Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
Human Rights
Issue No. 7 - Evidence - June 1, 2016
OTTAWA, Wednesday, June 1, 2016
The Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights met this day at 11:35 a.m. to monitor issues relating to human rights and, inter alia, to review the machinery of government dealing with Canada's international and national human rights obligations (topic: available economic levers to enhance respect for human rights, including the Export and Import Permits Act).
Senator Jim Munson (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: Good morning, everybody. Welcome to the Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights. Welcome, viewers, to this committee and its work. We have been quite busy in the last few weeks dealing with issues ranging from North Korea to Syrian refugees, and many other issues that the committee finds important.
Today we're starting our first day of testimony dealing with "available economic levers to enhance respect for human rights, including the Export and Import Permits Act." This study is part of the committee's examination of Canada's international and national human rights obligations.
Before we get to our testimony and statements, we will have the senators introduce themselves, including our vice- chair.
Senator Ataullahjan: Salma Ataullahjan, from Toronto, Ontario.
Senator Nancy Ruth: Nancy Ruth, Ontario.
Senator Ngo: Thanh Hai Ngo, Ontario.
Senator Omidvar: Ratna Omidvar, from Toronto, Ontario.
The Chair: I am a senator from Ontario but my heart is in New Brunswick. That's where I'm from, but I do know where I live.
Today, the committee will hear from two panels. On our first panel, from Project Ploughshares we have Cesar Jaramillo, Executive Director; and Ken Epps, Policy Advisor. Later, we will introduce the two other witnesses who will be with us in the second hour.
Gentlemen, welcome to our committee. As I mentioned before, this is not an interrogation. This is a conversation and we'd like to learn and understand a lot more about the Export and Import Permits Act and how it works and doesn't work. Whoever is ready to start, please go ahead.
Cesar Jaramillo, Executive Director, Project Ploughshares: Thank you very much, senator. The title of my presentation is "The Saudi arms deal: A test case on the strength of Canada's military export controls."
Thank you very much for the kind invitation to address this committee. It is a much-valued opportunity for Project Ploughshares, and for me personally.
For 40 years, Project Ploughshares has worked with governments, churches and civil society in Canada and abroad to advance policies and actions that prevent war and armed violence and build sustainable peace. In this context, efforts to track arms exports and to strengthen export controls have been a key focus of our activities.
In my opening remarks, I would like to say a few words about the multi-billion dollar deal to sell Canadian-made armoured vehicles to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which is widely known to be one of the worst human rights violators in the world. It is the view of Project Ploughshares that the effectiveness of Canada's export control regime is contingent upon its ability to produce objective, reliable assessments related to export permit applications. In our expert assessment, the regime's integrity has been compromised with the decision to proceed with this deal.
In this regard, I would like to highlight five basic facts about this controversial contract.
First, the deal is, by far, the largest military export contract in Canadian history. The contract, valued at $14.8 billion, was awarded during the 2013-14 fiscal year. With the value of all military export contracts for that period adding up to $15.5 billion, the Saudi deal alone accounted for more than 95 per cent of military export controls for the fiscal year.
Second, Saudi Arabia is one of the worth human rights violators in the world. By any modern standard, Saudi Arabia is indeed a human rights pariah. According to Washington-based Freedom House, the country is among the worst of the worst human rights offenders in the world. Year after year, authoritative organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch condemn the consistent, systematic repression of the Saudi civilian population by the governing regime.
Beheadings are routine. Posting online comments critical of the regime can result in the author being publicly flogged. Women cannot drive and freedom of speech is severely censored. Freedom of association, freedom of the press and academic freedom are restricted. Hundreds of thousands of websites have been blocked. The state imposes harsh penalties — including beheadings — for crimes such as witchcraft, apostasy, sorcery and fornication.
Third, this is, in fact, an arms deal. While former Prime Minister Harper referred to the armoured vehicles that Canada is poised to ship to Saudi Arabia as transport vehicles, and current Prime Minister Trudeau has referred to them as Jeeps, the fact is that the Saudi contract is as subject to Canada's military export control policy as say a deal for Canadian-made bombs, missiles or high-caliber automatic weapons.
In practice, this means that a human rights assessment must be conducted before an export permit can be issued by Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs. And this is not a matter of opinion or interpretation.
Canada's military export controls specifically apply to "any article included in the Export Control List" as mandated by the Export and Import Permits Act. The armoured vehicles at the centre of the Saudi deal fall specifically under Group 2 of the Export Control List, which includes military goods and technology that Canada considers to be "specially designed or modified for military use."
Fourth, although the Minister of Foreign Affairs has stated that Canada "has no evidence" that Saudi Arabia has used Canadian-made goods against civilians and may reconsider the authorization of this deal should evidence emerge, the threshold established by Canadian export controls to assess the possibility of misuse is neither evidence nor certainty but reasonable risk. Given what is known about Saudi Arabia's abysmal and worsening human rights record, both within Saudi Arabia and in neighbouring Yemen, we consider this risk to be evident.
In fact, not only do authoritative organizations that track human rights internationally warn of a worsening human rights situation in Saudi Arabia, but Global Affairs Canada's own 2015 human rights report on the kingdom points to "a significant increase in the number of executions, restrictions on universal rights, such as freedom of expression, association and belief, lack of due process and fair trial rights."
Fifth, disturbing videos revealed by The Globe and Mail earlier this month which show armoured vehicles being used against Saudi civilians unequivocally establish reasonable risk of misuse in the future. It doesn't matter whether or not the vehicles in these particular videos were made in Canada. This documentary material solidly confirms the proclivity of the Saudi regime to use force and specifically armoured vehicles against civilians.
All possible red flags have now been raised. Reasonable risk has been established. Evidence has been presented.
We find it difficult to see how a state can claim to place a high value on the protection of human rights while providing arms to one of the most repressive regimes on earth. The implications of this complicated stand will become even more apparent when Canada joins the Arms Trade Treaty later this year and could also play a role in Canada's bid for a United Nations Security Council seat.
Thank you for your attention. I would very much welcome comments or questions related to these remarks.
Ken Epps, Policy Advisor, Project Ploughshares, as an individual: Mr. Chair, thank you for the opportunity to address the Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights. In my opening statement I would like to discuss key improvements to Canada's export controls that are needed before Canada can accede to the international Arms Trade Treaty. A core purpose of the ATT is to "reduce human suffering" and its important standards include conventional arms transfer obligations to protect human rights.
Past and present Canadian governments have claimed that Canada's export control standards are among the best in the world. While perhaps true when they were introduced in 1986, the claim is now out of date. Today several states, including the U.S. and most European states, have stronger arms export controls and practices than Canada in many important areas.
With the limited time available, I would like to discuss three areas, although there are several more, where improvements are needed not only for Canada to accede to the Arms Trade Treaty but also for Canada to regain its arms control leadership status. These areas are risk assessment, brokering and transparency.
The Canadian regulations and procedures currently used to "closely control" arms exports are insufficient under Arms Trade Treaty provisions. To begin, Canada must improve upon the current control guidelines to implement the legal obligations of Article 6 of the ATT, whereby Canada must abide by the UN Security Council arms embargoes by international humanitarian law and by other relevant agreements.
Under Article 7 of the treaty, Canada must develop risk assessment procedures that deny arms transfers if the procedures reveal there are substantial risks of human rights violations, of weapons diversion, or of terrorism, organized crime or breaches of international humanitarian law.
While current Canadian controls formally include risk assessment for human rights, as my colleague has mentioned, it is apparent from the government memorandum released in April 2016 on the decision to authorize $11 billion in export permits for armoured vehicles to Saudi Arabia that current procedures are inadequate. In the 13 pages of background material provided to the Minister of Foreign Affairs to assist with his decision, the word "risk" does not appear once.
There are no Canadian regulations to specifically control the activities of arms brokers; that is the parties that act as go-betweens in weapons transfers. Illicit arms brokering is universally recognized as a problematic source of the illegal and irresponsible arms trade that contributes to armed conflict and human rights violations.
Article 10 of the ATT requires states parties to regulate brokering. Additionally, the Inter-American Convention on Firearms, known by its Spanish acronym CIFTA, includes model regulations drafted with Canadian assistance in Montreal in 2003 to control firearms brokers. These call for inter alia the licensing of brokers and penalties for those who break brokering regulations. Canadian implementation of these obligations would move it closer to accession to the Arms Trade Treaty as well as to CIFTA and the UN Firearms Protocol, both of which are legally binding agreements that Canada has signed but not ratified.
The Export and Import Permits Act is vague on the timing of an annual report to Parliament on the operations under this act. The latest report is for 2013 and it offers little detail on military exports and contains nothing to assist a review of operations protecting human rights. In contrast, the ATT obligates states parties to report annually by May 31 on exports of all military equipment within the scope of the treaty for the previous year.
Currently, Canadian arms export transparency is limited to government submissions to the UN Register of Conventional Arms and via the "report on the export of military goods from Canada." To meet ATT reporting obligations and to help establish high international transparency and reporting standards, both reports need improvements in consistency and scope. For example, although the "report on the export of military goods" broke important transparency ground when it began in 1991, its standards have dropped not only against its earlier record but also against the standards of many other national reports. The once annual report is no longer annual or timely, and it now reports less useful data than it once did.
I would be pleased to respond to comments or questions on these remarks. Thank you for your attention.
The Chair: I thank you both for your remarks. We were joined in the midst of your remarks by Senator Hubley, so it's not all Ontario. She's from Prince Edward Island so we do have some balance.
The senator whose idea brought us here today to have this study is Senator Ngo. I will ask Senator Ngo to lead the discussion and questioning. We appreciate it very much. He has been very forceful in wanting this to come to the public domain. We will have a report sometime in the future, but what you're saying today is relevant and hopefully it too will be shared with the public.
We joked with Senator Ngo that since he knows so much about this that he will ask all the questions for the next two hours, but there are many senators on the list that will share the time.
Senator Ngo: Thank you for your presentations, Mr. Jaramillo and Mr. Epps. You mentioned the deal with Saudi Arabia, $15 billion and so on. This is a real concern to us.
However, when we asked Minister Dion, he affirmed that his government received all guarantees that the Saudi government does not use the LAV against human rights in the country.
The question I'm asking is: What kind of mechanisms are available to us in the Export and Import Permits Act to assess the human rights situation of countries that we do business with?
Also, how should we control the export guidelines against the possibility of misuse of exported goods by the foreign regime with a notorious record of abuse of human rights? I will continue if you have any other questions from other senators as well.
Mr. Jaramillo: Thank you very much, Senator Ngo. I will offer a couple of remarks, and then my colleague may wish to also offer his own thoughts.
In terms of the Minister of Foreign Affairs' assertion that he has received guarantees that Canadian armoured vehicles have not been used against civilians, we find what existing Canadian export controls call for is not a retroactive, rearview mirror assessment of whether or not they have been used but rather, looking forward, the reasonable risk that they might be. This is a completely different standard. To call for evidence instead of reasonable risk is really, in our expert opinion, a complete misreading of the standard, of the threshold that has been set by Canadian export policy.
Here's the difference: If you're looking for evidence after the vehicles have been shipped and when, arguably, the leverage of the exporting country has decreased because the vehicles are already there, it's really hard to see what can be done at that point, after the human rights violation has already occurred.
What the export control policy really calls for is an assessment of risk before the vehicles are even shipped to the recipient nation.
In terms of what tools are available, I will reiterate one which was included in my opening remarks. It is the Canadian government's own human rights assessment of the recipient nation, in this case, Saudi Arabia. The most recent one, dated 2015 and only released this year, points, in unambiguous terms, to an increase — not just a dire human rights situation but a worsening human rights situation — in the number of executions, arbitrary detentions, et cetera, virtually every category of human rights violations. The Saudi regime has proven to have a very abysmal track record in that regard.
When you take that, the government's own human rights assessment, and also consider other widely known information about the human rights situation in Saudi Arabia, we find it very hard to see how there can be no reasonable risk of misuse. The obvious question is, if Saudi Arabia is a nation for which we consider that there is no reasonable risk, what kind of situation, what kind of human rights record, must a country have to actually trigger the human rights safeguards of Canadian military export controls? We think Saudi Arabia, in terms of human rights, sets the bar impossibly low. In other words, if Saudi Arabia is deemed to be an eligible recipient of Canadian-made military goods, who would not be? Because it doesn't get much worse than the Saudi human rights record.
Mr. Epps: On the question of misuse and assessment, my understanding is that there's no formal procedure within the Export and Import Permits Act that is set up to establish misuse after the fact, which is why it's all the more important for risk assessment to occur beforehand, as my colleague has noted.
Much of the Export and Import Permits Act allows cabinet and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in particular, to set the standards for how the procedures will apply, and there's nothing that we've seen that indicates that there's a regular procedure for looking at potential misuse after the fact.
In the case of Saudi Arabia, for example, we're unaware that Canada has anything in place to look at, say, two or three years down the road, whether the vehicles are being used as was originally agreed to, for example.
Senator Ngo: If that's the case, then, as to the Export and Import Permits Act guidelines, following the review of 1996, should these guidelines be reviewed and perhaps even strengthened?
Mr. Epps: I would say the short answer is yes. The points I was raising in my opening remarks were specific areas where those guidelines need to be made much stronger than, in fact, guidelines.
To give one example, currently, there is a guideline that refers to UN arms embargoes as being one of the guidelines that is subject to the close control that Canada uses. In fact, that's not a guideline; it's a legal obligation. The UN Security Council arms embargoes legally oblige UN member states to adhere to the embargo. It should not be a question of close control; it should be a question of prohibition in the case of any equipment that would go to a country that is under a UN arms embargo. There are other guidelines that also need improving.
The context, I would say, is the pledge that the current government has made to accede to the Arms Trade Treaty. That is an opportunity to improve Canadian export control guidelines and legal requirements.
Senator Hubley: I apologize for being a little late this morning.
I think you mentioned that the prior assessment of risk would be one way of improving Canada's export controls. I'm wondering about the use of sanctions other than that or if sanctions are an effective way to produce changes in behaviour or policies to address human rights violations. Is there any way that we can qualify their effectiveness?
Mr. Jaramillo: Yes. In terms of your first point, the assessment of risk, I wouldn't frame it as an improvement, although it could be stronger. I wouldn't necessarily frame it as an improvement but rather as an existing obligation. What we have to remember, in the context of this Saudi arms deal, is that, although there is certainly room for improvement, as my colleague has pointed out, this is not a case of an absence of norms. There are existing norms in place, and the necessity to assess reasonable risk is not something that we aspire to. It's not rooted in wishful thinking but rather in the existing norms that are already in place that clearly say that, for military export to be authorized, the government must first determine that "there is no reasonable risk that the military goods might be used against the civilian population." Again, it's something that's already in place.
In terms of sanctions, yes, they have proven, in other contexts, to be effective, but, with the underlying premise that we're willing to proceed specifically with this arms deal, I don't see how there would really be an appetite for sanctions. Perhaps using this deal itself as leverage could be seen as a form of sanction, given the poor human rights situation in Saudi Arabia.
However, given widely known information, we are not exercising that option as a nation. We're proceeding with the deal, and there has been, even since the deal was formally announced over two years ago, a series of new relevant information related to Saudi Arabia, including mass executions, including the Saudi-led campaign in neighbouring Yemen, for which a UN panel has basically accused Saudi Arabia of war crimes and the systematic and widespread targeting of civilians in neighbouring Yemen. If that compelling and recurring evidence does not prompt us to even reconsider the authorization of the Saudi arms deal, I'm not too optimistic about the prospect for sanctions at this point.
Mr. Epps: If I could maybe add to that, Canada already has mechanisms available to impose sanctions on states that it views need to do that. There are two that come to mind. Under the Export and Import Permits Act, there is an area control list that can be established by an order-in-council. If a country is placed on that list, then all exports of any nature require export permits and all military exports are prohibited. That is a mechanism where Canada has to unilaterally put a country on a sanctions list.
Similarly, the Special Economic Measures Act also allows Canada to impose special measures which can include sanctions around, for example, military exports.
There are existing mechanisms that can be used.
Senator Nancy Ruth: Thank you for coming here today.
Project Ploughshares for decades has been an organization striving for peace. Is Canada a country striving for peace? I'm going to ask a variety of questions around this theme.
Is peace Canada's framework — that is, the place we start from when considering any matter, including economic levers? If it isn't, what needs to change and flow through to these more detailed decisions?
Do you agree that gender inequality is a better predictor of a state's peacefulness than other factors such as democracy, religion, GDP? Should Canada make gender equality an explicit criterion when it considers its actions with other countries?
That's my gender question, but I also want to know if there are other countries that use peace as their framework and that incentivize or disincentivize the military industry in terms of the arms trade. How have they gotten out of government supports to do that when they change their ideology to become a country of peace?
Mr. Jaramillo: Thank you for those very pertinent and thought-provoking questions.
First, is Canada striving for peace? As a nation, our ethos is a peaceful one and we generally strive for peace. However, I also believe that we do not live in a world where things are either black or white. They tend to be grey.
I will refer back to the Saudi arms deal. A case as egregious as the Saudi arms deal presents an opportunity for us, as a nation, to make a clear choice whether to stand on principle or to let commercial interests trump those principles.
This isn't your garden variety arms deal. This, as I said, is by far the largest in Canadian history. Saudi Arabia — and I emphasize this isn't my personal opinion but the authoritative opinion of every authoritative organization — is one of the worst human rights violators in the world. In a case as egregious as this, one doubts the current commitment to the promotion of peace and international human rights if we are to proceed with this deal.
I think a country could conceivably have an open debate and say that, as a nation, we do a balancing act and human rights are not paramount. They are malleable. When there are strategic interests and jobs at stake, we can cut corners. That's conceivable. Maybe as a nation we have an honest debate that we're comfortable with and say we do cut corners on human rights when jobs or strategic interests are at stake.
I find it a bit perplexing to simultaneously make the claim that the international protection of human rights is a paramount objective while at the same time selling weapons to this repressive regime.
I will give a concrete example. Earlier this year, on January 2, the Saudi regime executed more than 45 individuals. It was a summary execution. There were doubts about the transparency of that process and about the active killing of more than 45 individuals. Within two days the government condemned that execution and proceeded to say that we remain determined to ship weapons to the very regime that did those executions. We find that these are contradictory propositions.
I'm glad you raised gender equality, senator. Gender-based issues as they relate to conflict and violence are gaining more prominence. I'm not going to attempt a ranking of gender issues versus other considerations but I will say that they are clearly relevant. In the context of the Arms Trade Treaty, for example, the gender dimensions of violence and arms experts have gained a lot of prominence and are getting a lot of attention from civil society, governments, et cetera.
In Saudi Arabia, again, the gender issue is of particular concern to us because women are subjected to systematic discrimination. I gave a couple of examples in my opening remarks. Women cannot drive. Women cannot get a passport without a male guardian approving it. Women are subjected to conditions that we would find utterly intolerable here in our country, in Canada. Gender is certainly a consideration for us to make.
In terms of other countries, I would highlight that the debate that we're having here in this chamber, more generally over the past few months and a couple of years ago around export controls and the arms deal, is not exclusive to Canada. Other countries are having similar debates about the cause and effect relationship of arms exports. Things that arms exporting countries could get away with 10 or 20 years ago, they can't get away with now. There is a renewed awareness of that cause and effect relationship. Perhaps you could claim ignorance in the past about what's going on with these weapons we are exporting, but no longer — not in this era of the social media revolution, of Twitter, of Facebook and of 24-hour news cycles where you can literally see the effect of these vehicles.
I think it is in the context of that greater awareness that the Arms Trade Treaty came into being a couple of years ago. In the context of that greater awareness, we should hold our own Canadian standards and Canadian mechanisms to a higher standard and greater scrutiny when it comes to the arms trade.
Senator Nancy Ruth: Are there any countries that you would advise us to look at in how they have moved?
Mr. Jaramillo: I will give you a couple of specific examples. The Dutch Parliament recently passed a resolution concerning an arms embargo to Saudi Arabia. The European Parliament has a non-binding resolution but it has symbolic value. The European Parliament also passed a resolution concerning an arms embargo to Saudi Arabia and urged all its members to make it binding and to act on it.
Sweden cancelled existing contracts with Saudi Arabia after they had been authorized. Some media outlets, including The Globe and Mail, recently reported that the Swedes themselves say the cost of that decision has not been particularly high. It was just related to that particular deal in question as it relates to Saudi Arabia but otherwise they made a decision to stand on principle and to cancel that.
Cancelling an existing contract would not be without a solid legal footing or without precedent. The Arms Trade Treaty itself, which Canada intends to join, specifically urges state parties to cancel arms export authorizations even after they have been granted if new relevant information emerges. As I said a couple of minutes ago, after this deal was announced, there were several instances in which new relevant information has emerged. I hate to sound pessimistic but given the pattern of human rights violations of Saudi Arabia, it may be just a matter of time, and not long, before another set of new relevant information emerges that should prompt these sorts of authorizations to be revisited.
Senator Nancy Ruth: In these parliaments that have made these motions or taken these actions, have they also included criteria on which they will lift the ban for sale of arms and what the Saudis have to do to get them to trade with them again in military weapons?
Mr. Jaramillo: The message has never been for Canada or any other country that there should be a blanket prohibition on the arms trade or a categorical claim that the arms trade should stop all together. That's not our position from Project Ploughshares or other observers that I know of. It's leverage, which speaks to the topic of today's session. You use the leverage and if there are clear credible assurances about the end use of the military export, then the actual export could arguably proceed. What we don't know in the case of the Saudi arms deal is whether or not such assurances have been sought or received by the Canadian government.
Only recently, the Minister of Foreign Affairs visited Saudi Arabia for a meeting of the Gulf Council, and for other matters not all related to this deal. Ottawa's position, which it iterated over and over again, was that it was going to raise human rights concerns. To me, that sounds a little vague. We have raised concerns. Anyone can raise concerns. In fact, at the Human Rights Council in Geneva Canada has raised concerns in the past about specific areas related to the Saudi human rights record. On every single area that Canada has raised concerns, the Saudis have pointed to a worsening of the situation.
We don't need to raise concerns. We need concrete assurances to be sought and received.
Senator Nancy Ruth: Those assurances are not necessarily related to human rights. They are related to the use of the vehicles or the arms.
Mr. Jaramillo: Yes, they are related to the possibility that the vehicles might be used against civilians, not necessarily within Saudi Arabia's borders but in neighbouring countries. We have seen evidence of armoured vehicles crossing the border from Saudi Arabia into Yemen; and we have seen evidence of vehicles being used against civilians within Saudi Arabia. We need to seek assurances and remember who the ultimate recipient is: The Saudi Arabian National Guard, whose stated mandate is to perpetuate the existing regime and protect the ruling house of Saud AUD the centre of power.
In an Arab Spring kind of uprising, which is not a far-fetched notion as it has happened in neighbouring countries, it is not hard to fathom how these vehicles would be used. If the House of Saud were seen to be in peril, these vehicles would be used to fight off, crush and repress those eruptions of democratic cravings for reform.
Senator Ataullahjan: You just said a very interesting thing. I had another question but I have to ask another. You said ". . . the House of Saud . . . in peril." We keep hearing reports that Saudi Arabia is ready to explode but for the time being they're managing to control it. It's going to be the next place where it will be out of control and the House of Saud is having a hard time. We've seen that certain ministers have been changed and we've heard reports that the king is not in control and that the son is running everything. Can you clarify that?
Mr. Jaramillo: That's a relevant question. I'll start with an example in another country.
We'll look at Syria, the mess that it is today and how the West is left to pick up the pieces and deal with the debacle there. Sometimes I find it peculiar how we struggle to find the genesis of that. How could that happen? How could that pressure cooker have exploded? Why is there such chaos? I would invite honourable senators here to imagine what would happen if an Arab country had a similar uprising and it happened in Saudi Arabia. With Canadian-made vehicles, the response would be that much harsher and the consequences would be felt not only in the region but also in the world. One cannot predict.
The current king is in his 80s, so there will be some sort of transition of power in the relatively near future. We do not know how peaceful that transition will be; and different factions may be vying for power. Our fear or apprehension is that by arming this regime, we may be fueling an eventual eruption of democratic protests and uprisings.
Mr. Epps: I would add a historical overview of the patterns of the arms trade.
The largest recipient of weapons in the 1970s was Iran. The largest recipient of weapons in the 1980s was Iraq. Since then, Syria and Saudi Arabia have been very close to the top of the largest recipients of weapons; and Saudi Arabia currently is the largest recipient. There is a pattern we can look to as problematic that can inform where these things go and, if we aren't paying sufficient attention, where they will end up.
Senator Ataullahjan: Is the House of Saud in trouble? Are the reports exaggerated or is there a movement trying to rise up against the House of Saud?
Mr. Epps: To be honest, I can't speak to the political situation in detail in Saudi Arabia. What we have clearly is suppression of opposition to the House of Saud, particularly in response to the executions that occurred earlier this year. We know that those uprisings were suppressed and violence came out of that.
My view would be that it's evident that, internally, Saudi Arabia is not stable and that there may welcome a time, as my colleague mentioned, when there could be a major Syria-style civil war. That would be where we would be of particular concern as to where Canadian weapons are being used and how they are being used.
Senator Omidvar: This is very interesting testimony. Most of my questions were asked by Senator Nancy Ruth.
I'm troubled by the statements in your submission on the lack of controls, accountability, or possibly even knowledge within the brokerage industry. Even if a jurisdiction like Canada were to stop direct arms sales to a foreign jurisdiction, it is my suspicion that brokers would pick up the slack.
Can you think back in history and give us a sense of where Canada has suspended an arms trade agreement with a country because of human rights and whether in that case an arms broker stepped into the void legally or illegally and provided the desired goods?
Mr. Epps: As the Export and Import Permits Act is currently structured, there is no formal process for declaring when a country potentially could be sanctioned or come under an embargo. We do know of some cases where there have been de facto embargoes, and Pakistan is a good example.
We know that in 1998 or the late 1990s, when Pakistan tested a nuclear weapon, the response from Canada at the time was to stop conventional exports to Pakistan; and that has been consistent ever since. Canada has not exported military goods directly to Pakistan in all the intervening years.
There have been occasions when that has happened.
At the same time, there was some particular equipment embargoed by the U.S. We know F-16s that were, at one point, purchased by the Pakistanis eventually were delivered but for many years they were held back. There have been examples where other countries imposed embargoes, in particular cases where an agreement, like that for the F-16s, that has been stopped.
As I say, there isn't a lot of transparency around the Canadian process for doing this. The Area Control List that I mentioned earlier is one place where we know that if a country is placed on it, then it's under embargo by Canada, but Pakistan was never included. That was more of an informal process we found out about informally.
Your question is a good one but it's difficult to answer because there isn't the transparency to be able to assess the situation. The role of brokering remains, regardless of the embargoes, because so many brokers operate in the illegal arms trade.
One of the key goals of the Arms Trade Treaty and the article that deals with brokering is to try to address that problem. It is doing that by setting international standards for all countries to follow around registering brokers and having penalties in place if there are citizens or residents of particular countries that are involved in illegal brokering.
Senator Ataullahjan: You just raised a very important issue. What are the standards that we apply, in the case of Pakistan, if we impose sanctions on one country and not on another? Are there any standards?
Mr. Epps: Again, there is not a formal process for distinguishing countries by standards. The way that Canada currently decides the process for approving exports of military goods is a case-by-case process. The way it's supposed to work, as we understand it, is that the end user the country is looked at, as well as the kind of equipment. There may be instances, for example, where naval vessels might be approved for shipment to a particular country because they're used for protecting the borders or the coastline, but automatic firearms are not approved because they potentially could be used in human rights violations.
We don't have any details of that in the way that Canada reports on its exports of military goods. We do not know how those decisions were actually made. All we know is that the process is supposed to be case-by-case and is supposed to take into account a number of factors, including the guidelines that are in the Export and Import Permits Act.
Going back to a question raised by Senator Ruth, there are some tools that exist at the moment that I think Canada could make better use of to bring in higher standards and could actually allow for transparency in the process.
One of them is the Automatic Firearms Country Control List, which is also part of the Export and Import Permits Act. This is a uniquely Canadian instrument where Canada places on a list countries that are eligible to receive automatic firearms. Any country not on that list automatically is excluded from receiving automatic firearms.
It's transparent in the sense that we know who is on it and who is not, but the criteria for being placed on the list are part of a defence agreement between Canada and the recipient country. It does not deal with human rights, international humanitarian law, gender problems or gender violence, for examples, and it does not deal with many other criteria that are within the arms trade treaty.
One of the things Canada could do in the near term, for example, is to change the criteria — the Automatic Firearms Country Control List — to include more than just a defence agreement between Canada and the recipient state.
The Chair: We have about 10 minutes left and a second round with two senators on.
I was intrigued, Mr. Jaramillo, by the last paragraph in your opening statement and what you really meant by Canada valuing itself as a protector of human rights while providing arms to one of the most repressive regimes on Earth.
The implications you talked about will become apparent when Canada joins the arms treaty later this year, and you said it can also play a role in Canada's bid by the for UN Security Council seat. Canada is very anxious to return to the Security Council, so there are political games and friendships with countries from South America to Africa. There are interesting things happening as far as who will be on side and we know the kind of thing that goes at the United Nations in this respect, and sometimes that's troubling.
What do you mean by "play a role?" What kind of role? Will it hinder Canada's bid to get on the Security Council, or is this part of the bigger play?
Mr. Jaramillo: It's hard to say what role we will play, but my guess is this could hinder Canada's chances to get a seat on the coveted UN Security Council, and it goes back to the Arms Trade Treaty.
I think Canada is going to soon find itself in a very peculiar situation — if it is not in one already — where it will be sending a mixed message to the international community.
When Canada announced it would join the Arms Trade Treaty, it was an international public and legal commitment to pay close attention to the end use and end users of our military exports and to exercise more rigour, transparency and due process as those things relate to military exports.
At the same time, when we do join the Arms Trade Treaty we will be only at the early stages of the Saudi arms deal, which is expected to last until 2028. Between now and then, again, we will be sending a mixed message.
As we hope to join the UN Security Council — and the decision will be made while the deal with Saudi Arabia will still be in the implementation stage — I think that the greater salience and prominence of the human rights record of every country will play a role. Other nations will play close attention to that.
Senator Ngo: Thank you, chair.
Mr. Jaramillo, you talked about the age of the Internet and Facebook, and how it's very difficult to hide. I heard that some Internet filtering firms are making a lot of money by exporting military spyware that could allow the foreign government to (unintelligible). They tried to control the Internet through the legal and the regulatory framework by filtering the content and saying that was in the interest of enabling security.
Should Canada treat these exports of such Internet filtering and control systems in the same way as weapons or military assets, like LAVs, to those countries?
Mr. Jaramillo: The short answer is yes; the qualified answer is that this has a lot to do with the notion of dual use.
These web filtering technologies could potentially have benign uses as well. In a workplace environment, you don't folks to be on Facebook all the time, so you block certain sites.
At the same time, there is evidence in Yemen as recently as last year where people got a lot of information, for example, advance warning that an air strike was coming from the Internet about these particular technologies being used deliberately so people could not access that information in a timely fashion and seek shelter and be able to escape or avoid those incoming air strikes. That is obviously a use that we want to avoid.
The rigour should be the same or very similar to that applied by what we traditionally think of as conventional weapons. We're not saying all conventional weapons exports are necessarily wrong or to be prohibited. Again, it is a case-by-case analysis of the end use of the realistic end use and the reasonable risk that there may be misuse that should inform decisions of whether or not to authorize these exports.
I would add that already on the Export Control List software is a category. Again, it's not something that could be included. Perhaps further clarity could be added but today software is a category on the Export Control List.
Senator Ngo: If you say this is the case, then it will touch China, which is one of the major trading partners with Canada, and also Vietnam, which is in the TPP. Do you think this will affect our trade with those two countries?
Mr. Jaramillo: Sometimes the critics of some of these arms deals or those advocating for greater rigour and transparency is misrepresented in various circles. And some people ask whether we should only trade with countries that have a pristine human rights record or trade only with NATO allies, and the short answer is no. We're not saying that trade should only be with NATO allies or only with countries that have a pristine human rights record. We're saying military trade is a particularly sensitive area for obvious reasons so there is a need to assess the end user of these exports. Again, we think that the criteria of reasonable risk, if properly applied, would go a long way to prevent misuse of weapons. It is already there and it already part of the legislation, but unfortunately we feel that threshold of reasonable risk has not been properly applied.
Senator Nancy Ruth: I want to ask about what kind of incentives Canada gives to the Canadian arms business; what kind of tax breaks, what kind of economic loans to increase this industry? Are they different than other industries in Canada or is it just generally applied? Is there anything we should recommend against it?
Mr. Jaramillo: My colleague may want to add something, but I will say one thing just for clarity. The prime contractor in these arms export contracts is not the private firm. It's not, in the case of the Saudi arms deal, General Dynamics Land Systems, for example. It is a Crown corporation, which is a Canadian Commercial Corporation. Sometimes we've heard the argument from Ottawa that this is a private deal with a private company. It is not. It is a deal brokered by the Canadian Commercial Corporation.
I think my colleague can address it the latter part of your question.
Mr. Epps: To go further with the Canadian Commercial Corporation, the Canadian Commercial Corporation receives funding from Parliament for some of its budget so that could potentially be looked at as an oversight function of Parliament.
There are other mechanisms the Canadian government provides in support of the defence industry. One of the issues that arises here is that quite often the defence industry is included as part of the aerospace industry, so it's hard sometimes to distinguish the support used for purely civilian aerospace or to distinguish it even from military aerospace because one company is producing equipment for both markets. So it's a challenge to try to find out exactly the extent of subsidization of the industry that's exclusive to defence when aerospace and defence are often lumped together.
However, there are funds available that are often meant to be repayable loans but because of the terms of the loans they often aren't repayable. Then there's also support that comes in the form of assistance with booths at international defence shows.
The issue is not that this is unique to the defence industry, because Canada supplies similar support to many other industries, but it's the fact that often the support is for companies to go into markets where there are real concerns about human rights or about conflict or even about development issues and whether it's appropriate for a country to be spending restricted funds on military when there are many other development challenges.
Senator Omidvar: Today we focused on the export of arms as a contributor to human rights offences. If you were to go down the list to the next worst offender in terms of export commodity and human rights and its interplay with human rights abuses, what would that be?
Mr. Jaramillo: In terms of our recipient nations?
Senator Omidvar: Yes.
Mr. Jaramillo: There are many and not just currently but historically. First, this particular deal with Saudi Arabia is not unprecedented.
Senator Omidvar: Not Saudi, but the export of arms and their interplay with human rights. That's clearly the worst, but what exports are just below arms exports?
Mr. Epps: I would say dual-use goods. They aren't military goods but they are goods that can be provided to both military and civilian markets, and that includes the software. But it also includes many things that Canada is particularly good at, for example, aerospace equipment.
Mr. Jaramillo: On the dual use, it also includes uranium, which Canada has been under a nuclear corporation agreement with India, which has been selling and in fact contradicting the long-standing mantra that the trade in uranium should be reserved for states that are party to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, which India is not, yet we're engaging in trade in uranium which has obvious dual-use implications for its potential to be diverted for military purposes.
The Chair: As you can see, we're very interested in this subject. For the record, which of Canada's allies sell military equipment to Saudi Arabia, and are we in sync or out of step on this?
Mr. Jaramillo: It's not only Canada.
The Chair: The United States and so on.
Mr. Jaramillo: Right. The argument we have heard of "if we don't sell somebody else will" is not only devoid of any ethical considerations but I think it is becoming less and less valid. There is a clear difference whether or not we sell to Saudi Arabia. For one, we could be directly or indirectly involved in the violation of human rights, but also if we were to take a principled stand and not sell, it would put pressure on other countries that may be willing to sell to Saudi Arabia.
In terms of specific allies, I don't know if you can answer.
Mr. Epps: Basically European and U.S., many of our allies, but another important point here is that they are going through second thoughts about all those sales in the same way as Canada. This concern about Saudi Arabia is not unique to Canada; it's being raised in many other countries in Europe and even in the U.S.
The Chair: We want to thank you both. This has been enlightening for us. It's a good and credible start to this particular study.
Mr. Jaramillo: Thank you all for your attention.
The Chair: We are continuing our study dealing with the issue of the Export and Import Permits Act and the whole idea of how this affects human rights and how Canada sells arms to other countries. Of course, corporations are involved in this sort of thing. We mentioned before that we're the Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights. This is our first day of testimony on this particular subject. We heard very compelling testimony earlier from Project Ploughshares.
Our second panel I'd like to introduce is: Belkis Wille, Yemen and Kuwait Researcher, Middle East and North Africa Division, Human Rights Watch. Welcome. Dr. Andrea Charron, Assistant Professor and Deputy Director of the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at the University of Manitoba. In the interests of time, we have with us today Senator Ngo, Senator Ataullahjan, Senator Nancy Ruth and Senator Omidvar, and I'm Senator Munson. Because we went a little over time on the last one and would like to give you an hour before we go off to work in the Senate, I will open the floor to either one of you.
Andrea Charron, Assistant Professor and Deputy Director Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba, as an individual: Thank you to the honourable committee members for the invitation to speak to you today. My area of research interest is with respect to sanctions, and so my comments will be presented using the various regulations, measures and international organizations associated with sanctions as my lens to consider the machinery of government that may be applicable to promoting and enforcing Canada's international and national human rights obligations.
According to Global Affairs Canada, sanctions are: "Measures, including limitations on official and diplomatic contacts or travel, the imposition of legal measures to restrict or prohibit trade or other economic activity between Canada and the target state, or the seizure or freezing of property situated in Canada. In order to maximize the effectiveness of a sanctions regime, particularly one involving trade and economic measures, Canadian policy seeks to ensure that sanction measures are applied multilaterally whenever possible."
The UN Security Council, the European Union and various African regional organizations have all shifted their use of sanctions from exclusively addressing armed conflict and international instability to issues of governance, of which human rights is one example. As Canada has applied all mandatory UN sanctions, often matched EU sanctions and at least tracked African regional sanctions, our record of sanctions employment, reflective of geopolitical events, has also shifted from addressing armed conflicts to also addressing additional issues, such as support to terrorism and corruption of foreign officials.
That being said, Canada's use of sanctions has limited impact on the national and foreign policies of other states. The exceptions are trade embargoes and engagement with other international organizations that involve a full court press to make a particular human rights issue a cause célèbre, as was the case with apartheid and White minority rule in the 1970s and 1980s.
There are currently numerous examples of massive human rights abuses around the world, including in North Korea, Syria and elsewhere, that are the subject of sanctions, but the sanctions are linked to stopping other priority issues, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. Stopping human rights abuses, although implied, is not specified as subject to the sanctions. There is still value, however, for Canada to highlight the violations of international human rights law, if only to contribute to the creation of new norms of behaviour expectations via its regulations.
There are several means by which Canadian sanctions can be imposed, including via the United Nations Act, the Special Economic Measures Act, the Export and Import Permits Act, and the Freezing Assets of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act. Which of these tools is chosen is dictated primarily by the requisite sanctions authority, usually an organization to which Canada belongs, and not necessarily because of the transgression or the target in question.
Furthermore, sanctions can serve to signal, stigmatize, coerce or constrain but very rarely are they able to incentivize.
Next, the onus to give effect to sanctions is disproportionately placed on private companies and citizens. Finally, as Canada does not have extraterritorial reach, Canadian sanctions are applied against a Canadian connection or association with the target, not the target directly.
Therefore, if the promotion of human rights is a goal, there are already four challenges to consider. Number one, Canada never sanctions alone, and so other international organizations or likeminded states must be interested in sanctioning the same target or issue.
Number two, sanctions are able to highlight and decry violations of international law but are rarely able to motivate desired behaviour, such as active promotion of human rights. Lifting of sanctions is viewed by targets as an indication that they are engaging in more positive behaviour, but this is achieved by stopping the violation, not engaging in new behaviour.
Three, companies, banks and private citizens are the main subjects that give effect to Canada's regulations, not government. Therefore, the more vested interest these entities have to make human rights part of their business model, the more likely sanctions aimed at human rights will be given effect.
Number four, the assets, targets and property to be banned, seized or controlled must have a Canadian connection or association, and so rarely are the key human rights violators touched by Canada's employment of sanctions.
Furthermore, Canadian legislation preferences limiting the effect of export and import controls on Canada rather than on the target country. For example, the establishment of control lists under the Export and Import Permits Act stresses the need to consider security of Canada and supplies of goods within Canada. Government of Canada policies, however, can provide additional criteria, as is outlined in the Export Controls Handbook, which details objectives, including limiting the export of goods that may be used to commit human rights violations.
These are my opening comments. I look forward to your questions.
The Chair: Thank you, Dr. Charron. Ms. Wille, welcome to our committee. Go right ahead.
Belkis Wille, Yemen and Kuwait Researcher, Human Rights Watch: Thank you very much for having me and for this opportunity to speak with you all. For the purposes of time, I will limit my intervention to what we've seen happening in Yemen over the last year and the war that's taken place there. I've been covering Yemen for the past three and a half years, living there as a researcher for Human Rights Watch.
We've seen a war that has killed about 3,200 civilians. That's the minimum estimate. That's the number put forward by the United Nations. Sixty percent of those civilians have been killed by coalition air strikes. This is a Saudi-led coalition. The war room is in Riyadh, and the spokesman for the coalition is Saudi. Of these strikes that have taken place, we, as Human Rights Watch, have investigated 43 of those air strikes that we think are unlawful. Some of those are unlawful because they are indiscriminate, and some of those are unlawful because they are disproportionate. Those 43 air strikes killed just above 660 civilians, about 664, and wounded many hundreds.
Now, in addition to those air strikes, we've also been documenting the use of banned cluster munitions in Yemen. The Saudi-led coalition has been using banned cluster munitions across the North of the country. Saudi Arabia is not a member of the treaty banning the use of cluster munitions. However, it, like every other country in the world, is prohibited from using cluster bombs in or near civilian populated areas. We, as Human Rights Watch, have documented 16 cases in which the Saudi-led coalition has used cluster bombs in the middle of villages and in the middle of farming land. In those 16 cases, 19 civilians were killed, and 44 civilians were wounded.
In the context of these violations occurring, what we've seen on the side of the Saudi-led coalition is a resistance to make any results of investigations into these air strikes that look unlawful public. We've seen no commanders held accountable, as far as we know, and we've seen absolutely no compensation go to the civilians on the ground.
Now, in the context of these violations, countries across the world have been extremely concerned. We saw the European Parliament pass a resolution in March calling on all member states to put an arms embargo in place on Saudi Arabia, citing specifically the way Saudi Arabia has conducted this war in Yemen. Subsequent to that, we saw the Netherlands as the first country in the EU to put that into law. Their parliament passed the law with a complete arms embargo on Saudi Arabia, again, because of its carrying out of hostilities in Yemen.
We saw the Swiss government, only a month ago, block several million dollars in arms sales to several countries that are part of the coalition because they were specifically concerned that these arms might be used in Yemen.
Finally, we saw the announcement, over this past weekend, from the White House, saying that now they are stopping all cluster sales to Saudi Arabia, going forward, because they have used them in or near civilian populated areas in Yemen.
So, given the realities of this, given Canada's obligations not to become complicit in these IHL violations, not to want to be a part, I'm sure, of any violations including some that we think amount to war crimes, which we've documented in the context of this war, our concern is with the fact that, now, not only do you have what, for the last year, has been mostly an aerial campaign, but you now have ground troops that are mostly composed of Yemeni soldiers that were taken to Saudi Arabia and have been trained and armed by the Saudis. These are troops that are now coming back across the border and doing ground incursions, in several months, against the Houthis in Northern Yemen. These troops are being armed, as I said, by the Saudis, and they are using vehicles to cross the border. These are, again, provided by the Saudis.
The question is, what steps are in place and will be in place to ensure for these LAVs, where it looks very much like the sale will go forward? What steps are in place to make sure for these forces? Given the context of the war that we've seen, there's little reason to believe that there's no chance that they might commit violations. What steps are in place to ensure that they are not the ones to receive some of these LAVs?
I guess a real question is whether this deal, as it has gone through, has in place a robust monitoring mechanism that would allow Canada to be sure that the LAVs will not end up in the wrong hands and not be used in the wrong manner. This would include very clear stipulations of end use, again, to make sure that the LAVs are not used in a problematic manner.
The Chair: Thank you both for your presentations. We've learned so much in the last hour and a half. Some things we certainly didn't know. So we certainly have a lot of questions, and we'll have a conversation.
Senator Ngo: For each of you, I have one question. First, I would like to ask Dr. Charron, you mentioned sanctions. What kind of provisions in the Export and Import Permits Act could be utilized to employ sanctions? Do you think that this act could be amended to better protect our national interests and advance our human rights in other countries?
The question for Ms. Wille: As you know, Canada exports to Saudi Arabia LAVs worth $15 billion. Do you think that the proper evidence to measure human rights in these arms trade deals with Saudi Arabia is being considered? If not, what kind of risk assessment should we use in order to go ahead with this kind of export?
Ms. Charron: If sanctions have been called for, it's the requisite authority that determines which legislation Canada pulls off the shelf. If it's the UN Security Council, we use the United Nations Act. If it's another organization of which we are a member or if Canada has decided that the situation is of such a serious nature that we will apply sanctions, usually with a coalition of like-minded states, we use the Special Economic Measures Act.
For the Export and Import Permits Act, what it has is the Export Control List, and there are various categories of control lists for things like arms and military equipment, but even things like dairy products. You name it. It's an extensive list. From the Export and Import Permits Act, though, there's something called the Area Control List, which has been used from time to time. When a state is put on that list, anything that goes to it or from it has to be monitored by Canada. We haven't put very many countries on that list. Currently, we have North Korea and Belarus, but the latter will soon be off the list.
So really the starting question is: What other organizations and like-minded states are calling for the sanctions? Canada is lucky in that we have a number of standing pieces of legislation we can pull out and then craft regulations to give the sanctions effect.
Ms. Wille: The evidence that's being considered here in Canada I don't have an intimate knowledge of but from my understanding, what's being used, let's say, as evidence to perhaps raise concerns about this arms deal going forward is things like YouTube videos and photos that have surfaced showing, for example, the Houthis in Yemen with Canadian snipers. If there were photographic or video evidence of these LAVs being used in an improper manner, it would be the evidence that would be used. The problem is that from my understanding the Canadian standard is risk. If we're talking about risk, then what we already see in the context of this conflict and in terms of the Saudis arming troops crossing the border, the standard of risk is already clearly being met.
If one is simply waiting for evidence to emerge on the Internet through videos or photographic evidence, then one is waiting for these events to happen but by then it's too late.
Senator Nancy Ruth: The 1986 cabinet document that's always being referred to is obviously not good enough for today. One of my concerns about it, and I need correction if I misunderstood, is that it focuses on what's happening inside the importing company, for example in Saudi rather than what that country is doing in Yemen or someplace else. Is that correct?
Ms. Wille: I'm not Canadian or intimately knowledgeable but I have seen the memorandum for action to the foreign minister with regard to the sale of LAVs. In these documents several times it mentions that sales of these LAVs would be relevant to bringing stability in Yemen. It looks very much like this sale is intended for these LAVs to be used not only inside Saudi Arabia but also across the border in Yemen.
Senator Nancy Ruth: What could this committee recommend to improve that document of the 1986 measure?
Professor, do you have any comment on that?
Ms. Charron: Not particularly on that but to be fair, I don't think I answered your question very well so I'll try to link the two.
There's always a balance to be struck with trying to be too prescriptive with our legislation to match the events that are happening today because they may then miss the mark on future events. One thing Canada can be proud of is generally how we craft our standing legislation and the means by which we create the regulations, which are usually models for other states. We are fortunate that we have such flexibility.
The Export Act, the Special Economic Measures Act and the United Nations Act try to give credence to the spirit of why the sanctions are being imposed; but sanctions are a very dull tool. While we would like them to be a lightning bolt or smoking gun or a button you push to make situations go away instantly, that's not the way sanctions work.
Senator Nancy Ruth: The armed conflict in the world is increasing and civilians are getting murdered all the time. New forms of conflict demand innovative responses. First, what responses are available to Canada that do not involve the sale of military goods and technology, if any?
Second, should Canada make gender equality an explicit criterion when it considers its action with respect to other countries, both in terms of arms trade or other trade or anything else?
Ms. Wille: I'm happy to address what you have just raised. On your former question, one thing I understand about the Canadian legislation on this is that it has a specific provision that speaks to exporting to countries that are imminently going to be engaging in an armed conflict. This legislation was drafted at a time when almost all conflicts were interstate.
The idea that this would be linked to weapons only being used in the purchasing country wouldn't make much sense and then have the secondary provision about this imminence of entering into armed conflict with another state.
In terms of what Canada can do beyond arms sales, first let's look at the arms sales and ask what we can do in that context. They can be used as extremely powerful leverage. This and other sales are a very strong opportunity for a country like Canada to say to Saudi Arabia, "We're under an extreme amount of scrutiny and pressure because of the fact that in the last year we've seen such horrific abuses carried out by the coalition. In order for this deal to go ahead as planned, we need to start seeing something from you. We need to see transparent investigations that meet international standards and if a violation is found, that those in command are held accountable and that a clear compensation scheme is put in place for the victims and their families." This is the main thing we want to see these arms sales being used for, and this is a powerful way of doing that.
There are other ways for Canada to be engaged more actively in the Yemeni peace process, one being to ensure stability in Yemen. If that's ultimately the aim of this, as it says in this memorandum, it would be another way to be engaged rather than selling arms to Saudi Arabia that might end up in Yemen.
On your question of whether gender equality should be taken into account I think that question is more for Canadians and whether that should be included.
We have called for this restriction of arms to be put in place on Saudi Arabia specifically because of the widespread or systematic abuses that we've seen in the context of this war in Yemen. We're focusing on that as opposed to the serious violations throughout society in Saudi Arabia, particularly with regard to gender discrimination.
Ms. Charron: That's a really tough question. Generally, it would be wonderful if we could link gender diversity to all policies that Canada undertakes. If we're looking at something like sanctions, that may happen later on down the road but for now sanctions are a coercive tool on par with the use of force. We're starting to see different organizations use sanctions to not only try to stop immediate conflict but also to add other issues of governance, promotion of democracy and perhaps human rights.
We're finding that sanctions may go some ways to stopping particular activities, but there are not very good at encouraging the sort of deep infrastructure and constitutional changes that states need to really make things like gender diversity an everyday part of the machinery of government, as opposed to a tick in the box to say, "Phew, we got rid of those sanctions." It may happen in the future but that's not the case now.
Also, I would say that often there are unintended consequences with trying to apply sanctions that deal with issue only to find that it creates a whole host of other problems. I point to, for example, when we had sanctions against southern Rhodesia, that spurred factories in Rhodesia to get their act together and become economically independent, in which case the sanctions had less and less effect.
In the case of Libya, when an arms embargo was put in place in 2011, there were discussions about how we only meant the arms embargo to apply to certain individuals, and not everyone. Do we remove or skirt the sanctions? What do we do? Canada, as part of the NATO coalition, was part of that conversation.
Senator Nancy Ruth: Given the new forms of conflict that exist, are there any innovative responses available to Canada besides the sale of military goods and technology?
Ms. Charron: I think so. Having students come and study in Canada and having cultural events are a couple of the many things that Canada can do. It's usually not just one tool that will make a change. It is a whole host of them.
Senator Nancy Ruth: So, there is education. What else?
Ms. Charron: There is education, cultural exchanges and keeping Canada the open society it is so people can use it as a model. It's trying to be as consistent, open and transparent with decisions that are made, again, to create a model for others.
The Chair: It's a two-way street, though, isn't it? Canadian universities and colleges are operating in Saudi, where we talk about all these restrictions that are in place. Should we do that? Algonquin College in Ottawa has prided itself on having programs in universities in Riyadh. Should we keep that system going when we talk about this repressive regime?
Ms. Charron: To play devil's advocate, the Saudis could say, "Look at your history of treatment of indigenous peoples," so it's better to engage. One of the things we have found is that when we try to isolate states and tell them we're kicking them out of polite society and interactions with international organizations, they tend to turn to more nefarious activities. Then, they don't get the benefit of seeing what it's like to be part of the international community and striving for these various goals.
It's not a coincidence that the worst human rights abusers are the first to sign on to human rights treaties. They want to be seen to be part of the international community, but we can't just let them sign on and then not follow the requirements outlined in the treaties.
Senator Ataullahjan: Thank you for your presentations. Ms. Charron, in our Human Rights Committee we recently had an Iran accountability week. We heard that sanctions can sometimes be ineffective because they hurt the most vulnerable and not the people in power, who are committing most of the human rights abuses. Is there any way we can ensure that we don't inadvertently hurt the vulnerable?
Ms. Charron: You're not unique in thinking this. The UN Security Council was actually the first to realize that the sanctions it was putting in place, especially what we used to call "comprehensive sanctions" against Haiti, the former Yugoslavia and the Balkans, were mostly harming innocent civilians, and not the peace-spoilers whom they were after.
In the case of Iran, there has been a debate about getting that balance between targeting the elite decision makers while not harming individual citizens. We can try via targeted sanctions and providing exceptions for foodstuffs and medical supplies, but the one piece we have little control over and can have one of the biggest consequences is the government that's in place — whom we are targeting — which can manipulate the sanctions any way they want.
We saw this with Iraq and the Oil-for-Food program. Hussein was a master of making sure his people felt the full thrust of the sanctions and then turning it around to blame it on all the sender states.
We can try via this movement towards targeted sanctions, but the piece of the puzzle we don't have control over is how they are perceived in the sender state and what happens there.
Senator Ataullahjan: Iran and Saudi have regional objectives in that area. We know they have been engaged in a Cold War for some time now, and the Saudi intervention was brought about by perceived Iranian influence in Yemen.
Is the conflict in Yemen giving al-Qaeda a foothold there? Saudi has not used its own troops; they seem averse to using their ground troops, and are trying to get other Muslim countries involved. Some did, and some refused.
Did Saudi overestimate the power of Iran, and Iran's influence in that region? We know of the hatred that these two countries have for each other. We've seen it at the pilgrimage: the Iranians always demonstrate, there have been issues with Iranian pilgrims and for the first time, we're seeing that Iran is not letting any of its people go to Mecca for pilgrimage. There is a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran being fought in Yemen.
Ms. Wille: I am glad you asked whether we can reduce what happens in Yemen to a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Unfortunately, that's the lens most media outlets have put on it, and I also think Saudi Arabia has perpetuated that, and to a certain extent, other countries involved in supporting the coalition have put that gloss on it.
It is extremely important to understand the roots of the conflict in Yemen and to understand the Houthis and who they are. They are Zaidi, a branch of Islam very different from the one in Iran. Historically, the Zaidis make up 38 per cent of Yemen's population and felt closer in terms of their faith and sharing mosques and other procedures with the Sunni population.
Unfortunately, it was only post-2011, particularly with the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood party in Yemen, that their politicians used a lot of nasty sectarian language, saying the Zaidis are Shia. Between that and the very nasty wars that the Yemeni government fought against the Houthis between 2004 and 2009, the Houthis were marginalized. Iran did reach out and provide support as far as we know, most of which came in the form of bringing Houthis to Iran and giving them training; whether it religious, political or military is a little less clear.
Subsequently, there is very little clarity as to whether any money has gone from Iran to support the Houthis. The bulk of what the Houthis have been using to support this fight is the finances of former president Saleh, who was in power for 33 years until 2011. He pilfered from the state for many years of his time in power, and that's the money that has been driving this conflict on the Houthi side. The weapons they have been using are, to a vast extent, the arsenal of the Yemeni military and these are the weapons you see on the actual battle feel.
As the conflict has continued we've seen more very small weapon shipments intercepted, coming from Iran. It's interesting to see that at the beginning of the conflict, fewer weapons were coming and it has been increasing as the conflict has gone on.
The important thing the Houthis' agenda, and why they came to take control of the capital in September 2014, is the fact that their ancestors were the rulers of northern Yemen for 1,000 years until the 1960s and they very much feel that it is their country and land. They were battered in these wars again them, and now they see this as their opportunity.
As much as they are happy to take support and assistance from another country, it's very much their own agenda.
The Saudis do and did feel, particularly in the context of the Iran nuclear deal, like Iran was winning in the Persian Gulf — in their backyard — and felt uncomfortable with that. Ultimately, if one wants to reduce it, the Yemen war was very much the price they demanded, particularly from the United States, which was they would get a blank cheque on Yemen, and keep getting arms in order to feel safe.
This is borne out when you look at Saudi commentary. You even see that the Saudis say the point of intervening in Yemen was to pre-empt influence from Iran. So they've even been very careful about not saying that it simply is a proxy war with Iran because they acknowledge this.
The other thing that I think really drove Saudi Arabia to react as strongly as it did and start bombing Yemen when the Houthis came into power was the reality that there are so many demographic concerns that Saudi Arabia has internally, including the fact that 75 per cent of its population is under 25, high unemployment within that category of the population and part of that population is Shia, is marginalized, and their concern about what this part of the population would feel and would they feel empowered and take to the streets when they see that in their neighbouring country of Yemen this Houthi group was able to take control of the capital.
Finally, on the question of al Qaeda, unfortunately al Qaeda, in this vacuum, though they had been pushed back from taking territory since 2011, over the last year has gained mass territorial expanses.
Over the last two months we've finally seen the United Arab Emirates and America doing a push to conduct more drone strikes and the UAE to actually carry out air strikes against AQ targets, but broadly speaking over the last year the advances by al Qaeda have been unparalleled and AQ has been able to benefit from weaponry coming into the country and money coming into the country in the fight against the Houthis. Ultimately they were the best organized from the beginning of the conflict and were able to take advantage of that by meeting the needs on the ground of fighting the Houthis.
Senator Ataullahjan: Is Saudi Arabia losing influence in Yemen?
Ms. Wille: It's hard to know what's going to play out at the end of this conflict. It's hard to predict whether Saudi Arabia will have lost influence, though until the transitional process undergone from 2012 until this conflict began, so 2012 to 2014, until then Saudi Arabia generally speaking had a very firm hold on politics in Yemen, paid off tribal leaders to ensure they had the tribal assurances and allegiances they needed and was able to essentially control their backdoor neighbour. And the transitional period allowing more players at the table and a push for a federalist model meant they would potentially have less influence and, again, it's really going to depend on how the chips fall at the end of this conflict.
Senator Omidvar: This is fascinating and we could stay in that region but I want to bring the discussion back to Canada.
Professor Charron, you point out something very interesting: It is Canada's companies, banks and private citizens that give expression to our regulations and making human rights part of their business model is an effective way of promoting our human rights agenda.
What is the record of Canadian banks, private citizens and companies in this field? We know that our resource industry has been in the news because of human rights infringements in parts of the world. Perhaps you can give us a lens on that question.
Ms. Charron: It's not very studied. If you look at the literature on how many people are actually tracking Canada's use of sanctions it's very small. It's an area we need to expand. I know from the perspective of banks it can be extremely onerous to try and keep up, not only with additional sanctions that Canada puts in place but then the sanctions Canada is obligated by international law via organizations like the United Nations.
For example, right now, we have 13 sanctions regimes in place because of UN Security Council mandate measures, and then we have an additional nine via the SEMA of the ACL and other Canadian measures. That means Canadian banks have to constantly make sure that they are not in violation of those sanctions so that if a name is listed they have to make sure they seize the assets of that individual. However, our definition of assets could be different from the definition of assets according to the United Nations.
Considering that banks have literally millions of clients, it is a very onerous task to make sure that they're complying with that. They do so because they have to by international law. We can change our sanctions measures to try to keep up to date, but you can imagine that it is an onerous task for smaller organizations to keep up with the litany of information and tweaks.
I don't know how much it's costing banks and institutions. I'm not sure we necessarily want to know that figure. But it is up to them to give effect to the sanctions.
The Chair: I find it amazing that we keep referring to this 1986 document and I keep thinking it's 2016. That's 30 year ago and what has changed? It is our understanding and yours I think that the cabinet guidelines we're talking about require examination of risk to a country's civilians but not civilians in other countries. For example, as we're dealing with what you were talking about and the Saudi actions against Yemeni civilians, we need a recommendation that we want to tell government it is 2016, not 2015, as was said by the Prime Minister.
How could we go about doing this and what would you recommend in this regard for Canada to step up a bit more? The world is a different place from what it was in 1986. Perhaps you would like to answer.
Ms. Wille: I think one key thing that we're honing in on is this issue of not being territorially bound to the country in question that's doing the purchasing. Again, this is arms and if the country in question is going to war interstate, the idea is that the arms would potentially be used in another country and in a country like Saudi Arabia, which has shown an interest and willingness to be more active across the Gulf in military intervention. You have a reality in which weaponry going to them is likely to be used not in the territorial bounds of Saudi Arabia but externally by Saudi forces or by forces that Saudi Arabia is arming and supporting. So I think it's extremely important that that's a taken into account.
The other thing that I think would be great to see is a much clearer idea or framework laid out of what mechanisms are required in order to monitor these concerns. Again, if deals are going to be green-lighted, if they are going to go through, what constitutes proper monitoring that would allow the continuation of such contracts or the stopping of such contracts? If it's simply a matter of waiting for videos on YouTube to surface, or photos, I don't think that is enough to say Canada is doing due diligence.
I think Canada would need to be doing a lot more in order to avoid potential complicity and in order to be able to say to the Canadian people they did everything they could to make sure these arms were being used in the way they were meant to and not in any other way.
Ms. Charron: Our regulations act as a filter for what can come in and out of Canada, so to try to foresee what may happen three, four or five months, let alone years down the road is difficult. One idea in the past has been something like end-user certificates and this was used in the case of the Kimberley Process to try and clean up the diamond industry. What we've learned from that is it has to make business sense. If it makes business sense, then it has a chance of holding. The trick is to create conditions so that it makes business sense for arms industries to comply with Canada's regulations and to continue to be in the business of making arms and equipment, because Canada needs that, our allies need that and our police forces need that. It doesn't make sense to say we will ban that kind of industry but it has to make business sense.
For instance, the Kalashnikov company, which is famous for its rifle, now realizes it's not making the money it used to in gun sales and it's now making cargo pants. Businesses make those kinds of strategic decisions all the time. But it cannot come from one tool and dictated down. It has to take many organizations, governments and businesses all working together to say, "This has to make sense for all of us;" and that's difficult.
Senator Ngo: You just mentioned that Canada can use many tools for sanctions, such as the United Nations Act and so on. Can the Export and Import Permits Act be used to extend sanctions? What system do we have in place to ensure that Canadian sanctions on importation and exportation are effective?
Ms. Charron: On your first question, the Export and Import Permits Act is not used for sanctions, per se, other than the area control lists article within it. The SEMA is the more appropriate tool. The Export and Import Permits Act can act like a form of sanction in that we do have these export lists to control goods that are leaving Canada. All sorts of goods have Export Control Lists, so if we try to change the EIPA to be too prescriptive in one category, then that legislation may not work for the other categories we have. There's always a fine balance.
If we make our legislation so complicated that public servants spend nothing but their time trying to come up with new ways to make the legislation work, then it creates incentives to go around the legislation. That's always something we have to be wary of. Can you repeat your second question, with my apologies?
Senator Ngo: What systems are in place right now to ensure that Canadian sanctions on importation and exportation are effective?
Ms. Charron: Our Border Services Agency monitors things that come in and go out. A large part of the onus is on companies to make sure that they have the necessary permits as per the Export and Import Permits Act to send out goods that may be under either sanctions or may be on one of these standing export lists. It's just eye-watering when you try to look at all the different permutations. That's why companies are investing more and more in lawyers to try to help them navigate through the various pieces of legislation out there.
Senator Ngo: Can an example like software be considered in the arms sales category?
Ms. Charron: I'm not an expert on the Export and Import Permits Act, but Group 1 is Dual Use Lists, Group 2 is Munitions List, and there're some for nuclear; and Group 5 is Miscellaneous Goods and Technology. Perhaps that's where software would fall, but I'm not a trade lawyer. That's a question for Global Affairs.
The Chair: We have one of those hind-sight questions, which I neglected to ask of Project Ploughshares. To get your perspectives, should the Trudeau government have moved along on this whole issue of these LAV sales to Saudi Arabia or should they have sat back and said "Hold on; let's have a real look at this and put a stop to it"? I know people in this country talk about the economy and the jobs that happen in southwestern Ontario audit how important they are; but from your perspective, should this deal continue to go through, as it looks like it will?
Ms. Charron: At times like this I'm really glad I'm not a politician because this is why they get paid the big bucks.
This is a tough question. We are talking about billions of dollars, and Canada's economy is struggling. This is helping a Canadian company, and we need that Canadian company to do well because it can't survive on the Canadian market alone. We want to keep those skills and those jobs. Due process was done. The understanding was that Saudi Arabia was not going to use the LAVs to violate human rights. It met the terms of our legislation so a decision was made to let it go ahead.
Now, does it pass the smell test? Canadians will debate that. From what we have in front of us, they seem to have checked off the boxes. This is the grey area, which is why we have elected officials to make these decisions for us.
Ms. Wille: At the time this deal was initially struck, things did look different. What you would need to talk about is how the world in that neighbourhood looks right now and how Saudi Arabia's engagement looks today in the context of a new government in place here — a government that has chosen to put human rights front and centre and a government that has taken such incredible positive measures in many other domains — and in the context of this war in Yemen, which has seen Saudi Arabia at the helm of a coalition carrying out such horrific abuses to the point that many other countries, as I've pointed out, have been deciding to put in place complete arms embargoes. Under that lens, it would have been much wiser for the foreign minister to say that now is not the time for us to go through with this because, again, the standard for Canada is risk; and the risk is there.
We need to take a step back and talk to Saudi Arabia about what we would need to see in place in terms of end-use assurances and a robust mechanism of monitoring in order to continue to keep this deal on track and to actually put that signature on the page and green-light it. Unfortunately, that simply isn't what happened.
The Chair: We thank you both very much. This has been an incredible two hours of information for our study. It was Senator Ngo's idea to start this, and we hope to have recommendations. We are senators who have an independent point of view. We're independent and from different parties; but normally, we come to a consensus. You've added great valuable insight for our decisions and recommendations, so we thank you very much.
The meeting is adjourned.
(The committee adjourned.)