THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
EVIDENCE
OTTAWA, Wednesday, November 5, 2025
The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met with videoconference this day at 4:15 p.m. [ET] to examine and report on such issues as may arise from time to time relating to foreign relations and international trade generally.
Senator Peter M. Boehm (Chair) in the chair.
[Translation]
The Chair: Honourable senators, my name is Peter Boehm. I am a senator from Ontario and the chair of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade.
[English]
I invite committee members participating in today’s meeting to introduce themselves.
Senator Adler: I’m Charles Adler, Manitoba.
Senator MacDonald: Michael MacDonald, Cape Breton, Nova Scotia.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: Amina Gerba from Quebec.
[English]
Senator Ravalia: Welcome. Mohamed Ravalia, Newfoundland and Labrador.
Senator Ataullahjan: Welcome. Salma Ataullahjan, Ontario.
Senator Woo: Good afternoon. Yuen Pau Woo, British Columbia.
Senator Harder: Peter Harder, Ontario.
Senator M. Deacon: Hello. Marty Deacon, Ontario.
Senator Wilson: Duncan Wilson, British Columbia.
Senator Al Zaibak: Mohammad Al Zaibak, Ontario.
Senator Coyle: Mary Coyle, Antigonish, Nova Scotia.
The Chair: Welcome, senators, and welcome to anyone who is watching us across the country today on Sen ParlVu.
Colleagues, today we are meeting under our general order of reference to discuss the situation in Haiti.
[Translation]
Today, for our first panel, from Global Affairs Canada, we are pleased to welcome Ian Myles, Executive Director, Haiti Division, Jeff Senior, Director, Stabilization and Peace Support Operations Division, and Pamela Moore, Executive Director, Peace and Stabilization Program Division.
[English]
We also welcome, from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Liam Price, Director General, International Special Services; and Adriana Poloz, Executive Director, Intelligence and International Policing. Welcome to the committee. Thank you for being with us today.
Before we hear opening statements and proceed to questions and answers — which will be a bit of a challenge today because we have five witnesses, but I think we’re going to make it all work — I would like to ask everyone present to please mute notifications on your devices and also follow the instructions on the card with respect to earpieces being removed or set away from the microphone to prevent feedback that might cause audio damage and concerns to our interpreters in particular.
Mr. Myles, you have the floor, and you are to be followed by Mr. Price.
[Translation]
Ian Myles, Executive Director, Haiti Division, Global Affairs Canada: Good afternoon. My name is Ian Myles, and I am the Executive Director with the Haiti Division at Global Affairs Canada. With me today are Pamela Moore, Executive Director, Peace and Stabilization Program Division, and Jeff Senior, Director, Stabilization and Peace Support Operations Division, who are also both from Global Affairs Canada.
I’m also joined by Adriana Poloz, Executive Director, Intelligence and International Policing, and Liam Price, Director General, International Special Services, who will later deliver remarks on behalf of the RCMP. Today, I will provide an overview of the crisis in Haiti and Canada’s response.
[English]
Since the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in 2021, the country has spiralled downward into a profound, multifaceted crisis as gang violence and disorder continue to escalate. Despite the commendable efforts and sacrifices of the Haitian National Police and international stabilization initiatives, gangs now control up to 90% of the capital and are expanding into other regions. The gangs are exceptionally well funded and equipped due to their use of kidnapping, extortion and drugs and arms trafficking. Their tactics are increasingly brutal, recruiting children, inflicting widespread sexual violence and committing mass killings. Since 2024, over 8,700 people have been killed.
The political situation is similarly challenging. The Transitional Presidential Council, TPC, established in April 2024, has now acknowledged that elections cannot be held before their mandate expires in February 2026 due to continued insecurity. Haiti’s many political actors are currently undergoing intensive deliberations to determine a subsequent governance plan.
Haitian citizens are bearing the brunt of this crisis. More than half the population requires urgent humanitarian assistance, and more than 1.4 million people have been forced from their homes. Haiti is still recovering from the devastating earthquake of 2010 and, in 2025, Hurricane Melissa caused further flooding and destruction. The convergence of natural and human-made disasters is pushing the country to the brink, straining the resilience of its population and the capacity of its institutions.
The crisis’s impacts are also felt beyond Haiti, including in Canada and Haiti’s neighbours. Haiti’s instability creates ideal conditions for transnational crime to thrive, illicit flows of money, drugs and weapons are expanding, and Haitian gangs are building ties to criminal networks in the region and even in Canada. Desperate conditions are also driving irregular migration, and the extremely high-risk business environment is hindering economic recovery.
In response to the escalating crisis, on September 30, the UN Security Council authorized the transition from the existing Multinational Security Support Mission into a larger and more aggressive Gang Suppression Force, backed by a robust UN support office. Canada has agreed to be part of the standing group of partners that will provide strategic oversight, policy guidance and resource mobilization. The new force will increase from 1,000 police officers to up to 5,500 military and police personnel. Critically, the GSF will leverage the expertise and resources of the UN but will still rely on voluntary contributions of personnel and funds to pay for them. The GSF is critical to restoring stability in Haiti.
In September, Minister Anand announced $40 million of new funding to the GSF, adding to Canada’s initial commitment of $86.2 million for the original mission. Canada also committed $20 million of new funding to improve regional maritime security. As president of the G7, Canada has led efforts to mobilize additional support for stabilization efforts. Canada is a long-time friend to Haiti and its second-largest bilateral donor. Since 2022, Canada has invested over $450 million towards peace, security, humanitarian and development initiatives managed by multiple departments and agencies, including some led by my RCMP colleagues here today.
While stabilization remains the immediate priority, Canada is also targeting the root causes of Haiti’s repeated crises, notably corruption and impunity. For example, we are supporting lawyers and civil society organizations that represent victims of human rights violations, enabling access to legal services for more than 10,000 people — including over 3,000 women — and training over 220 lawyers. Canada has also independently sanctioned 34 individuals, including gang leaders and several members of Haiti’s political and economic elite.
Despite the challenging operating environment, dedicated Canadian and international organizations continue to work hard to alleviate suffering and provide basic services.
[Translation]
Canada will continue to work alongside our Haitian and international partners to help restore security, support democratic governance and promote prosperity for all Haitians.
We will also prioritize supporting local civil society, maintaining our sanctions regime and fighting corruption to achieve far-reaching and lasting results. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Myles. Mr. Price, you have the floor.
[English]
Liam Price, Director General, International Special Services, Royal Canadian Mounted Police: Mr. Chair, thank you. Executive Director Poloz will be offering the RCMP’s opening remarks, if that’s okay with you.
The Chair: Of course.
Adriana Poloz, Executive Director, Intelligence and International Policing, Royal Canadian Mounted Police: Thank you, and good afternoon, honourable chair and esteemed members of the committee. My name is Adriana Poloz, and I’m the executive director of the Intelligence program for the RCMP, which also includes international. I am joined by my director general, Liam Price, who oversees the International Peacekeeping Program. I would like to thank you all for the opportunity for the RCMP to be present today and to be alongside our GAC colleagues.
[Translation]
Thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak to you about Canada’s long-standing commitment to Haiti and the vital role that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Canadian police in general play in supporting peace and stability in the region.
[English]
The RCMP’s engagement in Haiti spans over four decades. This reflects Canada’s deep and unwavering commitment to the Haitian people and their institutions. Over the years, RCMP members have worked side by side with the Haitian National Police and international partners, helping to build capacity, foster trust and strengthen the rule of law.
This year marks the fifteenth anniversary of the devastating 2010 earthquake — a tragedy that profoundly impacted Haiti and touched Canadians deeply. In the wake of that disaster, Canada intensified its support, and the RCMP played a vital role in humanitarian and stabilization efforts.
We also remember, with solemn respect, the loss of two RCMP members, Chief Superintendent Doug Coates and Staff Sergeant Mark Gallagher, who gave their lives in service to Haiti, a powerful testament to Canada’s ongoing commitment to the Haitian government and its people.
More recently, Hurricane Melissa brought renewed devastation to Haiti and countries across the region, displacing thousands and further straining already fragile infrastructure and emergency services.
These compounding hardships underscore the urgency of Canada’s continued engagement and the importance of sustained international support for Haiti’s recovery and resilience.
Since early 2023, with the emergence of the most recent round of crises, the RCMP has continued to play a key role in supporting the HNP through advice and assistance, training and intelligence-gathering missions across Haiti and the Caribbean. Despite these challenges, such as frequent leadership changes within the HNP and logistical constraints, Canada’s police officers have successfully built strong networks, delivered impactful training and provided strategic advisory support.
Canada’s efforts are operationalized through the International Police Peacekeeping, the IPP, under Director General Liam Price, administered under the Canadian Police Arrangement — a partnership between Global Affairs Canada, Public Safety Canada and the RCMP. This program enables the deployment of Canadian police officers and civilian experts to key multilateral organizations such as the United Nations, the European Union, NATO and other bilateral peace support and stabilization missions.
The RCMP’s involvement with regard to Haiti is multifaceted, as well as complex, with all efforts focused on helping combat transnational crime, stabilize the country and, of course, support the HNP. Despite challenges in the operating environment, which have prevented the large-scale deployments of personnel, the RCMP remains committed to supporting the Government of Canada’s efforts in supporting the renewed mission. Even the RCMP’s limited presence on the ground has proven essential for maintaining momentum, fostering trust and ensuring the HNP receives consistent, high-quality policing expertise. Continued engagement, particularly through in-person engagement, is absolutely critical to ensuring our assessments that are guided by operational decision-making.
To further coordinate our efforts, Canada established the Haiti Integrated Intelligence Cell, which is no longer operating, as well as the Haiti Mission Centre, which is currently still operational. We currently deploy personnel under the CPA Ministerial Authorization. The Haiti Intelligence Centre, when it was working and fully operational, enabled timely integrated intelligence analysis that informed government responses and international engagement, producing both classified and unclassified assessments. Under the CPA, 40 Canadian police trainers were deployed to deliver programs focused on anti-gang strategies, anti-corruption and vetting, tactical operations and technical tradecraft. As of April 2025, 182 HNP personnel have been trained in areas such as command and control, intelligence, tactical response and strengthening institutional capacity and regional cooperation.
It is important to note that our efforts have extended beyond Haiti. The RCMP has worked closely with regional partners, including the Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Turks and Caicos, contributing to initiatives led by the Interdepartmental Strategic Advisory and Coordination Group and the United Integrated Office in Haiti. These partnerships have addressed critical issues such as illegal migration and border security, with RCMP intelligence support helping deter the flow of irregular migration across the Caribbean and into North America.
Additionally, the RCMP has combatted the trafficking of drugs, firearms and illicit financing through the deployment of temporary liaison officers, who have cultivated key relationships within regional intelligence-sharing centres. This has enabled Canada to contribute meaningfully to INTERPOL-led operations and bolster regional security.
Canadian police trainers have delivered and continue to deliver specialized instruction in drone operations, criminal analysis, surveillance, polygraphy, media relations, open-source intelligence, screening interviews and incident response, ensuring our partners are equipped with modern tools and techniques to meet evolving threats.
Finally, chair and members, the RCMP’s engagement in Haiti reflects our enduring commitment to Haiti and to peace, security and international cooperation. As we mark 40 years of effort and reflect on the lives lost in service, we reaffirm our dedication to supporting the Haitian people in building a safer, more stable future. This commitment is long-standing, principled and evolving. Through these sustained efforts, alongside our international and regional partners, the RCMP remains committed to enabling the Government of Canada’s efforts and support for Haiti in its pursuit of lasting peace and security.
Thank you.
[Translation]
The Chair: Thank you, Ms. Poloz.
Honorable senators, I would like to point out that Senator Hébert from Quebec has just joined us. I remind senators that they have a maximum of three minutes each for the first round, including questions and answers.
[English]
Also, I would say, as usual, keep your questions as concise as you possibly can so as to elicit a maximum-duration answer from our witnesses. Since we have five witnesses today, I would ask senators to be specific as to whom you are directing the question. To our witnesses, you will have to engage in some self-selection, not deflection but self-selection, as to who would respond to the questions.
Senator Ravalia: Thank you very much for being here.
I will direct my question to Director General Price. I wonder if you could give us an update on the situation at the Haiti-Dominican Republic border.
Mr. Price: Thank you for the question. Could you clarify, please? What, in particular, are you referencing, just generally?
Senator Ravalia: There is a realization that people are trying to get out of Haiti and, historically, there have been tensions. We have had previous updates. I was just wondering what the latest situation might be.
Mr. Price: Absolutely. Thank you again for the question.
Just for context, the situation over the last number of months has not evolved significantly. It remains fraught with some amount of tension between the two sides. In terms of specifics — and I turn to my Global Affairs colleagues, if they want to add anything — we were monitoring through 2024 a certain level of concern in the dynamics between the two sides, but that reporting has lessened as of late, from our perspective.
Senator Ravalia: Mr. Myles, did you have anything to add?
Mr. Myles: Senator, I would be happy to add a little bit to that side.
As you inferred, there has been a long-standing, ambivalent relationship between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. There are many Haitians working at many of the tourist outlets and so on. Many have been there for generations, and they pose quite a heavy strain on the health system and the education system, which has generated some tensions.
I think it was in October or November last year that they began large-scale deportations. I think there are well over 200,000 who have been deported, putting a tremendous strain on Haiti as a country because they are in crisis and their capacity to absorb those returnees is not high. It is a porous border, so many of them are finding their way back as well. There is some concern over pregnant women who have been deported, creating a high risk there. We are providing assistance to the International Organization for Migration to try to provide some support for those waiting to be deported to the other side, but it is an ongoing challenge.
There is also a security dimension there as well because some of the drugs and weapons are also crossing over that border, so that’s an ongoing concern. I know the Dominican Republic is tightening some of their security at their port areas through new scanners and so on to try to intercept some of the weapons coming in. Hopefully that helps.
Senator Coyle: Thank you to all of our witnesses. I have a personal and professional stake in Haiti, and I really appreciate the work you’re doing.
I have many questions, so I’ll try to get them out fairly quickly. I think the first ones are for Global Affairs. You talked about how 90% of the capital, Port-au-Prince, is occupied by gangs at the moment, and that it’s expanding. The experience that we’ve had, with the organization I’ve been working with, has been the rest of the country hasn’t been so bad. I would like to know first about the situation in the rest of the country beyond Port-au-Prince.
The Transitional Presidential Council has said it’s too early for elections. There was a move within the country to suggest at one time that local elections, as opposed to national elections, might be the way to sequence things, so working from the base up to the national. I don’t know where that sits at the moment.
My third question, you said Canada is the second-largest donor. Who’s the largest now? I’m curious, with USAID pulling out.
Mr. Myles: Thank you very much, senator, for those questions.
In terms of the first figure, in terms of 90% of the capital, I’d like to nuance it a little bit. In terms of full control, we’re probably talking closer to 40% to 50%, but they exert such a heavy influence over the other areas that it makes them very insecure. There is movement in and out that really complicates things. It’s hard to put one figure on it, but it is a bit more nuanced in terms of that.
You’re absolutely right. The insecurity and the violence is primarily centred in the capital. Most of the country is less affected. I wouldn’t say unaffected, because so much depends on the role the capital plays, but the gangs are now reaching past the capital. They’re getting into some of the neighbouring districts and so on, such as Artibonite and other areas, where they’re becoming more pronounced and more active. The second-largest city is Cap-Haïtien, and for now, that is very much a saving grace for Haiti because commercial flights are still coming and going there. A number of organizations have decamped to Cap-Haïtien and are using it for temporary operating bases.
In terms of development cooperation, it has allowed Canada and its partners to continue accomplishing interesting results outside of the capital, and that’s often a surprise. People ask, “How are you operating there?” And that’s the answer, because much of the country is still managing to do important things elsewhere.
In terms of local elections, there hasn’t been much discussion of that. Such a high percentage of the population is in Port-au-Prince that I think it is a bit inconceivable that meaningful elections could happen at the local level without also addressing that. There were proposals at one point to try to organize elections for those parts of Port-au-Prince that aren’t controlled by the gangs, but they were quickly dismissed because they just wouldn’t be credible.
The Chair: I have to interrupt because we are past the time, but I want you to give a one-country answer to the third part of Senator Coyle’s question.
Mr. Myles: The United States is still the largest donor, but it comes in different forms.
The Chair: Thank you.
Senator Ataullahjan: Senator Coyle asked my question about the capital being controlled by gangs, but I would like to know, from the RCMP, how many personnel do you have in Haiti?
The other question I have is for Global Affairs. What’s your current assessment of HNP’s human rights record? How effective have the Canadian training programs been to address this concern?
Mr. Price: Thank you for the question.
Right now, we have three personnel on the ground. We have ministerial authorization for up to 48 personnel for this mission, 25 of whom could be deployed to Haiti at any given time, but because of the security conditions on the ground, we don’t have that many in country. Those were mostly projected for training initiatives in areas that, at the moment, are largely gang controlled. What I would say, though, is that that small number of personnel is having a significant impact, which is to say they’re working directly in the offices of the HNP senior leadership and working alongside them as they’re planning work with the MSSM, the Multinational Security Support Mission, and ongoing initiatives.
To the second part of your question, just quickly in terms of the human rights record, the HNP is a large organization, and there have been historical challenges, for sure. We’re monitoring that very closely as we go forward, and we do have an ongoing eye on that, in particular around things like sexual and gender-based violence. We’ve attached to the MSSM in Washington a sexual and gender-based violence adviser to pay attention. Every part of the training we do provide, though, includes an element of human rights training in one form or another. For example, our training on interviewing techniques is consistent with Canadian values. They are adapted for their reality, but we train on our type of interviewing techniques.
Senator Ataullahjan: Thank you.
Mr. Myles: If I can add to that, certainly human rights has been emphasized in all the training components that we have, particularly around gender rights and how to respond to gender-based violence. It has been important.
If we look at the HNP right now, it suffers from a very weak command and control system. It really is a destabilized organization. It has suffered a lot of losses, both in terms of physical casualties but also people just leaving because it’s such a dangerous job to have. That has left room for freelancing, let’s say, at lower levels. There have been reports of extrajudicial killings. The leadership of the HNP takes those seriously. They launch investigations. It’s not always clear that those follow through to the end.
One dynamic that complicates things is a lot of the police are from the neighbourhoods that have been taken over by gangs, so things get personal very quickly. There is also a dynamic of self-defence brigades that have risen up to defend, and they are taking very violent approaches, often extrajudicial killings as well, so that can add to the dynamics. Some of them are forming almost new gangs. It’s complicated the dynamics as well.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you for being here. I’m really glad we’re back to get an update and talk about Haiti.
To GAC, Mr. Myles, in your opening comments, you talked a little bit about the gang suppression force and replacing the Multinational Security Support Mission and gave us a little information on that. I’m trying to understand the learnings. This is really complex. We’re trying to appreciate how complex this is. What can Canada do to ensure that the GSF succeeds where the MSSM did not? What lessons can be learned? What is shifting targets from the earlier mission? What can we use that can be applied in this next go? I know September is just yesterday, when it started up, so these are early days, but the learnings are perhaps what I’m looking at today.
Mr. Myles: Thank you for the question. I’ll lead off with a little bit and turn to my colleague Pamela Moore to speak to that.
The key difference is that the new mission will try to leverage the capacity and experience of the United Nations, whereas the first one didn’t. It was very much ad hoc, kind of a coalition of the willing, and didn’t have legal status, which posed a lot of administrative problems. They had great difficulty mobilizing troops. They only had about 400 Kenyans until around January/February. Now they are up to a thousand, but the mission was designed for 2,500. There are all of these different problems. The new force will be 5,500, and it’s supported by UN support office and paid through assessed contributions. Already, that will be a big way forward.
That’s one element of response, but I want to leave some time for my colleagues to weigh in on that.
Pamela Moore, Executive Director, Peace and Stabilization Program Division, Global Affairs Canada: Thank you for the question.
I’ll add that one of the other areas that still requires reinforcing is the area of human rights and strengthening those aspects of the mission, so this links back to the senator’s previous question. The fact that the UN will establish a support office and that there will be UN standards in place will be very helpful in reinforcing the UN standard when it comes to respect for human rights, preventing sexual exploitation and abuse. The Government of Canada has, over the last number of years, invested in organizations like the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights as a complement to do programming support and to work with the Haitian National Police to improve their ability to respond to incidents of human rights abuses and incidents of sexual and gender-based violence. There is a complex structure in place with support from the Government of Canada to reinforce those aspects.
Did anyone else want to add anything?
The Chair: I’m afraid we’re out of time. I’m sure we can come back to that.
Senator Harder: My question is for Executive Director Poloz. My understanding from the excellent testimony we have heard is that we are doing more, we are very focused, we are strategic in our investments, and things are getting worse. From an intelligence point of view, I would like your intelligence assessment, to the extent that you can share it in this forum, of transnational gangs, the corruption and impunity that you are observing, whether I am right in that trajectory, and if that is inevitable.
Ms. Poloz: Thank you for that very good question.
I think that the reality — I did allude to it in the opening remarks — is that we have been invested for over 40 years. One thing that should not be dismissed lightly is the evolution of crime. We see that more and more with convergence. We see that more with the criminal space, with organized crime and more of that with the national security side. It has blurred the line. We always hear about the blurring of borders and that really there is no jurisdictional boundaries to crime, and it’s no different from Haiti.
Where it’s a little unique — and Liam, I will hand over to you in a moment — about Haiti specifically is the gang and the gang violence and the evolution of that. It’s the volatility of those gangs. There is absolutely no rule of law, to some degree, in the sense that when you don’t have peace and order and stability, it’s ripe for exploitation. We’re seeing that with the gangs, with the availability of guns, who they are targeting, the extortion, et cetera. They have different motivators from traditional organized crime. It is not so much profit-based or profit-driven; it is control and power. That is the fundamental difference and why it has been so challenging to help address that.
Mr. Price: Just to build on Executive Director Poloz’s answer quickly, no, I don’t think it’s inevitable. It is very difficult to discuss the counterfactual of what would have happened had we not been making the investments that we are making. Certainly, if I look back on where we were two or three years ago, as the decline unrolled that my colleague spoke to, there were very negative projections about where the HNP would be right now. They are in a tough spot, a very tough spot, but whether they would be even where they are today without the investments that have been made by the international community is really the better question.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: My question is for Mr. Myles, but other witnesses may respond as well.
I wanted to come back to the elections. The president of Haiti’s provisional electoral council, Jacques Desrosiers, has announced that elections will not take place before February 2026. Under the current circumstances, do you think it is realistic that elections could be held early next year?
Mr. Myles: Thank you, senator. To give a short answer, I don’t think anyone believes that an election could be held early next year. Some people still think that it would be held in the following months or at the end of 2026. Many things remain unknown. One thing that the international community can ask for, possibly spearheaded by Canada, is to have a confirmed timeline and concrete commitments.
What complicates the discussion is the very reasonable argument that a certain level of security is needed before these elections can be held. Everything else — the planning, the preparations — can be done, but we haven’t seen enough progress so far. We are also concerned about the incentive for leaders to try to extend the transition period. I am thinking of the debates between Haitian political actors at the moment. As international players, we must also take a stand.
For now, we are trying to send a message that whatever the solution, it must be inclusive, and there must be a clear path to an election. That’s really the starting point for us.
Senator Gerba: Thank you. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has indicated that as of October 27, 2025, only 14.7% of the UN’s $908 million U.S. humanitarian response plan for Haiti had been funded. Why is it that this plan cannot be funded further? Does Canada have a role to play in encouraging other members to better fund this plan?
The Chair: Very quickly, please.
Mr. Myles: Honestly, I don’t have the answer to that question. As usual, all I can say is that there are several crises in the world, and some very difficult decisions are being made. I have colleagues who are closer to these debates, so if you like, I could try to get more details on that.
Senator Gerba: Thank you.
[English]
Senator Al Zaibak: My question is directed to Mr. Myles. Thank you and your colleagues for the work you do and for joining us on this committee today. I understand that Canada’s four-pillar approach to Haiti seeks to balance security, governance, rule of law and socio-economic recovery. Could you outline how these priorities are being sequenced and coordinated on the ground? How does the Government of Canada ensure that short-term security actions are linked to longer-term political stabilization?
Mr. Myles: Thank you. It’s an excellent question.
I think the pillar, so to speak, that takes all the attention is the security one, and a lot of people see that as a precondition to the rest. In reality, we are pursuing all of them simultaneously, albeit the balance will change over time. To give an example, our sense is that repeated crises are really rooted in very deep corruption at many different levels that undermine institutions and the rule of law. We continue to work on things like international sanctions. Canada is leading the way on that. We have 34 independent sanctions and UN sanctions as well to send a message that impunity will not be accepted.
At the same time, we are actually still working with the judicial system to strengthen lawyers, civilian access and civil society groups demanding justice to try to build capacity to resist political interference. One of the groups that we have been supporting is an anti-corruption unit within the government, which is actually remaining independent and was even strong enough to accuse three of the current nine members of the Transitional Presidential Council of corruption, which has had serious impact. That is happening as well.
In terms of my earlier response to Senator Coyle, we continue to do a lot of work outside of Port-au-Prince, which is helping to address the economic and livelihood situation with humanitarian assistance. For instance, through the World Food Programme, we’re continuing to provide 100,000 children with a warm meal every day, at least during the school year. A lot of these things are happening simultaneously, but hopefully we’ll be able to do more of the latter once the security situation improves.
Senator Al Zaibak: Thank you.
Referring to the sanctions applied to the 34 Haitian individuals and others, are there any indicators suggesting that these measures are changing behaviour or limiting gang financing networks?
Mr. Myles: I think there are some indications. Of the number of people who have been accused, there are gang leaders, and it’s a little less obvious there. It certainly makes it harder for them to move and leave and so on. We have also sanctioned members of the political and economic elite who we believe have been in collusion with the gangs and who helped create them in the first place. They’ve destabilized the country and helped to lead it where it is today. As a consequence to that, many of them have lost their political ambitions. They have been marginalized in that sense. Many of them are finding that their economic empires have been shaken. Fewer people are willing to work with them. They have difficulty accessing international banks, for instance.
Senator Al Zaibak: That is good to know. Thank you.
Senator Woo: I have a follow-up question more for the RCMP, I think. What do we know about the transnational linkages of these gangs in terms of the groups, countries and regions that are supporting them? Are there any backward linkages to Canada that we should be aware of?
Mr. Price: Thank you, senator, for the question.
As my colleague mentioned, part of the nature of crime today, especially at this level, is that it’s inherently transnational. Senator Ravalia asked about the Haitian-Dominican border. We see links between the Haitian gangs and the instability in Haiti in a number of countries regionally, and yes, with linkages up to Canada.
Part of our strategy over the last couple of years has been not just to focus our presence in Haiti but to work with partners across the region to address irregular migration, weapons trafficking and drug trafficking that both help fund the gangs and their activities locally but also serve to destabilize communities around the region. We have personnel in Jamaica, in Turks and Caicos, in southern United States and in the Dominican Republic, all of whom are helping pursue a regional strategy.
Without getting into too much detail, I would say that many of these gangs are transnational. They seek to either move into and out of their space, move goods and people into and out of their space and/or resupply themselves with weapons and arms from other areas.
I turn to colleagues if they want to add anything.
Ms. Moore: Thank you.
I would just add that we work closely with Global Affairs Canada and the RCMP in tracking these types of issues and also looking at ways that we can respond. Through GAC’s Anti-Crime Capacity Building Program, we do a lot of work in collaboration with the RCMP, working with organizations like the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and other organizations in the region, such as CARICOM, to try to counter what is a transnational problem of illicit flow of people, arms and goods.
Mr. Price: One final hot pursuit on that to say a big thank you to Global Affairs Canada for their funding to INTERPOL as well. INTERPOL’s recognition of the Haiti challenges as a regional challenge has brought that out as we try to address these transnational flows.
Senator MacDonald: I’m looking at the numbers here that we’re contributing. We seem to have contributed over half a billion dollars a year since 2022. I am always curious to know how much money France is contributing to this particular mess down there, since they are the ones who started this place. They are the ones who colonized Haiti and left this mess there. Why are we putting all the money up? Where is France?
Mr. Myles: Thank you for the question.
I don’t have exact figures with me, but I can say that the vast majority of the funding is coming from the United States. Canada is, by far, the second-largest contributor.
You’re quite right; the French contribution, at least to the existing multinational security force, the Gang Suppression Force, is rather modest. I think it’s in the range of $8 million to $10 million, whereas we have either contributed or committed over $126 million. The value of the U.S. contribution is probably closer to a billion or more. Much of that has been in kind, so we’re putting our money primarily through a trust fund. The French are also contributing through other mechanisms. They are contributing to the Haitian National Police and the Haitian Armed Forces. It’s hard to quantify that. We don’t have exact numbers. They are there, but it is certainly a question that is asked. We have spent a lot of time and effort trying to mobilize resources from other G7 countries, and France, of course, has been front and centre in our sights. As you’re aware, their country is politically in quite a crisis right now, and a lot of that is rooted in their budget situation, their financial situation.
Senator MacDonald: I guess you can say that about a lot of contributing countries.
Don’t you think that Canada and the U.S. should be putting the squeeze on France a little more to make a contribution here and take responsibility for what is, in many ways, its inheritance or what it has driven here?
Mr. Myles: I think it is happening. It’s not always straightforward as to how that pressure is applied and when it can be applied effectively and constructively. We’ve used our presidency of the G7 to advance that. There is a Haiti working group that was established last year and that we’ve been leading since last February. Every time we meet, that’s one of the top agenda points. If they don’t step up, though, there’s not that many options for us to kind of twist arms, so to speak. The conversation never drops, and it gets raised in many bilateral conversations between our ministers and theirs.
Senator MacDonald: Thank you.
The Chair: We’re coming to the end of round one of questions, and that’s usually when the chair asks a question or two, and I have two.
Some members of this committee will recall we had a meeting a couple of years ago in Washington with the chair of the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. At the end of that meeting, we had a rather, shall we say, active discussion on Haiti, and we were told that Canada is not doing enough because, after all, Haiti is the other French-speaking country in the hemisphere. We countered, and we’re actually doing a lot. Now, the U.S. has stepped up its presence in the Caribbean for security reasons. This is being labelled as drug interdiction and, of course, has been quite kinetic in pursuing its goals. I would like to know whether you, at the officials level, have more contact now with the U.S. administration, given its changed posture in the Caribbean.
Secondly, I certainly have been quite involved in assisting Canadians behind the scenes on adoption cases of Haitian orphans. I know you’re not with IRCC and that IRCC has a presence in our embassy in Port-au-Prince, but it seems to me that processing citizenship, immigration and getting these children to Canada is a very, very difficult matter, especially now given the security situation in the urban areas. I’m wondering whether that is changing or not or whether you’re still going full on through the embassy. I guess I’m looking at you, Mr. Myles, and your microphone is on, too.
Mr. Myles: There is no escape. I’ll try to begin, and again I’ll pass it over to my colleagues who might have more information.
In terms of connections between the recent kinetic activity off the coast of Venezuela and elsewhere, I must admit I have very little visibility on how that was developed. All I know is that there hasn’t been any Canadian participation in it. It hasn’t been linked in any discussions that I’ve been part of with what’s been proposed for Haiti, which is my primary focus. That said, with the transition to the stronger, more aggressive Gang Suppression Force, it’s very much front and centre of our conversations, not only with the U.S. but with the other members of this governance body, the standing group of partners, as they develop what they call the concept of operations, which is essentially the overview of how the mission’s going to work, what its objectives are and so on.
Centre to that, of course, is ensuring a full compliance with international human rights law, which is difficult to do in the context. There is debate as well whether or not what we’re seeing now is evolving from criminal activity into something which would be called non-international armed conflict or some form of criminal insurgency, and the rules of engagement are different in those different scenarios. That is something I think those of us who are engaging in security operations in Haiti are grappling with now, to figure out what’s the appropriate response.
The Chair: Thank you. If you could just devote a few seconds to adoptions.
Mr. Myles: Unfortunately, I don’t have any visibility at all on that. I do know that we have IRCC people still positioned in Port-au-Prince, but I’m afraid I don’t have any visibility on their actions. I could try and find a contact, if that would be helpful.
The Chair: That was more of a general question. Some of us often get approached to assist. Thank you very much.
We’ll move to a second round.
Senator Coyle: I’m not sure if this is for Mr. Price. It’s about the Gang Suppression Force. I’m curious, and maybe it was said and I missed it, about the relationship between the Gang Suppression Force and the Haitian National Police. As I remember last time, things were being recalibrated and there was this point about the Haitian National Police having to be the front line. I’m curious about what that relationship is.
Mr. Price: Thank you for the question.
As my colleague just mentioned, the concept of operations for the Gang Suppression Force remains under development. Our view continues to be that the situation in Haiti must be resolved by a Haitian-led approach, and that’s critical as we work through this. That said, certainly the UN Security Council resolution envisages a more robust force to support the HNP and, at times, alongside and even independently at the front of them. That’s a dynamic that’s going to evolve but, at the moment, the exact construct of the Gang Suppression Force hasn’t been determined. As my colleagues would mention, that’s the work of the standing group of partners that we’re contributing to.
Jeff Senior, Director, Stabilization and Peace Support Operations Division, Global Affairs Canada: I’m happy to add a short comment. The resolution that mandated the new force gives the capacity for autonomous operations. They can work alongside or they can work with the Haitian National Police. They have a mandate to confront and counter gangs, informed by the intelligence component, to support the operational capacities of the Haitian National Police and to work with them on combatting arms flow as well. So in parallel and with on those aspects.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: My question is for Mr. Price.
The mandate of the multinational security support mission, or the MSSM, led by Kenya expired on October 2, 2025. According to the UN, it remained underfunded and never deployed the 2,500 people stipulated in its mandate. How do you explain the MSSM’s track record? What didn’t work? Conversely, were there any successes?
Mr. Price: Thank you for your question. I’ll answer it in English, since these are rather technical terms for me.
[English]
It’s very complicated to assess exactly why the MSSM didn’t make as much progress as necessarily it may have liked. It’s compounded both by the realities on the ground, where the gangs continued to grow in strength, and the support and the time it took to get up to speed. When that mandate expired, it transitioned into the new structure. In fact, the forces remain in place, and they are continuing to expand their missions. They never had the operating capacity they needed to fully implement the concept of operations that they wanted. As a result, it’s reasonable to expect that they would have been suboptimal on meeting their goals and objectives. At the same time, unfortunately, as with most of these situations, the enemy does have a vote and does have actions that they will take and that also cause challenges in the mission. That summarizes a very long answer.
The Chair: We like that. Thank you.
Senator Al Zaibak: My question is directed to Ms. Moore or Mr. Senior. I understand that the UN’s humanitarian plan for Haiti is barely 15% funded, and I stand to be corrected. What is Canada doing to mobilize additional donor support and encourage reform of aid delivery mechanisms to ensure assistance reaches vulnerable populations, especially women and children trapped in gang-controlled areas? Either one of you would be good.
Ms. Moore: Thank you, senator. I can start, and then if other colleagues want to add.
Canada continues to provide significant humanitarian assistance to Haiti, although, as you noted, the overall requirements are very high compared to what the collective international community has provided. Canada is and has been and continues to be a voice in encouraging all parties in Haiti to ensure unhindered access for humanitarian assistance. One of the things that Canada has been steadfast in is our policy around ensuring unhindered humanitarian access. As the second-largest donor overall in Haiti and a significant partner, we do have a voice that has some influence in this space. One of the things that we try to do is to engage all actors on that.
The humanitarian needs, however, are enormous, and the humanitarian United Nations system is facing quite significant budget constraints. So in terms of the question of how to engage others to contribute more, the one way that we’re doing that is what Mr. Myles referred to, which is using our presidency of the G7 to encourage G7 members but also other countries to contribute not only to the security situation and the security force but also to humanitarian assistance. So there is quite a lot of diplomatic and political engagement on this front.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Senator M. Deacon: My question is very brief. There have been some conversations around the U.S. and U.S. support. I can sort of recall former president Joe Biden suggesting to Canada that we ensure that we send forces into Haiti to get boots on the ground. I remember that and just want to know if we have had similar pressure from the Trump administration.
Mr. Myles: It hasn’t been a subject of discussion under the Trump administration. The sense is that the question of the financing and the question of the troop mobilization are quite independent. One of the challenges of the new mission will be mobilizing the troops because both the troops and the money to pay for them come from voluntary contributions, whereas the support is through assessed contributions, which is much easier. That’s one of the challenges that lies before us.
Discussions are just beginning now as to where those troops will come from. There is quite a long list of potential candidates, knowing countries that have contributed elsewhere. The language barrier is an important consideration. Potentially francophone African countries will be consulted, but there is also an interest to get more support from the hemisphere as well. The Organization of American States has recently prioritized Haiti, and the membership has been very supportive of the hemisphere taking a more active role in responding to the situation.
The Chair: Thank you very much. I would only add that I was ambassador to the OAS 25 years ago, and we prioritized Haiti then, so there is more work to do.
Senator Harder: My question is to Pamela Moore. I want you to put Haiti in the context of your full agenda of crises, and my question is, are we allocating, in terms of all of the crises that we could talk about, and we have been briefed on many, the right levels of engagement for Canada, or is our contribution to Haiti preventing us from doing stuff that we otherwise could in other situations? Are we overweighted or are we underweighted? How do those decisions and allocations get made, particularly at a time when we’ve got withdrawal of direct assistance from the U.S., from the U.K. and, tragically, from other countries as well?
Ms. Moore: Thank you very much, senator.
That’s a large question that goes beyond the mandate of any one particular program or part of Global Affairs Canada or the Government of Canada. However, I can say from the perspective of managing a global program at Global Affairs that engages in many different crises that the way that we have allocated funding is that when there are greater needs, there is often a more significant discussion that involves ministers and the cabinet table around allocations. As officials, my experience is that we work with the global programs that are allocated to us and the range of the most important crises out there. We work together to pool resources and collaborate across different federal government departments to make the best use of the resources that we have. But the significant needs and the growing number of crises and conflicts in the world means that many of these discussions need to happen amongst ministers to determine for the Government of Canada and the current environment how we’ll make those prioritization decisions.
We all know we’re in a world of a very large number of growing crises, so the challenge of answering your question and doing that exercise of whether we are allocating enough among all the different ways that we do our assistance, from diplomatic engagement to law enforcement and security involvement to development and humanitarian and security assistance, is a real challenge.
The Chair: Thank you very much. We’ve gone over time a little bit. Pamela Moore, Jeff Senior, Ian Myles, Liam Price and Adriana Poloz, thank you. You are all fine public servants. Thank you for the work you’re doing, and thank you for your testimony today. Obviously, the situation in Haiti is a very serious one. This committee will keep its eye on it, and we may have another session where we would invite you to speak to us of any progress. Hopefully, there will be some.
Colleagues, for our second panel, we welcome, from the International Crisis Group, Diego Da Rin, the Haiti Analyst. He is joining us by video conference. Also, as an individual, we have Stephen Baranyi, Full Professor, University of Ottawa. Professor Baranyi and I go back many years to what I call my Latin American phase.
Welcome. Thank you both for being with us today. We’re ready to hear your opening remarks, which will be followed by questions from senators.
Diego Da Rin, Haiti Analyst, International Crisis Group: Thank you for having invited me to join this afternoon’s proceedings. All protocols are observed.
I would like to focus my remarks today on the new possibilities for curbing gang violence opened by the UN Security Council’s authorization of a new foreign security mission for Haiti. In the coming months, a window of opportunity may emerge to lay the foundations for lasting peace, but this could also turn into another failed attempt to rein in the growing power of the gangs.
Haiti will face two important transitions in the coming months. First, the Kenyan-led security mission will transition into a Gang Suppression Force, but there is still little clarity about how this process will be managed. Second, in February 2026, the mandate of the current transitional administration will end, and it will need to be replaced by a new governing structure.
Credible elections cannot take place before the Transitional Presidential Council’s term ends in February. Gangs control much of the two departments where over half of the electorate resides, as well as the main national highways, which would prevent the distribution and centralization of electoral materials. Holding elections amid the wide opposition to Haiti’s current leadership would also inevitably trigger a post-electoral crisis, with political groups refusing to recognize the results.
While maintaining the current transitional structure could help preserve some political stability, the government is severely discredited due to corruption scandals and the endless political infighting that has prevented it from designing and implementing a comprehensive security strategy to enhance coordination between the different security forces operating on the ground.
Consultations to establish a new political arrangement to succeed the transitional government after February have only recently begun and have shown little progress. There is a significant risk that any last-minute agreement will result in a weak governance structure lacking sufficient support and may be perceived by Haitians as being imposed by the international community.
The multinational force authorized two years ago was able to deploy fewer than 1,000 of the 2,500 officers it aimed to have by late 2024. Due to lack of funding, personnel and equipment, the force has only been able to establish 3 of the 12 planned bases that were meant to maintain continuous presence and carry out dedicated operations against gangs in all the territories they currently occupy. The mission operates with less than 30% of its required equipment. Its armoured vehicles are not suited to the urban environment of Port-au-Prince, and a lack of spare parts has left half of the fleet out of service. Although the force now has two helicopters for medical evacuations, it still lacks air and maritime combat capabilities, which are critical to disrupting supplies to the gangs.
The new security mission’s concept was developed mainly to address the funding shortages and logistical challenges that have limited the foreign force’s operational capacity so far. The new mission will have a UN support office based in Port-au-Prince, which will be funded through predictable resources coming from the UN’s assessed peacekeeping budget. However, the cost of the mission personnel will still depend on voluntary contributions. At full deployment, this could amount to around $100 million per year. Without these contributions, the new mission will not be able to reach and sustain its full capacity to achieve its objectives.
It is still unclear how the transition to the new force will unfold. Some countries currently participating in the MSSM, Multinational Security Support Mission, have expressed their intention to remain under the GSF, Gang Suppression Force, but it is not yet known whether the currently deployed contingents will be fully integrated into the new structure. In the meantime, voluntary contributions will be needed to pay for the mission’s logistics and basic personnel needs to ensure that current personnel on the ground remain operational until the new force is fully deployed. A gap between the outgoing Kenyan-led mission and the incoming Gang Suppression Force must be avoided at all costs, as gangs will certainly try to take advantage of it.
The new force has a more offensive mandate than the previous one, but operations should begin in rather accessible areas to minimize civilian casualties while also disrupting gang supply chains and cutting off revenue sources. Initial victories in sparsely populated areas — for example, regaining control of specific sections of national roads currently held by gangs — would carry symbolic value, build public support and encourage defections within gang ranks.
It is unlikely that the new security force will solve Haiti’s security problem by arresting or killing all of the estimated 12,000 gang members — of whom 30% to 50% are minors — nor would such an approach be desirable, as most gang members join these structures at a young age to meet their most basic needs in an environment offering few, if any, alternatives. Haitian authorities have recently launched a program to help minors who want to leave gangs do so safely, but it currently envisions reaching only a fraction of the estimated number of children involved in these groups.
Haitians should also start exploring when and under what conditions they could contemplate engaging with the criminal groups, with the goal of permanently dismantling them. The Haitian state, with international support, should consider what kind of exit pathways could be offered, beyond minors, including for senior gang members willing to disarm and cooperate with justice.
As Haitian authorities and their international counterparts plan for these two crucial transitions, they must be prepared for the Viv Ansanm gang coalition to step up attacks in an effort to derail them, to expand territorial control, targeting critical infrastructure and attempting to bring down the government again, as they did last year.
Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Da Rin.
[Translation]
Stephen Baranyi, Full Professor, University of Ottawa, As an individual: Mr. Chair, honourable senators and colleagues, you know that Haiti has been trapped in a multi-dimensional crisis since 2018, particularly since the assassination of President Moïse in 2021. Reports from the UN Secretary-General and Haitian NGOs such as the National Human Rights Defence Network document this situation very well. I would like to talk about what I believe to be five key elements of the situation.
First, there is the decline of the state and its democratic institutions, since there is currently no elected authority at the head of the state.
There has also been an expansion of well-armed gangs coordinated by alliances such as Viv Ansanm, led by former police officer Jimmy Chérizier. These gangs commit serious crimes against the population in the West Department, where the capital is located, and in other departments.
There is also the inability of the National Police and the Kenyan-led multinational security support mission, despite their efforts and the support of partners like Canada, to counter the expansion of these gangs, stop their acts of terror, or retake most of the territories seized by gangs.
The Transitional Presidential Council, which was established in 2024 on the basis of consultations between political parties, CARICOM and other international partners, has been unable to implement a viable security strategy or hold elections.
Finally, the sanctions imposed by the UN aimed at ensuring the detention and punishment of gang leaders and their allies within the political and economic elites have not worked, despite a few exceptions.
In short, the strategy put in place to help Haiti emerge from its dire situation has not worked. If there is any hope, it is in the possible articulation of some of these measures with measures adopted more recently. I would like to highlight the relevance of three critically important approaches in this regard.
First, the UN Security Council’s authorization on September 30 of this year for the deployment of a Gang Suppression Force, the GSF, which you discussed with my colleagues a little earlier, that will take over some of the MSSM’s personnel and equipment infrastructure. However, this force will face challenges similar to those faced by the MSSM in terms of funding, personnel, intelligence, equipment and cooperation with the National Police, which does not have the trust of much of the population because it is accused of colluding with gangs.
As a second relatively positive development, the Interim Electoral Council announced five days ago that it intends to hold at least by-elections in the coming months to ensure a more legitimate government takes office on February 7, 2026, because the Transitional Presidential Council is completely discredited. Like the Gang Suppression Force, this commitment is deeply problematic because it is difficult to see how free and fair elections will be held in the West Department, where half the population lives, including much of the 1.4 million people displaced by violence.
There is also the international community’s commitment, through the Organization of American States, to finance these elections, reform of the National Police, provide humanitarian aid on which a quarter of the population depends, and rebuild the economy and communities devastated by the crisis. As you have rightly observed, this organization is committed, but the money isn’t coming in so quickly.
In a few weeks, our scientific study of Canada’s engagement, particularly the impact of the Feminist International Assistance Policy on our cooperation in Haiti in the areas of security and justice will be published in the Canadian Foreign Policy Review, or the Revue de politique étrangère canadienne. I can expand on that in the question period, but I’d like to conclude with three recommendations for Canada.
First, despite everything, let’s stay the course by supporting the deployment of the Gang Suppression Force and the strengthening of the National Police, including software elements such as the relaunch of the General Inspection office and its activities to clean up, verify and control its staff, also known as vetting, to reduce crime within the police force; by supporting the training of cadets in human rights to ensure that paramilitary intervention units reinforced with U.S. assistance in the coming months are sensitive to their legal and accountability obligations; and finally, by supporting the increase in the number of gender-sensitive women and men in the police force, which is essential to creating a force that is more representative in the eyes of the population, including women and girls.
Second, let’s stay the course in our support for the elections, knowing that these elections will be far from perfect, but that they could be much better than other options, namely, the appointment of another transitional government by Haitian leaders and the international community — or worse, the seizure of power by gang leaders and their allies, as they attempted to do in February 2024. This is therefore not a hypothetical scenario. The assassination of President Moïse was part of a different coup attempt; unfortunately, there have been recent precedents that must be considered in this regard.
Finally, let’s also stay the course on our humanitarian and development aid by strengthening two strategic areas that were not mentioned by the previous panel. First, let’s support the forthcoming reform of statutory justice and, in the meantime, the revival of transitional justice in 2026, hopefully under an elected government. Second, we should continue to support the renewal of the Women’s Voice and Leadership Program which, despite its renewal in 20 other countries and subregions in 2024, has not yet been renewed in Haiti. I would have liked you to ask that question. I would be happy to provide more details in this regard in answering your questions.
The Chair: Thank you for your remarks, Mr. Baranyi. We’ll now move on to questions.
[English]
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you both for joining us this evening. It’s greatly appreciated. We would love to see hope, a reduction in violence, having elections and living under a functioning government and doing the kinds of things we need to do.
You have suggested three things today to talk about. Looking at an agreement that works with Haitians and those terrorized in the country, one could be difficult to accept, but I do wonder about the term “amnesty” and whether or not any agreement of amnesty amongst the gang leaders would be accepted by Haitians, or would it simply lead to more reprisals and violence, barring any chance of peace for the country?
Mr. Baranyi: That’s a very important question.
Over the past few months, since the commission for truth, justice and reparations has been established on paper and since the gangs have increased their territorial control, there has been some talk, both within Haiti and internationally at the OAS, among others, about the possibility of dialogue with the gang members, and one of the things they are asking for is amnesty, continued impunity. The reaction from broad sectors of the population in Haiti, the organized population, has been swift and clear: Absolutely not. This would basically endorse and legitimize the absolutely horrible scale of the human rights violations they have perpetrated over the past few years, including the assassination of a president — not necessarily the same people, and I’ll get back to that. Second, it would just entrench impunity.
That said, there have been reactions against by human rights NGOs, by the churches, Christian churches in particular, by the lawyers, the federations of bar associations and so forth. However, we know very little about what the people think besides media reports. One of the projects that IDRC is funding right now is a project to use scholarly research to accompany the whole process of building transitional justice. They are conducting the first qualitative survey of victims and their family members all across the country, focus groups all across the country, as we speak. That study will, as far as we know, be the only study that will be available to give us a sense of how the victims feel, who should be at the centre of any transitional justice enterprise. Let’s use that study when it comes out, all of us, to answer that question.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Senator Ravalia: Thank you to our witnesses for being here.
My question is for Mr. Da Rin. Given the relative failure of the Kenyan Multinational Security Support Mission, in your mind, how realistic is it that the proposed gang suppression force will achieve any tangible success?
Mr. Da Rin: If I may, I will shift to French. That will be easier for me.
[Translation]
Of course, the Gang Suppression Force is a gamble, as the MSSM was two years ago when it was approved, except that its mission has advantages over its stated objectives, as planned, including a more predictable budget.
The bulk of the budget will come from the UN Integrated Office in Haiti, which will help not only to provide the logistics that the MSSM lacked, but also to channel funds to deploy all the personnel and equipment that were planned. I would say that the Kenyan-led force did not have the opportunity to show that it could be effective. It deployed only 40% of its personnel. It operated with 30% of its equipment. It was only able to establish three of the 12 forward operating bases it had planned. As a result, it was only able to act as a rapid reaction force to various gang attacks, rather than as a permanent presence in all the territories it controls.
With this new force, with a personnel of up to 5,500 officers, not 2,500, which is double, and with a more robust mandate, it may have more resources to be more effective.
[English]
Senator Ravalia: Professor, would you be able to outline the key funders and supporters of the gangs, given that this is sort of a multinational puzzle?
Mr. Baranyi: The best report that I have read on this was written by Robert Muggah, a Canadian living in Brazil, for the UN, published two years ago. Essentially, it traces and documents very carefully the links, financial and otherwise, between certain members of the economic elite in Haiti, and to some extent the political elite, former senators — no offence; they are very different in Haiti — and in some cases, it also documents their links through the gangs directly or some of these business people in particular to transnational organized crime based particularly in Colombia and the United States.
The United States is a key part of this. The United States supplies the guns and some of the money. Fortunately, it’s also beginning to detain some of the notorious individuals on the sanctions list. Two of the biggest business people in Haiti, Dimitri Vorbe and Reginald Boulos, have been detained in Florida and, if they get tried, that would be a huge first against impunity.
The Chair: Thank you.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: My question is for Mr. Da Rin. I would like to come back to the new mission that is supposed to be operational starting in April when the MSSM’s mission should already be over. What measures are planned? Do you think that this security vacuum will be problematic between the end of one mission and the beginning of the next one in April?
Mr. Da Rin: That’s a very good question, and I will try to answer it as briefly as possible.
Officially, as of October 2, the MSSM became the Gang Suppression Force. The officers from Kenya, El Salvador, the Bahamas and Guatemala who are deployed to Haiti are currently operating under the mandate of the new force, except that it is a change on paper because the new force has not yet been deployed. The new concept of operations is being drafted, and this concept of operations includes an initial transition phase that is being planned.
I believe that all countries deployed as part of the MSSM have decided to remain on the ground as long as they have the means to stay there. Until now, the United States has funded contract services for the central base of the mission — infrastructure, water, food, and so on. These contracts will expire in December.
The UN trust fund that also finances the MSSM currently has $54 million, if I’m not mistaken. That could finance a month and a half of those contracts. So we would have to see which countries will finance them from February until April, when the UN Integrated Office in Haiti will take over the financing of the logistics for the new mission.
Aside from that, we don’t have many details about whether the contingents currently present will be reinstated, but we do know that the new mission has a much more military flavour than the previous one. Since the 991 officers currently deployed are from Kenya and are police officers, they may not remain in the country in the medium term and will only be ensuring the handover with the new force.
The Chair: Thank you.
[English]
Senator Al Zaibak: Mr. Da Rin, you have described Haiti as existing in a state of institutional collapse. In your view, what are the most immediate governance priorities that must be addressed to restore a minimum level of state functionality? What role should international partners play without deepening dependency?
Mr. Da Rin: I’ll try to be quite blunt in my answer. There is deep political turmoil right now under negotiation to see what kind of governance structure will take over after the new transitional government mandate will end in February, but we think that the most important thing right now for Haitians is security — there is no doubt about it — and very much more than elections. People want their children to go to school without being killed, without being raped. They want to be able to travel on foot without being kidnapped. That is the priority. The government should really focus right now on how to establish and implement a cohesive security strategy.
One way to do that would be to create a national security council as it was provided in the April 3 political accord that created the transitional government last year. This national security council would work as a stable liaison with other initiatives of foreign security aid that are ongoing, and the political bickering ideally would not intoxicate the discussions of the national security council. That is the priority right now.
There are two other things that should be very important. There is a project to establish two special judicial units that will not only be a tribunal but that will be kind of the whole judicial chain that will work in parallel, and independently, from the current judicial system, which is severely dysfunctional and severely dependent on the decisions of the executive. Establishing these two specialized judicial units could help end impunity in the short term by giving condemnations on corruption and mass crimes.
A third thing that is incredibly important, and that sometimes is overlooked, is that the prison system is not prepared for the operations of the new force. There are no high-security prisons for gang leaders who would be arrested, so it is very important to move as fast as possible to establish a prison — which was planned for last year but funds were not allocated for. I understand that it would cost around $10 million because it would be a prison with containers and that it would be quickly established. It is very important to have this ready before the new force is deployed.
Senator Adler: Professor Baranyi, I have just a brief uncomfortable question, and feel no pressure to offer a brief answer. Is Haiti a failed state?
Mr. Baranyi: Yes and no. It has all of the characteristics of a deeply fragile state. I’m one of the people who avoid using that language because it’s deeply offensive to Haitians, and it’s not very useful analytically either. But yes, not having any elected officials, having a police and a government that can’t control most of the capital and many parts of the country, having other ministries being very unable — wholly unable — to provide basic public services like education, water and health for the majority of the population and so on would certainly put it on the list of most fragile states.
Senator Adler: Would our other expert want to weigh in on this? Is Haiti a failed state?
Mr. Da Rin: I would say that Haiti is becoming a failed state, but if you see, it has several institutions that are functioning. Even if the judicial system is not functioning very well, as was mentioned in the last panel, l’Unité de Lutte contre la Corruption does thorough investigations on corruption. It has several ministries that are delivering — for example, aid for the most vulnerable. It has institutions and it has security forces, but all of these in institutional frameworks are extremely weak and are weakening by the day. So I, as a professor, don’t really know what a failed state could be, but Haiti is a very, very weak institutional state.
Senator Harder: My question is for Professor Baranyi. Your second priority was elections. The previous panel was highly skeptical as to whether elections would take place before the end of next year. There is a gap. You have, in your commentary, been more encouraging, or suggesting that elections were a precondition of moving forward. Give a little bit more colour, if you can, to what is realistic to expect with respect to elections and the consequences of the timetable that we seem to be slipping towards.
Mr. Baranyi: Thank you, senator, for that question.
What I tried to convey in my comments on that point is that Haitians are trapped — and the international community partners are trapped — in a dilemma. There can be no fully free and fair elections without security. It’s very difficult to suppress the gangs and to re-establish public security without having a government in place that enjoys some confidence and legitimacy in the eyes of the people. So they are stuck and, by extension, their partners are stuck trying to move forward on both fronts in a sensible way, along with dealing with humanitarian issues and so on, as Canada is doing and as most of Haiti’s large partners are doing, or as the government is doing, despite its institutional weaknesses, trying to address all of these crises, if you will.
But on the elections, I think there may be slightly different reading of the provisional electoral council’s recent decree. It issued a decree on the 30th, and it issued a draft full decree for the elections for public consultation as we speak, and then the government, after having said that it was impossible to hold free and fair elections under current conditions of insecurity in the capital and in several other parts of the country, reversed its stance and said, “Well we’re going to go ahead with those elections because we recognize that to name another transitional government on February 6 would just prolong the illegitimacy of the state at the very stop.”
So, the best that I have heard — perhaps Diego has seen it. I have not seen a calendar come out yet. I’ve looked on the CEP site. I have asked my contacts in that area. No calendar yet. But the sort of smart money in Haiti, the people I trust on this issue, are saying probably partial elections, so a sequential plan that may be holding presidential elections and not much more by September 7. A whole election — there is a parliamentary election, senatorial elections and municipal elections — for sure cannot be done by February 7, but perhaps partial elections as the Gang Suppression Force deploys, as the PNH gets beefed up and so on and so forth. That’s the hope.
Senator Ataullahjan: I have a two-part question. We’re talking about elections. Once we have elections, do you think that would solve Haiti’s problems? If I look at it, it’s almost like a total collapse of society: health care, violence, humanitarian emergency, political instability. That’s my one question. My other question is, is there any good news coming out of Haiti? Anything that gives us hope?
The Chair: For both of our witnesses?
Senator Ataullahjan: Yes.
Mr. Da Rin: Thank you for this question.
For elections to happen, you need several things. First: political consensus, appropriate logistics, security and money for the elections.
Currently, Haiti has put aside $67 million, which is approximately three quarters of what elections will cost if you don’t do the constitutional referendum they want to do, because that would be very costly as well. Some countries have said that they will contribute to reach what is needed to do that.
In terms of political consensus, the political tensions could not be higher at the moment. You need an inclusive government in which most of the powerful political forces are represented so that any potential spoiler of the political process is not boycotting the way to elections, not recognizing the results. That was the idea of having this nine-member presidential council that seemed to many like a crazy idea, but it was based on having the most broad-based coalition that would be represented in the government. That will be very important to keep in mind in the political discussions for a new governance structure after February.
In terms of logistics, things have been moving forward. Personnel have been trained for the electoral centres across the country. It is moving forward, but the main issue that is preventing elections from occurring, of course, is security.
The new Gang Suppression Force was asked by the Security Council to come up with time-bound and realistic objectives by June. The idea was not to have a strict deadline for elections, but rather, to have two parallel calendars in which a minimum security threshold would be established by Haiti and its international partners. It is impossible to solve Haiti’s security problems before elections are held, so elections will be held during some level of insecurity, but a minimum security threshold should be established so as to advance with the last preparations for elections. This new calendar that will have objectives from the Gang Suppression Force should be used by the authorities not to establish a strict deadline but the phases to reach the moment in which Haitian authorities can say when elections should happen.
The Chair: Thank you. We won’t get to Professor Baranyi on this question because we have exceeded the three-minute time limit. Perhaps we can pick it up later.
Senator Wilson: Thank you to both of our witnesses.
My question actually relates to something that we discussed with the first panel, but I would like to get your perspective on it, and that is the role of the United States in all of this. I’m pleased to hear about the new special force that is coming to bear, but given the significant financial contribution in the past of the United States, distantly but certainly not too distantly followed by Canada, it leaves me feeling very anxious given the major role we play relative to other countries in Haiti and the change in approach of the U.S. administration. We heard the first panel say that it didn’t sound like it was a big change in terms of the total amount of resources, but it was coming differently. Is this differently better? You mentioned, Mr. Baranyi, the detainees in Florida. Is this better? Is it worse? Is it neutral? Given how much Canada is putting into this and how we haven’t seemed to make any progress at all with the full support of the United States, I do feel quite anxious about what this change means.
Mr. Baranyi: Thank you for the question.
I must say that I have been pleasantly surprised by this administration’s ability to actually keep its eye somewhat on the ball with Haiti compared to so many other files around the world. I think it’s really driven by the priority they give to security in a rather narrow sense, including controlling immigration flows into their country. Their championing of the Gang Suppression Force in the Security Council and putting the largest money on the table is part of that. Detaining those two very influential Haitian business people in Florida and probably bringing them to trial is part of that logic too. Will they go all the way? Will they actually really put the squeeze on arms trafficking to Haiti? I doubt it, personally. Diego might know a lot more about that.
I think we have to work with what we get in the U.S. Canada maybe a relatively big player in Haiti, but it’s not a big player compared to the U.S. in general. We have to just work with that and try to fill gaps. That’s why I pointed to the importance and the officials’ awareness that it’s not Canada that will supply most of the equipment and the training needed for the police anti-gang forces that will be hugely beefed up over the next few months to years. It’s the U.S. What Canada can do is provide the software to ensure that that doesn’t create other risks down the line.
The Chair: Thank you. We won’t get to Mr. Da Rin right now.
I’m going to ask two questions and, if there is time, allow both of our witnesses to respond. I made a crack about the OAS in the last panel, but it’s an organization that does election observation and support for electoral tribunals very well if it has the funding. I would like a comment from both of you on that.
Second, to what extent is the Haitian diaspora — we have a very lively and vital Haitian diaspora in Canada, particularly in Montreal. There is one in the United States as well. Are those diaspora in these two countries influential? What about Haitians in other countries?
Mr. Da Rin: Thank you very much for the questions.
I think that the OAS right now is playing a crucial role as there are many initiatives to help Haiti on different fronts. What the OAS is trying to do is use its convening power to follow up on progress on Haiti on the most important initiatives there to help Haiti, such as security, elections, political consensus, humanitarian assistance and development.
The new Secretary General of the OAS, Albert Ramdin, is playing a leading role in establishing a roadmap for Haiti, which is a comprehensive plan that aims to outline the most essential needs of the country in the short, medium and long term. It’s a three-year plan in which initiatives like, for example, the Gang Suppression Force and political facilitation by the CARICOM are being integrated. The idea is that the OAS presented a $2.6 billion plan, but this is not an OAS-specific initiative. For example, the UN humanitarian assistance plan is $900 million, which is part of the $2.6 billion plan that the OAS is preparing.
The Chair: Thank you. I’m going to interrupt you because I’m going to throw the diaspora question to Professor Baranyi. I think we’re all supportive of the OAS. In fact, the Secretary General was the Suriname permanent representative when I was there all those years ago. Professor Baranyi, do you have a comment on diaspora?
Mr. Baranyi: Sure.
The OAS is deeply discredited in terms of electoral observation in Haiti. It was complicit in the fraudulent election of the Martelly government in 2010-11, and it whitewashed the very poorly managed first round of the elections in 2015. It was only when Haitians and the transitional government took back the organization of those elections in 2016 that they actually became relatively free and fair. It’s complex.
The Haitian diaspora, maybe just in Canada, is very important. You have seen the numbers. There are people like Michaëlle Jean and then lots of grassroots organizations, a treasure trove of expertise, many of whom remain very involved. We should continue to engage them and support their efforts, but they are not all angels. One of the people I think convicted in Quebec City this summer of being a major part of the assassination and coup attempt against President Moïse in 2021 was a Haitian Canadian. Let’s not romanticize diasporas either.
Senator Al Zaibak: Professor Baranyi, based on your decades of research on peace building, what lessons from Haiti should inform Canada’s broader policy toward fragile and conflict-affected states, particularly regarding coordination among diplomacy, development and defence?
Mr. Baranyi: Feel free to look at my blogs on exactly that issue. I would summarize them by saying that perhaps the most important lesson has been learned as former Prime Minister Trudeau and other senior officials went on record saying, despite pressures from Washington, that we are not going to front and lead another international intervention in Haiti like MINUSTAH because they have failed. They have failed miserably, and it is time to actually support Haitians to craft Haitian solutions. That may seem naive, but it’s such an important principle. Sometimes it means that things are messy and sometimes it means that things take a lot longer, but our government has really tried to actually follow that path, while suggesting and stopping to recommend actions to the Haitian government and to other stakeholders. That is one principle that has already been learned.
In terms of coordination, coordination has greatly improved — coordination between defence, RCMP, development, humanitarian, diplomacy, et cetera. Canada has learned a lot. There is always more that can be done. In the study I mentioned in my introductory comments, we actually identify how, despite improvements, there was for a few years a real disconnect between some very good development projects that Canada was supporting on the ground — including working with the police and access to justice and so on — and actually not distancing itself openly from the Moïse government. I’d be happy to talk that about more, but even worse, not distancing itself publicly from the transition — the de facto government of Prime Minister Ariel Henry who was named in a tweet by the representative of the Secretary-General. This is a scandal. Canada actually went along with that. After, there was a lot that went on behind the scenes and Canada did some distancing, but it took three years of putting up with Mr. Henry and a lot of wasted time before Canada and others abandoned him. However, it took the gangs to actually stop him from returning to Haiti for Canada to really change its policy.
The Chair: Thank you. We’re almost at time here. I want to give a minute to Mr. Da Rin to provide a final comment.
Mr. Da Rin: One lesson that has been learned is that what MINUSTAH achieved was to contain the security problem and keep it at a manageable level. The new force that is going to be deployed might do the same thing. The two problems were when MINUSTAH withdrew, the national security forces did not have the capability to maintain the security levels that MINUSTAH had.
The other problem is, in conflicts, as in Haiti, where violence and politics are deeply interlinked, a strategy that is solely focused on security, on a military strategy, by arresting or killing gang leaders, and even a substantial number of gang members, won’t solve the problem. You need to tackle impunity, which could be Haiti’s most important problem and the root, the cause, of the endless cycles of violence. You need to hold those perpetrators of violence accountable, but also those who have been supporting them, giving them weapons and impunity for their crimes.
These are the most important lessons learned.
The Chair: Thank you very much. On behalf of the committee, I would like to thank Professor Stephen Baranyi and Mr. Diego Da Rin. I think, Mr. Da Rin, you have joined us from Mexico. Thank you for taking the time to be with us, both of you. You’ve enriched our knowledge of Haiti and the situation, which is quite dire. The situation in Haiti is a theme that we come back to from time to time in this committee, and I dare say that we’ll be coming back to it and will be in touch with you, so thank you again.
Colleagues, we will reconvene tomorrow morning at 10:30 in this room to discuss Canada’s trade relationships with the United States and Mexico.
(The committee adjourned.)