Africa and the West has also been reflected in the direction taken by votes in the UN Security Council and the General Assembly. African leaders are only too aware of the proxy geopolitical interests that are increasingly playing out on their continent. We are now seeing the Belt and Road initiative transforming into a silk road in efforts to technologically connect and develop Africa in ways that will be a decisive factor in the contest for the loyalty of the continent and the wealth of resources it will bring. Coups are on the rise, horizontally and vertically, as well as significant disinformation challenges in the absence of data governance.
While China enters Africa in pursuit of its wider economic objectives, countries like Russia seek to gain influence through security cooperation arrangements. Russian mercenaries, such as the Wagner Group, have been involved in supporting Sahelian coup leaders as well as the Rapid Support Forces, or RSF, in Sudan’s current conflict.
This dynamic combines powerfully with a long-standing challenge for many African countries — the reform of regional or provincial security structures. In a number of African countries, regional militias and/or presidential guard structures — usually organized around ethnicity — have separate chains of command to regional presidents coming from the same ethnic group. When a regional leader has a difference of views with a federal leader, this arrangement can and has become instant grounds for conflict. We have seen this recently in Sudan, Ethiopia and elsewhere.
Reform of a number of national security sectors is needed to support one national military with one federal chain of command. All other armed entities should be deemed unconstitutional, disarmed and demobilized. Regional security sectors should be led by police forces and not militia, paramilitaries or what’s sometimes called special police forces loyal to a regional president. This only facilitates conflict and a range of vulnerabilities around national elections and any other significant government transitions.
Supporting this must be a strong, well-managed set of institutions led by civilian ministries and an investment in civil service capacity, with more attractive work conditions in order to attract the best and the brightest graduates into government institutions. Equally, the public ownership of state-owned enterprises, which have wielded monopolies and encouraged cronyism and rent-seeking, is also important for democratic development.
A developed capital market, even with a limited percentage of each company being publicly owned, could help economies become fairer and more inclusive places, and provide opportunities that incentivize lasting peace and apathy toward conflict.
Lastly, independent media capacity must also be supported. At the moment, in a large number of African countries, both media and higher education institutions are politicized with leaders being appointed to senior administrative positions based on their political loyalties. When these critically important institutions become politicized, quality evidence-based reporting is difficult to find. Many in-country reporters and academicians feel that they cannot speak out for fear of repercussions. The outcome of this is that external actors, including international media and diaspora organizations, provide reports on Africa but often from remote locations. Good independent national media reporting and institutional development of higher education would bring enormous benefit and opportunities to the continent.
Unfortunately, conflicts and grievances have become amplified by the data-driven and digitalized world, new forms of conflict with one playing out on the ground and another one playing out on the internet, the latter of which seeks to attract support in other parts of the world, particularly in strong democracies like Canada, whose views on human rights and good governance matter. We need to be aware of the way in which well-organized and technology-enabled global networked interest groups project the politics and conflicts of some African countries — and the geopolitical interests linked to them — onto Canadian soil, at times in a violent, misleading and polarizing manner, which brings harm and instability to Canadian society. It is, therefore, important for our governance institutions, particularly important committees like this one, to understand and monitor these dynamics.
What does this mean for future engagement with the continent?
The Chair: Dr. Fitz-Gerald, I am sorry to interrupt you. We’re over the time a little bit. I know you still have a few comments that you would like to make, and perhaps that could be teased out during the question period if that’s all right.
Ms. Fitz-Gerald: Absolutely. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chair: We will go now to Dr. Whitman for your opening statement, please.
Shelly Whitman, Executive Director, Dallaire Institute for Children, Peace and Security: Thank you very much. I want to thank everyone for this opportunity to address the Senate standing committee. As mentioned, our institute, the Dallaire Institute for Children, Peace and Security, while we are based here in Canada and our home is in Halifax, Nova Scotia, also has a Centre of Excellence in Rwanda and one in Latin America based in Uruguay.
Our mission is to prevent the recruitment and use of children in armed violence and to transform cycles of violence, and that is rooted in a foundational belief that peace is possible, that violence is preventable, and that children and youth must be at the heart of those solutions. If we are serious about breaking intergenerational cycles of violence, we must invest in our children and youth.
The world is changing, and much of this change is happening in Africa. The continent’s population, which today stands at 1.4 billion, 60% of whom are under the age of 25, is projected to reach 2.5 billion by the year 2050. By 2050, one in four people on this earth will be African. One in three of the world’s young people will live in Africa, and two out of five of the world’s children will be African. This seismic shift in African demography is not only transforming African countries, but it can reshape the continent’s relationship to the rest of the world.
While birthrates are falling in wealthier nations, Africa’s youth boom has the potential to drive global economic growth in the way that China’s young workforce once led global growth. By the year 2035, there will be more young Africans entering the workforce each year compared to the rest of the world combined. If harnessed properly, this “youth quake,” as some have called it, can create an unprecedented opportunity for growth and innovation. This requires African governments to enact the right policies, but it also requires consistent investment in Africa’s youth.
From an economic perspective, Canada’s investment in African youth would allow Canada to tap into a burgeoning market which could provide immense potential for Canadian businesses and open up investment opportunities that could benefit both Canada and Africa.
From a peace and security perspective, investing in education and jobs or vocational training for African youth can help lift youth in their communities out of poverty and reduce the likelihood of unrest and conflict. Investing in youth-led peacebuilding and peace education efforts, builds young people’s capacity to deal with disputes constructively, preventing them from escalating into armed conflict or armed violence. When youths are seen as a priority and feel that they have a purpose and a stake in their country’s futures, they are less likely to become radicalized and are less vulnerable to recruitment and use by armed forces and armed groups.
From a diplomatic perspective, if Canada increases its investment in African youth, this could strengthen ties between Canada and Africa and could enhance Canada’s soft power in the region. This is particularly important given China and Russia’s expanding influence on the continent and the United States’ diminishing credibility and influence in Africa. Our most recent failed UN Security Council bid can be partially attributed to our non-existent Africa strategy, our lack of visibility, but also our shallow relationships with key nations, communities and leaders. If we want to promote good governance, democracy and human rights, then we have to be ready for the long game and be trusted in Africa. At the same time, we have to be better at listening and learning from Africa about the things that we too can improve in our own society, such as genuine dialogue and relationships.
Finally, Canada has a significant African diaspora, and so it is in Canada’s own best interests to strengthen its engagements in Africa and to see this as an untapped potential for greater connections, understanding and innovation. Africa’s youth is the continent’s greatest asset. Investing in the youth of Africa is not only a moral imperative but a strategic one too. It is the only way we will create a more equal, secure and peaceful world. Thank you for your time.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Dr. Whitman.
[Translation]
We will now move on to the question period. I would like to advise the senators that they have a maximum of four minutes each in the first round, for both questions and answers. I would ask my colleagues and the witnesses to be concise. We can have a second round if time permits.
[English]
Senator MacDonald: Thank you to the witnesses. Either one can answer this question, hopefully. Given the decline in the number of UN peacekeeping operations in Africa — such as the upcoming withdrawal of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the recent closure of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali due to the coast countries’ dissatisfaction with their effectiveness — how has this reduction in the UN presence influenced the dynamics of child soldier recruitment in regions such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mali? What preventive measures can be implemented in the absence of peacekeeping forces?
Ms. Fitz-Gerald: Thank you for the question. I would give two comments on that issue. The first is that we are living in a new era of conflict which is characterized by insurgency, war among the people. So the old-style peacekeeping that we were comfortable with, which involved demarcation lines and zones, is no longer apparent on the continent, and core to this new style of warfare and conflict is information, the authenticity of information. I feel more meaningful interventions can come with better information gathering and better analysis on the issues, as well as reform to regional security sectors. These groups usually consolidate in peripheral areas where there have been paramilitaries, militia or special police of some sort, which in most cases are unconstitutional. The reform can involve constitutional reform, but also something that Canada has in the past been excellent at, through its Military Training Assistance Program, or MTAP, which is capacity building on the democratic governance of the security sector. The one shortfall on these programs was a lot of those efforts, not just from Canada, but the U.K. and others, were geared toward a federal centre and not toward the provinces and the regions.
Ms. Whitman: Yes. Thank you very much for the question. Just coming from Protection of Civilians Week in New York, speaking at some events there over the last couple of days, and I would like to highlight that I am not entirely sure, first of all, that your comment that the DRC and Malian mission are ending because of dissatisfaction by the people. I think it has far more to do with the politics of those who are supporting those missions and the funding and those aspects related to it.
Related to the question on children and child soldier recruitment, I know you are aware that in 2017 Canada — we did this along with the Canadian government — created the Vancouver Principles on Peacekeeping and the Prevention of the Recruitment and Use of Child Soliders. We have 106 nations that have now endorsed it. The crunch comes in on how we are ensuring that we have implementation. This is where Canada needs to do a good job of also supporting implementation measures. It is one thing to have countries endorse; it is another thing to have them implement.
A challenge we have at the Dallaire Institute for Children, Peace, and Security that I want to convey many times is that it isn’t possible for countries to merely endorse and then know what it means to implement it. We have to give capacity-building approaches to help support that and to sustain it. It doesn’t happen overnight. This does also require to have local ownership, domestic approaches. We do also have to support regional bodies such as the African Union, or AU, but there are other bodies too at a more regional level, such as the Economic Community of West African States, or ECOWAS, that we could point to — or Southern African Development Community, or SADC — as examples. There is a need for us to help them understand what it means to implement and how we can create linkages and dialogue between community engagement approaches, whether it is women’s groups or youth groups, and how we can ensure that we see this as a priority.
I will be very frank —
The Chair: I’m sorry to interrupt you, Dr. Whitman. I’m sure there will be more on this. We’re at time there.
Senator Coyle: Thank you to our two witnesses. It is good to see you again, Dr. Whitman, and good to welcome you here.
My first questions are for Dr. Whitman, and I will ask them quickly. We had two witnesses last week, I believe, Professors McCallum and Tieku, and they spoke about integrating peace and economic development, and I heard you say something very similar, when you spoke about the “youth quake” and how it could present an unprecedented opportunity in terms of innovation and prosperity for the country and for the world. Could you tell us a little bit about what you are seeing actually working in terms of that integration of peace goals and economic development?
Ms. Whitman: Sure. Thank you very much, Senator Coyle. What we are seeing is that when there are opportunities for youth-led organizations to be empowered — I can name one as an example that we are working with in Cameroon called Local Youth Corner, and they work on empowering youth across Cameroon in terms of skills development and, at the same time, in terms of peace education. This has been really important in terms of addressing issues related to Boko Haram but also the anglophone-francophone crisis in Cameroon. The more that we can invest in opportunities such as these, you will see that they will come up with their own innovative approaches. They also have a great ability to have buy-in from children and youth because of the ownership that they are taking themselves in those communities.
Senator Coyle: Thank you.
I also have a question for you, Ms. Fitz-Gerald, and thank you. I know you didn’t get to everything you wanted to say. I was really interested in your analysis around the impact of social media, also disinformation, artificial intelligence and the double-edged sword that is there, not just for the continent of Africa but also globally, including our own backyard. Earlier this week, I met with some representatives from the International Development Research Centre, or IDRC, and particularly the Africa-Canada Artificial Intelligence & Data Innovation Consortium. Can you maybe point us to anything specific that you, in your experience, see as good work going on in this area to improve AI governance between Canada and Africa or just in Africa itself?
Ms. Fitz-Gerald: I think, generally, that AI governance is being taken into the hands of nations themselves, right, because a lot of people are waiting for countries like the United States and the European Union to take the lead on these governance frameworks, and the progress is sluggish. We are looking to cooperate with the U.K. on this and to look at good practice in both countries. With ChatGPT 4 having come out recently, AI is getting better and better. So there were what we would call signposting for disinformation that the research was generally pointing everybody to look at, and the signposting has almost been eradicated now because of how good the AI is. Technology solutions don’t help on their own because of the dual usage. The same technology can be used licitly and illicitly, so it is like a spiral. You need the regulatory frameworks. Those are slow in development, understandably so, because the world has changed profoundly. We need civil services that are fit for purpose for an intangible world, and we have to wait for more and more graduates to be able to legislate and develop policy around these realities.
There is one other area that I wanted to stress in this forum, which was education. This is where Canada has a value proposition that outstrips that of others, including China. We might not come with infrastructure, but if you can help educate, with our higher education, a flexible delivery and a partnered delivery, you have the grounds for long-lasting, meaningful, long-term partnerships. You can’t get a bad degree anywhere across this country. It is one of the reasons I came back after 24 years abroad. There is a lot to be done in terms of defence diplomacy, science diplomacy with Africa to tap into that youth bulge, not just at the younger level but at the higher level where you will produce those professional civil service graduates and make the civil service and the military attractive to graduates.
The Chair: Thank you. I am sorry to interrupt again.
Senator Ravalia: Thank you to both witnesses for your very compelling testimony. My first question is for Dr. Fitz-Gerald, and I would like to focus on the issue of the challenges of peacekeeping and peacemaking in Africa. I am wondering about the extent to which you feel private mercenary groups are impacting the continent. I am thinking in particular, for example, of the Wagner Group, which is now rebranded as the Africa Corps, and then groups working in areas such as Libya and Mozambique in particular, and their disruption to the momentum that’s perhaps been created in the peacemaking, peacekeeping avenues.
Ms. Fitz-Gerald: Thank you for the question. It’s a very important one. It is the reason why I touched on this notion of a regional security architecture, which has not attracted a lot of attention with donor-related programs over the years and has been allowed to exist constitutionally. Can you imagine, sometimes in provinces like Manitoba and Alberta, we have leaders from different parties than the central leader, the prime minister, and if there is a difference of agreement and both had a militia or military loyal to them, there are grounds for conflict. That is what we are seeing playing out. So, peacekeeping can come in different forms. It can come in capacity building as well and in work to help generate better governance in the regional security sector and in constitutional reform.
I have facilitated peace talks in Africa. I have been asked to do that, I think, largely because of my Canadian background and what Canada represents. People come up to me regularly and say, “How does Canada’s federal system work?” Our federated experience and system here can also help support capacity-building and provide knowledge. We need to reimagine peacekeeping in other forms.
Senator Ravalia: Thank you.
Dr. Whitman, could you share any success stores or case studies where rehabilitation and reintegration efforts with child soldiers have been particularly effective?
Ms. Whitman: Yes, there are examples. I would say there are some good examples in Sierra Leone. You can look at Sierra Leone right now, a country that had a bit of instability last year, as you may have read. There was an attempted coup. One of the great things, at least from the perspective of Sierra Leone, is that the re-engagement of children in armed conflict has become a thing of the past for them, even if there should be a re-eruption.
There are, of course, good examples that have also existed in Rwanda. I would highlight that right now in Rwanda there is a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration centre in Mutobo. That centre is also bringing in children from the DRC, Democratic Republic of the Congo. And I have been there to witness those particular efforts to reintegrate individuals into the community, but I would also highlight that DDR is your last resort.
We want to be in a phase where Canada is working on prevention elements and trying to be in much earlier. While DDR is important, it should be viewed as something that we are considering when we have failed at other options to prevent children from being recruited and used in the first place.
Senator Ravalia: Thank you.
Senator Boniface: Thank you very much to both witnesses for being here. Welcome.
I wanted to follow up, Ms. Fitz-Gerald, on a comment you made around coups on the rise, horizontally and vertically. I would like to understand what that means and how that differs from what we’ve seen in the past.
Ms. Fitz-Gerald: I think by that reference I meant that the space, the coup belt, is growing and expanding. And we have seen a stretch from the west side to the Red Sea, and now we’re seeing some areas that sort of broke up the coup belt in the past, like Niger, joining the same trend.
Again, I go back to the issue of regional security structures, presidential guards that have separate lines of command. You have multiple entities with a monopoly on the use of violence, with different loyalties, loyalties that are usually divided based on the centres of power, ethnicity, and constitutional reform. Learning how to operate in a federal system where some responsibilities are at the centre and others are at the provincial level is fundamental here.
Senator Boniface: Thank you. To both witnesses, one of the expressions we’ve heard in our hearings in this committee is a move from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. I’m wondering, have you heard that term? When you hear that term, how would you interpret that shifting? What might that look like, given your emphasis on issues of governance and other aspects?
Ms. Fitz-Gerald: I think the model that Boutros Boutros-Ghali introduced with this peacekeeping, peacebuilding, peace enforcement, was linear in nature, and I think that’s long behind us now. You can have peace and transition to peace enforcement overnight, especially around government transitions, elections where a certain party is ousted and the loyalties with the security forces are split. Enforcement is something that the African Union has developed more of a capacity to do over the years. It’s something that the UN steers away from because of the largely political nature of the United Nations.
Peacekeeping has drifted away in its traditional form because there are no lines of demarcation and zones of demarcation. I think Abia, between South Sudan and Sudan, is really the last one. So the traditional tools of peacekeeping, in my view, and knowing what the new forms of conflict are — especially where we have five domains now; not just land, sea and air; we have space and cyber — the conflict across those five domains is incompatible with the traditional principles of peacekeeping.
Ms. Whitman: I would reinforce that, yes, of course, I’ve heard about the phraseology of peace enforcement. One of the difficulties is that we are often shortsighted in terms of our investment in countries that we’re working in. If you’re going to do peace enforcement, it requires a longer-term strategy to that.
I also believe that sometimes we see transitions happening, but then we fail to make the investment at the community level. If you’re going to enforce peace, that also means making sure that the institutions that we’re working with, as well as at a community level, have that support to continue that good work, and we create more resilience that way.
Senator Woo: Good afternoon, witnesses. I have two questions for Dr. Fitz-Gerald. The first is your allusion to the harmful effects of some kinds of cyber activity, maybe disinformation, and the harmful effects in Canada. Could you elaborate on what you meant?
Ms. Fitz-Gerald: Yes. Platforms are being used to mobilize support. We’ve seen some violence in a number of different Canadian cities.
Senator Woo: Can you be more specific?
Ms. Fitz-Gerald: Yes. For example, at Eritrean gatherings in Waterloo recently, our police were attacked as well as the people gathering for these traditional ceremonies. It happened in Edmonton and Toronto as well. Groups have come from out of town and have mobilized according to platforms and activities that are linked to political issues back home.
Senator Woo: These are emanating from Africa? Or from —
Ms. Fitz-Gerald: From Africa. But it also leads to polarization as well and difficulty to bring groups. These are things that Canada has always been so good at in the past, its capacity to assimilate and to have a strong social fabric and to have dialogue in the interest of the highest common outcome. Our capacity to do that is being eroded.
Senator Woo: Thank you for that. If I could ask a broader question, you frame the problématique of Canada-Africa relations as one in which the West has to wrest influence away from China and Russia. Setting aside Russia, even though China, as you said, is building useful infrastructure and so on and so forth, is there a different way of framing the problématique where it is African-interested first and foremost? Because I would be surprised if Africans are thinking about, “Who do we want to be wrested away from?”
I know, in other parts of the global south, they don’t really want to take sides. They want to make the best of whichever side can offer them the best deal. Is it possible for us to frame it differently, with African interests first, and how would we do that?
Ms. Fitz-Gerald: Absolutely, yes. One could argue that Cold War One was one of decoupling. Cold War Two is one of enmeshment. So there has to be some coupling where our values and interests don’t align, but there has to be de-risking. In other words, we have to fully understand what those risks are to de-risk around.
Now, the infrastructure is very important, very valuable.
In fact, I do a lot of work in the Horn of Africa, and the infrastructure has brought together regions that hardly frequented each other or connected in the past, and it has strengthened the social fabric and the ability and the ease to trade and to interact with each other. People are proud of capital cities when they are heavily invested in and developed.
I’m suggesting that we can complement all of that with a value proposition that is stronger than what a lot of parties can bring to the table. That’s our higher education system and our ability to build capacity, which will lead to a number of things — professionalization of civil services in government institutions, professionalization of the security sector, and resilience, because a new technology divide will not open a new poverty gap. We will be able to play in the same landscape as actors like China and others.
The Chair: Thank you.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: You both mentioned the importance of education. From the many witnesses who have appeared before the committee, we have often heard that Canada played a major role in education in Africa in the past. Many African leaders today can say that they studied in Canada or went to a Canadian high school. In what tangible ways can Canada resume its education efforts? Today, over 70% of the African population is under 25, and young people need to be educated and trained.
In addition, how can we make sure that education is applied in a practical and realistic way? There are countries where children are educated and go on to get diplomas, but there are no jobs. Jobs are another matter. When there is education without jobs, children end up in conflict zones and are used as cannon fodder. Thank you.
[English]
Ms. Fitz-Gerald: Thank you very much for the question. I will speak from a higher-education perspective, as opposed to a primary-education perspective, but I think the same principles hold. We live in an intangibles world at the moment, and technology can enable all sorts of educational engagements — blended learning, distance learning, part-time learning, executive learning, unaccredited, accredited. We can join up with like-minded universities in delivering dual degrees, where we bring a value proposition and our African partner brings a value proposition, not just to African students but also to Canadian students. We can facilitate exchanges.
I sit as a visiting professor in adjunct faculties for seven African universities. One thing I do is sit on theses committees, but this gradually develops the research prowess of many of these institutions. It allows them to attract their own grant funding and not have to ride on the backs of universities from the northern hemisphere.
The jobs that exist at the moment are the government jobs, the civil service. It helps professionalize those jobs, make them more attractive to go into. Capitalist market activity is also on the rise, too, because of the entrepreneurial options and the wealth of resources in Africa.
New national stock exchanges are being introduced. This is terribly important because it enhances democracy because you have to list companies that were formerly state-owned. You have to list your board members, your shareholders, everything. It can’t be dominated by one group; it has to be plural. This also helps to engender plural politics, but that capitalist market activity, in an intangibles marketplace, is key for entrepreneurialism on the continent and also trade with Africa. I think the jobs will follow if we make a commitment to education which is fit for purpose in an intangibles world, led by an already strong country from higher education experience.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Senator Harder: Thank you to our witnesses. I want to go a little further on the education suggestion in two ways. One is, to the extent that the institutions are in Canada, the federal government has no direct lever in terms of international education. The existing formulae that are used for foreign students are a disincentive — I would argue — to use that system in a soft power sense, both in terms of the cost structures and the heroin-like addiction that universities are living now. And how do we choose?
That’s sort of on the education side in Canada. The other challenge we have is, do we do it bilaterally? Do we do it multilaterally? Do we choose certain countries? Because we are just a small country and how do we boil this ocean?
Every minister I’ve dealt with has always said, “I want to have priorities.” We have a small number of missions abroad. So what is your advice? How do we square that, having an impact versus priorities versus generalized African approaches?
Ms. Whitman: Can I take a moment to respond to one of the questions?
The Chair: Sure. Is it with respect to this question, Dr. Whitman?
Ms. Whitman: Yes, and it follows on from the last one. I just wasn’t clear because, last time, it said to both, but I wasn’t given an opportunity to respond.
The Chair: That’s because we ran out of time. Why don’t we do the following on this segment? I think Senator Harder was directing to Dr. Fitz-Gerald first, and then we will go to you. Okay? Dr. Fitz-Gerald?
Ms. Fitz-Gerald: Thank you. I will be quick. Something I feel strongly about is with education being such an important instrument of national power in Canada, we don’t have a national Ministry of Education to strategize around higher education. A national strategy would be enormously important, especially if it forms a pillar of regional strategies like Indo-Pacific and Africa, et cetera.
There are multiple ways that we can do this that don’t involve bringing students to Canada because the visa issue is also difficult, as are issues concerning operating budgets, certainly with Ontario universities.
With part-time education, the British government has done this alongside civil servants working their day jobs. They come away two weeks every couple of months for a residential couple of weeks, et cetera. You have distance learning, blended learning. There are a lot of possibilities here whether you do it bilaterally or regionally. Yes, there are many countries in Africa, but they have finite resources.
One model in which I have participated and which has worked fairly well in the past is to locate a program in a regional hub and to bring other countries to it, around the area, on an executive part-time basis through a fly-in faculty model. Canadian universities can partner with some like-minded universities. Networks can be developed as well so that there is a true Canadian delivery in all parts of our country.
The Chair: Thank you. Dr. Whitman, go ahead.
Ms. Whitman: Yes, I wanted to respond from an educational perspective. We need to focus on things like critical thinking skills. Sometimes we focus too much on an individualized level of education. There was a reference to the leadership in Africa being educated elsewhere. But we need those who can focus on teaching critical thinking, learning about some of these aspects related to peace education, as well, as I referenced earlier. Also, that might mean working more strongly with those who are the educators, the teachers. This is a key part of having increased success.
I would also want to reiterate this point about working with universities. It’s totally possible for us to do a lot more giving of capacity to universities in countries that are demonstrating a commitment to wanting to have such partnerships and to have more of an approach where we are doing that, such as we are doing with the University of Rwanda with our work at Dalhousie and the Dallaire Institute. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Senator M. Deacon: I must confess that I feel parts of my questions have been touched on by my colleagues. I will do my best to define and to not have any redoing here.
It’s education first. We talked about higher education, and a national higher education strategy would be a dream, for sure.
I want to come back to little people. When there are limited opportunities for children, they can become prime targets for recruitment in armed conflicts. It’s made all the more difficult by the fact that, in many instances, armed groups specifically target the education system, like in Burkina Faso where a quarter of the schools were closed in the last year.
How does Canada help those education systems? You described some really great and creative learning opportunities and ways to go about it with good satellite systems, but how do we see that education systems remain up and running during an armed conflict in a country in the African context — not the Canadian context but the African context? I will ask you first, and then, Ms. Whitman, if you could also respond, I would appreciate that.
Ms. Fitz-Gerald: Africa has pretty good connections and cyberoptics cables coming into the continent, and these have been enhanced with the support of China and other countries. We have done a very good job in our higher education institutions through COVID at getting preparatory courses and online courses together. More can be done to scale that. It is important to understand insurgency strategy. The first thing targeted are basic infrastructure to try to delegitimize the government, so bridges, roads, universities, museums, anything that can help indoctrinate the other way and rewrite history.
Children then lose access to school. More can be done to give online support to basic modules and courses, possibly in a way that is generic enough to support populations in conflict and at risk of conflict. We can support local partners through NGOs or offices like Dr. Whitman’s in using local teachers and trainers to facilitate that delivery for the younger groups.
Ms. Whitman: I want to also emphasize there is the Safe Schools Declaration, which is a commitment Canada has made. Many countries in Africa have also committed to it. This is an example of where you need to take the security sector reform approach as well as the protecting of education. Often, not enough priority is given in the conflict zones to protecting those zones where children are in education. We could do a lot better job of supporting that capacity. I can give you examples in Northern Nigeria, where we were working with the Nigerian armed forces and a local defence unit to emphasize to them that they had knowledge before those Chibok girls were taken that it was going to be attacked, and I can give many other examples of that around the globe.
If we could take that early warning knowledge and actually put it into protecting those educational institutions, that could also go a long way to prevent attacks on those schools where the children may be disrupted from education, as well as the pathways to and from school. Make it safer. Make those kinds of zones of peace. I just wanted to emphasize that along with the points of working with the schools directly on the quality of the education and the IT elements.
Senator Downe: My first question is for Dr. Fitz-Gerald. In 2007, this committee did a study in sub-Saharan Africa. One of the focuses was UN peacekeeping missions. We were advised at the time that part of the problem was that rich countries were giving money, as opposed to highly trained troops, because they didn’t want boots on the ground possibly with people being killed and so on. Therefore, they were getting troops from developing countries who weren’t quite as well trained, and they had a host of problems with them. That’s what happened when their missions failed. Is it your view that that is still the situation?
Ms. Fitz-Gerald: Well, I think there are incentives that attract regional peacekeeping forces to stay longer than necessary. There has been a regional peacekeeping force in the Gambia, for instance, for a long time, and there were many calls to have that mission disbanded ages ago.
This has happened in parallel to security sector reform efforts. Both have been going on in parallel. It reflects the limitations of UN peacekeeping principles as well, which usually facilitate the deployment of countries like Canada.
The African Union has the ability to develop rules of engagement that are skewed more toward stabilization and peace enforcement than traditional UN peacekeeping can support and facilitate.
Senator Downe: Thank you. My second question is for our witness from Halifax. I understand the work you do for children who are involved in armed conflicts. But I am wondering what you do for all children affected by war. Do you have any programs and post-conflict assistance for children?
Ms. Whitman: In terms of our work, it’s always to approach this from the “all children” view. We want all children to be prevented from being recruited into use in armed conflict. In terms of your specific question of programs in a post-conflict zone, as the Dallaire Institute, that’s not our role. Our role is to work on it from a preventative angle. Yet we do work with community groups to help build their capacity in several contexts around the world. This can be from community engagement groups that we work with.
I want to emphasize that I think it’s really important that the institutions and structures which also give security to a nation, such as the police and the military — they have to be given the right tools and approaches to be able to understand the centrality of children to peace and security.
From our perspective, that’s what’s been missing. There are a lot of NGOs that do programmatic work from education or sanitation and humanitarian perspectives but not enough to connect those two elements of peace and security as well as humanitarian assistance. Thanks.
The Chair: Thank you very much. Unfortunately, the time will not us allow us to go to round two. I know several senators asked for a question in the second round. I want to say that I’ve given latitude in every segment for more time. That’s why we are where we are, just in case some of you have might not believe that.
I want to thank both Dr. Ann Fitz-Gerald and Dr. Shelly Whitman for their engaging testimony today. You’ve given us a lot to think about. Thank you very much. This is an important contribution to our ongoing study on Africa.
Colleagues, we will now proceed to our second panel. We’re very pleased to welcome by video conference Marie-Joëlle Zahar, Professor and Director of the Research Network on Peace Operations, Université of Montréal. And Nicholas Coghlan, former Head of Office of the Canadian Embassy in Sudan and former Canadian ambassador to South Sudan, and also former colleague of mine.
Thank you both for taking the time to be with us today. We’re now ready to hear your opening remarks, and they will be followed by questions from senators. We will start with Mr. Coghlan. You have the floor.
Nicholas Coghlan, former Head of Office of the Canadian Embassy in Sudan and former Canadian ambassador to South Sudan, as an individual: Thank you very much. Today, I want to make six points where I believe Canada could be doing a better job in promoting peace and security in Africa. I’ll refer as examples to the countries I know best: Sudan and South Sudan.
Sudan is the site of the world’s most serious humanitarian catastrophe, a new genocide and a war that is proliferating. Its neighbour South Sudan is the poorest country in the world and is heading fast for implosion too.
First, in any situation where peace and security are at risk, we need eyes on the ground if we’re to make a difference. We have quit the field in Sudan. This is in contrast to our allies who have either kept senior staff in the region or given them roving commissions.
Second, we also need high-level statements, visits, interventions. It’s not happening on Sudan. Notably, neither the PM nor the Foreign Minister has spoken out since May 2023. The impression given is that we only care when Canadian citizens are in danger.
In April, Minister Hussen travelled to a major Sudan donor conference in Paris but was the only official out of 19 not to endorse its closing statement; humanitarian aid should not be an alibi for inaction.
There’s no public record that we have discussed Sudan with allies, let alone with the most problematic external player in the crisis, the United Arab Emirates.
Third, over the long term and beyond the Sudans, we need to select peace and stabilization issues, stay with them and develop at Global Affairs Canada pools of regional and mediation specialists. A model could be Norway. With a population smaller than Toronto’s, it was one of the three lead countries that successfully stickhandled the independence of South Sudan. Norway remains disproportionately influential in both countries.
My fourth point, peacekeeping, we touched on. I will make one personal comment from my experience in South Sudan where 10 of Canada’s 28 peacekeepers are currently assigned.
When civil war broke out in Juba and up-country in December 2013, a hundred thousand lives, including dozens of Canadians, were saved when the UN opened the gates of its compounds.
We need to get back on board. A UN mission to protect civilians in Darfur would be a great place to start.
Point number five, sanctions: As you know, the current Canadian government likes sanctions. There are 4,300 individuals and/or entities now on the Canadian autonomous list. To be useful, sanctions must be timely, consistently applied, coordinated with allies and enforced.
A month ago, Canada announced its first six targets in Sudan. This is a small set relative to the issue, and it came a year late.
As for enforcement, I’m not encouraged by the fact that one of the only two listed targets from South Sudan has been dead for five years.
There is an opportunity that we are missing here. Both parties are financing the war in Sudan by selling gold. If any country knows about how gold reaches world markets, it is Canada. We could lead forensic investigations and advise our partners on sanctioning those networks, rather than just following others.
Point number six: Business. In parts of Africa, a small number of Canadian companies, mainly extractives, have given us a disproportionately bad reputation. An example, few of the honourable members will be old enough to remember, but it was a controversy over the activities of a Canadian oil company that led Canada to open an office in Khartoum.
Talisman’s complicity in war crimes was not proven, but the company’s presence and the royalties it paid allowed the Islamist government to pursue its brutal war in the south. Had we wished at that time to play a high-profile role in the Sudan peace process, the Talisman factor alone would have disqualified us.
In 2019, the government set up the Canadian Ombudsperson for Responsible Enterprise, to address complaints of this kind. It has no teeth at all. It must be given at least the power to compel testimony from defendants when complaints are lodged.
Sweden offers a more drastic and more effective example of how to deal with rogue companies operating abroad.
I have one more business-related remark: For years a Canadian-owned company has been selling armoured cars into both Sudans; they have been used in armed conflict and in the suppression of legitimate protest. I’ve seen them in person. Commercial activities of this kind, isolated though they may be, undermine Canadian credibility on peace and security, the more so when Ottawa is perceived to be indifferent to them.
I’ll close by quoting from a recent report by the Montréal-based Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights:
. . . it is nearly impossible to overstate the global indifference and inaction in the face of ongoing devastating mass atrocities in Sudan.
If Sudan is a litmus test for our commitment to peace and security in Africa, we’re failing it badly.
Thank you very much.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Coghlan. We will now go to Professor Zahar for her statement.
Marie-Joëlle Zahar, Professor and Director of the Research Network on Peace Operations, University of Montréal, as an individual: Thank you for the invitation to appear before your committee.
I will focus narrowly on peace and security issues relating to peacekeeping and conflict resolution, but I want to make very clear that peace and security cannot be artificially separated from governance and/or socio-economic issues, things already highlighted by previous witnesses.
Let me start by stressing that whilst our government has reaffirmed its engagement in Africa with efforts focused on women and girls, green economic growth and prosperity for all, these cannot achieve any sustainable results in the current context if we do not simultaneously engage on issues of peace and security.
The context you know, but I think it bears reminding that it is characterized by an increasing number of coups d’état, political and electoral crises, including in countries that we considered stable only a few years ago. Niger and Senegal, for example. The context is also characterized by instability and exponential increases in rates of violence against civilians — not just in Darfur, although Darfur is a prime example — and humanitarian crises as violent extremist groups spread and regain strength, particularly but not only in the Sahel region, and as governments increasingly favour, military responses.
All this at a time when regional and sub-regional organizations are experiencing tensions and fragmentation as was the case when Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso left ECOWAS to form the Alliance of Sahel States, and at a time when the legitimacy and role of international organizations in peacekeeping and peacebuilding is increasingly called into question with the UN exiting Mali and now close to being asked to exit the DRC. This context demands a more sustained Canadian engagement with issues of peace and security.
Beyond our obvious interest in international security and stability, which are key to Canada’s prosperity, we have multiple interests in the security and stability of Africa. These relate to the continent’s mineral reserves — the largest high-grade rare-earth metal deposits available anywhere outside of China — to the management of the growing worldwide problem of refugees and migrants and, as was highlighted by Dr. Fitz-Gerald, to social peace here at home in Canada. It also relates to the future of the world order, which depends on rebuilding trust and partnerships with countries of the global south, 56 of which are on the continent.
I want to spend the rest of my time making two points. The first is that addressing peace and security issues on the continent passes through an increased and sustained engagement. The second is that addressing peace and security issues can be best achieved by opposing the logic of military force with the forceful logic of necessary dialogue to resolve issues.
On increased and sustained engagement, I will not repeat things that have been said by other witnesses, including Mr. Coghlan, but presence and visibility matter. Although Canada has 44 diplomatic missions, our most important contributions to peace and security are often financial, and many of them are channelled through regional or international funds and initiatives. Others, such as helping countries fight disinformation, while crucial, are best kept away from the public eye. When asked about China’s presence, experts agree that branding is important. China is seen building roads and infrastructure, and stays a long time in a country. Many of Canada’s contributions are invisible to the intended beneficiaries.
Sustainability also matters. For Canada’s engagements in Africa — many of which do seek to address issues of peace and security — to have an impact, they cannot be short term or dictated by the logic of our own electoral and budget cycles. The decision to provide the Peace and Stabilization Operations Program with multi-year funding was a good first step in this direction, but much more is needed. This sustainability is essential to rebuilding trust with partners and to actually be welcomed when space opens for Canada to engage.
In recent years, Canada has contributed to U.S.-led military training of African armed forces. This training was supposed to contribute to peace and stability on the continent, but it ended up contributing to coups, particularly in the Sahel region. The same groups we formed are now at the head of juntas that are actually privileging the logic of military force.
The juntas are dealing with violent extremist groups, and sometimes with their own political opponents, with military might. Many are aided by Russian mercenaries by Wagner/the Africa Corps. This logic is not only contributing to the humanitarian crisis and to an increase in civilian casualties, it is also diverting limited financial resources that the countries have away from pressing social, economic and governance needs.
While many African states, including the states where we have seen coups d’état, are expressing a desire to reclaim sovereignty and rejecting Western powers and international organizations as imposing their own norms and priorities. These countries will ultimately need support when they come to realize that their preferred solutions are not working, and we have a long list of lessons that show that military answers are only short-lived.
This is where Canada can play a role. Because we are not seen as a colonial power in the same way as some of our allies, because of our bilingualism, pluralism, federal experience and experience managing a deep, divisive conflict in our own country, imperfect as these might be, Canada can — as we demonstrated in Cameroon — still play a much-needed role in restoring the logic of dialogue and in contributing to negotiated solutions that have a better chance of lasting to the benefit of all Africans first, but also to us and the rest of the world. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Professor Zahar.
We will go immediately to questions. Colleagues, I will remind you again that these are four-minute rounds. We’ll try to get through as many as we can, and perhaps have a round two. We’ll start with Senator MacDonald.
Senator MacDonald: Thank you to both witnesses.
I’ll go to the ambassador first. With the complexity of conflicts in Africa involving non-state actors and terrorism, and considering Canada’s active support through initiatives like the Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building Program, how can peacekeeping missions integrate more effectively technology and intelligence sharing to stay ahead of these threats? In addition, what tech-driven strategies do you think could make peace operations more effective in Africa?
Mr. Coghlan: Thank you very much. When I was posted in Sudan, I was constantly being appealed to by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to — how can I say this — send Canadian expertise where we had value added. She would say openly, “I would rather have two, three Canadian intelligence experts,” — she actually had one favourite lieutenant from Quebec by the name of Rémy. “Just send me Rémy, and I will do without the battalion of” — I won’t name the country. She really looked for where we have the value added.
I believe we have the value added in areas such as intelligence, in air support, also possibly in supplying the medical facilities that enable UN missions. So it is not a question of sending battalions, it is finding where we have a good niche with the value added.
In terms of the high-tech, I believe this has been quite a sensitive issue. The UN in the DRC had the intention of using drones. High-level politics start to come in there. I believe that was vetoed by certain members of the U.N. Security Council, the ability to use drones. In South Sudan, they did use quite sophisticated forward-looking radar on helicopters, but that’s about as far as it went.
Unfortunately, the politics, I believe, is a major inhibiting factor when it comes to using more sophisticated technology. Also, of course, the unwillingness of certain countries to share that technology and to put it in the hands of other UN partners.
Senator MacDonald: Professor, do you want to respond as well?
Ms. Zahar: I wholeheartedly agree with the comments of Mr. Coghlan. I do think that the issue of willingness to share the information and the technology and the sensitivity that a number of major powers have around these issues are the biggest obstacle to the UN being able to both acquire and actually use these.
You asked a question about how they could be helpful. This technology could be extremely helpful in the UN being more preventive than reactive. When you have limited troops on the ground in countries where you cannot cover the entire country, drone technology surveillance could actually allow you to foresee movements of troops. These could be regular or irregular troops, and you could send assets ahead of crises instead of sending them to do the cleanup job afterwards.
Senator MacDonald: Thank you.
Senator Ravalia: Thank you to both witnesses. My question is for Ambassador Coghlan. Thank you very much for your very forthright testimony. To what extent is what I have described as a Eurocentric approach to global conflict and crisis impacting what we see as the apathy of many global players, including Canada, to the ongoing conflict in Sudan, noting, of course, that the Nordic countries are an example of what should be our gold standard? Do you feel that donor fatigue is becoming an issue? Is our disproportionate engagement in places like the conflicts in Ukraine, Israel and Gaza a factor in all of this?
Mr. Coghlan: I’m sure, being absolutely pragmatic, donor fatigue must be an issue. Obviously, Ukraine and Israel-Gaza must be taking up a huge amount of bandwidth in all of the Western foreign ministries.
Donor fatigue, when it comes to actual aid and development, is the dominant issue in South Sudan. South Sudan has been dependent on external donors for I would say 30 years now, and this has led to a sense from the Government of South Sudan that it is the job of donors to look after the people of South Sudan, and we’re very bad at trying to break that cycle. We have diplomats rotate in and out at a fairly high rate. We have had five ambassadors there in the past eight years, and in a sense, it becomes much easier just to write another cheque than to have a really hard discussion, in this case, with the government of South Sudan, which has oil revenue, or I would say had oil revenue until about two days ago. With the conflict in Sudan, it lost 95% of its external revenue in one fell swoop. Donor fatigue is a huge issue.
The fact is that in Sudan, to be honest, it’s quite difficult to relate to what’s going on. It is not clear who the good guys are and who we should be rooting for. To be honest, we shouldn’t be rooting for either side. It is easier to go for issues where most of our electorate here in Canada have strong views on such as Israel-Gaza and Ukraine. Most Canadians know whom they relate to in those conflicts. In Sudan, it is much more difficult to say who we should relate to. As I said, in terms of scale and potential for proliferation, it is the most threatening of all of the catastrophes.
Senator Ravalia: Thank you very much for that. Just to follow up, when you were the ambassador there, to what extent did you engage with the Nordics, and what are lessons we could have learned that are tangible and applicable, do you feel?
Mr. Coghlan: Absolutely key are the Nordics, so impressive in both Sudans really for 40, 50 years. Norway, in particular, has managed to generate almost a revolving circle between their major non-governmental organizations, a couple of which are faith-based, the United Nations and their government. It doesn’t matter which government is in office in Oslo, and they have developed just a bank of expertise.
In South Sudan, for example, I would go to the Norwegians. That’s the historic knowledge there. They have people there or can tap people who have knowledge going back 30, 40 years, more than the British, who were the former colonial masters, and more than the Americans, who were the midwives of the process. They have stuck with that issue.
Quite unrelated to Africa, I would say they exerted similar skills in Colombia. They found a niche in the peace process in Colombia with the ELN. I know historically they did in Sri Lanka. It is not just the area knowledge but also the niche as a mediator. They developed the expertise and the niche in mediation as well.
Senator Ravalia: Thank you so much.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you to our witnesses for being here today and your very candid testimony.
In an earlier meeting, His Excellency Ambassador Bankole Adeoye told the committee that the African Union views the concept of peacekeeping in Africa as obsolete and argued in favour of moving toward a new generation of peace operations that would involve kinetic operations that could respond more effectively to challenges like terrorism. I wonder if both of you agree with this statement or if you believe there is still a place for traditional UN peacekeeping, having heard some of your introductory comments also.
Ms. Zahar: Thank you for the question. If I may, I will first add something to Mr. Coghlan’s response to Senator Ravalia. I want to highlight that one of the reasons Norway has been so effective is that there is a baseline agreement between the various parties on mediation and commitment to mediation, which has completely allowed them to buffer the mediation file away from all kinds of political disputes and changes in governments. That is an essential thing that has allowed the Norwegians to punch way above their weight on this file.
Considering kinetic operations, peacekeeping as it was imagined years ago is increasingly difficult because it is at odds with the nature of conflicts in many African countries. Nevertheless, I personally, based on my experience, have not been convinced that a move toward either simply kinetic operations or more enforcement to go back to an earlier discussion is the answer.
As I tried to suggest, answering force by force runs the risk of bracketing the underlying causes of conflict which will perforce re-emerge. I spent some time in Sudan around the same time as Mr. Coghlan was there. One of the main reasons why we failed in the Sudan as an international community was our inability to see the connections between different conflicts and treating them separately. So we had a deal for Sudan-South Sudan but didn’t realize the same issues were at the heart of the Darfur conflict of the tensions in [Technical difficulties] and therefore, left unattended, these issues came back to haunt us and instability is now rife in the same regions where we were not able to bring solutions.
To go back to your initial question, peacekeeping may not be in its original form, but some sort of peacebuilding and peace mediation is absolutely essential if we want to actually achieve sustainable results. We will not achieve those results by force. We have seen that time and again, even where we have had overwhelming force in places like Afghanistan, where we have deep experience ourselves. Force has never provided an answer to the socio-economic and governance issues that drive people to take up weapons.
The Chair: Thank you very much. We’re out of time on that segment. Knowing Mr. Coghlan as I do, I’m sure he’ll pick up on a few of these things as we go forward.
Senator Coyle: Thank you to our witnesses. My first question is for Professor Zahar. You talked about Canada having an increased and sustained engagement. You also talked about how our actual presence and visibility is important. I think you said something like branding matters. You also mentioned that so many Canadian resources invested in Africa are often through indirect routes, through regional or multilateral mechanisms.
Could you speak a little bit more about what you would see as the future in this area? Does that mean that we should improve our actual visibility on the continent? What would that actually look like?
Ms. Zahar: It would not necessarily be in the area of peace and security. What we do in other areas impacts our ability to engage on issues of peace and security. You heard a lot earlier about exchanges, university collaborations, what have you. These create relationships and trust, and allow people who might, at different points in time — because people move in their careers — find themselves in positions of power or close to positions of power to actually knock on the doors of their Canadian partners — when need be — knowing what Canada might be able to offer.
I do think that our sustained presence is an engagement that does not end with budget cycles or — and I will go back to the Sudan example very briefly — does not end with changes in the context.
When South Sudan became independent, many of Canada’s activities in the North — in Khartoum — were, basically, suspended. I used to work with the Forum of Federations at the time on initiatives, and many of our pro-democracy NGO partners felt abandoned. That’s the kind of sustained engagement that I’m talking about — staying the course so that when the need arises, Canada is there, has people, has eyes on the ground and is able to respond quickly.
That doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t have priorities; however those priorities are decided. Currently, I would say the situation is absolutely inadequate. Our presence on the continent is extremely limited, and we can’t even address situations that are emergencies because there are not enough people to deal with them in our embassies and consulates. I will leave some time for Mr. Coghlan.
The Chair: He has about a minute to respond to Senator Coyle’s question.
Mr. Coghlan: Just a quick point. I talked about some of the downsides of Canadian extractives on the continent. I will tell an anecdote. When Talisman finally did quit Sudan in 2002 under pressure from activists in Canada and a lawsuit in New York, the foreign minister called me in and said, “This will be our final meeting, Mr. Coghlan. I no longer have to meet with you.” Equally interesting was the fact that Canada faded away because the controversy was gone.
Although I am opposed to some of the more negative effects of the Canadian business, it gave us profile, but it did not speak well of Ottawa either, that we pulled back because it was no longer controversial, and nobody in Canada was interested any more.
The Chair: Thank you for that observation.
Senator Harder: Thank you to our witnesses. I want to pursue this further if I could. I will start with Nicholas Coghlan, but I would like to hear from Dr. Zahar as well. Both of you spoke about needing eyes on the ground, building our capacity and increasing our engagement. I think we can all sign up to that, but what does it really mean? Is it an embassy presence? Is it a capacity of Africa thinking in the foreign service itself and experience? Is it the tools that Africa needs in terms of mediation, negotiation, skill sets and peacebuilding?
Norway is an excellent example. I totally agree with that. But Norway has been disciplined in choosing where it goes. You mentioned the three areas of historic engagement. They are not everywhere, and they are long-term. But they do match local knowledge with capacity, not just in government but outside of government as well.
I would like you to reflect on what a Canadian model could be, which is not eyes on the ground in every place, because that’s unaffordable and probably not sustainable, with some of the capacity-building skills that we do have. How do you interact between the two?
Mr. Coghlan: I agree. We certainly can’t be everywhere. We can’t do everything. We are only a medium-sized country. Having said that, in the case of Sudan, one year into the crisis, it is clear this will be a long-term major crisis and it is proliferating. Having reassigned our ambassador and all our staff, we need to get back to that case, just in terms of the dimensions of the crisis. In practical terms, no, it doesn’t mean an embassy right now, it means someone in the region, like our allies. It doesn’t mean our ambassador in Nairobi or Cairo covering it. We need regional expertise — as you said — as well. We cannot just stick with the issues.
You are right, Norway chooses its issues and it develops its mediation skills. I know you have been having separate hearings on the future of the Canadian foreign service. This goes back to rewarding area experts and giving them an incentive to become an expert on Sudan or Cameroon or wherever. Rather than, “Oh, there’s the guy in the back office whom we occasionally call on, who was posted there five years ago.”
I believe that Senator Boehm knows this well. I don’t believe the Canadian foreign service is structured that way at the moment. We reward generalists, not subject area experts. Of course, we have had a huge expertise in trade mediation over the past 20 or 30 years. We have people who know all about the software lumber dispute with the U.S. They’ve been doing it 25 or 30 years. Why couldn’t we develop expertise in international conflict mediation in the same way?
Ms. Zahar: I totally agree with most of the points. We cannot be everywhere. However, we do have capacities that we do not use well as a country. Mr. Coghlan talked about mediation. Most of the foremost international mediation experts that the UN employs are Canadians or Canadian residents. However, the same experts seldom get called or invited by Ottawa to discuss issues that Canada might be thinking of engaging in.
That, I think, is a missed opportunity. So is the missed opportunity of thinking more systematically, analytically and creatively about how one can actually leverage diasporas, which do have eyes on the ground because they are always in and out of their countries of origin. Diasporas are a reality of our country. As has been said before, some conflicts external to Canada are inviting themselves onto Canadian soil. Therefore, not thinking of diasporas as an important element of our foreign policy and particularly of our engagement with Africa — because Africa is now providing the majority of francophone immigrants to Canada, for example — is a missed opportunity. While I don’t have the answer — I am not a specialist of immigration or diasporas — I think that a sustained conversation on these issues needs to be had both in the political sphere and between you and experts on these matters, so that we can move things along.
Senator Downe: I have the same question for the two witnesses today. It seems to me we have to face the reality that, given our national defence capacity, we can’t really participate in peacekeeping missions. The current Canadian Armed Forces are 16% down in membership. We have the worst recruitment and retention in generations. We have missions in Latvia. We have a training mission in the United Kingdom for the Ukraine situation. Our troops, quite frankly, are quitting because these deployments are being extended month after month, because of the lack of new members. So, other than platitudes signifying nothing, all the Government of Canada can currently do is give financial assistance.
Given that, what is the number-one priority we should do with our money in Africa? Given the comments about Norway, Denmark and other countries that have targeted — as Senator Harder indicated — priorities, would it be a better use of our funding, if we needed results, just to give the money to Norway?
Mr. Coghlan: If I may recount a very short anecdote. When I was posted in South Sudan every so often — I would be back in Ottawa every six months or so — I would go around to the Department of National Defence to basically plead for more peacekeepers. And I got what I thought, frankly, was a rather cynical response. They said, “You have to answer two questions. First, can you guarantee the success of this UN mission? Second, can you guarantee no Canadian casualties? If the answer to either of those is equivocal, our meeting is over.”
I thought that was completely unrealistic. Yes, I can give you a huge list of inefficiencies in UN missions. A lot of the time they are there and what they are doing is preventing things from getting worse. Of course, there is a risk of Canadian casualties.
I think that part of that, to be frank, is also a choice of the Canadian Forces — the sense of more conventional combat being in Latvia. Where there is a much more easily identifiable enemy, it’s very much black and white, whereas somewhere like Sudan or South Sudan, it is actually, in some ways, a much more difficult military role there. My own suspicion is that they don’t necessarily want to do it.
Should we pay for others to do it? There is a risk of hypocrisy or perceived hypocrisy here. As you know, Canada funds the so-called Elsie Initiative to support the participation of female peacekeepers around the world. Senior UN peacekeeping officers have said to me, off the record, “So you are paying for 100 to 150 other officers from other countries — women — to participate in missions, but you are not sending any yourselves. It doesn’t look good.”
Of course, that’s off the record. They very much appreciate that cash. But in order to make UN missions more efficient, I believe we have to get there on the inside to change them on the inside. We won’t get force commander positions unless we start to become more committed. If you get the force commanders, then you start to change missions for the better.
Ms. Zahar: Two quick follow-ups.
First, if one cannot send troops, that does not mean that one cannot make valuable contributions. The helicopters we sent with medical teams to Mali were worth multiple units on the ground because they saved lives and they allowed the troops that were deployed by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, or MINUSMA, to do their jobs in an environment that was complicated and difficult.
So it is not just troops; it is also sending contributions that have value added in a different context. Nowadays, these contributions are mostly technological and highly skilled, as opposed to just sending troops.
I totally agree with Mr. Coghlan that unless we do this more systematically, we will not get senior commander positions. These are the positions where one can have an influence on the way in which things happen.
My answer would be that we do not close the door on peacekeeping missions. However, if we are called to contribute, we need to think more smartly about how we respond to those calls, but also — and I will allow myself to divert a bit more — how we sell our contribution to the Canadian public.
I remain completely puzzled by the fact that, in Canada, the government — which had made a valued and welcome contribution to MINUSMA — allowed itself to basically be criticized in every major newspaper by people who said that the only valuable contribution would have been soldiers. To my mind, that was a missed opportunity for communicating what we were doing and how welcome that was, even though it didn’t look like our traditional contributions.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: I’d like to hear from our witnesses about the role that the diaspora can play, since that seems to be a very underused resource in our country.
Other countries might provide examples of working with the African diaspora that could be useful to our committee. How could the diaspora be better linked to Canada’s peacekeeping efforts?
What specific recommendations do you have for how to engage the diaspora as a key player in peace and security efforts in Africa?
Ms. Zahar: I am not an expert in diasporas. What I am telling you is not based on research.
However, it seems obvious that diasporas have very detailed knowledge about their countries. Of course, not everyone has the same opinion of what is going on in their country of origin. It’s important to use a variety of sources and not rely on one or two people who are familiar or have a high profile.
The diasporas have an interest in investing in their countries of origin and are therefore more inclined to contribute to rebuilding efforts if Canada makes a serious commitment. That could help make these efforts much more sustainable. As was pointed out during the discussion earlier in the meeting, it is one thing to educate young people. However, if there are no economic opportunities in their countries, no investment and no exciting initiatives, young people still face the same limited prospects, and the temptation to radicalize or take up arms is still very real.
It seems to me that there are a number of ways for diasporas to be involved as economic partners or sources of information. They can really help us build our knowledge. We do not necessarily have the in-depth analysis or a sufficient understanding of situations that can be very complex and seem very removed from our everyday concerns.
Since members of diasporas also increasingly take part in conflicts, we need to better understand them so we can prevent their having a negative impact. We also need to prevent these conflicts from potentially spreading to Canadian soil when diasporas come into conflict with each other.
Senator Gerba: Thank you. Ambassador, would you care to add anything?
[English]
Mr. Coghlan: Yes, thanks very much. It is an interesting question.
Just a little anecdote, if I may. When conflict broke out in South Sudan in 2013, I was back in Ottawa shortly afterwards and met with some members of the South Sudanese diaspora. It was quite sad because, until that point, they had all come together as one group. They used to go on picnics to Upper Canada Village. They had a basketball tournament among themselves. Now they were completely split on ethnic terms, Nuer versus Dinka. It was the same in Calgary, meeting with a group there. I was only able to meet with the groups quite separately. Yes, they are a huge resource, but they can become very divided.
In the case of Sudan, interestingly, if you go back just a year to the beginning of the current crisis, I would say there was a uniformity of view of a plague on both their houses when it came to the Sudan Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces. Now that opinion has shifted very definitely in favour of the armed forces — who, after all, are coup mongers and were responsible for the original Darfur crisis. Yes, they’re a huge resource, but as government — I will sound a little condescending here — you have to go in with your eyes open.
There is also a risk of hate speech. I’ve seen hate speech coming out of Canada in the case of both South Sudan and Sudan. I think maybe our authorities, whether CSIS or RCMP, also need to be a bit vigilant in terms of tracking certain individuals.
Yes, a huge resource, but with some care. I realize that I risk sounding a little condescending.
The Chair: Senator Woo, earlier, I think you were emphasizing a point, but you didn’t have a question. Just double-checking.
Colleagues, if you want to put up your hands for a second round, the page is clear for that.
I was going to ask a question as well on something Mr. Coghlan said about the foreign policy capacity bandwidth in ministries.
I think most people would agree that we are now — everyone is using the term — in a “polycrisis” environment. If you take the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, what is now becoming an ongoing conflict in Gaza and other parts of the world, and the thematic issues that preoccupy us — migration, climate change, security in general, cyber security, all of those things — we’re probably at a complicated point in terms of the conduct of international relations and developing policy.
Over the years, Canada, through various governments, has sometimes been at the right place at the right time to push on certain issues. I’m thinking of Brian Mulroney and Joe Clark on apartheid in South Africa, Lloyd Axworthy on antipersonnel land mines, the Harper government in the early stages of dealing with Ukraine in 2013-14 — the first Russian moves at that time — and the present government on a variety of things. As a country, we’ve been able to introduce certain concepts and initiatives. It is becoming more and more difficult.
Some of this — and I am showing a bias here — the incubation area was often the G7, where decisions could be taken and initiatives launched. We are just ahead of the G7 summit in Italy next month. Canada will be hosting the G7 and chairing the presidency next year, which is the 50th anniversary of that organization.
I am thinking of Sudan — the great conflict, great tragedy, great famine and everything else that is out there. It is not front-page news. It should be. It pops up once in a while in editorials and the like. Is there anything that Canada could do with its partners to push that agenda forward? I will go to Mr. Coghlan first.
Mr. Coghlan: To be honest, just have it on the agenda and have a discussion about it at a very high level. As far as I am aware, certainly from public commentary, our prime minister has not discussed it with Secretary Blinken or with President Biden. It is just raising Sudan to that level.
We have also need to be very conscious that Sudan has these dimensions of proliferation. The United Arab Emirates, or U.A.E., is a key player and not for the good. Having said that, the U.A.E. is a key player in the whole Middle Eastern conflict. The U.S. has nominated an envoy for Sudan. He is completely hobbled by the fact that he clearly has instructions not to bend the ear of the Emirates on what is happening in Sudan.
At the moment, everything is being dominated by Israel-Gaza and, to a lesser extent, Ukraine.
At the very least, if Canada could get it on the agenda, but to be frank, we have not demonstrated signs of engagement ourselves. As I said, we have not had a single high-level statement on Sudan. I think it would cause some surprise for our partners if we were to say at the next meeting that we want Sudan on the agenda. It should be. But to coin a phrase, it is a complicated issue.
In a positive way — maybe it is positive — over the last six months, you have never seen North American and European publics more involved or engaged on foreign policy since the years of the Vietnam War, perhaps. People have very strong opinions on what is happening in Gaza, the International Criminal Court, or ICC, Ukraine and so on. Yes, it is a very competitive marketplace.
What is happening to the ICC and Gaza is having a very negative effect on the perceptions of Western countries in the Sahel and North Africa, in particular. Activists on Sudan are simultaneously activists on Palestine. The ICC has a dimension in Sudan. What is happening in Israel-Gaza is having repercussions throughout the continent and on our perceptions, too.
The Chair: Thank you.
Ms. Zahar: I do not have much to add. I am not hopeful, actually, that the G7 will be the place to raise the profile, exactly because of the perception that the countries of the G7 have actually chosen a camp on issues, such as the protection of civilians and what have you, and our credibility has been dented. However, I do think there is a real opportunity to structure a dialogue with the G20. That is something Canada has done very successfully on other issues in the past. When the next opportunity to have that kind of dialogue at the G20 is? I don’t know.
But on Sudan, as on other peace and security issues in Africa, we cannot continue to discuss these things among ourselves as Western countries. That has actually contributed to the cynicism and the lack of confidence that many African countries have vis-à-vis us. The dialogue needs to be more respectful of equal partnerships.
There is one hopeful little note on all of this, which is the agreement that was reached at the UN Security Council back in December on the funding of African Union, or AU, peace operations. That was the one time where there was an equal-to-equal discussion that achieved results that very few people thought were possible.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: My question is for both witnesses.
Resolution 2719 was adopted in 2023 by the UN Security Council. It seeks to amend the financing model that Ms. Zahar was talking about for support operations for the African Union, by giving it access to UN funding through assessed contributions. Do you feel that this new model will increase financing to AU-led peace operations? What should Canada do? Should Canada encourage this financing model at the G7?
Ms. Zahar: I’ll start. It is a financing model that, in my opinion, has both positive and negative effects. On the positive side, the model ensures that part of the funds will be allocated to the operations budget. That said, it still requires that close to 25% of the total amount be raised afterward. That doesn’t entirely solve the financing problem.
We’ve also heard in the evidence given by witnesses that the African Union’s approach isn’t always a peacekeeping one. The AU takes a much more robust position when it comes to enforcing peace. For example, in the missions it has led in Somalia, it has no qualms about using military force. In a polycrisis situation, where terrorism as well as political problems exist in a country, the use of force could have unintended consequences and actually undermine the objectives of sustainable conflict resolution. Providing help and support does not mean shirking responsibility.
I’ll go back to something Mr. Coghlan said earlier: We cannot just provide support and financing without more meaningful involvement. That would basically mean that we don’t mind signing the cheque, but we’ll get others to do the dirty work. It’s hard work, and our contribution must go beyond money, especially if we want to restore the trust that has been lost between Western countries and the countries on the African continent. Canada is not the worst offender. Trust is at a low ebb. We need to be a partner, not just a generous donor.
Senator Gerba: Thank you. Do you want to add anything, Mr. Coghlan?
[English]
The Chair: You have one minute to respond, Mr. Coghlan.
Mr. Coghlan: Very quickly, I’m not fully up to speed on this issue of the African Union financing. Unfortunately, in the case of Sudan, which is the largest crisis on the continent, the African Union appears to be paralyzed right now. That’s partly its subset, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, or IGAD, the regional organization, has bitter internal splits.
The old saw of African solutions to African problems is simply not happening. If there is any hope at all in Sudan for a peace process right now, it will be the United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. That is not an ideal approach, but the African Union is in paralysis because of internal splits on what to do.
The Chair: Thank you very much. Unfortunately, we have come to the end of our time on what has been a very rich discussion. On behalf of the committee, I thank Professor Marie-Joëlle Zahar and, of course, former ambassador Nicholas Coghlan for joining us today. We have benefited greatly from your comments. Thank you for taking the time, and, of course, your comments will be factored into our report as we draft it.
Thank you, colleagues. Unless there is anything else, we are adjourned.
(The committee adjourned.)