Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
National Security and Defence
Issue 4 - Evidence - Meeting of February 4, 2008
OTTAWA, Monday, February 4, 2008
The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence met this day at 4:11 p.m. to examine and report upon the national security policy of Canada.
Senator Colin Kenny (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: This is the meeting of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. I am Senator Colin Kenny and I am the chair. Before we start, I should like to briefly introduce the members of the committee. On my immediate right is Senator David Tkachuk, from Saskatchewan. He was appointed to the Senate in June 1993. He is the deputy chair of this committee and also a member of both the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce and the Standing Senate Committee on Transport and Communications. Over the years, he has been a businessman a public servant and a teacher. Senator Tkachuk is chair of the John Diefenbaker Society, where he was instrumental in arranging for an endowment to continue funding for the Right Honourable John G. Diefenbaker Centre at the University of Saskatchewan.
Beside him is Senator Wilfred Moore. He was called to the Senate in September 1996. He represents the senatorial division of Stanhope Street/South Shore in Nova Scotia. He has been active at the city level in Halifax-Dartmouth and has served as a member of the board of governors of Saint Mary's University, from which he holds an honorary degree of laws. He is a former member of the Royal Canadian Air Force Reserve Squadron. Senator Moore is currently a member of the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce and the Standing Joint Committee for the Scrutiny of Regulations.
Beside him is Senator Nancy Ruth, who is a feminist activist. She has been instrumental in co-founding organizations that work for women's social and legal change in Canada. A senator since March 2005, Senator Nancy Ruth is a member of the Standing Senate Committee on Internal Economy, Budgets and Administration and the Standing Senate Committee on National Finance. She is also a member of our Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs.
On my left is Senator Tommy Banks from Alberta. He was called to the Senate in April 2000, following a 50-year career in the entertainment industry. He is known to many Canadians as an accomplished and versatile musician and entertainer. Senator Banks is the Chair of the Standing Senate Committee on Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources and is also a member of our Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs.
Beside him is Senator Michael Meighen, who was appointed to the Senate in 1990. He is a lawyer and member of the bars of Quebec and Ontario. He is chancellor of the University of King's College and a former chair of the Stratford Festival of Canada. He is currently chair of our Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs and also a member of both the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce and the Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans.
Beside him is Senator Grant Mitchell from Edmonton. He has had careers in the Alberta public service, the financial industry and politics. He was a member of the Legislative Assembly of Alberta for the riding of Edmonton-McClung from 1986 to 1998 and was the leader of the provincial Liberal Party from 1990 to 1998. He was appointed to the Senate in March 2005. Senator Mitchell is also a member of the Standing Senate Committee on Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources.
At the end of the table, we have Senator Joseph Day from New Brunswick, where he has had a successful career as a private practice attorney. He has served in the Senate of Canada since October 2001. He currently chairs the Standing Senate Committee on National Finance and is deputy chair of our Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs. Senator Day is also a member of the Special Senate Committee on the Anti-terrorism. He is a member of the bars of New Brunswick, Ontario and Quebec, and he is also the former president and CEO of the New Brunswick Forest Products Association.
Colleagues, in March 2004, the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence published a comprehensive report on the state of Canada's readiness nationwide to respond to man-made and natural disasters. This report clearly indicated that Canada was not well prepared to deal with national emergencies. The committee has undertaken a review of the current state of emergency-response capabilities, to check on the pace of progress of emergency response organizations at all levels, from local to federal.
Our first panel today is here to enlighten us on the progress that has been made, based on past committee recommendations, with respect to the state of Canada's emergency broadcast communications systems.
To speak to us further on this topic, I should like to welcome from the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, Scott Hutton, Associate Executive Director, Broadcasting; Serge Beaudoin, Director General, Preparedness and Recovery, Public Safety Canada; and from Industry Canada, Chaouki Dakdouki, Director of Regulatory Planning and Policy.
Welcome, all of you. You each have five minutes; we will commence with Mr. Hutton.
Scott Hutton, Associate Executive Director, Broadcasting, Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission: Mr. Chair and honourable senators, good afternoon. It is a pleasure to be here. Public safety is an issue the commission feels very strongly about and we appreciate the interest you have expressed to learn more about our activities in this area.
I will focus my comments on the major developments that have occurred since the publication of your report, National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines — An Upgrade Strategy.
[Translation]
The broadcasting system can be a valuable asset in the event of an emergency situation. Through it, information and messages can be relayed quickly and efficiently to Canadians across the country, or targeted to specific regional or local areas.
However, a national emergency alert system is necessary if we want to take full advantage of the broadcasting system's capabilities and resources. These include radio, television, broadcast distribution and possibly other elements such as satellite radio.
In February 2007, the commission challenged emergency management officials, broadcasters and companies that distribute broadcasting services, such as cable or satellite companies, to work together on a voluntary basis to build and operate an emergency alert system.
[English]
In issuing this challenge, we gave the industry two years, or until March 1, 2009, to come up with a workable system. Following this decision, we acted quickly to remove a major regulatory barrier that would have interfered with the implementation of an emergency alert system. This was done by amending our broadcast distribution regulations to allow companies that distribute broadcasting services to insert warnings into a program without first having to obtain the network's consent.
We hope that a spirit of cooperation will prevail in the industry and that our deadline will be met. However, we will not hesitate to act if, by March 1, 2009, broadcasters and companies that distribute broadcasting services have not come together to build and operate a national emergency alert system. The commission has the necessary powers to designate a single entity to serve as the system's aggregator and to ensure that the system is funded by the industry.
[Translation]
Let me repeat on behalf of the CRTC: if a national emergency alert system has not been implemented on a voluntary basis by March 1, 2009, the Commission will use its powers to designate a single entity to operate the system and to ensure it is properly funded. This project is of the utmost importance to the safety and security of all Canadians, and we will do everything within our power to ensure the successful implementation of a reliable system. In the absence of a national emergency alert system, some Canadian municipalities have established telephone-based notification services to warn the public of an imminent danger or to communicate with the public during an emergency situation.
Depending on the severity of the situation, the ability to obtain the most accurate and up-to-date information can make the difference between life and death. The Commission therefore issued a decision, also in February 2007, allowing municipalities to use the telephone numbers and addresses in 9-1-1 databases for this purpose.
[English]
A working group consisting of municipalities, telephone companies, government representatives and other interested parties has been meeting to establish common privacy standards and to resolve technical issues. All the major municipalities in Canada are represented on the working group, along with a number of smaller municipalities. They have shown their strong support for this initiative, which will make their notification efforts more effective.
The CRTC directed the working group to submit a report outlining its recommendations on these and other related issues by February 28, 2008. We expect the members will come to a consensus on most issues, but we are ready to step in and make a determination on any issue where a consensus was not reached.
The commission firmly believes that a national emergency alert system and improved community notification services will significantly enhance public safety. Much work still remains to be done. We are closely monitoring progress on these initiatives and we are ready to act, should we see a need.
I trust my comments have been useful. I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
[Translation]
Serge Beaudoin, Director General, Preparedness and Recovery, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada: Mr. Chairman, Honourable Senators, thank you for inviting me to discuss the establishment of a national public alerting system. As you are well aware, the need for such a system has been under discussion for several years. Indeed, this is an issue that was addressed in your 2004 report, National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines.
My colleague Chaouki Dakdouki, will describe the significant amount of groundwork undertaken by Industry Canada with provincial/territorial officials since 2001. They put in place the precursor elements of the national system we are proposing to build, from getting multipartite stakeholder advisory groups engaged, to creating a Canadian standard protocol for alert messages.
Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada took on responsibility for the public alerts file in June 2006. In January 2007, federal, provincial and territorial ministers responsible for emergency management expressed support for the timely creation of a national public alerting system. Officials were tasked with developing options for the minister, and I began co-chairing a federal-provincial/territorial working group with my colleague from the Province of Manitoba.
Our aim was to build on the groundwork already established and to obtain consensus on options for a national public alerting system. As my colleague from the CRTC mentioned, the CRTC released several decisions related to public alerting in 2007. One decision in particular changed the context in which we were working. On February 28, 2007, the CRTC pressed broadcasters and distributors to transmit alert messages to the public voluntarily.
This put the onus on industry stakeholders to carry public alerts by February 2009. For us, that really changed the equation in our way of thinking about the system. I met with most of the major cable companies following this announcement. They generally indicated a strong interest in implementing a public alerting system. They also suggested that governments find a way of collecting the alerts into a single source, rather than having each company make individual arrangements with all the alert-issuing authorities. So they were looking for a standard approach to the system.
If you turn to the diagram I have provided, you will see that this is a central element of the system we are proposing to build.
[English]
We put before the committee a diagram that outlines the basics of the system. On the left, you will see originators, in the middle, a dispatch centre, and, at the right-hand side in green, you will see radio, television, wireless and Internet as distributors.
To summarize, the originators are entities who decide to issue an alert, such as the provincial-territorial emergency management organizations in each of the 13 provinces and territories, as well as federal originators of messages, such as Environment Canada's Meteorological Service of Canada. If a tornado is expected to rip through Winnipeg in the next eight to nine minutes and our Environment Canada people are aware of it, they would be able to use the system to issue a public alert within two to three minutes. On the left-hand side, you will see municipalities in a dotted line. Over time, we expect that municipalities will become originators of messages, but they will be accredited by provincial governments.
In terms of context and scope, alerts messages would be issued only for life-threatening events such as tornadoes, toxic spills or tsunamis. Each alert would identify the authorized government agency issuing the alert, the imminent danger, the communities and areas affected and protective action that should be taken by citizens, including advice on what to do about the threat basis of the alert. Originators will create these alerts in a standard message format called the common alerting protocol. This is an internationally recognized alert message format that is being adapted for use in Canada. It allows messages to be quickly and easily transmitted between different jurisdictions working with different systems.
The dispatch centre in the centre of the diagram will collect all alerts from the various originators and authenticate that they have been issued by an authorized user. This will be an automated process. The dispatch centre will not alter the content of the message, given the need to distribute it quickly. Alert content is the full responsibility of the alert originator.
These first two components, shown in yellow in the diagram, represent the government-run portion of the system. It would consist of a secure IT system to create, authenticate and log alerts and a governance body made up of representatives from both levels of government.
The private-sector component of the system is shown in green. Distributors would receive the alerts from the dispatch centre and disseminate the alerts to the public over a variety of media. Our main focus to date has been on ensuring that the alerts will be broadcast to the public over radio and television. This is to capitalize on the CRTC decisions. However, in short order, as the system matures, individuals would be able to sign up to receive alerts via the Internet and wireless devices, such as the Canadian-made BlackBerry.
Of course, the system will be operational 24 hours a day, seven days a week and will contain security and redundancy features. It is worth noting that, although the proposed system is Canada-wide system, in most instances each alert will be distributed only at the local area that is affected.
We are also in discussion with our counterparts at FEMA — the Federal Emergency Management Agency in the United States — to learn more about the ways in which we can help each other. Currently, the U.S. has a national public alerting system in place. It has been in place for years, but they are in the process of modernizing and upgrading it. Clearly, we want to ensure that our two systems develop in ways that are compatible and interoperable to the extent possible.
The system I have just described was presented to the federal, provincial and territorial ministers responsible for emergency management at their meeting on January 9, 2008. They were quite supportive and they instructed us to continue working with the broadcasting industry to establish a Canadian public alerting system that will be operational in 2010.
[Translation]
Honourable senators, that concludes my opening statement. I will be pleased to answer your questions.
[English]
The Chair: Mr. Dakdouki, please proceed.
[Translation]
Chaouki Dakdouki, Director, Regulatory Policy and Planning, Industry Canada: Mr. Chairman, Honourable Senators, thank you for the opportunity to discuss Industry Canada's role in the establishment of a national public alerting system.
[English]
As my colleague Mr. Beaudoin pointed out, Industry Canada has been actively involved in this file for some time. With the committee's permission, I will summarize the history of our public alerting work, which might help to provide some context for today's discussion.
In 2001, under the Public Safety and Anti-terrorism Initiative, the PSAT, $4 million in seed funding was provided to Industry Canada to develop a strategy for a public alerting system in Canada. The vast majority of the funding was allocated to the three fiscal years ending in March 2005.
[Translation]
Various activities were undertaken as part of this project to determine the need for a national public alerting capability and demonstrate the feasibility of launching a Canada-wide public alerting system. Industry Canada established federal, provincial/territorial, municipal and industry-based advisory groups to assist in this process, thus ensuring key stakeholder input.
A review of existing public alerting capabilities across the country revealed that there were considerable gaps in almost all parts of the country. Industry Canada, with the participation of its stakeholder advisory groups, led the development of a draft vision paper to address these gaps. This vision paper described the state of public alerting in Canada and set out best practices.
It also proposed a plan for the development of a Canada-wide multi-technology, multi-channel public alerting system that would carry emergency messages over the country's existing telecommunications and broadcasting infrastructure. This proposed system was commonly known as CANALERT. Industry Canada conducted a series of technology field trials that demonstrated that various broadcasting and telecommunications technologies can be enabled to effectively carry emergency alert messages to the public, in areas affected by imminent or unfolding threats to life. For example, field trials involving 24 CBC stations were performed to determine the feasibility of deploying a broadcast alerting tool across Canada. A prototype was tested to demonstrate how emergency messages can be disseminated through unmanned radio stations. As well, tests were performed using enhanced telephone notification systems in high-risk communities, Internet systems and wireless cellular broadcast technology.
A common message standard, the Common Alerting Protocol, was identified as a key element of an integrated national system. The Common Alerting Protocol, also known in English by the acronym CAP, is being adopted as the message standard for public alerting systems around the world, especially in the United States and here in Canada. CAP is designed to ensure the compatibility of various systems and technologies within Canada and for future compatibility, as Serge mentioned, with the United States.
Draft guidelines for the operation and use of CANALERT were developed by a federal/provincial/municipal working group, and provided to industry groups on a consultative basis.
These draft guidelines raised operational, regulatory and strategic issues in the governance of the proposed systems and legal liability considerations associated with the different components of the system. The working group established by Industry Canada has addressed these and other implementation issues. Industry Canada also hosted two successful forums on public alerting as well as a comprehensive workshop on the Common Alerting Protocol.
Finally, funds were used to support activities aimed at keeping abreast of public alerting developments in the United States and adapting the Common Alerting Protocol to the Canadian context. We have thus established important groundwork in the development of a national public alerting capability. Throughout the course of this early work, Industry Canada received tremendous support for its public alerting initiative from Public Safety Canada and its other federal partners, as well as from provincial, territorial and municipal emergency management organizations and industry stakeholders. This is reflected in the January 2005 announcement by the federal, provincial and territorial ministers responsible for emergency management of an eight-point work plan that included the development and implementation of the national public alerting strategy led by Industry Canada.
To clarify roles and responsibilities under the federal, provincial and territorial work plan, the federal, provincial and territorial deputy ministers responsible for emergency management decided in June 2006 that Public Safety Canada should be the lead federal department in the implementation of the national public alerting strategy, with Industry Canada taking on a delivery partner role.
In that capacity, we continue to work closely with Public Safety Canada and our other partners with a view of achieving the goal recently articulated by the federal, provincial and territorial ministers responsible for emergency management: to continue to work with the broadcasting industry to establish a Canadian public alerting system that would be in place in 2010.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my opening statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions from the Committee.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Colleagues, with your permission, I would ask to restructure the schedule so that we complete the questioning of this panel at 6:30 p.m. and then commence with the second panel at 6:45 p.m. until 8 p.m. Is that satisfactory?
Hon. Senators: Agreed.
Senator Banks: Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
I have to confess to a considerable bias. I apologize in advance for the obstreperous nature of some of my questions, which may be more along the line of argument. With the exception of one of the things you said, Mr. Hutton, what we have heard today, and what we have seen over the past many years, is a perfect example of why things in this country do not work efficiently. I have to tell you that I and, I think, others of our colleagues are extremely frustrated by people who say to us, ``We are working towards this'' and ``considering that'' and ``putting into motion plans to bring about this, that and the other thing.''
I have a bias in this respect because I come from Alberta, where there has been an imperfect but functional form of working interruption of all broadcast entities except one to warn of events of this kind that might cause potential harm to life or property. It has been in place for a long time.
I am extremely frustrated by the fact that, as you just pointed out, Mr. Dakdouki — at least, the government figured out in 2001 that something should be done about this, 2001, and began to provide funding to study the feasibility of whether there should be a national warning system.
The question is absurd, because, as has been pointed out to us by Mr. Hutton, depending on the severity of the situation, the ability to obtain the most accurate and up-to-date information can make the difference between life and death.
No one needs to study that. We know that. This could be done in days, if it had to be done. If the emergency situation were sufficiently urgent, it would be done within days. I know that you know that the technology exists to do that. The happiest news I have heard today is from Mr. Hutton, namely, that you will do something about this if someone else does not. I hope you have in the CRTC the authority to bring into place the recommendation this committee made years ago, long after others had recommended it, too, that this will be done. I hope this will be mandatory among broadcasters and other means of communication in the country.
Mr. Hutton, do you have the authority to do that?
Mr. Hutton: Yes, we do.
Senator Banks: Will you do it?
Mr. Hutton: We will do it.
Senator Banks: We have your words today, and we will hold you to it. It will be too late, far later than it had to be.
You said March 1, 2009. You also talked about a reporting coming up this year. Will you determine on the basis of that report whether to act so there will be something in place by March 1, 2009, or will the decision be made if you have not done it by 2009?
Mr. Hutton: I will clarify one item prior to answering your question.
In my opening remarks, I talked about two things. One was an all-channel alert system, which covers all broadcasting. The second element is with regards to what we call community notification service, which I believe this committee has addressed under the terms of REVERSE 9-1-1 service. We are expecting to receive a report on the community notification service this month. We have already made the decision that such a service must be implemented. The industry, municipalities and those concerned have worked all year and it has been confirmed that they will be delivering us that report. Following that, I understand there will be a short implementation period. Therefore, that system will be up and running this year.
Senator Banks: Talk about the broadcast messages and the date of March 2009.
Mr. Hutton: We challenged the industry on February 28, 2007, to come up with a voluntary plan. That involved working with these individuals and us to come up with a system. On March 1, if that system is not in place, we would then start our processes to get a system in place.
Senator Banks: How long would that take?
Mr. Hutton: That depends on what needs to happen. Mr. Beaudoin is well on his way to putting in place the messages from the government side. If nothing has occurred by March 1 and our broadcasters are not playing ball, we can, within six to eight weeks, put in place regulations that require them to comply with what is occurring already in government.
If there is no system at all in place — no baseline, such as the one provided — we would proceed with calling for applications to put one in place. That would likely take a few months.
Senator Banks: Years?
Mr. Hutton: Likely not. In the past, there has been a number of applicants before us. We did not adopt those systems, because they were not perfect, but there would likely be interest on the part of at least two parties to come before us to do that.
Senator Banks: When that happens, would you pick a system and make it mandatory for broadcasters?
Mr. Hutton: Yes.
Senator Banks: Will it be a condition of licence?
Mr. Hutton: We can do it through regulation or condition of licence, likely both.
Senator Banks: Do you think it likely that the CRTC would use both, to make it very clear?
Mr. Hutton: The primary way would be to do it through regulations; that would be clear. As a fallback, should someone be falling outside of the regulation, it would be through condition of licence as a backup.
Senator Banks: I apologize for my frustration, gentlemen. This technology is never going to be perfect. It will always improve. However, someone must bite the bullet and do something. As you point out, this can affect life and death, and has in Alberta, as I think you know. Someone has to bite the bullet and make it mandatory, because its necessity does not need to be questioned.
The Chair: I was hoping you would continue for a while, Senator Banks.
Senator Zimmer: You indicated that, if is not in place by March 1 of next year, you will start the process. My question is this: When will it be operational?
Mr. Hutton: It would take at least a year after that to be operational — if the system needs to be built from scratch. If it is a question of ordering companies or our broadcasters to do it, it would take less time.
Senator Zimmer: Would you put a deadline date on it to be operational?
Mr. Hutton: It would be within a year.
Senator Tkachuk: I have some of the same concerns as Senator Banks. However, so that I am clear, in February 2007, when the commission challenged emergency management officials, broadcasters, et cetera, regarding the March 1, 2009, deadline, was that for them to say yes or was that to have a system operational?
Mr. Hutton: I believe we had plans, although imperfect, on the table in February 2007. Our view would have been to be operational by March 2009, or at the least, to be very near.
Senator Tkachuk: It has been a year. Who is keeping track?
Mr. Hutton: We have collectively been working together. I believe Mr. Beaudoin has been leading the team.
Senator Tkachuk: How does it look?
Mr. Beaudoin: I joined Public Safety Canada in February 2007 and went to a federal-provincial-territorial meeting with senior officials responsible for emergency management. They expressed frustration similar to what Senator Banks expressed a few minutes ago. We heard them loud and clear.
We rolled up our sleeves over the year and sat down with this provincial-territorial working group and put out the options. We put everything on the table to see what kind of system we want to build. What is it we will have at the end of this? We mapped this out from A to Z and over the year presented options to ministers. Those options were well received. Our provincial colleagues who were frustrated at the outset of this were pleased by how far we got within the year.
We are on track to have a system in place by 2010. I would like to say that it will be operational tomorrow; however, I cannot say that, it is not the case.
Senator Tkachuk: What happens if there is an emergency now?
Mr. Beaudoin: We rely on existing mechanisms.
Senator Tkachuk: Which are what?
Mr. Beaudoin: In Alberta, there is a system. However, the mechanisms are uneven across the country. This is what we are trying to resolve. We are able to commit to a date now.
Senator Tkachuk: Like health care, do we want it exactly the same in each province? Do we not have some emergency measures operation in each province? Is there not an alert system in each province?
Mr. Beaudoin: No.
Senator Tkachuk: Outside of Alberta, who else has one?
Senator Banks: No one.
Mr. Beaudoin: Alberta has one. Alberta wants to upgrade its system because it is an analog system. They are in line with us to modernize their system as we are building the national system. They are partners with us in that regard.
Senator Tkachuk: How did we do national alerts, or did we, in the Cold War or the Second World War? Did we not have some kind of a system?
Mr. Beaudoin: I think it was a siren-based system, but I am not aware of the details.
The Chair: In the 1950s, there was a siren-based system. For the record, currently, there is a voluntary system, where people hold a press conference or phone a radio station. However, there is no mandatory system in any province other than Alberta.
Mr. Beaudoin: The system we are trying to build is one that will allow us to get to the public within two or three minutes, regardless of where you are.
Senator Tkachuk: If there is an emergency in Prince Albert, you want Prince Albert to know; you do not care if I know in Ottawa. Why do you say you want everyone to know, regardless where we are?
Mr. Beaudoin: Let me clarify. We want a national public alerting system, but for the most part it will be used at the local level. By national, we mean a system that works from coast to coast to coast; however, using geocodes, you can specify the population you want to alert.
Senator Tkachuk: When will you notify CRTC that everything is okay and that we will have a system?
Mr. Beaudoin: We have been keeping the CRTC fully informed, as we have all our federal colleagues, because Environment Canada, Canadian Heritage and various players all have an interest. Throughout the process they will be kept informed.
Senator Tkachuk: You expect that this will be done in March 1, 2009?
Mr. Beaudoin: We have prepared a critical path. Since we received instructions from the ministers to build this, we have the buy-in from all provinces and territories to have this in place by 2010. That is a decision. Since then, we have mapped out what needs to be done by 2010.
Our next step is to go to a request for information, a government process whereby you put out your statement of work to private industry to say what you are trying to build and obtain information on what people could contribute to this. It is a step before request for proposal, which is a formal bidding process to build the system.
We will be going with a letter of intent — a request for information — by mid-March and receiving bids by the end of April. This will put us in a position to meet with industry and scope out the parameters of requests for proposal, which we will issue on the Public Works website, through MERX. We will receive bids from private industry, hopefully by the end of the year. The contract would be issued at the beginning of the year to build the system at the most effective cost.
Senator Tkachuk: I want more information on how the siren system works. My view is that, if it takes six years to put it together, I do not have a lot of confidence that when there is an emergency it will be effective.
Mr. Beaudoin: I am not sure I understand the question.
Senator Tkachuk: It is taking so long to put the system together, and it seems to me that urgency is required. Is it not correct that the same people will be managing the system that put it together?
Mr. Beaudoin: The system will be managed at various levels — according to my diagram. The emergency management offices in the provinces will issue alerts. I trust it will be well managed.
The Chair: I believe what Senator Tkachuk was saying is that he is afraid that, when a tornado is spotted, a committee would be formed to set up a study group that would hire consultants to report back in due course.
Senator Tkachuk: Exactly.
Senator Banks: Senator Tkachuk, in the Alberta instance, which is not necessarily a model, the EMO people punch a button when they have decided there is a problem and no one is consulted about anything. Those responsible are given the authority to immediately interrupt all the broadcasts and the message goes out. I presume that will be the case with the diagram Mr. Beaudoin proposed.
How long did it take the United States to put in place its national warning system?
Mr. Beaudoin: I do not know. It has been in effect since the 1960s and has received certain upgrades since then.
Senator Tkachuk: Even though we do not officially have a system in Saskatchewan, in reality there is one. When there is an emergency, like the snowstorm in 2006, people were alerted and action was taken. News media broadcast to people by radio. People quickly knew what was taking place and knew what to do.
I do not see the difficultly, when it already is operating in some way. Whether it is legislated or not does not really matter; it is operating. We have a system in Saskatchewan to let people know of an emergency.
The Chair: Do you have transistor radios in Saskatchewan?
Senator Tkachuk: That are compulsory, no, but we do have them.
Senator Day: There is nothing like that rural Saskatchewan information line — word gets around.
Is it okay to talk about CANALERT for this project that will be in place in 2010? CANALERT is still the term we will be using in relation to the project, is that correct?
Mr. Beaudoin: We are using the term «national public alerting system.»
Senator Day: Yes. It was CANALERT earlier and now it is the national public alerting system. Is that the way we have evolved into it?
Mr. Beaudoin: Yes, we are using national public alerting system instead. We thought it was more direct terminology.
Senator Day: I saw Industry Canada's discussion paper that was a summary of the presentation. At page 3, you say that, in addition to the operational issues, there are draft guidelines that raise regulatory and policy issues such as governance of the proposed system. Have you worked that out now? Will it be Stockwell Day's department that will take the lead in relation to the government dispatch centre? Are these governance issues worked out?
Mr. Beaudoin: Yes, Public Safety Canada will be taking the lead on the whole issue of national public alerting. We are supported by Industry Canada. In fact, some Industry Canada people have been on loan to us to help us maximize the efficiency of the technical expertise in-house on this. However, Public Safety Canada will be the lead.
Senator Day: Have the governance issues you talked about at page 3 been worked out? What are your impediments to getting this done? What are you working on now?
Mr. Dakdouki: The way we approach this issue is not just the governance regarding who will be the lead. We also talk about who will issue the alert. As my colleagues here mentioned, the alert will be issued at different levels. With the case of Alberta, if it is a municipality first responder who will issue the alert, he or she will be able to do that.
The governance was more about who will be responsible for different components of the network or the system and how they will deal with each other. This was solved. We have a final report that seems to have a consensus among all stakeholders about the process of issuing the alert.
Senator Day: Who will decide if the municipalities' alert should go through the system?
Mr. Dakdouki: That is why we had this working group. During an emergency, we will not sit down and come up with a committee to discuss who will do what. We have to solve these issues up front. The decision is that whoever is in charge of the emergency will be able to issue the alert.
Senator Day: May I still follow this one-page document?
Mr. Dakdouki: Yes.
Senator Day: Let us say a selected municipality has an emergency. Can that municipality use the system to issue the alert? Who will determine which one or all of the industry sources that will be used?
Mr. Dakdouki: That will be part of the common alert protocol. There is a protocol that is dependant on the severity and eminency of the emergency and who is issuing it and what authority they have. It will be decided automatically and redistributed automatically to the right channels.
Senator Day: Let us talk about the authority. Suppose that I am the mayor of a municipality and I have an emergency. To whom do I have to go to get authority to use this system?
Mr. Beaudoin: To use this system, you would go to your provincial emergency management office initially. If your province accredits you, then you would have access directly to the system. If you are running a 24-7 operation and have certain parameters to meet, you can then issue the warning directly to your population.
Senator Day: Who is in this government dispatch centre where the emergency message is received that determines which one or all of these industry sources would be used?
Mr. Beaudoin: To clarify, this will be an automated process. It will be housed in the Government Operations Centre, to ensure that it has technical support 24 hours a day, but it is an automated process. It will go through, using technology to authenticate who they are getting it from, and they will be issuing it to all — radio, television, wireless and the Internet. The idea is to send it to the various sources and let the private sector deal with their subscribers, the Canadian public, directly.
Senator Day: Can you tell me who makes the decision as to how broad a distribution this will be?
Mr. Beaudoin: At the front end, the person alerting or the organization alerting will specify. We use geocodes, so if it is the City of Ottawa, for instance, wanting to issue warnings to residents of Ottawa, they will use geocodes to specify that and be able to alert their own public.
Senator Day: Did you have something to add, Mr. Dakdouki?
Mr. Dakdouki: Alberta has a similar system, whereby first responders will have preauthorization to access the system. They call a directed voice system, which will give you a message, and then you push in your code. Depending on your code and the code of the emergency, the system will decide automatically though which channels or radio stations the message will be broadcast. This system will be similar. We are thinking about multichannel distribution systems.
Senator Day: I am starting to get a bit of a flavour for this. Has the technical equipment been ordered yet?
Mr. Beaudoin: No, it has not.
Senator Day: Do you have money to do this or do you need us to help you get approval for the proposed appropriations on this?
Mr. Beaudoin: We have a decision of ministers to move forward on the issue.
Senator Day: You have a decision from the ministers to ask the parliamentarians to approve the amount of money that is needed, is that correct?
Mr. Beaudoin: Not necessarily at the federal side.
Senator Day: Has there been any request for funds at this stage?
Mr. Beaudoin: The funding earmarks could potentially be used within existing budgets.
Senator Day: Let me ask you one other thing. Legal liability is one of the stumbling blocks that you mentioned. I can understand how it would take a while to get over some of those legal liability and privacy issues. Has that been worked out or is that still one of the hurdles that must be overcome?
Mr. Dakdouki: We have a group that has worked on this. The decision is that the issuer of the alert will be legally responsible for any legal damage. The group reached a consensus on how to proceed. On any other legal issue, some discussion is still taking place, but we have a consensus on that one.
Senator Day: My final question relates to the CRTC, Mr. Hutton. I am interested in expanding on the obstreperous question Senator Banks asked you earlier. Can you tell me about the money? You said that ``if it is not done, then we will do it; if we do not get approval, we will do it ourselves.''
I understand how the CRTC could make it a condition of licence. Are you telling us that the CRTC has the authority to make blanket regulations regardless of whether they are regulating a particular entity?
Mr. Hutton: We have to regulate the entity. We would be regulating broadcasters — some broadcaster in the business of radio-television or other broadcasters who are in the business of delivering products between broadcasters and customers. The more feasible proposals we have seen today use satellite technology to distribute the alerts to the cable companies in each area. They would then be carried over the technology that would be housed in each local area.
Senator Day: In your comments earlier, you said that you would designate a single entity to operate the system and ensure that it is properly funded.
Mr. Hutton: The funding would come through every television viewer's cable bill.
Senator Day: As opposed to being funded out of general revenue of the government?
Mr. Hutton: That is correct.
Senator Day: The CRTC does not regulate the Internet, but do you still have the authority with respect to the Internet to ensure that they comply with this plan?
Mr. Hutton: We have the authority to regulate broadcasters. It would be to require broadcasters, or who we choose who would likely be a broadcaster to operate this system, to distribute to the Internet. The initial plan would be to distribute it to the television viewers. It would be easy enough to arrange to get it to the radio stations. The Internet enterprises seem to believe that they can deliver the items through emails, but I do not think we are in a position yet to deliver such a message directly to an ISP so that it alerts over any other activity at the time.
Senator Day: You are talking about ISPs?
Mr. Hutton: Our system would be primarily television-based.
Senator Day: That is what I thought. You have the Internet listed, but it will not play a big role at this time.
Mr. Hutton: That is why in the past we declined to embark on the systems provided to us because they were not integrated, as I indicated to Senator Banks. Ours would start with television.
Senator Day: You talked about it being from sea to sea to sea, which made me think of satellite communication. Is that included?
Mr. Beaudoin: It is included for television companies that have satellite television. There will be a satellite uplink for whoever wants to receive it.
Of the companies we met with that will be required to build this into their television programming, some are Internet service providers and some are wireless service providers. They have indicated that in time they will move to have this available to their subscribers.
Senator Day: I will conclude by complimenting you on your comment that you are looking for interoperability and you are conscious of that at the front end as you make your plans. We have seen many problems in the past because there was not interoperability in North America in respect of emergency planning. Interoperability will be extremely important. I congratulate you on that.
Senator Meighen: In my questions, some clarification might be largely for my benefit only. Would it be fair to say that Mr. Hutton has some leverage to ensure compliance, in that he has licences and regulations that can be promulgated in a pretty swift fashion and a deadline of March 1, 2009? Mr. Beaudoin talked about a deadline of 2010, which is one year later. It seems that Mr. Beaudoin does not have the same levers to ensure compliance. Is a deadline of only one year later than Mr. Hutton realistic, given that he has many tools at his disposal and that, Mr. Beaudoin, you have only your charm and persuasive abilities?
Mr. Beaudoin: I thank you for the comment about ``charm.'' I also have my colleague. The industry is well aware of the CRTC decision. When we met with them over the summer and fall, they were eager to see us, to learn what is going on. They are also looking to the federal government for leadership, or they would have to find the solution themselves. It might be piecemeal, and the more piecemeal it is, the more costly it is and the less likely it is to be followed freely. They are aware of the CRTC decision and we travelled in a virtual package, if I may say.
Senator Meighen: Senator Tkachuk touched on this, but the great unknown or whole in all this is the need, to a substantial degree, for electricity to flow in order for this system to function. For example, if there is another ice storm, like the one in 1998, the electricity will not flow because of a collapse of transmission towers, et cetera. Given that very few people have transistor radios, how will we get the message out?
Mr. Beaudoin: It is important that each of the originators of the message have business continuity plans to ensure that they are fully functional in the event of a power outage. All EMOs are required to have these in place.
Senator Meighen: That is great if they can broadcast but I cannot hear or see them because I am depending upon electricity to power my receiver.
Mr. Beaudoin: That is why we are trying to distribute these messages to the broadest array possible. We are sending it to radio and television. As well, weather radios, which turn on when there is a special kind of alert, will receive these messages. We are going with a broad variety of distribution products.
Senator Meighen: Will these products function in the absence of electricity?
Mr. Beaudoin: For the individual?
Senator Meighen: Yes.
Mr. Beaudoin: There are no guarantees, which is why we are trying to go multimedia.
Senator Meighen: I am worried about whether you have enough «multi» that does not depend upon the flow of electricity. I will leave that for now.
Mr. Hutton, page 2 of your brief talks about allowing municipalities the use of telephone numbers and addresses in 9-1-1 databases. What are they? Are you referring to the REVERSE 9-1-1?
Mr. Hutton: We are referring to REVERSE 9-1-1 in this case. At home, you dial 9-1-1, but there is a telephone system behind that. You simply have to dial 9-1-1 and, hopefully, speak to the 9-1-1 operator. The system will provide for the 9-1-1 operator to know the address, phone number and name of the primary resident of that home. As well, a codified addressing system has been put in place so that they can take that information and send it out to the emergency respondents. REVERSE 9-1-1 is used instead of other municipal phone lists, or even our white or yellow pages that, at best, are updated quarterly electronically and once a year on paper. The REVERSE 9-1-1 system is updated daily so that the most up-to-date information is available in that database.
Senator Meighen: How is it updated daily if I do not access 9-1-1?
Mr. Hutton: The telephone company populates the 9-1-1 database. When you move, you subscribe to a telephone line. The telephone company is the one responsible for putting that information into the 9-1-1 database. Doing so allows another party to dip into that 9-1-1 database, to be able to place calls to advise residents.
Senator Meighen: I apologize if I am asking something that has already been testified to, but have the privacy issues been settled?
Mr. Hutton: We are working on the privacy issues. That was one of the main elements of the working group. We have made certain decisions on our own to bring it as far as we can, but there are certain details to ensure that the proper person accesses the information — someone who is duly recognized in an emergency situation — and that it is only used in an emergency situation.
The final legs of the protocols are being put in place by the committee report, which is due at the end of this month.
Senator Meighen: My information is that the original broadcast distribution regulations defined «emergency alert message» as a warning to the public announcing an imminent or unfolding danger to life or property. Apparently, on July 17, 2007, the amendments to these regulations redefined ``emergency alert message'' and dropped the word ``property.'' Is that so and why is that so?
Mr. Hutton: That is correct. That decision was made by the CRTC because they were concerned about interruptions and the effectiveness of an alerting system. The definitions that included ``property'' meant that there could be so many emergency messages that the system would be rendered less efficient and less effective. It was a question of keeping the system at a high level and ensuring that the danger was to persons, not property.
Senator Meighen: I find that surprising. Surely, an imminent ice storm is serious.
Mr. Hutton: There are approximately 15,000 strong wind alerts each year.
Senator Meighen: They are more likely to damage property than life. We cannot use the system for such alerts now; is that correct?
Mr. Hutton: I cannot tell you the exact nature, but it was primarily strong wind warnings that would cause a significant increase in the level of warnings and interruptions to the system.
Senator Meighen: Let us explore this, because it sounds strange.
Mr. Hutton: As an extra piece of information, this was in the automatic system without interruption. Warnings to property can still occur but through a voluntary system.
Senator Meighen: For example: Do we assume that an imminent tornado is a danger?
Mr. Hutton: One that is more than a strong wind.
Senator Meighen: That is a danger to life?
Mr. Hutton: That is right.
Senator Meighen: What about an ice jam or a flood?
Mr. Hutton: I believe it is a threat to life.
Senator Meighen: Really? Were there many people who died as a result of the Winnipeg flood in 1950 or in the more recent one? I do not think so, but there was a considerable loss of and damage to property. Perhaps if people were alerted in time by the full system, they would be able to take remedial measures.
Mr. Beaudoin: The common alerting protocol, which we talked about at the beginning of this hearing, enables us to weed out what is urgent and not. The system we are talking about is direct-to-air, meaning it is something you need to know within two or three minutes. It requires immediate interruption of the individual who is receiving the message. However, the system will allow us to send messages over the network, and should radio, television, et cetera, want to carry messages of lesser importance that do not require immediate interruption, this system will enable for that. It will require the distributors to make a decision as to when they want to issue the alert.
To be clear, this system can be quite intrusive, in the sense that you may be watching something important and you will be switched to another channel to talk about an alert. It needs to be something that is imminent and life- threatening. Other than that, the distributors would receive a message that there is an ice storm or forecast, and they can choose to put it in an information bulletin.
Senator Meighen: I see. It is voluntary in the case of property.
Mr. Beaudoin: Yes. All emergency management offices and Environment Canada want to use this common alerting protocol to be able to push as much material out to the distributors in terms of information. Then it becomes the choice of the distributors as to what they carry besides the direct-to-air material.
Senator Meighen: I was watching television yesterday and there was an announcement from the Government of Canada about ``individual warning.'' Does that ring any bells with you? It goes to show how deeply I assimilated the message. It did have the Government of Canada logo, it talked about 72 hours and other things. Do you remember it?
Mr. Beaudoin: I did not see the announcement you are talking about, but it may be the 72-hour preparedness campaign that the Government of Canada runs. It is a campaign that informs citizens that they should be self- sufficient for a 72-hour period should an emergency occur. If there is a major power outage, et cetera, individuals should have food provisions and other necessary things to carry them through 72 hours. The Government of Canada promotes that along with the provinces and territories as a good personal preparedness process.
Senator Meighen: Have you had any public feedback subsequent to the publication of the regulations?
Mr. Hutton: We ran a public process where we made that first decision. Subsequently, we ran another public process to implement the system. I believe the same issues that were similar to yours were reported. However, we concluded that the regulation should stand. In cooperation, and in light of what was placed in front of us on the public record, I think emergency management personnel and systems were arguing for the decision as it now stands.
Senator Mitchell: When the point was made that Alberta is the only province that has a structured system, I was wondering what would have, whether there were provisions, in the event of a Chalk River issue. Clearly, there is a system in place for that. In a situation such as that potential turmoil, how would people be notified?
Mr. Dakdouki: We did a survey of existing systems; as such, we have an inventory of the existing systems. «Nuclear cities» have an obligation under regulations to have a public alert system within some area around the nuclear reactor. Each nuclear city must have a system. There are sirens in some cities. There is a community communication system in others. The City of Ottawa mentioned this last Monday. It is a system in which a circle is drawn around the map and messages are sent within that circle using the 9-1-1 database to specific telephones around the reactor. We have a list.
Alberta has a provincial system, but there are different and smaller systems around the country. We have a list of them. Nuclear cities such as Sarnia have some alerting systems that are used by the oil and refinery industry there.
Senator Mitchell: Who monitors those systems to ensure that they are operational? I am thinking about Walkerton's water-monitoring system. The stakes are very high.
Mr. Dakdouki: Usually, it will be the local authorities, and it will be done in cooperation with the private industry.
Senator Mitchell: I am interested in this whole concept of the voluntary industry process. Perhaps I do not fully understand all the components of this operation, but what are they doing that you are not doing, and what are you, the government, doing that they are not doing? What is it that takes so long for these industry players to sit down and talk about? Do they have to decide on a common technology? They do not decide on protocol, it would seem that you do. Can you give us your thoughts on that?
Mr. Dakdouki: We work together; it is collaborative work. It is important for them to not receive 10,000 or however many sources of alerting. It is important for them to follow the same protocol. That is what we spent this year doing, actually. In order for these stakeholders to sit down, we created working groups from the municipal, provincial and industry levels. Between them, they came up with a consensus regarding the protocols they will use, when the alert will be issued and the form of the alert.
For example, a television would have a different form of message than a radio. One would be text and image; the other just voice. We have to combine all of the systems so that they can talk to each other and follow the same protocol.
The industry has been very collaborative with us. The example from Alberta is a good one. They did not have an obligation to do it. Everyone in Alberta is involved in the EPWS-enabled system — emergency public warning system — except one channel. The experience in Alberta shows that the private industry will do it because they do not want to be singled as the only one not broadcasting emergency messages. Slowly, everyone got involved and started working with EMA — Emergency Management Alberta — to be involved with the system.
I do not think there are issues within the private industries. It is more about the technology. There are different aspects that need to be figured out in terms of how a message will be sent and how the message will show up. I will not go into technical details but, for example, where you will put the message on the television screen. Will you block, for example, closed captions for the hearing-impaired? Will you put it on top or block the screen? Different systems will react differently to different technical aspects of it.
Senator Mitchell: Thank you. It is one thing to break into a television or a radio station — the system is there and you could overtake the transmission and transmit — but a telephone system is more complicated. If you are talking about telephone systems, 9-1-1 databases and the use of that approach, telephone companies will have to put a lot of technology into their systems so that someone can press a button and everyone in the region is called, I presume, at the same time.
Who pays for that technology? Is that worked into private carriers' fee systems? Does the CRTC allow them to charge more for it? How does that work?
Mr. Hutton: The system may not be as extensive as you indicate because the working groups have been working on solutions. We provided for telephone companies to bill the municipalities.
Mr. Beaudoin: This system is not concerning REVERSE 9-1-1, for instance. To clarify that, we are not on that.
Senator Mitchell: However, REVERSE 9-1-1 is being considered at some level or in some way. Under certain circumstances, how would it be used in addition to, in place of or instead of television or radio?
Mr. Hutton: Unlike the REVERSE 9-1-1 mechanism that we put in place, the community notification system is based with the municipalities. It is the municipalities who would be emitting local notification in the communities.
Senator Mitchell: Where would the decision be made and what is the protocol for the use of television versus radio versus telephones?
Mr. Hutton: The REVERSE 9-1-1 system is telephone-based only; it does not provide for radio or television.
Senator Mitchell: However, who decides when there is an emergency?
Mr. Hutton: It would be the local originators.
Senator Mitchell: I want to return to the voluntary initiatives. On July 17, 2007, the CRTC amended its Broadcasting Distribution Regulations so that emergency messages can now be displayed without private-broadcaster consent. Was there an issue here? Were there private broadcasters who resisted?
Mr. Hutton: The broadcasters in question were cable companies, who distribute the property of someone else, that is, the signal of a television enterprise. Previously, the regulations provided that a cable company could not interrupt the television signal of this third party. That is the common carrier principle. The cable company is paid to distribute the signal, not to modify it or put in another form of programming, not put in advertisements, et cetera. The regulations were meant to impede cable companies from modifying signals. We have created an exemption that allows a cable company to modify the signal for the purposes of an emergency.
Senator Mitchell: You are monitoring and working with the industry on its voluntary initiative. You mentioned that if it is not done by 2009, it will be done one year later. How can you be so certain about that? You said that regulations might take months, but clearly regulations would be needed to impose this on these broadcasters. Have you been given a budget for this? Could someone change their mind?
Mr. Hutton: No. We would require cable television and satellite customers to pay a subscriber fee to the entity that completes this function. We had a couple of proposals in front of us, one of which would have used The Weather Network system. They had proposed a subscriber fee. That is how we see this working, should all else fail.
Senator Mitchell: Going back to Senator Banks' question. I have been involved in enough projects in my life where people say that something can be done in a year but where the reality is that it cannot. Is there a sense of urgency in your organizations to get this done?
Mr. Beaudoin: Senator, you can trust that I am personally seized of the issue, both my organization and myself. This is a major undertaking and we are on it.
Senator Moore: A number of things were mentioned in Mr. Dakdouki's remarks. There was the Common Alerting Protocol, an eight-point work plan and an inventory of systems in place in nuclear cities and also for other cities. Could copies be provided to the committee?
Mr. Beaudoin, did you mention that the U.S. system has been in place since the 1960s?
Mr. Beaudoin: That is what I understand; correct.
Senator Moore: Are you the co-chair of this working group?
Mr. Beaudoin: Yes, I co-chair the provincial-territorial working group with a provincial representative from Manitoba.
Senator Moore: How often do you meet?
Mr. Beaudoin: We meet fairly regularly, at least once a month if not every two weeks at certain times.
Senator Moore: How do you function? Do you set out action points and then come back next month and tick them off as being achieved and move on to the next? Are decisions made by consensus or is there a lead entity. If so, who is the lead entity?
Mr. Beaudoin: The working group is pushing it; Public Safety is leading in terms of preparation of documents. The committee sets tight timelines for itself. For instance, after the ministerial meeting in January, we sat down and mapped out the next steps for ourselves, that is, the letter of interest I mentioned earlier. We committed to getting that substantive document drafted and out to the provinces and territories within a month for comment to allow us to build in their comments with a view to getting the request for information out into the public and the private sector through MERX by mid-March. This is indicative of the way we have been setting deadlines throughout this process since we were established in 2007.
Senator Moore: The working group has been in place since when in 2007?
Mr. Beaudoin: February 2007.
Mr. Dakdouki: We have had many working groups with the provinces and municipalities since 2004. This is a continuation of the work done in the last three or four years.
Senator Moore: Mr. Hutton, you talked about the challenge giving industry two years or until March 1, 2009, to come up with a workable system. Yet, Mr. Beaudoin is looking at a target of 2010. I am confused by that. Are you working together? Are you trying to achieve the same thing?
Mr. Hutton: Yes. We have levers over the broadcasters and we use those to challenge them. Government, broadcasters and everyone have stepped up and worked together. Ultimately, a holistic plan is what is best. We can address broadcasters through our plan. Ours would certainly be a lesser plan if it is put in place.
Senator Moore: In a previous response to Senator Day or Senator Mitchell, you said your model would be television-based and that an amount was earmarked so you could fund it within existing budgets.
What is the dollar amount that you could fund within existing budgets?
Mr. Beaudoin: The initial costing of the system, without going to RFPs, request for proposals, is estimated at $15 to $16 million on a 50-50 cost-share formula with the provinces and territories. That puts the federal share at $7.5 million. Our preference is not to fund it within existing funds, but we can move forth with certainty knowing that it is an option.
Senator Moore: Mr. Hutton, you said that funding could come from each subscriber's cable bill. What percentage of Canadian households are subscribers to cable?
Mr. Hutton: There are approximately 7.5 million cable and satellite distribution service subscribers in this country — about 90 per cent of the population.
Senator Moore: This is 7.5 million homes?
Mr. Hutton: Yes. That is cable subscribers.
Senator Tkachuk: So that would be industry as well. How many homes?
Mr. Hutton: Covering off the population, the rough number that we use is approximately 90 per cent of Canadians receive their television signals through a satellite or cable distribution. Therefore, you would ultimately address 90 per cent of the homes.
Senator Moore: Given that, you must have some idea or estimate of the funds needed to operate the television-based system. Can you give us the dollar amount?
Mr. Hutton: In the last application we received, which was public and which we decided on, the proposal was 8 cents per subscriber, which is approximately $6 to $7 million a year on an annual, recurring basis.
Senator Moore: Eight cents a month?
Mr. Hutton: Yes.
Senator Banks: That means 10 per cent of the people in Canada would not get this message, because you are talking about interrupting this at the cable head, not at the broadcaster head. Am I right that the Alberta system has the broadcast head — the stick actually carries the signal? If it goes to cable, 100 per cent of the people watching television at the time would get it, is that right? This system omits the 10 per cent of people who are not receiving their television by cable.
Mr. Hutton: That is correct.
Senator Banks: Would it not make more sense to require the broadcaster to interrupt their signal so everyone gets it?
Mr. Hutton: You would likely move to a system that is more complicated. What we have received in front of us at the cost that has been provided are systems that are cable-, television- or satellite-based. It is a system that Pelmorex, the company that runs The Weather Network, was promoting.
Senator Banks: I understand that, because they do not have a stick. They are not broadcasters in the traditional sense.
Mr. Hutton: That was the proposal put in front of us. There were options — naturally, costs would have to be over and above that amount — to also deliver that warning. This company would also deliver the warning directly to the various broadcasters; then they would have to implement further systems to put it over their networks.
Senator Banks: I hope the inconvenience of that will not keep those 10 per cent of people from getting the message.
Mr. Hutton: Obviously, broadcasters in this nation have participated as best they can. Alberta is a case in point. There are many voluntary systems, so they are always there and want to do this.
Senator Zimmer: Some of these questions are preliminary, but is your major objective to achieve 100 per cent with the system? Is that your ultimate objective?
Mr. Hutton: For the CRTC, basically that is why we did not accept the system that was put in place for us before, because it did not reach 100 per cent.
Senator Zimmer: Will you have a backup for breakdown and make it jam-proof also, in case of terrorism and things like that?
Mr. Hutton: Regarding the system we have seen, I cannot answer that question. I do not believe so.
The Chair: I apologize to you and everyone in the room for the disruption earlier on. We clearly have not asked all of our questions, but we have another panel ready to go.
I would ask you to expect a letter from us with further questions. If you could give it your attention, we would be most grateful.
On behalf of the committee, I wish to thank you very much for your assistance in examining this matter tonight. We are grateful to you for your participation and for the knowledge you have shared with us.
Our next witnesses are Dr. David Butler-Jones and Dr. Howard Njoo, from the Public Health Agency of Canada, as well as Carolina Giliberti and Sonja Heikkila, from Health Canada.
Dr. Butler-Jones, please proceed.
Dr. David Butler-Jones, Chief Public Health Officer, Public Health Agency of Canada: Thank you, and good evening. It is a pleasure to be here this evening.
With me is Howard Njoo, Director General, Centre for Communicable Diseases and Infection Control, Public Health Agency of Canada, and Carolina Giliberti, Assistant Deputy Minister, Public Affairs, Consultation and Regions Branch, and Sonja Heikkila, Director General, Office of Emergency Preparedness.
I appreciate the work that this Senate committee has been doing. It will help to inform much of our work. You have some challenging and appropriate questions, which we look forward to.
[Translation]
Many events in recent years have raised the value that Canadians place on emergency preparedness and response. And if we look back to the SARS outbreak of 2003, it marked a clear turning point in how we approach emergency planning.
[English]
The outbreak of SARS highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of Canada's public health system. During the crisis, some things worked very well, but others did not work well — for example, public health responses and capacities were different across the country; surge capacity in the system was limited; the leadership needed was not evident; and decision lines were not always clear.
The questions we need to ask are this: Since that experience, have we learned our lessons? Have governments worked together to ensure that responsibilities and lines of communication are clearly defined? I believe we have made important progress.
In the months and years after the SARS outbreak, reports pointed to the need for Canada to have clear leadership and coordination in public health. The Public Health Agency of Canada and the Chief Public Health Officer position, which I have the privilege to hold, have helped to fill this role, to lead on the public health issues at the federal level and to work to protect the health of Canadians.
In a public health emergency, the PHAC will support other levels of governments and help emergency responders to act quickly and effectively. In simple terms, the agency becomes involved in a human health emergency when the problem has the potential to affect more than one province or when a provincial or territorial government requests our assistance.
The Chief Public Health Officer has a unique role, in that while I lead the agency as deputy and advise the Minister of Health, I am expected to communicate directly with Canadians about their health. As you can appreciate, this is rarely more important than in the midst of a health emergency. Canadians need to know what it is and what it means to be safe, what to do to stay safe and to know that their governments are taking action and what that action is.
I want to be clear that, while the agency leads on the human health aspects of emergency preparedness and response, it is a joint responsibility of the health portfolio and the role we play within the broader agenda of the Government of Canada. In particular, there is a close relationship by necessity between Health Canada and the PHAC in many areas of emergency preparedness as we work together to address these issues.
[Translation]
The exception here, as my colleagues will discuss, would be with a nuclear incident, in which case Health Canada would have the health portfolio lead.
[English]
In the bigger picture, emergency preparedness involves more than just human health and requires collaboration beyond the health portfolio. This is where Public Health Safety Canada plays the important coordinating role.
What brings all of us here today is this committee's study on Canada's nationwide readiness for natural and man- made disasters. The PHAC has made relevant progress in this area. I should like to keep my opening remarks short, in order to have time for questions. Activities like information surveillance tools, collaborations, quarantine measures, emergency response mechanisms and pandemic plans all contribute to that.
One point that I believe overarches all of the plans and tools that we have developed in recent years is the importance of communication, not only between and within governments but also with Canadians and other governments outside of Canada. As I have said, people need to know what is happening, what to do and what we are doing to address it. In this age, there are so many channels of information open to Canadians that we need to be sure that our voice can be heard and that what we have to say is valuable and credible, otherwise that void will be filled. At least in terms of human health, providing this information is a vital function that we play. This is why we develop and maintain crisis communications plans.
We are also building on international relationships to facilitate the sharing of information so that any implicated countries are on the same page. It is a small world and every country's actions, or inaction, and willingness to share information can and will affect others, especially in the case of infectious diseases that know no borders.
I will conclude with these remarks. I want to emphasize that, in my view, one of the biggest lessons of the SARS outbreak had to do with the importance of being clear on the roles and responsibilities before the emergency happens. Emergencies always will be full of surprises. The more we address it in advance, the better it will be so we can focus our energies on the surprises. If we wait until the crisis moment to find out who does what and who we need to call, it is already too late. The creation of various networks and relationships, the establishment of a few key tools and the work of the agency and others in health emergency management all mark true progress.
[Translation]
When my colleague has finished her presentation, I will be pleased to answer any questions you might have.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you. Ms. Giliberti, please proceed.
[Translation]
Carolina Giliberti, Assistant Deputy Minister, Health Canada: Mr. Chairman, it is my pleasure to be here tonight. As Dr. Butler-Jones indicated, the Public Health Agency is the lead for emergency and pandemic preparedness and response for the health portfolio.
Health Canada works closely with the Public Health Agency and provides direct service and assistance to our federal partners in the area of emergency preparedness and response.
With the exception of one key area, Health Canada works in a support role to the Public Health Agency for emergency preparedness and response activities. The one exception is in the area of a federal response to a nuclear incident.
[English]
In accordance with our responsibilities under the federal Emergency Management Act, Health Canada is responsible for the Government of Canada multi-agency plan — the federal Nuclear Emergency Plan. That is in place and ready to be implemented in response to a nuclear incident in Canada or abroad. The Public Health Agency provides medical advice and support to this plan, portions of which are exercised regularly and are maintained current.
Aside from this lead role, as mentioned earlier, Health Canada provides support to the Public Health Agency in its capacity as the health portfolio lead.
[Translation]
With your indulgence, I would like to provide a brief summary of these support activities, although I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have about the details.
Health Canada's First Nations and Inuit Health Branch supports the development of national and regional health emergency preparedness and pandemic influenza programming and assists on-reserve First Nations and Inuit communities outside of the territories to develop their community pandemic influenza plans.
The First Nations and Inuit Health Branch also provides technical and financial support for the development and testing of community pandemic plans.
[English]
In the event of a major chemical emergency, whether it is an accidental spill or a human-induced act, Health Canada provides subject-matter expertise, working in close collaboration with the Public Health Agency Canada, which services as the focal point for coordination of all response efforts.
The Public Health Agency of Canada and Health Canada have a collaborative approach to Canada's international leadership and activities on global public health security. We work together with our global partners such as the World Health Organization, the Pan American Health Organization and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, to name only a few.
[Translation]
Health Canada also participates in regulatory initiatives at both the domestic and international levels to ensure the availability of a vaccine should the human influenza pandemic arise.
In addition, Health Canada has the responsibility for post-market surveillance, risk management and risk communications for antiviral drugs, as well as other therapeutic health products or medical devices, that might come into increased use for treatment or prevention of a pandemic strain of influenza.
[English]
As you are aware, the Quarantine Act came into force in December 2006. While PHAC quarantines travellers suspected of having communicable diseases, Health Canada's Workplace Health and Safety program helps to protect the health and safety of the travelling public by implementing a range of activities pertaining to passenger conveyances such as aircraft, trains and ships to reduce the spread of disease. Health Canada employees inspect food, water and sanitary conditions on these conveyances and provide advice and information to Canadians and the travel industry.
[Translation]
As an employer, the Government of Canada has a responsibility to ensure the health and safety of their employees. The Workplace Health and Public Safety Programme in Health Canada, on behalf of the Government of Canada, assists federal government workplaces to help them protect the health and safety of their employees during emergencies, and ensures that federal workers can continue to provide services to the Canadian public during or following emergencies.
And, finally, the Workplace Health and Public Safety Programme has the responsibility to promote and contribute to the health and safety of visiting dignitaries and the travelling Canadian public.
[English]
In conclusion, I should like to assure you that emergency preparedness and response is taken very seriously at Health Canada and within the portfolio. We are pleased with the progress we have made to date. We will continue to support our colleagues in PHAC and we will continue to work collaboratively with our other federal partners to ensure an integrated, well-tested, ready response to health emergencies in Canada and abroad.
[Translation]
We have confidence in our current level of emergency preparedness and our ability to respond.
[English]
Thank you for this opportunity. I welcome your questions.
Senator Nancy Ruth: I would be interested in hearing more about the federal nuclear emergency plan. How does it work? What would have happened if Chalk River had, or if it does, exploded?
Ms. Giliberti: I have a copy of the nuclear plan here. We are always in a situation of responding with the community and the province. Chalk River has an emergency preparedness plan that they would put into operation; the province would also work with that plan. As well, the federal plan would come into effect. We also would work with Public Safety because it is the federal emergency preparedness plan that is the umbrella plan. Then the nuclear plan would come into effect as part of that in terms of how we would work with our federal partners and how we would respond when asked to do so by the community and the provinces.
Senator Nancy Ruth: I live in Toronto and have owned land in Pickering. It is an issue. If someone steels rods or something, what will happen?
Ms. Giliberti: The plant itself would have an emergency preparedness response that it would enact: Closing the plant, sealing the boundaries and putting into place the operation that is their security plan. Then the provincial plans would kick in.
Senator Nancy Ruth: Let us say some rods are missing or something has exploded. What actually happens? There are millions of people living in that area and surrounding areas. What would happen?
Ms. Giliberti: As I said, the nuclear plant would have an emergency plan that they would put in place.
Senator Nancy Ruth: Can you tell me what that is?
Ms. Giliberti: I can provide you that information, but I am certainly not an expert on that subject. We can ensure you get that information, however.
We react once we are asked to participate by the province and by the community. The nuclear plant would have their emergency system that would kick into place. The provincial plans would then kick in, and we would be asked to participate in terms of our federal assessments. We would provide assistance when requested to do so. It is not our jurisdiction, in that sense.
Senator Nancy Ruth: I understand that, but if I am living in Pickering, what will happen to me besides death?
Dr. Butler-Jones: Each municipality has a plan, depending on the issues — a plan that may include evacuation, security, advice to the public, et cetera. I used to do medicals on the workers at Pickering when it was being built a long time ago.
As Ms. Giliberti is describing, there is the plant issue, the municipal or local issue in terms of how that is handled and their emergency responses, and then the province and up. Depending on the level and the issues, it escalates to engage other levels of government.
Senator Nancy Ruth: I am a bit confused because my understanding was that the nuclear issue was in the sole jurisdiction of the federal authority. Yet, you say you will be responsive to municipalities, provinces and others acting.
Dr. Butler-Jones: The difference is between the regulatory issues in terms of nuclear plants and how they function and how municipalities respond to any emergency. For those in the vicinity of nuclear plants, that must be one of the issues that is a contingency, just like those on a river think about flooding, those on the ocean or near the B.C. coast or Ottawa think about earthquakes, et cetera. My understanding is that they all have emergency plans, based on the region and the situation, and that those plans were done collaboratively with the various levels of government.
Senator Nancy Ruth: Is it your job to supervise or evaluate those plans?
Ms. Giliberti: No, it is not. We participate in terms of our radiological surveillance networks. We do all kinds of assessments and provide tools to support the nuclear emergency management.
Senator Nancy Ruth: Can you give me an example of what type of tools you are talking about?
Ms. Giliberti: They would be planning tools in terms of providing them with assistance. It is really a public safety issue, as well. We would provide some assistance to them in terms of their plans, but it is certainly not the role of Health Canada to determine whether they have appropriate assessments or appropriate emergency preparedness plans. To the best of my knowledge, that is not the role of Health Canada.
Senator Nancy Ruth: Whose responsibility is it?
Sonja Heikkila, Director General, Office of Emergency Preparedness, Health Canada: It is under the National Critical Infrastructure Assurance Program. Regarding major pieces of infrastructure like nuclear plants, there is a process that is under way right now to ensure that we have identified the entire appropriate critical infrastructure and that they have plans in place to protect them from the theft of critical nuclear material, et cetera. These things all work under the federal emergency response plan that is under the guidance of Public Safety, and we feed into that on the health side.
Senator Nancy Ruth: How would such an explosion or theft of spent fuel rods impact your responsibilities to notify the international community, if at all?
Ms. Giliberti: It is certainly my understanding in reading the plan that we would be contacting our international partners if we felt there was a risk assessment that required notification to them. I am not by any means an expert in the nuclear emergency preparedness plan. If you would like further information, I would be more than happy to prepare it for you and get it to you, as would our people.
Dr. Butler-Jones: To a certain level, it relates to the International Health Regulations, IHRs, in terms of general provisions around bioterrorism — chemical, nuclear events, et cetera. If they are a risk, potentially, to other nations, then there would be some obligation. They have not been tested, but I think that is something we would want to look at further.
Senator Tkachuk: I want to turn to page 6 of your brief, Dr. Butler-Jones. You talked about the SARS outbreak and the lessons learned. You said that the ``outbreak had to do with the importance of being clear on roles and responsibilities before the emergency happens.''
Could you tell us what some of the issues were during the outbreak, and then tell us what you learned and how some of these problems have been fixed?
Dr. Butler-Jones: It took several commissions, so I will try to be brief.
The first issue is that it is all connected. You cannot think about hospitals in isolation from the community and you cannot think about clinical care in isolation from public health. The engagement in networking between institutions and public health in infection control is key.
Second, there is the issue of communications, both with the public and within the system. People observed during SARS that hospitals would get different directions, get a fax on a new direction at different times in the same day. It was not clear to people who was in charge, whom to listen to and what actually needed to be done as opposed to not be done.
The third is not just communications in terms of that kind of day-to-day activity, but also information sharing between jurisdictions. During the outbreak, one province actually announced a travel ban to Toronto. The province in question quickly withdrew the ban, but then, later on, the WHO did. Largely, it was a lack of communication and transparency about what the issue was and how it was being managed.
Also, some legal questions were raised about sharing this information — for example, with respect to patients we had positive tests on in one level of testing. Could those be shared with another jurisdiction in terms of talking with those people to see what the issues were?
We have now resolved most of that, first in terms of the recognition that it does not do anyone a favour. Second, in terms of clarifying roles and responsibilities — not just in a pandemic, say, of influenza but in other emerging infections or natural disasters — the planning has gone on not just in the health sector, which has been our focus, but in others as well. We now have draft information-sharing agreements among all the provinces and territories and us, as well as mutual aid agreements in draft, along with roles and responsibilities — at least a draft document. That has not been finalized yet but, should something happen tomorrow, we could refer to that in terms of who does what at what level in addressing these issues — either federal, provincial or regional activities, et cetera.
The other thing is the establishment of the agency and having a federal focal point for issues of public health, the primary focus being on the public's health. The act that established the agency, the Emergency Management Act, again, gives better clarity at the federal level, along with our own planning — the national Canadian pandemic influenza plan, the North American pandemic plan and the integration of that with our international colleagues, and so on. There are a range of things — I have only touched on a few of them — that have moved us a great deal along.
The other thing is thinking of what you need. For example, in the case of a pandemic, we have a contract with a domestic manufacturer of vaccine to produce enough vaccine for the whole population of Canada. Recognizing that it will take some time to produce the vaccine and get it into everyone's arms, we have hedged our bets a bit by having an antiviral stockpile that could treat anyone that becomes ill and seeks treatment during the early phases of a pandemic. Those are a couple of examples of the things that we have done.
Senator Tkachuk: What happens, for example, to a person who has SARS and is quarantined? Does the individual have a legal obligation to observe the quarantine or is it a voluntary effort?
Dr. Butler-Jones: I probably should have divided that question into what happens at borders. At entry points to Canada, the Quarantine Act applies. We work at the entry points to Canada in terms of who is allowed into Canada, and have the ability to either quarantine or isolate individuals or conveyances, for example — or even a building.
Once you get out of that setting and into the community, provincial public health acts apply. The acts vary from province to province, but if there is a public health order by the local medical officer on an individual either to seek treatment or to isolate him or herself, et cetera, that is a legal prescription. If the person does not do so, the medical officer can ask the police to apprehend the individual in question and take him or her to a medical facility. It depends on each act exactly how that is worded, but there are provincial acts that do that.
Senator Tkachuk: I have a question on international cooperation. With pandemics, it is always a problem of it being brought from somewhere else — or it could easily originate here, I suppose. What kind of agreements are there? Would they be governed by the United Nations or are there separate bilateral agreements that you have with other countries to share information?
With SARS, there were news reports that China was not cooperating very much. There was difficulty in determining the seriousness of the problem, how many people were infected, whether it was just a local problem or more widespread, and so on. What kind of agreements do we have, or is that an issue that we deal with? Tell me about that, please.
Dr. Butler-Jones: The international health regulations put responsibilities on governments to not send infected people to other places and to share appropriate information to deal with the issue. In addition to that, we operate GPHIN, the Global Public Health Intelligence Network. We maintain this program on behalf of the WHO, and the world really. It is constantly searching the Internet, looking for potential outbreaks of infection, bioterrorism or whatever, in multiple languages.
In retrospect, in an early version of this program, before it was really up and running, we think we detected SARS several months before it actually broke out of China. That, combined with the IHRs, now allows us — because we do this all the time — to inform the WHO that something is going on so, that they can engage the country.
The last word I had is about 40 per cent of the notifications to the WHO actually come from our system and not from the country that is affected. Again, that is something new that allows the potential to address an infectious disease problem or outbreak when it is in the tens and hundreds rather than the thousands and tens of thousands. That puts us in a good place.
The other thing is that I have been very intentional in terms of relations with my colleagues around the world. Since SARS, there is now an organization called the International Association of National Public Health Institutes. It is the head of the CDC-type organizations around the world.
That association serves two purposes: One is to build a network beyond the official channels through the WHO, et cetera, so that we can communicate directly to address issues. I now have contacts around the world I can call directly to ask what is really going on.
The second purpose of it, for which the Gates Foundation provides funding, is to support developing countries' development of their capacity and a link between developed and developing countries so they can improve their own public health capacity. As we know, the more we can do to stop it before it leaves a country, the better off Canadians and others are.
That is why we are engaged in a number of countries, working on a number of levels, in addition to that kind of work. That helps to protect Canadians, in our view, and is a good thing to do.
The Chair: Just a few points that have come up in the responses. The first concerns entry into Canada. Do you have an effective way of dealing with sick people who enter Canada?
Dr. Butler-Jones: We have the Quarantine Act, which puts the onus on people operating conveyances to notify where they are arriving. The Canada Border Services Agency would then contact one of our quarantine officers to make an assessment as to whether that person could continue.
The Chair: Tell me how the carrier would know.
Dr. Butler-Jones: The carrier would know when someone is actively ill. For example, when someone on an airplane is desperately ill and coughing all over the place, a person from the airline would call for advice as to whether the case was an issue.
The Chair: Would they call from the airplane?
Dr. Butler-Jones: Yes, that is advance notification.
The Chair: I do not think that will happen, doctor.
Dr. Butler-Jones: It does happen, actually.
The Chair: I do not think it does. There was a system set up by the federal government that measured people's temperature arriving at customs areas. It was a useless system.
Dr. Butler-Jones: That was useless, absolutely.
The Chair: I do not think you have a clue as to who is coming in at our borders at any given time.
Dr. Butler-Jones: We have a system in place, but that does not mean it captures everyone. The best system is a combination of those kinds of provisions, to the extent that you can identify them in advance. The reality is that people can arrive in this country from any point in the world within the incubation period from the time that they are exposed until they get sick. They can arrive perfectly well and then get sick later. The temperature scanners serve no purpose anywhere in the world in terms of protecting or diagnosing patients with SARS. You need that provision in place at your borders, so if it is obvious and it gets picked up, then you have a means to deal with it. In the work that the provinces and territories do with their physicians, one of the questions to ask is whether the person has travelled out of the country. I used to be a chief medical officer and a regional medical officer. It used to be that a doctor would call talk about a patient with a problem and I had to ask whether the patient had been travelling outside of the country. In this post-SARS era, that has become a standard question for doctors to ask. The most effective thing since SARS has been the information given to travellers that tells them what they need to do if they become ill.
You are right in that there is no system that will capture everyone at the point of entry, but we need to have the systems in place to assess those that we can.
The Chair: How many provincial acts have mandatory quarantines?
Dr. Butler-Jones: We do not use the term «quarantine» generally. I am not sure what you mean by «mandatory.»
The Chair: If it is mandatory, you can force someone to stay in their house or to seek medical attention.
Dr. Butler-Jones: I think all of them do at this point.
The Chair: What provisions are in place to protect the police who have to enforce it?
Dr. Butler-Jones: These are provincial acts, not federal acts.
The Chair: I understand.
Dr. Butler-Jones: Protect the police in what context?
The Chair: Taking the SARS example, all of the fatalities were physicians or other people who worked in hospitals. They were people who came in contact with people with SARS. If you are sending a police officer out to enforce a quarantine, or whatever you want to call it, what provisions are in place to protect that police officer from contracting the disease?
Dr. Butler-Jones: The provisions are the same as those appropriate to other diseases that we have them deal with. It is a risk assessment based on the disease. Those in hospital that were affected had high exposure. In retrospect, exposed police officers were told to stay home; the risk was minimal at the time.
However, for other diseases, that is not the case. If the situation involves someone with active TB who is coughing all over the place, you will put them in an ambulance and ensure that the ambulance staff wear masks in that confined place. It is a matter of risk assessment at the time. When I was a local medical officer, we would work with the police and first responders to work out the appropriate precautions to take when dealing with such a situation. It would be based on the disease or the issue that you are facing.
The Chair: What do you do with someone who is not cooperative?
Dr. Butler-Jones: Again, you assess the situation. Fortunately, there have been relatively few of those. The police will apprehend them as they apprehend anyone else. If it becomes necessary to wear a mask or gloves in the process of doing so, then that is part of what they do at the time. It depends on the assessment of the risk of the individual to others and whether it is necessary to involve the police. More often than not we do not need to involve the police because people by and large are cooperative.
The Chair: They might get hungry and decide to pop out to pick up something to eat.
Dr. Butler-Jones: Again, in the local planning around a pandemic, one of the things is how you engage local volunteer organizations, for example, to deliver food, et cetera. You do not need to have direct contact with people. Even in a pandemic, taking something to the door and leaving it for someone will not create any greater risk for that individual than going to Wal-Mart.
The Chair: I am hearing from you about a system that sounds like it all works. Yet, when I looked at SARS and followed it very closely, I found that people were writing the rules as they went along. They were going back to protocols that existed in 1948 and saying, ``Well, goodness, perhaps these seem to apply.'' In fact, it was done on the fly. I must say you are making it sound like everything will be terrific the next time we see such a problem, but I think you still will be doing things on the fly.
Dr. Butler-Jones: There is no question in my mind that, no matter what we face, there will be surprises and things that we need to figure out at the time. The difference between pre-SARS and post-SARS is the lessons learned that have involved people in the debates and discussions on what to do and what not to do. Isolating people in their homes might not be effective, and probably was not effective in terms of SARS. However, at the time, because they were not sure what they were dealing with, it was the most sensible thing to do. In Singapore, they gave guidelines to school principals and employers on what to do in the event. They were advised to send the person home and call the local health authority to follow up by phone. You do not need to quarantine in the sense of issuing an order on a person. There has been tremendous debate and discussion about what worked and the importance of ensuring that the communication lines are open so that we do not repeat SARS. To say that everything will work perfectly, especially when dealing with a pandemic that affects the world, is just not so. The focus of our efforts in terms of the planning is to minimize any of those impacts. Any disaster or emergency will be a messy thing, but the idea is to mitigate the effects of the mess as much as possible. That is the focus of our efforts, whether in training, planning or exercising the plans to find out where the gaps are. We want to ensure that the communication lines are open and that we do not trip over each other, which was one of the problems in SARS in terms of jurisdictional roles and responsibilities.
Senator Banks: I am sure you have heard the old gag familiar to Alberta farmers: The most terrifying words in the world are, ``Hello. I am here from the government and I am here to help you.'' One line that is even more terrifying was said by Ms. Giliberti this evening: ``The Public Health Agency and Health Canada have a collaborative approach to Canada ...'' That strikes terror into our hearts.
You may have answered the question, Dr. Butler-Jones, when you said there is a draft list in place of who does what and when. Could you send that to us, please? Essentially, that is the answer to all the questions that we have been asking for many years now on this issue: Who is in charge in this given circumstance? Did I understand that there is a draft list that answers that question?
Dr. Butler-Jones: There are two MOUs approved in principle by the ministers of health across the country, one on mutual aid and the other on information sharing in public health emergencies. We have a third one that is a draft document on the roles and responsibilities in public health emergencies. Although it has not been approved by the minister yet, there is no problem sharing it with you.
Senator Banks: Could you make a draft and send it to us?
Dr. Butler-Jones: If something happened tomorrow, all that thought has been put into it, whether the ministers have approved it or not. In a crisis, ministers would approve it quickly.
The other documents, both in terms of the collaborative arrangement and my role versus Deputy Minister Rosenberg's role, we have a number of things to help outline that, as well as the national plan that outlines the various aspects. Additionally, there are the annexes in terms of dealing with various aspects of a pandemic but also applicable to other emerging diseases and events.
When I am talking to municipalities and others, sometimes it seems overwhelming when people try to think about pandemics. The reality is that much of it is part of either their business continuity planning or their emergency planning with the addendums appropriate to an infectious disease. Unlike a natural disaster, which happens, goes away and then you recover, a pandemic can go on for weeks, go away and then come back again. It is about thinking through those exceptional issues that relate specifically to any emerging disease. It is building on the existing planning and capacity; it is not really strange, or it should not seem strange.
Even in the great pandemic of 1918-19, which was probably the worst pandemic in human history in terms of influenza, for specific reasons — and the two since were nothing like that. Having said that, it will be messy and a challenge for us to address, regardless of what it is. The point being, even in that pandemic of 1918-19, 70 per cent of the population never got sick at all. Of those who got sick, 1 per cent to 2 per cent did die — which was a terrible thing — but it was not like Armageddon or a Robin Cook novel. That was the worst pandemic in human history, in terms of a short period of time. The plague killed more people in the Middle Ages, but that was over decades. The same is true with the HIV pandemic, which has been occurring over decades and has been devastating.
Again, do not lose sight. What bothers me is that we have gone from the we-are-all-going-to-die hype to suddenly wondering what we were worried about. We need to sustain the interests and momentum around doing the planning so that we are not surprised and able to respond.
Senator Banks: Can and will you send us that draft?
Dr. Butler-Jones: I will. I apologize if I was not clear.
Senator Banks: I wanted to have a «yes» on the record. Thank you very much.
When we began looking at these questions several years ago, we heard from witnesses that things were in wonderful shape all over the country, particularly with respect to the National Emergency Stockpile System, NESS. We were assured that it was terrific, omnipresent and that it was going to come in handy when some untoward thing happened.
Then we went to have a look at it/them in various parts of the country and found that no one knew where they were, how to get into them or who had the key. When we finally did have a look, we found that much of the stuff in there was rotten, old and out of date.
I believe there was a review conducted by your agency in December 2006 of those national emergency stockpiles in various parts of the country. What would we find if we looked at them now? There are two parts to the question: Would the local responders to whom they would be the most use know either where they are or how to get at them; and second, are they in good shape and now contain useful supplies?
Dr. Butler-Jones: In terms of the first part of the question, local responders would not necessarily know where they are.
Senator Banks: Should they not know that?
Dr. Butler-Jones: I would argue that they should not. You may disagree. It is not local responders who decide when to implement or use it. It is up to the provincial emergency people. We provide it based on a request from the provincial emergency people. The escalation is that if you cannot do it locally, you manage it provincially. If you cannot manage provincially, then you engage us federally. They are across the country.
Some may know, but the point is that they need to know to talk with the emergency coordinator, who talks with the province, and things get there quickly.
Senator Banks: I was talking about emergency coordinators who did not know where they were.
Dr. Butler-Jones: They all know who their points of contact are, or should know now. However, they would not necessarily know exactly where the stockpiles are. They should know by now, through their emergency contacts, who to ask. It is not coming to us. If they do not know, that is a question we would have to ask provincial and regional coordinators, to ensure they do.
Senator Banks: What is in them now?
Dr. Butler-Jones: We are starting to update them. We got rid of some of the non-essential stuff. That is going to be an ongoing process. It also required a re-evaluation of what is needed today, as opposed to 10, 15 or 20 years ago. We do not need to duplicate many of the capacities that the provinces have now built up.
For example, by the end of this fiscal year, the combined antiviral stockpile that we cost-shared with and that is in the hands of the provinces and territories contains about 55 million doses. We will have another 12 million doses that we have control over as a backup to the rest of the system. Ten or 15 years ago, we would not have thought of having antivirals or masks or other things that we are starting to maintain in the NESS.
Senator Banks: If you had to describe as concisely as possible to someone what kind of things, materiel, supplies, antivirals, et cetera, exist in the NESS that are across the country, what is there?
Dr. Butler-Jones: There are field hospital-type equipment, beds, shelters, water purification systems, medications, antivirals, et cetera. There is quite a range. We would be happy to provide you with a list.
Senator Banks: That would be helpful.
How close are you to being confident that those things that are deemed now to be currently necessary are in all of those stockpiles across the country?
Dr. Butler-Jones: They will not be in all of them. There are regional, larger stocks as well as local stocks. In terms of the framework of that, without giving specific addresses, we would be happy to provide you with something to give you a better picture of how things are distributed across the country.
Senator Banks: Thank you very much. That would be helpful.
The Chair: What participation do local municipalities have in determining what might be in the stockpile near them?
Dr. Butler-Jones: We consult with the provincial coordinators, who I am presuming are consulting, we encourage them to consult and engage with the local municipalities in terms of what is most useful. It will depend. In northern Saskatchewan, shelter is still a big thing. Almost every year, they make use of our shelters related to forest fires.
The Chair: What provisions are there to ensure that there is no duplication, that a municipality is not creating its own, unnecessary stockpile because you have a stockpile 10 miles away that the municipality could use?
Dr. Butler-Jones: We consult with the provincial coordinators. I know they are in contact with the municipal emergency coordinators. Having said that, we have enough antiviral medication to treat anyone who wants treatment. Not everyone will get sick and not everyone will want an antiviral. We are not sure how long the antiviral medication will work, if they will work at all. The Toronto Hospital, against the advice of the province, has purchased additional antiviral — which is perfectly their rights. Hence, there will be some duplication with or without the advice of the municipalities.
Dr. Howard Njoo, Director General, Centre for Communicable Diseases and Infection Control, Public Health Agency of Canada: We support a federal, provincial and territorial network, the Council of Health Emergency Management Directors. They are designated contacts for each province and territory. We meet regularly with those people to discuss common guidelines, protocols and approaches in terms of what should be in specific stockpiles within the province and what they would be considered appropriate for our NESS.
The Chair: That does not solve the problem of the municipality going out and effectively wasting money by duplicating what is in your stockpile as a result of not knowing what is in your NESS.
Dr. Butler-Jones: That is why there would be a conversation with the province — because the province knows. Presumably, if the communication between the municipal emergency coordinators and the provincial coordinator is good, they should be in regular contact. I most recently worked in Saskatchewan, and they were constantly in contact with each other.
I am not sure about all jurisdictions, but that would be an expectation. We will not jump over the province to have independent conversations with municipalities without provincial engagement, because they are the ones responsible.
Senator Zimmer: Thank you for your presentation. I want to follow up on the line of questions Senator Kenny and Senator Banks asked you.
Ms. Giliberti, on page 4, you say that, ``While the Public Health Agency quarantines travellers suspected of having communicable diseases...to reduce...''
It was somewhat answered, but it is quite subjective in those terms, if travellers and even immigrants come into this country with viruses. I do not want to cause a public panic, but doctors have said they have no idea what is out there, where it is coming from or how to treat it. That is not very comforting.
My question is this: If there are no visible signs of coughing or things like that, how do you choose people that may have viruses? Is there any way of knowing what they might have?o
Dr. Butler-Jones: No, there is no way of knowing for people coming into the country, nor is there for people already in the country who grew up here. I may be incubating a virus that will render me sick tomorrow. For example, with influenza, I could have no symptoms today. I rub my nose, shake his hand, he rubs his nose, I am sick tomorrow and he is sick the next day. We are limited to what we know and what is reasonable.
It changes if you have something like SARS, in which case you may bring about different protocols for different regions or you may expect immunization. For example, with respect to travel, there are some countries that you cannot go into without demonstrating that you have had a yellow fever vaccine. Those are the exceptions. A third of us get food poisoning every year, mostly from the way we handle food in our own homes.
Infectious diseases are common. Nasties are rare and difficult to detect, unless you have obvious symptoms.
Senator Zimmer: I want to talk about the Canadian Pandemic Influenza Plan for the health sector. Has this plan been subject to exercises involving all orders of government as well as international partners? Does this plan work in conjunction with the North American Plan for Avian and Pandemic Influenza?
Dr. Butler-Jones: It does work in conjunction with the North American plan. Canada was in a fortunate position. We were actually first out of the gate of any country to have a national plan. Other countries have either copied ours or learned from it. There is a lot of concordance between our own plan and that of many other countries. Certainly, we are actively involved in the development of the North American plan. It is quite consistent and coherent.
There have been a number of levels of testing of it, and there are plans for additional testing of different aspects of it over the next years. It is an ongoing plan.
Also, with respect to the pandemic plan — there are commonalities among different diseases. For example, when we had the triple play with the British and the Americans, where there is a large exercise around a bioterrorist event, many of the same issues that we would face with the introduction of a new influenza virus, for example, we had to deal with through that exercise. The learning from that around communications and capacity in different countries, et cetera, helped towards that.
Even if it is not labelled influenza, which many of our exercises are, there are things that are useful to us in that as well.
Senator Zimmer: H5N1 bird flu virus — it almost sounds like a football play. My question is this: What is the agency's prediction on the likelihood that this virus will enter Canada? Could you tell us of any plan to counter this virus in the event it does enter the country?
Dr. Butler-Jones: There are two aspects to that, the human side and the animal side. While we have not seen the H5N1 Asian strain, we do have H5N1 North American strain in wild birds in North America, as well as a lot of other bird avian flu viruses. It is always out there. Most of them do not affect humans.
The thing about the Asian one is that it is very nasty in birds. It kills a high percentage of birds and flocks that are affected. Second, in a small percentage of people, it can also cause disease. If it does so, it is devastating.
While there have been hundreds of cases, between 30 and 50 per cent of those who get sick die. In humans, it is also nasty, but that is several hundred out of probably millions of exposures. It does not cross the bird-human barrier very easily.
At some point, could we see it in wild birds? That is probably inevitable, as we see more birds and with migration, et cetera. Similarly, when West Nile virus started in New York, eventually, over a period of years, virtually all birds east of the Rockies, a percentage of them, had been affected.
With respect to your question, we will probably see it, but, again, it is unpredictable. We have not seen it or detected it yet. On the animal health side, CFIA and others have plans in place in terms of dealing with domestic flocks.
On the human side and the prospect for a pandemic from H5N1, we have seen it now for a decade. It has shown an ability to infect a small percentage of humans. It may infect from person-to-person in conditions of high levels of exposure and virus and a similar genetic makeup, in terms of susceptibility or lack of resistance to deal with the virus.
At the same time, what worries me more is that we have seen outbreaks of an H7 virus in the U.K. that appears to have been easily transmitted from person-to-person. That virus was able to be contained by using antivirals and other measures, but we see those and we will continue to see them crop up.
With respect to the predictability of when we will have a pandemic, most people would say eventually we will have another pandemic of influenza, but who knows when. Nature is unpredictable.
How severe it will be is impossible to predict. Whether it will be H5 developing and spreading easily from person-to- person or one of these others like an H7 or some other strain of the virus, we do not know.
For example, we isolated a virus in a Canadian child that had components of pig, human and bird genes in it. This is a very challenging virus in terms of understanding what will happen. It is the same with the resistance we are seeing over the last couple of weeks, where about 10 per cent of some of the samples that we have been getting — we have also seen this in Europe — are resistant to Tamiflu, which is the most common antiviral available. The problem is that these people have not been exposed to Tamiflu, which is usually the context in which you see resistance develop. This particular virus has a gene that makes it resistant.
Where did it come from? How did that happen? Quite honestly, we do not know. We need to hedge our bets. That is why our pandemic planning is not just about any one strain of virus or influenza; rather, it involves thinking about all the possibilities, because if you put your eggs in one basket, you are almost certain to be fooled.
Senator Zimmer: How is it transmitted from bird to human?
Dr. Butler-Jones: There are different ways. If you have a flock, particularly in a henhouse or whatever, it is in the feces, it gets up into the air and you inhale it. Or in some of the cases in Asia, it is in the blood and it is not cooked — in other words, through eating raw poultry products. Close contact with birds is another example. However, lots of people are potentially exposed, but a relatively small number actually get sick. We do not know all the factors.
It is the same with SARS. That virus was floating around in animals. Either from eating it or being in the market where the animals were sick and someone who had the genetic susceptibility became sick and spread it to someone else. Eventually, we had one case that spread it very easily, for whatever reason, whether because they were shedding a lot of virus, but it infected six or seven people who then travelled around the world. Those were unique circumstances.
Most viruses are species specific. In other words, there are many influenza viruses that we cannot give to a pig or a bird. Others we can, and vice versa. It is an interesting virus, to say the least.
Senator Zimmer: Given the importance of intelligence and detecting and preventing and responding to a crisis situation, how, when and under what circumstances is PHAC consulted by CSIS and the RCMP and other agencies of Canada's intelligence community? Do the employees of PHAC have the required security clearances to enable them to share fully in the intelligence collected by CSIS and others?
Dr. Butler-Jones: Certainly, we are well connected. We have an individual who works directly with the security people and shares the health information with them and vice versa as it applies. As needed, I get regular briefings as to different things relating to the things we are interested in. We are also a major contributor to that because of the Global Public Health Intelligence Network — GPHIN — and our ability to pick up potential diseases in other countries to the broader security community and the risk of pandemics, et cetera. The theoretical risk of different agents being used in a bioterrorist way is something we are very much involved with, along with our colleagues. They obviously have the lead, but we have the health interest and expertise.
Senator Mitchell: Dr. Butler-Jones, I must say that, although your agency is relatively young, it is quite evident that you have a great range, scope and grasp of what you are doing. That is reassuring in many ways. Given that the Public Health Agency is relatively new — just three and a half year's old — what is the state of its evolution? Do you have the people in place? Have you figured out what kind of organizational structure you need? Do you have all the liaison — you talked a bit about that — necessary with the other levels of government? How has it evolved to this point?
Dr. Butler-Jones: That is an interesting question, something I reflect on often, though I am not sure I have the fullest answer. Some people have described it as building the ship while sailing or, more frightening, the airplane while flying.
We have been focused on a number of areas. Given that we were born out of SARS, it was clearly a mandate that we need to get our act together. We have been tracking the recommendations from SARS and what we have ticked off as to actually meeting the recommendations that make sense.
The Chair: Regarding the recommendations, are you referring to the Naylor report?
Dr. Butler-Jones: Yes, the Naylor report, as well as the Senate committees and other recommendations. We have been making good progress on that. The other thing is the establishment of the Pan-Canadian Public Health Network, which is the FPT oversight to public health activities. I co-chair the council of the network, along with the Provincial Health Officer from B.C., Dr. Perry Kendall. Under that are all the various advisory committees, both expert as well as intergovernmental-type committees on public health. This council reports to the Conference of Deputy Ministers of Health, where I sit, and then on to the Conference of Ministers of Health. There is now a forum for bringing forward policy and other issues up through ministers, which did not exist — a lot of committees were not connected before — as well as to deal horizontally with issues of guidelines, expertise, et cetera.
In terms of the agency itself, in terms of structure, I have the view that structure follows function. This year, for us, is a bit of a consolidation year. Three and a half years in, we have a number of new resources and mandates since the beginning of the agency, as well as the existing ones, the expectations around SARS.
It is always a challenge because the expectations seem to climb much faster than the resources and capacities. This is not unique to us. Given that my observation is that we had 15 to 20 years of relative neglect in public health as we were focused on hospitals and waiting lists and budget overruns, it will take us some time, and there are absorptive capacity issues.
If you want to hire 20 trained medical officers in Canada, they do not exist. As we have, we need to work closely with the academic institutions and other levels of government around what the capacity should look like, not just in the agency but in the system. We try to look at what I describe as a web, trying to understand what is needed where so each is value added. Then, whatever the problem is in the country, we have a capacity to respond appropriately to the issue in the way that is needed, whether it is in P.E.I. or Toronto or wherever.
We have been intentional about how we develop. We now have a strategic plan. We are also doing a review of what we are doing, why we are doing it, what we need to do in the future and what changes we need to make. This is a good year to do that and to do some consolidation around it. There is always a need for more, but at the same time we are making progress. As long as we make progress from year to year, that is the key.
Senator Mitchell: It is key, but if you could wave the magic wand today, apart from finding more trained medical officers, are there specific structural organizational policy initiatives missing that you would like to have in place? That is to say, how would you assess the weaknesses in your organization at this point, and what are the risks?
Dr. Butler-Jones: We have done a risk analysis regarding the issues we are facing, where our strengths and weaknesses are and, therefore, where we need to focus from a corporate organization sense, some of which are within our control and some are not. We are targeting those.
One is the depth of the organization. I will give you a practical example. What we had were people acting both as managers, in terms of directors general, and experts, and the challenge of fulfilling both roles. Now we are broadening that base, which increases our capacity but also minimizes our risk. My position is a dual position of deputy and Chief Public Health Officer and has two headquarters. Now I have Jane Billings, who is functioning as my associate. Again, it has added tremendous capacity, as have others. We have been looking at our issues and strengths and where we need to balance that so that we can be effective not only in public health but also as a government organization.
Senator Mitchell: You mentioned you have a strategic plan. Is that something we could get a copy of?
Dr. Butler-Jones: Certainly.
Senator Mitchell: How do you budget for emergencies? Do you spend what you have to at the time and worry about it later, or is there a more precise process?
Dr. Butler-Jones: Governments generally are not very good at budgeting for emergencies. It tends to be something that we budget for in the preparations. Some of it we have — for example, the stockpile of antiviral medication, the contingency of having a domestic manufacturer of vaccine, which will be the ultimate solution to a pandemic. Those things you can budget, as well as stockpiling other things we may need, so there is a bit of a hedge there.
To actually budget for emergencies is, I think, pretty difficult. When we are talking about a national emergency such as a pandemic of influenza, there are other provisions that come into play far beyond a departmental organization like ours.
Senator Mitchell: You have answered a lot of this, or elements of this, but maybe I will give you a chance to summarize or add some things. What would you capture or characterize as the main challenges the agency faces today in delivering its mandate? Are there financial issues, coordination with levels of government issues, information- dissemination issues, legislation, regulation, anything that you have yet to overcome that you think is germane and critical?
Dr. Butler-Jones: Before I respond to that, I should reference something else. The government has, in the budget before last, set aside $400 million as contingency in the event of a problem. The government actually did set aside some money in the fiscal framework.
Senator Mitchell: Does that stay there in some sort of escrow?
Dr. Butler-Jones: Yes, I think it is per year.
As we do not see a crisis, then that will go out and the government will reconsider that. However, there is something in place. That is actually quite unique; I do not remember having seen that before — I should mention that.
In terms of the issues we are facing, a lot of it is the unpredictability. That is just the nature of public health. The other is we have to be, by its nature, a bit of binder twine. The things we deal with tend to be things that might happen, and there is not much credit in the system for things that did not happen, as opposed to responding to things that do, or the lineup at the door.
Sustaining the kind of interest in the upstream stuff — and we have talked a lot about the emergency preparedness side — if you think about the fact that more people die between pandemics from influenza than during pandemics of influenza. There are smaller numbers per year with many years in between. Many people do not think about the fact that their risk — if they get influenza this year — of dying is pretty much the same as if they get it during a pandemic, but a whole lot more people get it during a pandemic.
To stockpile antivirals but not to get your flu shot every year does not make a lot of sense to me. That is a generic thing about prevention. Whether it is health or other aspects of society, it is always a bit of a challenge to maintain the support, interest and resources outside of the crises.
SARS was a watershed because everyone stood back and said, oh, they were right. This stuff will bite you if you do not pay attention between crises.
It is a challenge in this system generally, and this is why we have been working on the whole health and human resources issues related to public health and health generally, also in working with the universities on what kind of training and skill sets are needed. Interestingly, there are a half dozen or more presidents of universities who have taken this on as an issue — and thinking through how we have capacity, skilled people in public health, in order to actually address the problems into the future. Therefore, getting people trained and appropriately supported affects not just us but the whole system.
Continuing to build on and demonstrating the resources needed, how they are well spent and well used and what they actually do to prevent problems in the future is important.
Finally, on the issue of human pathogens generally, the government is looking at other tools we need to manage that. There are many labs across the country. While we have provisions around pathogens — like bugs coming into the country — and you need a licence for that, there can be movement. We do not really know what sits there. That is a potential risk we are figuring out how best to address.
Senator Mitchell: It is not unlike a peacetime army — we do not have one of those now — that really has no way of knowing what kinds of crises it might face, but a good one has parameters upon which it can base its estimate of readiness.
In your particular capacity and in the work you do, it is very unique; it is a national agency in a federal state. How many of those are there in the world? It is a very new one.
Do you have specific parameters or a way of auditing to measure yourself and heighten your state of readiness or confidence in your state of readiness? Are you still in the development stages of this project?
Dr. Butler-Jones: In terms of our own state of readiness, we are constantly comparing ourselves with international peers, in terms of our planning, capacity, research, what areas we focus on, and so on. There is not any specific benchmark.
If you ask how many public health nurses we need in Canada, no one really knows. The way they function in different communities is very different; hence, the answer in different communities may be different. It may not be a public health nurse doing public health functions — they will be — but others may be doing that. It is very hard to pin down.
That is why we have focused and developed core competencies — so that governments, local health authorities and others can look at the competencies needed to address this — and get away from a public health inspector, which you need, and a public health nurse — the things you are trying to get at in the face of what you need as a medical officer of health. It is a challenging area.
I used to talk with the CEOs in the regions around two things. I will focus on physicians, but you can think about other public health professionals. Public health physicians are the only doctors who will save you money. Second, unlike surgeons, if they make a mistake, they do not kill them one at a time; they kill them by the hundreds. Hence, you really want a good public health physician. It is about the only specialty where you go back to school for another three or four years to come out with more responsibility, longer hours, be shot at in public and make considerably less money. You have to love it.
Senator Mitchell: With climate change occurring — and I think you alluded to the mosquito-borne virus that is moving northward — have you given any thought to potential outbreaks, pandemics, that could arise in Canada because of that kind of thing?
Dr. Butler-Jones: It is something we are always looking for. Whether West Nile, in its ability to persist in Canada, was a function of warming winters, we do not really know for sure. Certainly, we are seeing Dengue Fever expanding its range. The wildlife people would talk to you about the fact that the parasite load in muskox and others is changing. We do not know exactly all.
Certainly we saw the challenge in Paris a few years ago with seniors dying from heat stress, et cetera. It is something that we are taking very seriously. It is not just public health involved, but municipalities, et cetera.
Oddly enough, where we are sitting now was a malaria area 150 years ago. We wiped that out. Could that come back and sustain itself? Who knows? We need to be constantly looking and thinking about the various factors that promote or take away from the ability of them to survive.
Form year to year, it is hard to tell, but certainly this year West Nile on the Prairies started almost a month earlier than we would normally expect. This was the worst year ever on the Prairies. Part of the reason was a mild winter, which allows over-wintering of mosquitoes. It is a complex area that requires not only public health folks, but entomologists, biologists, municipal people and so on.
West Nile is an example of how the different sectors came together to try to minimize the risk, educate the public and respond to problems as they arose.
The Chair: A robust public health system seems, to the committee, to be a no-brainer, but we do not often see a business case being put forward for it. Is there a reason for that?
Dr. Butler-Jones: A business case in what sense, senator?
The Chair: If you want to make a small investment at the front end you will save a whole lot of money in the long run.
Dr. Butler-Jones: They may not appear, but they are done. Some of it is hard to predict, but often it is not the same level of interest.
I have some PhD students working on scenarios, and one of them talked about what Canada would look like if it had not been for the polio vaccine. Not just looking down the road, but we would not be worried about hip and knee replacements because all the orthopaedic surgeons would be dealing with polio victims. The costs are enormous. There is a fair amount of work that looks at the alternate costs. If the Senate committee has any ideas of what will help it resonate, then we would be pleased to hear them.
The Chair: That is sort of the point. If you look at smoking and smoking prevention plans, clearly you can demonstrate a cost benefit. You can come up with a business plan that says, if you want to invest this much, we can show you where you will save the money.
My question is: Why does it not have traction?
Dr. Butler-Jones: It is episodic. It goes back to an ounce of prevention, a stitch in time — or Mr. Goodwrench's, ``Pay me now or pay me later.'' At the same time, we tend to respond to the new and the reactionary.
In my view, we are in a better position now having the agency in place and having these kinds of discussions. People will make their decisions accordingly.
For example, British Columbia did an analysis — if health and education continue on the same trend, in 10 years there will be almost no money for any other department, based on the nature of potential tax revenues. They now have a minister of state for ActNow BC, which is a program around physical activity and nutrition. That minister is engaged with his colleagues to ensure that transportation and others are thinking about the impacts on physical activity and nutrition of their policy decisions.
Ultimately, I think it is returning to what we think is the government's role in the public good and what we can or cannot effectively do. Then, it is a matter of governments setting their priorities — this being one that I am interested in.
Senator Mitchell: Could you make a public health business case for gun control? How many people have to get sick before it is an epidemic?
Dr. Butler-Jones: That is not my particular area of expertise. I will leave it at that.
Senator Moore: Dr. Butler-Jones, you referred to GPHIN? What is that?
Dr. Butler-Jones: That is the Global Public Health Intelligence Network, which is the surveillance system we operate internationally.
Senator Moore: Who are GPHIN's members?
Dr. Butler-Jones: Our staff runs it.
Senator Moore: This is within your own agency?
Dr. Butler-Jones: Yes, and we provide information to the WHO and other countries based on our analysis.
Senator Moore: You referring earlier to finding out that something is going on in another country and then we alert ourselves and make readiness plans. How do you find that out?
Dr. Butler-Jones: GPHIN is constantly scanning the Internet. It will pick up reports from local media, et cetera — for example, that there are 37 people in hospital who are coughing and bleeding.
Senator Moore: Is this in some other country?
Dr. Butler-Jones: Yes. Let us imagine that the report is in Chinese. It is translated and we pick up the key words about blood and coughing. We may decide that that story is a legitimate issue. We would then contact the WHO and let them know that we have this possible clue of something happening. They would then talk to the relevant country to follow up. If it is a country with which we have a direct relationship, we might call them up at the same time and ask them if they know such and such is going on. They may not. We often pick up some things before the country does.
Senator Moore: You are picking these items up in news releases day to day?
Dr. Butler-Jones: Yes, new releases or just stories in the media. For example, a local paper in Guangzhou province of China may print something about which the public health authorities may not know anything. We have seen things spread quickly in the media. This is a way of picking up stuff sooner and then they are able to respond.
Dr. Njoo: The reason we use news sources is that health events, first and foremost, are human interest stories. Talking about the small village in China that Dr. Butler-Jones referred to, it may be unusual, but if 50 per cent of the students in a high school became ill with a mysterious illness, even though local health authorities may not be aware, the local health reporter may have it appear in a news story.
Dr. Butler-Jones: Sometimes it amounts to something and something not. We had a report that was translated into black smallpox. We have not seen smallpox in almost 40 years. It turned out to be a local term for a common disease, but we picked that up, which allowed the country to investigate.
Senator Moore: Where did you pick it up?
Dr. Butler-Jones: Again, it would be a story that we pick up.
Senator Moore: Do have you an employee who is reading all the newspapers? How is it done?
Dr. Butler-Jones: We have a search engine that is triggered by key words. Analysts look at the results and make decisions about whether something is worrisome or not. It is the analyzed data we share, not the raw data.
Senator Moore: I understand.
During the SARS outbreak, I was sitting at home in Nova Scotia watching reports on television. A World Health Organization spokesman issued a warning telling people not to travel to Toronto. That warning put the whole country, perhaps, in a bad light by saying that it is unsafe to go there. It takes a long time for that to disappear afterward.
What is the role of the WHO and what is their authority for doing what they did? What is their source of information?
Dr. Butler-Jones: For example, we issue travel advisories to different countries for different purposes. Many other countries, particularly developed countries, do so as well. The WHO will issue travel advisories based on certain health matters.
At the time, they were not receiving the information to reassure them that Canada had its act together. There were potential cases that looked like SARS spreading from Canada to other countries. They made the decision to issue an advisory at that time. However, because it was an advisory on a developed country city, it was big news. That does not happen very often.
Senator Moore: Where did they get that information? To whom did they speak in Canada?
Senator Tkachuk: Mel Lastman.
Senator Moore: Would they have phoned the public health agency in Toronto or the Government of Ontario? Where did they get the information that substantiated, in their mind, a situation deserving an international alert?
Dr. Butler-Jones: They were talking to the federal government and to other governments that were reporting potential cases having arrived from Canada. That is in the past and studies have looked at that in depth. The point is that now we have a very close working relationship with the WHO. In fact, one of my former deputy chief public health officers is now in Geneva to work with the WHO on infection diseases — bringing the collaboration even closer, so there are no misunderstandings about information.
Senator Moore: Would that travel advisory not happen today?
Dr. Butler-Jones: It should not happen today because the decision was based on partial information and we would have better information now that would guide them to a different decision.
Senator Moore: I found it to be alarming.
Dr. Butler-Jones: People were already not coming to Toronto. For me, at the time, it was odd. Conferences were being cancelled, et cetera. We knew it was an issue within the hospitals that were affected, but in the general population it was not an issue. In fact, Toronto was probably one of the safest places in the world to visit because people were washing their hands like crazy. If they were sick, they stayed home and avoided other people. The usual things that we catch — colds, pneumonia, et cetera — would be much less. Yet, you could get into any show you wanted without any trouble whatsoever. That would be a great time to have a conference in Toronto. Even the Premier of Prince Edward Island at the time said that their shellfish market was devastated. People were cancelling events in Banff. It shows the fear of contagion and its impact, and how we mange communications.
Senator Moore: That is why I was asking about the authorization for someone to say something that could be so disruptive commercially.
Dr. Butler-Jones: We have an agreement that they will have a conversation with us prior to any such decision, as well as the impact of the IHRs.
If you have not met her already, Elaine Chatigny is really considered one of the experts in risk communications. She consults with the WHO, the Americans and others. We have some of the best in the world right here in Canada. I am anticipating we will not make the same mistakes twice.
Senator Moore: Senator Mitchell touched on something. How many cases does it take to put a situation on an epidemic footing? Is it 100? Is it 50? I am thinking about last year. In my province, we had a great many outbreaks of mumps. Would you have been alerted to that and involved in that?
Dr. Butler-Jones: Yes.
Senator Moore: What numbers would trigger your involvement?
Dr. Butler-Jones: To be technical, an epidemic is one more than you expect. Therefore, one case of smallpox is technically an epidemic. Generally, it is when things are more than you would expect, or you are challenged — you hear people talking about clusters, which is like a mini-epidemic, and then it gets bigger. There is not an absolute number. Is it a lot more than you would expect? Then it is an epidemic.
Senator Morin: Is it more than one location?
Dr. Butler-Jones: Yes, all that influences it. It is a bit of a judgment call. A pandemic is a worldwide epidemic.
In terms of the mumps, we were in close conversation with the province. Theresa Tam, who is here, was with the vaccine and respiratory group previously and is now DG for emergency preparedness. She and her team would be in regular contact with them.
In terms of when we get involved, there are several ways. First, we may read something that causes us to call Alberta and ask them what is really going on and whether there would like some help.
Senator Moore: Who do you speak with in that example?
Dr. Butler-Jones: It depends. Usually, it will be the chief medical officer for the province. It might be the deputy minister or someone with responsibility in a particular area, depending on the issue. Both the public health network, as a formal network, and our informal networks are key to being able to respond quickly in supporting the provinces in their role as appropriate and as they feel need.
The level of need is different in different provinces, depending on their capacity. That is something that is an ongoing dialogue because it is, in part, art as well as science. Do you move now or later to do an immunization program in universities, for example? There is no absolute answer.
Second dose is a recommendation of the National Advisory Committee on Immunization, but at what point do you intervene to try to minimize an outbreak? It is a bit of a judgment call and is something that, with experience, we get better and better at.
Senator Zimmer: I have a question about bioterrorism. It has been described as a poor man's bomb because of the availability of caustic agents in nature and the relative ease with which they can be delivered.
I am sure you know Dr. Frank Plummer in Winnipeg; we are proud of our lab there. Is the Public Health Agency of Canada an active participant in emergency preparedness and bioterrorism-related exercises run by all levels of governments? If so, what is your extent of participation?
Dr. Butler-Jones: The answer is yes. The lab is part of the agency. As well as being DG of the agency, Dr. Plummer is also my chief science adviser.
We are actively involved. Obviously, in terms of the military, they have their expertise and they do that. However, we work very closely with them. On exercises, I talked earlier about triple play — if there were a bioterrorism event that involved different levels of government in addition to the three national governments. Again, we are very much involved in that exercise and others.
Staff from the lab, in terms of advice internationally or work with the Global Security Action Group, GSAG, we are active with them as well. We are on the biological side; Health Canada is on the nuclear and chemical side. Again, we are in conversation because there are obviously issues for us as well.
The Chair: I wish to thank the panel very much tonight. We overshot our time by 25 minutes but that was because we had a very interesting panel. We are grateful that you could share so much information with us.
Dr. Butler-Jones: Our pleasure any time, senator.
The Chair: We found it to be very worthwhile.
On behalf of the committee, I should like to thank you all very much.
The committee adjourned.