Honourable senators, I rise today to speak in support of Senator Boisvenu’s amendment to Bill C-5. Senator Boisvenu’s amendment would remove conditional sentences from Bill C-5 for a list of offences, including those related to domestic, family and sexual violence. This would mean that offenders convicted of serious crimes like sexual assault, assault with a weapon, criminal harassment, kidnapping, human trafficking and causing bodily harm by criminal negligence could not receive a conditional sentence.

There are crimes that most reasonable people would agree are so grievous that society demands some form of reparation both to victims and to society. Generally, for more serious crimes, we have accepted that is generally sought through time spent in custody and through denial of one’s freedom to circulate within a community. Usually, the types of crimes Senator Boisvenu has listed in his amendment should warrant this, particularly because vulnerable victims are involved.

In reality, those sentenced to prison in Canada almost never serve their entire terms of incarceration. In almost all cases, prisoners are released after serving two thirds of their sentences. Quite frequently, their term may be reduced further to only one third of their original sentence. Most Canadians wouldn’t find that even close to acceptable.

Prisoner rehabilitation is certainly an important goal for the safety of society. But we can work to promote that goal while simultaneously ensuring greater truth in sentencing. In some of these cases, prison may be a place where offenders access programming to help them deal with their violence and abuse issues. And an offender’s removal for a custodial sentence may give the victim in a domestic abuse situation time to secure the supports she needs to establish her own safety and that of her family. In the event of a non-custodial sentence, such as the conditional sentences the Liberal government proposes with Bill C-5, these offenders may be returned to the very communities and, in some cases, the very homes where they abused their victims.

Last week, in its ruling on the R. v. Sharma case, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the constitutionality of current limitations on the use of conditional sentences imposed by Parliament in 2012 during the Harper government. The case concerned Ms. Sharma, a 20-year-old Indigenous woman, who was found at the airport transporting a suitcase full of heroin for her boyfriend. Ms. Sharma had a troubled background of significant hardship, intergenerational trauma and sexual assault, and was a young, single parent with few supports. Ms. Sharma appealed her sentence for importing drugs, challenging the constitutionality of Criminal Code provisions limiting conditional sentences from being applied for certain offences, contending that they are over broad, arbitrary and discriminatory to Indigenous offenders.

The Supreme Court majority held that a conditional sentence was unavailable to Ms. Sharma and dismissed her challenges under sections 7 and 15(1) of the Charter. They ruled that Ms. Sharma’s personal circumstances did not make her crime any less serious. While a judge must — and, in this case, did — take an offender’s circumstances into account, it does not mean that an Indigenous offender cannot be given a sentence of incarceration. And, writing for the majority, Justices Brown and Rowe stated:

The impugned provisions do not limit Ms. Sharma’s s. 15(1) rights. While the crisis of Indigenous incarceration is undeniable, Ms. Sharma did not demonstrate that the impugned provisions created or contributed to a disproportionate impact on Indigenous offenders, relative to non-Indigenous offenders, as she must show at the first step of the s. 15(1) analysis.

Nor do the impugned provisions limit Ms. Sharma’s s. 7 rights. Their purpose is to enhance consistency in the conditional sentencing regime by making imprisonment the typical punishment for certain serious offences and categories of offences. And that is what they do. Maximum sentences are a reasonable proxy for the seriousness of an offence and, accordingly, the provisions do not deprive individuals of their liberty in circumstances that bear no connection to their objective.

When Minister of Justice Lametti proposed Bill C-5 to our Senate Legal Committee, he raised the example of “. . . an Indigenous mother who was caught in very low-level trafficking in order to put bread on the table” as the type of person this legislation was meant to target with conditional sentences. Clearly, the Supreme Court of Canada found in the Sharma ruling that, although personal circumstances should be taken into consideration, a sentence still must fit the severity of the crime and that the limitations Parliament placed on the application of conditional sentences in 2012 is constitutional.

With Bill C-5, this activist Trudeau government is further chipping away at Canadians’ confidence in the justice system. Half of Canadians surveyed earlier this year indicated they were not confident in the fairness of our justice system. Senator Boisvenu’s amendment aims to correct this problem.

One statistic that stood out to me, being from Saskatchewan, is that intimate partner violence is experienced by rural women at the rate of 75% higher than that of urban women. In fact, my home province of Saskatchewan has the highest rate of family violence in Canada, so this is an issue of paramount importance to me and to my region.

Legislation like Bill C-5, which would have repealed mandatory minimum penalties on a number of significant crimes, and allow for conditional sentences in others, will devalue the justice system further in the eyes of victims of crime and the Canadian public.

At the Senate Legal Committee, we heard testimony to this effect from Jennifer Dunn, Executive Director of the London Abused Women’s Centre. She told us:

It is already hard enough for a woman to come forward, and when she does, it takes years to get to the point of a conviction, if there ends up being one at all. This makes women feel as if the justice system isn’t taking them seriously. Just today, I was told by a woman we serve that if we have less protection in sentencing, we are less likely to report offences and this would be a real setback for us.

Crimes involving violence against women are already some of the most under-reported in our country. Statistics Canada estimates that more than 80% of violence against girls and women at the hands of an intimate partner, spouse or relative goes unreported. Only 6 out of every 100 sexual assault cases are reported to police. The last thing these victims need is to fear that the perpetrator of violence against them may receive a conditional sentence so that they will be back in the community where they live or work.

Jennifer Dunn told us about the chilling effect conditional sentences can have on victims of crime:

Conditional sentences for some offences can undermine the seriousness of the crimes. Women report to us that they believe this makes them feel as if they must watch their backs in the community when conditional sentences are imposed. We need to remember that sometimes victims and offenders are from the same communities as each other.

At our centre, there was a situation with a woman where the perpetrator was ordered to stay off her property, among many other conditions, of course. The perpetrator decided, though, to bring a lawn chair to a neighbouring yard and sit in that yard, facing her house and there was nothing that she could do about it.

Victims of crime should not have to endure this kind of intimidation or the threat that a perpetrator will turn up unexpectedly in the home community that a victim expects to be their safe space.

Honourable senators, if this Trudeau government passes Bill C-5 without Senator Boisvenu’s amendment, they will make conditional sentences available to: criminals convicted of abduction of a person under 14 years of age, those who benefit from human trafficking and those who sexually assault someone — and potentially serve those sentences at home? Show me where the justice is in that. Because, believe me, the survivors of these crimes don’t see the justice in this either. How can we expect them to report crimes against them when they happen again?

Victims of domestic violence already face barriers to justice in the courtroom. Bill C-5 could make that problem worse. University of British Columbia law professor Isabel Grant has written about the justice system’s lack of regard for female victims of abuse and related crimes and sentencing. She wrote this about female victims of criminal harassment:

The power of judicial discourses can also act to silence women who encounter the law. This is especially true of those women who do not comply with the construction of the “responsible victim.”

Female victims of crime know all too well that a court placing conditions on an offender is no guarantee of that perpetrator’s adherence to the rules. Because of the under-reporting of intimate partner violence it’s hard to know precisely, but the women’s shelter Interval House estimates that recidivism of domestic abuse falls somewhere between 39% and 66%. On its website, Interval House notes that abusers are often sentenced to lighter sentencing, carrying lighter penalties — similar, we could expect, to those the Trudeau government has listed in Bill C-5 as eligible for a conditional sentence.

Even if an offender is deemed low or no risk to the community and released on a conditional sentence with orders not to contact a victim, we know orders can be, and often are, breached.

Earlier this month in this chamber, Senator Fabian Manning — my friend and seatmate — gave an impassioned speech on his bill, Bill S-249, advocating for a national framework for the prevention of intimate partner violence in Canada. He presented us with many staggering statistics about the magnitude of domestic violence and the frequency with which it occurs. Senator Manning shared that 3 in 10 women who suffer intimate partner violence endure it — in some form — at least once a month, if not more often. One in five who suffers sexual abuse by their partners say it happens to them monthly or more frequently than monthly.

Domestic violence is a crime that repeats, and it is a crime that escalates. Often violence escalates through what might seem like less severe behaviour, which might fall on the lighter end of the criminal spectrum — the very offences that might receive a conditional sentence under Bill C-5 — for example, unlawful presence in a dwelling house or criminal harassment.

One such example is criminal harassment, which is a highly gendered crime. The Department of Justice estimates that females account for 76% of all victims in criminal harassment cases, while men account for 78% of the accused perpetrators. Stalking is a crime that can have devastating and profound psychological effects on its victims, and it is also often a precursor to repeated and increased violence. One study found that 76% of femicide and 85% of attempted femicide respondents had reported at least one episode of stalking within 12 months of the violent incident — more than had reported physical assault during that same period.

Domestic violence victims are often highly vulnerable once they have broken free from a relationship: 26% of all women who were murdered by a spouse had left the relationship, and 60% of all dating violence occurs after a relationship has ended. For the Trudeau government to institute conditional sentencing for these serious crimes against the person is dangerous. For these offenders to be returned to the communities where their victims live is unconscionable.

The government argues that removing mandatory minimums and increasing conditional sentences under Bill C-5 will address the overrepresentation of Black and Indigenous Canadians in the prison system. Two of the only witnesses we heard from at committee who presented actual data, University of Ottawa criminology professor Cheryl Webster and researcher Dawn North, testified that the provisions of Bill C-5 will barely touch Indigenous overrepresentation in incarceration. Further, Ms. North stated that Indigenous offenders tend to have higher breach rates when granted conditional sentences. The increase is further troubling for the Indigenous women and girls who may be victims of abuse by their partners. Among Indigenous women, 6 in 10 have experienced physical or sexual abuse at some point in their lives, and Indigenous women are 61% more likely to suffer from intimate partner violence than non-Indigenous women. For Indigenous women who are a sexual minority, the number is a shocking 83%.

Increased access to conditional sentences by offenders is not an advantage for victims of crime, especially Indigenous women and girls. As Jennifer Dunn repeated at committee:

I said in the House of Commons, and I’ll say it again, we need to view this bill through the lens of male violence against women. There needs to be a focus on women, specifically marginalized women, how they will be impacted by this bill and not get the justice they deserve.

It’s not just Indigenous victims who are vulnerable under Bill C-5. The statistics for other marginalized groups are shocking as well. An estimated 83% of disabled women will be assaulted at some point in their lives. Two thirds of sexual minority women have experienced intimate partner violence. Immigrant and refugee women and girls are especially vulnerable to the effects of intimate partner and family violence given language barriers, social isolation, a lack of resources, concern for their children and precarious immigration or deportation scenarios.

Honourable senators, the statistics on domestic abuse in this country are heartbreaking, but we need to act, not just talk about it. It is not enough for us to tweet supportive messages a couple of times a year or give a short speech here on an inquiry about domestic violence.

Colleagues, our opportunity to protect women and children living in these dangerous and very vulnerable situations is right here and right now. Your vote on this amendment is what can actually make a difference. Don’t let these abusers back into their communities so they can hurt or perhaps kill these women. Please take a stand, vote yes to this important amendment and help us protect victims of domestic abuse.

Honourable senators, I rise to share my perspective on the amendment proposed by our respected colleague, Senator Boisvenu.

My remarks will centre on the following points: first, some background on sentences to be served in the community; second, the purpose of Bill C-5 in that regard; and third, the scope of Senator Boisvenu’s proposed amendment.

Some of my remarks are inspired by the most recent Supreme Court of Canada decision, which was handed down on Friday, November 4, in R. v. Sharma, a case that was referred to by the Minister of Justice and Senator Gold, as well as numerous witnesses, during the committee’s consideration of Bill C-5.

I will use Professor Cotter’s three-step approach. First I will provide a little history.

When the first Criminal Code was adopted in 1892, Parliament set out hanging, imprisonment, and fines and forfeiture as possible penalties. The death penalty was abolished in 1968. We have also seen the emergence of other types of sentences, such as conditional release, also known as a probation order, and conditional sentences, which are sentences served in the community.

Conditional sentences were introduced as part of a 1995 bill entitled An Act to amend the Criminal Code (sentencing) and other Acts in consequence thereof. This bill significantly reformed sentencing law by stating the purposes and the principles of sentencing, and by setting out considerations for judges when determining a fit sentence.

In other words, the bill substantially structured the discretion of Canadian judges with regard to sentencing. Nowadays, there are many provisions that start at section 718 and following in the Criminal Code that really structure, if not limit, the discretion of judges.

Among the various principles enunciated, the one relevant to our consideration of the proposed amendment is found at section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code. That provision states that all available sanctions other than imprisonment must be considered where reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done to the victims or the community.

Under the 1995 bill, offenders were not eligible for conditional sentences if: one, the offence was punishable by a minimum term of imprisonment — what we call a mandatory minimum penalty, or MMP; two, the court was considering imposing a term of imprisonment of two years or more; three, imposing a conditional sentence would endanger the safety of the victim or of the community; or four, a conditional sentence would be inconsistent with the fundamental purposes and principles of sentencing. These are the four types of exclusions that make a conditional sentence unavailable.

The principal objectives of Parliament in enacting this new legislation in 1995 were, thus, to reduce the use of sentences of imprisonment in cases that were admissible and to address both punitive and rehabilitative objectives as stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Proulx, a judgment rendered in January 2000, which is the most famous judgment on conditional sentences.

In 2007, Parliament adopted a government bill to exclude the possibility for a judge to impose a conditional sentence for those convicted of a serious personal injury offence, a terrorist offence or a criminal organization offence prosecuted by way of indictment, for which the maximum term of imprisonment is 10 years or more. In other words, even if there was no MMP applicable for these offences and the sentencing judge held the view that a sentence of less than two years would be appropriate, this was not possible. Imprisonment was the only way.

In 2012, Parliament adopted another bill called the Safe Streets and Communities Act for the purpose of excluding the possibility of conditional sentences for a long list of additional offences. First, this list included all the offences prosecuted by way of indictment for which the maximum term of imprisonment is 14 years or life. Second, this list included categories of offences prosecuted by way of indictment for which the maximum term of imprisonment was 10 years that: one, resulted in bodily harm; two, involved the import, export, trafficking or production of drugs; or three, involved the use of a weapon. These categories of offences are found at paragraph (e) of the current section 742.1 of the Criminal Code. Third, there are 11 specific offences prosecuted by way of indictment: prison breach; criminal harassment; sexual assault; kidnapping; trafficking in persons — material benefit; abduction of person under 14; motor vehicle theft; theft over $5,000; breaking and entering a place other than a dwelling-house; being unlawfully in a dwelling-house; and arson for fraudulent purpose. These 11 specific offences are found at paragraph (f) of current section 742.1 of the code.

Bill C-5 proposes to delete paragraphs (e) and (f). This means broadening judicial discretion in sentencing in connection with offences described a few seconds ago, including all offences related to drugs under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, many of which were declared unconstitutional.

This means that a conditional sentence will again become an available sanction in relation to these categories of offences and specific offences should the judge conclude that, first, an offender deserves a sentence of imprisonment of less than two years — these are not the most serious offences. Second, the offender presents no risk to the community or to the victim. And third, such a conditional sentence would be in accordance with all the sentencing principles including consideration of all available sanctions other than imprisonment where it is reasonable in the circumstances, especially in the case of Indigenous offenders which requires the application of the Gladue principles.

The current government has made a policy decision, and this is perfectly valid. In the recent judgment in Sharma, which Senator Batters referred to, the Supreme Court of Canada said:

Parliament has the exclusive authority to legislate in matters of sentencing policy. There is no constitutional right to any particular sentence, including a conditional sentence . . . . Parliament had no positive obligation to create the conditional sentence regime. This Court stated in Proulx that Parliament could “have easily excluded specific offences” from the conditional sentencing regime when it came into force in 1996 . . . . It chose to do so later, and may choose to do so in the future. That is inherent in the role of Parliament, informed by experience and by the wishes of the electorate.

Senator Boisvenu disagrees with the broadening of judicial discretion proposed by Bill C-5 in connection with sentencing, and proposes to revert to the 2012 policies of the Harper government, which Senator Batters referred to.

The senator is proposing, in keeping with the 2012 legislation, to exclude any possibility of conditional sentences for a list that includes nine specific offences, which would become the new paragraph (e) of section 748.2 of the Criminal Code. I want to point out that this list is shorter than the 2012 list, because the senator is proposing to drop the following offences: prison breach; motor vehicle theft; theft over $5,000; breaking and entering a place other than a dwelling-house; and arson for fraudulent purpose.

In doing so, he is dropping four types of offences described in 2012 as being serious property crimes that justified excluding conditional sentences. I note this change.

As he stated in response to one of my questions, he chose to focus on offences against the person. That is why there are two new offences on the proposed list that were not found in the 2012 legislation: causing bodily harm by criminal negligence, and assaulting a peace officer with a weapon or causing bodily harm. I want to point out that in my research, I found very few legal decisions for either of these offences. They do not seem to be used. I would add that I did not hear one witness or read one brief that suggested adding these offences to the list of cases where the use of conditional sentencing would be prohibited.

In his speech leading up to the proposed amendment, Senator Boisvenu repeatedly referred to violence against individuals, especially women and children, to justify the other items on his list. For example, he said it was completely unacceptable for a man convicted of intimate partner violence to serve his sentence in the community.

I agree with him in the case of a repeat offender, and I believe that, in such cases, judges will not even consider a sentence of less than two years. I should add that a conditional sentence is possible only if the judge believes this type of sentence poses no threat to the victim or the community. Unfortunately, Senator Batters did not mention these prerequisites for a conditional sentence in her speech.

Also, in Quebec, judges can require offenders serving a conditional sentence to wear an electronic monitoring bracelet if the victim consents to having a corresponding app installed on their cellphone. My understanding, based on what Senator Batters said two weeks ago, is that this is also being done in Saskatchewan and other provinces.

Senator Boisvenu also mentioned that, according to 2010 figures he obtained from the Syndicat des agents de la paix en services correctionnels du Québec, or CSN, which is the union representing Quebec peace officers in correctional services, 40% of offenders serving conditional sentences don’t comply with the conditions imposed by the Criminal Code and the judges. Unfortunately, we did not hear any witnesses make that claim, nor did we receive any documentation or evidence to support it. Furthermore, we have no information on the nature of the alleged violations, which I am sure must vary in severity.

Finally, I would point out that a conditional sentence can only be imposed on offenders if the judge believes that the appropriate sentence is imprisonment for a period ranging from a few days to two years; in other words, these are offenders who would be sent to provincial corrections facilities. The proposed amendment is tantamount to saying that we will automatically increase the number of inmates in provincial prisons. In my view, we cannot impose that consequence on the provinces unilaterally, without consulting them and giving them the opportunity to express their views on such an amendment in committee. As senators representing the regions, we owe it to the provinces to consult with them before imposing a significant financial burden on them.

In conclusion, it seems to me that this amendment must be rejected. That was the outcome at the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, by a vote of nine to four. Thank you for your attention. Meegwetch.

Honourable senators, I want to begin by thanking the Honourable Senator Boisvenu for his amendment, which clearly stems from his deep concern for the well-being of victims of crime, particularly victims of gender-based violence. However, the government opposes this amendment because it would limit judicial discretion in sentencing when the whole point of Bill C-5 is to broaden that discretion.

In committee, most of the witnesses were in favour of giving judges more flexibility to take into account the particular circumstances of the individual and the offence. In fact, many wanted this bill to go even further in that direction.

We absolutely agree that serious criminal behaviour should be met with serious sanctions. Under Bill C-5, the offences listed in this amendment will continue to result in a prison sentence almost all of the time. The bill simply gives judges the discretion to issue conditional sentences for these offences in what are likely to be rare and exceptional cases.

Judicial discretion is especially important where the description of the offence can cover a broad range of circumstances and degrees of culpability. For example, this amendment seeks to prohibit conditional sentences for the offences of “being unlawfully in a dwelling-house” and “causing bodily harm by criminal negligence.”

There could be, and I’m sure there will be, many instances where someone who commits one of these offences deserves — and will receive — a harsh sentence. But there could also be cases where it would be appropriate for the judge to have some flexibility. Indeed, when she spoke to this amendment, Senator Simons gave multiple examples of these types of scenarios.

The Criminal Code, as Senator Dalphond masterfully outlined, only allows conditional sentence orders for sentences of less than two years when the individual is not a public safety risk or, indeed, a risk to the victim. Now, one might be tempted to argue that we should jail everyone who commits any of these offences, just in case, because it is possible a judge’s assessment of whether someone poses a threat could be wrong.

But, colleagues, overincarceration comes with its own risks to public safety.

When we unnecessarily separate people from their loved ones, their jobs and their social support network, when we interrupt their education, send them far away from their normal environment and place their children in foster care, it can contribute to creating unstable homes and communities, which increases the risk of recidivism and the likelihood that the next generation will also end up in conflict with the law.

Honourable senators, in the long term, our communities are safer when dangerous people go to prison and when those who can safely remain in their communities are not needlessly imprisoned. It is therefore in the interest of public safety that the government opposes this amendment. I encourage all senators to do the same. Thank you for your attention.

Senator Gold, would you answer a question?

Of course.

Senator Gold, you referenced some examples that Senator Simons gave regarding situations she found would be acceptable for conditional sentences. Which particular examples that Senator Simons referred to do you think are acceptable for conditional sentences?

Thank you for the question. I won’t repeat the criteria that are set out in the Criminal Code, which make it clear that the offence must be one for which the judge would otherwise not impose a sentence of over two years, that there is no risk to the victim and that there’s no risk to public safety under all sentencing provisions. Therefore, it is case by case, and it is circumstance by circumstance.

Let us take the example of kidnapping, if I may. It’s a horrible crime when we imagine taking somebody, confining them against their will, locking them up and all the horrible things that unfortunately happen not only in TV shows but in real life — horrible things, indeed. But it could also apply, technically, to blocking an exit in the heat of a fight or to a prank that has simply gone too far. Indeed, unfortunately, and tragically in some cases, these actions take place when there are disputes around custody or care of a child.

I repeat, colleagues, and in response to your question, Senator Batters, that the judge has the discretion to take all the circumstances into consideration but is obliged by law to not grant a conditional sentence order if there is a risk to the collectivity, a risk to the victim or would otherwise be inappropriate given the objectives of the criminal law. In that regard, I think we should support the bill and reject this amendment.

Senator Gold, I’m looking for particular examples. Since you listed kidnapping and then referenced some types of situations, do you really think those would result in a kidnapping charge? Because not only do the police have discretion, but the prosecutors and judges have discretion in the types of charges that are laid and the sentences that are given out. For blocking an exit or something like that, would you contend that is actually something that somebody would receive a kidnapping offence charge for?

With respect to custody situations, of course, those can be extremely damaging situations too. We had one in Saskatchewan a few months ago where the mother in that situation had no idea where her child was for months. Wouldn’t you contend that if someone is charged with kidnapping, that is particularly something that should not be a conditional sentence?

Respectfully, I do not. Decisions as to whether charges should be laid are made through a process involving police and Crowns and the like. The judge — she or he — performs an important role at the sentencing stage. It’s in evaluating all the circumstances and the nature and reasons for the charge that Bill C-5 would return discretion to the judges, which was earlier eliminated precisely because it is in those rare circumstances where to imprison somebody would be unjust and not in the interests of public safety that conditional sentence orders are the appropriate response in the interest of public safety.

Senator Plett, Senator Dalphond has a question. Would you agree to answer a question?

Thank you for expressing your policy on the issue. I think you’re right: The Supreme Court has made clear there are policy decisions to be made here.

You tell me that conditional release should not be imposed to protect the victims, but here we’re talking about the less serious offences that deserve less than two years.

Are you saying that someone who receives a sentence of three months — and the judge thinks that is the proper sentence, according to all the principles and based on his case-by-case analysis — should serve the time in jail? So after three months, what would you do? The person will be released, and will maybe live next to the victim again.

What are you proposing — that the law be amended to specify that the person be forced to live in a different city? Please explain it to me. I understand the victim’s perspective, and the right to be protected, but you think that the conditional sentence is a fix? I don’t think it is a fix. So after three months, what would you do?

Don’t you think the real problem is the root cause of this violence? That the real answer is to address the real cause of this violence — that jail is not the answer to it, that three months or three weeks in jail is not going to change a person, that the judge should impose conditions that the person go to therapy to follow some education to better understand his reaction and to have to wear a bracelet that will signal to the victim he’s coming by? Don’t you think three weeks in jail is not protecting the victim enough? There are other ways. We have to address the real issues. It may be sensational to say, “He shall serve three weeks in jail because he did something to deserve jail,” but is that the answer?

Are honourable senators ready for the question?

Is it your pleasure to adopt the motion in amendment?

Those in favour of the motion will please say “yea.”

Those opposed to the motion will please say “nay.”

I believe the “nays” have it.

Do we have agreement on the bell? Call in the senators for 4:53 p.m.