THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS
EVIDENCE
OTTAWA, Monday, June 5, 2023
The Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs met with videoconference this day at 4:02 p.m. [ET] to examine and report on issues relating to national security and defence generally.
Senator Jean-Guy Dagenais (Deputy Chair) in the chair.
[Translation]
The Deputy Chair: Welcome to this meeting of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs. My name is Jean-Guy Dagenais. I am a senator from Quebec and the deputy chair of the committee. Unfortunately, our chair, Senator Dean, was unable to join us today. I invite my colleagues to introduce themselves, beginning on my left.
[English]
Senator Yussuff: Good afternoon, ambassador, and welcome. Senator Yussuff, from Ontario.
Senator Ravalia: Good afternoon, Your Excellency, and welcome. Mohamed Ravalia, from Newfoundland and Labrador.
Senator Dasko: Donna Dasko, senator from Ontario.
Senator Cardozo: Andrew Cardozo from Ontario.
Senator Anderson: Margaret Dawn Anderson, Northwest Territories.
Senator M. Deacon: Marty Deacon from Ontario. Welcome.
[Translation]
Senator Boisvenu: Pierre-Hugues Boisvenu from Quebec.
[English]
Senator Petten: Iris Petten, Newfoundland and Labrador.
Senator R. Patterson: Rebecca Patterson from Ontario.
Senator Oh: Victor Oh, Ontario.
[Translation]
The Deputy Chair: I thank you and I take this opportunity to welcome Senator Petten, who is attending her first committee meeting. For those joining us live from across Canada, today we are welcoming three groups of experts who have been invited to inform about the committee about the current situation in the war between Russia and Ukraine.
The purpose of this meeting is to receive an update from our witnesses. To that end, each witness will be asked to give longer opening remarks for the committee. If time remains, senators may ask their questions.
For our first panel, we have the honour of welcoming Her Excellency Yuliya Kovaliv, Ambassador from the Embassy of Ukraine; from the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, Ihor Michalchyshyn, Chief Executive Officer and Executive Director, and by video conference, Orest Zakydalsky, Senior Policy Advisor. Thank you all for being here today. We will begin with Ambassador Kovaliv. Your Excellency, you may begin at your leisure.
[English]
Her Excellency Yuliya Kovaliv, Ambassador, Embassy of Ukraine to Canada: Honourable senators, it is my great pleasure and honour to be here today with you. Thank you for the opportunity to address you and provide an update on Ukrainian resistance and our fight for not only our country but for the principles of democracy, human rights and international established law and order for which Ukrainians are fighting now on the front line.
First of all, I would like to thank you for the robust support of the Canadian people, Canadian Parliament and Canadian government. We value Canada standing with us shoulder to shoulder for all of these 15 months of the full-scale Russian invasion.
Let me briefly update you on the situation in Ukraine and what is happening as of now.
As of today, the length of the active front line is about 1,300 kilometres. That is roughly like the Canada-U.S. border of Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba combined. Russia relies on cannon fodder, on scorched-earth tactics, while attacking Ukraine.
As of May 31 of this year, 207,000 Russian troops were killed in action during their attempt to occupy Ukraine. In the area of Bakhmut alone, Russia’s invaders suffered over 100,000 casualties. That is Russian tactics where Russia does not care about any of the lives of the Russian soldiers. Many of those soldiers sent by Russia were not trained and very poorly equipped. The operation Russia is planning in the Bakhmut region shows they just don’t care about any of their people’s lives. On the contrary, Ukraine cares and values each and every one of our soldiers on the front line.
In revenge, Russia continues to terrorize Ukrainian civilians. Russia is constantly attacking by air. In May, there were 17 massive air strikes in Kyiv, including on May 16 when 25 missiles of various types, and in particular 6 air ballistic missiles, were intercepted. The strike on May 28 had the largest number of Iranian-made drones, known as Shahed drones, and 58 of those drones were intercepted among the 59 drones that were in Kyiv region alone.
The air alarm sounds almost every day and night in Ukraine, especially in May. That is an enormous amount, almost every day or sometimes two times a day when Russia is striking with missiles, with drones, throughout all of the territory of Ukraine, and Kyiv in particular. That’s why the air defence, which Ukraine has been asking from our partners, is so crucial. We saw in May that most of the ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and Iranian drones were intercepted. We avoided a significant number of casualties among civilian people.
But still, it’s not enough. On June 1, when we all marked the International Day for Protection of Children, unfortunately, because of another attack, a 9-year-old child together with her mother, who were on their way to a shelter, were killed during another Russian air missile strike. That’s why the air defence is one of the big priorities.
We would like to thank you for Canada’s contribution to the military support, including the decision to procure the NASAMS system, which is one of the best air defence systems in the world, and to give it to Ukraine. In the NASAMS system, U.S. Patriots provide shields to Ukrainian civilians and to our cities, and they save the lives of thousands of Ukrainians in peaceful cities.
Canada’s provides armoured vehicles, artillery, shells and drones. These are all important investments not only for our victory but also for your Atlantic security. I would also like to recognize that 36,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been trained by the Operation UNIFIER training program. I would like to thank the Canadian instructors for all their dedication.
Ukraine defenders have liberated nearly half the area occupied by Russian troops since the start of the full-scale military invasion. This process will continue until the complete deoccupation of our sovereign territory with our internationally recognized borders. There should be no official restrictions or red lines for military and technical assistance to Ukraine.
The top five priorities for Ukraine in terms of the needed military support are the air defence systems, artillery and ammunition, armoured fighting vehicles and training, including the training of Ukrainian pilots.
The U.S., Great Britain, France, Belgium, Denmark, Portugal and the Netherlands agreed to work together on the creation of a coalition of fighter jets which are highly needed by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, including for the further steps needed for the liberation of our territory.
At the same time, we understand the capability of the defence sector to produce needed equipment both to support Ukraine further and to replace the stock in our partners and the Armed Forces of our allies. Cooperation with the defence sector is crucial. It is also crucial to provide the tools for the defence sector to quickly ramp up and produce the weapons and ammunition that is desperately needed for Ukraine to go further on a counteroffensive.
This also requires multi-year support programs so that the defence sector can not only ramp up but also increase investments to enable Ukraine’s ability to fight further and to increase their own capabilities. As an example, Norway already launched a multi-year support program for Ukraine. Last week, Denmark announced $2.6 billion U.S. dollars. The increase of the financing of the Ukrainian fund is aimed to strengthen our combat capabilities in the short and medium realm. The multi‑year program of military support will help to ramp up defence sector production and to secure the production of much needed military equipment for Ukraine.
Iran and Belarus, along with Russia, bear responsibility for terrorism against Ukraine. In response to the increased number of Iranian drones that have been supplied by Iran to Russia, Ukraine imposed sanctions against Iran for 50 years, which includes a ban on trade investment, transfer of technology, transit and withdrawal of all of the assets of Iran. Lukashenko’s regime in Belarus remains the Kremlin’s proxy in this war against Ukraine, and the territory of Belarus is used for training and logistics purposes for the Russian invasion.
At the same time, the Russian invasion strengthened Euro Atlantic unity. It will be even stronger when Ukraine becomes a member of the strongest military alliance, NATO. As of today, 18 NATO member countries have signed the declaration in support of Ukraine’s NATO membership. Last year, Ukraine signed an application for accelerated accession to NATO. We would appreciate a strong stance by Canada, the Canadian Parliament, to support Ukraine’s application to become a NATO member.
Today, we have several prerequisites. Ukraine already has a strong military capability, including support of the training programs which are launched based on the NATO standards. The Ukrainian Armed Forces are successfully using NATO-standard weapons. Despite the war, the Ukrainian defence sector is continuing deep reforms to bring our institutions and regulations to the NATO standards. We believe this year the Vilnius Summit of NATO should be the historical one. The clear message for Ukraine’s future membership in NATO should be on the agenda of the NATO summit.
I would like to also thank you, both the Senate and the committee, for your role and for your support. We are grateful for the resolution of the Senate of Canada regarding the recognition of Russia’s crimes in Ukraine as a genocide of the Ukrainian people and for the immediate recognition by the Government of Canada designating the Wagner Group as a terrorist organization. I would like to thank you for your support of this motion.
There is one more area where Ukraine differs from Russia. We do care about all of our people and the soldiers. Unfortunately, as of May, we have a lot of Ukrainian prisoners of war. On May 25, 106 prisoners of war returned home. In total, since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, 2,430 people were returned from Russian captivity. Unfortunately, Russia still holds thousands of Ukrainian prisoners of war and civilians in terrible conditions. We continue to work to return all of them home from Russian captivity, and we call on further exchanges and support for our ability to liberate them and to get our people back.
Unfortunately, Russia fails to implement its obligations under International Humanitarian Law and is restricting the ICRC mandate to visit Ukrainian prisoners of war and civilians who are now in captivity. Unfortunately, none of the international organizations today have the ability to visit the prisoners of war to find out in what horrific circumstances these people are imprisoned. Video of people who have been liberated from Russian captivity shows that often they do not have any health care or medical support. Sometimes, there is lack of food. All the places where they are being kept in captivity, unfortunately, are far beyond humanity.
I would also like to raise one more issue which is now, for Ukraine, of crucial importance. It’s mining. First, I would like to thank you, Canada, for the robust support in Ukraine’s demining efforts. Unfortunately, today, the territory of over 155,000 kilometres is at risk of being contaminated by mines. This also includes thousands of hectares of agri-land which, because of mine contamination, cannot be used for producing food. Ukraine is one of the biggest food exporters, so this puts global food security at risk. I would like to thank the Canadian government for helping us actively on this file, including providing Ukraine with the big demining vehicles that can clean up the territories from mine contamination, allowing Ukrainian farmers to continue to work in the fields. This is of great importance for us, and I would like to thank you.
However, the challenge for Ukraine in the mining efforts is still so huge that if we take the normal average speed of demining, it will take more than 90 years to clean the territory from mine contamination. That’s why Ukraine has increased by four times the number of people that we recruit and train for the demining effort, equipping them with needed equipment, including demining rubbers, big demining vehicles and all the gear that will save their life. That is hugely importance to us. We value Canada’s support, and we hope the supports will continue, as this is one of the priority files.
As Ukraine understands it — and, historically, we are the country that suffered through the horrific crime of genocide known as Holodomor — global food security matters not only for the people of Ukraine but also on a global scale. Ukraine was the supporter and the initiator of the grain deal, the Istanbul grain initiative, which allowed Ukrainian exports through the Black Sea ports.
Unfortunately, now, with the last four weeks, the situation with the grain deal is increasingly difficult and the number of ships that have been inspected by Russia is decreasing significantly. Of course, that puts a huge risk on the further exports of Ukrainian grain from the seaports. As a result, it would also have influence on other countries, including the African countries.
As we understand the needs of the further export of food and food security, Ukraine launched an initiative called, “Grain from Ukraine.” It is a humanitarian program led by President Zelenskyy and supported by many countries, including Canada, where we have already provided 170,000 pounds of wheat to Ethiopia, Somali, Yemen, Kenya and are ready to continue providing more humanitarian support with Ukrainian wheat and other grains to help those countries that most need it and where the level of food insecurity is quite high.
As a final note, I would like to thank you, the members of the committee, for also working on an important file, and that is Russian disinformation. It is a weapon that is sometimes even more dangerous than Russian missiles and Russian tanks. Disinformation is the weapon that is usually not seen until it hits the minds of people and spreads the lies and doubts which have taken particular aim at destroying the unity among people, partners and countries. We also would like to thank you, the Government of Canada and the Parliament, for putting attention on disinformation and its danger. There is no one-time solution to successfully fight disinformation, but I think our joint efforts, working on a daily basis to explain, tell the truth and provide the relevant data, are very important to keep this unity and to fight this important weapon that, unfortunately, Russia is using as a part of the war.
Honourable senators, Ukraine is grateful for your leadership, your voice and your efforts to stand with us against the horror of the Russian full-scale invasion, and I would like to thank you from all of the people of Ukraine, including those who are fighting now on the front-line, for your standing support.
I am ready to answer all of your questions. Thank you.
[Translation]
The Deputy Chair: Thank you for your presentation. I would like to acknowledge the presence of senators Richards and Kutcher. We will now hear from Mr. Michalchyshyn.
[English]
Ihor Michalchyshyn, Chief Executive Officer and Executive Director, Ukrainian Canadian Congress: My colleague Orest Zakydalsky is joining us by video link and will assist with questions, but I’ll do the opening statement.
Thank you very much for the invitation to join this committee, and thank you to the ambassador for her excellent presentation and the great work she and her team are doing in these difficult circumstances.
For those who are not familiar with our organization, the Ukrainian Canadian Congress is the voice of Canada’s Ukrainian community. Together with our member organizations, provincial councils and branches, we are the leading coordinating and representing body for the interests of the self-identified 1.4 million-strong Ukrainian-Canadian community. We have been active since 1940, and we work to shape Canada’s social, economic and political landscape.
Before we talk about the war in Ukraine, I would like to take a moment to thank all Canadians, and especially the senators in this room, who have in the last fifteen months come together to donate, fundraise and demonstrate support of Ukraine and literally open their homes to Ukrainians who have come to Canada to seek refuge from Russia’s war. I would note for our friends from Newfoundland that I just saw an extraordinary documentary that I will send along to you, called “Rest Ashore,” which is particularly poignant with how that province has welcomed Ukrainians. The generosity and kindness that Canadians have shown will always be remembered by our community and the Ukrainian people. This year, the UCC and the Canada-Ukraine Foundation, or CUF, have jointly formed the Ukraine Humanitarian Appeal, which has raised over $60 million for humanitarian projects in Ukraine.
As the ambassador noted, last Thursday was International Children’s Day, a day which Russia marked by firing missiles at Ukraine’s capital and killing a nine-year-old girl and her mother. Subsequently, there have been many other missile attacks — thankfully, most of them shot down. There have been over 480 children killed in Ukraine since the beginning of the war and over 980 wounded. Ukraine has also identified 19,000 Ukrainian children that Russia has deported or illegally separated from their parents. The actual numbers of murdered, injured or stolen by Russia are likely to be far higher.
The trauma and devastation that Russia is inflicting on the Ukrainian people will affect generations to come. We know that the Office of the General Prosecutor is investigating over 80,000 instances of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the Russian invaders. Mass rape, torture, murder, forced deportation and mass abduction of children are some of the litany of horrible crimes that are happening this year as Russia commits its war against Ukraine. It is important to note that these are not random crimes. These are not actions of a few rogue soldiers. These are deliberate, systematic and part of Russian military state policy. These are the crimes by which Russia seeks to destroy the Ukrainian people. The cruelty is not incidental. The cruelty is their point.
Russia is a criminal state which should be isolated from the international community. Canada’s House and Senate have unanimously recognized Russia’s actions in Ukraine as acts of genocide and called for the government to list the Russian mercenary Wagner group as a terrorist entity. We would call on Global Affairs Canada to implement this. The UCC has consistently argued that the Russian Federation must be designated a state sponsor of terrorism and that the 81 Russian diplomats present in Canada — I use the word “diplomat” loosely — must be expelled. I ask the committee for your support in this call.
The UCC and our community applaud the assistance that Canada has provided to Ukraine, including over $4.5 billion in government loans and over $1 billion in weapons and, as the ambassador mentioned, the strong people-to-people links of the over 35,000 Ukrainian armed forces soldiers who have been trained by Operation UNIFIER. We are proud to know that the Canadian Armed Forces continue to train their counterparts in the Ukrainian armed forces, in Latvia and the United Kingdom. We welcome these announcements of increases in training size.
However, more assistance from Canada and our allies needs to follow. Unfortunately, in Budget 2023, we did not see major investments by Canada in Ukrainian defence. Here are a few observations on military assistance from our perspective.
First, Ukraine needs far more heavy weapons than we and our allies are providing right now, specifically tanks, armoured personnel carriers, air defence systems, long-range missile systems, naval defence, artillery and ammunition for each of these systems.
Next, Ukraine needs fighter jets to protect its skies and continue to deny Russian air superiority. Several of our allies, for example, Poland and Slovakia, have committed to deliver jets to Ukraine. The fighter jet coalition that is taking shape, a little belatedly but it is taking place, includes several key NATO allies, including the U.S. and the United Kingdom. That is a key for Ukraine’s future defence. We believe Canada can play a key role in this by training Ukrainian pilots on NATO jets such as the F-16 and by working with other allies on the need to supply Ukraine with more fighter jets in the future.
The security of Canada, our European allies and Ukraine requires a sustained commitment to increasing production and procurement of weapons and ammunition. We look forward to the Canadian government making multi-year investments to ensure we have the stockpiles to deal with the current and future Russian aggression. Once Ukraine defeats Russia in this war, Russia will still remain an enemy of Ukraine, an adversary of NATO and a threat to peace in the world. We need to be prepared.
As Ukraine’s defence minister Oleksii Reznikov said on May 31 at the CANSEC conference, a list of high-tech Canadian equipment that Ukraine needs has been provided to the government. We urge our government to work closely with industry to fulfill these needs as quickly as possible. We stress the urgency of what Canada can do in the immediate weeks and days. The longer we wait to make decisions to liberate Ukraine, the more Ukrainians are killed, soldiers and civilians, the more are wounded and injured, and the larger the price Ukraine pays. It’s our fervent hope that Ukraine’s allies, Canada key among them, will deliver this aid with the tools that are needed to win in the near future.
Finally, as the NATO summit approaches in July in Vilnius, we know that Canada has consistently supported Ukraine’s membership in the NATO alliance. The summit is an historic opportunity to move from the open-door policy framework to the concrete and practical implementation of that open door. We hope Canada will use its good offices to ensure that emerging from the Vilnius summit, there will be a roadmap for Ukraine’s membership in NATO because we know the future of Europe — indeed the world — depends on it.
I will be pleased to answer any questions, along with my colleague Orest Zakydalsky.
[Translation]
The Deputy Chair: Thank you, Mr. Michalchyshyn.
We will now move on to a round of questions. Note that the first part of the meeting will end at 5:00 p.m. We will do our best to ensure that at least one member of each parliamentary group has time to ask a question. You have a total of four minutes for questions and answers.
Senator Boisvenu: Your Excellency, it is a pleasure to see you.
I would like to talk to you a bit about China. We know that President Zelenskyy had a discussion with the Chinese president. Mr. Putin also met with the Chinese president. A lot of observers think that China could intervene in this matter to find a compromise or to find a way out of this war.
What are your thoughts on China and its role in the conflict between Ukraine and Russia?
[English]
Ms. Kovaliv: Thank you for the question.
Indeed, President Zelenskyy had a call with the Chinese leader. The key topic President Zelenskyy is discussing with many leaders around the world, including the Chinese leader, is the peace formula of President Zelenskyy. What Ukraine is seeking is sustainable peace. The peace formula, which has 10 points and was endorsed by the UN resolution, includes the main objectives of Ukraine’s peace.
First, there’s the restoration of the sovereign borders of Ukraine. The peace formula includes justice. Justice is important not only for Ukraine; it is important for all the world because if the war crimes — crimes of aggression, sexual crimes, crimes against women and children — are left unpunished, this impunity can also endorse other dictators to commit these kinds of crimes. That’s why justice is in the centre of our peace formula. Nuclear security is also included because the current situation in the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, which is the biggest nuclear power plant in Europe, remains at a very high risk. The third is food security — which I covered in my introductory speech — and ecocide, because war also brings damage to the ecosystem and the environment. Its consequences reach far beyond the borders of Ukraine. There are many others.
Ukraine is working with a variety of partners to get support for the peace formula we presented because we believe it’s the only grounds for sustainable peace in Ukraine.
Senator Cardozo: I would like to take the issue a bit broader with your knowledge of what Russia is planning. I wonder if you could share with us your thoughts about their global plans. What they’re doing in Ukraine is certainly of great concern to the whole world. It’s illegal in every sense of the word. But they have plans beyond Ukraine. There is news about them moving more actively in Cuba and working with Iran. There’s talk about them moving into Africa in various ways. What are your thoughts about what their plans are, regardless of how things work out in Ukraine? What do you see as their plans? What is their motivation?
Ms. Kovaliv: I think we can all agree that Russia has already strategically lost in Ukraine. At the beginning of the full-scale invasion, there were many people around the world who believed that Kyiv would fall in days or weeks. We have had 15 months of the full-scale Russian invasion, and we have not only managed to hold the line but to liberate 50% of the territories that were captured.
I think that the more sanction pressure is put on Russia, the more Russia is a pariah state. If we see the consequences of the latest decision of the International Criminal Court, or ICC, which provided the global arrest warrant for Putin and his so-called Children’s Ombudsman, this all brings Putin and his regime into a pariah state. Of course, they are trying to find ways to get more weapons, including the Iranian Shahed drones that Iran is providing to Russia and including their contacts with North Korea and other countries.
However, if we look at the UN vote, the number of countries that condemn the Russian illegal invasion is far over 120–146 for the relevant resolutions. Of course, since there are strict sanctions on Russia and the Russian military sector, Russia is trying to find a way to circumvent the sanctions and find third party intermediaries that would help provide them with this needed technology, equipment and chips and to provide the semiconductors to be able to produce more weapons. In order to deprive Russia of that ability, there should be a stricter way of how we deal with the circumvention of sanctions. The key Russian aim now is to find those allies who will help them circumvent the sanctions, and the stronger we all are together on that file, the weaker Russia will be in their capability to reproduce the weapons they’ve lost while fighting in Ukraine.
Senator Ravalia: Welcome, once again.
Your Excellency, there’s evidence of the Ukrainian government taking increased measures to crack down on corruption within the country, including the detention recently of the Supreme Court head. These measures are obviously critical in preparation for the application to NATO as well as to the EU. Are you concerned about levels of corruption within the country and the impact these may have on continuing to fight the war against Russia?
Ms. Kovaliv: Thank you.
It remains the top priority of the Ukrainian government to build transparency in the government in all of its procedures, despite the other files that take a lot of effort — the first, of course, being fighting the war and protecting the people. I think the case you mentioned sends a clear message to everybody in Ukraine and to our partners outside that, when it comes to any corruption crimes, there is nobody untouchable in the government whatever high position they have held. This case is about one of the highest top officials in the country who has been caught in a corruption case. It is sending a clear signal to all of us that the government has the aim to fight corruption and is effectively doing it while fighting the war.
Also, the government is committed to further work on strengthening these institutions. Just recently, there was a decision needed to continue with the cleaning up of the justice system and improving the process of bringing judges to accountability. A special commission was created, which was one of the big milestones of our plan to reform the system of justice. There are many other files Ukraine is working on. Of course, now with Ukraine having the status of a candidate to EU membership, a lot of reforms that aim to build transparency and to reform the judicial system are based on our aspiration to the European Union. We are closely working with the EU on that file. The third pillar is the IMF program. A big part of the program of the International Monetary Fund is on improving transparency, and that is a top priority for us. We continue working on this file.
There could be other cases. That is where you see the president standing on the position that there will be no one who is untouchable. We will fight to the very end, as with Russian enemies, as with corruption.
Senator Richards: I’m sorry I was a bit late. Thank you for being here.
Ambassador, the spring offensive seems to have begun. Of course, there’s no guarantee that this offensive will have the absolute positive results we all hope for, which is the dismantling of Russian aggression. It has been telegraphed, and the Russians are ready for it. Can we expect this offensive to be as successful as once expected? If not, then this is the question, really: How do you think this will affect the morale of Ukrainians — though I don’t think it will affect the morale of Ukrainians — and of its allies in the West, which is the most important thing?
Ms. Kovaliv: Thank you. I was expecting the question about the counteroffensive.
On a serious note, a counteroffensive is not something that Ukraine treats as a film or show that you can buy tickets for in the first season and see how it goes. It’s very hard work for each and every soldier and commander. As many of you know, on the military and defence side, it is up to the majority of logistics and the ability to have the needed weapons and their speedy supply. If you were to ask me about the counteroffensive and the skill and the dedicated fight of our men and women who are now on the front lines, its success will be determined on the amount and the speed of delivery of the needed weapons to Ukraine. I think it’s up to us together to determine the success of the counteroffensive.
In terms of the morale, we saw in the autumn the attacks on civilian infrastructure and on the electricity grids, depriving people of electricity, heat and gas, everything needed in the cold winters. The idea for Russia was to break the morale of Ukrainians. Today, we are at the beginning of summer, and the morale of Ukrainians is high. Over 86% believe in a full Ukrainian victory, including the restoration of all Ukrainian borders, and they are ready to continue to sacrifice to achieve this goal. For us Ukrainians, I think, morale is as high as it was on the very first day of the aggression. Even despite the attacks in autumn and now in May, I think people are spending almost every night in bomb shelters, and in the morning they go to the office and children go to school. That’s because of their resilience and high morale. I think it’s for all of us together to determine the success for the counteroffensive.
Senator Richards: Thank you.
Senator Dasko: Thank you, ambassador, Mr. Michalchyshyn and Mr. Zakydalsky for being here today.
Ambassador, when will the war end?
Ms. Kovaliv: When the Russian troops either leave the sovereign territory of Ukraine themselves or our soldiers kick them out.
Senator Dasko: Will it end this year?
Ms. Kovaliv: It depends on how robust the support is and how much time it will take for our partners and allies to make the decision on further helping us with much-needed weapons. I can reassure you that Ukraine, the country and the Ukrainian people, are those who want the victory and the end of the war the most in the world, but we want this victory and peace to be sustainable. Unfortunately, we have learned from history, from Russia’s invasion of Georgia, from Russia’s illegal occupation of Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and from Russia’s operations of Syria. Unfortunately, the only way to have sustainable peace in Ukraine is to liberate all the territories of Ukraine.
Senator Dasko: Do you have a sense of the time frame?
Ms. Kovaliv: It will depend on all of us, we Ukrainians who are fighting and the much-needed support that is provided.
Senator Dasko: I want to ask you about reparations and reconstruction. Is there discussion of that now? If so, who is engaged in those discussions and what direction are they going?
Ms. Kovaliv: Thank you.
Just over a month ago, the World Bank made an assessment of the damages that the Russian illegal invasion brought to Ukraine. The figures are over $111 billion. That is the cost of the damage. Of course, Ukraine will require a lot of capital inflows to rebuild the country, including infrastructure, the energy sector, residential buildings, hospitals and schools.
We believe that Russia needs to pay for it, whether they would like to pay or if there is an instrument. We believe this instrument is already available, which is the issue of the frozen sovereign Russian assets. There are over $200 billion in Russian state assets, which are frozen now. We believe that seizing these assets and transferring them to the needs of rebuilding Ukraine is actually fair and needs to be done. Russia is the country that caused this damage, and Russia needs to pay for this damage.
There are discussions among the partners and among countries on the legal aspects of this, but I would like to thank you, Government of Canada and Parliament, for the support of the legislation where Canada was the first among all of the countries to adopt legislation that allows the process of seizing the assets, both the sovereign assets and the assets of Russian-sanctioned oligarchs. That is an example for other countries to follow, because we believe these Russian sovereign assets need to be used both for rebuilding and also paying damages to the people who suffered from their illegal invasion.
Senator Oh: Thank you, ambassador, for attending this committee session.
What additional military equipment can Canada provide to Ukraine?
Ms. Kovaliv: Thank you for that very precise question.
Of course, Ukraine’s priority on military aid, the air defence and the missiles for the systems, is crucially needed to protect the civilian infrastructure and the cities. As we saw the examples when the air defence system intercepted the ballistic missiles, as they called it a few years ago, “their strategic weapon,” this is how the military support protects the people. Of course, that is artillery and ammunition. Those are the crucial things. The third is armoured fighting vehicles. We are grateful that Canada provided 39 armoured personnel carriers last year. We still have a big need for them. And training. We value the UNIFIER program that trains our soldiers, our tactical people, the engineers on how to work with the Leopard tanks and the many other fields this training covers. Of course, we need to continue with the training, including, at some point, training for pilots as well.
Senator Yussuff: Thank you, Madam Ambassador, for being here. Thank you, of course, for travelling the country to talk to Canadians and also to talk to many of your former citizens who are now in Canada. I know this is not an easy effort on behalf of Ukraine, but equally on behalf our country Canada in terms of how Canadians are stepping up. I think there’s very little I can add to the conversation. From everything you have said, I think our country has stepped up and continues to support, which I think is critical. It is a long-term effort, because we don’t know when this war will end. Your presence to engage Canadians in this effort is really critical. As much as we’d like to believe that people have an endless support for the war, if you’re not in their face talking about it, we will lose that support. I want to thank you for all you are doing, travelling the country, talking to Canadians and going from community to community.
I’m not from Ukraine, but I can tell you how passionate I feel about the efforts of Ukraine to defend their sovereignty. I think this is probably the most critical moment in the history of the world since the Second World War. We’ve seen such blatant attacks on a country’s sovereignty and the justification of Russia to steal the soil of another country. We haven’t seen this for a long time. I think if we’re going to be successful in the long-term effort, at least from a Canadian perspective, your presence on the ground is critical in that regard. I also want to extend sympathy to my friends in the Ukrainian Congress and thank them for all of the work they are doing to reach out to Canadians, to raise funds, but also to remind us that we have a role and responsibility. Our Parliament and our Senate have been strong.
I want to again extend my solidarity to you, and again, thank you for the good work you have been doing in talking to Canadians because I think that reinforces what our Parliament is doing. We need to stand with Ukrainian people until they reach the ultimate victory to regain their soil but also to reclaim the sovereignty of their entire country that has been violated by the Russian invasion. Thank you so much.
Senator R. Patterson: Madam Ambassador, you have put forth some very important points about what Ukraine needs now and what they need in the future as they step into victory and reconstruction.
First and foremost, I can’t help but thank the Ukrainian people, yourselves, everybody, for standing up to this Russian imperialism, which I know will be a discussion as you move forward into future conferences.
One thing we also know, or one of the crimes that Russia has committed, is they have targeted medical facilities. From the very early days of the war, they claimed it was random destruction of maternity hospitals, but we know there is some deliberate targeting in that, which in and of itself is a war crime. We also know it is great to have armour, ships, planes and heavy artillery, but without people, there is no defence of Ukraine. I’m also aware that the NATO COMEDS are looking at how to better support Ukraine in not only providing medical care and evacuation within the system you currently have but also into the future.
I have two questions. First, from a medical support perspective, is there anything Canada can do to help in the here and now? Then in terms of ongoing reconstruction, is there anything you would be looking for from Canada?
Ms. Kovaliv: Thank you.
Indeed, engineers, doctors and teachers are also among the heroes because of the amount of work that they are doing and just deliberately saving the lives of the people, both the soldiers on the front lines but also civilians, unfortunately, who are targeted by Russian aggression. It’s huge.
I would also like to thank the special mission of Canadian surgeons coming back and forth with their mission to not only help with the surgeries for those wounded and also to train Ukrainian doctors, who then can come back home and share their experience and also use the experience they are getting from Canadian surgeons and doctors in Ukraine. We do value this.
Of course, there is one more field of great importance for us, which is mental health. It’s not only about those who are physically wounded. People who are either on the front lines or those children and women, just simple citizens of Ukraine who are coming through all the horror of the war, under missile attacks, those who have suffered sexual crimes, including children and elderly people, they all have deep psychological trauma. For us, the mental health issues for the millions of people in the country is of big concern and big priority for the government. Of course, knowing the strong mental health care system in Canada, we welcome the support of building in Ukraine a strong mental health system as part of health care throughout the country, including training specialists so the people in Ukraine could get the mental health support they need, both now and postwar. This is an issue that all Ukrainians will deal with in the years ahead.
Senator Kutcher: Thank you, Ambassador Kovaliv and Mr. Michalchyshyn, for being here and for your attention to the importance of this issue for us.
I want to build on Senator Patterson’s question on mental health. We’ve had those discussions. I want to come down to specifics for the committee to understand. Ambassador and Mr. Michalchyshyn, if there were two things that you would say that you would really like Canada to step up to right now, the top two priorities on the mental health area, what would those two top things be so that we would be able to see some action in moving this important issue forward?
Ms. Kovaliv: Thank you, senator, for the question.
I will be frank with you. I’m not a deep expert in the mental health system and the proper building of it. I do know that our government and the ministry of health care are working on building the whole system, and incorporated in the health care system of Ukraine there are other countries, our partners, who are stepping in with support, whether it’s in PTSD treatment or training.
I would say here that to properly address this question, it would be great if our government, and we have a dedicated ministry of health care that is now developing the roadmap on the needs of mental health care, could share that with their colleagues in the Government of Canada and relevant ministries. I would not take my responsibility to name those two priorities, being not a deep expert on the building of the mental health system.
[Translation]
The Deputy Chair: We are at the end of our panel. I would like to thank Her Excellency, Ms. Yuliya Kovaliv, and Mr. Michalchyshyn and Mr. Zakydalsky. We are most grateful to you for the time and effort that you have put into this session. Your courage is a source of inspiration for all of us. We stand at your side and we offer our undying support. Thank you for your participation.
We will now move to our second panel. For those joining us live, this meeting is about the war between Russia and Ukraine.
For this second panel, we will have the pleasure of welcoming Ms. Kerry Buck, Senior Fellow at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa and Former Ambassador of Canada to NATO. Welcome Ms. Buck.
We also welcome Mr. Alexander Lanoszka, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Waterloo. Welcome Mr. Lanoszka.
Finally, by video conference, we welcome General (Ret’d) Dominique Trinquand, Former Head, French Military Mission to the UN and NATO. Welcome, General Trinquand.
I thank you for joining us today. We will begin by inviting you to give your opening remarks, which will be followed by questions from our members. Ms. Buck shall start us off.
Ms. Buck, the floor is yours.
Kerry Buck, Former Ambassador of Canada to NATO, and Senior Fellow, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, as an individual: I would like to thank the committee for inviting me to appear before you.
[English]
I am appearing as an individual and speaking entirely from a personal perspective providing my own analysis based on almost 30 years of experience as a diplomat who worked on international security, including at NATO. When I last appeared before you, which was about a year ago, I spoke of why I thought President Putin had launched the invasion and how the war had evolved in its first six months.
In the short time I have for my remarks today, I would like to focus on the challenges or risks in the months ahead for Ukraine, NATO and NATO allies like Canada. I see four areas where I believe the international community needs to focus in the weeks and months ahead.
First, the maintenance of international support for Ukraine will be crucial not only in terms of political support but also logistics.
The fact is that President Putin has more people to throw at the war in Ukraine and less to lose. He has shown a disregard for the fate of Russian soldiers and a propensity to use them as cannon fodder. A long, grinding war of attrition is in Russia’s interest and, in fact, may be their strategy, hoping to see support from the West start to crumble. Minister Lavrov, their foreign minister, has said as much publicly.
What do NATO and NATO allies like Canada need to do? They need to put in place a longer-term strategic plan to provide weaponry and other support to Ukraine. For the past year, the rhythm of support to Ukraine has been marked by President Zelenskyy asking for specific support and then allies moving — sometimes quickly; sometimes more slowly — to find what is needed, provide the training and get it into theatre. This is different from a strategic plan that ensures a steady flow of predictable support. The next NATO summit in Vilnius, in early July, should include a commitment to a stable, long-term plan to provide Ukraine with weaponry, ammunition, supplies and support needed to continue to liberate Ukrainian territory occupied by Russia. To achieve this, allied defence production and procurement needs to be stepped up. Ukraine is burning through ammunition and weaponry faster than the West can provide it, and stockpiles are being depleted.
Related to this is the need for Ukrainian military to meet NATO standards, which will provide a significant deterrent to Russia going forward. They need to be able to move away from Soviet-era equipment and toward NATO interoperability. That, too, requires a steady stream of weaponry into Ukraine.
In terms of political support for Ukraine, the maintenance of NATO unity is key. I say “maintenance” because it’s something that takes constant diplomatic care and feeding to achieve. Some allies, like Hungary, have been taking positions that could harm NATO unity on Ukraine, and quiet and constant pressure is needed to stay the course.
International political support for Ukraine is not just about NATO allies. It’s also about a larger world with countries that could, if they aligned themselves with the NATO position, not only help to isolate Russia but also apply pressure. For example, a few months ago we saw a string of Western leaders travelling to China. That was about China bilateral relations, but it was also about pressuring China to send a clear message to Russia that they shouldn’t resort to nuclear weapons. That’s my impression. It’s important to do that diplomatic work around the world to isolate Russia.
Second, aside from support to Ukraine, another question I expect high on the agenda of the Vilnius summit is Ukraine’s future relationship with NATO. Will Ukraine be offered formal security guarantees? What kind of security arrangements? Will there be a clear path to NATO membership with concrete steps?
I don’t expect the Vilnius summit to come up with an answer on this, and Jens Stoltenberg has been pretty clear that while there’s an ongoing war, this isn’t going to happen. That’s not determinative; it’s logical for now. Maybe it goes without saying, but with Article 5 of the mutual defence guarantee, if you bring in a NATO ally that’s in the midst of a war, the Article 5 obligations would kick in. NATO’s been very clear to avoid going into direct conflict with Russia. To bring Ukraine in too early, before the war ends, could hasten that if you are being true to Article 5 and the rationale for NATO. Ukrainian membership will and should happen after the war. Jens Stoltenberg, in advance of the summit, has been clear that Ukraine will become a member.
The thing that the Vilnius summit needs to do is go beyond the language from the 2008 Bucharest Summit that said Ukraine will become a member and then did nothing about it in terms of concrete steps. There will have to be a clear path with steps to NATO membership. More importantly is credible arrangements to provide Ukraine’s security through a steady flow of weaponry, but other steps as well. Also, after the war, there must be some kind of interim security arrangements as well.
The third issue the international community will have to grapple with at some point is that of peace talks. We don’t need to get into it; the time is not now. It’s unthinkable now, but at some point the international community will have to figure out how to work with Russia. It’s in our collective and longer-term security interests to do so. Timing and content have to be driven by the Ukrainian leadership, and it can’t happen until enough territorial gains have been made so that Ukraine can, from a position of strength, either pressure Putin to accept a negotiated compromise, or enough has been won that Ukraine can decide on its own, with backing from Western nations, that the conflict could be frozen, regardless of Putin’s intent. To achieve this, the West must remain united and coordinated. It’s not helpful if Western leaders start to muse publicly about peace talks before the Ukrainians do.
Fourth, and finally, when the war starts moving to an end, the international community has to turn its focus to accountability, reconstruction and reintegration of returnees. Some of that planning work has already begun, but I can see some areas where Canada could bring its skills and resources to bear: resettlement and reintegration of refugees, helping to bring about accountability for war crimes, rebuilding certain economic sectors such as the agricultural sector, reconstruction of infrastructure and bolstering the building blocks of democracy.
That’s not just about post-conflict reconstruction. It’s also about meeting NATO standards that will then allow Ukraine to accede to NATO. Why? Because NATO accession and meeting NATO standards isn’t just about military capabilities. It’s also about having a functioning market economy, a functioning democracy, legislative institutions that include civilian control of the military and a whole host of legislation in place to ensure that those institutional structures work.
I’ll leave it there. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
[Translation]
The Deputy Chair: Thank you very much, Ms. Buck.
We will now hear Mr. Alexander Lamoszka’s presentation.
You have the floor, Mr. Lamoszka.
Alexander Lanoszka, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Waterloo, and Senior Fellow, Macdonald-Laurier Institute, as an individual: Honourable senators, I thank you for your invitation. It is a great honour for me to have this opportunity to discuss this very important topic.
[English]
As the occasion indicates, the last time I spoke before you was about a year ago. In preparation for this meeting today, I reviewed what I had said back then to see whether my assessments and predictions at the time still hold up. I explained that Ukraine had suffered withering cost, despite the strategic and tactical successes that it achieved in the face of Russia’s full‑scale invasion. I concluded, however, that from Putin’s perspective, at least, it was unclear whether he himself believed that he was losing and that Russia had indeed inflicted massive pain on Ukraine, had possessed about 20% of Ukrainian territory at that time, including key parts of the Kharkiv and Kherson Oblasts in addition to the northern shores of Sea of Azov. That all said, Ukraine’s fighting spirit has been indefatigable, and Ukraine understands the need to conserve its military forces while Russia was running into serious morale and equipment problems. Accordingly, we were very far away from any sort of negotiated settlement to resolve the war.
I dare say that this assessment has largely held up. That said, I think we can allow ourselves a bit more optimism about Ukraine’s prospects in militarily defeating Russia in the time ahead.
For one, Ukraine successfully mounted counteroffensives in the Kharkiv and Kherson Oblasts to varying degrees of difficulty, to be sure, in the late summer and fall of last year, thereby shrinking Russia’s zone of occupation on Ukrainian territory. Russia still occupies a lot of territory, but it has expended much materiel and personnel in trying to capture sites of dubious military value, such as in Bakhmut. The result of those efforts is that major morale problems within the Russian army persist, with anecdotes of its mobilized personnel being of very low quality and lacking basic training, as well as ammunition, while holding down a very long front line of the sort that the ambassador described.
For another, although Ukraine has incurred massive losses and traumas that we cannot ignore, the Ukrainian population remains highly motivated to see the challenge through. Despite concerns that Western support would dissipate, it remains resilient and robust, with a number of NATO countries expanding their military assistance to include the provision of main battle tanks as well as air-launched cruise missiles — something once thought to be unthinkable. One concern is that Ukraine is dependent on the Western manufacture of munitions. Encouragingly, however, production in many NATO countries has stepped up.
Much hinges on the success of Ukraine’s upcoming counteroffensive. This might have begun today, as a matter of fact. We don’t really know. The fog of war is very thick. The discourse surrounding the counteroffensive has been very optimistic — arguably too optimistic, with many observers seemingly expecting that Ukraine will inflict massive losses on Russian forces and expel them from large swathes of Ukrainian territory in a one-fell-swoop action. I am sure that Ukraine will achieve success, but we must manage our expectations for three reasons, and I will echo what the ambassador said in the previous panel.
First, offensive or counteroffensive military operations are extremely difficult to undertake. Indeed, even a very successful military counteroffensive operation on the part of Ukraine will likely involve heavy losses as those Ukrainian military personnel will be put in the range of Russia’s artillery dominance. Indeed, we can expect heavy losses, which is a problem compounded by how munition shortages in Ukraine, as well as on the Western side, and delays in the provision of Western military assistance might mean more casualties than what could have been the case otherwise.
The second reason to manage our expectations is that Russia, ultimately, still is Russia. It has a lot of mass to bear, despite the operational and tactical problems that it has been experiencing for the last 15 months. It has built fortifications in occupied territories that admittedly are a very strong complicating factor for the Ukrainian armed forces. Russia has adapted somewhat to improve its combat effectiveness by improving the performance of its own air defence systems on Ukraine territory, as well as better integrating the use of drones with its artillery. It has unfortunately found new ways to terrorize the Ukrainian population, as we have seen with respect its use of Iranian suicide drones.
The other and final reason for being a little skeptical is to take note of how the spectre of a looming counteroffensive itself seems to have had really significant psychological effect on the Russian military, with much guesswork involved as to where the counteroffensive would take place and to what extent. Aside from its deception operations and the support of various border incursions into Russia itself, Ukraine has even raised the possibility of expelling those Russian forces located adjacent to Moldova and Transnistria. A massive counteroffensive across the entire front line will cede this psychological advantage unless, of course, Ukraine can achieve major operational success across multiple sectors of the front line. Given the varied difficulties associated with mounting a counteroffensive military operation, I imagine that Ukraine might want to proceed piecemeal to exploit Russian weak points, to create more psychological pressure and to constrain even more the Russian military presence on Ukrainian territory. Of course, I am not privy to Ukrainian military planning, and very few are. Anything can happen, but my point is that it is not obvious why the counteroffensive will be a front-wide action. It could take longer than we might think it will take.
Put together, the war is far from finished. I echo everything that the ambassador said. Russia is relentless, but Ukraine nevertheless sees the possibility of scoring very important victories in the near future. We are far from a negotiated settlement, which, if anything, is exactly what Russia would want right now to lock in its present gains. We should be optimistic about Ukraine, but that should not invite complacency on our part. If there is indeed one message I would like to impart today, it is certainly one that echoes the Ukrainian ambassador, and it is that much hard work remains to be done.
Thank you very much.
[Translation]
The Deputy Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Lanoszka, for your presentation.
General Trinquand will now have the floor.
General (Ret’d) Dominique Trinquand, Former Head, French Military Mission to the UN and NATO, as an individual: Thank you very much, senators, for inviting me.
For my part, I would say that, as a military man, the war in Ukraine is far more than just a war in Europe. It is a problem of international relations, geopolitics and the role that Russia, as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, naturally cannot continue to play given its current behaviour.
I will simply try to describe to you the stages of the war as I have seen them, the final goal being sought and the means for achieving that goal.
It must be acknowledged that this war is the goal of one man, Mr. Putin, who made a massive miscalculation in believing that he could overturn the government in Kyiv as easily as he did in 2014 when he successfully annexed Crimea.
That error led to a war he did not want, that he was not hoping for in the beginning, and for which the Russian army was not ready. That explains why the Russian army, after an initial phase that lasted until July during which it took a certain number of areas, faced a Ukrainian offensive in the fall, from about September to November, that allowed Ukraine to take back some territory, particularly in the Kharkiv region, and to repel Russian forces on the left bank of the Dnieper in the Kherson region.
Throughout the winter, to our great surprise, we saw that, despite Russian mobilization, Russia was unable to reconquer the area. The Bakhmut battle is a league of its own, taking seven months to secure and costing thousands of casualties. Today, we are awaiting the Ukrainian offensive that began on a strategic level and that even brings the fight to Russian soil with Russian fighters who are probably equipped by the Ukrainians.
I come back to my introduction and my statement. This cannot be seen as just a war in Europe, a conflict between NATO and Russia, but rather as the fact that a permanent member of the Security Council has deliberately breached the accords that it signed to cross an internationally recognized border, and because of our weaknesses shown of 2014 — primarily in the war in Syria in which the West, allow me to lump all Western countries together, essentially the Americas and Europe, did not act decisively. Russia stayed the course and was able to keep President Bashar al-Assad in power. That was the first sign of Western weakness.
The second sign was the loss of Crimea to the little green men, as we call them. That was a remarkable success for Russia, who won the battle, as Sun Tzu would say, without a single shot being fired. It was a great strategic victory for Russia.
Those two signs of weakness led President Putin to think that the West would never react. Since February 24, 2022, we have been facing a situation in which Ukrainians, led by President Zelenskyy, have decided to resist. That was the first great victory: deciding to resist.
I would like to note that, in the early days, the United States recalled their ambassador and all their advisors and advised President Zelenskyy to leave Ukraine. The first victory was that of the Ukrainians.
The second victory was that of the West who, after that initial hesitation, decided to support Ukraine during this long war that has now lasted for 15 months. Today, there is no possible outcome without a Ukrainian victory. I heard the previous speakers who were rather pessimistic as to Ukraine’s capacity. I believe in Ukraine’s capacity to defeat the Russian army in Ukraine and restore the internationally recognized borders. I believe that the West has no choice: the world is watching us.
We saw the results of the last vote in the United Nations Generally Assembly on February 23, 2023, when 140 countries condemned — it cannot be stressed enough, 140 countries condemned Russia’s actions — and about 40 abstained, meaning that they did not have the courage of their convictions, and only 6 or 7 countries supported Russia.
The world is watching us and must understand that Russia’s position is unacceptable. If we want to live in a world of peace, international accords must be respected. Unfortunately, that requires a war against the Russian army in Ukraine. I will be happy to answer your questions.
The Deputy Chair: If I may, we will ask the technicians to see if there is some way to correct the sound. We will suspend for a moment.
(The committee suspended.)
(The committee resumed.)
The Deputy Chair: General, you may continue your presentation.
Gen. Trinquand: I was simply saying that we have no choice. The entire world is watching this operation and it is a matter of abiding by international conventions and borders. That can only be achieved by a Ukrainian victory to restore the internationally recognized borders. It is a matter of honouring the accords signed in Budapest in 1994. The consequences for the world are enormous. I do not want to be accused of hyperbole, but there is a large country, called China, that is watching what is happening right now in Europe and that would reap the consequences.
The Deputy Chair: General Trinquand, thank you very much for your presentation. We will now go to a round of questions. I remind our members that we have until 6:10 p.m. for this panel. As with the previous panel, we will do our best to ensure that at least one member of each group is allowed a turn. Please be brief and identify the person your question is for.
[English]
Senator Oh: Thank you, witnesses, for being here.
My question is for anyone who would like to answer. With the recent talks of a Ukrainian counteroffensive attack possibly weeks away, how do you believe this will change the trajectory of the war? What impact will this have on both countries?
Mr. Lanoszka: I suppose that question is for me. It really depends on how the counteroffensive goes. It depends on the direction. The front line is massive. You’ve heard it’s as long as 1500 kilometres. That’s a lot of territory. We don’t really know where those weak points are. Ukraine military intelligence has that information. As such, we have to prepare ourselves for it to be a rather protracted campaign.
What happened last year suggests two models. One model was the Kharkiv offensive whereby the Ukraine military was able to expel a lot of Russian forces from a large part of that country in a rather dramatic fashion — to the extent that even the Ukrainians themselves were surprised. That was a rout. That took place in August of last year. There was yet another counteroffensive that took place in the Kherson Oblast. That took place over the course of five or six months. Although the liberation of Kherson city was inevitable, it took a long time precisely because Russian forces were well dug in and still fought very effectively, all things considered.
As such, we have to be prepared. The upcoming counteroffensive might not necessarily look like the Kharkiv counteroffensive, which resulted in a rout, but more like the grind that was the Kherson offensive — although a strategic victory was ultimately achieved in that one. Maybe it will be something in between. I don’t know. But I think the Kharkiv offensive sort of misleads us into thinking that counteroffensives could take this sort of form, whereas the Kherson offensive suggests another possibility.
Senator Oh: Thank you.
[Translation]
Senator Boisvenu: My question is for General Trinquand. Thank you for being with us, despite the time difference. Does Russia have the military industrial capacity to engage in a long‑term war? My second question is this: On what basis are you able to conclude that Ukraine could win this war?
Gen. Trinquand: Thank you very much, senator. With respect to your first question, yes, Russia has a long-term, yes, long-term, industrial capacity. It has had to rebuild factories for drones with the Iranians’ help. Russia has an interest in the war lasting a long time. Not to mention, of course, the American elections in 2024 that might be of interest to Mr. Putin and the possibility of less support in the United States. Regardless, Russian industry has to recalibrate itself, so it needs time. That is the first point.
As for the second point, my basis is as follows: I heard about what happened in Kharkiv and Kherson. We must remember that until the summer, for the first six months of the war, Russia relied on its crack troops, professional troops. They took heavy losses. Today, Russia is relying essentially on conscripts and on Wagner, i.e., mercenaries. They are much weaker now than they were at the start of the war, as a result of losing several units and their best equipment.
Given this Russian weakness, what is the strength of Ukraine? A total of 60,000 men have been trained and equipped with Western equipment. That is enough capacity to be able to apply a serious offence that can break and, above all, disrupt the Russian forces.
I find that the current operation in Belgorod is identical to the Russian offensive in Crimea in 2014. The Russians are very embarrassed because they see Russian opponents, equipped by Ukraine, who are in Russia, and they do not know what to do about it. The Ukrainians have been able to strike in unexpected places, namely beyond the front line, farther north, and with the element of surprise. Russian opponents were unexpected. I think that Ukraine has the capacity to win this campaign due to Russia’s weaknesses and Ukraine’s ingenuity.
Now, it is the fog of war. I would not bet any serious money on Ukraine’s victory. I am crossing my fingers and I really hope it happens. I am thinking a lot about those soldiers waiting for the order to attack.
Senator Boisvenu: Thank you.
Senator Cardozo: My question is for Ms. Buck and General Trinquand and is related to the evolving geopolitical situation. General, you mentioned China.
[English]
When I look at China and Russia, I think many people think these are two major powers that are exercising power in different ways and have new designs on the world as they’re moving into Africa, for example. Apart from being concerned about this war itself and the effects it has on Europe and other parts of the world, what should we be concerned about the longer-term plans of these two countries in the future geopolitics around the world?
[Translation]
Ms. Buck: With your leave, General, I will begin.
Gen. Trinquand: Of course.
[English]
Ms. Buck: I actually think Russia is a weakening state. In Mr. Putin’s mind, they’re a strong state. We all overestimated their military capacity. When I was at NATO post-2014, the orthodoxy was that they had a very strong military that had been incredibly beefed up, professionalized, trained and equipped since 2008. I’m glad to say we were wrong. Their lack of capacity in the Ukraine theatre has been really important. So Russia, in a way, is weakening. With the sanctions and the money put into the war, their economy is not doing as well as it might otherwise, nor has it been under good economic stewardship by President Putin since he came into power. If I can be blunt about it, what’s happened as a result of the war is that Russia has turned into the gas station for China. They’re buying Russian energy cheaper, and geopolitically they’re gaining more power. Russia could end up being almost like a vassal state of China if this continues in the same direction.
From my perspective, China has been playing an interesting role. They seem to be close and in support of Russia, saying early on it was a friendship without limits. We’ve seen important visits of the Chinese leadership to Moscow. But there are also a number of things China hasn’t done that they could have done. I don’t see the intelligence anymore, but at least from public information, it doesn’t look as though they’re providing a lot of weaponry to Russia, and they could. They don’t announce things after a visit to Moscow, like a defence alliance. I think China is carefully playing a line where they will support Russia but not go in too far, which is interesting for the West to watch.
Then it’s a bigger question, what do we do with China? You’ll see different variations of this. How do I put it. You have the U.S. talking about full decoupling from China, and then you have Europe talking about de-risking from China. There are some areas where we do have to worry about China, particularly in those areas where we do a lot of trade with China, so a complete decoupling, not just for Canada but everybody, I don’t think makes such sense. There’s much more integration than we had with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Assuming it will always be an adversarial relationship with China on every front isn’t necessary in our interests. That being said, Xi Jinping is extremely aggressive, has been aggressive militarily, and we have to be extremely careful, as in the Asia-Indo-Pacific strategy, doing more on the defence front in the Indo-Pacific and de-risking in those areas of trade with China that are essential to our national security such as critical minerals, et cetera.
There are things we need to do, and we need to do them in a way that we align with both the U.S. and Europe. If we split inside the West in our approach to China, we’ll achieve nothing and will actually help the Chinese aggressive leadership and promote it and support it.
Senator Yussuff: Thank you, witnesses for being here.
My question is to Kerry. Much of what you say I recognize and see as a broad strategy. Of course, this war could be a long, endless one. In the context of damages and reparations that have been talked about by many countries, I think this is something we’re going to have to put our minds to. The West has frozen billions of dollars of Russian assets around the world. I think, certainly, those assets can be repatriated to rebuild Ukraine but equally to support it on an ongoing basis as long as this war continues. Maybe you could share some observation in regard to your thinking about this. I think a lot of people have been certainly talking about it. Maybe you can put it in an international context as to why that makes sense and, more importantly, why we should cross that threshold.
Ms. Buck: Absolutely. There’s a long history of reparations being paid after wars by the losers against the victims. There’s international law that would support it. The important thing right now is to do two things: while worrying about the war, to also mobilize for the after-conflict period; and, do the hard thinking to make sure that is not just on reparations but the international community across the board. So support for demobilization, demilitarization, returning Ukrainian troops, reintegration of Ukrainian refugees, infrastructure, accountability for war crimes, et cetera.
On reparations, there was a report that came out about six months ago, and it involved the World Bank, parts of the UN, parts of the European Union and a few others, looking at how much the war has cost and starting to look at how you could establish reparation funds. Thinking has begun and, as I said, there is precedent for using seized Russian assets, absolutely legal precedent of international law to effect those reparations. So yes, yes and yes.
Senator Ravalia: Thank you to all of our witnesses for being here.
My question is directed to Ms. Buck. How concerned are you about a shift in support outside of the Euro-Atlantic axis for Russia’s ongoing onslaught on Ukraine, in particular with the Global South, what’s happening in India, Iran’s continued support, a shift in the South American political climate with a change of presidency in Brazil and the upcoming BRIC summit in South Africa in August of this year? Do you envision Mr. Putin of taking the step of going to South Africa? Do you see the ICC jurisdiction as being one that potentially South Africa would apply?
Ms. Buck: General Trinquand talked about the votes on the UN resolutions that condemn Russia’s invasion. I was on the file in 2014, and I have to say that the cross-regional support to condemn Russia’s move has been really impressive. It’s held, which is also important. It’s also due to some constant sustained diplomacy from places like Ambassador Rae’s team, the Canadian team, and others who do a lot of cross-regional diplomacy to maintain that vote and have it turn out. That’s an important political signal to isolate Russia.
Behind that, there are a number of things happening. There are states that I will call the in between states or swing states where, even if they might abstain or vote in favour of the resolution, are quietly buying cheaper Russian oil, for example. It’s in their self‑interest to do so. There’s a lot of work that is needed to expand the sanctions regime and to better implement and enforce the sanctions regime. That takes a lot of quiet diplomacy. There are a number of states playing both sides, I think is the way you can frame it. As I said, it takes quiet diplomacy to try to maintain that.
The Global South is also suffering from the war with food shortages and spikes in food prices. Unless the non-geographic West steps up to alleviate that suffering, the Global South won’t stay with the position.
Finally, there’s a bit of hypocrisy. It’s quite easy — Minister Lavrov does it — to point back at, for instance, the first Iraq war and say, “Well, how can you talk about the illegitimacy of invasions and the rule of law? Look what you did back in the first Iraq war.” It’s an easy argument, not entirely true but partially true. I think it’s therefore important to approach that diplomacy with humility and understand that there are wars going on in the Global South that the West doesn’t pay adequate attention to. There’s unfair or inequitable geometry around what invasions we care about. I think it’s important to send messages and send support and understand where the Global South is coming from. Again, that’s back to diplomacy.
[Translation]
Gen. Trinquand: While I agree with what has been said, I would just like to add two points on this if I may.
In fact, it is a matter of convincing the 40 or 45 countries involved, who did not vote or abstained, that it is not simply a matter of doing business, but rather that global balance is at stake.
I heard some good news today. I do not know if it has reached Canada yet, but South Africa has realized that it cannot bypass the decision by the International Criminal Court (ICC), so it asked for a review of the location of the meeting of BRICS members, i.e., Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. The meeting will not be held in South Africa, in any event. So that is a good start.
[English]
Senator Dasko: Thank you to our witnesses for being here.
I have two questions, both for General Trinquand and also for Ambassador Buck. I’m interested in European solidarity as opposed to the Global South. I’m back to Europe. I’m very interested in particular in your analysis of any potential European weaknesses in the solidarity for Ukraine. I would like you to comment on that, especially going forward. Ambassador Buck, you did say that this will take a sustained effort on the part of the West. Of course, Europeans are there in the heart of the continent and also the heart of NATO. I’m not even referring at this point to the U.S., but I’m really focusing on Europe. I’d like your sense, if you feel there are any potential weaknesses within the European NATO coalition and interests.
Ms. Buck: NATO works by absolute consensus, so what happens at NATO stays at NATO until there is that consensus, a bit like Fort Lauderdale at spring break.
When I was there post-2014, that consensus was achieved to condemn Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014. It was not instant. It took about a year of negotiation. We condemned it early on. That was instant. But to understand that we had to beef up our NATO deterrence in the eastern flank as a result, that took about a year to negotiate. That’s because some countries were focusing more on their part of the neighbourhood, so the southern part of the alliance, and not perhaps as immediately concerned as the Baltics, for instance in 2014. Part of it is just what threat you perceive.
Now, since the invasion a year and a half ago, that threat is much more visible. The condemnation is really solid on that front. NATO’s response was really quite good and quite consistent, but there are some NATO allies where there will be problems. I will name Hungary publicly because it’s clear. Part of it is they have some small cross-border issues with Ukraine, minority rights issues. I’ll say it because it came out publicly before they held up or delayed meetings of the NATO-Ukraine Commission and all that kind of stuff. I would think some pressure on Hungary would be not unwelcome. I note that there are some kinds of political ties that would be interesting to use levers beyond diplomacy, to try to pressure Hungary, for instance, into staying with NATO line in terms of support for Ukraine.
The second potential soft spot is the U.S. election in 2024. I don’t know what candidate Trump means when he said he could end the war in Ukraine very fast. I fear what he means is he would just stop American support. America is the backbone of NATO. What would happen there? I’m convinced that President Putin decided that he would go into Ukraine full bore because he thought the West was weak. As General Trinquand said, he thought that the West wouldn’t react. Part of it was President Trump undercutting the alliance and being much more friendly to President Putin than any other American leader had ever been. If former President Trump or a Trump-adjacent leader comes in in 2024, I’m quite worried about what might happen.
On that positive note, I’ll stop.
[Translation]
Gen. Trinquand: I wanted to make one short comment on Europe because NATO is not really Europe, it is Europe and the United States.
I would simply like to note that Europe has greatly impressed me with its reactions. People talk about problems with Hungary, but Hungary has always voted for every decision made, so things do not happen without discussion.
Each time, decisions are made by the entire European Union. The decisions are made by 27 countries and, in particular, they have made decisions extremely fast, which surprised everyone. Everyone expected Europe to have difficulties and, each time, it makes decisions very quickly, with 27 countries.
[English]
Senator R. Patterson: My question will be directed towards Dr. Lanoszka and potentially General Trinquand. It relates to other states that surround Ukraine. We talked about Europe, Ukraine and China, but we need to talk about Belarus. It is becoming the proxy state, an autocratic governance that they’re talking about putting nuclear weapons on. We know people who are allied with Russia have a tendency to have heart attacks, where you can create power vacuums, especially if our predictions do come true in terms of Russia’s ability to sustain the fight in Ukraine. I’m very interested from both of your perspectives, how are or should we and NATO look at places like Belarus, especially as the war progresses? The other state that is definitely a risk is Moldova, and they are the pending proxy for Russia. I’m very curious as to your thoughts about the way ahead.
Mr. Lanoszka: I’m more comfortable talking about Belarus than I am about Moldova.
I think there’s a mistaken tendency to view Belarus as simply a proxy for Russia in the sense that it has zero agency in how it conducts its foreign defence policy. That view was well expressed by one American senator who said that Lukashenko needs to get Putin’s approval to go to the washroom.
If anything, events of the last year have shown that, in fact, there is a bit of space whereby Lukashenko can maneuver in such a way that is not necessarily aligned with Putin’s own preferences. We see that clearly in how Belarus has refused to engage in the ground operations in Ukraine itself. Yes, Belarus is a staging ground for multiple forms of attack on Ukraine. Yes, there is training, and yes, there is the provision of some military assistance to Russian Armed Forces on the part of Belarus.
But Lukashenko has a lot to lose by expanding his country’s involvement, not least because the war, according to some surveys conducted by Chatham House, for instance, have shown that Belarus respondents do not support the war effort whatsoever, that the regime is walking on eggshells since the fraudulent elections in August of 2020 and that partisan activity that was seen affecting rail networks and other parts of the logistical supply chains that go through Belarus also remain under risk by those partisan networks.
I think we should see Belarus as an actor in its own right. It’s between a rock and a hard place. Of course, I have no sympathy whatsoever for President Lukashenko. I have trouble believing that it is in Putin’s interest to unseat Lukashenko, precisely because that could send train dynamics that might be very hard for him to control. Indeed, he started that process already in Ukraine, and look where that has led him. I think Lukashenko is the worst option except for all the others at the moment. As such, that’s in some ways good news for President Lukashenko, notwithstanding what ailments he might have had since he visited Moscow not that long ago.
[Translation]
The Deputy Chair: I have a question for General Trinquand. General Trinquand, I have always been impressed when we count the number of missiles that Russia has been able to fire at Ukraine. Do you know if all those missiles were of Soviet manufacture or if they were acquired from external suppliers?
Gen. Trinquand: With respect to the missiles, they are Soviet missiles. The drones are sourced elsewhere, particularly Iran, such as the Shahed drone. Indeed, the major strikes on Kyiv in recent weeks have always been a mix of those Shahed drones and missiles.
Senator Boisvenu: My question is again for General Trinquand. I would like to ask you about what is going on in Russia. There are significant differences with the head of the Wagner militia and as you said, military operations are being conducted now on Russian soil.
Do you think that the apparent support of the Russian people or Putin’s circle will hold for a long time? What is your take on what is happening in Russia?
Gen. Trinquand: That is a very interesting but also difficult question. I often appear on French television with experts who are extremely knowledgeable about the Kremlin, Russia, etc. No one is able to provide an answer. For 25 years now, Russian propaganda has ensured that Russians say nothing. I often say that the strikes that took place on Moscow a few days ago — 22 drones were sent to Moscow — were aimed at telling Russians: “Get out of your bubble that you think keeps you safe.” The people are being told that the war does not concern them and that it is far away. It concerns them.
One of my former students was a teacher in Moscow over the last two months. He told me that students with whom he met one-on-one freely told him that the war was absurd and that it was not necessary. As soon as a third person entered the conversation, they stopped talking. The silencing of the Russian population compared to our way of seeing things, being accustomed to freedom of speech and expression, is extremely hard to understand. How can they remain in that bubble?
[English]
Senator Cardozo: I just want to say, Ms. Buck, that I really enjoyed your commentary. Given your experience in NATO, it has been extremely educational to understand how that whole scene operates.
I want to come back to General Trinquand and just ask for your thoughts on the global situation and the ambitions of China and Russia and how that all relates to what is happening now in Ukraine.
[Translation]
Gen. Trinquand: Thank you very much. I will not come back to what was said about China’s position on Russia and the fact that Russia is more or less becoming a vassal of China.
There are two things you should know about China: China is carefully watching what is happening in Ukraine. It understands that a direct military operation in Taiwan is impossible. A military operation cannot fail. There is a 120 km strait. Today is June 6, D-Day. In France at least, June 6 is important to us. The Chinese know very well that they cannot do the same thing in Taiwan. A military operation is risky; the Chinese have taken this on board.
In terms of geopolitics, I took part in a Chinese think tank last week. I was struck by the fact that the Chinese knew very little about our opinions. The director of the think tank told me: “But in the end, Crimea is Russia. We do not understand why Ukraine would reclaim it.” I told him: “Sir, would you like me to talk about Taiwan?” Suddenly, he was quiet. I told him: “I can talk to you about Kaliningrad as well; it is an interesting topic.” He became closed off. He understood that we were in two different worlds. We do not have the same points of reference when it comes to honouring international accords.
[English]
Senator R. Patterson: This is a question for Ambassador Buck. We know that one of the key people in all of this is President Putin. What do you think his potential is for having the enduring support of the Russian people? We’re starting to hear about internal attacks, which he is trying to flip around and blame on Ukraine. This is all through open source. What do you think his longevity is going to be like, especially as casualties start to mount and information goes into the country and they start to see the impact? Thank you.
Ms. Buck: It’s the six-million-dollar question.
You can’t trust Russian polling. We have heard a few examples already of how dangerous it is to answer the wrong way.
President Putin is doing a few things that will shake support. He is taking a lot of soldiers — not technically conscripts but pretty close to conscripts — from ethnic minority regions and not so much from Moscow. At a certain point, I wonder if he’ll draw too much from those areas. As body bags and injured young men start coming home, those are areas where Putin can’t afford to have unrest. Think back to Chechnya. The results of the war may start to cause some splitting or fraying of support.
The other observation I’ll make is that the Russian people have a history of putting up with a lot and living under a succession of autocratic leaders, so they don’t expect to have trust in the state. It takes a lot before they will move to revolution. So I think he is going to be there for a while. I really do.
I’m quite worried about what might come after because, as you said, he has poisoned, defenestrated — if that’s a word — and suicided so many of his potential successors — scorched‑earth policy — that I don’t know what the succession might look like. Not that it will be better under Putin, but I don’t think it will necessarily be better after.
[Translation]
The Deputy Chair: That brings us to the end of our panel. I would like to thank Ambassador Buck, General Trinquand and Professor Lanoszka for taking the time to be with us today. We thank you for your willingness to share your expertise.
We will now move to our final panel for today’s meeting. We will receive an overview of the current situation in Ukraine from yet another group of excellent witnesses. I would like to welcome from Global Affairs Canada, Alison Grant, Executive Director, Security and Defence Relations, and Kati Csaba, Executive Director, Ukraine Bureau; and from the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, Major‑General Paul Prévost, Director of Staff, Strategic Joint Staff. Thank you for being with us.
We will begin this panel with Major-General Prévost. You have the floor.
Major-General Paul Prévost, Director of Staff, Strategic Joint Staff, Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces: Mr. Chair, esteemed members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to provide you with an update on the situation in Ukraine.
As you said, I am Major-General Paul Prévost, Director of the Strategic Joint Staff at National Defence Headquarters.
My role is to provide decision support to the Chief of the Defence Staff, General Eyre, in terms of strategy and operational planning, Canadian Forces operations and logistics support from a strategic perspective.
[English]
Today, I am accompanied by my colleagues from Global Affairs Canada, whom you will hear from today as well, and together we will aim to answer the questions you have with respect to this terrible crisis that is unfolding in front of us.
First let me start with opening remarks where I will briefly cover the evolution of the situation on the ground in the last year since we last spoke in June. I will then update you on what the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces have done and some considerations for the future.
As you will recall, Vladimir Putin’s unjust and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine quickly failed to achieve its aims and transitioned to a grinding war of attrition. The security forces of Ukraine demonstrated impressive adaptability and resolve to counter Russian advances and regain their sovereign territory, or at least some of it.
As I mentioned when we met in June of last year, starting in April 2022, the security forces of Ukraine conducted a series of counteroffensives that liberated the north of Ukraine, mainly around Kharkiv, and pushed the line of contact to the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts in the east, and to the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast in the southeast, where the line of contact has since stabilized despite attempted Russian offensives in early 2023. Since then, the most intense, fighting has occurred around Bakhmut, but similar fighting has been observed along the line of contact.
After the line of contact stabilized in November, both sides initiated programs to reconstitute and mobilize new forces for future phases of the fighting. This period of the armed conflict also saw Russia launch an indiscriminate air campaign against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure to weaken the resolve of the Ukrainian people. Western-led multinational support in the face of these developments has been key to Ukraine’s continued resilience during this phase.
[Translation]
Multinational support has coalesced under the U.S.-led Security Assistance Group — Ukraine, or SAG-U, formally established in November 2022 in Wiesbaden, Germany. Canada has maintained representation in these headquarters from the beginning.
SAG-U exists to coordinate both the short- and long-term equipping and training of the security forces of Ukraine. The provision of both Soviet-era weapons and munitions, and advanced Western systems and associated munitions, such as 155 mm artillery, HIMARS, and air-defence systems, have been crucial to Ukraine’s defence.
Allies and partners have set up coordination mechanisms to consolidate and prioritize Ukrainian requirements. The Canadian Armed Forces have made considerable material and training contributions to this effort through Operation UNIFIER, Canada’s military training and capacity-building mission in support of Ukraine.
[English]
Since February 2022, Canada has committed more than $1 billion in military assistance donations to Ukraine. This includes donations from CAF stocks and equipment purchases from Canadian industry and allies. Some of the key equipment donated to date includes Leopard 2 main battle tanks, armoured recovery vehicles, M777 artillery guns and 40,000 rounds of artillery ammunition, air defence missiles for existing Ukrainian systems, commercial pattern armoured vehicles, armoured combat support vehicles, drone cameras, small arms and ammunition, and non-lethal aid such as protective equipment, winter clothing and individual meal packs. We are also in the process of providing a NASAMS air defence system with associated missiles.
[Translation]
In support of both Canadian and multinational military assistance donations to Ukraine, the Canadian Armed Forces have deployed an air detachment consisting of three CC-130 Hercules aircraft.
Since February 28, 2022, the air detachment has flown over 388 missions delivering more than 9.8 million pounds of assistance to Ukraine, including 4,5 million pounds of military equipment. These are donations by other countries that Canada helps transport to Ukraine.
[English]
In terms of training contributions, Canada was already established as a contributing nation for military assistance to Ukraine prior to the 2022 invasion, having trained over 33,000 Ukrainian soldiers from 2015 to 2022.
[Translation]
Although Operation UNIFIER was immediately suspended before and after Russia’s large-scale invasion in 2022, the Canadian Armed Forces acted quickly to re-establish the mission’s operations elsewhere in Europe. Since the resumption of Operation UNIFIER, in April 2022, the Canadian Armed Forces have trained over 3,000 members of the Ukrainian security forces. Currently, there are over 300 Canadian Armed Forces members deployed abroad training and supporting Ukrainians under Operation UNIFIER.
[English]
Since the invasion, more than 3,000 security forces of Ukraine members have been trained by our contingent since we restarted our training effort.
Canadian and multinational military assistance has significantly enhanced Ukraine’s defensive capabilities, providing Ukraine much-needed support as it defends its sovereignty. A much anticipated Ukrainian offensive is expected to usher in a new phase in this difficult armed conflict. While there is reason for hope, the armed conflict will likely continue to be protracted, requiring Canada to remain steadfast in our cooperation with international partners and allies to provide Ukraine with the support it needs today and into the future.
[Translation]
We have done much to assist Ukraine since the start of the armed conflict, and the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces will continue our intensive and important work to assist Ukraine as best we can. In order to ensure the continuation of the rules-based international order, which has underpinned global stability for generations, we must continue to stand behind Ukraine as it fights off one of the greatest threats to international peace and security of our times.
Thank you and we look forward to your questions.
The Deputy Chair: Thank you very much, Major-General Prévost.
I believe Ms. Kati Csaba will give a presentation on behalf of Global Affairs Canada.
Ms. Csaba, you can begin when you are ready.
[English]
Kati Csaba, Executive Director, Ukraine Bureau, Global Affairs Canada: Good evening, members of the committee. My colleague from National Defence has updated you on the battlefield situation and Operation UNIFIER, and it will be my role to provide you updates on other critical issues affecting Ukraine.
Russia’s attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure continue. This is an existential war; Ukraine is fighting for its survival. The courage, resilience and democratic aspirations of Ukrainians continue to resonate with Canadians.
Canada has responded with an unprecedented level of support. Since the invasion, we have committed over $8 billion in military, financial, humanitarian, development, stabilization and immigration support. Canada’s objectives are to bolster Ukraine’s security, resilience and long-term stability while imposing serious costs on Russia.
[Translation]
Among the many high-level discussions between our two countries, Canada welcomed Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal in April for a visit that focused on strengthening the security, resilience and recovery of Ukraine and its prosperity.
The visit was marked by two bilateral agreements strengthening our partnership for a stable future. Those agreements include the Canada-Ukraine Youth Mobility Agreement and a statement indicating the conclusion of basic negotiations on the modernization of the Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement.
Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction remain an essential objective for the international community. Russia’s aggression has displaced millions of people, killed or injured tens of thousands more, destroyed or seriously damaged civil infrastructure, farmlands, energy systems, schools, hospitals and homes in Ukraine. The second Ukraine Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment estimated reconstruction costs as of March 23, 2023, at over US$411 billion.
[English]
This year’s Ukraine Recovery Conference, co-hosted by the United Kingdom and Ukraine at the end of June, will bring together the international community in support of a Ukraine that is more modern, open and resilient. Canadian senior officials will attend, along with leaders from our private sector. This year’s conference will seek to enhance the role of the private sector in order to mobilize investment at the scale needed. As part of these efforts, the conference will focus on the enablers of investment to strengthen Ukraine’s business climate, including macroeconomic stability, war risk insurance, governance reforms, development bank financing and visible opportunities for investment.
At the same time, Ukraine is committed to pursuing reforms and EU and OECD accession and to ensuring its reconstruction is transparent and accountable, both to donors and to Ukrainians. Ukraine is continuing with its decentralization reforms, engaging communities to set priorities for reconstruction and empowering them to manage their own recovery. The government has set itself ambitious timelines, and progress may not always be even, but Ukraine has shown strong forward momentum in a short period of time.
[Translation]
For example, Ukraine has made progress in gender equality. It is also increasingly emphasizing mental health and is seeking to address sexual and gender-based violence.
In its proposed reform, Ukraine is making a real effort to target not only what is needed today, but also the needs of a post-war country. Canada plans to support it on that path.
[English]
The recent news coverage of corruption scandals in Ukraine underscores how critical transparency and accountability are to ensuring Ukraine’s future. We continue to encourage Ukraine to deepen anti-corruption reforms and strengthen institutions and governance systems. Corruption scandals may continue to surface, but these events demonstrate the strength of Ukraine’s anti-corruption institutions, even during the war. Canada’s and other donors’ investment into anti-corruption, rule of law and governance institutions are paying off but will need to continue to ensure that a just and comprehensive peace settlement actually holds.
[Translation]
The conclusion of negotiations for the modernization of the Canada–Ukraine Free Trade Agreement clearly demonstrates Canada’s unwavering support. Canada and Ukraine have entered into a high-level agreement that will be useful to the long-term economic recovery of Ukraine and its interests in relation to international trade policy.
Canadian and Ukrainian representatives added new chapters dedicated to services, investment, financial services and inclusive trade. They also improved the existing chapters on e‑trade, labour, the environment, transparency and anti-corruption measures.
[English]
Let me turn now to peace. So far, there have been no known peace talks between Moscow and Kyiv, and each has ruled out a ceasefire for now. However, we must continue to pursue a sustainable and just peace in Ukraine. As you are aware, President Zelenskyy launched a 10-point peace formula at the last G20 summit. Canada and the G7 support Ukraine’s formula as it continues to evolve towards an approach that puts Ukraine at the forefront of peace discussions, can be widely supported by the Global South and is based on principles consistent with the UN Charter.
Others have also begun putting forward their ideas. However, few start from the premise that Russia must first remove its military from Ukraine. Among these, China, Brazil, the Holy See and, most recently, a delegation of the heads of state of six African countries have proposed visions for how this war could be ended.
[Translation]
Canada, along with its G7 partners, is in favour of a plan developed in Ukraine and is working with its allies to provide support to Ukraine to ensure success.
[English]
Russia’s aggression must not be tolerated or imitated. We will continue to work with Ukraine and with G7, NATO and other partners and allies along several lines of effort — sanctions, judicial investigations, asset seizures and forfeiture and countering disinformation. Supporting Ukraine and holding Russia to account are investments in global stability, democracy and accountability. Canada will continue to stand with Ukraine and Ukrainians.
Thank you for your attention.
[Translation]
The Deputy Chair: Thank you for your testimony, Ms. Csaba. We will now move on to a round of questions. As with the previous panels, we will do our best to allow one member of each group to ask questions.
Senator Boisvenu: Welcome to our witnesses. My question is for Major-General Prévost. The Prime Minister of Canada confirmed a few weeks ago that Canada would not meet the 2% target for its contribution to NATO. Will that commitment by the Prime Minister to not meet that target handicap the Canadian Armed Forces in adequately supporting the war in Ukraine?
MGen. Prévost: Clearly, the way the Canadian Armed Forces are supporting Ukraine is based on the equipment being provided to Ukrainians. This is done through two mechanisms. First, equipment that we already have in surplus in the Canadian Armed Forces and that we do not need ourselves. I will give some examples. There are the air defence missiles we provided, equipment that we do not need in the Canadian Armed Forces. There is other equipment that is given from our effective inventory and that we need. It is about striking a balance — which Canada and the allies do as well — between what we can provide to Ukraine and what we must keep for our own needs.
Senator Boisvenu: Canada’s expenses over the next 30 years include the F-35s, which will not go fight in Ukraine, NORAD to protect the Arctic and ships. Apart from that, there are no other financial commitments in terms of the Canadian Armed Forces.
Apart from the equipment that we have provided or transferred to Ukraine, what other commitments are being made to support Ukraine? This is a war that could be drawn-out if we don’t invest more than we are currently.
MGen. Prévost: The Minister of National Defence will provide the government with an updated defence policy, which will be submitted to the government in the coming months. There are several options in the defence policy update and it will be up to the government to reach a decision about the level of capital investment in the Canadian Armed Forces.
[English]
Senator Cardozo: I’d like to ask you a question that I asked our previous panels. Could you share with us your thoughts about how this war fits into the larger changes in the world, the geopolitical changes and challenges posed by both Russia and China, and what their intentions are? I’m thinking about what’s happening in places like India and Africa and how those two countries are moving into those two countries and what’s happening in Cuba and Taiwan. What are your thoughts, and how are you preparing for the challenge ahead of us from both these major powers? Maybe you can both comment on that from the perspective of diplomacy and Armed Forces.
MGen. Prévost: That is a very broad question that we can debate for many hours, I’m sure. Perhaps either Kati or Alison want to start.
Alison Grant, Executive Director, Security and Defence Relations, Global Affairs Canada: Senators, it’s a pleasure to be with you this evening.
Senator, it’s a great question. It’s one we think about probably every day at Global Affairs Canada as we carry out our work. I’m the director for the security and defence policy division, so very appropriate. Many of the changes that you’re referring to are changes due to increased strategic competition but also what we see from adversaries as major disruptions in the international system and abrupt challenges to the rules-based international order that we have spent decades building.
I think that the war in Ukraine is directly relevant. We’ve seen Russia completely violate international law in this case and abrogate the UN charter as well and needs to be held to account. There are many threads here I could respond to here, but I think the idea of accountability is very important, given the changes in the international system. When we have a country like Russia that, as a permanent member of the Security Council, has so blatantly violated not just the rules but international law and the UN Charter, we need to do everything we can to hold them to account. We’re doing that through a number of means legally in terms of working with other countries to find legal mechanisms to bring them to account but also just through our support to Ukraine in being able to defend itself according to its own rights under the UN Charter.
That’s my short answer, I suppose, to a very relevant question. I’ll turn to my colleagues to see if they have anything to add.
Ms. Csaba: To add a couple of thoughts to my colleague’s, another existential question we need to consider is what Russia’s role will be in the future. They will remain our circumpolar neighbour. We will need to continue to engage with Russia around certain issues that are important to Canada and to our own future prosperity and security. There’s no easy answer as to what kind of role they might play, but we need to keep that in mind as we are planning how we respond.
I would also note that the impact of this crisis on the Global South has been striking. It has increased inflation and food pressures and so on. We also need to be thinking about how we continue to engage with the Global South. We know that Russia and China are taking advantage of this situation to spread their disinformation in order to make inroads on other continents. We know that Russia is also being watched very carefully by other despotic leaders who are interested in the kind of invasion that Russia has carried out to see if it is something they could contemplate, which is why it is so important that we do not allow Russia to win.
Senator Cardozo: Do you have any comments on the incident in the Taiwan Strait, for example, in the last couple of days?
MGen. Prévost: That’s a good corollary to what my colleagues have discussed here. Our presence in the Taiwan Strait is because we had to transition from the south to the north there. The Taiwan Strait is an international strait in which we have the right to navigate. Our presence there follows the law, and we were following the law there. China’s reaction to that speaks to what Alison and Kati have been talking about where our strategic competitors are not happy with the rules-based international order and are trying to change those rules in the future. It’s our role to make sure that we maintain that security environment we have been living in over the last 60 or 75 years.
Senator Dasko: Thank you for being here and enlightening us on the situation.
My questions are for Ms. Csaba and Ms. Grant. When the Ukraine ambassador was here earlier, she was urging Canada to expel Russian diplomats. Could you just comment on that, the status of that and the thinking of the government on that? What are the considerations?
Ms. Csaba: This is a question that is of great interest to many people. We understand that it is important to maintain enough of a corridor for conversation to be able to engage, when necessary, with our Russian colleagues, so we continue to use the Russian embassy here to deliver certain messages. Certainly, we have had occasion to call in the Russian ambassador to speak to him in a very firm way about some of Russia’s actions, the same way as we use our embassy in Moscow to also deliver certain messages. From our perspective, we see these as important channels for communications. At the same time, any activities that are undertaken by Russian diplomats that are inappropriate with their role will result in expulsion.
Senator Dasko: So they have to do something as individuals here before they’re expelled. Is that the way it works?
Ms. Csaba: In general terms, yes. They would need to behave in a way that is inappropriate and that goes against the Vienna Convention, and that can include a variety of actions.
Senator Dasko: By expelling them, we’re losing something.
Ms. Csaba: Well, we could be losing, but at the same time, as long as the two embassies remain open, we will continue to have lines of communication.
Senator Dasko: Thank you.
You mentioned we have a number of tools that we can use — legal and other tools. You mentioned asset seizures, but now we have the ability to repurpose assets as well. I wonder if you could comment on that. Some people think that maybe Canada isn’t being quite as aggressive as we could be now that we have this wonderful legal tool that we didn’t have before. Can you also comment on the plans and perspective with respect to using this new tool?
Ms. Csaba: Thank you. We do have these tools at our disposal, and Canada is proud to be the first G7 country to have put in place the seizure and forfeiture legislation that allows us to go forward. We have a first case that is under way already, as you are aware.
What I would say about the process is that it’s very complex, legally. We have to make sure that every step we take is in line with Canadian laws and will not allow for the recipient of this seizure action to respond in a way that would put us at a disadvantage. Also, as the first country to have this legislation in place, we want to be very sure that our first examples of using the legislation are successful as an example to other countries as to how they could use similar legislation. It’s a slow and very careful process that is being looked over by lawyers at every step to make sure that what we do will keep us in a positive position and that we are abiding by all the laws around this issue.
Senator Dasko: Are there other Russian assets in Canada that you have identified in addition to the ones you’ve taken action on? Are there others?
Ms. Csaba: Potentially there are some, yes. Our department continues, along with other government departments, to be exploring what those assets might be and how we might choose to seize them, if it’s appropriate. There needs to be enough of a clear legal trail that we can identify that these are, in fact, Russian assets.
I would also note that, given the sanctions Canada put on Russia from early on after the invasion of Crimea, there is not a huge amount of Russian assets in Canada at this time. There are other countries where the number of assets is significantly higher.
Senator Yussuff: Thank you, witnesses, for being here.
An $8 billion commitment to this effort is no small measure, but as the war goes on, that will grow in time. In terms of Ukraine’s requests, as a country, we’ve met most so far. However, again, there’s no end in sight in terms of the war. In the context of preparing for the ongoing efforts, you are identifying areas on the military side that we have to step up on, such as fighter jets and more ammunition that they need on the ground. Of course, battle tanks will be at the forefront of doing that. At the same time, we’ve got a significant number of Ukrainians in the country who also require ongoing support.
In the broader question, when you measure what we are doing, do you think there are areas where the country could step up and do more? More importantly, in the context of military equipment, Ukrainians are making a lot of requests of us, and we need time to identify the source where we could secure this equipment should they need it in the short term, and we can supply them at the same time.
My last point is that all of this requires a significant amount of coordination, not just by ourselves but with our allies around the world, to be effective. How is that effort? You guys are on the front line of coordinating that on a regular basis. What is your general feeling of how the coordination is going? What is your evaluation of whether we’re strong and united as we go forward in this broader effort to support Ukraine and to ensure they win the war and also be there to help them rebuild the country?
MGen. Prévost: Thank you for the question.
We’ve done a lot, but we need to continue to do a lot. Canada has done a lot. We’re in the top tiers in terms of donation with what we have, but also how we’re able to work with industry to supply what Ukrainians are asking for.
This conflict has evolved from the beginning as to what the requirements for Ukrainians were. The donations at the beginning are different than the donations today, which explains why we’re at the point where we went from artillery to air defence and now bringing into the fold the issue of fighter jets being provided.
These requirements from Ukraine will continue to evolve, and we are very well linked with Ukrainians in what they require. They’ve given us the lists. We validate those lists amongst allies. It’s an effort from Canada but also an effort where allies are complementary in the holdings they have and can provide holdings in those terms.
I think you also touched on something we don’t talk about. We need to continue to do this, and we need to remain united in the way we do it as well. As this conflict is protracted, potentially we’re entering a new phase, we understand, as the conflict continues, we have to remain united to help Ukraine win this war. Those requirements will evolve.
You’ve heard the Chief of Defence staff talk about that, as well as our minister. There is a role for industry, not only in Canada but around the world, beyond what the chief called the war footing, to anticipate as well what Ukrainians will need and what the West will need in the future. I think it’s all hands on deck, not only within our headquarters but also with our allies and with industry to be able to supply what Ukrainians will need as well as what we need in the future.
Ms. Csaba: To add to that, I fully support what my colleague just said. There is coordination happening in a variety of forums and with all of our partners and allies. We have been using the G7 very effectively, for example, as a means of coordinating the G7’s support to Ukraine and how we respond to the evolving situation. There is now a donor coordination platform that has been established where, again, Canada as a G7 member is sitting. We use these opportunities to make sure that we are providing the support Ukraine needs, that we’re not duplicating efforts and that we’re supporting each other and reinforcing the same messages of support to Ukraine.
Ms. Grant: I was going to add a point on NATO coordination because there’s so much we’re doing right now at NATO on the political military side. The focus is very much how we step up and sustain the support that we are giving Ukraine. As the general pointed out, that focus on unity and a sustained approach is to enable Ukraine to defend itself and to do what it needs to do to retake territory and to hold it. It is a major focus. There’s a huge amount of coordination going on right now within NATO as we lead up to the NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, in July. We’ve been working and looking at a very significant package of political and practical assistance that we can give Ukraine through NATO channels. This is a key area of coordination for us. Thank you.
Senator Oh: Thank you, general, Alison and Kati.
Ukraine has a serious problem of corruption. We’ve heard a lot of news about military weapons that have surfaced in Africa in the black market. The U.S. was talking about alleviating the situation. Could you comment on that, please?
MGen. Prévost: Thank you for the question.
What I’ll say is that when we do give donations to Ukraine, we make sure that the donations that we give follow the Arms Trade Treaty, and all the legal aspects of those donations are looked at in detail. We also come into agreement with the Ukraine government through an end user agreement to make sure that the weapons we donate are actually going to be used for the purpose they’re being used in the conflict in Ukraine. We meet our obligations there.
Also, we have mechanisms in place to make sure that the donations we make that leave Canada or that we buy from industry, that we deliver in the hub in Europe, that that equipment makes its way into the hands of the Government of Ukraine. We don’t keep track of everything that happens in Ukraine. Nobody can, as it’s a very dynamic conflict over there, but we make sure that the weapons we provide are legally given. There’s an end user agreement with the government of Ukraine that those weapons end up in their military system. We have proof that they enter their system, and we’re hoping it makes it to the soldiers they’re intended for. There’s a limit to at which point we can control that equipment.
Ms. Csaba: Certainly, we have seen in the news recently several corruption scandals. While, on the one hand, they do point to certain entrenched systems, at the same time, they are a sign that some of the anti-corruption measures that are in place, some of the systems, are starting to work and that they are able to identify people who are involved in levels of corruption and removing them from their positions. This is an area where Canada has invested a great deal over almost 30 years now around governance reforms and rule of law in Ukraine. It’s an area that we see continuing to be very important. Certainly, the situation is not perfect, but we are pleased to see that those anti-corruption systems are coming into effect.
Senator Ravalia: Thank you, witnesses for being here, and thank you, major general, for your contributions to our country.
Just to enhance further on Senator Yussuff’s question, can you comment on the alliance’s ability to continue to replenish and advance new munitions in the face of an ever-increasing demand of war effort? I was recently at a NATO meeting in Brussels, and this was a topic that came up, with some countries expressing a concern that, with such a large demand, countries felt a sense of vulnerability about their own ability to protect themselves, for example, or maintaining an integrity within their own borders. Furthermore, do you feel that the delay in Sweden’s accession to NATO is somehow impacting this position as well?
MGen. Prévost: Thank you. I’ll answer the first part of the question and turn to Alison for the second part of the question.
It is a challenge in terms of the capacity for the West to replenish the weapons and provide support to Ukraine with their weapons. It’s top of mind for all of us, not only in Defence here in Canada but I would say all allies that we speak to. Something we didn’t discuss too much here is the Minister of National Defence, pretty much on a monthly basis, has a meeting with her counterparts in many countries, chaired by Secretary Austin in the U.S. This is something that regularly comes back to that table. We have tables at NATO to discuss how to beef up the capacity of Western countries to produce weapons, not only to replenish Ukraine but also to replenish what we’ve donated to Ukraine. It is top of mind. It’s an all-hands-on-deck approach as to how we galvanize our industrial capacity in terms of the defence industry to make sure we are ready for the future and to sustain the conflict there. It is top of mind for everybody and we are working on it, but it’s not that simple.
What we can say is the military might and industrial might of like-minded countries are clearly greater than Russia can produce. We don’t have a crystal ball yet, but if you do a comparative analysis, we probably have more capacity here than Russia. Russia is playing a dangerous game.
Senator Ravalia: If we’re talking about ongoing replenishment, are we reaching a tipping point where, in order to maintain a global rules-based order, we sort of need to go on a semi-war footing in channelling other industrial forces to ensure that munitions continue to be produced in a way that ensures that Ukraine gets its fair share?
MGen. Prévost: Yes. This is what we’ve been saying for a few months already, and we’re working hard with industry in Canada.
There is a recognition not only for Ukraine but for Western countries to have the capacity to produce in the defence industry. The world is getting more complex, not only for Ukraine, not only in the face of Russia, but the world is getting more complex. We are not where we were 20 years ago, and now we have to really all turn our minds to this. It’s an issue of deterrence.
Senator R. Patterson: I’m going to focus a bit more down and in, and it’s probably going to cross all three of you from a commentary perspective.
As we know, this is a war of attrition that affects Ukraine and Russia, but Ukraine is who we care about. We talked a lot about hardware that’s going in in terms of military donations. I’m aware that COMEDS, which is the committee of the medical leads in NATO, have been meeting and trying to modernize the Ukrainian medical system, which is being used to treat soldiers. Where are we going in the here and now in order to help them sustain, from a Canadian donation perspective, the health care system, in particular to support fighting forces?
Second, as part of the long-term re-establishment of Ukraine post-victory, we know that the toll on mental health of all Ukrainians is severe. The ambassador talked about mental health. Could you talk a bit as well about how Canada sees itself participating in reconstruction, mental health and within the health care system? Good luck.
MGen. Prévost: Thank you.
Maybe I’ll start with what we do here and now in support of the security forces of Ukraine. Right now, we are training medical technicians in Poland with our very capable medical technicians and the system that the senator will know very well. We started this a few months back, and this continues. We actually just increased our support to Ukraine in terms of capacity to train their own soldiers to provide combat first aid in the field. This is one way we’re doing it right now. We’re one of the major contributors there. Also, there are military tables that are discussing this in terms of casualty management. Our Surgeon General is involved in some of those conversations in Europe on this. There is a role for Canada to play there, just as we were doing before the invasion started.
I know we have much more to talk about, maybe from Global Affairs, in terms of mental health and where we’re going.
Ms. Csaba: Mr. Chair, I’m happy to speak on the mental health side.
Certainly, we’re aware that for Ukrainians, this has become a very important priority. Ms. Zelenska, the spouse of the president, has, in fact, put in place a special project to support the mental health of Ukrainians, recognizing that every Ukrainian has been affected by this conflict, including children, women, soldiers and veterans.
We have put in place already several initiatives that are supporting certain aspects of that. For example, we are funding the United Nations Population Fund to ensure that the needs around sexual and reproductive health services are in place, which includes for victims of sexual violence. That will include not only physical health support but also mental health support. We have other initiatives as well, including through the UN’s conflict-related sexual violence prevention trust fund, and it also provides holistic services. It’s an area we are already engaged in. We continue to explore opportunities for future support in that sector. Thank you.
[Translation]
The Deputy Chair: We will move on to the second round and I will ask a question to Ms. Csaba and another to Major-General Prévost.
Ms. Csaba, how many Ukrainians welcomed by Canada since the start of the war, who are here permanently, intend to return to their country when peace returns?
[English]
Ms. Csaba: Mr. Chair, yes, Canada has been very generous in terms of welcoming Ukrainians to Canada through the CUAET program that has been managed by IRCC. We know that there are a number of Ukrainians who do have the intention of returning to Ukraine. It will be, in fact, important for Ukrainians to return to Ukraine to participate in the reconstruction and the recovery of their country. There may be others, of course, who choose to stay in Canada. This is precisely the purpose of IRCC’s program, to support those who choose to stay here as well.
[Translation]
The Deputy Chair: Thank you very much.
Major-General Prévost, I was most interested in what you told us. With respect to the equipment we provide to Ukraine, it is said that aid may be limited. You sent equipment that we had in surplus, you sent equipment that you were not using and that was already in stock. However, how much longer will Canada be of use to the Ukrainian army or able to provide support? We know very well that the war will not be over tomorrow morning.
MGen. Prévost: Thank you for the question. We will continue as long as we can. As I said a bit earlier, needs change. That does not mean that the Canadian Armed Forces have stopped trying to help. As the conflict evolves, each time there is a new request, we try to see what we can provide in the context of the conflict, rather than sending everything we can today. It is really based on the needs of the Ukrainians.
Consider the tanks we sent. There was no talk about tanks at the start of the conflict but, given the preparation of a counter‑offensive, the request came in for tanks. We looked at what we could do in that respect and we provided tanks. No one is saying the conflict will evolve in a way that we will no longer be able to give. The Canadian Armed Forces will always be able to look at how the conflict is evolving and what can be provided in the context of that conflict.
What we also try to do is to look a bit beyond what we currently have in stock, but also what Canadian industry can provide. Most of the work remains to be done and we are working with industry to see what our Canadian production capacity, together with our expertise, can provide to meet current and future needs.
That is done in two ways. The Canadian Armed Forces will continue to monitor the equipment we do have, because there will always be the possibility of restocking our equipment by purchasing from industry suppliers, but we also look at what the Canadian industry can provide in terms of equipment that we do not have in the Canadian Armed Forces.
[English]
Senator Richards: My question is for Major-General Prévost. Thank you for being here. Thank you to all of you for your service.
What is the production capacity in Canada? We seem to be in a very reflective mood about our military. A lot of people are leaving through attrition. We don’t seem to be up to the numbers we could be. Overall, what is the capacity to ship armaments over to Ukraine? Do we have to build on that? Should we build on that?
MGen. Prévost: Regardless of the capacity of the Canadian Armed Forces, we know we need to reconstitute the Canadian Armed Forces. We don’t have the people we need to be where we’re supposed to be right now. We’re short about 15,000 members. I would say 10,000, plus some of them are not trained.
In terms of the capacity of Canada to continue to supply weapons to Ukraine, there is a capacity there. There is an industry there regardless of what the Canadian Armed Forces need for ourselves. We have a lot of industrial capacity in Canada. We are already producing weapons and technology for other countries. That capacity is there. We have increased that capacity through discussions with industry since the conflict started. There was the issue of artillery shells that were in high demand at the beginning, and that capacity has been increased in Canada and elsewhere in the world as well. It’s a matter of how the industry is able to mobilize itself to do this. There is a lot of industry in Canada that is producing military technology that the Canadian Armed Forces are not a client to but is selling to other countries.
There is the capacity, and we have that knowledge, and we have that intellectual property. I don’t think that’s the issue. The issue is, how do we mobilize them regardless of how the Canadian Armed Forces themselves are struggling through capacity inside the Canadian Armed Forces?
Senator Richards: Well, optimistically, I hope the Canadian Armed Forces will be able to meet its projected amount of personnel. That would be great for Canada, wouldn’t it?
MGen. Prévost: We are working hard on this.
Senator Richards: I know a medic in Ukraine. He is from the Miramichi, where I’m from. Is he there on his own? By that, I mean, is Canada backing people who go into Ukraine and serve as medics or maybe as soldiers? I don’t think they are, are they? These guys are on their own. I think the medic is on his own. I think he was wounded. He is back on the front lines. I think he was in Bakhmut at one point. Are these guys on their own, even if they are medics?
MGen. Prévost: We don’t allow serving CAF members to travel to Ukraine. We don’t advise Canadians to travel to Ukraine. People are making personal decisions, but in terms of Canadian Armed Forces members, we don’t allow —
Senator Richards: He is a former member, and I think he is extremely brave. I thought I would throw that out. Thank you.
Senator Cardozo: I have two questions, and I hope they are quick.
I was really intrigued, Ms. Csaba, by your talk about possible peace talks. Could you share whether that might be a possible end to this?
My second question is about the matter of public support. My colleagues are asking about public support internationally, but I’m wondering what your thoughts are about maintaining public support for this effort within Canada and where you see that heading.
Ms. Csaba: Regarding peace negotiations, as far as we are aware, there have been no negotiations between Moscow and Kyiv since the start of the war. Each side has ruled out a ceasefire based on current battlefield conditions. That’s because both sides have put into place very hard preconditions before they would be willing to engage in peace talks. We know that, on the Ukrainian side, their precondition is that all Russian troops must be out of the territory of Ukraine, based on 1991 borders. So we’re unlikely to see peace talks anytime soon so long as both sides are sticking to their very clear and firm preconditions.
That being said, we absolutely are interested and engaged in bringing about a sustainable and just peace in Ukraine. With the announcement of President Zelenskyy’s 10-point peace formula last year, we have been working with our partners, allies and Ukraine to see how we could support that process going forward.
I would note that there are other countries that are now engaged in seeking to launch peace talks as well, including China, Brazil, the Holy See and now a group of six African countries. We need to continue to look at what the most promising elements of those peace proposals are and how we can support Ukraine to find itself in a strong situation in terms of being able to negotiate. We will see where this path will take us, but it’s certainly not clear that we will be in a position to engage in peace talks anytime in the short term.
Senator Cardozo: Any comment in terms of maintaining public support within Canada for this effort?
Ms. Csaba: It’s a challenging question, let’s say. There continues to be widespread Canadian support for our efforts in Ukraine. Over time, how that may evolve, given other domestic pressures, that will be something to keep in mind. We will want to demonstrate to Ukraine that we are continuing to support them through this process, and we’ll need to find the right balance. Clearly, that will require some difficult decisions down the road.
MGen. Prévost: I will add a point on this. This is a reason why it’s important we are here today: It’s important we maintain public support around this important fight that Ukraine is engaged in. I thank the committee for inviting us to discuss this. There is a role for every senator in Canada. There is a role from every member of Parliament. There is a role for the media. There is a role for all of us to maintain public support around this important fight.
Senator R. Patterson: Something we have seen in this conflict is that Ukraine has integrated women at all levels, from front-line combat right through to the ambassador sitting in front of us. Mrs. Zelenskyy has been global in her influence. It’s a little-known or little-recognized fact that you have to include the voices of women, not only in the process of war but also in the process of peace. I’m going to be biased about and say that, from personal opinion, Canada and how we actually operationalize women in peace and security, especially within the NATO framework, from operationalization, we are, I believe, ahead. How do you see the continued voice of women, girls, boys and those who are not normally in the decision-making places remaining in the future establishment of peace? How can Canada help in that domain?
Ms. Grant: Thank you, senator, for the question. It’s a very important one.
There is no quick answer to it. We are engaging with Ukrainian women who are involved in government, in the prosecution of the war and in peace negotiations, eventually, on a daily and weekly basis. We find that, in Ukraine, from our perspective at the foreign ministry, there are a number of senior Ukrainian women in the foreign ministry with whom we work exactly on these questions. We’ll be working with them after the fighting has stopped to look at the post-conflict issues and where Canada can play a role. They are themselves designing those programs. We do seek those women out.
In the NATO context as well, which we have talked about before, women, peace and security are front of mind for us in the NATO context. That will also include Ukraine and the support NATO has been giving, is giving and will give to Ukraine. We would like that lens on that support to Ukraine via NATO channels. We not only try to mainstream the priority of women, peace and security in all of NATO’s lines of work but in its very concrete and practical support it delivers to vulnerable countries such as Ukraine but also Georgia, Moldova and Bosnia‑Herzegovina.
Those are a few pieces of an answer to a very important question.
MGen. Prévost: I think we all have something to say. I’ll let Kati speak first. It’s an important question.
Ms. Csaba: Thank you. I didn’t mean to go in front of you.
The questions of gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls have been at the core of all of our development assistance with Ukraine since the very earliest days. That’s in line with our current Feminist International Assistance Policy and our feminist foreign policy. We firmly believe that empowering women to play that role is extremely important to Ukraine’s future. We have done our best all along to be supporting the role of women, whether it’s as women parliamentarians, women judges or in all spheres of life, such as local governance and so on.
MGen. Prévost: Yes, it’s a very important question.
We’re true believers in Canada regarding women, peace and security. We have been leaders. The senator might be tracking that when we did our training of Ukrainian soldiers from 2015 to 2022, we had started to implement women, peace and security in the way we train Ukrainians and in trying to institutionalize women, peace and security in the way they train, the gender focal point and the way they consider this in their operation. They were still fighting a fight in the Donbas themselves, so we had started at that point.
Since the invasion started, we obviously train on what the Ukrainians need most right now, and we receive the trainees that we receive. As our training evolves, we’re going to continue to give the basic skill sets for the soldiers to continue, but we’re thinking how we’re going to transition from training soldiers to training back to leadership — back where we were — so we can get back on track into transforming the way Ukraine will see themselves in the future. We’re thinking of those things. How can we bring back where we were in 2022 into our training for the future? Thank you.
[Translation]
The Deputy Chair: That brings us to the end of our meeting. I would like to thank Ms. Grant, Ms. Csaba, and Major-General Prévost, as well as all the witnesses who were with us today.
These discussions are extremely important and we thank you for your participation today.
The next meeting will be on Monday, June 12, at 4 p.m., when we will hear from witnesses on Bill C-224, An Act to establish a national framework for the prevention and treatment of cancers linked to firefighting. If the committee agrees, we will immediately move on to the clause-by-clause study. I invite you to contact the law clerk if you wish to submit amendments. On that note, I wish you all a good evening.
(The committee adjourned.)